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2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - State Important

Feminist strategies must engage the state

Mansbridge 03 (Jane, “Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values @ Harvard, Anti-statism and Difference Feminism in International Social Movements,” International Feminist Journal of Politics)

Feminist strategies that neglect or consistently deplore state action cannot accomplish what women need – because individuals need collectives such as states to solve collective action problems and to move toward more just social arrangements. Strategies that rely heavily on women’s differences from men also cannot accomplish what women need – because women are like men in many ways relevant to individual and collective action. Despite these truths, social movements also need some strategies of action that work separately from and sometimes against the state. Moreover, strategies that accentuate the differences between oppressed and oppressing bring needed energy to a movement. The best overall strategy is, therefore, to realize that both states and difference theories are dangerous weapons, and proceed with caution. In this important paper, Jane Jaquette sounds the alarm. She exposes the dangers of ignoring the state and the dangers of ‘difference feminism’. She also shows how these are linked. Although I will underscore the merits of anti-state activity and difference feminism, I agree that a feminist strategy that neglected or deplored state action would be weak indeed. So would a strategy that relied on women’s differences from men. First, the merits of Jaquette’s argument. One strand in feminist theory and practice greatly suspects the state. This suspicion can escalate into outright rejection, with potentially grave consequences for women. The philosophical case for the state is relatively simple. Collective action can improve human lives. Efficient collective action requires coercion. Instru- ments of collective action involving coercion can, paradoxically, increase human freedom. We are freer to do many things if we can bind ourselves with legally enforceable contracts. Rather than enforcing these contracts privately, it is more efficient and potentially more just to give a monopoly of legitimate violence to one entity, so long as that entity can reasonably claim to be more just than the alternatives. Humans have long struggled to devise relatively legitimate forms of coercion. The history of democracy is part of that struggle, although that history has nowhere produced national-level institutions that are highly legitimate. Despite their incapacity ever to be fully legitimate, however, we still need both states and international institutions to help solve collective action problems and to give scope to the human capacity for justice. Regarding women, the practical case for the state, must be grounded in contemporary realities. In some states, such as Sweden, women do better, compared to men, than in the most egalitarian of known pre-state entities, such as the Kung!. Moreover, although the dangers of state power for women are great, it is not practical to contemplate returning to pre-state entities. Human beings seem to want the goods produced by more extensive forms of cooperation, including those that require legitimate coercion. Given that states will not disappear in the near future, what stance should we take toward them? My answer is: wary usage. State power will be used against women, just as other forms of power are used against women, unless we intervene. One response is to establish barriers, such as constitutional or internationally enforceable rights, to certain kinds of invasions by state power. Another is to make states more likely to act in the interests of women. In the United States both theory and institutional practice carry suspicion of the state farther than in most countries, with some malign consequences. Ours has been a ‘liberalism of fear’ more than an Enlightenment liberalism that envisions a common good. Americans are wary of state power, encouraged in that wariness by powerful capitalist interests. Jaquette rightly warns against this. State power can serve both as a brake on the negative externalities of capitalism and as a positive force for material redistribution. Particularly when patriarchal power takes violent forms in the private sphere, state power can help women struggle against that violence as well as other non-state evils. The question, then, is how far to carry wariness of state power and of theories of state universalism and impartiality. I believe we must both use state power and place bounds on. Because the state as a tool is dangerous and flawed, we need to use it with caution. Jaquette faults contemporary feminist anti-state theorists not for wanting to abolish the state but for spending their energies on wariness rather than on how to use it for redistribution. How important one thinks this problem is depends on how one judges the current balance within feminist theory. Many feminist theorists – e.g. Susan Okin, Nancy Fraser, Iris Young – call for redistributive reforms requiring state power. Perhaps in Latin America, from 356 International Feminist Journal of Politics ––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 which Jaquette takes her lead, theorists of the North are represented by anti- state theory. In that case, one must ask why these are the theorists Latin American feminists choose to read. Anti-state discourse may have informed radical practice in Latin America not because anti-state theory is dominant in the North but because activists in Latin America find that anti-state discourse meets their organizing needs. Anti-state discourse may reflect the reality of individuals working on the margins of states that either are relatively corrupt or, even more obviously than most, enforce the interests of dominant classes. Jaquette also rightly warns of the dangers of valorizing action in civil society to the neglect of state action. However, we need evidence that the more women participate in NGOs the less they participate in the state. Without such evidence it seems equally plausible that the more women participate in NGOs the more they will acquire the skills and contacts required for involve- ment in state politics. Some individuals also will not be able to deal with the hierarchy, coercion and male dominance embedded in all states. They will need to work in social movements. Political activism usually sustains a division of labor, with the individuals who can best deal with established institutions doing just that and those who are most repelled by those institutions charting another course. The directions they take sometimes conflict with one another. Women and feminists trying to achieve places in the state, whether as femocrats or politicians, face major barriers but also major attractions. I do not know how much we should worry that they will not be attracted to these jobs because of radical anti-state discourse. In the United States this does not seem to be a huge problem. In some countries, women who could be agents of feminist change turn down jobs in the state because those jobs are boring and unsatisfying. When these women speak of their frustrations, radical anti- state discourse appears to play a small or non-existent role. In short, Jaquette is right that an established anti-state discourse within radical movements makes productive interaction with states less likely, but I am not sure that such discourse is created by feminist theory. Jaquette also points to distortions produced by difference feminism. It is true that any stress on women’s differences reinforces the tendency of dominant groups such as white or middle-class women to interpret ‘women’s’ experiences primarily in light of their own experiences. In recent years, women of color have produced the greatest advances in feminist theory, forcing white feminists to look more closely at their hegemonically defined concepts of commonality; this work has given all feminists the tools to understand better differences within their groups and subgroups. In addition, in most areas of presumed personality difference between men and women, the differences are extremely small. The currently definitive meta-analysis of studies on Carol Gilligan’s hypothesis shows that – at least in the United States, in the highly educated populations where she argues that differences should appear – only very small differences can be found. –––––––––––––––––– Jane Mansbridge/Anti-statism and difference feminism 357 Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 Most studies do not show women taking a different approach to justice or behaving more cooperatively than men. Studies designed to elicit behavioral gender differences often generate practically none. In-groups, we now know, exaggerate similarities within their group and their differences from other groups. The human brain makes these predictable cognitive and emotional mistakes in in-group/out-group differentiation. Recognizing this tendency, we should constantly struggle to take into account the fact that our social and first-order cognitive estimates of such differences are usually exaggerated. In the case of gender, all societies also engage in ‘gratuitous gendering’ – giving gendered meanings to nouns and patterns of action that do not functionally require that identification. These processes increase even more our perceptions of gender difference. Today we have little idea what differences might or might not emerge between men and women in a non-oppressive society. It seems mistaken, therefore, to insist on difference rather than focusing on the effects of dominance. Finally, as Jaquette warns, promising different political results based on the premise that women are different from men is dangerous. We are almost certain not to deliver on that promise, at least in the short run. The backlash after the US suffrage movement was undoubtedly caused in part by disillusion at the lack of change when women won the vote. And yet, small differences that do appear between men and women can take on major symbolic significance, precisely because of our human tendency to exaggerate group differences. Although using that significance is danger- ous, not only because it exaggerates reality but also because it underlines the very stereotypes that have been used to keep women in their place, the existence of danger does not mean that we should forswear this tool – any more than for swearing the tool of state action. Just remember: when using a dangerous tool, take active precautions against its potential harms. Difference arguments for electing women are not just arguments from ‘utility’, as Jaquette reports Marian Sawer’s point. For example, the fact that women are perceived as more honest than men can advance an attack on corruption by associating its female leaders with honesty. Using positive stereotypes of women in this way need not be degrading. Successful uses may even result in males adopting certain features of female symbolism to signify their own adherence to better standards. In another example, among professional populations in the United States, women are somewhat more likely than men to adopt participatory, egalitarian styles of leadership. The difference probably derives from women’s relative powerlessness, which teaches skills of persuasion rather than command. In the US women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, women used the gender differences they perceived in listening, interpreting body language and participatory style to create significant departures from the prevailing styles of left politics in organizations dominated by men. The message, ‘We do things differently’ is exhilarating. It prompts greater effort in trying to 358 International Feminist Journal of Politics ––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 forge a new model, because the effort is associated not only with a different culture that can replace the old one but also with a different self and associated selves. Turning from practical politics to political theory, concepts are also often gender-coded. Freedom and self-interest, for example, are often coded as male, community and altruism as female. It is not surprising, then, that when feminist theorists entered the field of theory, some explicitly supported certain values previously denigrated as female. Although the arguments made for these values might not be female, their proponrnts often were. Moreover, having been raised in a subculture that had been allocated cultural respon- sibility for these values, women had often thought about them more thor- oughly than men. Women had also usually experienced the denigration of these values first-hand. In short, Jaquette is right that stressing women’s differences from men is fraught with danger. But values and practices that many cultures associate with women are often good in themselves, denigrated because of their association with women. Asserting the value of these ideals and practices from a stance as women often makes emotional, cognitive and political sense. Importantly, Jaquette identifies a link between anti-state discourse and difference feminism. A number of anti-state theorists who are also strongly anti-essentialist would deny this identification. But in social movements themselves, the identification makes sense. The state is male; hence difference feminists should be anti-state. The state is instrumental, self-interested and hierarchical; women are communal, nurturing and participatory. To the degree that these associations are simply accepted as unchangeable truths, they compound the most problematic anti-state mistake. I agree wholeheartedly with Jaquette’s fears in seeing no visible trend toward a renewed interest in the politics of economic justice, at least in the United States. In contrast to the creativity in the struggle against globalization, there has been an absence of ‘street-level’ activism against, for example, the revolutionary shift in tax burdens in the USA. More positively, the anti- sweatshop movement has had some good effects in raising consumer con- sciousness and bringing younger activists in touch with international labor movement organizing. As for the causes of the shift away from the politics of economic justice, I agree with Jaquette that it is related to the post-Cold War era and the temporary triumph of capitalism. I am not so sure that it has much to do either with activists’ anti-state discourse or with difference feminism. This commentary has concentrated on the caveats to Jaquette’s thesis. I conclude by stressing again my fundamental agreement with her argument. Feminists have a ‘stake in a capable state’. It would be catastrophic to be so carried away by the theoretical virtues of civil society or by anti-state discourse as to deaden oneself to the practical need to work with the state to improve the lives of women. Because ideas have influence, it is worth stressing Jaquette’s point that –––––––––––––––––– Jane Mansbridge/Anti-statism and difference feminism 359 Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 ‘norms adopted internationally depend on states to implement them’; and only states can change the rules for women and other disadvantaged groups. The welfare state is a huge improvement over the arbitrary power of men in private families. Women’s groups must therefore work closely with govern- ments or remain on the fringe. Feminists will not only have to ‘learn to live with the state’. They should learn to work with the state. For those who do not already know this, Jaquette’s article is required reading.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Essentialism DA

Essentialism DA: Their analysis reductively reifies gender norms.

Reiter 15 (Dan, Department of Political Science, Emory University. 10/2015. “The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, no. 7, pp. 1301–1326.)

Summary This wide array of positivist gender/IR work offers three major sets of contributions and challenges to existing IR scholarship. First, this scholarship has provided positivist evidence shedding light on many of the theoretical and descriptive suppositions developed in nonpositivist gender/IR work. Furthermore, the positivist evidence has argued for the substantive as well as statistical significance of gender in explaining critically important phenomena. As noted, Hudson et al. (2012) propose that gender has a larger impact on conflict onset than economic development or democracy. Erik Melander (2005a) found that measures of gender equity have at least as much impact on civil war onset as factors such as economic development, democracy, and ethnic fractionalization. Gizelis (2009) found that improved gender equity, as measured by higher female life expectancy, increases the likelihood of the success of UN peacekeeping missions several fold. Some of the positivist work critiques the simple view that women are always more peaceful than men are, supporting the general feminist perspective that the effects of gender on behavior are sophisticated, especially because gender is cultural/social as well as biological. For example, the role of women in terrorist and insurgent groups varies widely, as women are sometimes combatants, even engaging in sexual assault. The effects of gender on public opinion are also complex. Contra some 1980s perspectives about the hypermasculinity of nuclear weapons, for example, there is some evidence that American women are not significantly less likely than American men to favor nuclear weapons use. Second, this positivist work has helped address some scholarly questions that nonpositivist scholars had identified as important and underexplored. At a very simple level, positivist data collection has helped shed more light on the monumental scope of gender-related violence, a set of behaviors that significantly negatively affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people who happen to be women (Hudson et al. 2012). Positivist work has helped describe and understand the effects of elements of the global economy on the lives of women. It has also helped improve our understanding of the role women play in the foreign policy process, especially female heads of state, cabinet members, and members of parliament. Third, positivist work has helped identify new questions related to gender and IR. Positivist work has explored the role gender plays in the formation of trade policy preferences, the different political roles of female as compared with male casualties, the international determinants of the spread of gender equity, and others. New Directions Positivist scholarship has not yet come close to answering all existing questions relating to gender and IR. Much work remains to be done. Perhaps the single most important priority is for scholars to be aware of making essentialist assumptions that the meaning and behavioral consequences of gender are constant across space and time. Some of the positivist gender/IR work assumes that gender has essentialist effects, using research designs that do not allow for the possibility of varying effects of gender across context. Future positivist gender/IR work would benefit from relaxing essentialist assumptions, developing ideas as to how the effects of gender might vary across contexts. For example, a female national leader emerging from a society with weaker gender equity norms might behave differently than a female national leader emerging from a society with stronger gender equity norms. Research already suggests that the consequences of gender vary drastically across insurgent and terrorist groups, a phenomenon that deserves greater attention.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR – Binary DA

The neg oversimplifies feminist ir theory – the strict binary works to recreate the patriarchal hierarchy they seek to destroy

Stephan 14 (Rita, foreign affairs officer at the United States Department of State and a visiting researcher for at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. “War and Gender Performance”. p. 5-7. International Feminist Journal of Politics. )

The question of incentives here certainly applies to some women who were rewarded for their consent. Complying with their gender roles made their evacuations safer and less traumatic. However, in most of the stories in this article, men and women fall along a spectrum between hero and victim, rather than entirely as one or the other. The protective masculine and vulnerable feminine model represents a broad view that sometimes abstracts the changes that are taking place on the global level. Patriarchy ought to be seen “not only as an arrangement of political institutions, but also, and perhaps even primarily, as a broadly understood value system that revolves around identity constructs which support and entrench gender-specific hierarchical visions of society” (Bleiker 2000, 32). Looking at the 2006 war from the micro level, I find that the binary relationship that international relations feminists claim in their model of patriarchal violence does not always apply, or applies only in a rigidly logical way. The stories in this study show that women, men and children were all victims of military aggression. However, in some cases, women were the only agents available to save the children; in other cases, representatives of the patriarchal order, such as fathers or fathers-in-law, were either left behind or uninvolved. While the men did protect the womenandchildren in some instances, women, who subscribed to their gender roles as mothers and wives, acted in instances when men were impotent to act, thus in a sense protecting the men also. While some would argue that these women’s performances lie outside the realm of gender norms, one could clearly see that such binary distinction is not possible.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Binary DA

The dualistic nature of equating militarism and patriarchy reinforces the cultural basis of Western gendered power relations

hooks 95 (bell, Distinguished Professor of English at City College, The City University of New York. A lecturer and the author of Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3/4, Rethinking Women's Peace Studies (Fall - Winter, 1995), pp. 58-64)

By equating militarism and patriarchy, these feminists often structure their arguments in such a way as to suggest that to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression, and the will to dominate and do violence to others and that to be female is synonymous with weakness, passivity, and the will to nourish and affirm the lives of others. While these may be stereotypical norms that many people live out, such dualistic thinking is dangerous; it is a basic ideological component of the logic that informs and promotes domination in Western society. Even when inverted and employed for a meaningful purpose, like nuclear disarmament, it is nevertheless risky, for it reinforces the cultural basis of sexism and other forms of group oppression. Suggesting as it does that women and men are inherently different in some fixed and absolute way, it implies that women by virtue of our sex have played no crucial role in supporting and upholding imperialism (and the militarism that serves to maintain imperialist rule) or other systems of domination. Often the women who make such assertions are white. Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Case Outweighs

Our impact outweighs and the alt fails— forwarding claims about representations over resolving the violence of war-torn areas is simply academic complicity.

Hudson 15 (Heidi, professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, “(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” pg 413-419, Politics & Gender; Cambridge Vol. 11, Iss. 2, June 2015)

Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour--or even a dead end--if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men [people] are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women's lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression. In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space. After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, "security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways" (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically--with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization. Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes--performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn't we first make the bodies from "other worlds," rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), "language" remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke's claim that "embodied security is ... fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language" (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013). There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called "new materialisms" on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities. While FPE reminds us to consider the global picture of inequality, a systematic feminist political economy theory of security/conflict/violence is yet to emerge. That said, revisiting the material conditions that influence the socioeconomic production of gender as a relation of inequality is a potentially agency-inducing factor that could complement (together with attention to new materialisms) the discursive analytics of FSS, as will be shown in the discussion that follows on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). FSS research has highlighted the harmful discursive misrepresentations that characterize international attention on rape as a tool of war in the DRC (e.g., Baaz and Stern 2013). However, feminist poststructuralism on its own is not a suitable lens to understand the hybridity of how women in the DRC adapt SGBV discourses to fit in with local cultural practices and to fulfil particular sociomaterial needs within their specific context. One needs a postcolonial feminism for that. To keep the international community interested and maintain the status that funding brings, women's organizations in the eastern DRC tend to emphasize the brutal and extensive nature of SGBV. The outcome is not straightforward--women's victimhood is reinforced--but at the same time, it could mean that so-called "victims" fight back, negotiating the "global patriarchal bargain" from below, simultaneously engaging with discourse and the material aspects of socioeconomic justice and empowerment (Jean-Bouchard 2013). This case also underlines the necessity to consider a broad range of materialities (i.e., not only those that are discursively produced, but also "conventional" political economy materialities during and after war). During war, rape as a form of gendered accumulation by dispossession was used in Mozambique and Rwanda to strip women of their productive and reproductive labor power, as well as their possessions and access to land and livestock. Postwar, Baaz and Stern (2013) found that Congolese men rape due to a complex mix of cultural and political economy perceptions about masculinity, women as property, and a sense of entitlement to sex as compensation for their loss of status as providers. Borrowing Claudia Card's (2003) term "social death" to describe the cultural shame as a consequence of rape, I argue that the loss of social vitality is not just a loss of identity and meaning for one's existence, but also a deeply material loss of political, economic, and social relations. Both FSS and Feminist IPE should therefore pay more attention to the political economy of social relations and inequalities of the everyday.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Link Turn (Arms Control)

War turns gendered violence, but analysis isn’t enough – only material engagement with the circulation and use of weapons makes feminist advocacy effective

Mhajne 18 (Anwar, a Palestnian citzen of Israel, recently received her Ph.D. in Politcal Science from the University of Cincinnat in the US. Her current research focuses on gender, politcs, and religion. "THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN’S (AND MEN’S) SECURITY." )

As opposed to the aforementioned foreign policies, an effective feminist foreign policy needs to acknowledge existing power structures and analyse the causes and consequences of patriarchy, militarisation, and neoliberalism as the dominant order. Profiting from arms production creates a vested interest in sustaining the systems of war. The manufacture, trade, proliferation, possession, and use of weapons facilitate sexual and gender-based violence, human trafficking, and armed conflicts, which are integrally tied up with violent masculinities. Governments need to reallocate resources spent on the military towards activities that benefit women and humanity in general, such as implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. As Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have always argued, bloated military spending raids funds set aside for human security and sustainable development: “If the [1.6 trillion USD] spent on military security in 2015 was directed towards human security, this would provide a substantial portion of the total needed to realise the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals” (WILPF, 2017: 20). Militarism and arms trades are tightly connected. An emphasis on militarism might serve the interests of those profiting from arms production, thus sustaining the systems of war. As various studies produced by WILPF and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) demonstrate (see: Gaynor, 2015 & WILPF, 2016), women and girls often disproportionately suffer from the use of weapons in conflict due to “forced displacement, sexual violence, trafficking, lack of access to health care (including sexual and reproductive health), and lack of access to victim and survivor assistance” (WILPF, 2016: 6).

Therefore, a more impactful approach to feminist foreign policy should be based on challenging militarism and preventing arms from reaching entities that will utilise them to violate the rights of men and women. A feminist foreign policy should not only focus on addressing women’s needs during conflict, but also focus on preventing conflict itself and reducing its intensity through controlling the influx of weapons and limiting arms trade. It is important to ensure that peace processes are inclusive and gender-sensitive, but this alone is insufficient. Rather, to ensure peace, policymakers need to focus on how militarism and arms trade fuel conflicts and increase civilian casualties for men and women alike. A feminist foreign policy should enable effective conflict prevention through disarmament, women’s meaningful participation, and providing effective conditions for women’s empowerment.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR - Perm

The aff and alts methods should be synthesized – rejecting the permutation creates a methodological hierarchy that limits both theories

Sjoberg et al. 16 (Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera, and Cameron G. Thies, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, 9-23-2016, accessed on 11-4-2020, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 62, Issue 4, "Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship: Moving beyond Reiter’s Dichotomies toward Effective Synergies", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002716669207)

These two broad research traditions talk about similar subjects but in different ways. Postpositivists problematize, while maintaining an interest in, questions of where and how women participate in political violence. Likewise, the best positivist analyses of where and how women participate in political violence are theoretically informed by complex understandings of gender and gender relations. Yet, these two groups of scholars’ adherence to their own intellectual traditions limit their ability to produce synergistic understandings of gender and violence. Because many feminist researchers reject positivists’ tendency to use dichotomized understandings that reduce gender to sex in order to formulate testable hypotheses, they find it difficult to directly engage those hypotheses and the associated statistical results. Yet feminist scholars are well situated, for example, to provide deeper sociological interpretations of the findings of positivist data analysis and to use the results of that data analysis to tell more complicated stories. Positivists’ tools, on the other hand, are poorly suited to addressing the questions with which feminist research is most concerned. First, positivists’ implicit assumptions that sex categories are stable, dichotomous, and contain essential characteristics that can be read onto people hamper their ability to account for gender differences as constitutive of sex differences in political violence. In other words, it impedes their ability to recognize statistical problems with which they are otherwise quite familiar: correlations (between sex and violence) may be spurious (with gender as the underlying cause) and correlations can be produced by unseen or difficult to measure intervening variables (Kadera and Mitchell 2005). Second, standard regression analyses are constrained by the difficulty of detecting coconstitution and the challenges of directly testing relationships between quantifiable and unquantifiable phenomena.4 Neither research program is above reproach on its own terms either. Large-n statistical work on women’s political violence encounters difficulties other large-n statistical work does not: it is, for example, limited by difficulties in obtaining data, including criminalization of most political violence, the fact that politically violent women commit (and often hide) transgressions of gender norms, secrecy of politically violent groups, personal security risks in conflict zones, and political interests of both researchers and their funders. Feminist work, even as it seeks to resist sensationalization and stereotyping, can struggle with sex, race, and cultural essentialism as it tries to make sense of performance, presentation, and policy surrounding women’s violence in global politics.5 The two research approaches cannot—and do not aim to—analyze identical subjects. Furthermore, neither can provide sufficient leverage on all forms of relevant questions related to women’s political violence to warrant excluding or superseding the other. A deeper, more engaged dialogue that accepts these differences (and sometimes incommensurabilities) would provide significant intellectual purchase. In order to build effective positivist–feminist bridges, we must recognize what each piece of research analyzes and evaluates, and its analytical strengths and weaknesses. Dialogues can then address and engage the knowledge parameters that limit the generalization of particular claims, resulting in richer conversations about both extant work and trajectories for future research. Seeing Effective Synergies The syntheses we envision, then, do not equate or compare apples and oranges or create a hierarchy among approaches. Instead, they leverage difference as a source of complementarity and differences as a source of dialogue. Recognizing the rich nuances of a variety of work in gender and IR, rather than dichotomizing understandings, produces more effective engagement. Below, we provide three examples from the literatures on conflict sexual violence, international norms and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and terrorism and political violence, of actual and potential dialogues.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Perm

Perm: Do both - Working with both critical feminist IR and traditional IR is most productive and consistent with the neg’s literature

Hudson et al 10 (Valerie M., Prof. of Poli Sci @ Texas A&M, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof. of Poli Sci @ the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof. of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program @ the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” in The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark, 2010)

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay. In our view, seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies as a discipline, the literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212). Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline. Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of empirical scholarship on gender, whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that make a meaningful contribution to security studies.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC – Extinction O/W

Preventing extinction isn’t liberal futurity or naïve optimism---mobilizing against dangerous conditions is preferable to fatalism that consigns the planet to nuclear war.

Stevens 18 (Tim, Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC – War First

Case turns the K – War is qualitatively different then everyday life - The affs pragmatic approach to security is compatible and necessary to accomplish feminism goals in IR

Peach 4 (Lucinda Joy, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University, 2004, “A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 436-441)

The pragmatist feminist perspective that I develop in this chapter is deeply indebted to and affirms in many respects the antiwar feminist approach outlined by Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick in the preceding chapter, but with some marked differences. These differences, I argue, reveal more completely both the promise and the limitations of antiwar feminism.

At the outset, it is important to note that there is neither a single "feminism" nor a single "pragmatism" with which it might be aligned. Instead, there are multiple feminisms, just as there are multiple pragmatisms. The "pragmatist feminism" developed in this essay draws on several elements from American Pragmatism, a philosophical school developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most prominently by Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR – Realism Good

Realism is politically useful even if its not theoretically perfect---their reductionism results in ahistoricity that triggers worse violence

Abraham 17 (Kavi Joseph, Johns Hopkins University. “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” https://academic.oup.com/ips/article-abstract/11/3/221/3798787)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better.

The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › DoS CP › 2NC---INB Solves Ukraine

Diplomacy solves Ukraine war.

Solomon 7-3 [Norman Solomon, 7-3-2022, "Nuclear War Could Mean Human Extinction. Biden and Congress Should Stop Messing Around.", Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/nuclear-war-could-mean-annihilation-but-biden-and-congress-are-messing-around/, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

As scholar Alfred McCoy just wrote, “With the specter of mass starvation looming for some 270 million people and, as the [United Nations] recently warned, political instability growing in those volatile regions, the West will, sooner or later, have to reach some understanding with Russia.” Only diplomacy can halt the carnage in Ukraine and save the lives of millions now at risk of starvation. And the dangers of nuclear war can be reduced by rejecting the fantasy of a military solution to the Ukraine conflict.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 2NC---FI---Say No

They need all the countries to say yes.

Magnuson 6-15 [Stew Magnuson, 6-15-2022, "", No Publication, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

Why do you think it is taking so long to deliver the weapon systems?

Sharapov: You should understand that any weapon transfer is always a political decision. And very often, it's not up to the government of one country. There are different alliances.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---Israel

No war—Iran and Israel are both risk averse, which limits likelihood of escalation

Miller, 15 – vice president for new initiatives and a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Aaron David, 7/24. “Why War Isn’t Inevitable If Congress Rejects the Iran Nuclear Deal.” http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/24/why-war-isnt-inevitable-if-congress-rejects-iran-nuclear-deal/

Why go to war? The theory that conflict with Iran is inevitable rests on several highly arguable contentions. First is the assumption that Iran is willing to accelerate its nuclear program and to either break out or sneak out to a weapon and thus court a military response from Israel or the United States. The second big assumption is that Israel is just itching for an opportunity to unilaterally strike Iran with or without Washington’s approval. In the wake of a no vote by Congress, neither of these developments are certainties. Israel is implacably opposed to the deal, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pretty risk-averse; he would have to think long and hard about launching strike in which Israel is operating at the margins of its capacity, particularly without a reason that would justify the severe international consequences.

And why would Iran want to provide such a reason as long as it could play the Security Council card and pocket the political and economic benefits that would flow from being cooperative? For Tehran, the smarter option in the wake of Congress blocking the accord would be to exploit the appetite for international investment and pick up as many chits as possible on the global stage by blaming the failure and missed opportunity on Washington. This isn’t a perfect outcome, but it’s a more compelling choice for Iran’s leadership than a headlong plunge into war. That course stands to bring Iran few benefits and many risks. Tehran is also aware that its ally Hezbollah is bogged down in Syria as part of Iran’s campaign to support Bashar al-Assad, which limits Tehran’s regional assets to use against Israel in the event of a military strike. If Congress blocks the nuclear agreement, the mullahs will take their time and consider all of Iran’s options. Courting a major strike from Israel and the U.S. isn’t necessarily one of them.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---Israel

No Mid East escalation

Imran 19 [Myra Imran, writer for The News International. Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’. 2/6/19, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428298-seminar-on-strategic-dimensions-of-peace-and-conflict-in-south-asia-middle-east]

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars.

Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---A2: NATO Unity

Squo solves NATO cohesion and unity.

Fouriezos 6-29 [Nick Fouriezos, Journalist at the Atlantic Council. 6-29-2022, "Blinken: NATO is 'more united, more focused' after historic summit", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/blinken-nato-is-more-united-more-focused-after-historic-summit/, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

“NATO is emerging from this summit more united, more focused, and with more assets to deal with a multiplicity of challenges,” Blinken said, praising the solidarity shown in this week’s gathering in Madrid.

The conversations at the two-day NATO Public Forum, taking place on the sidelines of the Madrid summit, brought together a number of global leaders in person and virtually, including US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who reaffirmed US support for Article 5, the principle of collective defense, as “ironclad.”

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---AT: Taiwan

Invasion is likely now because of aggressive American actions.

Wong 22 [Tessa Wong, BBC reporter citing William Choong, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Collin Koh, research fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies; 6-14-2022; "Taiwan: Are the US and China heading to war over the island?"; BBC News; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61782370; KL]

Weeks after the US president warned China over Taiwan, Beijing has delivered its sternest rebuttal yet, saying it would "resolutely crush any attempt" at Taiwan's independence.

On Sunday, China's Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe essentially accused the US of supporting the island's independence, saying it was "violating its promise on Taiwan" and "interfering" in China's affairs.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---AT: Taiwan

That solves Taiwan invasion.

Klare et al. 21 [A. Trevor Thrall, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; Jordan B. Cohen, a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; Michael Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and is a senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; 8-20-2021; "New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan"; Defense News; https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-on-taiwan/; KL]

The Biden administration recently approved its first arms sale to Taiwan for $750 million worth of howitzers and high-tech munitions kits. Proponents incorrectly argue that this sale will enhance stability in the region by sending a strong signal to China of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and by complicating any Chinese plans for an invasion of the island. In fact, the sale will accomplish nothing of the sort. To avoid enflaming tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. needs to halt sales of weapons to Taiwan.

This sale will not allow Taiwan to better defend itself in any clash with China. It will, however, tell Taiwan that it’s OK to keep passing the buck to the United States for its defense. Moreover, a new sale of arms at this time is sure to inflame tensions between Beijing and Washington, increasing the risk of conflict and making it more difficult to make progress on issues of mutual concern, such as climate change, trade and nuclear nonproliferation.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---AT: Taiwan

China’s playing the long game.

Nathan 22 [Andrew J. Nathan; Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University; 6-23-2022; "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan; KL]

Concern is growing in Taiwan, in the United States, and among U.S. allies in Asia that China is preparing to attack Taiwan in the near future. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee last year, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned that Beijing might attempt to seize the island in the next six years. Unifying Taiwan with mainland China is a key element of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream.” And as the political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro has argued in these pages, Xi wants “unification with Taiwan to be part of his personal legacy,” suggesting that an armed invasion could come before the end of his third term as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 and almost certainly before the end of his probable fourth term in 2032.

Putin’s war in Ukraine has intensified these concerns. Xi’s announcement just before the Russian invasion of a “no limits” partnership with Moscow, coupled with his failure to condemn Putin’s actions and the Chinese media’s endorsement of Russian propaganda, seem to signal Beijing’s support for Russia’s territorial aggression. Beijing may see a strategic opening now that U.S. political and military resources are tied up in Europe. Moreover, Chinese leaders may have interpreted the West’s response to the Russian attack as an indication that the United States will not intervene militarily to defend a country to which it is not bound by a defense treaty, especially against a nuclear-armed adversary. As David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations has argued, “Chinese policymakers may conclude that Russia’s nuclear arsenal effectively deterred the United States, which would be unwilling to go to war with a nuclear power over Taiwan.”

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR › PGMs NEG › 1NC---AT: Taiwan

No Taiwan invasion. It’s all talk and no action.

Wong 22 [Tessa Wong, BBC reporter citing William Choong, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Collin Koh, research fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies; 6-14-2022; "Taiwan: Are the US and China heading to war over the island?"; BBC News; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61782370; KL]

One major fear is that war would be triggered if China invades Taiwan. Beijing has said in the past it could reclaim the island by force if necessary.

But most analysts say this is not likely - for now.