2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › The
Supreme Court of Minnesota 12. “State v. Hohenwald”; A10-1986; July 11, 2012; Lexis //BY
With regard to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, the definite article "the" is a word of limitation that indicates a reference to a specific object. The definite article "the" particularizes the subject which it precedes. "The" is used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified persons or things Applying the word "the" as a word of limitation, Rule 20.01 requires the suspension of the proceedings in the then-existing case in which the court orders the suspension, not in an unspecified or indefinite number of cases. The word "the" is a word of limitation, not a word of indefinite or generalizing force. If the drafters of the criminal rules intended to suspend all proceedings brought against a particular criminal defendant, including those not yet in existence, they could have easily used words to that effect by suspending "all criminal proceedings" or "any criminal proceedings." Thus, the most natural reading of Rule 20.01 is that it requires district courts to suspend the proceedings in only the particular case in which it orders the suspension, not in all prospective actions that could possibly arise during the period of suspension.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › In
Scalia ’12 [Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner; 2012; Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States; American lawyer, lexicographer, and teacher; Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, “Ordinary-Meaning Canon,” Ch. 6]
Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.
“The enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › 2ac---t “the”
Overlimiting---excludes swaths of the collaboration lit base
Aff ground---country pics decimate the topic, exclude discussion of NATO
Precision---cites 6th circuit decisions AND dictionary which is good for plain meaning reasons
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › 2ac---t “the”
John M Borky 9-9-2018, "Protecting Information with Cybersecurity," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7122347//DG
In dealing with cybersecurity, risk management is focused on protected assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and risk mitigation using security controls. It begins with risk identification and analysis, which then supports selection of security controls to achieve an acceptable risk level. This, in turn, is the basis for securing approval to operate the system. Accordingly, risk analysis is an essential component of defining security policy and requirements. The goal is to apply security controls intelligently to mitigate the most important risks while preserving an operationally effective, affordable, and supportable system. Risk management continues over the life of a system to deal with changes to the system itself and with the emergence of new vulnerabilities and threats.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: T › T The = All of Nato › 2ac---t “the”
Cullen ’52 [Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Commissioner, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, November 13, 1952, Riehl et al. V. Kentucky unemployment compensation commission; the judgment is affirmed. Rehearing denied; COMBS, J., and SIMS, C. J., dissenting, ]
We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It is our opinion that the key word in the statute is the word 'in,' preceding the words 'each of three calendar quarters', and if the word is accorded its ordinary and common meaning, the statute does not require simultaneous employment. According to Webster's New International Dictionary, the word 'in,' used with relation to a period of time, means 'during the course of.' The same meaning, expressed in another way, would be 'within the limits or duration of.' Employing this meaning, the statute says that an employer is subject to the Act if, during the course of, or within the limits or duration of each of three calendar quarters, he had in covered employment four or more workers, to each of whom the required amount of wages was paid. This clearly means that the employment need not be simultaneous. Obviously, the word 'in' does not mean 'throughout' or 'for the entire period of,' because then there would be no point in adding the requirement of the payment of a minimum of $50 in wages. In these times, no worker employed for a full calendar quarter would be paid less than $50 in wages. The appellant seeks to read into the statute the words 'at the same time,' following the words 'had in covered employment'. There is no justification for this, unless the word 'in' means 'during any one period of time in.' We are not aware of any authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word 'in'.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Uniqueness CP
Jensen 7-15 [Stephan Jensen, former Officer in the Norwegian Army; 6-16-2022; "If Europe Wants Peace, It Must Prepare for More War"; Quillette; https://quillette.com/2022/07/15/if-europe-wants-peace-it-must-prepare-for-more-war/; KL]
Should NATO not receive the necessary upkeep—whether through the US stepping back or European countries failing to re-build their militaries in the near future—a number of unfortunate scenarios become more likely. First and foremost, Russian aggression beyond Ukraine is entirely dependent on Putin or his successor believing they might be successful. This is a situation which only becomes possible if Europe fails to adequately rebuild its militaries.
Other threats might also emerge. If NATO ceases to be a powerful alliance, Erdoğan, for example, might gravitate away from it and towards Russia and China instead. This is especially worrisome as Turkey has revanchist claims on territory in Greece, a fellow member of NATO. Orbán, too, has prevaricated about whether Hungary’s place is with the EU and NATO or Putin’s Russia. If a realignment was accompanied by Russia finally succeeding in Ukraine—a scenario which becomes far more likely if Western support begins to fall away—NATO-members Bulgaria and Romania could quite literally be “boxed in” by Russia, Turkey, and Hungary.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Türkiye PIC
Coşkun 22 [Alper Coşkun; senior fellow within the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, especially in relation to the United States and Europe; 5-12-2022; "Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/making-new-u.s.-turkey-strategic-mechanism-meaningful-pub-87117; KL]
As the war between Russia and Ukraine grinds on and as the need to maintain a united front against Moscow grows, Turkey and the United States are seeking to put their long-troubled relationship on a better path. The new U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism, announced in early April 2022, is a promising (but tentative) step forward.
The mechanism grew out of an understanding reached between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Joe Biden during their meeting on the margins of the October 2021 G20 summit in Rome. Though the idea is said to belong to Biden, the U.S. readout after the meeting lacked any reference to the mechanism, whereas it was the highlight of the Turkish narrative. This difference in emphasis initially triggered rumors that the United States might be dragging its feet.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Türkiye PIC
Kara 22 [Mehtap Kara, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University; 6-13-2022; "Turkish-American strategic partnership: is Turkey still a faithful ally?"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2022.2088081?journalCode=fbss20; KL]
American analysts have also raised the question of Turkey’s expulsion from NATO (Carpenter 2019). The suspension of membership rights or the explosion of a member is not clearly stated in NATO’s founding treaty. Turkish policymakers do not consider unilaterally withdrawing from NATO’s collective security umbrella due to its troubled neighbourhood and history with its current allies, Russia and Iran. However, the escalating tension between the US and Turkey and restrictions on security and defence alliance are likely to isolate Turkey from NATO activities. Several NATO allies, including Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and Canada, have already announced that they have suspended the sale of military equipment to Turkey (BBC News 2019b). After the UK, another NATO member Canada also decided to suspend exports related to drone technology to Turkey on the basis that Turkey provided these technologies to Azeri forces during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Reuters 2020). The US Ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, underlines that Russia is trying to flip a key member of NATO, and Russia would be one of the main beneficiaries of the destabilization of the alliance and Turkey’s expulsion (Hurriyet Daily News 2018). Turkey was always seen valuable ally and indispensable member of NATO because of its geostrategic significance and military capabilities. It has been argued that alienating Turkey from NATO is not possible for these reasons, but there has been an ongoing Western effort to develop alternative options for Turkey by promoting closer cooperation with Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania (Idiz 2021). With increasing isolation from NATO, Turkey would continue strengthening its military ties with Russia. Erdoğan has already confirmed that Turkey will jointly produce S-500 defence systems with Russia (Reuters 2019). He underlined that ‘if the US. refuses to sell F-35 fighter jets, then Turkey turns to other options’ (Hurriyet Daily News 2019b). Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program might likely force Turkey to look for other options, possibly Russian Su-34 and Su-57 fighter jets (Groll and Seligman 2019). In this case, Turkey’s over-reliance on Russia will reduce its capacity to formulate independent foreign policies and pursue its national interest. Russia is increasingly becoming Turkey’s neighbour, which might be a problem for Turkey in the mid-to-long term.5 Turkish policymakers are aware of this dilemma, and instead of opting for Russian jets (compensate F-35), in October 2021, Turkey has requested to buy 40 new F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernization kits for its existing air forces from the US (Pamuk and Stone 2021). The American attitude will be decisive in Turkey’s return to the Western fold or further isolation from the alliance.
Following the American withdrawal and Turkish military incursions in Syria, French President Emmanuel Macron criticized the lack of coordination between NATO allies. He expressed his frustration by stating that NATO is experiencing ‘brain death’ (Solletty 2019). Biden calls for a renewed commitment to multilateralism and strengthening the transatlantic ties that were weakened during Trump’s America first policy. Pentagon defines the current security environment by identifying China as a ‘pacing challenge’ within the strategic competition, whereas Russia has been identified as a significant but ‘lesser threat’ to US interests and security (Vergun 2021). The Biden administration re-embraces the ‘pivot to Asia’ rhetoric introduced by the Obama administration in 2011, referring to the development of a grand strategy to deal with the North Korean threat and China (Manyin et al. 2012). However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that currently, Russia poses a greater risk to the rule-based international system, and the American pivot will be towards Russia and Europe. Strengthening transatlantic ties is not possible without taking Turkey back from Russia. Turkey, NATO’s second-largest army and third most populous member, has a geostrategic significance due to its proximity to Russia and the Middle East. It would help limit Russian expansion in several regions, including the MENA, Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Therefore, bringing back Turkey to the Western camp is important to contain the US adversaries in multiple regions since Turkey actively fought on the opposing side of Russia in those regions. Turkey actively has pursued increasingly military engagement abroad; it has launched four major military operations in Syria, deployed military troops in Qatar and Somalia, introduced the Blue Homeland doctrine, and expanded its defence exports. Turkey’s indigenous unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) capabilities are an element of Turkey’s changing defence and security policies, as its drone capabilities are progressing rapidly. Israel was the main contractor supplying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to the Turkish military (Defense Industry Daily 2011). However, with the flotilla crisis in 2010, Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations collapsed, and Turkey has started to focus on developing its domestic drone program UCAV fleet known as the Bayraktar TB2. The Bayraktar TB2 has been operative since 2015 and became a valuable strategic asset in Turkey’s counterterrorism operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, Syria and Libya. In recent years, Turkey’s drone power gained attention internationally. The Bayraktar TB2 armed UAVs significantly contributed to Azerbaijan’s victory (Kınık and Çelik 2021), and Ukraine has been relying on Turkish-made drones to target Russian targets (Forrest and Malsin 2022), which implies the possibility that Turkey’s indigenous, but ambitious defence industry can be used to balance against Russia.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Türkiye PIC
Rogin 22 [Josh Rogin; Washington Post columnist; 6-30-2022; "How a thaw with Turkey could help Ukraine win the war"; Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/30/biden-erdogan-thaw-turkey-help-ukraine-against-russia/; KL]
At this week’s NATO summit, President Biden met for the first time in a year with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, setting aside his long-standing issues with the Turkish leader. But Turkey continues to play both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. If the United States is now willing to deal with Ankara, the next deal should center on persuading Erdogan to side with the West on Ukraine.
There’s no love lost between Biden and Erdogan. As a senator, Biden was a regular critic of Turkey, owing in part to the strong Greek American constituency in his home state of Delaware. As vice president, Biden clashed with Erdogan over the Turkish leader’s backsliding on democracy and human rights. But despite their mutual dislike, Erdogan has long sought Biden’s validation. This week’s phone call and bilateral meeting in Madrid with the U.S. president allowed Erdogan to project himself to his people as an important leader on the world stage.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Türkiye PIC
Daily Sabah 22 [Daily Sabah with AA; 1-20-2022; "Turkey is good NATO ally with high capabilities: Estonian FM"; https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-is-good-nato-ally-with-high-capabilities-estonian-fm; KL
Estonia sees Turkey as a good NATO ally with high capabilities, which understands its security concerns very well, the country's Foreign Minister Eva-Maria Liimets said Friday.
Speaking to Anadolu Agency (AA) during her official visit to Turkey, Liimets said that the bilateral relations between the two countries are evolving every year and said: "Estonia and Turkey are two very good allies in NATO."
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Norway PIC
Marius Kristiansen 7-12-2022. MS in Defense Analysis, Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, officer in the Norwegian Special Operations Command. Njål Home, Norwegian Special Operations Command. "Small state security sector assistance in the age of great power competition". Comparative Strategy an International Journal. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2087435. Pen-DL
Geopolitical realities, being NATO’s front to the northeast, largely defines Norwegians strategic- and security policy. The Russian bear is our neighbor and represents the strongest permanent military presence in our part of the High North. This is unlikely to change overnight, and Russia will thus remain “the defining factor of Norwegian defense planning in the foreseeable future.”5 Russia is also occupying a gradually more prominent place on the competitive stage, challenging western dominance and allied coherency. So amidst the (re-)emergence of great power competition, Norway is also predicated to take a greater responsibility for deterrence prior to aggression. Not necessarily because the relationship with Russia is set to deteriorate, but due to “growing uncertainty surrounding allied support to Norway in the most likely crisis scenarios.”6
Preserving regional (and global) stability is paramount for Norway’s security. Historically, Norway’s relations with Russia have consisted of a delicate balance of deterrence through NATO membership and reassurance through self-imposed military and nuclear restraints, diplomacy, and cooperation whenever possible. Reassurance might be described as a Norwegian strategic niche. Before the Baltic countries became members of NATO, Norway was the only NATO country that bordered Russia. General Philip Breedlove (former Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR]) describes Norway’s strategic role this way: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in the way it handles relations with Russia. Norway has a long history of working with Russia in the border areas. You have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”7
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Hotlines CP
Bertrand 22 [Natasha Bertrand, CNN reporter; 3-16-2022; “NATO has tried to reach Russia unsuccessfully via deconfliction hotline”; CNN; ; KL]
NATO has tried unsuccessfully to connect with Russia via a deconfliction hotline and written letters as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has spread further west toward NATO territory, senior NATO military officials said on Wednesday.
“We are trying to communicate with them of course,” one of the officials told reporters in a briefing at NATO headquarters. “But it requires two [sides] to communicate.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Hotlines CP
Faure 22 [Juliette Faure, PhD candidate in political science at Sciences Po Paris; 3-17-2022; "The US-Russia military hotline in Europe: Key principles for risk reduction from the US-Russia deconfliction measures in Syria"; European Leadership Network; https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-us-russia-military-hotline-in-europe-key-principles-for-risk-reduction-from-the-us-russia-deconfliction-measures-in-syria/; KL]
The increasing reliance of the US and Russia on military deconfliction channels to sort out confrontational relations between them, however, should be seen as buying time for diplomatic tracks to manage and eventually solve the conflict. Whilst military hotlines are essential to avoid misunderstanding and escalation precipitating a conflict between two nuclear-armed military powers, they also might change the incentives for aggressive and risky behaviour in the international arena if they are perceived to be reducing the need for diplomatic dialogue and genuine risk reduction measures.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Nukes CP
Kühn 18 [Ulrich Kühn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, based in Vienna, Austria. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, and a fellow with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). He holds a PhD (summa cum laude) in political sciences from Hamburg University, an MA in Peace Research and Security Policy from Hamburg University, and a Magister Artium in medieval and newer history as well as German literature from the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University Bonn. His current research focuses on NATO-Russian relations, transatlantic security, nuclear and conventional deterrence and arms control, and the proceedings of the OSCE. Kühn worked for the German Federal Foreign Office and was awarded United Nations Fellow on Disarmament in 2011. He is the founder and a permanent member of the trilateral Deep Cuts Commission and an alumnus of the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius; 3-28-2018; “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: Introduction”; Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook, pages 7-11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kuhn_Baltics_INT_final_WEB.pdf; KL]
All these developments create political (as well as military) problems for NATO. They lead to pressure on NATO to review its own deterrence and defense posture, including its nuclear component, and, perhaps, to formulate more muscular responses. But such a debate—already tentatively taking place at NATO Headquarters—risks eroding unity among NATO allies, which have a wide range of different preferences in the nuclear realm. This erosion of unity could undermine deterrence. A military alliance at odds over its own deterrence and defense posture could be perceived as weak by Russia, making it a potential target for military blackmail and coercion.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Delay CP › Delay CP
Tol et al. 22 [Jan van Tol, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to his retirement from the Navy in 2007, Captain van Tol served as special advisor in the Office of the Vice President. He was a military assistant to Andrew W. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense’s Principal Advisor for Net Assessment, from 1993–1996 and 2001–2003. At sea, he commanded three warships, two of which, USS O’Brien (DD-975) and USS Essex (LHD-2), were part of the U.S. Navy’s Forward Deployed Naval Forces based in Japan. Captain van Tol’s analytic work has focused mainly on long-range strategic planning, naval warfare, military innovation, and wargaming. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and Logic from the University of Massachusetts/Amherst and a M.S. in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and graduated with distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the U.S. Naval War College; Christopher Bassler, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where he researches technology & innovation, joint aerospace capabilities, maritime operating concepts, and overall U.S. & allied military strategies. He served as a civilian in the Department of Defense, for both the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force, as an engineer, designer, strategist, and advisor. His previous assignments include the F-35 Joint Program Office, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) in the Pentagon, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division. He has worked in various capacities to enhance capabilities and interoperability across all warfighting domains, in many technology areas, and with key allies and partners on five continents, including NATO for both the capabilities and the S&T Organisation. He was awarded two U.S. Patents. Dr. Bassler received two U.S. Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Awards, from the U.S. Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Research. His degrees include a Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from Virginia Tech; a M.A. in Security Policy Studies from the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs; and a Diploma in Strategy & Innovation from the University of Oxford, Saïd Business School; Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. She brings rigorous research to policy discussions and has held positions in both academic and policy organizations. Prior to joining CSBA, she served as a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she wrote and published on grand strategy, great power relations, U.S. defense strategy, European security, and alliance management. Dr. Elgin has also worked at the Brookings Institution and with the Long Term Strategy Group in Washington, D.C. In 2018, she served as a visiting fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy in Stockholm, Sweden. Dr. Elgin earned her Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Security Studies) from Princeton University’s School of Public & International Affairs. At Princeton, she served as the director of the Center for International Security Studies’ Strategic Education Initiative, leading the university’s program for educating and mentoring students with an interest in national and international security; Tyler Hacker, Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. Prior to joining CSBA, Tyler was an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, where he conducted research on topics in defense logistics. Tyler previously served as a field artillery officer in the United States Army in Germany, where he participated in NATO operations and exercises in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. He has also completed internships at the U.S. Army War College and the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a B.A. in International Studies from Virginia Military Institute and an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University; 2022; "Executive Summary"; Deterrence and Defense in the Baltic Region: New Realities, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA); https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf; LR + KL]
The NATO posture “reset” announced by Secretary Stoltenberg, if properly and promptly executed, could greatly reduce the potential for a Russian fait accompli against the Baltic states as well as deter aggression against other NATO states on the eastern border. Presently it is broadly supported among the NATO member states because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and its accompanying atrocities. However, depending on the evolution of the conflict, the enthusiasm and willingness of some member states may flag over time or individual member state priorities may start to shift. For any reset to be successful, there must be genuine burden-sharing among all member states, whether on the eastern front or not, until NATO’s “reset” is fully implemented.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU-NATO CP---Britain
Valero 22 [Jorge Valero, Bloomberg reporter; 7-6-2022; "EU’s Sefcovic Signals Possible Trade Retaliation on Brexit Plan"; Bloomberg; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-06/uk-plan-on-brexit-seriously-harms-eu-s-interests-sefcovic-says; KL]
The European Union’s chief Brexit negotiator signaled the bloc could impose retaliatory trade measures on the UK over its planned legislation to override parts of the withdrawal agreement, saying the proposal “seriously harmed” the bloc’s interests.
Maros Sefcovic told lawmakers in Strasbourg that if the bill put forward by Boris Johnson’s government is adopted as drafted, “of course in that case we would be forced to use the measures at our disposal, including the measures” in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, known as the TCA.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › EU---Canada
Lacroix 16 [Rejeanne Lacroix, research assistant at the Fund for Peace. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Laurentian University in Ontario, Canada and a Master of Arts in International Security Studies from the University of Leicester, United Kingdom. Due to her Slavic maternal heritage, her area of focus is the post-Soviet space and the Balkans where she has contributed widely on de facto states, frozen conflicts, counter-extremism programming and state-building initiatives. Réjeanne has numerous academic publications under her belt ranging from Russian counter-terrorism financing policy, intelligence cultures of Central Asian states, and national security issues. In addition, Réjeanne has a keen interest in compliance and responsible business practices in fragile states and their relation to security.; 12-17-2016; "Guns versus Butter in the Baltics: How Canada Can Help"; NATO Association of Canada Association (NAOC); https://natoassociation.ca/guns-versus-butter-in-the-baltics-how-canada-can-help/; KL]
As Canada prepares to accept a leadership role in NATO operations in Latvia in 2017, it is apparent that Western powers prioritize military strength as the primary method to counter Russian aggression. Modern security threats are a nuanced consolidation of variables. The dichotomy of ‘guns or butter’, or the debate between military force and economic development, is representative of NATO’s mission in the Baltic States. Canadian-led military forces may prevent external Russian incursions but responsibility rests with the individual Baltic States to rectify any concerns from ethnic Russian populations within their borders.
National security concerns over Russian diaspora became prominent once analysts alleged that Russian hybrid warfare techniques would foment separatist sentiments in populations in Russia’s Near Abroad. After the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in southeastern Ukraine, such circumstances did not seem far-fetched. It is assumed that Russia’s northern neighbours are the next targets of its perceived neo-imperialism due to their relatively small geographic size and substantial ethnic Russian populations. (Estonia 24 %, Latvia 26 %, and Lithuania 6%)
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › AT: EU-NATO CP
Zandee et al. 21. Dick Zandee is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Security Unit of the Research department of the Clingendael Institute. Prior to his work at Clingendael, he was Head of the Planning & Policy Unit of the European Defence Agency; “Countering hybrid threats”; October 2021; Clingindael Institute; //BY
Since the beginning of EU-NATO cooperation, there have been obstacles that have hindered the optimalisation of cooperation, leading to sub-optimal outcomes. Some obstacles are age-old, others have emerged over time as a result of the changing security environment.
The first and most important obstacle to further cooperation is the organisations’ difference in member states. Although there is quite some overlap – 21 states are both a member of the EU and NATO – there are also EU countries that are not a NATO member and vice versa. The differences in membership are especially an obstacle when it comes to sharing more sensitive security-related information. It is common that some states only want to share information with either the EU or NATO, but not with both. Bruno Lété of the German Marshall Fund of the United States describes this as follows: “(…) the EU and NATO nevertheless remain two separate bodies, and each uphold restrictive information-sharing procedures that prevent the emergence of a culture of shared situational awareness or cyber threat assessment.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Unilat CP
Urbelis 20 [Vaidotas Urbelis, Defence Advisor at the Lithuanian Embassy in the U.S., former Defence Policy Director at the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, lecturer at General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University; 2020; "The New United States defence strategy: consequences for the Baltic states"; Lithuania in the Global Context: National Security and Defence Policy Dilemmas, Chapter 4, General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania; https://kmilc.lka.lt/data/Leidiniai/sisteminis_katalogas/Socialiniai_mokslai/Politologija/2020-Cesnakas-Lithuania%20in%20the%20global%20context.pdf#page=65; KL]
In the U.S. strategy, the defence of Lithuania, like other Baltic states, is based on the viability of the NATO organization and its ability to defend its members. Theoretically, the U.S. could provide bilateral security guarantees to Poland or the Baltic states, but because of the geographical location, their defence requires the involvement of the Allies. German, Belgian and Dutch ports and railways, Norwegian and British fleets and French rapid response forces can be best utilized under NATO’s framework. Therefore, the U.S. looks to the defence of the Baltic states primarily through NATO and coordinates its plans accordingly.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AT: CPs › Airpower CP
Hendrix 18 [Dr. Jerry Hendrix, formerly a Senior Fellow with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and is a retired U.S. naval officer. During his services as a Captain in the U.S. Navy, his staff assignments include tours with the Chief of Naval Operations’ Executive Panel (N00K), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and the Office of Net Assessment, as well as a stint as the Director of Naval History. Most recently, Hendrix was Director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at CNA; 8-2018; "Filling The Seams In U.S. Long-Range Penetrating Strike"; Center for a New American Security (CNAS); https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Penetrating-Strike-4.pdf?mtime=20180906151753&focal=none; KL]
Unfortunately, these investments do not go far enough to fill the seams created by deficiencies in previous acquisition decisions. While the department has made a significant investment in fifth-generation stealth strike fighter aircraft, none of them have sufficient range to reach their targets without the assistance of large “big wing” tankers, which are susceptible to attack from enemy A2/AD systems, a critical vulnerability.10 Attempts to pair these aircraft with long-range missiles with sufficient range to reach deep into A2/AD “bubbles” to reach critical strategic targets are hampered both by slow development of modern weapons to replace Tomahawk cruise missiles based on 1970s-era designs and by a lack of capacity within the defense industrial base and the logistics supply chain to keep forward shooters well supplied during high-tempo combat operations.11 Additionally, there are command and control difficulties associated with missile control after launch in competitive spectrum and cyber environments.12
Perhaps most concerning to planners is that the U.S. Navy’s carrier aviation arm, composed of 11 supercarriers and 10 accompanying air wings of approximately 60 aircraft, is not optimized to execute long-range penetrating strike missions. The carriers, given their size and electronic emissions, are vulnerable to attack by antiship ballistic and cruise missiles and hence are restricted to operating in excess of 1,000 nautical miles (nm) from enemy shore.13 Air wing aircraft, largely consisting of F/A-18 C/D/E/F Hornets and F-35C Lightning II aircraft, which have unrefueled ranges of 500nm and 630nm respectively, are unable to reach enemy targets without tanking.14 As mentioned previously, large Air Force “big wing” tankers are too vulnerable to penetrate A2/AD bubbles, and the Navy currently lacks sufficient organic mission tanking to effectively extend the range of the air wing.15 Oddly, naval aviation has consistently either fumbled or bypassed opportunities to develop new longrange strike aircraft that could maintain the relevance of the carrier itself in future security environments dominated by A2/AD technologies.16