2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Caroline/Proportionality/Imminence---1NC
Titiriga Remus 13 Assistant professor Inha Law School, 100 Inharo, Nam-gu Incheon 402-751, Korea. "Cyber-attacks and International law of armed conflicts; a “jus ad bellum” perspective." https://media.neliti.com/media/publications/28802-EN-cyber-attacks-and-international-law-of-armed-conflicts-a-jus-ad-bellum-perspecti.pdf
The opposing side argues that the reference to ‘inherent’ right of self-defense preserves ancient customary law, which allowed the anticipatory action.33 Proponents of a broad reading of self-defense invoke the 1837 Caroline incident and suggest that in the nuclear era States cannot be expected to wait for a ‘first strike’. However the majority of scholars reject the precedent value of the Caroline incident based on the fact that it precedes the actual interdiction for the use of force. 34They warn of the risk of escalation that results from accepting anticipatory actions. We think that the latter reason should prevail in the case of cyber-attack and as such, anticipatory self defense should be clearly banned. ii) Interceptive self defense If an armed attack is incipient or is on the verge of beginning, the intended victim may not wait powerlessly for the inevitable blow. The attack can be legitimately intercepted. In fact interceptive (different from anticipatory) self-defense seems to be acceptable under the Charter.35 The theme of interceptive self-defense is pertinent to a computer attack when the intrusion into a computer network has been discovered, although it is not yet lethal to persons or destructive of property (using Schmitt’s analysis). The issue is to determine whether the intrusion may reasonably be seen as a first step of an unavoidable and developing ‘armed attack’. This is a very difficult matter of evaluating and interpreting information available at the time of action (including warnings, intelligence reports and other data). 4. New Horizons and Challenges In the following section we will lance a debate about possible use of cyber means as self-defense or over the boundaries of the classical international paradigm (armed force or armed attack). There are numerous theoretical and practical challenges to be relived in this exploratory topic. 4.1 Computer Attacks as Means of Self Defense If a preceding armed attack (or a computer attack qualified as ‘armed attack’ –according to Schmitt’s analysis) occurred, the possibility to use the computer attacks as legitimate defense seem obvious (legitimate defense allows the use of all military means against an aggression therefore the cyber means should be included). However there are two substantive constraints for the right of self-defense: the criteria of necessity and proportionality. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice acknowledged the ‘inherent’ right of self-defense as part of customary law. The Court recognized the two criteria, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’, as additional requirements under Article 51.36 i) ‘Necessity’ ‘Necessity’ means that no alternative way of redress may be available and the target should be a military one, in agreement with the rules of International humanitarian law (“jus in bello”). Likewise, ‘necessity’ requires that the timing between the armed attack and the recourse to self-defense to be reasonably short, taking into account the need to carry out investigations and/or negotiations, or to make military preparations (this is an upper time limit while the above discussed interceptive self-defense concerned the lower time limit). ii) ‘Proportionality’ ‘Proportionality’, on the other hand, supposes that the use of self-defense will be weighed against initial armed attack(s), not only in terms of gravity/intensity, but also in terms of duration, location, and range of selected targets. And here lays a real problem for cyber-attack qualifying as self-defense. Computer attacks are naturally uncertain as to the outcome they produce, making difficult to estimate deliberate and collateral damage. In fact the consequences of a cyber-attack may be both direct and indirect, and in some cases the indirect consequences can be higher than direct consequences.37 As result it is very difficult to fulfill the criteria of proportionality in case of a self-defense by way of cyber-attacks. The risk of escalation should prevent this use of cyber-attacks in the present international framework. An eventual solution may be revealed by technological breakthroughs that will allow controlling the outcome of cyber-attacks. But this kind of technological evolution is far from being assured yet. 4.2 Difficulties on the Boundaries of Classical Paradigm: Cyber Means Not Qualifying as “Armed Force” or “Armed Attack” Much more appealing might be an analysis of the use of cyber-attacks in response to an initial act (a computer network attack) not achieving the threshold of “armed attack” (Schmitt’s criteria). i) Computer network attacks not achieving the threshold of “armed attack” If an initial (cyber) attack does not reach the threshold of an”armed attack” there is no right of selfdefense. We should examine the case of a computer attack used in retaliation short of the right to selfdefense. This situation is not purely hypothetical since there are plans to use computer attacks as counter offensive instruments. For example Col. Charles W. Williamson 38 argued that an Air Force-controlled ‘botnet’ could be a cost-effective mean to protect military networks. He envisioned collecting computers that would otherwise be discarded and remove their hard drives by making them available to launch attacks against foreign-based computers targeting American military facilities. To prevent collateral damage this ‘botnet’ would have built-in filters preventing US military and government computers from being targeted. We think that Schmitt’s threshold of an “armed attack” by cyber means (and the corresponding right to self-defense) is not attained in the example above. At this point we are considering a non-military ‘retaliation’. However this kind of action brings up tremendous risks for cyber escalation linked to the obvious indiscriminate nature of computer attacks. All those affected by this computer retaliation may react with devastating (deliberate and collateral) effects to networks. This outcome could, by aggregation and escalation, finally trigger a classical armed conflict. The dangers are too high to consider this kind of action. i) The exception of espionage and the challenge of multi-purpose nature of cyber means If there is no destructive outcome (lacking the threshold in Schmitt’s analysis) the cyber means could be covered by the espionage exception in interstate relations. These are harmful actions (not illegal from the point of view of armed conflict) that each state use constantly. Nevertheless some problems related to the nature of cyber means remain unclear. Cyber means are by nature multi-purpose tools (‘weapons’). The methods used for computer network exploitation are similar to those used for computer network attack, but configured for different objectives. For example the Wall Street Journal claimed 39 that some agents from China and Russia, along with several other countries, had infiltrated computer systems charged with managing electricity in the US. They left behind software which could be used to control or disable electric grids of the country. Security experts stated that while the incident showed gaps in the US security infrastructure in time of conflict, such an attack could have catastrophic effects. In this case, a cyber-activity (intelligence-gathering) can easily become, if undetected, the ground for a future cyber-attack. In situations like this, the only solution for the offended State is to use its own cyber exploitation or cyber defense instruments while the use of computer attacks in retaliation would be the least reasonable choice (even less reasonable than in the above example of cyber retaliation to a previous computer attack not qualifying as “armed attack”). This is another example where classical armed conflict framework seems unable to cover certain cyber means characteristics.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › Say No/Solvency---1NC
Jackson ’16 [Received his juris doctor degree from George Mason University School of Law and is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Infrastructure and Protection at the George Mason University School of Business [Stephen, 8/16/2016, “NATO Article 5 and Cyber Warfare: NATO’s Ambiguous and Outdated Procedure for Determining When Cyber Aggression Qualifies as an Armed Attack”, George Mason Center for Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security, ]
Article 5 is useful for assessing state and non-state actions used in traditional warfare. However, the NATO allies drafted Article 5 in light of the technology and tactics of the World War II era. While NATO continued to successfully adapt Article 5 to the evolving challenges post-Soviet Union, it cannot properly invoke the principle of collective self-defense against cyber attacks without at least new definitions for the various forms of cyber events. In particular, without unambiguous guidelines for identifying from where a cyber attack originated, NATO will face difficulty in both locating the origin of a cyber attack and determining whether the cyber attack was sanctioned by the host nation. Also, without proper definitions for the various forms of cyber attacks, NATO will likely encounter unnecessary debate between NATO allies over any cyber attack against a NATO country. Furthermore, without removing ambiguity in identifying cyber events that equate to a traditional armed attack, the North Atlantic Council will face difficulty in deciding upon a proper and proportionate armed response in accord with the principles of jus in bello.
Currently, almost every NATO ally has an individual national security and defense strategy related to cybersecurity.[12] These strategies vary in detail and scope, and lack uniformity in defining the elements of which cyber attacks warrant an aggressive response. Some scholars argue that the International Court of Justice accurately determined that collective self-defense is triggered when an act “inflicts substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state,” even if the attackers used non-traditional weaponry like airplanes or cyber attacks.[13] For instance, this “scale and effects” test does not adequately address the technical differences between using cyberspace to create either a kinetic disruption to a power plant or the potential to dismantle an entire financial infrastructure with zero physical effects. The potential for a single cyber attack to result in major disturbance, with or without any physical element, is sufficient to warrant specific guidelines. However, as long as the North Atlantic Council assesses individual cyber attacks on a case-by-case basis without predetermined specialized rules, the various interests of all 28 NATO nations will pose obstacles for a swift and efficient NATO response.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › Say No/Solvency---1NC
Jordan ‘14 [Klara; September 4; Senior Fellow and Assistant Director of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, LL.M from the Law School at the University of Groningen, Masters in Interdisciplinary European Studies from the Institute of Advanced European Studies, Law Degree from Matej Bel University; National Interest, “Would NATO Go to War Over a Cyberattack?,” https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/would-nato-go-war-over-cyberattack-11199]
Deliberations on thresholds triggering Article 5 could prove particularly thorny, given the transatlantic divide in views on what consequences are necessary to constitute an armed attack.
For example, the United States may be willing to consider a lower threshold than its less eager European allies for whom only grave uses of force are considered an armed attack. A state’s view of this threshold may well depend on whether it is the victim of an attack or a member called upon to fulfill its collective-defense obligation.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › AFF › Impact Turn
Ward, 17 - Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 217-218
The former approach is one that few policymakers and scholars openly promote.23 If the United States is interested in avoiding the creation of a deeply revisionist, anti-Western China, it needs to accommodate China’s status claims. Since these likely include the right to a sphere of influence in East Asia, accommodation would likely have to involve a reduction of the American military presence and American influence in that region. This does not mean conceding global leadership to China. Rather, the aim would be to acknowledge that China, as a great power, deserves the same rights that the United States does in world politics – including the right to manage East Asia and the South China Sea the way that the United States manages Latin America and the Caribbean.
This approach carries with it great risks and costs as well.What would be the effect on navigation and trade through the South China Sea? Would important American allies like Japan and South Korea turn into Beijing’s vassals? What if an American withdrawal from East Asia produces a regional arms race? And what if China grows more ambitious rather than more satisfied as the United States withdraws overseas?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › AFF › Impact Turn
Goldstein 20, associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College. (Lyle, 7-22-2020, "China’s Putative Threat to U.S. National Security", Published in A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/chinas-putative-threat-us-national-security)
Factions and interests on both the right and the left are now disturbingly united in an effort to cast China as the next multidimensional threat to the U.S.—on par with or even exceeding that of the Soviet Union in its dimensions. Many of those interests, moreover, are poised to profit from such a characterization. A few obvious facts, however, are worth repeating when considering the putative threat posed by China to U.S. national security: China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting. In the coming decades, all of those metrics may reverse, and China could morph from a bungling, paranoid panda into a fire‐breathing, goose‐stepping dragon. It seems likely that Beijing will have the requisite resources, bureaucratic discipline, and talent to make such a transition. Moreover, it is not short of strategists advocating for more aggressive steps to counter the United States.41 Washington’s overall goal should be to forestall that metamorphosis, in part by acknowledging China’s security concerns and by seeking compromises on the many issues that divide the United States and China, as outlined in the previous section. It is worth reiterating that Beijing is planning neither to attack the United States nor to conquer East Asia. Rather, its foreign policy behavior has, by and large, comported itself well with current international norms—in rather stark contrast to Moscow’s much more confrontational approach toward the West.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › AFF › Impact Turn
Depetris 8-18-2020, fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Washington Examiner. (Daniel Depetris, "China isn't the Soviet Union, and the US needs to find a different way to compete", Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-needs-to-find-different-way-to-compete-with-china-2020-8)
Unfortunately, simplifying China as a modern-day Soviet Union misdiagnoses the problem and leads to a faulty cure. Combatting Chinese power everywhere and anywhere will exhaust the US, deplete its resources and weaken US power over the long-term.
For nearly 30 years, the Washington foreign policy establishment has gotten used to the United States being the paramount power in the global system. But this is no longer the world we are living in.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › AFF › Solvency
Evelyn Farkas 08-11-2011 [Evelyn N. Farkas, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for Public-Private Partnership to the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and Commander, U.S. European Command, Atlantic Council, “Public-Private Collaboration in NATO,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/publicprivate-collaboration-in-nato///ZW]
From Evelyn Farkas, U.S. European Command: “Why should the public and private sectors collaborate today?” The answer? The complex challenges that we face around the world today often require skills and approaches beyond traditional military capabilities. Collaboration allows us to meet these challenges utilizing specific expertise found in the private sector. The private sector can provide agility, swift innovation, and a unique resource set. Together, government and private entities can reduce shared risks, minimize costs, and address mutual threats like terrorism, organized crime, cyber attacks, and climate change. The government gains access to the private sector’s expertise and resources, and private sector entities benefit from the information sharing involved in collaboration and the legitimacy gained from meeting complex challenges to provide for the greater good. . . . NATO adopted a comprehensive approach that recognized the need to build partnerships with non-military entities both inside and outside the government. With this in mind, in 2008, NATO launched the Building Integrity Initiative, which works with private NGOs like Transparency International, to reduce corruption in defense establishments in Europe and Afghanistan. . . . First, is the issue of trust. Neither sector likes to broadly share information about vulnerabilities. Corporations worry that it could lead to the public revelation of weaknesses and of sensitive intellectual property. The government is cautious about disclosing national security vulnerabilities to private entities that have international ownership or global interests and about safeguarding the privacy of U.S. citizens. And finally, there is the problem of how to institutionalize this collaboration. Because the responsibility for advancing public-private collaboration is so decentralized, optimization and coordination of efforts across the government has proven to be difficult.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › AFF › PDB
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovíc 06-16-2022 [Former President of Croatia, Defense One, “NATO Must Ensure Defense and Civilian Industries Work Together,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/nato-must-ensure-defense-and-civilian-industries-work-together/368250///ZW]
The internet, microwaves, and synthetic rubber came into our lives as products invented for military purposes. Even everyday things, such as undershirts and concentrated fruit juice were created to improve the combat readiness of armed forces. Though many people typically associate the military with war and suffering, this industry has been a source of incredible progress, producing inventions that made our lives longer, healthier, and easier. These days, innovation is likely to run the other way, with the military benefiting from inventions developed with private funding. A symbiotic relationship between military needs and human progress is not necessarily the default. Instead, it requires a well-oiled innovation ecosystem in which military and civilian industries share their expertise and knowledge with one another. NATO has recently announced several initiatives to build on past success, but more are needed—particularly as members increase their military funding. Virtually all alliance members are investing more in defense or are soon planning to do so. Germany, for example, declared that it would create a 100-billion-Euro fund and reach its 2% goal in 2022. Poland, which shares the longest EU border with Ukraine, has taken in more than 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees and promised to dedicate 3% of its GDP to defense. Croatia ramped up its defense investment to 2.3% of GDP. To ensure that this new investment spurs innovation and co-operation between military and civilian industries as well as academia, NATO announced in April the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. DIANA will concentrate on deep technologies, including artificial intelligence, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, novel materials, and outer space. In addition, 17 NATO nations have agreed to set up the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund. It will invest 1 billion Euros in early-stage startups and other deep tech funds aligned with its strategic objectives. But NATO members need to do more to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and China, who are also increasing spending on military research and development. The trends make this clear. In 1960, the U.S. accounted for 69 percent of global R&D investments, with U.S. defense-related R&D accounting for no less than 36% of global spending. The bulk (65%) of U.S. investments in defense-related R&D was financed from the federal budget. However, by 2019, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 30%, and the share of federal government investment in defense-related R&D fell from 65% to 21%, whereas the share of business investment in R&D has grown from 33% to 71%. This leaves no doubt that meaningful innovation is not possible without close co-operation with the private sector. As NATO prepares to adopt its next Strategic Concept at the summit in Madrid, it is essential that it focus on mechanisms that maintain its technological advantage. As part of GLOBSEC’s work at the Future Security and Defense Council, we have proposed several ideas to help promote innovation in the Alliance. We are convinced that NATO’s innovation ecosystem must integrate public and private sectors to ensure this edge.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › AFF › PDCP
MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES”
How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.
The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › AT PDCP
Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, at the UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined” December, )//BB
Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies in foreign countries. The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from properly defending its geographic borders. The host nation’s request for support from the U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect its people and limit internal or external threats. The security cooperation exercise Baltic Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources 9 provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders. In this scenario Estonia is attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders. In contrast to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure. The false labeling of reconstruction operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › AT PDCP
Finkelstein 10, PhD, Vice President of the CNA Corporation, an independent, non-profit research institution in Arlington, Virginia (David, “The Military Dimensions of U.S.-China Security Cooperation: Retrospective and Future Prospects,” Center for Naval Analyses, )//BB
The United States and China have engaged in security cooperation on a variety of international issues since the normalization of relations in 1979. In fact, security cooperation began even before the formal establishment of state-to-state relations. We recall that during the height of the Cold War the two nations demonstrated that when a pressing and shared security concern in that case, the former Soviet Union presented itself, Washington and Beijing were capable of working together, extant differences notwithstanding. Security consultations and sometime security cooperation between the two countries continue today. But as the record of security cooperation is reviewed, one comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, U.S.-China security cooperation has been mainly of a political nature and operationalized at a high level of strategic policy coordination. Security cooperation between the two nations has been largely the purview of U.S. and Chinese civilian officials and diplomats, not generals and admirals. In other words, over the course of 30 years of relations, security cooperation between the defense-military establishments of the United States and China -- the uniformed services -- has been the exception rather than the rule. If a serious discussion about future security cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy is to take place -- a leitmotif of this series of conferences as described by the sponsors -- then some of the issues, challenges, and problems from the past need to be confronted even as we look over the horizon. For the purposes of this paper, security cooperation is defined as the two militaries working together to achieve a common objective -- not high-level visits, exchanges, port calls, or other activities that are mainly symbolic or representational in nature.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › AT PDCP
Van Eerden 20, Captain (James, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11.1)//BB
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › AT PDB
Mohammad Taslim Uddin and Hasina Akter 2021 [Uddin is of the University of Chittagong, Bangladesh, Atker is of the International Islamic University Chittagong, Bangladesh, Journal of Developing Areas Winter 2021, Volume 55 No. 1, “Macroeconomic rates of return of investment in public-private partnerships: evidence from South Asian region,” https://muse.jhu.edu/article/766453/pdf//ZW]
Public investment creates a crowding-out effect on both private and PPP investment. In the presence of a positive shock in public investment, the IRFs show a positive impact on both private investment and 𝐺𝐷𝑃, with a fluctuation around zero in the time path of 𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃. However, the output elasticity of public investment is negative; the total RoR is positive and large in magnitude, possibly because in the presence of a shock in public investment the response from private investment and investment in PPP leads to an increase in output. Finally, private investment crowds-in both PPP and public investment. The output elasticity of private investment is found to be positive. The partial RoR of private investment is positive, while its total RoR is found to be negative.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › AT PDB
Edward Segal 07-01-2022 [Senior Contributor for Forbes, Forbes, “What Business Leaders Need To Know About NATO’s New Cyber Initiative,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2022/07/01/what-business-leaders-need-to-know-about-natos-new-cyber-initiative/?sh=280252f33764//ZW]
A new initiative announced by NATO at its summit this week in Madrid has important implications for business leaders who are concerned about cyberattacks. The multinational organization said it will launch a rapid response force that will ramp up collaborations with military and civilian organizations to help meet cyber threats. As important as it is to protect against and respond to cyber threats, the plan comes with built-in challenges and limitations. Strengthening Cyber Defenses “We are confronted by cyber, space, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies,” NATO said in a statement. “We face systemic competition from those, including the People’s Republic of China, who challenge our interests, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order.” “We will significantly strengthen our cyber defenses through enhanced civil-military cooperation,” the declaration says. “We will also expand partnership with industry. Allies have decided, on a voluntary basis and using national assets, to build and exercise a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond to significant malicious cyber activities.” Challenges “Most of those in the cyber world are excited about this possibility but some challenges face it. First, it is all voluntary so countries and industries will have to want to actually do it. Second, each country may do something different so it could be patchwork in its establishment,” crisis management expert Baruch Labunski, CEO of Rank Secure said in an email interview. “Finally, the joint effort of civilian industry and the military can be commendable or dangerous. It depends on your point of view and how one looks at government overreach,” he observed. Taking Responsibility NATO’s new program does not take the pressure off companies and organizations to protect themselves from cyberattacks. “Cybersecurity teams must take responsibility as information warfare continues to become part of the rapidly evolving threat landscape,” Wasim Khaled, co-founder and CEO of Blackbird.AI said in an email. “These new risks are driven by a new breed of threat actors who exploit digital media to drive harmful narratives that can [impact] organizations, employees, and executives using sophisticated tradecraft and technologies." Hybrid Warfare "In today's threat landscape, military adversaries and threat actors are combining cyber, information and kinetic attacks as a form of hybrid warfare that is highly effective when coordinated,” Khaled said. “The new NATO cyber rapid reaction force will help countries against cyberattacks that are designed to intimidate and disrupt an entire nation,” he observed. ‘No Surprise’ At least one cybersecurity expert was not surprised by NATO’s announcement. “For those that work in the field of cybersecurity, NATO’s new strategy comes as no surprise. As we suspected and have now confirmed through the conflict in Ukraine, cyberspace is a critical dimension of operations in modern warfare,” Robert Stines, a partner in the Litigation Practice Group at Freeborn & Peters and a cybersecurity advisor said in a statement. “We have also learned from past events that cyber threats tend to detrimentally impact the private sector,” he noted. To Be Determined “While we know very little about the scope of NATO’s new strategy, the pledge to work with the private sector to counter threats is very encouraging. Of course, the question becomes how does the private sector benefit from NATO’s new commitment,” Stines said. “It will also be interesting to see how NATO plans …to bring together governments, the private sector, and academia to bolster NATO’s technological edge. I suspect that America’s technology giants (Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft) will have a role in the Accelerator,” he concluded. 3 Key Cyber Trends Preventing and responding to cyberattacks continues to be a top priority and business leaders should be aware of three key related trends, according to Khaled. He said the trends include: Convergence “Convergence between information operations and traditional cyberattacks will continue to increase. Modern cybersecurity companies will integrate specialized information operations technology and fuse these capabilities with their existing cyber threat platforms.” Attacks On Supply Chains “Supply chain attacks will be on the rise due to ongoing economic shortages and disruptions through ransomware and other means in these critical times which could consist of holding victim’s data hostage, leaking and publicizing breaches, and attacking vendor supply chains.” Ransomware “Modern ransomware extortion will continue to proliferate across traditional enterprise environments. The market size for offensive skills has grown incredibly due to the potential payout size of cryptocurrency breaches that can exceed $100M on a single intrusion.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › AT International Fiat
US Code Title 10 [From Title 10-ARMED FORCES Subtitle A-General Military Law PART II-PERSONNEL, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section1501a&num=0&edition=prelim//ZW]
§1501a. Public-private partnerships; other forms of support (a) Public-private Partnerships.-The Secretary of Defense may enter into arrangements known as public-private partnerships with appropriate entities outside the Government for the purposes of facilitating the activities of the designated Defense Agency. The Secretary may only partner with foreign governments or foreign entities with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Any such arrangement shall be entered into in accordance with authorities provided under this section or any other authority otherwise available to the Secretary. Regulations prescribed under subsection (f)(1) shall include provisions for the establishment and implementation of such partnerships. An employee of an entity outside the Government that has entered into a public-private partnership, cooperative agreement, or a grant arrangement with, or in direct support of, the designated Defense Agency under this section shall be considered to be an employee of the Federal Government by reason of participation in such partnership, cooperative agreement, or grant, only for the purposes of section 552a of title 5 (relating to maintenance of records on individuals)
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › INB
Rose Gottemoeller et al. 06-26-2022 [Gottemoeller served as the Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019. Prior to NATO, she served as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State. Gottemoeller was also the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation Maj. Kathryn Hedgecock, U.S. Army, is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. She holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from Stanford University in Political Science. Maj. Justin Magula, U.S. Army, is an Army strategist in the Strategic Landpower and Futures Group at the U.S. Army War College. Paul Poast is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Paul received his PhD from the University of Michigan, Defense Studies, “Engaging with emerged and emerging domains: cyber, space, and technology in the 2022 NATO strategic concept,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082955//ZW]
The cyber and space domains have often been interpreted as public commons. As a result, these commons are difficult to govern and serve as the intersection of public and private actors. NATO must seek to lead cooperation within the Alliance, across partnership states, and with private actors to maintain a scientific edge (Rugolo and Monic 2022). NATO currently supports the Industry Cyber Partnership to improve Allies’ network security and increase resilience. This industry partnership must be replicated in a NATO Industry Emerging Technology Partnership, to facilitate a competitive edge in capabilities that are on the horizon or not fully realized in the operational security environment. The agreement to establish Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) for civil-military cooperation at the 2021 Brussels Summit, is a step in the right direction. Once established, cooperation must also be facilitated across partnership hubs within NATO to prevent stove piping of innovation. Additionally, it is critical that these innovation centers encourage partnerships across the entire spectrum of private industry, from startups and garage innovators to large scale private corporations with extensive scale research and development (Kosal 2022). Finally, intra-Alliance cooperation requires intelligence sharing and capability development among member states to ensure that the Alliance continues to meet the challenges of the strategic environment. One example of intra-Alliance cooperation that compliments NATO’s efforts is the European Union’s initiatives to bolster cybersecurity. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s efforts to improve capacity, cooperation, and a whole-of-society approach to cybersecurity ultimately bolster NATO’s deterrence by denial by hardening the attack surface of Europe.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › INB
Nadja El Fertasi 06-22-2019 [El Fertasi has built a career path in NATO over the past seventeen years taking on a variety of posts in different fields within large multinational NATO institutions. She holds a Master’s degree in International relations from the University of Cambridge and is an alumna of the NATO-wide Executive Development Program, Information and Security, “Why Digital Ecosystems of Civil-Military Partnerships Are a Game Changer for International Security and Defence,” https://procon.bg/system/files/4202_elfertasi_digital_ecosystems.pdf//ZW]
The Challenge of Military Adaptation To keep the military edge and prevail in future operations, NATO forces must continually evolve, adapt and innovate and be credible, networked, aware, agile and resilient. 12 Under NATO’s renewed collective defence posture, there is a greater emphasis on static versus deployable presence. The efforts underway to implement an adapted NATO Command Structure to achieve NATO’s level of ambition are grand. However, what is even more daunting is the cultural change needed within a homogeneous culture to embrace non-traditional ways of working. For example, high readiness and deployment of forces within the needed timeframe remain critical issues for years to come. Challenges and gaps in interoperability, cyber, logistics and hybrid warfare which became prevalent during NATO’s enhanced and tailored forward presence require comprehensive and inclusive partnerships beyond the military. This requires tapping into the human potential across disciplines and all backgrounds within the civil-military spectrum.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › INB
Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova 2017 [Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, refined these ideas PsyD, is a transitioning U.S. Army officer, Functional Area 59 (strategist). He holds a doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, Dominika Kunertova is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic, Army University Press, “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO,” https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO///ZW]
Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Demoracy
Cheryl Pellerin 11-16-2016 [Writing for Department of Defense, Department of Defense, “Cybercom Commander: Public-Private Partnership Needed for Cybersecurity,” https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1006807/cybercom-commander-public-private-partnerships-needed-for-cybersecurity///ZW]
The public-private cybersecurity partnership between private companies and U.S. Cyber Command and other federal agencies has been uneven so far despite some fledgling success, but collaboration is critical given growing threats to everyone from cyberspace, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command said here yesterday. Navy Adm. Mike S. Rogers, who is also director of the National Security Agency, spoke during the Wall Street Journal’s CEO Council annual meeting on the fight for global security in an era of borderless wars. On the government’s ability to help industry during major cyberattacks, Rogers said it’s unrealistic to expect the private sector alone to withstand the onslaught of activity that is being directed against them by nation-states and other actors. “Likewise,” the admiral added, “I don't think it's realistic to say the government's just going to do this [by itself] because the challenge with the government doing it is, if you want me to defend something I can't … defend a network if I ... don't have access to that network structure,” a level of outside access the private sector has resisted. Critical Success An exception to this was Sony Corporation after a 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment hack of confidential data sponsored by North Korea. Rogers said that a positive aspect of the hack was great collaboration among a private company, the private-sector computer network expertise that Sony brought in and federal agencies. “They knew they were dealing with something [after the hack] so they went out and hired expertise and capability from within the private sector,” the admiral said. “They then came to the conclusion that this was something bigger than they had initially thought so they reached out to the government. I give them big kudos for that.” Sony officials were “very up front” when they approached the government, he added, saying they asked for help to understand what happened and to make sure it didn’t happen again. Providing Value “We said, if you want us to provide value and insight we need full access to your network and your data,” Rogers recalled, adding, “They had no issue at all, just insure that you inform us of what you're doing, why you're doing it and exactly what you're doing and you stick to that.” It “worked out great,” Rogers said, and there was good information flow between Sony and the U.S. government response team, which consisted mainly of Cybercom, NSA, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. “One of the reasons why the partnership is so important -- using NSA resources to monitor and guard U.S. networks -- that's not our mission,” Rogers said in March 2015 in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on cyber operations, “and it's against the law … but on the other hand, I do want to create a partnership where we're able to share information with each other.” The FBI was designated as the lead agency, Rogers said, “and the FBI turns to NSA and says, ‘We could use your analytic help, will you partner with us in working with Sony?’” The admiral said Sony cooperated completely with the government during the investigation. Significant Calamity Rogers said that as director of NSA and commander of Cybercom, the agreement he always reaches with whoever they’re working with is that neither agency will use the data they gain for anything other than the exact purpose they’ve discussed. “I don't want it to get to the point where it takes some significant calamity to drive us to the conclusion that we've got to do something different than what we're doing now,” the admiral added. During Rogers’ remarks, the audience of chief executive officers participated an instant poll was taken on the question: Do you trust the government enough with your information to work with it during a cyberattack? The choices were: a) absolutely, b) only if my company is attacked, or c) never. The result was that 56 percent said they “absolutely” trusted the government enough to work with them, 34 percent said only if their company was attacked, and 9 percent said “never.” For Rogers, this was a positive result. “Overall that's pretty good,” he said. “Less than 10 percent of you said that there were no circumstances under which [you] would consider doing this. From my perspective that's a broad positive -- that means there's a willingness among 91 percent of you to have some form of dialog and to potentially look at [partnering with the government on cybersecurity] as a possibility.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
CIVIL-MILITARY COUNTERPLAN › NEG › Solvency---Demoracy
Martin Banks 2019 [Writing for EU Political Report, EU Political Report, “How to Strengthen Public-Private Cooperation in Hybrid War, https://www.eupoliticalreport.eu/how-to-strengthen-public-private-cooperation-in-hybrid-war///ZW]
Western nations need to build closer partnerships with the private sector to sharpen NATO and the European Union responses to hybrid security threats, participants at a unique day-long exercise concluded on Thursday. “Hybrid warfare is now real warfare,” Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant General at NATO. “This is an opportunity for the private sector and government to solve the problems.” Shea spoke during the tabletop exercise “Strengthening Public-Private Cooperation in Hybrid Crises” organized by Friends of Europe in partnership with the Finnish Presidency to the European Union and the United States European Command (EUCOM). The event drew over three dozen senior officials and security experts from NATO, European institutions, national authorities and private companies to examine how they can build society-wide resilience to hybrid challenges. Participants underscored the need to build trust that creates a “co-working” space for private and public players to ensure seamless cooperation in the event of a crisis. “Partnership with the private sector, has to more than just cooperation,” said a lawmaker from one NATO ally. “It should be about formulating policy together, not just cooperating when you have a problem,” they added, pointing out that the private sector is often the target of hybrid attacks as well as a solution provider. The exercise was based on responses to a fictional scenarios that included the high-jacking of a ship loaded with liquified natural gas which terrorists threaten to explode in a crowded port city; cyber-attacks that shut down banking services in a European Union country ahead of sensitive elections; and the mysterious severing of undersea cables linking the country to the rest of the EU. Among the ideas, participants emphasized the need for better intelligence sharing to ensure relevant policy makers are fully informed of hybrid risks; the importance of greater international cooperation between law-enforcement and civil protection services to match that among the military; for pro-active media strategies to keep citizens informed and counter fake news during a crisis; and outreach to all sectors of society to counter hostile efforts to undermine faith in democratic institutions. “If we adopt resilience it will serve us for all sorts of scenarios, so it’s a win-win situation,” Shea concluded. The exercise, which was also conducted with the support of Facebook, is Friends of Europe’s newest flagship project.