What can NATO and the European Union do to prevent Russia from escalating the conflict to unacceptable levels? What follows are a few principles to guide NATO’s assessment of preventing and avoiding escalation. Keep Ukraine in the fight. The first, and most immediate, curative is to keep Ukraine in the war. This means continued financial assistance, shipments of lethal aid, and real-time intelligence sharing, as well as humanitarian assistance and help with absorption and resettlement of refugees. The United States and Europe have shown unity and concerted action in responding swiftly to Russian aggression in Ukraine and this must continue, even as Putin seeks to find and drive wedges between transatlantic allies and partners. In this struggle, a coherent narrative, shared and articulated in common, will be critical. In this regard, continuous references to the and a steady drumbeat of measures not to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a free hand in Ukraine. A degree of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of US and NATO intervention should he go too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An “all measures on the table” approach will force Russian planners to consider, and prepare for, multiple response scenarios, complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one’s opponent that one is too frightened to engage is more likely to encourage than to deter. The most effective way to prevent spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to . Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the best way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention by NATO. This means combat aircraft, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket artillery, mobile air defense, secure radios, unmanned aerial vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems in great numbers in the United States and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such as the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, also warrant consideration. If NATO intervenes, do it decisively. Several European nations, including Poland, Denmark, and Belgium, are considering some form of in Ukraine, while calls for a no-fly zone are mounting as the civilian death toll rises. This suggests a critical mass of support may be forming for outside intervention under certain circumstances. Strong material and financial aid may enable Ukraine to hold on, and even advance to retake occupied territory, but Russia remains a far larger and stronger opponent. If the logic that it is better to defeat Putin in Ukraine than on NATO territory is sound, intervention to prevent the fall of Ukraine or its dismemberment must be considered. The prospect of actual genocide of Ukrainian civilians, or use of weapons of mass destruction, might also trigger NATO intervention. This can take several forms. A no-fly zone would mean that NATO, or a coalition of the willing, employs combat aircraft based outside Ukraine to ground Russian military aviation, leaving ground combat to the Ukrainians (an analogy is the Kosovo air campaign). Unified command and control would be essential. The effort would fail if all targets required approval by thirty nations, so allowing discretion to military commanders acting within political guidance would be required. All Russian aircraft entering Ukrainian airspace would be engaged. Russian air defenses must be suppressed (perhaps even inside Russia), forward air controllers must be embedded with ground units to prevent fratricide, and target lists may be expanded quickly to include attack of Russian missile and rocket systems that are destroying Ukrainian cities. A no-fly zone is, of course, an escalation itself, but one intended to lead to a Russian defeat in Ukraine to prevent follow-on aggression in Europe. Entering the conflict from the air is a serious and sober step. Some aircrew would be lost. Putin could retaliate by launching ballistic missiles against Polish, Romanian, or other European targets. To do so, however, would mean expanding the conflict against a much stronger and wealthier NATO, at a point at which almost all of Russia’s available combat power is deployed in Ukraine. Intervention from the air also provides a clear firebreak. Introduction of large NATO ground forces would be an even more dramatic step Russia would surely seek to avoid if possible. Introduction of “peacekeeping forces” or establishing a “” in western Ukraine, use of NATO special forces and trainers, and deployment of “niche” specialists with critical skills such as communications, targeting, and computer-network defense are also forms of intervention that could contribute to success in Ukraine. Unlike air operations, however, these could make only marginal contributions that may not be worth the added risk of bringing the Alliance into the war. Should the campaign mature, and a no-fly zone materialize, these additional measures could augment Ukraine’s defense in helpful ways, but they should not precede air intervention. Direct intervention is a major step. It should not be undertaken except to achieve a decisive result. Bolster forward presence. As a hedge against further Russian aggression and to reassure allies, the US deployed two additional heavy brigades to Poland in February and early March, along with an airborne brigade, bringing the US rotational “heel-to-toe” brigade there to divisional strength. US divisional and corps-level headquarters were also sent. The US 2nd Cavalry Regiment based in Germany (actually a Stryker brigade) was relocated to Romania at the same time. Additional air units and ground troops from a number of allies have also been deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, while the forty-thousand-soldier NATO Response Force (NRF) has been alerted for the first time in its history. Putin’s rhetoric and aggressive disinformation and subversion efforts have, for years, targeted the Baltic States, which stand between Kaliningrad and contiguous Russia and extend almost to the suburbs of St. Petersburg. To forestall future aggression and cement firm deterrence, these forces should remain in eastern Europe at least for the near term (i.e., 3–5 years). As the campaign in Ukraine unfolds, Putin should understand clearly that NATO is postured to respond strongly to further escalation. For many years, policymakers have providing the Baltic States, and NATO’s eastern flank in general, with an adequate defense for fear of “provoking” Russia and to “maintain Alliance unity.” Measures to build up Ukraine’s defensive capacity were resisted for the same reasons; the Barack Obama administration opposed lethal aid, even after the invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, while the Donald Trump administration provided only a trickle. The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the pitfalls of this thinking. Putin’s threats were intended to keep his neighbors weak, but recent events have proven that it is the perception of weakness, not strength, that provokes him most. Accordingly, a from the borders of Finnmark to the Black Sea can prevent spillover or regional escalation, communicate resolve, and reassure host-nation publics that the conflict in Ukraine will not land on their doorstep. This is under way with the recent announcement that NATO battlegroups will be posted in . Meanwhile, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and others have also pledged to increase their forces in the Baltic States. To further strengthen deterrence and head off escalation, NATO should thoughtfully consider how best to help the Baltic States help themselves. Though proud members of the 2-percent club, their small economies prevent them from acquiring the air defense and heavy forces they need to deter future Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia field only a single light brigade each, while Lithuania fields a mechanized brigade with no tanks and a motorized brigade. (such as the European Deterrence Initiative), the United States and NATO could equip existing Baltic formations with modern tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense from reserve stocks, along with the training, spare parts, and ammunition needed to make them viable. The Alliance should also strengthen the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) formations in the Baltic States, as Secretary General Jens . These forces are too small to pose a credible offensive threat, but can defend long enough for other NATO forces, such as the NRF and US armored units in Poland, to move up to assist. In the maritime domain, NATO’s naval strength clearly outmatches Russia’s, but operations in confined waters like the Baltic or Black Seas , as well as sea mines. Russian anti-ship missiles also outrange NATO’s. Should Russian naval forces begin to attack commercial shipping in international waters, NATO can respond with standoff weapons, but should exercise caution within range of land-based systems until they are suppressed. If Turkey agrees, stronger NATO naval forces should enter the Black Sea to provide flexible response options to counter Russian maritime aggression. Take an unambiguous stance on nuclear policy. To relieve the threat of a Russian first-use nuclear strike and regain freedom of action, the United States and NATO must return to core deterrence principles. As it has for many decades, nuclear deterrence rests on both capability and credibility. NATO nuclear forces, though much reduced since the Cold War (especially with respect to theater nuclear systems) are redundant, survivable, and absolutely capable of destroying Russia from end to end. NATO’s credibility, on the other hand, is when leaders publicly express palpable fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, for unclear reasons and in unclear ways, and that they must at all costs avoid pushing him into a corner. A resolve not to be bullied is essential. Deterrence works best when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and calm, as John Kennedy was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As President Emmanuel recently, the West has nuclear weapons, too. Use economic tools as a primary “offensive” weapon. As the military campaign progresses, sanctions will continue to strangle the Russian economy. This pressure must continue—and, if possible, intensify—in order to force Russia, not just to the negotiating table, but to withdraw altogether from Ukrainian territory. To date, not all Russian banks have been banned from SWIFT, and many oligarchs remain unsanctioned. Though painful and difficult, weaning Europe from Russian energy, divesting from Russian businesses, and closing European markets are powerful weapons the EU can wield in its own right. (While 37 percent of Russian trade is with Europe, only .) Today, Russian energy remains exempt from EU sanctions. Developing alternate sources of energy, in particular, will take time and investment, but continued reliance on Russian oil and natural gas can only enable Putin to continue to finance the war in Ukraine. In March 2022, the EU imposed its on Russia, tightening export restrictions on dual-use technologies, expanding the list of sanctioned persons related to defense industries; imposing further trade restrictions for steel, iron, and luxury goods; and prohibiting transactions with specific state-owned enterprises. The challenge now will be to maintain the full range of sanctions until they bear fruit. Global food shortages, rising energy prices, and scarcities among certain commodities will challenge the sanctions regime. Much depends on the persistence and resolve of Western leaders. Properly understood, comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia—what the French finance minister has called “total economic and financial war on Russia”—can be a major tool, denying Putin the financial resources to carry on the war and generating internal pressures on elites that could lead to his removal. By themselves, however, they . China, Brazil, and India remain open markets and suppliers, if not active supporters, while Hungary and Serbia retain close ties. As former Deputy National Security Adviser General Rick Waddell has pointed out to the author, “An economy that is self-sufficient in energy and food takes a lot of killing.” In concert with diplomacy, aggressive information operations, and the military instrument of power, sanctions can be a vital component of an overall strategy to control and limit escalation and drive conflict termination by draining Russia of the financial resources it needs to carry on the war.