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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines › AT: PDCP

Hotlines are under the Department of State’s jurisdiction – here’s proof of US’s most RECENT hotline agreement

AP News 5-5-1998 The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business. [China, Russia Open Communications, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

China and Russia have opened a direct presidential hot line to improve understanding between the former communist rivals, the Foreign Ministry announced Tuesday. The secure telecommunications link, China’s first with a foreign capital, will allow presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin to ``exchange views on bilateral relations and international issues at any time,″ Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan signed an agreement for a U.S.-China hot line last week, but Zhu said he did not know when it would open. China and the former Soviet Union engaged in a tense rivalry for the allegiances of the socialist world during the Cold War and fought border skirmishes in the late 1960s. Relations have improved steadily over the past decade.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines › Solvency – China

China wants cyber diplomacy to maintain interdependence with the West

Nikolay Bozhkov March 2020 [China’s Cyber Diplomacy: A Primer, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

In absolute terms, the People's Republic of China is the European Union's largest trading partner. China is its most significant source of imports and second-largest export market. The EU is second only to the United States as China's top trade partner.207 In the framework of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation signed in 2013 - the strategy that guides comprehensive bilateral cooperation - the EU and China agreed to establish strategic partnership across a wide range of issues, including sustainable development, economic prosperity, global governance, foreign policy, security and peace.208 In 2017, China and Europol reached an agreement known as the "Europol-China Strategic Cooperation Framework" to increase law enforcement cooperation directed at combating transnational crime. The 2016 Joint Communication on "Elements for a new EU strategy on China", adopted by the High Representative, the European Commission209 and the EU Council's Strategy on China210 further clarified EU priorities vis-à-vis China. In line with the EU's overarching engagement strategy, it put special attention on human rights, the rule of law, social-economic issues, trade and investment and market access. The EU has repeatedly highlighted the need to curb industrial cyber espionage by intensifying cooperation with China on reforming the country's "protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"211 through mechanisms such as the Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Protection212 and the EU-China Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation on IPR for 2018-2020.213 Underscoring the importance of intellectual property rights protection in Europe, and building on synergies with Japan and the USTR Section 301 Report, the EU has also launched a case at the WTO against China's "unfair [and forced] technology transfers" and discriminatory treatment of foreign companies.214 5.2 China's engagement with the EU and EU member states The landmark 2015 Xi-Obama industrial cyber espionage agreement has served as a template for EU member states' cyber-related bilateral partnerships with China. Both the United Kingdom (2016)215 and Germany (2015)216 have convinced China to formally adopt a norm against cyber espionage in bilateral accords, commit to hold a regular dialogue on pertinent cyber issues and cooperate in the fields of incident mitigation, CERTs assistance, cybercrime and CBMs. European member states' diplomatic approach to China has therefore been more functional and in pursuit of concrete practical outcomes of benefit for both sides. From EU countries' vantage point, this type of functional cooperation with China is necessary as it transcends unsurmountable differences between the two sides' normative preferences, threat perceptions and security interests. For decades, Sino-European Union relations have been characterised by consistently growing economic and cultural ties. Accommodating China's economic rise and appetite to shape international order has given rise to greater technological interdependence in tandem with tremendous new normative, security and political challenges. China's growing assertiveness - particularly its growing political reach in Europe, which is often perceived as a lever to undermine the cohesion of the Union - has eventually compelled the EU to fundamentally redefine its China strategy from an accommodation-based engagement policy towards one of balancing and "managed interdependence" in key strategic sectors and supply chains, with an emphasis on ensuring market reciprocity.217 2019 saw the European Union chart a new bolder course vis-à-vis China. In March 2019, weeks before the 21st EU-China Summit, and coming after recommendations made by the Federation of German Industries and other European actors (member states, other industry federations, etc.) earlier that year,218 the European Commission published an official document ("EU-China - A strategic outlook") describing a new "EU policy shift towards a more realistic, assertive, and multi-faceted approach" to dealing with China.219 The EU asserts that despite China being a cooperation and negotiating "partner" with which the EU needs to (re)align objectives and strike a "balance of interests", the PRC has increasingly become a "systemic rival" and an "economic competitor" that leverages economic investment to achieve geopolitical gains, energetically pursues global "technological leadership" and seeks to export norms and forms of governance at odds with neoliberalism. Furthermore, the profoundly intertwined role of the CCP in China's economy and the opaque and highly blended divisions between the public and private spheres and the military have made Chinese technology a security risk for the EU in the "short to mid-term". Overall, the EU's more critical stance before the 2019 summit has helped secure several concessions from the Chinese side. Concerning EU-China cooperation in cyberspace, the two sides will continue working towards implementing norms of responsible state behaviour under the EU-China Cyber Task Force framework and within parallel UN processes. While affirming that "there should be no forced technology transfers", the two sides also committed themselves to enhancing resilience against malicious cyber activities, including against cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. The two sides also committed to a concrete timeline to conclude the "EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement", for which "decisive progress" from the Chinese side - i.e. substantial market-opening reforms directed at ensuring a level playing field - will be required in 2019.225 Furthermore, China and the EU are to cooperate on reforming the WTO, though this will be conditional on China reforming the discriminatory effects of industrial state subsidies and other related issues.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines › Solvency – China

Solves China – you can use this card for space too

Liselotte Odgaard 4-25-22 Liselotte Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies . Her work focuses on US–China–Europe relations, including NATO–China relations; Chinese foreign, security and defense policy; Indo-Pacific security, and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. [NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, The Washington Quarterly, 45:1,167-183, DOI: ] //DamienHS WAgustin

Cyber and space is a promising arena for NATO to address China challenges by building member state resilience. Like the air and sea domains, as areas that belong to no one state and which provide access to much of the globe, they form part of the global commons. Command of the commons has been the key enabler of the US global position of power for many decades. However, China wields a sufficient range of sea, air, cyber, and space capabilities such that the global commons is now a contested zone. In contrast to the sea and air domains, cyber and space are sparsely regulated. This lack of international norms enhances the risk of conflict based on misperception, making NATO cooperation pertinent. Adversarial activities toward the US and Europe in the cyber and space domain threaten transatlantic security. These come not just from China, but also from other adversaries such as Russia and Iran. Mechanisms for addressing these challenges in the military sector are essentially generic and not, at least in their basic design, established with a particular country in mind. Thus, cyber and space provide an avenue for NATO to contribute significantly to deterrence of China without having to combat major internal resistance. NATO would also benefit from long-standing US-EU cooperation on cyber and space issues. Cyber and space provide an avenue for NATO to contribute without major internal resistance NATO has vowed to clarify Article Five’s collective defense commitment to encompass threats to satellites in space and coordinated cyberattacks. NATO can design this effort to include adversarial behavior from China. The alliance already has an array of instruments to deal with cyber and space challenges from adversaries. These can be extended to encompass China without pronouncing it a threat. This approach allows the US and Europe time to adjust their cooperation to take into account the fact that China poses military threats to them both without explicitly using the language of threat at a time when NATO members do not agree if China should be defined as a challenge that can trigger Article Five responses. Since the late 1990s, the vulnerability of shared space assets to cyberattacks has been a concern for both the US and Europe. For example, in 1998 a US-German satellite, used for peering into deep space, was rendered useless after it turned suddenly toward the sun, damaging its High Resolution Imager by exposure. NASA later determined that the accident was linked to a cyber-intrusion at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Coordinated cyberattacks have emerged as a major threat to both the US and Europe since the late 1990s. For example, for about eighteen minutes on April 8, 2010, China Telecom advertised erroneous network traffic routes that instructed US and other foreign internet traffic to travel through Chinese servers. Other servers around the world quickly adopted these paths, routing all traffic, including government and military traffic, to about 15 percent of the internet’s destinations through servers located in China. In the future, the need to enhance situational awareness in space is likely to lead to further integration of space assets between the US and its allies. Civilian entry points are likely to provide a growing opportunity for infiltration. The weak state of cybersecurity in civilian agencies should also be considered. Chinese military doctrine prioritizes weaponry that targets vulnerabilities in the deployment of US and allied power, such as the use of cyberattacks to disrupt surveillance assets, intelligence networks, and command-and-control systems. These threats are significant, since next generation systems, including fighter aircraft, destroyers, and special forces, will not function without access to space communication and space-derived data. Although European and US allies have indigenous space programs outside the NATO framework, cyber security and outer space would be a useful field for joint explorations of how to divert and manage attacks and identify an agency which can coordinate transatlantic responses to attacks. Allies are embedded in a range of information networks which may be disrupted, giving rise to alliance management concerns emerging from attacks. The lack of red lines regarding behavior in cyber and outer space between the US and its allies on one hand, and adversaries such as China on the other, adds to the risk of misperception and escalation, and hence also highlights the need for allied coordination to avoid starting a war by mistake. An improved NATO dialogue on safeguards and alliance consultation could also assist communication with China on arms control and conflict prevention in cyber and outer space, which is not currently taking place. Looking to the future, NATO’s success in establishing transatlantic mechanisms for cyber and outer space safeguards and consultation will be crucial to allow NATO a key role in taking on the China challenge in ways that help restore faith in NATO’s credibility as a provider of collective defense in all domains. It will also assist NATO in straddling the chasm between member states prioritizing threats from either China, Russia, the Middle East, or North Africa, since cyber and space threats potentially stem from all of them, and the effectiveness of cyber and space defense mechanisms do not necessarily depend on geographical origin. Cyber and space would allow NATO a key role in the China challenge without prioritizing China Improved communication between NATO and the EU will be essential for NATO to successfully address the military aspects of cyber and space threats. The framework for permanent EU-NATO relations, Berlin Plus, was concluded in March 2003. It allows for the exchange of classified information, the EU’s use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations, and the establishment of consultation arrangements. Due to disagreements over responsibilities and jurisdiction, however, meaningful coordination did not take place until July 2016. On this occasion, NATO and the EU issued a joint declaration stating their intention to work together on security and defense responses to unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East of the Euro-Atlantic area.During Biden’s visit to Brussels in June 2021, NATO promised to strengthen cooperation with the EU on promoting peace and stability including protecting critical infrastructure, strengthening resilience, maintaining a technological edge, and addressing challenges to a rules-based order. The EU-US summit statement from the same visit merely reaffirms support for robust NATO-EU cooperation and promises to strengthen the partnership. At the level of policy implementation, it is clear when talking to NATO and EU officials that usually they do not coordinate their strategies and tactics for countering China challenges.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines › Solvency – Russia

Russia says yes

Geoff Van Epps 13 Geoff Van Epps is a lieutenant colonel in the US Army. This article is based on research he conducted while serving as a Senior Fellow at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, from 2012-2013. [Common Ground: U.S. and NATO Engagement with Russia in the Cyber Domain, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

An Agenda for NATO-Russian Cooperation Absent any ongoing cooperation between NATO and Russia, a virtually blank slate exists for developing NATO's agenda to finally begin to engage Russia in the cyber domain - and NATO must acknowledge that such engagement is imperative going forward. While the NATO Policy on Cyber Defense acknowledges that NATO will "tailor its international engagement based on shared values and common approaches,"147 and a recent NATO study called international partners "essential actors of NATO's cyber defense" with whom NATO should "develop bilateral arrangements ... focusing on infor- mation-sharing, exchange of best practices, and judicial agreements," Alliance gridlock has prevented NATO from even initiating a relationship with Russia on issues of mutual concern.148 As a consequence, NATO members with favorable bilateral relations with the Russian Federation are bypassing NATO to work directly with Russia on cybersecurity and other topics, which neutralizes the collective influence of NATO and plays toward the Russian strategic goal of marginalizing NATO wherever possible.149 Rather than sitting on the sidelines as the cyber domain is evolving around it, NATO has the opportunity and the need now to match its actions to its rhetoric by accepting Russian overtures to cooperate on cybersecurity. It should build internal consensus on engaging Russia with relatively low-cost, low-risk measures where both sides can easily find agreement as first steps toward an eventually more substantial partnership that tackles the thornier problems where the two sides have fundamental differences. Specifically, NATO should seek to cooperate with Russia to accomplish the following goals. Add a Cybersecurity Working Group to the NATO-Russia Council. Ideally, this arrangement would establish a stand-alone working group on par with working groups covering topics like missile defense, logistics, or terrorism. If that were to provide too broad of a mandate for the Alliance partners to agree to, it could be formed as a subgroup underneath the Science for Peace and Security Committee with a much narrower and more technical purview. In any case, forming a working group at the NRC would signal the intention to work seriously with Russia on cybersecurity and would provide an organizational venue for doing so.150 Partner Computer Emergency Response Teams. Regardless of the level of trust between NATO and the Russian Federation, having contacts established between the technical experts who have the ability to respond in the event of a crisis is invaluable.151 NATO should collectively adopt the pragmatic stance of some of its member states and begin a series of limited, technically-oriented exchanges between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Center and the Russian CERT in order to exchange technical information and determine how best to communicate during a crisis. Share Cyber Intel. Because cyberspace is constantly evolving and the nefarious actors who operate within it are continually adapting, maintaining up-to-date information on cyber threats is an endless challenge. Likewise, sharing intelligence across NATO can be a sensitive and difficult process, so any proposal for trading secrets with Russia might on the surface seem dubious - except that during an April 2013 visit to Moscow, NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow proposed the creation of two centers to allow Russia and NATO to share intelligence, conduct joint planning, and coordinate operations on missile defense.152 While a final agreement on establishing these centers is nowhere near, missile defense has been as much of a source of friction between the U.S., NATO, and Russia as cybersecurity, so the proposed facilities provide a template for a cyber threat information clearinghouse as another space for NATO and Russia to cooperate. Such a clearinghouse could start small and work initially on shared analysis of excellent but unclassified data from commercial cybersecurity firms and, as trust is built, graduate to more sensitive and classified intelligence products.153 Develop Confidence-Building Measures. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is nearing completion of a set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) intended to prevent misunderstandings and avert international conflicts among its fifty-seven member countries.154 Although the publicly available draft of the measures reveals them to be voluntary and not particularly robust,155 the agreement, once finalized, will be important for having started a conversation on cybersecurity among over a quarter of the world's nation-states and in facilitating the exchange of cybersecurity terminology, doctrine, and contacts among the members. NATO should build on the OSCE agenda to pursue a more detailed and more ambitious set of CBMs with Russia, including joint early-warning mechanisms, exchanges of technical cybersecurity recommendations, and improvement of cyber crisis communication channels.156 Given that all twenty-eight NATO countries and Russia are part of the OSCE, achieving consensus on confidence-building measures at the NRC should be attainable, and it would go a long way to addressing Russia's almost paralyzing fears of being blamed for a cyber incident in which it legitimately played no role.157 And since NATO and Russia have a long track record of devising CBMs related to nuclear weapons, adapting those existing procedures and processes to cybersecurity would appear eminently achievable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines › Solvency – Russia

Solves Russia

Franz-Stefan Gady and Greg Austin 6-24-10 Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute. He has previously worked as an adjunct research assistant at the Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., focusing on regional security issues. He was also an analyst for the Project on National Security Reform, a congressionally funded nonprofit organization founded to reform the national security structure of the United States. He holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and has served in the Austrian Army and the Austrian Foreign Ministry, working on various security issues. Greg Austin is Vice President of Program Development and Rapid Response at the EastWest Institute. Greg’s career in international affairs spans thirty years and includes senior posts in academia and government. He writes a weekly column in the newspaper New Europe. He has also held senior posts at the International Crisis Group and the Foreign Policy Centre in London. Greg is the author of several well-reviewed books on international security, especially on Asia. His books include The Armed Forces of Russia, co-authored with Alexei Muraviev. He has several postgraduate qualifica- tions in international relations, including a Ph.D. His main specializations have included Soviet and Russian security policy. [Russia, The United States, And Cyber Diplomacy Opening the Doors , ] //DamienHS WAgustin

Russky Newsweek, the Russian-language edition of Newsweek, ran a cover story in its November 23, 2009, is- sue on cyber crime that pointed a very big finger at Russian hackers working from home and abroad. It used terms like the “Evil Cyber Empire” and the “Cold Cyber War.” At the same time, NATO is trying to understand how it should deal with cybersecurity issues. Does a cyber attack on a NATO member state trigger the Article V commitment of the mutual defense treaty? Geopolitics during the Cold War was about borders and defending them. Cyber diplomacy in the twenty-first century is about managing a world that is not just borderless but can function best when connectivity is almost seamless. This world—so dependent on stable financial transactions and global trading—cannot function at all if cyber connectivity is successfully attacked. So how does NATO, a geographically defined alliance trying to redefine its relationship with Russia, understand its role in pro- moting cyber diplomacy and cyber peace? What should the institutional structure and strategic profile of NATO look like if the biggest security threats to it in the next ten years are from terrorists or states with advanced cyber offensive capabilities? One big change will be in espionage. It will continue but its fundamental character will change. Russia will change its intelligence-gathering priorities in NATO countries, and the United States will change its espionage priorities in Russia. All parties will become more interested in pro- tecting at least some of the others’ secrets than in stealing them, because to do so will buttress their own economic security. For NATO, the time has definitely arrived for it to el- evate cybersecurity to the top rank of issues to be dealt with in its official relations with Russia; the two sides have a shared interest in seeking common solutions, not simply looking at each other as potential threats. A low-profile speech by the vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James E. Cartwright, in June 2009 gave a glimpse of an emerging strategic concept in the world’s only military superpower—something he dubbed “global strike.”91 He said that the low-end capa- bility for global strike “is probably [the ability to be] any place on the face of the earth in an hour,” while the “high end is any place on the face of the earth in about 300 mil- liseconds—that’s cyber.” This view was expressed during a discussion of the forthcoming quadrennial review of the country’s military planning and capability. It flowed from Cartwright’s vision of what deterrence looks like in the twenty-first century. Citing the proliferation of ballistic missiles, Cartwright observed that a new attack—potentially nuclear—“could be over in minutes.” This circumstance would require, he said, “something that deters that conflict and it has to be more than nuclear.” For him, part of the argument is that his country’s military bases are located “where we fought the Indians, the Japanese and the Germans.” He suggested that current basing realities might not address the needs of deterring or responding to new threats.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Hotlines

Multilateral cyber hotlines create cyber diplomacy and prevent attacks and miscalc

Stilgherrian 6-14-20 Stilgherrian is a freelance journalist, commentator and podcaster interested in big-picture internet issues, especially security, cybercrime and hoovering up bulldust. He studied computing science and linguistics before a wide-ranging media career and a stint at running an IT business. [Does the world need a multilateral cyber hotline?, ] //DamienHS WAgustin

When someone is throwing nukes at you, you can probably tell where they're coming from. There's only a few nuclear nations and, over the decades of the Cold War, they have developed complex strategic intelligence and early warning networks. But what about a cyber war? Particularly the kind of intense multi-vector cyber attack targeting critical infrastructure that's been dubbed as ? Cyber attribution is hard. It's not impossible, but it takes time. Time that doesn't exist when your infrastructure is collapsing and you're thinking about resorting to what is euphemistically called a "kinetic response". Retaliation against the wrong target could well result in disaster. One possible solution, at least in part, could be installing direct "cyber hotlines" between national leaders. The of Cold War fame is the archetype. During the high-stakes nuclear of 1962, official diplomatic messages took up to six hours to deliver. Presidents John F Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev had to resort to unofficial channels, including relaying messages via TV news correspondents. The Moscow–Washington hotline was installed the following year. This hotline was never the iconic red telephone of TV and movies. At first it was a teletype, then a fax machine, and now email. Initially, its terrestrial phone lines were backed up by a radio link via Tangier in northwestern Morocco. Today, a set of satellite links are backed up by optical fibre. At least eight other pairs of nations have . Cyber versions of these hotlines are a key recommendation of the (CSC), a US government initiative to "develop a consensus on a strategic approach" to defending the nation against "cyber attacks of significant consequences". "The US government should develop a multi-tiered signaling [sic] strategy aimed at altering adversaries' decision calculus and addressing risks of escalation. This signaling strategy should also effectively communicate to allies and partners US goals and intent," says the CSC's [PDF]. "The strategic level of signaling should involve overt, public diplomatic signaling through traditional mechanisms that have already been established for other domains, as well as private diplomatic communications through mechanisms such as hotlines and other nonpublic channels (including third party channels in instances in which the United States may lack robust diplomatic relationships)." At the operational level, this should include "clandestine, protected, and covert signaling (including through non-cyber means) that is deliberately coupled with cyber operations," the CSC wrote. "An example of this type of signaling is tailored messaging preceding or running concurrently with defend forward cyber operations." The CSC also recommends developing a framework to guide "when and under what conditions the US government will voluntarily self-attribute cyber operations and campaigns for the purposes of signaling capability and intent to various audiences". Diplomatic tools like hotlines are examples of what diplomats call "confidence building measures". Confidence building is one of four pillars of cyber diplomacy Your writer has previously reported on Australia's part in developing the so-called for nation-state behaviour in cyberspace and last year's for negotiating such rules. Last month, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported that it was . Norms of behaviour are only a quarter of the cyber diplomacy story, however. "You have binding international law, you have voluntary non-binding norms, which complement and together set clear expectations of behaviour," said Johanna Weaver, Australia's cyber negotiator at the UN. "You have capacity building, which is a really important part of it ... to make sure that all countries have the ability to implement the recommendations and agreements," she told ZDNet. "Then you've got confidence building measures, which are designed to increase trust and transparency." While the building of hotlines has not yet become a priority at the UN, there has been modest progress at the regional level in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Australia and Malaysia's proposal for a received in-principle endorsement at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Meeting on Security of and in the use of ICTs in Singapore back in March 2019. "The directory will provide a means of direct communication to prevent miscalculation and escalation, as well as manage potential responses in the event of cybersecurity incidents with the potential to impact regional security," DFAT wrote. A cyber equivalent to the International Atomic Energy Agency? The UN's Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), one of the two UN bodies negotiating the rules for cyberspace, has stressed the importance of accurate attribution of cyber attacks. "It was suggested that developing a common approach to attribution at the technical level could lead to greater accountability, transparency, and could help support legal recourse for those harmed by malicious acts," OEWG wrote in the [PDF] of its report. Australia has noted that attribution comes in two flavours. One is factual attribution, "the factual circumstances, including the technical indicators that allow you to make an assessment as to a technical assessment of attribution," Weaver said during a briefing in April. "Then there is a legal attribution assessment, which is taking into account the considerations of state responsibility. Can you take those technical or factual circumstances and say this is therefore attributable to a particular government?" Separate from that is any political decision to act publicly or privately on both of those attribution assessments, she said. To this end, the Geneva-based ICT4Peace Foundation has proposed what they've dubbed to be a Global Cyber Attribution Network. "ICT4Peace proposes the setting up of an independent network of organisations engaging in attribution peer-review," the organisation wrote in its policy brief [PDF]. Currently, most attribution is done by private cyber threat intelligence organisations and national security agencies. "For international legal provisions to be effective, and accountability for malicious cyber activities to take hold, high levels of confidence and publicly persuasive attribution of responsibility are required," ICT4Peace wrote. This new independent attribution agency should include "government representatives, private sector pundits as well as proponents from civil society and academia". Microsoft has also suggested, in 2017, an as part of its Digital Geneva Convention proposal. Such an agency has been compared with the long-established International Atomic Energy Agency, but the cyber world is vastly different. "Nuclear technology is industrial by design. It is difficult, if not impossible, to develop nuclear capabilities in hiding. Also, military use of nuclear technology is very different from civilian use," ICT4Peace wrote. "Cyber capabilities on the other hand are software based. In contrast to nuclear technology, cyber tools do not emit suspicious radiation and do not require factories for their development. A handful of dedicated individuals gathered in a room can launch a cyberattack of sizeable magnitude." While an independent agency wouldn't be able to provide real-time attribution during a cyber attack, its existence and its ability to subsequently validate or refute a nation's claims could provide a break on cyber escalation. ZDNet understands that the idea of an IAEA-style cyber inspection agency is raised at the UN from time to time, including in the OEWG intersessional multi-stakeholder consultations, but for various reasons, it has yet to gain traction.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Reforestation › AT: Crowther Wrong

Two issues with Marshall: 1---The card says that they were forced to admit that they were wrong because of backlash and anger not that they redid the study or model to determine whether they had errors – doesn’t 100% prove the study wrong 2---There is other evidence that proves that reforestation is good and possible – this ev is a year after Crowther “admitted” to being wrong – accounts for that yet it still optimistic

Robin Fearon, 12-3-2021, "Tree Planting and Reforestation Will Help Limit Global Warming," GH-PJ

Planting new trees is one of the most effective ways to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) and limit global warming. As forests grow they remove CO2 from the air through photosynthesis, working as a natural reservoir to store . Planned projects worldwide will plant of trees and it is thought that forests will help protect the environment for future generations. An 420 million hectares (one billion acres) of forest have been lost since 1990, converted to farmland and other uses. But by planting new trees in existing forests (reforestation), and growing in areas with no previous tree cover (afforestation) nations are using nature-based solutions to tackle man-made industrial emissions. Afforestation is seen as one of the best ways to store carbon. Data by the United Nations (UN) shows that, by 2015, China had planted 79 million hectares (195 million acres) in an effort to stop farmland from turning into desert. Next was the US, which planted forest covering 26 million hectares (65 million acres), ahead of Russia with 20 million hectares (49 million acres). The US Forest Service says it uses afforestation and reforestation to forestland damaged by events like wildfire, climate change, and insect and disease damage. Benefits it lists from planting include creating new wildlife habitat, improving clean supply, stopping soil erosion, and sequestering carbon. Sadly, despite slowing in recent decades, deforestation losses worldwide still planting gains. Forest areas measuring 10 million hectares (25 million acres) were cut down and every year between 2015 and 2020. That is roughly equal to the land area of Iceland or South Korea each year. Clearing forest releases CO2 and has 23 percent of all man-made greenhouse gas emissions. One study says it has caused day temperatures in Asia, Europe, and North America. In these regions, where more than 15 percent of tree cover was removed, deforestation led to a third of the increase in average hottest day temperatures.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Reforestation › Solvency – Climate Change

Reforestation and ecosystem replenishment is key to fight climate change – prefer our comprehensive model that is realistic and accounts for the amount of tree cover that could realistically exist while still solving

Crowther et. al. ’19 - , Bastin gold, Garcia, Mollicone, Rezende, Devin , and, 7-5-2019, "The global tree restoration potential," Science, Jean-Francois Bastin: Crowther Lab, Department of Environmental Systems Science, Institute of Integrative Biology, ETH-Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. Devin Routh: Crowther Lab, Department of Environmental Systems Science, Institute of Integrative Biology, ETH-Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. Constantin M. Zohner: Crowther Lab, Department of Environmental Systems Science, Institute of Integrative Biology, ETH-Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. Thomas W. Crowther: Crowther Lab, Department of Environmental Systems Science, Institute of Integrative Biology, ETH-Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. Yelena Finegold: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. Danilo Mollicone: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. Marcelo Rezende: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. Claude Garcia: Department of Environmental Systems Science, Institute of Integrative Biology, ETH-Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. Centre de Coopération Internationale en la Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), UR Forest and Societies, Montpellier, France. GH-PJ

Photosynthetic carbon capture by trees is likely to be among our most effective strategies to limit the rise of CO2 concentrations across the globe (–). Consequently, a number of international initiatives [such as the Bonn Challenge, the related AFR100, and the New York Declaration on Forests (, )] have established ambitious targets to promote forest conservation, afforestation, and restoration at a global scale. The latest special report () by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that an increase of 1 billion ha of forest will be necessary to limit global warming to 1.5°C by 2050. However, it remains unclear whether these restoration goals are achievable because we do not know how much tree cover might be possible under current or future climate conditions or where these trees could exist. Previous efforts to estimate global tree cover potential have scaled existing vegetation estimates to the biome or ecoregion levels to provide coarse approximations of global forest degradation (, ). However, quantitatively evaluating which environments could support trees requires that we build models using direct measurements of tree cover (independent of satellite-derived models) from protected areas, where vegetation cover has been relatively unaffected by human activity. With enough observations that span the entire range of environmental conditions, from the lowest to the highest possible tree cover, we can interpolate these “natural tree cover” estimates across the globe to generate a predictive understanding of the potential tree cover in the absence of human activity. To explore the determinants of potential tree cover, we used 78,774 direct photo-interpretation measurements (data file S1) () of tree cover across all protected regions of the world (fig. S1) (, ). Using global environmental layers (table S1) (), we examined how climate, edaphic, and topographic variables drive the variation in natural tree cover across the globe. The focus on protected areas is intended to approximate natural tree cover. Of course, these regions are not entirely free of human activity (), presenting slightly lower tree cover than expected in some regions or higher tree cover than expected in other regions because of low fire frequency, but these ecosystems represent areas with minimal human influence on the overall tree cover. We then used a random forest machine-learning approach () to examine the dominant environmental drivers of tree cover and generated a predictive model () that enables us to interpolate potential tree cover across terrestrial ecosystems. The resulting map—Earth’s tree carrying capacity—defines the tree cover per pixel that could potentially exist under any set of environmental conditions, with minimal human activity (). This work is directly underpinned by our systematic dataset of direct tree cover measurements (entirely independent of climate and modeled remote sensing estimates) () across the globe (fig. S1) (). Across the world’s protected areas (fig. S2), tree cover ranged between peaks of 0% in dry desert and 100% in dense equatorial forest, with fewer values falling between these two extremes (figs. S2 and S3). We paired these tree cover measurements with 10 global layers of soil and climate data (table S1) (). Our resulting random forest model had high predictive power [coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.86; intercept = –2.05% tree cover; slope = 1.06] (); rigorous k-fold cross-validation (fig. S4A) () revealed that our model could explain ~71% of the variation in tree cover without bias (R2 = 0.71; intercept = 0.34% tree cover; slope = 0.99) (fig. S3, B and C). Our k-fold cross-validation approach also allows us to generate a spatially explicit understanding of model uncertainty (figs. S5 and S6) (). Across all pixels, the mean standard deviation around the modeled estimate is ~9% in tree cover (28% of the mean tree cover) (figs. S5 and S6) (). As such, these models accurately reflected the distribution of tree cover across the full range of protected areas. We then interpolated this random forest model across all terrestrial ecosystems using all 10 soil and climate variables to project potential tree cover across the globe under existing environmental conditions. The resulting map reveals Earth’s tree carrying capacity at a spatial resolution of 30 arc sec (). The model accurately predicts the presence of forest in all existing forested land on the planet (fig. S7A) but also reveals the extent of tree cover that could naturally exist in regions beyond existing forested lands. The most recent Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) definition of “forest” corresponds to a land of at least 0.5 ha covered by at least 10% tree cover and without agricultural activity or human settlements (). Using this definition, our map reveals that about two-thirds of terrestrial land, 8.7 billion ha, could support forest (table S2). That value is 3.2 billion ha more than the current forested area (fig. S7A) (, ). We estimate that 1.4 billion ha of this potential forest land is located in croplands (>99%) and urban areas (<1%), as delineated by the European Space Agency’s global land cover model (fig. S7B and table S2) (), and 1.5 billion ha with croplands as delineated by Fritz et al. (fig. S7C and table S2) (). Therefore, ~1.7 billion to 1.8 billion ha of potential forest land (defined as >10% tree cover) exists in areas that were previously degraded, dominated by sparse vegetation, grasslands, and degraded bare soils. To avoid the pitfalls of categorical forest definitions, we also evaluated the tree canopy cover in a truly continuous scale (fig. S8). We refer to “canopy cover” as the area of the land that is covered by tree crown vertically projected to the ground (for example, 50% of tree cover over 1 ha corresponds to 0.5 ha of canopy cover) (fig. S8). By accounting for all levels of tree cover (from 0 to 100%), this approach balances the relative contribution of different forest types (such as woodlands, open forest, and dense forest) and of wooded lands outside forests (such as savannas) across the globe. In total, 4.4 billion ha of canopy cover can be supported on land under existing climate conditions (pixel uncertainty = 28%; global uncertainty <1%) (table S2) (). This value is 1.6 billion ha more than the 2.8 billion ha existing on land today (, ). Of course, much of the land that could potentially support trees across the globe is currently used for human development and agriculture, which are necessary for supporting an ever-growing human population. On the basis of both the European Space Agency’s global land cover model () and on Fritz and colleagues cropland layer (), we estimate that 0.9 billion hectares are found outside cropland and urban regions (, and table S2) () and may represent regions for potential restoration. More than 50% of the tree restoration potential can be found in only six countries (in million hectares: Russia, +151; United States, +103; Canada, +78.4; Australia, +58; Brazil, +49.7; and China, +40.2) (data file S2), stressing the important responsibility of some of the world’s leading economies. By comparing our country-level results to the commitments of 48 countries in the Bonn Challenge (), we can provide a scientific evaluation of the country-level restoration targets. Approximately 10% of countries have committed to restoring an area of land that considerably exceeds the total area that is available for restoration (data file S2). By contrast, over 43% of the countries have committed to restore an area that is less than 50% of the area available for restoration. These results reinforce the need for better country-level forest accounting, which is critical for developing effective management and restoration strategies. Of course, it remains unclear what proportion of this land is public or privately owned, and so we cannot identify how much land is truly available for restoration. However, at a global scale, our model suggests that the global forest restoration target proposed by the IPCC () of 1 billion ha (defined as >10% tree cover) is undoubtedly achievable under the current climate. By scaling these forest area calculations by biome-level mean estimates of carbon storage (, ), we estimate that vegetation in the potential restoration areas could store an additional 205 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) if they were restored to the status of existing forests (table S2). Our model accurately depicts the regions where tree growth is possible under existing environmental conditions. However, changing climate conditions may alter the area of land that could support forest growth over the rest of the century, a point that needs to be considered when developing long-term restoration projects. We tested this possibility by rerunning our potential tree cover model under future climate conditions, projected under three Earth System Models () and two Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) scenarios (RCP 4.5 and 8.5) (). Under both scenarios, the global tree carrying capacity is lower than the present day potential because of reductions in the potential area of tropics. This is in stark contrast to most current model predictions, which expect global tree cover to increase under climate change (). Although warming is likely to increase tree cover in cold regions with low tree cover (for example, in northern boreal regions such as Siberia) or with existing open forests (such as in tropical drylands) (), our model highlights the high probability of consistent declines of tropical rainforests with high tree cover. Because the average tree cover in the expanding boreal region (30 to 40%) is lower than that in declining tropical regions (90 to 100%), our global evaluation suggests that the potential global canopy cover will decrease under future climate scenarios, even if there is a larger total forest area with >10% tree cover. Therefore, despite potential increases in canopy cover in boreal (~130 Mha), desertic (~30 Mha), montane (~30 Mha), and temperate (~30 Mha) regions, the potential loss of forest habitat in tropical regions (~450 Mha) leads to a global loss of 223 Mha of potential canopy cover by 2050, corresponding to 46 GtC ( and table S3). Such risks of loss do not account for future changes in land use, such as pasture and cattle raising (), which might also contribute to the urgency of the situation. These models of future changes in tree cover potential reveal insights into how the structure of vegetation might change over time. Of course, these models are characterized by high uncertainty because, unlike the present-day interpolations, we rely on extrapolation of our machine-learning models outside of the existing range of global climate conditions. These extrapolations cannot be considered to be future projections of potential forest extent because they do not incorporate any of the ecological, hydrological, and biogeochemical feedbacks that would be associated with changes in forest cover. For example, it is possible that elevated CO2 concentrations under future climate scenarios might enhance the growth of those existing trees, although recent evidence suggests that increased growth rate does not necessarily translate to increase of carbon storage (). However, our approach has a strong predictive power to describe the potential tree cover in the absence of humans under any given set of future climate scenarios. The global photointerpretation dataset offers the capacity to characterize the potential tree cover under any given set of environmental conditions. The resulting openly accessible map can serve as a benchmark map to assess restoration opportunities (such as tree planting and natural assisted regeneration) around the globe, with a tree cover of reference that respects the natural ecosystem type (for example, from wooded savannah to dense forest). However, restoration initiatives must not lead to the loss of existing natural ecosystems, such as native grasslands, that can support huge amounts of natural biodiversity and carbon. Using existing global land-cover layers (–), our maps reveal that there is likely to be space for at least an additional 0.9 billion ha of canopy cover. If restored woodlands and forests were allowed to mature to a similar state of existing ecosystems in protected areas, they could store up to 205 GtC. Given that the airborne fraction of carbon dioxide is ~45% (), reaching this maximum restoration potential would reduce a considerable proportion of the global anthropogenic atmospheric carbon burden to date (~300 GtC). This places ecosystem restoration as one of the most effective solutions at our disposal to mitigate climate change.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Collision Warning System › Solvency – Satellite Collisions

Government subsidies decrease costs and accelerate production

idmworks, 9-3-2020, "Subsidies For Technology & Why That May Be a Good Thing," IDMWORKS: The Identity Experts, GH-PJ

In short – yes. Government subsidies assist the tech industry by covering the costs of production research and the distribution of goods or services. They can do this by offering tax credits, grants, loans, or reimbursements as is seen in the CARES Act. These subsidies make it possible for the tech industry to increase the overall supply of goods or services that they offer. This in turn increases the demand for the good or service, which lowers the overall price of the service. The idea is that when governments give subsidies to the tech industry, it’s a win-win both for the supplier and the customer. Subsidies give the tech industry more money to dedicate to research and development. Customers can enjoy life-improving products at a cheaper price since tech developers don’t need to break even on their production costs.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Collision Warning System › Solvency – Satellite Collisions

A CWS solves for collisions in Earth Orbit – the prototype exists but further investment is key to make it effective

Rahul Rao, 2-21-2022, "Avoiding satellite collisions: NOAA unveils prototype warning system," Space, Rahul Rao is a graduate of New York University's SHERP and a freelance science writer, regularly covering physics, space, and infrastructure. He holds a master’s degree in science writing from New York University's Science, Health and Environmental Reporting Program (SHERP) and earned a bachelors degree from Vanderbilt University, where he studied English and physics. GH-PJ

A new collision-warning system could help satellite operators sleep a little easier. The prototype system, developed by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), is designed to alert operators when their spacecraft may be on a collision course with another object. That's a real and growing concern, given how . The system, which was demonstrated in a on Feb. 11, is called the Open-Architecture Data Repository (OADR). It's a cloud database that keeps tabs on the growing population in orbit and warns if there's a danger of a collision, just as you might get a weather warning if you're in the path of a storm. It works like this: The OADR collects data on space conditions from a number of different scans from ground sensors that together cover much of the globe. The OADR is linked both to US-government-affiliated ground stations and to a network of commercial stations (especially in the Southern Hemisphere). The data also includes observations and other satellites' live telemetry and maneuvering plans. The OADR takes in all that data and creates a picture of the orbital environment, which it then uses to assess if there are any looming "conjunctions" — close encounters between orbiting objects. If there are any, the OADR can relay that data back to satellite operators as a sort of weather forecast, giving them (ideally) several days to move their satellite out of the way. "A hurricane notification displays a probability cone that continually changes as new data is obtained," Scott Leonard, Special Advisor to the Director of NOAA's Office of Space Commerce, said in the Feb. 11 press conference. "A conjunction is similar." OADR is still under development; the newly unveiled system is a prototype. According to Leonard, the OADR team still needs to iron out some kinks with automating data collection and prediction processes. If all goes according to plan, the OADR will see initial public operation by 2024 and be fully operational by 2025. There are already a number of commercial firms providing these sorts of space-tracking services, but the OADR's creators hope that it will ultimately have more data than those services — and better predictive capabilities to boot. It's hardly a secret that Earth orbit is getting quite crowded. There are already in space with a diameter of 4 inches (10 centimeters) or greater. That number really began to explode in the 21st century, and it isn't slowing down. “We expect on the order of 57,000 new satellites by the year 2030," Stephen Volz, assistant secretary of commerce for environmental observation at NOAA, said in the press conference. And in-space collisions aren't just the stuff of nightmare fantasy. Last year, for example, a with a piece of a 25-year-old Russian rocket. The satellites of SpaceX's Starlink broadband constellation, which may someday consist of more than 40,000 spacecraft, seem to be . In its stewards' eyes, the OADR is intended to preemptively keep track of all the biggest threats. But it will likely be some time before any system can keep track of the in orbit — everything from rubbish to shards of metal to flecks of paint — all of which can cause catastrophic damage, given how fast everything moves up there.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › CAFOs › Solvency – AMR

Massive health and economic costs to AMR

, 4-1-2016, "Antimicrobial resistance a 'greater threat than cancer by 2050'," Guardian, GH-PJ

Antimicrobial resistance to antibiotics will present a greater danger to humankind than cancer by the middle of the century unless world leaders agree international action to tackle the threat, according to . The British chancellor will tell a panel of experts at an IMF meeting in Washington that 10 million people a year could die across the world by 2050 – more than the number of people lost to cancer every year – without radical action. Osborne will warn of an enormous economic cost, which could cut global GDP by 3.5%, a cumulative cost of $100bn (£70bn). The chancellor will say: “Unless we take global action, antimicrobial resistance will become an even greater threat to mankind than cancer currently is. “It is not just a health problem but an economic one, too. The cost of doing nothing, both in terms of lives lost and money wasted, is too great, and the world needs to come together to agree a common approach.” Dame Sally Davies, the chief medical officer for England, has warned of an “apocalyptic scenario” in the next two decades in which people die of routine infections during simple operations “because we have run out of antibiotics”. A government-commissioned review in 2014 by the economist Jim O’Neill, now a Treasury minister in the Lords, estimated that antimicrobial resistance would become the world’s greatest killer by 2050 unless a new generation of effective antibiotics are developed. In a Guardian article, the director of health and HIV at the , Mandeep Dhaliwal, warned of a return to the era before Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin. “We are on the road back to the days of people dying from common infections and injuries,” Dhaliwal wrote.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › CAFOs › Solvency – AMR

CAFOs are the root cause of antibiotic resistant bacteria

IARA, No Date "How CAFOs Cause Antibiotic Resistance – IARA – The Iowa Alliance for Responsible Agriculture,", GH-PJ

Since many human diseases were transmitted from farm animals to humans, it is not surprising that many antibiotics that are widely used to treat humans are effective for animal diseases. Prior to routine antibiotic feeding to animals, antibiotic resistance was generally linked to misuse of antibiotics in hospitals or by individual patients of private physicians. While misuse is still a logical source of antibiotic resistance, scientific evidence is mounting that links antibiotic resistant bacteria in humans with routine feeding of antibiotics to livestock in confinement facilities. With the advent of factory farms, livestock producers quickly became a major user of antibiotics in the United States. An estimated 70-80% of all antibiotics in the U.S. are used in industrial agriculture. The majority of antibiotics are fed at sub-therapeutic (low dose) levels for disease prevention and growth stimulation. A comprehensive 2004 U.S. General Accounting Office review of the scientific literature on antibiotic resistance clearly linked antibiotic resistance to livestock feed. They reported that “many studies have found that the use of antibiotics in animals poses significant risks for human health, but a small number of studies contend that the health risks of the transference are minimal.”[1] By 2013, a U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention report concluded that any doubt about the potential for transference of antibiotic resistant bacteria from animals to humans had been resolved: “Scientists around the world have provided strong evidence that antibiotic use in food-producing animals can harm public health through the following sequence of events: Use of antibiotics in food-producing animals allows antibiotic-resistant bacteria to thrive while susceptible bacteria are suppressed or die. Resistant bacteria can be transmitted from food-producing animals to humans through the food supply. Resistant bacteria can cause infections in humans. Infections caused by resistant bacteria can result in adverse health consequences for humans.”[2] The evidence is clear that antibiotic resistant bacteria is a major risk to public health, and it is clearly linked to factory farms.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › CAFOs › Solvency – Food Security

CAFOs must be removed to promote sustainable agriculture and improve food security

Michelle Johnson-Weider 2020 - Ms. Johnson-Weider (J.D., Stetson University College of Law) worked as an attorney in the United States Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel for thirteen years, with primary responsibility for drafting legislative proposals relating to agriculture and nutrition. She spent three years as a program analyst at the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and is currently an attorney advisor in the Legislation Division of the Office of General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services. She co-teaches a class in Legislative Analysis and Drafting at the George Washington University Law School. © 2020, Michelle Johnson-Weider. GH-PJ

Sustainable agriculture is the future of food security. CAFOs are neither a viable nor a logical approach to achieving a safe, sustainable U.S. food supply—which is why they are already a failing model. As has been shown, cheap meat is not actually cheap when the environmental and health costs of industrialized production methods are taken into account. Moreover, industrialized agriculture like CAFOs, sometimes promoted as a job creator for depressed rural America, is actually a significant cause of the decline in the rural standard of living and quality of life. As the true costs of cheap animal-based protein are more widely understood, consumers will be less and less willing to see their tax dollars used to prop up activities that damage their rivers and lakes, poison their drinking water and air, and sicken their children. The impact of these consumer shifts should not be underestimated; changes to agricultural practices are already happening, from humane standards for egg production to increased demand for organic food and plant-based proteins. Additional changes are imminent. For instance, although milk production has been increasing, U.S. dairy consumption is down—one of the factors in the record-setting 1.4 billion-pound U.S. cheese surplus.100 Samantha Raphelson, Nobody Is Moving Our Cheese: American Surplus Reaches Record High, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:58 AM), https://perma.cc/JQU7-ZXGC. States are also recognizing that the damages caused by CAFOs outweigh the benefits. Oregon considered two bills to increase permitting requirements and environmental enforcement of air and water emissions from dairies with at least 2,500 cows.101 Tracy Loew, Oregon Bills Seek Nation’s Toughest Dairy Recommendations, STATESMAN J. (Dec. 12, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://perma.cc/C92D-XYLZ. The bills gained traction after a dairy farm with 30,000 cows was found to have more than 200 violations of its wastewater permit, including overflowing manure lagoons, improper application of manure to fields, and failure to report spills and leaks.102 Tracy Loew, Oregon Megadairy Lost Valley Farm Fined $187,320 for 224 Environmental Violations, STATESMAN J. (Oct. 16, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://perma.cc/J69X-TQ6Z. Of particular interest is that both bills “declare large dairies to be industrial, rather than agricultural or farming operations,” which would eliminate their ability to qualify for certain state agricultural exemptions and would subject them to local siting and health and safety requirements.103 One of the bills would also require new dairy CAFOs to post bonds “as security against environmental, health or animal welfare costs, such as costs due to manure spills, improper disposal of animals, excessive manure applications, cleaning up 100. 101. 102. 103. Loew, supra note 101. 2020] FROM FACTORY FARMING TO A SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYSTEM 703 abandoned facilities, or relocating animals after a facility closure.”104 In another notable development, Wisconsin appears to be taking a bipartisan interest in increasing CAFO permitting fees to account for their role in the widespread contamination of drinking water in the State.105 Steven Verburg, Tony Evers, Republicans Both Looking to Get Factory Farms to Pay for Cleaner Water, WIS. STATE J. (Mar. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/WL95-GMDG. Although these state-level efforts are notable, they do not provide a comprehensive solution to what is a national problem. As stated by the Executive Director of the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, “The present system of producing food animals in the United States is not sustainable and presents an unacceptable level of risk to public health and damage to the environment, as well as unnecessary harm to the animals we raise for food.”106 The FARM SAFE Act proposed in this Article would tackle the negative consequences of industrialized agriculture while providing federal support where it is needed most—to promote proven sustainable agricultural practices that protect the environment and public health and help to ensure long-term food security and safety. The FARM SAFE Act is about much more than eliminating bad practices of large agribusiness; it would commit the resources of the federal government— taxpayer funds and agency efforts—to assisting agricultural operations that grow food sustainably. Moreover, the FARM SAFE Act would provide support exclusively to small and midsized agricultural producers whose success or failure dramatically impacts their rural communities. Over time, the changes would restore contaminated watersheds, create new jobs, and revitalize rural America. Sustainable agriculture has the potential of being a true positive for U.S. agriculture. Consider, for example, the USDA organic program, which successfully created an entirely new, internationally recognized brand with ever-growing market power.107 The organic certification program was established under the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522. For more information, see the USDA Organic website at https://perma. cc/39A2-DNHR. With USDA organic-certified food now featured on grocery shelves from Whole Foods to Walmart,108 Jessica Wohl, Wal-Mart Aims to Push Organic Foods into Mainstream, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/M8YL-5EPH. the success of the organic program has demonstrated that agricultural producers are willing to embrace new production methods when they are compensated for them. In the case of the organic program, this compensation has come in the form of transition assistance and the ability to label and charge a premium for food produced under specific production and handling 104. Id. 105. 106. PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., supra note 10, at viii. The report further notes that CAFOs are increasingly found worldwide, often in countries with even fewer regulations and enforcement actions than in the United States. Id. at 9. 107. 108. 704 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:685 standards, such as prohibitions on synthetic fertilizers and genetic engineering, as well as proactive management of soil fertility.109 E.g., NAT’L ORGANIC PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ORGANIC PRODUCTION AND HANDLING STANDARDS (2016), https://perma.cc/D5XY-B7UM. The federal government created the industrial agricultural complex through law and taxpayer dollars; legislative change can redirect those same assets to create a sustainable agricultural infrastructure. Instead of continuing to support a model that benefits the corporate few at the expense of society as a whole, the United States must promote agricultural practices that are proven to minimize environmental harm and public health effects while promoting good stewardship of the soil, water, animals, and other farm inputs. As the watersheds are restored and agricultural operations diversify, opportunities now lost will be reclaimed, from the return of recreation and tourism to restoring jobs whose loss has devastated the rural economy. These are not new concepts, nor is the realization that industrial agriculture is unsustainable.110 As the climate grows more unstable and already strained global resources become even more scarce, the goal of agricultural production must change from producing cheap food quickly to producing nutrient-rich food sustainably.111 Climate changes are likely to make monoculture crop production untenable—even in the near future—and will exacerbate the already dire effects of large-scale agriculture on water quality as more severe storms will mean more flooding, more fertilizer runoff, and more overflowing manure lagoons. Increasing biodiversity, as well as diversity in production methods, will be necessary to survive unexpected disruptions from weather, pests, and socioeconomic difficulties.112

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Nuclear fail-safe › AT: Say No

A joint statement was issued that affirms that the nuclear powers don’t want to fight a nuclear war – they will be willing to cooperate since the CP reduces chances of a nuclear war

White House, 1-3-2022, "Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races," https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/

The People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities. We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented. We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State. We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. We are resolved to pursue constructive dialogue with mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other’s security interests and concerns.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Nuclear fail-safe › Solvency – Nuclear War

The CP prevents miscalc and eliminates the risk of nuclear use

Sam Nunn, Ernest J. Moniz 11-17-2021, Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, was a senator from 1972 to 1997. Ernest J. Moniz was energy secretary from 2013 to 2017. They are co-chairs of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. "Biden should do more to prevent the accidental launch of nuclear weapons. Here’s how," Washington Post, GH-PJ

President Biden can accelerate our efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear use by conducting a review aimed at strengthening nuclear “fail-safe,” the safeguards that could prevent unauthorized, inadvertent or mistaken use of a nuclear weapon, including through false warning of an attack, and challenge other nuclear powers to conduct their own internal reviews. Perhaps the most comprehensive review of the U.S. nuclear command and control systems was almost 30 years ago during the George H.W. Bush administration, spearheaded by Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney and led by the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick. New technologies, the strategic environment and threats from the cyber, space and information warfare domains to the U.S. Nuclear command and control system have become more varied and complex since the end of the Cold War. However, many of the technical, procedural and policy measures to assure the highest standards of nuclear weapons control remain grounded in that era. The ongoing U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program — and the nuclear modernization programs of potential nuclear adversaries, in particular Russia and China — offer both challenges and opportunities. In this century, the U.S. nuclear weapons system, including command and control, will increasingly rely on digital and automated technologies, so nuclear operations and policies must be updated to anticipate these changes. The broader aim of the fail-safe review process should be to reduce and (where possible) eliminate the risk of nuclear use as the result of an accident, a miscalculation, a false warning, terrorism or a deliberate act. The review should also consider bilateral and multilateral risk reduction measures, focusing on confidence-building and enhanced predictability, that could be taken with Russia, China and other states with nuclear weapons, including options to increase warning and decision times for leaders. Such a review should assess options for improving technologies, processes and policies in ways that maintain required levels of nuclear weapons command and control. This could include a process for certifying the safety, security and reliability of nuclear systems and fail-safe procedures at least every two years. Another option might be to implement, for the first time, a system that would allow for the post-launch destruction of nuclear weapons or their associated delivery systems, if launched by mistake. The review should also include cooperative measures, including the establishment of cyber-nuclear “rules of the road” and red-line understandings with other nuclear nations precluding cyberattacks on nuclear systems, as well as establishing a Joint Center for the exchange of data from early-warning systems and notifications of missile launches. All nuclear-armed states must learn from history — and especially the errors and miscalculations that have led to past wars. We should give ourselves every feasible tool to prevent a mistake or blunder from turning into a catastrophe beyond imagination.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Ukraine Intervention › Solvency - Russia

Quick devastating end to Ukraine causes Russian military collapse – takes them out as a threat

, 6/20/2022, "What if Russia's Army Fails in Ukraine?," RAND Corporation, William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and from 2014 to 2022 he served as executive director of the RAND Business Leaders Forum. He chairs the board of trustees of Eurasia Foundation, which carries out U.S. government-funded programs abroad to improve governance, strengthen civil society, and counter disinformation. He cochairs the international advisory council of the America 250 Foundation, the nonprofit arm of the U.S. Semiquincentennial Commission. GH-PJ

Despite incremental gains in eastern Ukraine, a is possible. Russian forces could suffer catastrophic defeat akin to that of in the 1967 Six-Day War, when more than 80 percent of its military materiel was lost. Is such a defeat possible? Military history is replete with breakdowns. Last summer, the collapsed amid weak governance and . So have other large or well-equipped armies—the demoralized , the outmaneuvered and , and the weakened and . Central to these fiascos was a lack of cohesion in military institutions, poor governance and corruption, and popular unwillingness to defend the state. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's , government, and society appears valid.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Ukraine Intervention › Solvency - Russia

Plan is key to end Ukraine quickly and stop escalation

, 4-21-2022, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council, GH-PJ

What can NATO and the European Union do to prevent Russia from escalating the conflict to unacceptable levels? What follows are a few principles to guide NATO’s assessment of preventing and avoiding escalation. Keep Ukraine in the fight. The first, and most immediate, curative is to keep Ukraine in the war. This means continued financial assistance, shipments of lethal aid, and real-time intelligence sharing, as well as humanitarian assistance and help with absorption and resettlement of refugees. The United States and Europe have shown unity and concerted action in responding swiftly to Russian aggression in Ukraine and this must continue, even as Putin seeks to find and drive wedges between transatlantic allies and partners. In this struggle, a coherent narrative, shared and articulated in common, will be critical. In this regard, continuous references to the and a steady drumbeat of measures not to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a free hand in Ukraine. A degree of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of US and NATO intervention should he go too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An “all measures on the table” approach will force Russian planners to consider, and prepare for, multiple response scenarios, complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one’s opponent that one is too frightened to engage is more likely to encourage than to deter. The most effective way to prevent spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to . Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the best way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention by NATO. This means combat aircraft, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket artillery, mobile air defense, secure radios, unmanned aerial vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems in great numbers in the United States and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such as the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, also warrant consideration. If NATO intervenes, do it decisively. Several European nations, including Poland, Denmark, and Belgium, are considering some form of in Ukraine, while calls for a no-fly zone are mounting as the civilian death toll rises. This suggests a critical mass of support may be forming for outside intervention under certain circumstances. Strong material and financial aid may enable Ukraine to hold on, and even advance to retake occupied territory, but Russia remains a far larger and stronger opponent. If the logic that it is better to defeat Putin in Ukraine than on NATO territory is sound, intervention to prevent the fall of Ukraine or its dismemberment must be considered. The prospect of actual genocide of Ukrainian civilians, or use of weapons of mass destruction, might also trigger NATO intervention. This can take several forms. A no-fly zone would mean that NATO, or a coalition of the willing, employs combat aircraft based outside Ukraine to ground Russian military aviation, leaving ground combat to the Ukrainians (an analogy is the Kosovo air campaign). Unified command and control would be essential. The effort would fail if all targets required approval by thirty nations, so allowing discretion to military commanders acting within political guidance would be required. All Russian aircraft entering Ukrainian airspace would be engaged. Russian air defenses must be suppressed (perhaps even inside Russia), forward air controllers must be embedded with ground units to prevent fratricide, and target lists may be expanded quickly to include attack of Russian missile and rocket systems that are destroying Ukrainian cities. A no-fly zone is, of course, an escalation itself, but one intended to lead to a Russian defeat in Ukraine to prevent follow-on aggression in Europe. Entering the conflict from the air is a serious and sober step. Some aircrew would be lost. Putin could retaliate by launching ballistic missiles against Polish, Romanian, or other European targets. To do so, however, would mean expanding the conflict against a much stronger and wealthier NATO, at a point at which almost all of Russia’s available combat power is deployed in Ukraine. Intervention from the air also provides a clear firebreak. Introduction of large NATO ground forces would be an even more dramatic step Russia would surely seek to avoid if possible. Introduction of “peacekeeping forces” or establishing a “” in western Ukraine, use of NATO special forces and trainers, and deployment of “niche” specialists with critical skills such as communications, targeting, and computer-network defense are also forms of intervention that could contribute to success in Ukraine. Unlike air operations, however, these could make only marginal contributions that may not be worth the added risk of bringing the Alliance into the war. Should the campaign mature, and a no-fly zone materialize, these additional measures could augment Ukraine’s defense in helpful ways, but they should not precede air intervention. Direct intervention is a major step. It should not be undertaken except to achieve a decisive result. Bolster forward presence. As a hedge against further Russian aggression and to reassure allies, the US deployed two additional heavy brigades to Poland in February and early March, along with an airborne brigade, bringing the US rotational “heel-to-toe” brigade there to divisional strength. US divisional and corps-level headquarters were also sent. The US 2nd Cavalry Regiment based in Germany (actually a Stryker brigade) was relocated to Romania at the same time. Additional air units and ground troops from a number of allies have also been deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, while the forty-thousand-soldier NATO Response Force (NRF) has been alerted for the first time in its history. Putin’s rhetoric and aggressive disinformation and subversion efforts have, for years, targeted the Baltic States, which stand between Kaliningrad and contiguous Russia and extend almost to the suburbs of St. Petersburg. To forestall future aggression and cement firm deterrence, these forces should remain in eastern Europe at least for the near term (i.e., 3–5 years). As the campaign in Ukraine unfolds, Putin should understand clearly that NATO is postured to respond strongly to further escalation. For many years, policymakers have providing the Baltic States, and NATO’s eastern flank in general, with an adequate defense for fear of “provoking” Russia and to “maintain Alliance unity.” Measures to build up Ukraine’s defensive capacity were resisted for the same reasons; the Barack Obama administration opposed lethal aid, even after the invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, while the Donald Trump administration provided only a trickle. The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the pitfalls of this thinking. Putin’s threats were intended to keep his neighbors weak, but recent events have proven that it is the perception of weakness, not strength, that provokes him most. Accordingly, a from the borders of Finnmark to the Black Sea can prevent spillover or regional escalation, communicate resolve, and reassure host-nation publics that the conflict in Ukraine will not land on their doorstep. This is under way with the recent announcement that NATO battlegroups will be posted in . Meanwhile, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and others have also pledged to increase their forces in the Baltic States. To further strengthen deterrence and head off escalation, NATO should thoughtfully consider how best to help the Baltic States help themselves. Though proud members of the 2-percent club, their small economies prevent them from acquiring the air defense and heavy forces they need to deter future Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia field only a single light brigade each, while Lithuania fields a mechanized brigade with no tanks and a motorized brigade. (such as the European Deterrence Initiative), the United States and NATO could equip existing Baltic formations with modern tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense from reserve stocks, along with the training, spare parts, and ammunition needed to make them viable. The Alliance should also strengthen the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) formations in the Baltic States, as Secretary General Jens . These forces are too small to pose a credible offensive threat, but can defend long enough for other NATO forces, such as the NRF and US armored units in Poland, to move up to assist. In the maritime domain, NATO’s naval strength clearly outmatches Russia’s, but operations in confined waters like the Baltic or Black Seas , as well as sea mines. Russian anti-ship missiles also outrange NATO’s. Should Russian naval forces begin to attack commercial shipping in international waters, NATO can respond with standoff weapons, but should exercise caution within range of land-based systems until they are suppressed. If Turkey agrees, stronger NATO naval forces should enter the Black Sea to provide flexible response options to counter Russian maritime aggression. Take an unambiguous stance on nuclear policy. To relieve the threat of a Russian first-use nuclear strike and regain freedom of action, the United States and NATO must return to core deterrence principles. As it has for many decades, nuclear deterrence rests on both capability and credibility. NATO nuclear forces, though much reduced since the Cold War (especially with respect to theater nuclear systems) are redundant, survivable, and absolutely capable of destroying Russia from end to end. NATO’s credibility, on the other hand, is when leaders publicly express palpable fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, for unclear reasons and in unclear ways, and that they must at all costs avoid pushing him into a corner. A resolve not to be bullied is essential. Deterrence works best when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and calm, as John Kennedy was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As President Emmanuel recently, the West has nuclear weapons, too. Use economic tools as a primary “offensive” weapon. As the military campaign progresses, sanctions will continue to strangle the Russian economy. This pressure must continue—and, if possible, intensify—in order to force Russia, not just to the negotiating table, but to withdraw altogether from Ukrainian territory. To date, not all Russian banks have been banned from SWIFT, and many oligarchs remain unsanctioned. Though painful and difficult, weaning Europe from Russian energy, divesting from Russian businesses, and closing European markets are powerful weapons the EU can wield in its own right. (While 37 percent of Russian trade is with Europe, only .) Today, Russian energy remains exempt from EU sanctions. Developing alternate sources of energy, in particular, will take time and investment, but continued reliance on Russian oil and natural gas can only enable Putin to continue to finance the war in Ukraine. In March 2022, the EU imposed its on Russia, tightening export restrictions on dual-use technologies, expanding the list of sanctioned persons related to defense industries; imposing further trade restrictions for steel, iron, and luxury goods; and prohibiting transactions with specific state-owned enterprises. The challenge now will be to maintain the full range of sanctions until they bear fruit. Global food shortages, rising energy prices, and scarcities among certain commodities will challenge the sanctions regime. Much depends on the persistence and resolve of Western leaders. Properly understood, comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia—what the French finance minister has called “total economic and financial war on Russia”—can be a major tool, denying Putin the financial resources to carry on the war and generating internal pressures on elites that could lead to his removal. By themselves, however, they . China, Brazil, and India remain open markets and suppliers, if not active supporters, while Hungary and Serbia retain close ties. As former Deputy National Security Adviser General Rick Waddell has pointed out to the author, “An economy that is self-sufficient in energy and food takes a lot of killing.” In concert with diplomacy, aggressive information operations, and the military instrument of power, sanctions can be a vital component of an overall strategy to control and limit escalation and drive conflict termination by draining Russia of the financial resources it needs to carry on the war.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Multinational Observer Controller Teams › Solvency – Interoperability

Technology not key to interoperability – consensus and agreement first – unified command structures solve best

Larson ’04 – Larson, Eric V., Interoperability of Coalition Air Forces: Lessons Learned from U.S. Operations with NATO Allies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004. . GH-PJ

Interoperability problems may occur at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, tactical, and technological. Military planners tend to think of interoperability as a technical and tactical concern. However, interoperability may also be affected by disagreement over the political objectives of a military operation, such as whether to pursue total destruction of an adversary or some agreed-upon level of damage to his forces. Problems at one level can affect interoperability at other levels. For example, the absence of secure communication among allies can increase the risk of aircraft attrition. This problem can exacerbate political differences over the number of acceptable casualties. Allies must recognize and address the fundamental sources of interoperability problems. In cases where political motives are misaligned, no amount of technological improvement will mitigate the problem. For example, in Somalia, disagreement between allies over the purpose of the mission led to a chain of command that proved incapable of preventing or mitigating the consequences of a downed helicopter. Consensus at the strategic and operational levels will make tactical and technical problems less likely and easier to resolve when they arise. Successful operations require flexible organizational structures, doctrines, and procedures. NATO allies often face uncertainty about what missions will be needed, which countries will participate, and what types of forces each country will contribute. Potential disruptions in interoperability can be mitigated through a unified command structure to coordinate the roles of various countries. Standing organizations devoted to planning, training, and exercising coalition forces can provide continuity between operations. These elements should be lubricated by the ready availability of liaison officers to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers and to facilitate information flow between allies. These case studies have supported PAF work to improve U.S.-NATO interoperability in the areas of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Multinational Observer Controller Teams › Solvency – Interoperability

The plan solves for interoperability – prefer our ev since its has specific mechanisms for solvency and the best warrants

Colonel Paul W. Fellinger, March 2013, "Enhancing NATO Interoperability," United States Army Strategy Research Project, GH-PJ

The EUCOM Posture Statement refers to the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) in Grafenwohr, Germany as a “strategic asset” and the “linchpin for achieving vital theater objectives meeting the comprehensive security cooperation mission”. Further it “enables a broad range of multinational training events that ensures U.S. and partner nation forces are well-prepared...for global contingencies.”42 The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels Germany, subordinate to the JMTC, is the U.S. military’s only combat training center in Europe. Located in eastern 18 Bavaria, it has been a maneuver training center since 1938 when it was first used to train German units preparing for combat. Since the 1950’s, the JMRC trained American infantry and armor maneuver battalions to combat the threat of the Warsaw Pact. Most recently, the JMRC has hosted Maneuver Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs) for units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq.43 These units have comprised a mix of NATO forces. Other training exercises have included 1200 personnel from 18 different counties conducting Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT) and Police Mentor Liaison Team (POMLT) training for deployment to Afghanistan.44 According to Mr. Chris Irwin, the JMRC Protocol Officer, since 2005 the installation alone has hosted over 170 foreign flag officers, Chiefs and Ministers of Defense, and parliamentary level civilians. In that same time representatives from nearly 50 countries visited the center to observe some aspect of the training environment.45 Although each visit had a separate agenda the number of foreign visitors demonstrates JMRCs importance as America’s allies strive for greater interoperability. A critical aspect of any training event at the JMRC is the feedback facilitated by the eight Observer Controller (OC) Teams assigned to the Operations Group. Each team is comprised of hand selected American commissioned and non-commissioned officers who have successfully served in tactical unit of the same type and size of the organization they are tasked to observe. Feedback is provided to units in the form of both informal and formal AARs and is designed to allow the rotational unit to learn from their actions. The goal is that a unit, regardless of nationality, departs the JMRC better trained than when it arrived and prepared to fight and win in a combat zone. The AAR is a sensitive event: the unit members should feel that they can learn from their 19 mistakes without feeling as if they are being belittled, humiliated, or at risk of being relieved. It is particularly sensitive for foreign armies who have not experienced AARs in the past. For the AAR to be an effective learning tool requires rapport building and proficiency across a broad range of technical and tactical skills. As foreign units rotate through the training center it also requires a greater degree of cultural empathy and an understanding of foreign weapons and tactics. OCs develop themselves professionally through interaction with rotational units and through discussion with other officers and NCOs assigned to the center. Most OCs depart the JMRC to re-join regular Army units where their expertise often sets them apart from their peers. Many OCs depart having initiated relationships with their rotational counterparts that endure.46 Currently OC teams are comprised of only American personnel: there are limited opportunities for other countries to integrate into the existing teams. To further develop interoperability and subject matter expertise amongst our NATO allies there needs to be more multinational representation on the OC teams. A gradual integration of our NATO allies into the teams would develop deeper understanding, cultural awareness, and ensure interoperability into the future. It is also mutually beneficial for the United States Army and any army that participates: allied officers and non-commissioned officers will leave the training center with a greater understanding of how to integrate into the planning and execution process of the U.S. Army. The first phase of this integration would assign NATO officers to key billets within the organization. This would include the Deputy Commander of the Operations Group, a position normally held by an Army senior lieutenant colonel. This assignment would place him as second in command of JMRC, and should be for a period of not less than 2 years. Integration would continue to the OC teams where alliance officers would assume executive officer positions, normally reserved for senior Army majors. Figure 2: Example of Key Position Integration. The second phase of this integration is the creation of a multi-national OC team where American commissioned and non-commissioned officers man only half of the authorized positions available. Over time, as countries see the benefit of this integration, NATO officers and NCOs could fill any position within any team. NATO observer controllers would have the opportunity to develop lifelong relationships, understand the complexities of developing training exercises, facilitate learning through the AAR process, and gain greater understanding of operating in a multinational force. 21 Figure 3: Example of Integrated Maneuver Observer Controller Team. Service as an OC should be recognized throughout NATO as a career enhancing assignment for those selected. Attendance and successful graduation from the required OC Training Academy training should serve as NATO professional military education for junior officer and senior non-commissioned officers. Two years of successful service on an OC team should result in the award of a skill identifier and NATO qualification badge. Future assignments should, as much as feasible, include service in NATO integrated units like those assigned to the NATO Response Force (NRF). Integration of the best officers and non-commissioned officers by our NATO allies into the existing structure at JMRC is a great investment in the future of NATO, and builds interoperability from the bottom up. This investment of officers and NCOs 22 demonstrates commitment to the alliance that later translates to resolve, trust, and more effective operations when deployed together.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Advantage CPs › Net Assessment Office › Solvency – China

China-India-Pakistan war draws in the US and goes nuclear

, 5-19-2022, "Our Next ‘Unthinkable’ Crisis: Nuclear War in Asia?," United States Institute of Peace, GH-PJ

The British Empire’s withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 left unresolved issues of statehood and borders — and the Himalayan frontiers of China, India and Pakistan have since formed a persistent, unhealed wound. The three nations have clashed in dozens of confrontations, from full-scale, conventional wars to Himalayan border skirmishes and armed standoffs, terrorist attacks or air strikes. India-Pakistan conflicts have escalated since Pakistani terrorists in 2008, killing or injuring hundreds of Indians. The India-China border conflict has flared since 2020, including its worst violence . The risks of sudden violence in the region in March when India’s military accidentally launched an unarmed, supersonic missile 75 miles into Pakistan. Luckily, the missile’s crash killed no one, and it came in a moment of relative calm in the two countries’ volatile relations. Less noticed outside the region is China’s and India’s of and capabilities along their disputed border, including of Indian troops to to that zone. While the rivalries, periodic clashes and armed capacity of the three nations have sharpened over 15 years, policies to protect strategic stability “didn’t really move along with the changes,” said , an Asia security policy specialist at USIP. Fundamentally, “there is an absolute lack of strategic engagement among the three powers about how they would manage escalation,” and rising uncertainty about “how crises might spiral,” he said. “I think what we’ve seen in Russia and Ukraine gives us reason to think hard about the unthinkable.” Singh among 19 Asia and nuclear security specialists who conducted . The report analyzes recent years’ evolution of the conflicts and offers recommendations for U.S. policymakers. “We see an evolution, both in terms of the capabilities” of the rival states, notably “more and different types of weapons of technology,” and perhaps more importantly, in deteriorating relationships, “particularly between India and China, and India and Pakistan,” said , a scholar and policy practitioner on South Asia and USIP advisor. These evolutions lead “to possibilities for even the potential of nuclear use in the region that are very worrisome,” he said. Analysts from the USIP-convened discussed specific evolutions that are increasing the risks. One is that China is significantly expanding its nuclear arsenal, which is expected to reach “up to 700 deployed warheads within the next five years,” said , who leads efforts to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons at the nonpartisan . Another problem is that the return to power of Afghanistan’s Taliban creates new space for violent extremist groups bent on attacking India through Pakistan. Such attacks have been a frequent trigger for India-Pakistan military clashes. Southern Asia has gradually become a theater of rival alliances — between the United States and India on one hand and China and Pakistan on the other, a polarization that has been accelerated by the global strategic rivalry between China and the United States, noted , an expert on Chinese foreign policy at the .