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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – Balkans

Ambiguous US commitments to NATO cause Russia to test resolve in Europe---it causes a deterrence perception crisis

Beauchamp 16 – senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology (Zach, “Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war)

Trump’s comments are worse than just undermining NATO: By refusing to commit to the Baltics categorically, he encourages Russia to test American resolve in dangerous ways. According to some Russia experts, Vladimir Putin’s ultimate wish in Europe is to break NATO. The way to do that, according to these scholars, is to expose the Article 5 guarantee as hollow: to show that when push comes to shove, the United States or other large NATO powers wouldn’t actually defend the weaker states. The Baltic states would be the most likely scenario for this to happen. They are very small, they’re right on Russia’s borders, and they aren't really all that important to Western countries' own security. By threatening these states, Russia would force a question: Are the United States, Britain, and France really willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in defense of a tiny state? In 2014, the Danish intelligence agency — note that Denmark is a NATO ally — publicly warned that this was a serious possibility: Russia may attempt to test NATO’s cohesion by engaging in military intimidation of the Baltic countries, for instance with a threatening military build-up close to the borders of these countries and simultaneous attempts of political pressure, destabilization and possibly infiltration. Russia could launch such an intimidation campaign in connection with a serious crisis in the post-Soviet space or another international crisis in which Russia confronts the United States and NATO. The critical issue in preventing this scenario, again, is the perception of NATO commitment. So long as Putin believes that the US and other major powers are firmly committed to the defense of their treaty allies, he’s unlikely to risk starting a war that he would almost certainly lose. This is why Trump’s comments are so damaging: They send a direct signal to the Kremlin that a Trump-led America will be less than serious about the defense of NATO allies. This suggests that a ploy to break NATO might have a bigger risk of succeeding than previously thought. But note that Trump also refused to say unequivocally that he wouldn’t abide by the NATO treaty. “I don’t want to tell you what I’d do because I don’t want Putin to know what I’d do,” he said. But the entire point of NATO is that Putin needs to know what America will do. If he knows the US will defend the Baltics, then he will likely back off. If he knows the US won’t defend the Baltics, then we could have the breakup of NATO — which would be quite bad but wouldn’t immediately risk World War III. The nightmare scenario, though, is that Putin’s confidence in NATO is undermined even though the United States under Trump remains committed to defending its treaty allies. That’s the scenario under which misperceptions potentially escalate into an actual war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. Max Fisher wrote an extended piece on how this uncertainty could plausibly escalate to war for Vox last year; I encourage you to read it. But the point, according the experts Fisher spoke to, is that a firm understanding that the US will defend its NATO allies is crucial. "That kind of misperception situation is definitely possible, and that’s how wars start," Steve Saideman, a professor who studies NATO at Carleton University, told Fisher. He then scarily compared modern Europe with pre–World War I Europe: "The thing that makes war most thinkable is when other people don’t think it’s thinkable."

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 1AR – Solves War

Consensus goes aff---NATO eradicates war

Beauchamp 16 – senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, citing multiple political science professors (Zach, “Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war)

Trump’s comments about NATO are like an arrow pointed straight at the heart of the alliance -- and, if implemented, would directly threaten the foundations of global peace itself. Any president could simply choose not to abide by Article 5. But abrogating NATO agreements was always deemed unthinkable by both parties, which has played an important part in maintaining credible deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Trump has put the idea of the US not defending NATO on the table, in a very real way. This threatens the very integrity of NATO itself. If NATO allies start to think that the United States can’t be trusted to defend them, that NATO is just on paper, then they’ll start to wonder why they bother to adhere to this alliance in the first place. If Trump wins the election, this could cause them to exit the security agreement altogether. According to the best available research, this would make war on the European continent far more likely. One study, from professors Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds, surveyed about 200 years of data on conflicts and concluded that "defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world." Another study looked specifically at the period from 1950 to 2000 and found that "formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits." The US's formal agreements, then, deter aggression against its non-nuclear partners (like Germany and the Baltics). In their new book on American grand strategy, Dartmouth scholars Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth also surveyed research from regional experts and found a similar consensus. In Europe, they write, "most assessments nonetheless sum up to the conclusion that NATO is a net security plus." Trump, then, could end up weakening one of America’s most important security agreements — and may already have done so.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – Catchall

The alternative is war

Berlinski 7-15-2018 – PhD in IR @ Oxford (Claire, “Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan: Postwar U.S. statesmen designed our world order as it is for a reason. They had lived through what happened without it.,” Politico, )

Trump’s NATO-bashing surprised no one. He has repeatedly suggested the United States’ postwar security architecture is a “bad deal,” one negotiated by weak and foolish “incompetents.” Foreign policy, in his view, is a zero-sum game; any benefit to another nation must of necessity be a loss for the United States. “NATO countries,” he declared on Twitter, “must pay MORE, the United States must pay LESS. Very Unfair!” Unfair? A world that revolves around American military, economic and cultural power, and uses the U.S. dollar as its reserve currency? What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock. Charles de Gaulle believed the Anglophone world could not, in the long term, be trusted with French security. It led him to withdraw France from NATO’s military integrated command and launch an independent nuclear development program. The independent nuclear program was real, but the withdrawal from NATO wasn’t—a secret agreement kept France in NATO anyway. But, today, with other NATO members obliged to consider the costs and benefits of an independent accommodation with Russia and the risks and rewards of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle is saying from the grave, I told you so. The American-led world order, undergirded by the ideal of liberal democracy, has been highly imperfect. But it has been the closest thing to Utopia our fallen and benighted species has ever seen. Its benefits are not just economic, although those benefits are immense. Its benefits must be measured in wars not fought, lives not squandered. Yet many Americans have turned their backs on history and reality alike. Let us hope pride does not prevent them from realizing this mistake before it’s far too late.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – Catchall

American leadership in NATO solves their impacts

Burns 2018 - former under secretary of state and ambassador to NATO, teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard Nicholas, "What America Gets out of NATO," Jul 11, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html

Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: climate change; drugand cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East. And America’s NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy and freedom, under assault by Russia and China.

Mr. Trump’s campaign to undermine the European Union and diminish America’s leadership in NATO serves none of these interests. He seems driven by resentment about European trade surpluses and low defense budgets, issues that blind him to all the other benefits Americans derive from our alliance with Europe and Canada.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › AT: Encirclement

Spending sufficient now – coerced, rapid increases in spending fail

Horn and Eloranta 2018

Heather Souvaine Horn global affairs editor at The New Republic, interviewing Jari Eloranta, an economic historian at Appalachian State University who specializes in military spending July 12, 2018 “Is It Fair for Trump to Bash NATO Over Military Spending?” https://newrepublic.com/article/149819/fair-trump-bash-nato-military-spending

To what extent has the president pointed to a real problem?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › AT: Encirclement

Now matters---internal restraints on the executive have completely eroded and undermines crisis response

Brands 1/30 - Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies [Hal, 2019, Bloomberg, Can U.S. alliances withstand Trump's venom?, ]

WASHINGTON - After two years under rhetorical assault from U.S. President Donald Trump, America’s alliances have somehow held up. This year, however, the constraints on Trump’s anti-alliance instincts are falling away, and a mix of internal and external pressures are endangering several key alliances at once.

This trend is most visible with respect to NATO. The trans-Atlantic alliance has been a target of Trump’s ire for decades. Since taking office, he has berated European leaders, waffled on America’s Article 5 commitment to protect allies, and even mused about withdrawing from the pact. Yet for two years, largely thanks to the initiative of Congress and the Pentagon, day-to-day relations with NATO remained relatively steady. The administration increased spending on military activities meant to deter Russian aggression. The alliance also took steps to improve its military readiness and address unconventional threats such as cyberattacks and information warfare.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › AT: Encirclement

Encirclement didn’t cause annexation---this is ahistorical and an excuse for brutal Russian aggression

Kirchik 14 – Fellow at Foreign Policy Initiative

(James, “NATO Expansion Didn’t Set Off the Ukraine Crisis” Foreign Policy, )

NATO Expansion Didn't Set Off the Ukrainian Crisis Russia hasn't been "encircled" by the West -- Vladimir Putin simply wants to be able to invade his neighbors at will. Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea has produced a great deal of handwringing in the West, with much of the ire directed at NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's slow, 15-year process of expansion into the former Warsaw Pact nations, critics allege, sparked a tragic, three-stage process: It humiliated Russia, led to the country's encirclement, and provoked its aggressive behavior toward neighbors. NATO, they say, is a relic of the Cold War, serving no purpose other than to antagonize America's potential partners in the Kremlin. Blaming NATO's enlargement for Russian belligerence has been a feature of European security debates since the end of the Cold War, and a reliable excuse for explaining away every disagreement between Moscow and the West. "Wasn't consolidating a democratic Russia more important than bringing the Czech Navy into NATO?" New York Times columnist Tom Friedman scoffed after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, in a column aptly entitled, "What did we expect?" Returning to this complaint after last month's invasion of Ukraine, Friedman declared that NATO expansion "remains one of the dumbest things we've ever done and, of course, laid the groundwork for Putin's rise." Fellow New York Times columnist Ross Douthat derided NATO expansion as a "neoconservative" project (pursued, oddly enough, by Bill Clinton) "to effectively encircle" Russia. And no less a figure than the late George F. Kennan concluded that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post cold-war era." Tempting as it may be to castigate NATO for the deterioration of relations with Russia, nothing could be further from the truth: It was, and remains, the Russian regime's ideology, rhetoric, and conduct that provided the impulse for NATO expansion, not the other way around. Far from representing a historic error, the enlargement of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe has been one of the few unmitigated success stories of American foreign policy, as it consolidated democracy and security on a continent once scarred by total war. Faulting NATO for Russia's bad behavior betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of post-Cold War European politics, misrepresents the organization's role as a defensive alliance, and confuses aggressor with victim. First, a little history is in order. Russia's hostile actions towards neighbors hardly ended with the collapse of Soviet communism. On the contrary, Moscow continued to bully its former republics and satellites throughout the early and mid 1990s, even before the first round of NATO enlargement (to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999). In 1992 and 1993 -- after Russia formally recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- Moscow cut off energy supplies to these small, reborn democracies in an attempt to pressure them into keeping Russian military forces and intelligence officers on their sovereign territory. From 1997 to 2000, according to former U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania Keith C. Smith, Russia halted oil shipments to the country no less than nine times after it refused to sell refineries to a Russian state company. To this day, the Russian Foreign Ministry maintains that the Baltic republics -- which Russia militarily conquered, occupied, and subjugated for nearly five decades -- "voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in 1940." The Balts didn't become part of NATO until 2004. Given this history, is it any wonder why these countries -- or any other country victimized by Soviet-imposed tyranny -- would want to join the alliance? Is it NATO's fault for saying OK? Critics of NATO expansion like to point out that, in exchange for earning Soviet acceptance of German unification, the United States and its allies promised not to expand the Atlantic alliance. This is a myth, stemming from a selective Russian interpretation of the diplomacy at the tail end of the Cold War. In February of 1990, with hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops still stationed in East Germany, then-German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, traveled to Moscow to meet with former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. A day earlier, President George H.W. Bush had sent Kohl a letter suggesting that East German territory be given a "special military status" -- the specifics of which would be determined later -- within NATO, implying that the alliance would indeed continue to expand. Hoping to earn speedy Soviet authorization for the removal of their troops and the unification of Germany, however, Genscher told Gorbachev that, "NATO will not expand itself to the East." But the Germans were not speaking for Washington, never mind the NATO alliance. Furthermore, as historian Mary Elise Sarotte has pointed out, Genscher's concession was never made in writing, and nor did Gorbachev "criticize Mr. Kohl publicly when he and Mr. Bush later agreed to offer only a special military status to the former East Germany instead of a pledge that NATO wouldn't expand." Ultimately, a legally binding agreement not to expand NATO beyond its pre-1990 borders never materialized, and Russia's latter-day claim that it was deceived by the West has no basis in fact. Russia's cries of Western betrayal are really just a smokescreen. Far from threatening Russia, NATO has repeatedly gone out of its way to be conciliatory. A 1997 agreement outlining relations between the two former adversaries stipulated that the NATO states had "no intention, no plan, and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of its new members. These "three no's" were intended as an expression of goodwill and a reaffirmation of NATO's founding principle: that it is a defensive alliance with no designs on Russian territory. In the spirit of transparency, the organization founded the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 to facilitate cooperation between Moscow and member states. Not only did Western leaders repeatedly and explicitly make clear that NATO posed no threat whatsoever to Russia's security, some even suggested that Russia ultimately join the very military alliance that had been established to contain it during the Cold War. "We need Russia for the resolution of European and global problems," Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski said in 2009. "That is why I think it would be good for Russia to join NATO." This hardly constitutes "cram[ming] NATO expansion down the Russians' throats," as Friedman alleges. Regardless, Sikorski was rebuked immediately by then-Russian envoy to NATO and now Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who retorted that "Great powers don't join coalitions, they create coalitions. Russia considers itself a great power...For the moment, we don't see any real change in the organization, we only see the organization getting ready for the wars of past Europe." With its invasion of Crimea, the first forcible annexation of European territory since World War II, it is Russia, and not NATO, that has returned the continent to "the wars of past Europe." More significant, however, was what this terse exchange revealed about the debate over NATO expansion: It has never really been about the enlargement of a defensive military alliance, but rather the nature of the Russian regime itself. If Russia had followed a democratic path (like the former communist states which joined NATO) and ceased posing a threat to its neighbors, there would have been nothing preventing it from becoming a suitable candidate for membership. After all, if the foreign minister of Poland, a nation historically terrorized by Russia and which is once again rearming itself in light of Crimea, proposed that Russia join NATO, who could possibly oppose it? As Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt aptly pointed out on Twitter recently, it was the "historic failure of Russia that a quarter of a century after fall of Soviet Union the new generations in its neighbors see it as an enemy," while, in contrast, "A generation or two after 1945 Germany is surrounded by countries that, after all the horrible pain and suffering, see it as a friend." Russia's hostility to NATO enlargement stems from the same root as all of its conflicts with the West: the zero-sum worldview and neo-imperialist agenda of President Vladimir Putin. . In 2005, he declared the breakup of the Soviet Union to be "a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century." And if there was any remaining doubt that he intends to reconstitute the empire, Putin erased it with his furious March 18 speech to Russia's Federation Council in which he essentially reserved the right to invade and annex any territory where ethnic Russians claim to feel oppressed. To say that NATO expansion "laid the groundwork for Putin's rise," as Friedman does, gets the situation exactly backwards. Putin's ascent was almost entirely the product of domestic factors, namely, the economic chaos of the 1990s and the popular desire for a firm response to the insurgency in Chechnya. NATO expansion barely registered on the minds of ordinary Russians. With Russia amassing tens of thousands of troops on Ukraine's eastern border and stoking ethnic conflict in the hopes of providing a pretext for gobbling up even more territory, lending credence to Moscow's complaints about NATO expansion is intellectually irresponsible and geopolitically dangerous. In the midst of negotiations to deescalate the crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has demanded that Ukraine essentially dismember itself into autonomous regions (the easier for Russia to meddle in the country's eastern provinces, which are heavily populated with ethnic Russians) and "firm guarantees" forswearing NATO and EU membership. Given that Russia has already invaded and annexed Ukrainian territory, and that it has shown no sign of discontinuing its aggressive behavior on the country's borders, these ultimatums constitute nothing less than a threat to use additional force if its demands are not met. Rather than firmly rebut these outrageous attempts to violate the sovereignty of an independent country, Secretary of State John Kerry has stated that Russia has "legitimate concerns" in Ukraine. This despite the fact that according to a new poll, 66 percent of ethnic Russian citizens there feel no pressure or threat from the new government in Kiev, a direct refutation of Moscow's relentless propaganda to the contrary. The assertion by Russia (and its Western apologists) that NATO constitutes a threat has always been a ruse. As was the case during the Cold War, it is Russia that threatens its neighbors today, not vice-versa. Russia's real reason for opposing NATO expansion, as one Ukrainian Foreign Ministry official told me in Kiev last month, is that the alliance's collective security provision would prevent Moscow from invading its neighbors, something that Russia has done twice in the last six years. It is for this reason that NATO -- and its expansion -- remains vital for European security and stability. To appreciate the hypocrisy of faulting NATO enlargement for the present predicament, one need only consider the claim that the military alliance has "encircled" Russia. There is only one country in Europe being encircled right now -- and it isn't Russia.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › AT: Encirclement

Russian aggression is pre-emptive---not caused by the US

Murray 15 – Professor of Political Science @ Alberta

(Robert, “Time for a New Western Strategy in Ukraine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/10/time-for-a-new-western-strategy-in-ukraine/)

The debate of whether or not to arm Ukraine seems to be transcending the prototypical liberal-conservative divide, with voices like realist international politics scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt joining the chorus of others who see arming Ukraine as an unnecessary escalation.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 1AR – Global Deterrent

Remaining steadfast to treaty commitments against Russia is perceived by allies and enemies globally

Samp 17 – senior fellow @ CSIS, MA in International Affairs @ GW (Lisa, with Kathleen Hicks et al, “Recalibrating US Strategy Towards Russia,” Kindle Edition)

How the United States chooses to manage the Russia challenge will shape the geopolitical land- scape for decades to come. U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere will be watching to see how the United States responds to the evolving challenges posed by Russia and will calibrate their behavior accordingly. In the rush to make deals with Russia to se- cure lesser objectives, the United States may well find itself sacri- ficing a more fundamental goal: advancing a global order that benefits our people, our econo- my, and our constitutional values. Standing resolutely by our allies and our treaty commitments is central to upholding that order. We must meet Russia's efforts to challenge it with the steel of our determination rather than mush that cedes our hard-won gains.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 1AR – Russian Expansion Impact

Russian aggression causes extinction

Shirreff 2016 - senior British army officer and former deputy supreme allied commander Europe Richard, "Putin's aggression in Europe should worry the US," Oct 21, www.cnn.com/2016/10/21/opinions/russia-aggression-nato-shirreff-opinion/

Since the formation of NATO in 1949 the defense of Europe and the free world has depended on the absolute certainty that whatever president is occupying the White House, the United States will come to the aid of a NATO member if attacked. Any doubt about the American commitment, and the credibility of NATO's doctrine of collective defense, is holed below the waterline. At a time when the West faces a greater threat from a resurgent Russia since the most dangerous crises of the Cold War, NATO, more than ever, needs to stand strong, united and credible. Russia's invasion of Crimea and Ukraine in 2014 may have already lit the fuse that could lead to the unthinkable: nuclear war with Russia in Europe. Consider the words and actions of President Vladimir Putin, who has described the breakup of the Soviet Union as the "greatest geo-strategic tragedy of the 20th century." In his speech on March 18, 2014, the day Crimea was admitted into the Russian Federation, Putin majored on the threat the West posed to Russia by its continued encirclement and warned about the possibility of pushback: "If you compress the spring to its limit, it will snap back hard: something you should remember," while claiming the right to protect the interests of Russian speakers everywhere, "even if it will worsen our relations with some states." Overnight, Putin became NATO's strategic adversary, starting a dynamic that could lead to a clash with NATO over the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (which have significant Russian-speaking minorities). Two years on and the threat is even greater. Indeed, the ratchet of tension clicks tighter on an almost weekly basis: Even this week we wake up to news of Russia sailing warships near the British coast in "a show of force and a show of capabilities," according to Peter Felstead, editor of Jane's Defence Weekly. Unprecedented levels of military activity on the borders and in the airspace of the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden have been matched by the rapid buildup of military forces in Russia's Western Military District on the borders of NATO. For example, in January, Russia announced the formation and deployment of three motor rifle divisions, about 60,000 troops, along the Russian frontier with the Baltic states. And the Russians have kept themselves busy with regular so-called snap exercises to test the readiness of their military, at least one of which was based on a scenario of invasion and occupation of the Baltic states. Putin's strategic aim is clear: to re-establish Russia's status as one of the world's great powers and to dominate the former republics of the Soviet Union -- imperialist intentions that might have been acceptable to great powers in the 19th century but which are an affront in 2016. If the opportunity presents itself, he may well activate long-held plans to march into the Baltic states. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's 1938 comment on Czechoslovakia, why are events in these faraway countries of which we may know little important to Americans? First, because if Russia puts one soldier across the borders of the Baltic states it means war with NATO. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have been members of NATO since 2004 and are therefore protected under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the founding document of NATO, which states that an attack on one is an attack on all. A Russian attack on the Baltic states puts America at war with Russia -- meaning nuclear war, because Russia integrates nuclear weapons into every aspect of its military doctrine. And don't think Russia would limit itself to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Any form of nuclear release by the Russians would almost certainly precipitate nuclear retaliation by the United States, and the dreadful reality of mutually assured destruction and the end of life as we know it would follow. Indeed, Russia is at war with America already. Russian hacking of Democratic Party email servers and, if confirmed, WikiLeaks publicizing of Clinton campaign emails to discredit the Democrats and propel Donald Trump -- arguably what Putin would classify as a "useful idiot" into the White House -- is classic maskirovka -- deception, aimed at undermining the intelligence and integrity of the enemy in a way that remains below the threshold of conventional warfare. In the words of Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center, and a man with close connections to the Putin regime, the Kremlin has been at war since 2014. But although the clock may be ticking close to midnight, it is not too late. Maintenance of the peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe for nearly 70 years depends on effective deterrence. The bar of risk must be raised too high for Russia to consider any opportunistic move into the Baltic states. This requires forward basing of a credible military capability in the Baltic states and eastern Poland (rather than the token presence agreed at the NATO Warsaw Summit in July). NATO reserves able to move quickly and effectively to bolster defenses in the Baltics will send a powerful message. It also requires Canada and European members of NATO to recognize that military capabilities lost from cumulative disarmament over the past two decades must be regenerated. This means increasing defense spending, almost certainly above the 2% of gross domestic product agreed -- but often not acted upon -- by NATO members (less the United States, UK, Estonia and Greece). 2017 is 100th anniversary of the first occasion the United States intervened in one of Europe's wars. The region's security is a matter of American security, and it means continued and close engagement in Europe and a continuation of the strong leadership that America has given NATO from the start.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 1AR – Russia partners with Hezbollah

Shapiro proves that Russia will partner with Iran and terror groups like Hezbollah if the US left NATO, that spirals into a global war

Cohen 2016 - Former U.S. State Department project officer involved in managing economic reform projects Josh, "Is Russia supporting Hezbollah," Feb 8, intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/russia-supporting-hezbollah

Adding a further degree of uncertainty to the story, neither the Israeli or Russian governments have acknowledged the report yet. This is not surprising, for a direct Russia-Hezbollah relationship could lead to any number of dangerous scenarios that might spiral out of control. For example, what happens if Israel strikes Russian arms shipments to Hezbollah and Russian troops are killed in the process? Alternatively, what if Russia defends an arms transfer to Hezbollah by shooting down an Israeli jet with one of its S-400 missiles recently deployed to Syria? Either one of these scenarios could lead to a rapid escalation that would draw the United States — still Israel’s closest ally despite the longstanding tensions between Netanyahu and Obama — into the fray. However, even if one of these worst case scenarios does not come to pass, at a minimum, Israel’s freedom for maneuver in Syria is diminished by the Russian presence. Whereas previously Israel owned the skies over Syria, the Israeli air force must now coordinate its activities with the Russians to avoid accidental clashes. Moreover, according to a report co-authored by Israeli Brig. Gen. Muni Katz and Nadav Pollak for the Washington Institute, simply working alongside the Russians will significantly upgrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities. “Hezbollah will be exposed to Russian military thought, which entails sophisticated operational concepts and advanced military planning skills,” the report notes, including “how to organize an effective command-and-control structure, how to choose different weapons for different scenarios, how to create additional targets after entering a battlefield, and how to maintain logistical routes.” The authors argue this will enhance Hezbollah’s offensive warfare and urban capabilities, which better positions the group to make good on Nasrallah’s pledge to launch strikes into northern Israel’s Galilee region in the next war. Hezbollah can also watch the weapons systems the Russians use, and according to the report, “can learn how to use its existing weapons more effectively, and examine systems it might want to procure in the future.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 1AR – AT: Russian Aggression

NATO is the only tool to deter Putin

Burns 2018 - former under secretary of state and ambassador to NATO, teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard Nicholas, "What America Gets out of NATO," Jul 11, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html

First, NATO’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to protect North America and Europe — the heart of the democratic world — from attack. Threats to our collective security have not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern Europe and American elections. NATO is a force multiplier: The United States has allies who will stand by us, while Russia has none.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – Europe

Retreat now is a victory for Putin, he’ll escalate in the future.

Economist '4/2 ["Why Ukraine Must Win," economist.com/leaders/2022/04/02/why-ukraine-must-win]

The other worry is Mr Macron’s: that NATO will provoke Russia. From the start of this war, when he spoke of “consequences…such as you have never seen in your entire history”, Mr Putin has hinted that Western involvement could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Wisely, the West has therefore been clear that NATO will not fight against Russian forces—because, if they did, the war could spin out of control, with catastrophic results.

Yet backing away from Mr Putin’s nuclear-tinged threat entails risks, too. Limiting Ukrainian aid would abet Russia in imposing an unstable—and hence temporary—peace on Mr Zelensky. It would reward Mr Putin for his threats, setting up his next act of atomic aggression. By contrast, more powerful weapons and sanctions would mark a change in the degree of aid, but not its kind. And this week, facing Ukrainian success, Russia paused the campaign in the north, rather than escalate. For all those reasons, the best deterrence is for NATO to stand up to Mr Putin’s veiled threat, and make clear that a nuclear or chemical atrocity would lead to Russia’s utter isolation.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – DA

That makes WWIII inevitable

Hanson 2016 - classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University Victor Davis, "The return of appeasement, collaboration and isolationism," Feb 18, tribunecontentagency.com/article/the-return-of-appeasement-collaboration-and-isolationism/

By the start of the Great Depression in 1929, America was mostly unarmed and determined never to get involved in European feuding again. Most Americans complained that the huge death toll of World War I had led to neither perpetual peace nor even a peaceful Germany. America’s isolationism and disarmament also helped prompt another global war. Had the U.S. kept its military strong after World War I, and had it entered into a formal alliance with its former World War I partners, Germany never would have risked a second war against the combined strength of a fully armed Britain, France and United States. Instead, Hitler assumed the U.S. either could not or would not offer much military help to his intended European targets. Why, then, did a relatively weak Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941 believe that it could take on much of the world, and inspire Axis partners such as Italy and Japan to follow its suicidal lead? The answer is obvious. British and French appeasement, Soviet collaboration and American isolation had together convinced Hitler and his Axis allies that the victors of World War I were more eager to grant concessions at any cost than were the defeated. The world of 2016 is eerily beginning to resemble the powder keg of 1939 Europe. Iran, China and North Korea, along with radical Islamic terrorist groups, all have particular contempt for Western democracies. Almost daily, various aggressive nations or organizations seek provocation by shooting off intercontinental missiles, boarding American boats, sending millions of young male Middle Easterners into the West, and issuing unending threats. China is creating new artificial islands to control commercial routes to and from Asia. The European Union is largely unarmed. Yet it still trusts that it can use its vaunted "smart diplomacy" to reason with its enemies. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin’s Russia cuts deals with Iran, Syria and most of the enemies of the West. Like Stalin before, Putin cynically assumes that his triangulations will turn aggressive powers exclusively against the West. Recently, he warned the West of a "new world war" starting in the Middle East. America is slowly withdrawing from involvement abroad, using the same isolationist arguments heard in the 1920s. Past interventions in the Middle East have worn on the nation. Ingrate nations did not appreciate American sacrifices. In tough economic times, some contend that defense spending should be diverted to more social programs. Appeasement, collaboration and isolationism always prove a lethal mix — past and present.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: NATO Bad › 2AC – DA

US abdication of NATO responsibilities greenlights Russian invasion of the Middle East

Shapiro 2019 - Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv Daniel, "The Most Dangerous Thing Trump Could Do Yet, and Its Nightmare Fallout for Israel," Jan 17,

Remove the United States from NATO - and forward-deployed U.S. forces from Europe, which would certainly follow - and the United States’ ability to respond to a Middle East crisis would be diminished.

Could U.S. support for Israel be shifted and coordinated instead through U.S. Central Command, based in the Persian Gulf? It has been proposed before as an efficiency measure. But Israeli generals have always resisted the proposal. Their worry is that they would find it challenging to enjoy the same level of intimacy they currently have with Europe-based U.S. commanders, with commanders who maintain a similar closeness with Arab militaries.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: CPs › AT: States

States can’t solve bioterror.

Pedersen, 17—Pepperdine University (Christian, “Reflecting Back on the Ebola Outbreak and the Future of Bioterrorism,” Pepperdine Policy Review: Vol. 9, dml)

Terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) have expressed interested, and have even attempted, to use biological agents in terror plots (Biodefense, 2016). The technical and administrative knowledge of biology and chemistry can be acquired globally in medical schools, research programs, and laboratories, making it difficult to prevent potential practitioners of bioterrorism from acquiring the required scientific knowledge (Chiodo, 2015). While at one time the ability to mutate strands was restricted to advanced research laboratories, rudimentary high school laboratories now have the ability to develop deadly biological agents (Garrett, 2012). With relative easy, terror groups could engineer the flu virus, making it deadlier (Selk, 2017). By combining traits of multiple strains and maximizing the virus’ natural properties, it could become highly transmittable (Farmer, 2107). Genetically engineered viruses have the potential to kill more people than nuclear weapons, governments remain underprepared for that threat (Selk, 2017). Terrorists could be drawn to the use of biological agents because of the difficulty of detection and the ease at which some biological agents can naturally spread through a population (Bioterrorism, 2006). There are essentially three ways which agents could be acquired by terrorist: they could be stolen, created in laboratory environments, or collected naturally. A gloomy reality is that as the advancement of new technologies reduce the costs of genetic sequencing, it will become easier and less expensive to create novel organisms (Garrett, 2012). Bioterrorist attacks can be planned to induce maximum damage and panic with a minimum risk of early detection. Potential agents of attack are categorized by risk (rated as an, A, B, or a C) depending on the agent’s availability, ease of dissemination and transmission, and potential impact (Bioterrorism, 2006). Category A agents are considered the most dangerous and threatening to National Security. Ebola is categorized as a Category A bioagent because of its ability to cause mass panic and disruption and the special public health actions required for treating those infected. Through the EVD, “mother nature has created the perfect bioweapon” (Thiessen, 2014). Following the Paris terrorist attacks, the French have warned that terrorist organizations may attempt to steal biological agents (Talent & Graham, 2016). The British Ministry of Defense feared terrorists would try to acquire EVD and released a report outlining three separate scenarios in which terror groups could successfully weaponize the virus. (Quinn, 2015) These could be stolen from research facilities, laboratories, or government stockpiles. While the more exotic and devastating agents (such as small pox) must be cultivated in laboratory environments and are therefore more difficult to obtain, many biological agents are naturally occurring (Gottron, 2002). Examples of these naturally occurring, and easier to obtain agents include: human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the hepatitis strands, yellow fever, and the Ebola virus (Gottron, 2002). Moreover, the Ebola virus is native to a continent where terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State are active (Thiessen, 2014). The 21-day incubation period allows potential jihadists more than enough time to infect themselves, then travel to infected population centers, developing the means of mass distribution (Thiessen, 2014). In June 2001 – months prior to the September 11th attack in New York – Dark Winter, a senior level wargame, was run in conjunction with security think tanks and government agencies to simulate government responses to acts of bioterrorism (Dark Winter). The simulation demonstrated how a biological terror attack could result in mass civilian casualties, civil disorder, institutional breakdown and lack of faith in government – compromising national security (Dark Winter). Major challenges for policymakers included the many “fault lines” which existed between governmental agencies, the levels of government, private healthcare systems, and the public (Dark Winter). Breakdowns in centralized leadership and communication could threaten containment and control. It was revealed that the healthcare system in the United States had no surge abilities to prevent hospitals from becoming overwhelmed or to meet the heightened demand for vaccinations (Dark Winter). Finally, targeted communications and information management was recognized as a challenge, both in working with the media and in disseminating important information (Dark Winter). It became very clear after the exercise that the United States was unprepared for an act of bioterrorism. In 2010, nearly ten years after the Dark Winter exercise, a commission created to evaluate the national emergency response capabilities gave the nation a failing grade on its ability to respond to a bioterrorist threat (O’Grady, 2015).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: CPs › AT: Incentives CP

The perm solves best.

Trump '21 – PhD, a research social scientist for the U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers, and served as a Strategic Planner and public health subject-matter expert for FEMA Region 1’s Data Analytics Task Force [Benjamin D, Marie-Valentie Florin, Edward Perkins, and Igor Linkov," Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology]

Still, the problem of how to incentivize private actors to invest in biosecurity remains. The answer will require the participation not only of bench scientists, but also of various overseers, gatekeepers, and watchdog groups involved in biotechnology research and development (for instance, the World Organisation for Animal Health’s Guideline for Responsible Conduct in Veterinary Research). One example of a potential approach is to train journal editors to recognize potential information hazards within article submissions. Additionally, funders responsible for reviewing grants could require that applicants include a review of potential information and security hazards which might occur over the course of the proposed work. In these and other examples, a fusion of top-down and bottom-up approaches is necessary in order to identify security threats and to raise awareness of biosecurity issues; meanwhile, bottom-up organizations can develop on-the-ground passive surveillance programs to monitor potential dual-use security threats.

An example of this collaboration is between the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and iGEM. The FBI has funded iGEM and collaborated with the competition’s organizers in order to increase awareness of risk and to build an understanding of possible or developing threats. While no biosecurity policy or practice can completely eliminate all threats (especially not without unilaterally preventing research and innovation that could greatly benefit society), a layered approach in which government, private organizations, and individual citizens collaborate will result in a more unified effort for biosecurity which could reduce gaps in oversight that might be exploited by actors looking to develop biological weapons.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: CPs › AT: Funding CP

The CP disregards bioethics.

Hamilton '21 [R. Alexander Hamilton, Ruth Mampuys, S. E. Galaitsi, Aengus Collins, Ivan Istomin, Marko Ahteensuu & Lela Bakanidze, "Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology," in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 37–58]

A laissez-faire governance approach cedes much of the regulatory power to existing or emerging bottom-up initiatives, placing trust in the capacity of technology producers, industry and users to play an active role in their own regulation. Under this approach, such non-governmental actors are encouraged to determine (at least in part) how safety and security practices are structured, implemented and enforced, while centralized government plays a role in setting minimum standards and intervening in the event of regulatory failures. This approach is generally intended to promote innovation and flexibility, as well as rapid adaption and response to emerging threats (Linkov et al. 2018a, b).

While laissez-faire governance is a promising approach that recognizes the important role that non-governmental actors can play in the regulatory process, there are also potential pitfalls. One such example, albeit focused on bioethics rather than biosecurity, can be traced to the use of germline editing in humans to produce the first CRISPR baby. In this case, despite broad international agreement that scientists should “hold off on editing human eggs, sperm or embryos until gene-editing technology (and the implications of the edits) are better understood.”Footnote13 (See also Cyranoski and Ledford 2018), a researcher in China took advantage of laissez-faire regulatory controls that resulted in multiple potential risks and unintended consequences. These included the possibility of long-term changes to the human germline; encouraging other scientists (including those working internationally) to pursue germline editing in humans (Cyranoski 2019a, b), and motivating Chinese regulators to introduce stricter regulatory controls on genetic research (ibid.).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: CPs › AT: Ban CP

Bans solve neither advantage and drive the tech underground.

Trump '21 – PhD, a research social scientist for the U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers, and served as a Strategic Planner and public health subject-matter expert for FEMA Region 1’s Data Analytics Task Force [Benjamin D, Marie-Valentie Florin, Edward Perkins, and Igor Linkov," Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology]

Synthetic biology is a transformative technology with the possibility to change the world to the same extent as – if not more than – the digital revolution. As is the case with previous scientific breakthroughs, the potential for its dual-use and misuse represents a global problem, and necessitates that the highest levels of policy makers pay it close attention. Although targeted countermeasures can go some way toward providing protection, preventative actions are likely to be more effective given the heightened uncertainty of the field’s future (Trump et al. 2020a). It is necessary that biosecurity policies and practices be updated to take into account both the unprecedented challenges associated with synthetic biology and the globalized, diffuse, and varied nature of its threat space.

Effective global biosecurity will not happen quickly, nor will it be enthusiastically adopted by all national governments and non-governmental organizations. Incentives to misuse synthetic biology with harmful consequences remain high for certain negligent actors, as are the incentives to dual-use by nefarious actors, and the coming years may see such events affecting human or environmental health. Successful biosecurity implementation must be adaptable to quickly incorporate uncertainty as well as new capabilities. Urgent steps are required to place such notions into practice before a major threat incident, which in addition to creating substantial damages could usher in policy changes that might limit or ban platforms of synthetic biology research entirely. Besides forgoing the benefits of the technology, such a ban could force development underground and further out of the reach of coordinated governance or risk assessment. By identifying the social, economic, institutional, and technological tripwires that influence a state’s trajectory towards biosecurity research of concern, now is the time to take steps to apply biosecurity to maximize technological benefits while minimizing the dual-use potential of synthetic biology by improving the framing, prioritization, and governance of biosecurity risks.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: CPs › AT: Ban CP

Top-down bans fail – instead we need adaptive policies like the aff.

Hamilton '21 [R. Alexander Hamilton, Ruth Mampuys, S. E. Galaitsi, Aengus Collins, Ivan Istomin, Marko Ahteensuu & Lela Bakanidze, "Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology," in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 37–58]

Claims about synthetic biology’s potential, like other emerging technologies, nonetheless tend to overstate its ‘enabling’ capacity. Likewise, the ease of producing biological weapons tends to be overstated. As a number of commentators note, biology is not yet easy to engineer (Jefferson et al. 2014) and, for the foreseeable future, the skills necessary to produce biological weapons are likely to remain only within the grasp of states (Piers Millet in Regalado 2016). However, the field’s emphasis on eliminating technical barriers and reducing the importance of tacit knowledge (Oye 2012) represents a powerful source of expectation for advocates and critics alike. For advocates, it represents the possible realization of modern biology’s full potential, one that could yield revolutionary advances in health, medicine, and industry in the twenty-first century. For critics, it represents a seemingly open-ended risk that requires exceptional precaution. For national governments, and international conventions responsible for establishing global biosecurity norms and obligations that are operationalized at the national level through legislation and other regulatory tools (McLeish and Nightingale 2007), a central question is how (if at all) does top-down biosecurity governance need to change in response to synthetic biology?

Regulatory considerations of this kind are both familiar and new (Hamilton 2015). In the 1970s, recombinant DNA technology similarly emerged as a source of significant and contrasting expectations, and questions were posed about the suitability of existing regulatory approaches in light of potentially novel risks. However, in the case of recombinant DNA technology, biosafety concerns – notably, concens about the possible unintended consequences of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) – were the primary focus of scientific deliberations at the Asilomar Conference and subsequent policy discussions. In the case of synthetic biology, a field that has emerged at a time of heightened concerns about (bio)terrorism, the possibility that synthetic biology could enable non-state actors to acquire (novel) biological agents that could be used as weapons has been an omnipresent source of concern. In 2009, synthetic biology came to the attention of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and in 2016 gene editing was listed as a potential weapon of mass destruction (WMD) by the US Intelligence Community (Ledford 2010; Clapper 2016).