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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- Russia

Russia won’t escalate---there’s no military, allies, or political incentives for them.

Dr. Limor Simhony 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/micahw

The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale.

Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- NATO Detterence

America dropped the ball by making it clear that they wouldn’t escalate in Ukraine---NATO can’t recover without risking war.

Dr. Nadia C. Schadlow 22, National Security Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, “Why Deterrence Failed Against Russia,” Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-u-s-deterrence-failed-ukraine-putin-military-defense-11647794454/micahw

A credible deterrent is designed to alter a potential aggressor's calculations of risk and reward. Vladimir Putin determined that the potential cost of invading Ukraine was relatively low, and on Feb. 24 he attacked. It will be the job of historians to try to understand why deterrence failed.

Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- NATO Detterence

NATO can’t work against modern warfare

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- NATO Detterence

NATO military exercises are dysfunctional.

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- NATO Detterence

NATO is a “tangled pile of spaghetti.”

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia.

Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › No Impact --- NATO Detterence

NATO and its allies have no deterrence capability – years of underfunding.

Kramer 22 [Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board director of the Atlantic Council. Mr. Kramer has served as a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, 6-13-2022, NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/nato-priorities-initial-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war/] Eric

As a starting point, it is important to recognize that almost all NATO nations, other than the United States, have—in the words of a recent European Union (EU) analysis—had “years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military” capabilities.

Most importantly in the context of the current environment, the “capacity to operate full-spectrum and at high intensity was neglected.” That neglect, and the concomitant need to focus on reestablishing the capacity for high-intensity battle, is well recognized by NATO military leaders. For example, France’s “Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff” specifically sets forth the requirement to be able to “respond…in a high-intensity conflict.” Yet, as a recent RAND report stated: France’s capacity to sustain a high-end, conventional conflict nonetheless is limited. The French military might be able to accomplish all its assigned missions at once, but it lacks depth, meaning that such demanding operations would quickly exhaust both its human and material resources.” What is true for France is similarly true for other European militaries, including—perhaps most importantly—Germany, which has suffered from years of underspending and strategic neglect. In addition, while operating at a different scale in terms of resources and reach, the US military itself is insufficiently prepared, in particular, in terms of its munitions and supply inventories for a sustained, high-intensity conflict. However, these deficiencies are entirely remediable if appropriate measures are taken.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impact Answers › 2AC --- Thumper – Afghanistan

Afghanistan thumps alliance credibility.

Sly 21 [Liz Sly is a correspondent-at-large covering global affairs. She has spent more than 17 years covering the Middle East, including the first and second Iraq wars.; “Afghanistan’s collapse leaves allies questioning U.S. resolve on other fronts”; The Washington Post; August 15, 2021; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghanistan-chaos-blame-us/2021/08/14/0d4e5ab2-fd3e-11eb-911c-524bc8b68f17_story.html]//eleanor

LONDON — The Taliban's stunningly swift advances across Afghanistan have sparked global alarm, reviving doubts about the credibility of U.S. foreign policy promises and drawing harsh criticisms even from some of the United States' closest allies. As Taliban fighters entered Kabul and the United States scrambled to evacuate its citizens, concerns grew that the unfolding chaos could create a haven for terrorists, unleash a major humanitarian disaster and trigger a new refugee exodus. U.S. allies complain that they were not fully consulted on a policy decision that potentially puts their own national security interests at risk — in contravention of President Biden's promises to recommit to global engagement. And many around the world are wondering whether they could rely on the United States to fulfill long-standing security commitments stretching from Europe to East Asia. "Whatever happened to 'America is back'?" said Tobias Ellwood, who chairs the Defense Committee in the British Parliament, citing Biden's foreign policy promise to rebuild alliances and restore U.S. prestige damaged during the Trump administration. "People are bewildered that after two decades of this big, high-tech power intervening, they are withdrawing and effectively handing the country back to the people we went in to defeat," Ellwood said. "This is the irony. How can you say America is back when we're being defeated by an insurgency armed with no more than [rocket-propelled grenades], land mines and AK-47s?" As much as its military capabilities, the United States' decades-old role as a defender of democracies and freedoms is again in jeopardy, said Rory Stewart, who was Britain's minister for international development in the Conservative government of Theresa May. "The Western democracy that seemed to be the inspiration for the world, the beacon for the world, is turning its back," Stewart said. Britain has voiced some of the bluntest criticisms of the pullout, which is unusual for a country that regards itself as the United States' closest ally. Britain made the biggest contribution to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and suffered the highest number of casualties after the United States. In comments Friday, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace predicted civil war and the return of al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization whose attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, prompted the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. "I feel this was not the right time or decision to make," he told Sky News. "Of course al-Qaeda will probably come back, and certainly it would like that kind of breeding ground." "Strategically, it causes a lot of problems, and as an international community, it's very difficult . . . what we're seeing today," he added. Rivals of the United States also have expressed dismay. Among them is China, which fears that the ascent of an extremist Islamist government on its western border will foster unrest in the adjoining province of Xinjiang, where Beijing has waged sweeping crackdowns on the Uyghur population that have been denounced by the West. Washington "bears an unavoidable responsibility for the current situation in Afghanistan," Col. Wu Qian, a spokesman for China's Ministry of National Defense, said earlier this month. "It cannot leave and shed the burden on regional countries." Secretary of State Antony Blinken rejected criticisms that the withdrawal damages U.S. credibility. He said staying mired in a conflict that is not in the "national interest" would do far more damage. "Most of our strategic competitors around the world would like nothing better than for us to remain in Afghanistan for another year, five years, 10 years, and have those resources dedicated to being in the midst of a civil war," Blinken told CNN. "It's simply not in our interest." But the manner and implementation of the withdrawal has left allies feeling betrayed, said Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations. Germany’s government, which withdrew its troops in June and is evacuating its embassy, has refrained from overt criticism of the U.S. withdrawal. Nonetheless, some German officials and lawmakers are seething at Washington's failure to consult coalition partners such as Berlin, Clüver Ashbrook said. Germany is particularly concerned about the potential for an exodus of Afghan refugees similar to the influx of 2015, when more than 1 million migrants, spurred largely by the war in Syria, surged into Europe, with many headed for Germany. "The Biden administration came to office promising an open exchange, a transparent exchange with its allies. They said the transatlantic relationship would be pivotal," she said. "As it is, they're playing lip service to the transatlantic relationship and still believe European allies should fall into line with U.S. priorities." "We're back to the transatlantic relationship of old, where the Americans dictate everything. . . . 'Yes we want to partner with you, but in reality, we want to be able to tell you what to do and when,' " she added. The United States' Arab allies, which have long counted on the U.S. military to come to their aid in the event of an attack by Iran, also have faced questions over whether they will be able to rely on the United States. "What's happening in Afghanistan is raising alarm bells everywhere," said Riad Kahwaji, who heads the Inegma security consultancy in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts one of the biggest American military contingents in the Middle East. "The U.S.'s credibility as an ally has been in question for a while," he said. "We see Russia fighting all the way to protect the Assad regime [in Syria], and now the Americans are pulling out and leaving a big chaos in Afghanistan." Clüver Ashbrook said Biden's plan to build an alliance of democracies to counter the influence of China and Russia is also in doubt, now that the West will no longer maintain a significant presence in Central Asia. For China and Russia, there is opportunity as well as concern in the departure of U.S. troops. Both Moscow and Beijing have hosted Taliban delegations in recent weeks in an attempt to pave the way for a post-American future in the region. The humiliating conclusion of the two-decade U.S. venture into Afghanistan will aid their efforts to persuade many governments to seek out relationships elsewhere, analysts say. In a commentary directed at Hong Kong, China's state-run Global Times cited Afghanistan in a signal to democracy activists not to heed repeated American promises to "stand by" Hong Kong. "It has been proven repeatedly that whomever U.S. politicians claim to stand with will face bad luck, plunge into social unrest and suffer severe consequences," the commentary said.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › No Link --- No Fracturing on cyber

No tradeoff – incorporating emerging tech cooperation into the strategic concept makes NATO deterrence more effective and modern

Thomson and Stacey 6/19/22 [Sir Adam Thomson, former United Kingdom ambassador to NATO, is now director of the European Leadership Network, a not-for-profit network of leaders working for a safer Europe. Sir Graham Stacey, former chief of staff of NATO Transformation, is senior consulting fellow at the European Leadership Network.; “NATO’s next Strategic Concept: Getting modern deterrence right”; The Hill; June 19, 2022; https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3529051-natos-next-strategic-concept-getting-modern-deterrence-right/]//eleanor

But while strong defense is necessary for deterrence, it does not guarantee it. For effective collective defense in unstable times, the 2022 Strategic Concept must deliver modern deterrence fit for the next decade. That means changes from the 2010 Concept, which was written for a less demanding era. The new wording should adapt existing text but give sharper focus and clearer intent. The 2022 Concept should move the Alliance beyond 2010’s purely military conception of deterrence to modern, full-spectrum deterrence in peace, crisis and war, using all the tools available to NATO and developing intellectual capital on deterrence across all levels of the Alliance. Agreed NATO language since 2010 already recognises the need for modern deterrence to be full spectrum. But the 2022 Concept should further guide Allies on how. Four quite simple adjustments would make NATO’s deterrence more effective at lower risk and lower cost. First, resilience. The first segment of the deterrence spectrum is to deny your enemy the ability to damage or coerce you. Allies are already sharply focused on things like diversifying energy supplies and defending against cyberattack. Last year, they agreed, painfully, on reviewing each other’s resilience, because to an important degree the Alliance is only as strong as its weakest link. But national resilience wasn’t explicitly part of 2010 deterrence. It needs to be made integral in 2022. Second, communication. Deterrence is all about what goes on in the mind of the adversary. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows just how spectacularly Moscow can miscalculate not only its next-door neighbour Ukraine but also the West as a whole. The Alliance needs not just the capability and credible will to defend itself but also the ability to communicate those facts accurately to its adversaries. Far more than in 2010, the new Concept must say how NATO will enhance its channels of diplomatic and military communication and use the full potential of its existing ones to plant deterrence, risk reduction and de-escalation with maximum effectiveness into Kremlin and other hostile minds. Third, shaping deterrence through diplomacy. NATO seeks international stability with undiminished security for all. It has always sought negotiated agreements to deliver this. Arms control is in NATO’s DNA, as is the diplomacy with which to deliver it, because arms control can facilitate better deterrence at lower risk and lower cost. The 2010 Concept doesn’t describe arms control and the diplomacy to deliver it as a part of deterrence. The new Concept should make arms control central to NATO’s modern deterrence toolkit, shaping the confrontation with Russia and putting Moscow on the diplomatic defensive. Fourth, updating for the coming decade. Emerging disruptive technologies are already accepted in the 2010 Concept as a part of deterrence. But less is said about their impact on strategic decision making (including nuclear): So many new technologies from hypersonic missiles through space weapons to artificial intelligence can distort or disrupt decisions. The complexity of the interaction of disruptive technologies is an issue in itself. Effective decision making is key to deterrence credibility. So, the 2022 Concept should include not just keeping the Alliance on the technological front edge, understanding the threats and exploiting the opportunities, but also confronting the challenges of technological complexity for NATO decision making. Thus ensuring that mitigation is a central part of Alliance capability and institutional development for the years to come. If the 2022 Concept sets the course, the detailed planning will follow — and NATO will be safer because its deterrence will be stronger.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › No Link --- No Fracturing on cyber

Tech interoperability improves NATO’s cohesion.

Kunertova 18 [Dominika Kunertova works as a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies think tank at ETH Zurich, where she reads, writes, and comments on the geopolitics of emerging and disruptive technologies, military robotics, and transatlantic security and defence cooperation.; “An Alliance Divided?”; Army University Press; January-Febuary 2018; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/]//eleanor

Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31 Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › No Link --- No Fracturing on cyber

NATO cooperation over emerging technology is key to NATO superiority

Simon and Arteaga 22 [Luis Simón is Senior Analyst and Director of the Elcano Royal Institute’s Brussels Office, in addition of being Research Professor of International Relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of London, and a MA in European Studies from the Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). Félix Arteaga is a Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and a Lecturer at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, UNED). He has a doctorate in International Relations and a BSc in Political Science from Madrid’s Universidad Complutense.; “NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept”; Real Instituto Elcano; January 17, 2022; https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/]//eleanor

Industrial cooperation and technological innovation is a subject that has been gaining ground in NATO circles in recent years, particularly with regard to emerging and disruptive technologies. It is true that the economic interests of the companies based in the member countries differ, and that so far NATO has not managed to consolidate the channels of existing collaboration. Furthermore, the EU’s aspiration to attain strategic autonomy, and the particular attention it pays to the technological-industrial aspect of defence, heralded another episode of transatlantic discord, now on the way to being healed thanks to the concept of so-called ‘open’ strategic autonomy, which will enable non-EU-member allies to take part in its industrial and technological initiatives. Added to the discrepancies between allies there is now the need to address the challenge posed by emerging technologies and those threatening to disrupt the traditional military superiority of the Alliance. In this context, the NATO 2030 report emphasises the importance of the Alliance maintaining its technological lead over possible rivals and warns of the progress made by China in terms of innovation. The adoption of NATO’s first Artificial Intelligence strategy in 2021, the setting up of the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the launch of the NATO Innovation Fund in October 2021[13] are tangible progress in the chapter of technological innovation and is destined to play a prominent role in the Madrid summit and Strategic Concept.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › No Link --- No Fracturing on cyber

No fracturing – NATO members already agree that cybersecurity needs to be a priority.

Csepregi et al. 21 [Zsolt Csepregi is the Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Antall József Knowledge Centre, Budapest based foreign policy think tank. He is a security policy expert focusing on the Eastern-Mediterranean region, specialised in Israeli foreign and security policy. Zsolt obtained his MA degree in International Relations at the Corvinus University of Budapest and also pursued studies at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Currently he is pursuing a PhD in War Studies at the National University of Public Service of Hungary.; Péter Dobrowiecki, Dominik Jankowski, Danielle Piatkiewicz, dr. Tomasz Smura, Matej Spišák; “The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass”; Casimir Pulaski Foundation; 2021; https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/the-v4-towards-a-new-nato-strategic-concept.pdf]//eleanor

This issue, over which there are no major disagreements among V4 states, comprises cybersecurity and the development of the alliance’s resilience in cyberspace. All member states agree that this new operational domain has become vital in all types of conflicts, and therefore must be a key area of cooperation amongst NATO members. Our experts also noted that cyber resilience is an area where cohesion can be achieved at the lowest cost. This does not diminish the importance of the topic at hand; rather, it shows us that there are still key challenges which have to be overcome in the near future. Despite the fact that it is not a physical area of operations, cyberspace cannot be separated from the aforementioned geopolitical tensions. It is also connected with the question of the alliance’s stance towards Russia and China; both of these countries have robust capabilities in cyberspace, which they are keen to utilise in the developing great power competition. This factor is also relevant on a lower level, connected to other disruptive and hostile powers such as Iran or North Korea, as well as non-state actors such as international terrorist organisations. The V4 countries naturally have lower levels of readiness in cyberspace than the great powers do; however, it is entirely possible for small and medium-sized powers to enhance their resilience against cyberattacks. For example, Estonia reacted (with the support of NATO) to Russian cyber aggression, and developed robust defensive infrastructure and practices, which should be emulated by other countries. Due to its limited size, resources, demography, and industrial capacity, Estonia could not aspire to such a power position in terms of conventional warfare. International cooperation in cyber resilience is also a force multiplier, and no country can or should rely solely on itself. Thus, it is in the interests of security and political stability to have more pronounced cooperation in this field. The V4 can be a champion in this area: Poland is a great example of the rapid development of the cyber industry, deeply anchored in the transatlantic alliance. The security environment in the 21st century is fundamentally different to any time in the past. The geopolitics of today is not about the possession of territory and material resources, but about the interdependence of economies and companies, as well as the incorporation of new technologies, such as 5G networks and AI, often developed either in the US or China. In such an environment, NATO should incorporate defence capabilities into the fields of cyberspace, countering fake news, human trafficking, and weaponising migration.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link turn --- NATO AI and biotech focus good

NATO leadership in EDTs improves deterrence – includes biotechnology and AI.

Soare 21 [Dr Simona R. Soare is a Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis. Simona analyses trends in emerging and disruptive technologies and their impact on transatlantic and European security and defence.; “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies”; GMF; June 11, 2021; https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies]//eleanor

Five steps could transform NATO into an innovator in its strategic environment: establishing a civil-military technology assessment capability; prioritizing systemic innovation targets; setting ambitious benchmarks linking innovation to capability development, deterrence, defense, and resilience; doubling down on collaborative innovation so that no ally gets left behind in the innovation competition; and committing to more ambitious NATO-EU cooperation. Throughout NATO’s history, defense innovation has been critical to its technological edge and its deterrence and defense posture against multiple threats. The unprecedented progress in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) offers the prospect and challenge of transformative defense innovation for allied armed forces and societies at large. Technological progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, advanced robotics, biotechnologies and human enhancement, quantum technologies, big-data analytics, and fifth-generation telecommunication systems, as well as growing autonomy in the critical functions of military systems, promise to change how wars are fought, how fast, where, and by whom. These technologies enable new forms of military presence, coercive action, and power projection in and across old and new domains (for example, cyberspace and outer space) and below and above the conventional threshold of armed conflict. However, NATO and the transatlantic allies are neither the only nor the most agile actors investing in emerging and disruptive technologies. China and Russia already invest substantially in and have accelerated their adoption of these technologies in military applications. To maintain its strategic advantage against China and Russia, NATO needs to become an agent of innovation and be more agile and strategic in supporting allies to jointly exploit new technologies for deterrence, defense, and resilience purposes. NATO has prioritized EDTs and signaled it has joined “the technological adoption race” against China and Russia.1 Much work remains to be done. Allies remain divided on the ethical and legal specifics of the military use of EDTs and by their national-industrial preferences. Technological capacity across the alliance also varies significantly and, as always, funding is in short supply. Concrete decisions on how to consolidate innovation in EDTs, a critical task for NATO’s mission and future adaptation, are expected at this month’s Brussels summit. Specifically, allies will respond to calls for a “strategic surge” in EDTs2 innovation by establishing a Defense Innovation Accelerator, an opt-in instrument funded through dedicated national contributions, which NATO hopes will incentivize innovation and transatlantic cooperation on emerging technologies.3 As NATO prepares to embark on the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies, this brief takes stock of its ongoing efforts in this field. It examines what drives the alliance’s efforts to exploit EDTs for defense innovation and what it would take for NATO to become an innovator in an environment of unprecedented technological progress and great-power competition. NATO’s ongoing efforts in innovation and EDTs are a step in the right direction. However, to survive in a world of multipolar great-power competition and deliver security to its members, it needs to innovate, not just to adapt incrementally. NATO needs a new framework in which innovation drives adaptation, rather than the other way round as is currently the case. Investing now in the establishment of a resilient innovation capability for the whole of the alliance is a long-term investment in the future of NATO and a strategic necessity. In addition to ongoing efforts, NATO allies should consider five further steps: establishing a NATO civil-military technology assessment capability; prioritizing systemic innovation targets; setting ambitious benchmarks linking innovation to capability development, deterrence, defense, and resilience; doubling down on collaborative innovation so that no ally gets left behind in the innovation competition; and committing to more ambitious NATO-EU cooperation. NATO, Innovation, and Emerging Technologies In NATO and the armed forces of 30 allies, technology-driven defense innovation4 is an ongoing process that encompasses transformational or disruptive innovation—“revolutions in military affairs”—and evolutionary, incremental, or sustained innovation. The alliance has solid experience and practice in defense innovation and technology assessment, not least because defense innovation is seen as a crucial part of continuous adaptation to its strategic environment.5 However, the commercialization of digital emerging technologies critical to allied security and defense, the ongoing technological competition with great powers such as China and Russia, and its own inertial bureaucratic procedures challenge NATO’s capacity to innovate.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link turn --- cyber focus good

NATO cyber defense makes it a more effect alliance.

Veenendaal et al 16 [Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. He has been closely involved in the development of cyber defence policy of the ministry of Defence and the principle author of the first Defence Strategy for operating in cyberspace (2012). Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As a legal and policy analyst with over 15 years of experience, her current research focus is on national cyber security strategies and organisational models, in particular cyber aspects of crisis management. She has also consulted on developing cyber security policy and strategy. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army.; “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?”; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence; June 2016; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf]//eleanor

Given modern armed forces’ dependency on digital technology, it is legitimate to expect that NATO would adapt to this new reality. Since 2002, NATO has invested significantly in improving the defence of its networks. However, NATO has shown little inclination to move away from its current purely defensive posture in cyber defence. At the political level, Allies remain reticent when it comes to discussing the options of using military (offensive) capabilities within a NATO setting. For most of them, cyber operations are generally still uncharted territory in which confusion abounds. Moreover, Allies that have invested heavily in cyber capabilities worry that others might benefit without making a similar investment themselves. Allies therefore remain reluctant to engage in any meaningful discussion on the position and role of cyber capabilities in military operations within the Alliance. In order to achieve a more mature and realistic cyber defence posture, the Alliance must address two important issues. Firstly, it must clearly recognise that network defence does not equal collective defence in cyberspace. Secondly, given that NATO accepts the applicability of collective defence in cyberspace, Allies should develop the full range of military capabilities to defend the Alliance and its interests.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link turn --- cyber focus good

Not recognizing cyber is more confusing for allies – NATO has already made cyber a core part of its mission.

Veenendaal et al 16 [Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. He has been closely involved in the development of cyber defence policy of the ministry of Defence and the principle author of the first Defence Strategy for operating in cyberspace (2012). Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As a legal and policy analyst with over 15 years of experience, her current research focus is on national cyber security strategies and organisational models, in particular cyber aspects of crisis management. She has also consulted on developing cyber security policy and strategy. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army.; “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?”; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence; June 2016; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf]//eleanor

NATO has defined two distinct responsibilities concerning cyber defence: (a) collective defence and (b) the protection of NATO networks. In 2011, the NATO Cyber Defence Policy established that “[i]n order to perform the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and crisis management, the integrity and continuous functioning of its information systems must be guaranteed.”6 The Wales Summit Declaration of 2014 expanded on this when the Alliance affirmed that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence, yet the Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence of 2014 failed to delineate roles and responsibilities.7 The task of defending the alliance against armed attacks through cyberspace with military means was thereby added on top of a policy for network defence. As long as the NATO Cyber Defence Policy merely recognises that the principle of collective defence is applicable in cyberspace, while limiting possible action to the protection of networks, it will continue to cause confusion among Allies. The principle of collective defence is NATO’s raison d’être and lies at the heart of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It commits the Alliance to protect and defend the Allies’ territory and populations against an armed attack.8 Consequently, the accepted core responsibility of the Alliance in cyberspace is to defend the Allies against armed attacks through cyberspace, when necessary through military means. However, the only means at its disposal is the protection of its own networks and systems. This means that while the Alliance recognises that cyberspace can be used by adversaries to launch an armed attack against it, it is impossible for the Alliance to counter such an attack in and through cyberspace. For NATO, this is rather a novel approach to its responsibilities. It would, for instance, be unimaginable that in response to an armed air attack, NATO would not allow for the use of air power, but would limit its response to the use of air defence systems. While the core tasks of collective defence and the protection of own networks are clearly connected and overlapping responsibilities, they are executed under different political, legal, and organisational frameworks. The responsibility for the protection of its own networks is, in principle, the same for NATO as it is for any other large public or corporate organisation working with sensitive information. It is essential to the security and continuity of these organisations, but it is a task mostly carried out in a peacetime context and day-to-day business setting. Outside of an armed conflict, cyber attacks against NATO as an organisation will be qualified as cyber espionage, cyber crime or, in some cases, information operations; but not as armed attacks. Thus, the organisation has the obligation to protect its networks, systems and data but there is a big difference between guarding duties and combat actions. Likewise, as the Alliance will not use military means to counter these types of cyber attacks, the guiding policy should not be defined in military terminology or integrated into a larger military framework. However, that does not mean that a guiding policy for the use of cyber operations is unnecessary and it certainly does not mean that a network defence policy can substitute a cyber operations policy.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link turn --- bioweapons

Including bioweapons in the strategic concept improves deterrence.

Finch 22 [Natasha Lander Finch is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.; “How NATO can curb Russia’s chemical weapons threat”; Atlantic Council; April 8, 2022; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-nato-can-curb-russias-chemical-weapons-threat/]//eleanor

Amid growing speculation that Russia could employ chemical weapons in its war against Ukraine, NATO has collectively voiced its concern over such an escalation, saying it would “result in severe consequences.” The Alliance has also pledged to increase protective equipment for Ukraine while enhancing its readiness against any chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. But how serious are the chemical and biological threats, and what exactly should NATO do to prepare? The West is right to be concerned. Russia used nerve agents from the Novichok family of chemical weapons to target a former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter in the United Kingdom in 2018 and prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Siberia in 2020. These attacks—predictably denied by Moscow—contradicted Russia’s claims that it destroyed the remnants of its chemical weapons program in 2017. Russia has also propped up a Syrian regime that repeatedly used chemical weapons in its brutal civil war, as well as wielded its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto to shield Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and other responsible individuals in his government from justice. This impunity has set a dangerous precedent that could tempt Russia: If Damascus could get away with it, why can’t Moscow? Meanwhile, Russia has also circulated disinformation about a purported biological weapons program in Ukraine backed by the United States—and even brought these false claims to the UNSC in March (they were swiftly dismissed). Related conspiracy theories have taken off on platforms such as Twitter and Telegram, received air time on US television channels, and were parroted by China. These allegations could set the pretext for a false-flag attack involving chemical weapons that Russia could use to expand its invasion or justify additional military action against Ukraine. While sanctions have destabilized the Russian economy and shrunk the resources available for President Vladimir Putin’s war efforts, he likely already has what he needs to mount chemical attacks in Ukraine. Moves, not just messaging To preempt Russia’s use of chemical or biological weapons, the United States and its NATO allies must publicly demonstrate that the West takes this threat seriously and are prepared to respond. In the past few weeks, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Department of Defense spokesperson John Kirby have done just that, raising these issues on social media and during press conferences. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made clear that any use of chemical or biological weapons would violate international law, while citing worries that the effects of biological or chemical agents would be felt in Ukraine’s neighboring countries (several of which are NATO members). And just as it “pre-bunked” potential Russian false-flag operations before the invasion began, the United States should also aggressively and proactively debunk Russian misinformation about chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, NATO should update its strategy for countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats was last updated in 2009 and does not account for the numerous developments in the international security environment. For example, the document references cooperation with Russia as a key element to curbing WMD proliferation, which is clearly untenable today. Russia has also shown its willingness to flout international norms and use CBRN weapons—so NATO’s new policy must place a corresponding emphasis on the ability to defend against such weapons. The Alliance is set to release its next Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June; by referencing a more relevant CBRN policy in that document, NATO would send a clear message to Moscow that CBRN threats remain top of mind. Messaging, however, is not enough. Words must be backed up by tangible actions. NATO has sent forty thousand troops to allied nations close to Ukraine; they should be reinforced with CBRN defense capabilities. NATO’s top military commander, US Air Force General Tod Wolters, has already activated the Alliance’s Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force, putting it on alert in case it is required to deploy. It can respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack with reconnaissance, sampling, protection, and decontamination capabilities, among others. Deploying this task force to support other military reinforcements along its eastern flank would demonstrate NATO’s practical preparedness to respond to contingencies that could involve CBRN weapons used by Russia. Finally, the US Department of Defense should sustain its support of Ukraine via the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which was established after the fall of the Soviet Union to secure and destroy Soviet WMD materials. The CTR program has a long history of working with Ukrainian officials to reduce WMD threats by destroying nuclear delivery systems and improving biological safety and security. US efforts can benefit from CTR’s long-standing relationships with Ukrainian government partners to quickly deliver additional supplies and equipment, which could include supporting other US government efforts to provide Ukraine with protective gear in case of a chemical attack. Through coordinated efforts that incorporate public messaging and tangible action, NATO might have a chance to dissuade Russia from escalating the conflict in Ukraine to chemical warfare. But to do that, Moscow needs to know that the use of chemical weapons will not help its ill-fated invasion and will not be tolerated.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link Turn --- Concept too Narrow

Concept too narrow --- focused on solidarity undermines deterrence and long-term planning --- including EDT is key

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

As NATO prepares to update its Strategic Concept, some might be tempted to regard this moment as an opportunity to push NATO beyond Trump – that is, beyond political division and towards a new era of trans-atlantic solidarity. Such a push is certainly needed, and dovetails with the heightened awareness that in a new geopolitical age, and following the debacle in Afghanistan, democratic values may lack the power to bring allies together and to offer the kind of unified vision required for renewed geopolitical competition. The danger highlighted in this article is that political enthusiasm for renewal might well produce a myopic, inadequate Strategic Concept. NATO has been here before: in 2009–10, eager to move beyond the political divisions built into the war on terror, NATO embraced a Strategic Concept that was perfectly crafted to speak to the Alliance’s broad range of political interests and sensibilities. In an age of contingent crisis management, NATO could muddle through without a clear statement of political–military priorities and defence guidance. In an era of great-power competition, this kind of muddling through would be a calamity. NATO’s post-Crimea adaptation tells the story. NATO responded with political vigour, condemning Russia and placing the burden of change on Moscow while bolstering its own defence and deterrence posture. However, internal political limitations meant that NATO did not develop its thinking on the nature of the threat and the effects that would serve to deter it. By 2016, when Trump burst onto the scene, NATO’s capacity for such in-depth political thinking seemed non-existent. The military authorities seized the initiative, crafting a new military strategy centred on desired effects and deterrence. This first real strategy since the adoption in 1967 of NATO’s Flexible Response strategy was then met with political ambivalence. NATO needs to get its strategic house in order. The political–military divide outlined in this article is real but not yet alarming; a failure to tend to it in the new Strategic Concept would sound the alarm. Confronting Russia while competing with China, digesting the lessons of Afghanistan and developing a range of policy competences in cyber, resilience, outer space, capacity-building and more is indeed a tall political order. Strategy is about priorities, however, and NATO’s priorities must bridge the political– military divide. Thus, the new Strategic Concept could do worse than establish collective defence as an overriding priority; wrap it in a narrative of democratic values necessitating both a rebalanced NATO and collective defence; and invite continuous political–military dialogue on military technology and its strategic implications.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link Turn --- EDT k Effective Concept

Only incorporating emerging tech into its new concept makes NATO functional

Allen et al ‘21

(General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” pg online @ //um-ef)

To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment. To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies. The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › Link Turn --- Aff key to SC

Turn --- including tech discussions key to effective concept and building deterrence

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

Intensifying internal political–military dialogue It is clear that NATO’s broad engagement with a range of amorphous crises following the end of the Cold War eroded its own internal political–military dialogue. The art of managing such crises was new to the Alliance, and it relied more on diplomacy and a host of other non-military means to do so, rather than on defence plans and military deterrence. Thus, as NATO – with some difficulty – built experience in crisis management from Bosnia and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Libya, the close communication that had once existed between the North Atlantic Council and SACEUR withered, becoming more contingent in nature. The Strategic Concept should help to rebuild this relationship. By prioritising collective defence and building a narrative of values, the Strategic Concept would invite a dialogue on the compatibility of a broad set of values with a focused military strategy to keep Russia at bay in the Euro-Atlantic area. The challenge will be to sustain this dialogue. The Reflection Group appointed by Stoltenberg rightly emphasised the need to enhance NATO’s political consultations,but gave scant attention to political–military dialogue.48 NATO should consider putting military technology front and centre in this dialogue. Military technology has come a long way, offering vastly enhanced processing power rooted in artificial intelligence (AI), faster loops from decision to strike, and the high speeds of hypersonic weaponry. Of course, rapid change can cause problems that need political framing and guidance. New technology complicates not only inter-service or joint warfare but also multinational warfare and, not least, the civilian decision-making that is meant to lie at the heart of strategy.49 Thus, military technology can be found at the juncture between the NATO priorities of values (democratic control) and defence (at high speed). Technology has already captured high-level political attention in and around NATO. President Biden is set to focus on ‘technologies vital to longterm economic and military power’ in the United States’ competition with other powers, primarily China.50 Britain’s March 2021 Integrated Review aims to ‘grow the UK’s science and technology power in pursuit of strategic advantage’.51 France has been investing heavily in closing the AI gap with China and the United States, and recently undertook its first exercise in space warfare.52 Finally, Stoltenberg’s February 2021 ‘Food for Thought Paper’ identifies NATO’s ‘technological edge’ as a priority.53 NATO should seek to build a sustained political–military dialogue on the strategic implications of new technology in order to bolster its collective-defence posture and its dialogue with like-minded countries.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Stuff › No Link/Link Turn --- Incentives Solve B/L

Incentives solve the backlash and in-fighting links

Goodman ‘21

(Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brooke Roberts is a research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS, “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” pg online @ //um-ef)

In addition to encouraging pre-standardization cooperation, Washington could do more to engender trust and cooperation with the private sector on standard setting and related policies. With its extensive firsthand experience, the private sector can help the government better understand the true dynamics of standard-setting rivalries in different standards bodies. Greater public-private exchange of perspectives on the commercial and national security dimensions of emerging technologies would also be valuable. Also, as mentioned above, small amounts of additional funding for government experts’ participation in—though not direction of—international standard-setting work could improve public-private coordination and support U.S.-preferred outcomes. While the focus here has mainly been on technical standards, it is also important for the U.S. government to work closely with allies on aligning regulatory approaches to technology. In addition to promoting positive U.S.-preferred norms such as environmental and social sustainability of technology, these efforts would help minimize the scope for misuse or ethical breaches of new technologies. The OECD Principles on AI, for example, are designed to ensure that development of AI technologies adheres to global democratic and human rights values. The International Bioethics Committee (IBC), housed under UNESCO, is another body working to develop normative requirements to safeguard human rights in the development and use of biotechnologies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › 2AC --- Thumper – Resilience

U.S. will push to expand the mandate to include EDT

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ // um-ef)

Adapting to Emerging Threats and Building Resilience Despite its focus on the basics, the US believes NATO must also modernise for a new era of emerging threats. Future-proofing the alliance will mean adapting for cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and disruptive technologies—all of which are insufficiently covered in the last concept. In the new version, the US will advocate for its allies to build resilience to these threats. Washington could champion the establishment of stronger shared resilience requirements for allied nations and capability targets aimed to address these challenges. Some in the US have even advocated for resilience to become a new NATO core task. As part of building resilience, the US will support efforts to strengthen NATO’s cyber defences. The alliance should be a more formidable and proactive actor against persistent Chinese and Russian hacks, espionage, and infiltration of allied networks. Washington will also push allies to do more to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation, investment in sensitive critical infrastructure and other hybrid activities in allied nations, which have serious security implications. For some at NATO, resilience should also include stronger sustainability guidelines and natural disaster response capacities to mitigate shocks from climate change. But given NATO’s limited resources and competing priorities, some in Washington believe climate issues should be left to other international frameworks. While the US will likely support acknowledging climate security in the Strategic Concept, it may wish to accordingly scope NATO’s role in addressing it. In response to the rise of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT), the US supports the alliance’s efforts to maintain its technological edge over Russia and China, including through NATO’s new EDT strategy. However, Washington sees NATO not as a developer of technology, but as a customer. With hesitation among allies to share key data and intellectual property (IP) necessary for the successful co-development of tech, some in the US believe NATO’s added value lies in standardising, adopting and integrating emerging technologies across allied nations. In this spirit, the US will want to make sure the Strategic Concept empowers nascent allied innovation initiatives—including DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—to fulfil this function.