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2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---No Russia Lashout

Heg doesn’t embolden Russia

Kagan, 2022 - [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. May/June “The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” SM]

So in what way might the United States have provoked Putin? One thing needs to be clear: it was not by threatening the security of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have objectively enjoyed greater security than at any time in recent memory. Russia was invaded three times over the past two centuries, once by France and twice by Germany. During the Cold War, Soviet forces were perpetually ready to battle U.S. and NATO forces in Europe. Yet since the end of the Cold War, Russia has enjoyed unprecedented security on its western flanks, even as NATO has taken in new members to its east. Moscow even welcomed what was in many ways the most significant addition to the alliance: a reunified Germany. When Germany was reunifying at the end of the Cold War, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev favored anchoring it in NATO. As he told U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, he believed that the best guarantee of Soviet and Russian security was a Germany "contained within European structures."

Late Soviet and early Russian leaders certainly did not act as if they feared an attack from the West. Soviet and Russian defense spending declined sharply in the late 1980s and through the late 1990s, including by 90 percent between 1992 and 1996. The once formidable Red Army was cut nearly in half, leaving it weaker in relative terms than it had been for almost 400 years. Gorbachev even ordered the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and other Warsaw Pact states, chiefly as a costsaving measure. It was all part of a larger strategy to ease Cold War tensions so that Moscow might concentrate on economic reform at home. But even Gorbachev would not have sought this holiday from geopolitics had he believed that the United States and the West would take advantage of it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---No Russia Lashout

The idea that US power in Europe leads Russia to lash out is illogical and incompatible with realism

Gunitsky ‘22 – Professor of Political Science [Seva; Seva Gunitsky is an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto.; 1-24-22; "There’s Plenty of Blame to Go Around on Ukraine”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/24/ukraine-us-russia-stephen-walt/; Foreign Policy; accessed 7-1-2022; AH]

Focusing on U.S. idealism ignores Russia’s own agency. In his latest article, FP columnist Stephen Walt traces the sources of the Russia-Ukraine crisis to a single cause: American arrogance. The conflict would not have happened, he writes, “had the United States and its European allies not succumbed to hubris, wishful thinking, and liberal idealism.” By overplaying its hand, the United States has now put Russia in a position where it has no choice but to defend its interests. Realists are sometimes criticized for ignoring weaker states’ agency, but Walt takes the argument to its absurd conclusion by denying the agency of everyone but U.S. policymakers. It’s U.S. officials who make the choices that matter—bad ones—while the rest of the world, Russian President Vladimir Putin included, are simply enacting the eternal laws of history. This is not just an academic dispute about isms. It’s a question about how Russia and the United States got into this situation and what to do about it. During the Cold War, debates raged about who was to blame for starting the conflict between the superpowers. To simplify a complex set of arguments, answers fell into three categories: traditionalists, who blamed the Soviet Union; revisionists, who blamed the United States; and post-revisionists, who blamed not a particular side’s actions but the uncertainty and mutual suspicion created by the anarchy of international politics. Policymakers are now rehashing these debates, but instead of asking who started the Cold War, the question has become who reignited it. Walt takes the equivalent of the revisionist side—America did it, period. Doing so makes sense as a counterargument to conventional Washington wisdom—that Putin did it, period. This view—while refusing to treat the United States as anything but a force of good—has contributed to foreign-policy blunders in Afghanistan and Iraq, so it’s understandable that Walt would push against it. It would be nice to have more voices in the foreign-policy establishment doing the same. But by placing blame on one state, Walt has robbed his argument of the strategic context that realists themselves correctly love to emphasize. As a result, focusing on the United States doesn’t just ignore the role played by others but contradicts Walt’s own theory. Realists argue that regional powers always seek primacy in their neighborhood. According to this logic, a recovering Russia would seek to reestablish regional hegemony regardless of U.S. actions. Western accommodation would have only sped up the process. It’s incoherent for Walt to claim that liberal illusions caused the Russia crisis while also arguing that regional powers naturally seek control over their neighborhood. The rise in tensions would be expected unless Washington abandoned all interest in the region. This incoherence extends to explaining Putin’s motivations. A key realist principle is that states should not go to war unless it serves their national interests. This is why realists have admirably opposed U.S. adventurism in Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere, noting that none of these places ever posed a threat to the United States. If you want to invade, you better have a good reason. But such high standards for starting a conflict disappear when applied to other regimes. What national interest do realists think Putin is defending by escalating this crisis? What is the existential threat he faces that justifies war and tens of thousands of casualties? Even if NATO is a worry, it’s hard to credibly portray it an as immediate danger, especially since Russia’s concerns center on an expansion that hasn’t happened and doesn’t look likely to happen. If you argue that Putin is merely reacting to Western pressures and his reaction is understandable and expected, you are also arguing that his decision to wage war is justified on realist grounds. Which is, sorry to say, a questionable way to explain a war of choice, fabricated and pursued for reasons unknown.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars › 2AC---Transition Wars Violent

Transition wars are violent -- the Britain to U.S. power shift was an exception

Schake 17 [Schake, Kori, Kori Schake is a senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)., “Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony”, Chapter 12, pg. 271-292, Harvard University Press, ] AA

12 Lessons from a Peaceful Transition LooKiNg AcRoss A hundred years of America growing stronger and more assertive in the international order, the most striking element is how highly contingent a peaceful outcome was in the transition from British to American hegemony. This peacefulness hinged on a unique sense of political sameness, both domestically and in in- ternational practice, for the crucial years of America surpassing Britain that allowed the hegemon to diminish the importance of relative power between them. The sense of sameness dissipated soon after the transition, and America set sail on radically changing the international order to more closely reflect its domestic political compact. To the extent that the British to American transition is illustrative for future changes, it cautions deep skepticism—both that the transition can occur peacefully and that, even if it should occur peacefully, the international order that results will operate on terms the United States has set in its hegemony. This is especially true if the subsequent hegemon emerges not from within the American order but from the much more probable direction of China. 271 In stark terms, the lessons of the British to American case for future hegemonic transitions are four: (1) the prospects for a peaceful hegemonic transition are small even in the most conducive circum- stances; (2) differences in political culture and structure of government make an American to Chinese hegemonic transition much less likely to be peaceful; (3) America is making the same strategic choice with China that Great Britain did with a rising America, that it can be induced to comply with extant rules; and (4) America ought to expect that a hegemonic China will rewrite the rules to reflect its domestic political culture, just as America itself did. The Crossing of Courses TharetaGt Britain failed to maintain its dominance in the inter - national order is a simple fact; the United States grew richer, stronger, and more assertive. As a result, America demanded and received the ability to reset the rules by which states operated inter- nationally. Since the establishment of the state system, and even be- fore, hegemonic transitions have occurred by force. A rising power tests its mettle against the dominant power, succeeding or failing by force of arms. That was not the character of the transition from British to American dominance; it was uniquely peaceful. Why it was uniquely peaceful has been the subject of this book. Theories about state behavior necessarily look to explain the pre- ponderance of the data. As the only peaceful transition, the Anglo- American hegemonic transition is an outlier, so it is not surprising that prevailing theories provide imperfect explanations for its history. Yet it is an extremely important case, as the only transition achieved without cataclysmic violence. Understanding why it occurred without violence is essential to determining whether future hegemonic transitions can occur peacefully, and what the 272 nature of the international order will be once such transitions have occurred. A realpolitik explanation for what transpired between Great Britain and the United States from 1823 to 1922 would be that a rising power began probing the established hegemon, backed off when it amisnecter, easndt advanced when the hegemon was distracted or iostehuernwwilling to counter the challenge. Building on a repu- tation for twisting the lion’s tail, an upstart America cannily took credit for what Britain would need to do to prevent European colo- nization of the western hemisphere in 1823, was slapped down while attempting a steal of the Oregon Territory in 1853, managed to threaten just enough trouble for Britain in 1861–1863 to tip the scales against recognition of the Confederacy, burnished its strength win- ning the Indian Wars, and consolidated a continental economic platform. Ultimately the economic and military strength of the rising power were so compelling that, confronted with war during the 1895 Venezuelan debt crises, Great Britain instead conceded. Cooperation over Venezuela and during the Spanish-American War would illustrate a waning power buying goodwill with a new hagt eims,ojnu—mtping on the bandwagon. Being more con - cerned with a rising Germany than a fading Britain, the United States joined in the Great War on the Allied side and brokered a peace, both at Versailles and in the Washington Naval Treaties, that locked in its own superiority. All seems sensible enough in that telling. But the realpolitik story line cannot adequately account for several elements of the history, the most important elements in producing a peaceful transition: why Britain at the height of its powers offered cooperation to its rising rival in 1823; why Britain declined to press its advantage over Oregon in 1845; why Britain resisted an inexpensive opportunity to 273 deal a devastating blow before 1863 during the American Civil War; why the two countries developed such a vibrant sense of sameness during their introspective decades, unique for both countries from any other international relations; why Britain encouraged American expansion into the Pacific and enabled American success in the Smpearniciashn-WA ar; why the United States grew more liberal as it grew more powerful; and why America in the time of its hegemony used its power to try and create a diffnertekind of international order. Menatsnoy feBlermitish strategy accounted for by realpolitik as a waning power accommodating a waxing power seem instead to be characteristics of British foreign policy across the whole of its dominance of the international order; to use Silicon Valley termi- nology, they are features, not bugs. Great Britain was a peculiar kind of hegemon. It never seemed to feel its own strength, perhaps because the strategy it employed across 150 years always required partner- ships to succeed. Balancing conflicting interests and quarrelsome partners for temporary gain was Great Britain’s genius. In contrast atodAumrinergicits hegemony, Britain seemed always intensely conscious of its vulnerabilities rather than exalting in its strengths. Hlseowtoeexplain Great Britain, ascendant in 1823, seeking out common cause with an America barely able to protect its own coast- line in order to prevent further European colonization in the western hemisphere? Great Britain had a genius for piecing together mosaics of mar- ginal contributors for tactical advantage. Governments from those of Earl of Liverpool to David Lloyd George were always temporizing, finding narrow bases for ephemeral collusion to specific purpose with a fluid collection of partners. It was a cost-efficient geostrategy that succeeded spectacularly until the international order calcified 274 into standing alliances. And when that more rigid international order emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, Britain had laid the trace lines for more stable cooperation with two of the three emergent great powers, Japan and the United States. It is unfair to British statesmen to conclude, as Paul Kennedy does, that they always accommodated their challengers.1 They did not, at least, always accommodate the United States, pushing back on both American territorial demands for Oregon and the revisionist legal claims for superiority in law of democratic governments. Presi- dent James Polk probably lost more in the 1845 confrontation over Oregon than he would have gained by playing a longer hand and letting the tide of American settlers make the case for the boundary location of British Columbia. The government of Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston was sorely tempted twice before 1863 to recognize the Confederate States during the American Civil War, considering it in Britain’s interests to do so. The British inclina- tion even in 1895 was to put America in its subordinate place and deride its claims for a sphere of influence in the Americas. British governments defined their interests expansively and threatened force effectively to constrain American challenges. Confrontation was a routine part of British-American interaction for much of the nine- teenth century. The theory that democracy produced a peaceful transition is only partly borne out in the Anglo-American transition. The difference in form of government between Great Britain and America did in- crease the likelihood of hegemonic confrontation between the two countries. British statesmen were appalled at the type of government on display in America. In part this was a reflection of class privilege in Britain, but leaders’ aversion to democracy was more than just prejudice. Speaking the same language, the British had a front row 275 seat for the demagoguery, recklessness, and corruption of electoral politics on display in America after the decorum of the founding fathers gave way to Jacksonian America. Theryewnot inaccurate in anticipating that democracy would produce a bellicose state un- willing to accept the established practices of great powers. A rising Aa mwaesriacn illiberal Amer ica in very many respects. Yet even democratic British leaders did not predict that a risen America would choose to reconstruct the international order in profoundly liberal ways. British leaders before 1867 feared how American influence could permeate their national boundary, a concern uniquely posed by America. The American experiment echoed through British debates on electoral reform; it was the only model of functioning democ- racy and therefore the basis for comparison of what Britain wanted and did not want in its own democratization. Before the electoral reforms, British governments worried about infection of American attitudes in the British body politic. They had a rich appreciation for the appeal of American ideals: George Canning championed James Monroe’s announcement in 1823 because it associated Britain with America’s international appeal. Robert Peel declined to push British advantage over James Polk’s 1845 exposure in Oregon when British reformers took up America’s case. In 1863 Palmerston was cautious not to expose his government to pressure for greater dateimzaotciorn by aligning with a Southern cause unpop ular with those least represented in British politics. ThespsrofcBritish adteimzaotciorn eventually brought the po litical cultures of the two countries together and gave them a sense of distinction from other states, all of which were differently constituted. Before electoral re- form in Britain, though, the democratic divide was cause for deep distrust between Britain and America. 276 aDteizmaoticorn was not the only threat Amer ica posed to British policy, however. Choices about America had a unique resonance because of immigration. British leaders had no trepidation about domestic repercussions of policy toward other countries; with Amer- aic, British leaders had to calculate the way anti- American policies would affect attitudes in Ireland, Scotland, and even within England. No other country could play a positive role in mobilizing public sentiment, reaching into domestic politics to affect foreign policy. Palmerston saw the dimensions of that challenge in 1863 and pulled back from recognizing the Confederacy. The foreign policy gain wasn’t worth the domestic policy cost of greater diffi- culty controlling Ireland and Scotland. Franklin Delano Roosevelt threatened revolt in Britain’s colonies if Britain made a separate peace with Japan in 1936. America’s ability to reach into other countries’ domestic policies, and the comparative difficulty of other countries being able to effect a more kaleidoscopic American body politic, provided a significant bargaining advantage in American foreign policy. Democracy and immigration affected foreign policy in one other aimntpowraty for Great Britain: Americans mobilizing against their own government’s policies considered too beneficial to Britain. American nationality initially defined itself in contrast to Britain, creating a natural antipathy. But even as that generalized effect abated, the specific effect of American immigrant constituencies grew to penalize British foreign policy because of British domestic policy. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquess of Salisbury got stung in Senate consideration of the arbitration treaty by the scorpion tail of Irish American resentment of Britain’s in- sensitivity during the Great Irish Famine. President Woodrow Wilson’s fury at “hyphenated Americans” denying the League of 277 Nations shows the Irish American retribution for Irish partition and German American resentment of ascribing all war guilt and severe reparations to Germany. Another significant advantage afforded a rising America was re- course to the public. Due to the American political system’s frequent elections being tied more tightly to public attitudes, presidents could reinforce their authority in foreign policy by appealing to public sen- timent. James Monroe, James Polk, Abraham Lincoln, and Grover Cleveland all played this card to great effect during foreign policy negotiations with Britain, capitalizing on the caricature of the masses as easily whipped into an uncontrollable frenzy. Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt were acknowledged to be swim- ming against strong currents of public opposition. Canning un- derstood Monroe was grandstanding with his 1823 proclamation and declined to even acknowledge it. Peel struck a deal over Oregon before America’s victory in Mexico out of concern that the public would then push Polk to greater intransigence. Palmerston gave Lin- coln leeway during the Trent affair, considering him hemmed in by public opinion. Salisbury changed tack on Venezuela after the roar of public support for Cleveland’s unexpectedly aggressive assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895. Democracy was thus a structural advantage for a rising America as it engaged the established great power. That would not have been the case if Britain were not rdaetmizoincg; an authoritarian state would have had greater latitude in ignoring public attitudes. But theories that domestic politics are determinative of foreign policy also falter as explanation for British and American behavior in the transition. Britain did become more accommodating toward Aa monecriec both were democracies, and public sentiment did trend strongly in America’s favor. But Salisbury did not make the 278 strategic shift in response to public attitudes in 1895; if they were anllti,mthpeoSrtalisbury government would not have initially taken a strong stand on Venezuela. Salisbury made the shift because the Venezuelan crisis brought into focus a strategic problem Britain needed to solve: it was overextended and looking for power to un- derwrite British objectives. Public sentimentality about America en- abled a choice, but it did not dictate that choice. Aa mis etrhiec even more di fficult case to make for domestic pol- itics driving foreign policy. As loud and combative as the American public was, and careful as American presidents had to be in mar- shaling opinion to support of their policies, opinion factors much more in campaigning than governing. Public attitudes did not factor at all in President Monroe’s declaration. President Polk did not allow public enthusiasm for “Fiftyo-ufr forty or fight” to pre- vent compromise with Britain over the Oregon boundary. President Lincoln did not allow public outrage over the Trent affair drive a damaging choice during the Civil War. President Cleveland did not allow a restive public to force his hand on the annexation of Hawaii nor in Venezuela. President William McKinley was not stampeded to war with Spain with the sinking of the USS Maine. President The- oe dore Roos velt only expanded the Monroe Doctrine in 1902 re- sponding to the Arbitration Court’s decision, not public or business interests. Public attitudes did press on President Warren G. Harding in 1921 to find some means less destructive and costly than war for the United States to engage in the world, but perhaps that shows that hegemony gives American presidents the latitude—the margin for error—to indulge public attitudes. Aa’smvearuicnted morality, such a prominent part of its own de - scription of itself, proved limber between 1823 and 1923; it never im- pinged on the destruction of Indian tribes and their way of life. In 279 fact, an alternate morality in the form of Manifest Destiny was developed to rationalize westward expansion. The morality of colo- nialism was, to America’s credit, a major political issue from the 1870s onward as America began expanding its political control be- yond territory inhabited by Americans. But the issue was more ab- stract, as it did not affect Americans directly. As with the influence of public attitudes, America’s morality in foreign policy correlates with the increase in its power. Like public opinion, indulging mo- rality in foreign policy may be a luxury of hegemony. Something important changed in interactions between Great Britain and America in 1895—or, more accurately, the 1895 Venezu- elan debt crises revealed changes that had been long accruing. Er- nest May, who considers domestic politics and morality the driving forces of American foreign policy across this time frame, even con- cedes that “Cleveland and Olney startled England and the United States into one another’s arms.”2 The 1870s had been introspective years for both Great Britain and the United States, with Britain adapting to the changes wrought by expansion of the voting fran- chise and America consolidating its hold over a continental expanse. The result of this was an America that in many important respects had become an empire and a Britain that had become a democracy. The result of the changes was to make the currency of power less iamntpionrthe British- American relationship than it was in other state relationships. Both of these changes were essential in the peaceful transition of hegemony. Great Britain would not have trusted that America out in the world would act as Britain did had America not eschewed its republican morality with the conquest of its Indian Wars. America would not have considered Britain its natural ally if Britain had not democratized. The transformations of both societies occurring simultaneously is an historical anomaly— serendipitous, but anoma- lous. If America had not come to act like a traditional great power rather than continuing to propound its ideology in foreign policy, Great Britain might well have countered rather than encouraged Aa’smreorliec in the world. If Great Britain had not become a re- lated government, the United States might well have forced foreign policy concessions from Britain as it did from other countries. The sense of sameness that pervades Anglo-American relations in the late nineteenth century allowed the British and American governments to view each other’s power in less threatening terms. Their shifting national perceptions, their ideas of each other and the international order, are hugely important in making the hege- monic transition peaceful. Britain did not lose the will to enforce its international order—something sorrowfully evident by the three million British casualties in World War I. What explains Great Britain not contesting America’s challenge to the established inter- national order is instead that Britain and the United States came to perceive each other’s power in uniquely unthreatening terms. This perspective was the basis for peaceful resolution to the 1895 Venezuelan debt crisis, British endorsement of Hawaii’s annexation in 1898, assistance to American arms during the Spanish-American War, encouragement for Cuba and the Philippines as American col- onies, America’s 1902 willingness to enforce commercial contracts in the western hemisphere, America’s lenient attitude toward Brit- ain’s World War I blockade and even its choice to join the allied war effort on land in 1917. During the crucial passage of dominance frreoamt BGritain to the United States, the two countries viewed their interests as indistinguishable, their military power as cumu- lative. They enabled and justified each other’s foreign policy choices, a collusion championed in Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden. 281 The glittering moment of Anglo-American sameness was remarkably short-lived. ThreeGat War undoubtedly had much to do with Aa mreecroiicling from a traditional great power role. America rititslkeinagndsodel manding so much in the a ftermath of the war would remind Britain of tiresome pre-rapprochement American grandstanding. America emerged from World War I as the interna- tional order’s strongest country by far. Neither its economy nor its military suffered losses of the kind or magnitude of Europe’s great powers, and its potential far outstripped its performance. The “war to end all wars” leftaAsmtaenrdicing tallest among contenders for dominance of the international order. What America chose to do with that power is what drove an end to the special intertwining of British and American interests. First at Versailles, and then even more adamantly in the Wash- ington Naval Treaties, a hegemonic United States attempted to build an international order of great power restraint. Limiting the means of war would remove the causes of war, prejudice governments toward domestic preoccupations, and allow mutually enriching eco- nomic competition. America mistook international politics to be a macrocosm of its domestic politics. aA’smterraincsformation—or perhaps reversion is more accurate, since many of the notions pervade American thinking about inter- national relations before 1890—alarmed the British government. Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, and Arthur Balfour had built British strategy on a foundation of American might underwriting British interests; those interests were diverging from America’s. The ultimate achievement of that British strategy, American soldiers providing the winning margin of a European land war in reinforce- ment of Britain, would be the anagnorisisafotor Abrminegricabout a very diffnerteinternational order. 3 282 After World War I, republican messianism returned to American foreign policy, and a hegemonic America became ambitious to change the rules of order. As it had prohibited European coloniza- tion of the nascent nations of the western hemisphere in 1823, pro- claimed a superior right in law for representative governments in 1845, and renounced the right of states that abused their citizens in 1898, America would advance its republican principles. The reality of a hegemonic America was even more sweepingly ambitious than the Canadian representative of Britain’s empire had warned in 1921: Aa mwaesrincot satis fied being a law unto itself; it would bend the international order to make its law universal practice. The world America wanted was one in which Britain was not uniquely advantaged or influential over America, because the rest of the world made itself like America and Britain. And the United States moved quickly to try and establish that world. The schism was apparent in the 1916 American naval program that would over- take Britain’s navy, deplored by the British and American negotia- tors at Versailles, and made manifest in American proposals at the 1921 Washington Naval Conference. The resulting treaties estab- lished parity between the British and American navies and thus were importantly symbolic of America overtaking Britain as hegemon. Implementation of the treaties would further showcase the inno- vative dynamism of America and Britain’s other rising rival, Japan. It would take nineteen years of further Japanese dynamism to push Britain and the United States back into collusion, and the result of that war would redouble American belief that a state’s domestic po- lailticulture was determinative of its be havior in the interna- tional order. This cast Britain’s imperial policies after World War II in sharp and negative relief, making impossible the sustainment of Britain’s unique intertwining with the United States that had occurred during the war. It is easy to imagine different Anglo-American relationships that might have resulted if the special relationship did not cohere at the historical moment that it did. There are so many particularities to both countries and in the timing and manner of their collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as America thrust outward and Britain became concerned about the burdens of its for- eign policies. Could the cultural similarities have trumped British concern about a genuinely republican foreign policy? If America had seemed likely to advance self-determination in ways that threatened Britain’s empire, or succeeded in fostering political change in coun- tries with important economic resources, Britain might well have used its military might to prevent an expansion of American power. Instead of assisting American efforts in the Spanish-American War, Britain might have thrown its weight behind the Spanish crown, to positive effect for its relationships with continental European powers. When Britain flirted with recognizing the Confederacy, the Amer- ican minister to St. Petersburg, Cassius Marcellus Clay, publicly questioned, “Is England so secure in the future against home revolt or foreign ambition as to venture, now in our need, to plant the seeds of revenge in all our future?”4 Might America have reached more aggressively in to British domestic politics, becoming an agent provocateur instead of a model for reform? That could have reig- nited a contest over Canada, which an America steaming out of its Civil War might have taken from British control (and thus perhaps wading into a quicksand of Canadian insurgency). A Fenian Army might have mobilized for Ireland itself, with overt American sup- port (beyond throwing money into Irish flags during St Patrick’s 284 Day parades) goading Britain’s sore. Or the American government could have agitated Britain’s workingmen and urban poor, threat- ening Britain with the revolution its elites so feared. American republicanism was probably too deeply in bone and anti-British sen- timent too sturdy a factor in American politics in the nineteenth century to have given the British much confidence of turning the eAompleeriacgaaninpst their government. But the transition from British to American hegemony reads more like a romance than a realpolitik primer. There is American yearning for the stature accorded by British attention; the courtship of con- vieennce; marriage proposals o ffered several times by Britain and always formally spurned by America, even as it tried to retain the affeacvtoirosnBartietafin was performing; development of tender regard for each other’s peculiarities; a relationship maturing into sober appreciation of common interests and mutually beneficial patterns; anxiety from both as fissures emerged over what future each wanted; the heartbreak of separation; and experience with others reuniting them in gratitude. Britain remains unique in its ability to understand and negotiate the corridors of American power, and more successful than any other state in harnessing American strength to advantage of its interests. It had the structural benefit of being the first mover, along with continuing advantages accruing from linguistic and cultural similarities. But these can be easily overstated. Britain’s connection with America is less organic than cultivated, as the resurgence of a special relationship in the run up to and during World War II dem- onstrates. British governments often feel they have too little influ- ence with American governments; all others wish they had what Britain has. It was, and is, in Britain’s interest to capitalize on Amer- ican power, and Britain is smart enough to do so shrewdly and 285 with a light enough touch that Americans hardly ever notice. It is difficult to imagine America replicating that feat with any poten- tially rising powers. The Same River Twice? A hundred years after the moment when America shook off Britain and strode forward to reshape the international order in its image come other claimants for global dominance, growing in strength and testing alternatives to the American equation for dominance of the international order. China, in particular, merits examination because of the momentousness of its great leap forward since the economic reforms of 1978. Its dynamism has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, with an economic growth rate of e9r.8cepnt between 1978 and 2005. 5 Afterntaucry of humiliation, its success has fostered a swaggering nationalism. It is the world’s second largest economy, and even if it fails to maintain its galloping growth rate it may well surpass the United States. The Chinese government has a fundamentally different model of the relationship between the state and its people than does America: it is counting on prosperity preventing demands for po litical ireaoennpr, easrevtertsal of the dynamic that Amer ica asserts as the nalaoturdrer of politics. It has an increasingly combative military being primed with high-tech weaponry. And it envisions a mani- festly diffnerteregional order in Asia than does the United States. John Maynard Keynes famously quipped that “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” Many of the practical men and women running American policy toward a rising China are unwittingly enslaved to the ideas of living political scientist Francis Fukuyama. Policy makers often deride Fukuyama’s 286 The End of History and the Last Man as though he were proclaiming that events would cease to occur, rather than ruminating on Hegel’s critique of traditional liberalism and advocacy of a state with lim- ited powers based on social consent.6hYoestetsame policy makers have also consistently across more than forty years supported an ap- proach to the world based on the Fukuyaman belief that sustained success is impossible for states that are undemocratic and that there can be no successful challenger to the Western model of market economies and representative governance. It is the lesson the West took from World War II and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is en- shrined in Robert Zoellick’s solemn invocation for China to be- come a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order. It is the rationalization for American businesses to invest in and shift man- ufacturing to China. What America means by “responsible stakeholder” is, of course, a China that accepts as given the rules of the international order Aa mhaesriecstablished. Amer ica supports a powerful and pros- perous China because it is wagering there cannot be a powerful and prosperous China unless it becomes democratic, that a demo- cratic China will dovetail into the same interests as America, that hshoasreiinngtetrests it will share the burden of upholding them, and that in upholding those interests China will conduct itself as Aa mcoenrdicucts itself. It is the strategic calculation Salisbury’s government made in 1895 about the United States. Salisbury’s reorientation of British policy was essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between Great Britain and the United States. So, too, may a Fukuyaman orientation of American policy prove essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between aAmanedriCc hina should it occur. If prevention of war is the metric, Salisbury’s policy is the right choice. But it merits recollecting that 287 Salisbury’s gamble ultimately proved wrong: the United States did not fully share Britain’s interests and did not uphold the rules Britain had established. A hegemonic America established its own rules, based on its domestic ideology. G. John Ikenberry has emphasized the importance of liberality in the American-led order.7 The rules are considered by participants— not just the dominant power—to be fair and fairly applied. This cul- ture invests other powers in helping uphold the order and utilizes legitimacy to drive down the cost to the United States of sustaining the order. The American-led order thus has a great capacity to accommodate fluctuations of strength—which is to say that rising powers need not change the rules in order to become dominant in the existing order. But China clearly does want to change the rules—even as it benefits from them. China has afforded the United States glimpses at least as numerous as nineteenth-century America did for Britain that the country’s reflexes are diffnertefrom those of the reigning hegemon. It does not embrace the philosophy that people have in- herent rights and loan them in limited ways to government. It cen- tralizes power beyond the constraint of laws or institutions. It does not hold the wielders of power accountable to the public by either election or journalism. It enforces a bias in favor of national corpo- rations, both overtly through access to Chinese markets and opaquely through theft of intellectual property. It appears to view the international order as a tribute system, with weak states forced into compliance and strong states lulled into accepting small changes by threat of consequences out of all proportion to the infraction. It would thereby destroy the alliance system that is the basis for American presence in the region and provision of defense for the weak states on China’s periphery. While China’s is currently 288 a regional strategy, there is little reason to believe it would not also constitute a global strategy if the nation is in the position to assert one. This suggests that China will pose a normative challenge as well as a power challenge to the American-led order.8 Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Balfour at least had the strong bases of common political culture and public affection between the two countries when they placed their bet on a rising America aligning so closely with Great Britain that both nations’ power could be har- nessed for Britain’s interests. The United States is making the same bet on much shakier grounds with China. To be sure, America has hedged its bets with China. It maintains alliance relationships that support America’s military reach and in- tensify when China behaves threateningly. It is attempting a major trade pact that will set the rules for Asia’s economies. It is purport- edly “rebalancing” its attention to Asia. Its military forces are reen- gaged on the challenge of a great power war and the defense spending for adequate preparation. Few defense specialists believe China’s military could defeat America’s, but the Pentagon watches with anx- iety at China’s ability to develop asymmetric capabilities that might render moot America’s military advantages. Few defense specialists in 1895 would have agreed that America’s military could defeat Britain’s, and yet Salisbury fundamentally changed the course of British strategy to cede American objectives rather than persist in the rules of order Britain had set and previ- ously enforced. Might not America cede China even more rather than fight a war that could collapse American power in the Pacific? Another element of the challenge is that military power is a de- rivative index; it relies in large measure on a country’s economic base. America’s consolation thus far with China’s meteoric rise is that China’s economy is merely a cheap manufacturing base that 289 has yet to prove it can navigate the middle-income trap, whereas Aa’smwereiaclth is driven by innovation. This, too, is Fukuyama’s long shadow: belief that only free societies can foster the intellec- tual creativity to sustain dynamism. It is a complacency that Ger- many’s rise in the prewar years ought to have shattered. Freedom is not the only motivator for innovation. Authoritarian capitalism in China is proving itself as creative and unrestrained as its American counterpart. Prosperity is the main allure of the authoritarian model, espe- cially when capitalism’s champions lag.9 Nationalism, too, is a puol wfoerrcfe. Moreover, the outsize disputatiousness and risk tol - erance of Americans may itself be a national characteristic rather than a universal human attribute. Most Europeans choose forms of governance and economy less tumultuous than those of Ameri- cans; public acceptance of retrograde motion in democratizing iseosciiseto ften a function of exhaustion with the enervation of po- lailtiacnd economic change. Theopple of China could well choose a government less free but more predictable than America’s—and prosper in the choice. Aa mnaetruicrally believes such a system is unsustainable. Not only would China have to impose it by force on free societies, but it is susceptible to corrosion from within. This is often mentioned in conjunction with the fact that nearly 150,000 Chinese students study at American universities each year. In Fukuyaman terms, education offers a path to China becoming part of the American order. Amer- ican policy encourages the practice in the belief that while Chinese may not return home hoping their teenage daughters behave as American teenagers do, they surely want a government they can hold accountable. And if a government is accountable, then it will become liberal. But if the Chinese dream proves magnetic, America will have educated the political, economic, and military leaders that occasion its demise. American government during the country’s rise to prominence was not liberal. The government became liberal in conjunction with prosperity and power, and it could be argued that America’s liber- ality was practiced to a greater extent in its foreign policy than in remaining true to its creed at home. The Fukuyaman mind-set takes as causality the increased liberalism of America; it may have simply been correlation. The Lockean liberal ethos is so fully embedded in American he- gemony, though, that it is difficult to imagine the United States re- fusing admission to Chinese students. Indeed, liberalism may so far pervade American political culture that courts would deny gov- ernment the ability to proscribe university admissions on national security grounds. While conservatives bemoan the preoccupations of liberal societies, they are the defiennint gofeltehme American brand and the seemingly inescapable basis for American foreign policy in the time of its hegemony. The American order will succeed or fail along Fukuyaman lines: either the United States will prove reigeht that people and free markets are the sole basis for sustain- able prosperity and political power, and China will either fail to continue rising or become indistinguishable from other states in the American order, or China will prove resistant to the attractions of liberalism and overtake America as hegemon. If the Chinese model sustains itself, then a dominant China is likely to recast the rules in ways that extrapolate to the international order its domestic political ideology, just as America did. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics would be a very different international order from the one America has fostered in its hegemony. It would encourage and support other authoritarian governments politically, financially, and socially. It would penalize states for interfering in the internal practices of repressive governments. It would offer priv- ileged access to state-associated commercial concerns. It would prevent market forces levying penalties that make markets efficient and reliable allocators of capital. China lacks an ideology likely to appeal to America in the seductive way America’s ideology appealed within Britain and beyond. Without such an ideology, any hegemonic transition will require imposition by force.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars › 2AC---Transition Wars Violent

Hegemonic power transition is violent -- Chinese revisionism has made it more aggressive than ever

Beckley 21 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., 2-24-2020, "Conditional Convergence and the Rise of China: A Political Economy Approach to Understanding Global Power Transitions," OUP Academic, ] AA

The conventional wisdom about current trends in the balance of power relies heavily on power transition theory, which assumes that economic convergence is an unconditional process in which poorer countries inevitably catch up with richer countries. Economists, however, have shown that convergence is rare and conditional on a set of geographic, institutional, and demographic factors that, so far, have not been incorporated into major theories of international change. In this article, I have discussed these factors and analyzed the growth prospects of the United States and China in light of them. The results cast doubt on China's ability to rival the United States as an economic and military superpower. The good news is that the world is unlikely to experience a full-blown hegemonic rivalry anytime soon. This is an extraordinary development for global security. In the past five hundred years alone, there have been sixteen hegemonic competitions in which a rising power challenged a ruling power for top-dog status. Twelve of them ended in catastrophic wars, and even some of the peaceful cases were brutal cold wars that inflicted tremendous harm. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the globe into rival blocs, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and brought the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. Today, by contrast, the United States does not face a peer competitor, and the world, though far from perfect, is more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. The bad news is that China may become more authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad as its economic growth slows, and this shift may undermine global security in numerous areas. History suggests that when a rising power peaks and starts to decline before its ambitions have been fulfilled, its people tend to become disgruntled, and its leaders usually respond by suppressing domestic dissent and demonizing foreign adversaries. Russia, for example, has become more hostile, revanchist, and disruptive since the collapse in world oil prices in the late 2000s gutted the Russian economy and crimped President Vladimir Putin's popularity. China seems to be going down a similar path. Over the past decade, China's economic growth rates have been cut in half, and the Chinese government has responded by massively expanding its internal security system, exporting parts of that system to other countries, waging information warfare on democratic countries, promoting “internet sovereignty,” flouting international trade rules, and ramping up its military presence on and around disputed features in the East and South China Seas in flagrant violation of international law. These actions may be just a preview of what is to come in the years ahead, as the economic, geographic, and demographic problems highlighted above grow worse. Trade disputes and territorial conflicts are only the most obvious risks posed by a stagnating and recalcitrant China. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as climate change and disease, which may fester without Chinese cooperation. Avoiding this fate requires other countries, and especially the United States, to handle China with a blend of reassurance and deterrence. Unfortunately, the widespread view that China is an emerging superpower has caused the United States to abandon engagement in favor of unbridled competition. In just the past few years, the United States has labeled China a rival, imposed steep tariffs on Chinese goods and severe restrictions on Chinese investment and immigration, inserted US forces into East Asian territorial disputes, and made plans to hit China early and hard in the event of war. This competition has not only increased the risk of US–China conflict but also threatened global security by hamstringing the World Trade Organization and effectively killing the Paris Climate Accord and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Thus, the stage has been set for tragic conflict: China is becoming more recalcitrant as it suffers slowing growth, while the United States, consumed by false prophecies of China's inexorable rise, is becoming more confrontational. The main threat to global security, therefore, is not a US-China power transition driven by economic convergence but divergence in US and Chinese perceptions about the long-term trends in the balance of power. China may not be able to stem its growth slowdown, but Americans can take note of it and recalibrate US policy accordingly.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars › 2AC---Retrenchment Wrecks Cohesion

Retrenchment leads to varying threat perceptions that block European unity in the face of Russia.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)

Assessing the Counterargument: Can Europeans Balance Russia?

Together, Europe's strategic cacophony and its defense capacity shortfalls feed and reinforce each other. For one thing, many of the needed steps to make up for Europe's defense capacity shortfalls will require prolonged cooperation; Europeans would thus need to overcome their entrenched strategic cacophony not just for a short time, but over a very long period. Moreover, because diverging interests hamper defense industrial cooperation among Europeans, this—coupled with major capability shortfalls—deepens their technological dependency on the United States, further reinforcing the challenges to addressing Europe's capability shortfalls.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars › AT: Retrenchment /= Russian Invasion

Their ev is wrong – Europe’s major powers underestimate Russia.

France, Germany, and the UK

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)

Russia is uninmportant or not a threat

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars › 2AC---Retrenchment = Russian Invasion

Retrenchment causes Russia-invasion

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)

conventional defense and deterrence. As Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly convincingly argue, “Russian military expenditure is considerably higher” than commonly estimated.142 Of key importance, they stress, is that Russia gets a lot for what it spends on its military: it pays its soldiers a pittance in rubles, and, even more important, it buys its weapons from its own defense contractors in rubles, not dollars. Moreover, the Russian government has squeezed profits in the defense sector, making the weapons it buys artificially cheap. Notably, Russia's unusually high capacity to produce advanced weaponry using domestic resources is a legacy of the Soviet Union's massive level of defense production during the Cold War. Ultimately, Kofman and Connolly maintain that, because Russia's rubles can purchase so much military power so cheaply, it is inappropriate to use market exchange-based estimates of its military spending. Based upon purchasing power parity exchange rates, “Russia's effective military expenditure actually ranged between $150 billion and $180 billion annually” (from 2015 to 2019), and “taking into account hidden or obfuscated military expenditure, Russia may well come in at around $200 billion.”143 Given this understanding, Russian military spending likely exceeds the combined levels of defense expenditures of the three major European powers (France, Germany, and the UK).

High levels of military spending have, in turn, spurred significant modernization and expansion of Russia's military forces, particularly in the 2010s.144 The Russian Federation is the descendent state of the Soviet Union, which created a formidable military industrial base with a huge cadre of highly trained personnel, providing a strong foundation for Russia's current military infrastructure. Although the Russian armed forces still display important weaknesses in areas such as surface shipbuilding, in the past decade Moscow has substantially “modernized its armed forces through a massive introduction of new and modernized weapons and infrastructure, accompanied by radical structural changes in the military organization, evolving modes of operation and a sharply increased number, scale and complexity of military training and exercise.”145 Of particular note, from 2015 to 2019, Russia's army increased in size by almost 25 percent.146 (In online appendix D, we measure the military capabilities of Russia and four potential European balancing coalitions regarding two overall indicators of military personnel [total active and total reserves] and three core weapon systems for conventional warfare [main battle tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers]. Across all five of these measures, the data show that Russia possesses a very substantial military superiority as compared to all four potential European balancing coalitions.)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars › 2AC---Retrenchment = Russian Invasion

Retrenchment causes Russia-Europe-invasion.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)

Europe is characterized by profound, continent-wide divergences across national defense policies, particularly threat perceptions, as well as by a fundamental defense capacity shortfall that cannot be closed anytime soon because of a series of overlapping challenges. Given the combination of strategic cacophony and capacity gaps, which are mutually reinforcing, Europeans are currently not in a position to autonomously mount a credible deterrent and defense against Russia. This situation would likely continue for a very long time, even if there were a complete U.S. withdrawal from the continent, and all the more so in the event of a partial U.S. withdrawal, a much more likely counterfactual. If a U.S. pullback were to occur, it would leave Europe increasingly vulnerable to Russian aggression and meddling, allowing Russia to exploit Europe's centrifugal dynamics to augment its influence. A U.S. withdrawal would also likely make institutionalized intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder. Accordingly, a U.S. pullback would have grave consequences for peace and stability on the continent.

These findings have major implications for both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, scholars and policymakers need to be realistic. The strong desire for strategic autonomy is justified and understandable, but it is necessary to discern between distant hopes and present realities. Ultimately, the barriers to strategic autonomy are so substantial that the achievement of this goal would require a long-term, sustained and coordinated effort. Sound European defense policymaking needs to reflect this: working under an unrealistic assumption that Europeans can quickly achieve strategic autonomy is both unwarranted and unwise. Pursuing unrealistic goals can, in fact, undermine the achievement of realistic ones. Instead, European policymakers should focus on a manageable, affordable set of initiatives for augmenting military capacity in the short term that the United States would see as valuable—and thus would help consolidate the transatlantic alliance—but that would nevertheless also prove useful if the United States does someday pull back. Such an approach could gradually and cumulatively create the foundations for greater commonality and cooperation in the future and, over time, help mitigate the centrifugal dynamics at play in Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Prolif › 2AC---Heg Solves Prolif

US alliances and nuclear guarantees are the most effective way to ensure nonproliferation

Ford ‘21 [Christopher; Christopher Ford is an an American lawyer and former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation; 4-7-21; " Reassuring U.S. Allies and Preventing Nuclear Proliferation”; https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/reassuring-u-s-allies-and-preventing-nuclear-proliferation; New Paradigms Forum; accessed 7-5-2022; AH]

I. The Critical Importance of U.S. Alliances Let me begin, however, by pointing out the obvious. It is, I would argue, very clear that the United States’ alliance relationships – both in Europe, centered upon the NATO Alliance, and in the Indo-Pacific through multiple bilateral alliances – are extremely important to U.S. national security, and to international peace and security more broadly. Indeed, I would contend that alliance relationships are perhaps more important to America today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The United States, after all, does not now stand astride the world as a global “hyperpower” in the way that it did a generation ago, and we cannot alone meet all the challenges we face from revisionist great power competitors who seek to diminish, destabilize, and supplant us – and whose increasingly aggressive agendas are proving ever more dangerous to the free and open international order upon which global peace and prosperity have depended for a very long time. To succeed against these challenges, it is necessary to work with others, and this requires careful attention to our alliances and partnerships. Our alliance relationships have been critical bulwarks of international peace and security for many decades. Established most fundamentally to deter aggression, the United States’ alliances have so far succeeded brilliantly in this task. Anchored in U.S. military power – in both our conventional strength and in the “extended” nuclear deterrence guarantees we have long offered military allies – these alliances faced down threats from the Soviet Empire in both Europe and Asia throughout the Cold War; they continue to deter belligerence by a resurgent Russia in more recent years; and they have protected East Asia from intimidation and aggression from the People’s Republic of China and from North Korea all the while. And U.S. alliances have done even more for international peace and security than just deter aggression by militarized authoritarian states. America’s alliances have also proven to be the world’s most effective and successful nonproliferation tools. They have not merely deterred would-be aggressors, but they have also provided reassurance to those who might otherwise fear being the victims of such aggression – thus reducing the incentives that such threatened states would otherwise have felt to pursue the development of nuclear weaponry. It is actually quite striking how many of the countries the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) once identified as being most likely to develop nuclear weapons in the postwar era ended up not doing so as a result of their relationships with the United States. Specifically, as I pointed out in a speech I gave in my previous job, the growth and institutionalization of America’s postwar alliance networks and other security relationships helped both persuade these countries that they did not need nuclear weaponry – because their existential security needs could be met through collective security, backed by U.S. conventional military power and nuclear weapons – and give Washington leverage over them that we used to insist that several nascent nuclear weapons development efforts be terminated. In fact, I’d be willing to wager that U.S. alliance and security relationships are actually responsible for shutting down more previously active nuclear weapons development programs even than was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself. As declassified memoranda from the late 1960s have documented, even the Soviets eventually came to appreciate the nonproliferation benefit of U.S. alliances during the negotiation of the NPT, agreeing to accept an understanding of that Treaty that would permit NATO to continue with its arrangements for coordinating deployment of U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons as a means not only to deter the Warsaw Pact but also to prevent access by additional NATO allies to such devices. All in all, between deterring World War III and preventing a long-anticipated “cascade” of nuclear weaponization, we clearly have enormously compelling reasons to be grateful to U.S. alliance relationships.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Prolif › 2AC---Heg Solves Iran Prolif

US power checks Iran prolif through military power and sanctions

Palti 6/30 [Zohar; Zohar Palti is the International Fellow at The Washington Institute. He previously served as head of the Policy & Political-Military Bureau at Israel's Ministry of Defense, where his responsibilities included directing defense and security relationships with foreign countries. Prior to that, he led the Mossad Intelligence Directorate and served as deputy head of the Research Division in the IDF Intelligence Corps at the rank of colonel.; 6-30-22; "Israel Hoping for Shift in US Iran Policy from Diplomacy to Deterrence”; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-hoping-shift-us-iran-policy-diplomacy-deterrence; accessed 7-5-2022; AH]

Applying pressure is something the West knows how to do. During the George W. Bush administration, when the US deployed a huge number of troops into next-door Iraq, fear of an American military invasion compelled the Iranians to suspend their nuclear weaponization program. And the application of massive economic pressure by the US and its European partners during the early years of the Obama administration is what forced the mullahs to the bargaining table and eventually into the original JCPOA. Israel’s security professionals believe now is the time to return to a policy of pressure. Only if Iran’s leaders truly believe that something more valuable is at risk than the nuclear program—namely, the very stability of the regime—will they be open to compromise. This can only be achieved if America can instill a sense of fear in Iran. This requires American contingency planning and military training operations to convince Iran that the US commitment to act militarily to prevent its nuclear progress is real. At the same time, a policy of pressure would include reinvigorated sanctions, especially in the fields of energy and finance. This has to include a willingness to target Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, which may run counter to the short-term desire to tamp down gasoline prices but is necessary to convince Iran that the cost of its nuclear brinkmanship will not be tolerated. And a policy of pressure would require extensive coordination—political, military, economic and diplomatic—with a wide array of countries. These need to include traditional allies and partners in Europe and the Middle East as well as the ring of countries that surround Iran—Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, even Afghanistan—that control the land bridges to the Islamic Republic and whose assistance in enforcing sanctions can make a huge difference. Admittedly, this is a tall order. A policy of pressure on Iran is dramatically different from the one adopted so far by the Biden Administration, which hoped that benign diplomacy would push the Iran problem down the road. At a time when the world is focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine, rising anxiety over Chinese ambitions in the Pacific, and deepening fear of a global recession, it will be tough to convince the White House to invest the time, resources and energy to orchestrate this complex and potentially risky initiative. But one thing the advocates of a pressure policy have in their favor is that staying the course—letting Iran proceed on its current path—is bound to be worse for US interests. If America doesn’t get its hands dirty now with restoring deterrence to its relationship with Iran, the Tehran leadership may decide to move forward to 90 percent enrichment, at which point Iran becomes a nuclear threshold state. Without American action before then, Israel will feel isolated, alone and compelled to consider measures to prevent what it would view as a strategic catastrophe, measures whose reverberations no one can confidently predict. All Israelis, regardless of their politics, hope America leads the world in preventing the Iran nuclear problem from crossing that dangerous line.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Oil Wars › Renewables Solve War

US renewables prevent rampant oil interventionism – we avoid global conflcits

Bolstad & Lee ’21 — Parker Bolstad, Military Intelligence Officer, United States Army, former research assistant at the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Research Service, graduate, Colorado School of Mines; Jordy Lee, Program Manager, Supply Chain Transparency Initiative at the Payne Institute for Public Policy; (July 26th 2021; “Energy Independence Doesn’t Mean What It Used To”; Foreign Policy; ; //LFS—JCM) [***NOTE*** — paragraphs have been condensed for readability, no text changed, omitted, or altered]

For decades, U.S. policymakers failed to understand the full meaning of energy independence. Their definition centered on the need for a self-sufficient supply of cheap oil and gas. That understanding was so dominant it became a matter of national security—eclipsing nearly all other environmental considerations. U.S. President Joe Biden is making a different bet. Biden realizes two things. First, climate change is its own national security threat; second, real energy independence now means securing the resources and ideas needed for 21st-century energy technologies—among other things, solar panels, rare-earth metals, batteries, and wind turbines. Yet although the Biden administration has made great strides forward with this acknowledgment, its climate strategy has room to grow. As climate change continues to destabilize at-risk regions worldwide, threatening to draw the United States into more protracted, international conflicts, the administration needs to do more to treat climate change as a matter of national security rather than as just an environmental concern—and to move toward true energy independence in the process.

For too long, policymakers thought the oil and gas industry was the key to energy independence. They gave the industry special treatment, allowing it to operate with minimal environmental restrictions in an effort to boost the economy and unshackle the country from its reliance on foreign hydrocarbons. From one perspective, that made sense: The oil and gas boom that began in the early 2000s, with the advent of hydraulic fracturing (or fracking), made the United States the largest oil producer in the world. It provided a significant  to the economy and enabled the country to cut its reliance on foreign oil and gas .

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Oil Wars › No Oil Wars

Domestic politics dictates oil wars NOT heg.

Maria Prebble 13, MA from Duke in Environmental Management, B.A. from Wessley college in Internatinal Relations and Affairs, 3-27-2013, "Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War," , kav

While there has been much research on the effect of valuable natural resource extraction on a state’s domestic development (e.g., the “resource curse”), Wilson Center Fellow Jeff Colgan focuses on how natural resource extraction affects foreign policy. In Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War, Colgan finds that “petrostates” – countries where revenue from oil exports exceeds 10 percent of GDP – are twice as likely to engage in inter-state conflict than non-petrostates.

“America has the unfortunate habit of getting into war with oil-exporting states,” said Colgan. Understanding the dynamics of petrostates’ aggressive behavior is therefore a vital security interest.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Oil Wars › No Oil Wars

Costs are too high- Not worth the effort

Meierding, PhD, 20

(Emily; 8/2/20; Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School; “The Exaggerated Threat of Oil Wars”; https://www.lawfareblog.com/exaggerated-threat-oil-wars#:~:text=These%20confrontations%20have%20prompted%20concerns,its%20various%20international%20territorial%20disputes)

A Question of Value The absence of oil wars is surprising and counterintuitive. Petroleum is an exceptionally valuable resource. It fuels all countries’ economies and militaries. Oil sales are also a crucial revenue source for producer states. Surely, countries are willing to fight to obtain petroleum resources. In fact, classic oil wars are extraordinarily costly. A country that aims to seize foreign oil faces, first, the costs of invading another country. International aggression is destructive and expensive under the best of circumstances. It may also damage the oil infrastructure that a conqueror hopes to acquire. Next, if a conqueror plans to exploit oil resources over the long term, it faces the costs of occupying seized territory. As the United States has learned from its “endless wars,” foreign occupation is extremely challenging, even for the world’s most powerful country. Additionally, a conqueror faces international approbation for oil grabs. As censorious responses to Trump’s proposition that the United States “take the oil” from Syria, Iraq and Libya have indicated, seizing another country’s oil is considered reprobate behavior. It violates international laws against plunder and materially threatens to consolidate control over global oil resources. As Iraq learned in 1990, other countries and international institutions respond to oil grabs with diplomatic censure, economic sanctions and even military force. Finally, if a conqueror manages to maintain control over foreign oil resources, it may not be able to exploit them. Conquest scares off the foreign oil companies that many countries rely on to finance and manage oil production. Because of the high costs of invasion, occupation, and international opprobrium, classic oil wars are simply not worth the effort, regardless of petroleum’s value. Countries may occasionally decide that it is worth initiating an oil spat to obtain desired resources, especially when targeted territories are contested and other issues are at stake. However, fighting major conflicts for oil does not pay.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Oil Wars › No Oil Wars

No oil wars – states fight for other reasons.

Meierding, PhD, 20

(Emily; 8/2/20; Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School; “The Exaggerated Threat of Oil Wars”; https://www.lawfareblog.com/exaggerated-threat-oil-wars#:~:text=These%20confrontations%20have%20prompted%20concerns,its%20various%20international%20territorial%20disputes)

Over the past year, Chinese seismic survey vessels and their paramilitary escorts have interfered repeatedly with Vietnamese and Malaysian oil and natural gas exploration in the South China Sea, harassing drilling rigs and support ships. These confrontations have prompted concerns that they could provoke a larger military conflict, especially as China exploits the unsteadiness created by the coronavirus to become more aggressive in its various international territorial disputes. Happily, the historical record indicates that China and its neighbors are unlikely to escalate their energy sparring. Contrary to overheated rhetoric, countries do not actually “take the oil,” to use President Trump’s controversial and inaccurate phrase. Instead, my recent research demonstrates that countries avoid fighting for oil resources. No Blood for Oil Between 1912 and 2010, countries fought 180 times over territories that contained—or were believed to contain—oil or natural gas resources. These conflicts ranged from brief, nonfatal border violations, like Turkish jets entering Greek airspace, to the two world wars. Many of these clashes—including World War II, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990), the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Falklands War (1982), and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1935)—have been described as classic oil wars: that is, severe international conflicts in which countries fight to obtain petroleum resources. However, a closer look at these conflicts reveals that none merits the classic “oil war” label. Although countries did fight over oil-endowed territories, they usually fought for other reasons, including aspirations to regional hegemony, domestic politics, national pride, or contested territories’ other strategic, economic, or symbolic assets. Oil was an uncommon trigger for international confrontations and never caused major conflicts. On approximately 20 occasions, over almost a century, countries engaged in minor conflicts to obtain oil resources. However, these “oil spats” were brief, mild, mostly nonfatal, and generally involved countries whose hostility predated their resource competition. Greece and Turkey have prosecuted oil spats. So have China and Vietnam, Guyana and Venezuela, and a dozen other pairs of countries. These confrontations inspired aggressive rhetoric while they were underway, but none of them ever escalated into a larger armed conflict. Oil has periodically influenced the trajectories of major conflicts that were launched for other reasons. At the end of World War I, British troops seized Mosul province in order to secure its oil resources. Oil aspirations also motivated Germany’s invasion of the Russian Caucasus (1941-1942) and Japan’s invasion of the Dutch East Indies (1941-1942). While the latter attack precipitated U.S. involvement in World War II, it was also a continuation of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). All of these “oil campaigns” were inspired by aggressors’ wartime resource needs. Absent the ongoing conflicts, these countries would not have fought for oil. The historical record also reveals one “oil gambit”: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Conventional explanations for the attack assert that Saddam Hussein was either greedily attempting to grab his neighbor’s oil resources or needily attempting to limit Kuwait’s oil output in order to raise oil prices and escape from a deepening economic crisis caused by falling oil prices and Iraq’s large debts, incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. The first explanation is wrong. The second is correct, but incomplete, because it omits Saddam’s larger motive for aggression: his fear of the United States. The regime’s records, seized during the 2003 U.S. invasion, reveal Saddam’s belief, nurtured since the 1970s, that the United States was determined to contain Iraq and remove him from power. In 1990, this false conviction led Saddam to assume that the United States was engineering Iraq’s economic crisis by encouraging Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to exceed their OPEC oil production quotas and refuse Iraq’s repeated entreaties to cancel its war debts. After his infamous meeting with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie failed to persuade Saddam of the United States’s benign intentions, he concluded that conquering Kuwait was his only remaining means of survival. Fear of U.S. hostility, not oil aspirations, prompted Iraq to invade Kuwait.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Oil Wars › Heg Solves Oil Wars

Retrenchment causes oil wars in the middle east- Russia fills in

Indyk, PhD, 22

(MARTIN INDYK is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022-02-14/price-retrenchment)

In the past, Saudi Arabia would not have hesitated, calculating that responding to its American ally at its moment of need was like paying an insurance premium to help guarantee that the United States would be there to defend Saudi Arabia when necessary. But that pact fell apart in September 2019, when Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq were attacked by Iranian drones and missiles that knocked out 50 percent of its oil production. Instead of rushing to Saudi Arabia's defense, Trump equivocated and then noted that it was an attack on Saudi Arabia and not on the United States. If he decided to respond, Trump vowed the Saudis would have to pay for it. Trump’s disregard for traditional U.S. security commitments compounded the doubts already raised by Obama’s decision in 2013 not to enforce his own stated redline against the Assad regime in Syria, when it used chemical weapons against its own people. Biden continued this trend, deemphasizing the Middle East as he made combatting China his first priority. When he ended the “forever war” in Afghanistan and brought the remaining U.S. troops and American citizens home in a shambolic evacuation, Middle Eastern leaders reached a common conclusion: the United States was no longer a reliable partner in the security of the region. Because this trend of U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East had been developing over the last decade, and because the region’s leaders are always sensitive to shifts in the balance of power, they have been looking around for alternative guarantors of their security for some time. Russia was quick to put up its hand, intervening militarily in Syria’s civil war in 2015 to save the regime of Bashar al-Assad. At the time, the United States was pursuing regime change in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The contrast was not lost on the region’s Arab leaders: Russia had become a status quo power in the Middle East; the United States was the one that seemed to be promoting instability. This did not precipitate a headlong rush into Moscow’s embrace, however. Memories of Soviet destabilizing behavior and the hope that a new president in Washington might turn things around led to more cautious explorations. But over time, Arab leaders have become comfortable with a hedging strategy that involves warmer relations with Russia. TIME TO CUT SOME SLACK For Israelis, the calculation is not that different, notwithstanding their heavy dependence on the United States. Their existential threat is Iran. On three of Israel’s four borders, Iranian proxies are gathering strength: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iranian-controlled militias in Syria. Israel is fighting what it calls “the war between the wars” to prevent the transfer through Syria of Iranian advanced missiles and guidance systems to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to thwart attempts by Iranian-backed militias to open yet another front with Israel, on the Golan Heights. Russia’s military presence in Syria makes it more of a player in this conflict than is the United States, which maintains a limited force in eastern Syria, to fight the Islamic State (or ISIS), but has left Israel to fend for itself in the rest of the country. The only way that Israel can keep up its frequent aerial attacks on Iranian targets in Syria is if the Russian air force acquiesces in Israel’s use of Syrian airspace. For that reason, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made ten visits to Russia between 2015 and 2020 to kiss Putin’s ring, secure the Russian president’s cooperation, and make sure that Russian and Israeli air force operations in Syria did not get in each other’s way. Similarly, once Bennett became prime minister last year, he wasted no time in reaffirming those arrangements on a visit to the Kremlin in October 2021. In January of this year, however, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that Russian and Syrian jets had conducted a joint patrol over the Golan Heights and that these patrols would continue. This was a symbolic warning shot across Israel’s bow, signaling to Jerusalem that if Putin wanted to, he could easily put an end to Israeli military operations in Syria. If Israel were thinking of siding publicly with the United States over Ukraine, Moscow had just signaled that there would be a steep strategic price to pay. Washington might have to release the Saudi crown prince from the penalty box. U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East are not critical to the effort to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. They may even be willing to help on the margins: Qatar could divert gas supplies from long-term contracts in Asia to the European spot market, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could ease the pressure on oil prices in the event of an invasion, and Israel can continue passing private messages to the Kremlin, urging de-escalation. But the public silence of all those countries in this crisis speaks volumes about the new geopolitics of the Middle East. Russia has become a player in the region, partially filling the vacuum left by U.S. retrenchment. And to some U.S. allies, Moscow appears more reliable than Washington. There is no getting around this fundamental tradeoff given the reality that a rising China and an aggressive Russia require greater U.S. attention. Rather than demand that his Middle Eastern partners and allies take a public stand, Biden is going to have to cut them some slack. And this extends beyond pronouncements and condemnations over Ukraine. Washington might have to release the Saudi crown prince from the penalty box if Biden needs MBS to reduce the price of oil. U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to end their war in Yemen may have to give way to support for their efforts to deter Iranian-backed Houthi aggression. The United States may have to continue giving Israel a free hand to deal with Iran’s regional subversions even as Biden reenters the nuclear agreement with Iran. And cooperation with Egypt in Gaza and Libya may have to take priority over U.S. demands that Sisi ease up his repression at home. The Ukraine crisis has spotlighted a cruel paradox for U.S. policy in the Middle East. Even though it has downgraded its interests there, which should have allowed for a greater assertion of American values, the return of geopolitics is forcing the Biden administration to adopt a new realism. Whatever good intentions the United States might have in the region, its interests there are increasingly taking priority over its values.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Oil Wars › Heg Solves Oil Wars

Abandoning hegemony causes middle east war- 6 reasons

Mansoor, PhD, 20

(Peter, retired history prof@OhioState, , 3-31)

Why have presidents of both parties, despite their stated willingness to remove U.S. forces from the Middle East, proven unable to do so? The fact is that promises to reduce the U.S. military presence abroad in order to nation-build at home sell well on the campaign trail, but once in office presidents are confronted with challenges that do not lend themselves to trite slogans or easy solutions. Flashy campaign promises set the stage for foreign policy failure, for in the Middle East, Las Vegas rules do not apply: What happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. Promises of retrenchment poll well, until the realities of migrant displacement, terrorism, and oil shocks cause reconsideration of simplistic policies ungrounded in Middle Eastern realities. In a recent op-ed, Janan Ganesh put the issue clearly. “The problem, I used to think, is the failure to honour these promises of retrenchment. In truth, the promises are the problem. The US accumulated foreign interests over the course of the 20th century that cannot be divested at speed, at least not without grievous cost, and at least not in a region as intractable as this one. A responsible political class would not pretend otherwise every four years. It would gird voters for a process of extrication that might turn out to be the work of a human lifetime.”1 Here are six reasons why the United States must remain engaged in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. 1. Terrorism. In 2011 President Barack Obama opted to allow the Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq to lapse, bringing home all of the U.S. forces deployed to that country. His desire was to normalize relations, removing forces that some believed served as an irritant to a smoother U.S.-Iraq relationship. But by removing U.S. forces from Iraq, the Obama administration squandered the leverage those forces created for U.S. interests in the region. High among these interests was the war against Islamist extremists, which did not magically disappear with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. I need not go into the subsequent rise of the Islamic State here, but suffice it to say that Middle Eastern political and security realities intruded on the view of the region held by some in the Obama administration. It turned out the tide of war was not receding, at least not without substantial investment by the United States in stabilizing troubled areas. Now that the Islamic State has been defeated, some in the Trump administration are all too ready to make the same mistake, believing that the war is over and the troops can now come home. Such hubris ignores the history of the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the rise of ISIS, a history that may rhyme if not exactly repeat itself absent continued U.S. involvement in the region. And lest we think that the war against the Islamic State wasn’t important to our security, I would note that since its destruction there have been no ISIS-inspired mass murder events in the West. 2. Iran. Retrenchment comes at a cost. We can debate whether the cost is acceptable, but we cannot ignore that there will be a cost to withdrawal from the region. Iran in particular desires to establish hegemony across the Middle East, and is likely to achieve that goal absent U.S. resistance. We may want Saudi Arabia to assume the costs of containing Iran, but it is unable to do so. Iran’s population of 81 million dwarfs the Saudi population of 33 million. The Saudi economy is also highly vulnerable to disruption, something the world discovered when cruise missiles and drones damaged a facility at Abqaiq and thereby halved Saudi oil production. 3. Oil. Although thanks to the fracking revolution the United States is now nearly self-sufficient in the production of oil and natural gas, the other major industrial nations of the world still rely on Middle Eastern oil to fuel their economies. The hydrocarbon market is global, so any disruption to oil exportation from the Middle East will have an impact on the availability and price of oil, which in turn could cause economic disruption or recession. It is convenient to say the Europeans, Chinese, or Japanese should defend their access to Middle Eastern oil since they are more dependent on it than the United States, but this is a pipe dream. Those nations would rather allow Iran to run roughshod over the Middle East than to defend their interests there with force. And do we really relish the prospect of Chinese military forces intervening in the Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to Asia? 4. Israel. Despite the lack of a formal alliance with Israel, that state is America’s only reliable partner in the Middle East. It is also highly vulnerable, surrounded by an Arab-Islamic world that desires its destruction. Abandonment by the United States would jeopardize its security in any number of ways that could lead to unpredictable results, including a potential war between Israel and Iran that would threaten the use of nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945. 5. Counter-proliferation. Possession of nuclear weapons by major powers have arguably kept cold wars from turning hot in the 75 years since the end of World War II, but a significant increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology would likely destabilize the international security environment. Imagine if Iran had nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles today; pushed to the brink by economic sanctions, the Supreme Leader might opt at some point for a nuclear attack against Saudi Arabia or Israel, leading to certain retaliation by the latter. Saudi Arabia would hardly stand by as Iran acquired these technologies; instead, it would simply purchase devices from Pakistan or North Korea or buy the technical expertise to develop its own weapons and delivery systems. This is a likely scenario, but one that can be avoided provided the United States remains engaged in the region. 6. Refugees. Millions of refugees have departed their homelands in the Middle East for safer destinations. Most of these people have settled in other Arab nations, but around 3.5 million are in Turkey. Since 2008 more than 5 million refugees, many of them from the Middle East, have arrived in the 28 states of the European Union, significantly destabilizing the domestic political climate of a number of countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. A U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East, if it led to a war between Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran, would lead to another refugee crisis.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Iran War › 2AC---Sanctions Key

Effective sanctions key to prevent Iranian nuclear acquisition.

Morrison 21 --- Master of Arts of Political Science, University of Waterloo.

Kallen, 2021, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Non-proliferation: A Comparative Study of North Korea and Iran, “University of Waterloo, Fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts, https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/16666/Morrison_Kallen%20.pdf?sequence=3

Economic sanctions have been successful in stopping Iran from pursuing their nuclear program thus far. Iran has conceded multiple times to the United States and the international community to halt the enrichment of uranium and the advancement of their nuclear program. The most notable example of Iran’s concessions has been the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in which Iran agreed to halt and greatly reduce their nuclear program in return for substantial easing of economic sanctions. The second criteria has been met as Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to continued economic pressure from the United States and the international community. Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to continued economic pressure from the United States and the international community. Continued economic pressure has been paramount to bringing Iran to the negotiating table. While the United States and its regional allies do pose a military threat to Iran, that is unlikely a sufficient factor in dissuading Iran.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Iran War › 2AC---Iran War---Hard Power

Only credible military presence deters Iran

Singh 21 – has a M.B.A. from Harvard University (Baker Scholar) and a B.A. from Princeton University, and was responsible for devising and coordinating U.S. national security policy toward the region stretching from Morocco to Iran, with a particular emphasis on Iran’s nuclear and regional activities, 10/25/21 (Michael, “A Plan B for Iran”, Foreign Affairs, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden laid out a two-part strategy designed to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. First, his administration would propose a return to “mutual compliance” with the 2015 nuclear agreement, which the United States left in 2018 and Iran subsequently violated. Second, Washington would commence new negotiations with Tehran on a “stronger, longer” accord to replace the original deal. When Biden announced this policy, it was widely assumed that the first step would be the easy part. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign, despite failing to attract support from the United States’ partners, had left Iran’s economy reeling. And Tehran’s violations of the accord, however egregious, seemed designed to leave it room to return to the nuclear agreement. But subsequent events have proved such analysis to be overly optimistic: Iran has made impossible demands in the negotiations to revive the nuclear deal, reportedly seeking sanctions relief beyond that provided in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while hesitating to commit to rolling back the nuclear activities it has undertaken in violation of that agreement. In any negotiation, each party compares the deal on offer with its best alternative option. Iran’s obstinacy in the talks to revive the JCPOA that have taken place in Vienna suggest the calculation it made in 2015—that the nuclear accord was preferable to continued economic pressure—has changed. This likely reflects the lower regard for the 2015 deal held by the hard-line government of President Ebrahim Raisi and its brighter view of Iran’s alternatives. Iran likely concluded from the last four years that sanctions relief was not all it was cracked up to be—both because foreign firms were reluctant to reenter Iran even when the JCPOA was in effect and because it was so easy for the United States to unilaterally rescind the accord in 2018. Raisi may also doubt the Biden administration’s willingness to enforce sanctions in the absence of a deal and pin a good deal of hope on Iran’s growing relationship with China as a counterweight to U.S. economic pressure. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. In other words, Iranian officials may believe that returning to compliance with the JCPOA is inferior to the alternatives. By developing a credible Plan B that sharpens the consequences for Iran should it continue to rebuff diplomatic overtures and expand its nuclear activities while simultaneously offering Iran a diplomatic proposal that has a better chance of outlasting his tenure in office, President Biden may be able to change Iranian leaders’ calculus. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE As the Biden administration weighs its choices, it should draw upon a long history of U.S. policy failures and successes with Iran. The central lesson from past diplomatic engagements is that the United States has been least successful when relying too heavily on a single approach or policy instrument and achieved the most when it has employed several policy tools in conjunction with one another and acted in concert with key partners. For example, Iran’s suspension of its nuclear weapons drive in 2003 is generally seen as a result of U.S. military pressure and European diplomacy working in concert. The combination of sanctions and diplomacy also produced nuclear agreements in 2013 and 2015—albeit ones subsequently deemed insufficient by both Trump and Biden. The Biden administration should learn from these experiences as it seeks to worsen Iran’s alternatives to a deal. First and foremost, the United States must demonstrate that Iran will face consequences for the unreasonable stance it has taken at the Vienna talks, where it has insisted on sanctions relief well beyond that provided in the JCPOA and on assurances that future administrations will not again leave the deal—assurances that Biden could not provide even if he wished to do so. Should Iran’s obstinacy persist, the Biden administration should enforce and expand existing economic sanctions. Doing so would disabuse Iranian officials of any notion that Biden officials’ past criticism of Trump’s maximum pressure approach means that sanctions will simply be permitted to weaken or lapse in the absence of a deal. In order to accomplish this, the Biden administration will need to underscore its commitment to enforcing Trump-era sanctions on Iran and filling in the gaps of the sanctions regime that have emerged in recent years. Foremost among these are Iran’s sales of oil to China, which increased dramatically starting in 2020 and are reportedly facilitated by deceptive maneuvers such as transfers at sea. China’s oil purchases from Iran reached nearly one million barrels per day in March 2021, higher than any period over the preceding two years, and Iran’s global petrochemicals exports rose as well. To their credit, U.S. officials have warned that tightened sanctions may be coming, but concerns about Iran’s reaction and competing priorities in the fraught U.S.-Chinese relationship will likely make it difficult to pull the trigger. Iran probably concluded that sanctions relief was not all it was cracked up to be. Such a decision would be easier to take, and the overall pressure on Iran would be magnified, if the United States acts in concert with partners. In particular, if the so-called E3 of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were to join the United States in withdrawing from the JCPOA in light of Iran’s refusal to return to mutual compliance, it could lead to the reimposition of both EU and UN sanctions—the “snapback” that the Trump administration sought. The past several years demonstrated that such a move may have marginal economic significance for Iran, for the simple reason that unilateral U.S. sanctions accomplished so much by themselves. But it would nevertheless represent an important escalation of diplomatic pressure on Iran, as its leadership is also sensitive to the perception that it is internationally isolated. This is why the Biden administration’s pursuit of a revival of the JCPOA may prove useful, even if its proximate objective is not achieved. If nothing else, it serves as a demonstration of diplomatic good faith and makes it more politically palatable for U.S. partners in Europe and Asia to once again act in concert with Washington. Convincing the E3 to withdraw from the Iran deal will be no easy task. Despite the fact that the agreement is no longer honored by either the United States or Iran, the group may fear that withdrawal could prompt an even more destabilizing response from Iran or that it would be sacrificing elements of the agreement that are still operational despite the U.S.-Iranian conflict. They may also be reluctant to act without consensus in the EU, which is also a party to the agreement. While that last problem may prove the most difficult, the first two are easily countered—Iran’s actions already risk serious instability, and Tehran’s recent moves to curtail its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency on inspections and monitoring of its nuclear activities mean that other elements of the JCPOA are unlikely to be preserved in the long run. The E3’s departure, on the other hand, would signal clearly that Iran was increasingly alone in its defiant stand and that a new agreement was needed. But the Biden administration should also prepare for the eventuality that diplomatic and economic pressure will not be enough to deter Iran’s leadership from its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Officials in Tehran have already demonstrated that they are willing to permit their country to endure severe economic hardship for the sake of nuclear advancement. As a result, the United States will need to send a clear message that it is willing to go beyond sanctions and conduct a military strike as a last resort to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. A restored JCPOA would likely be scuttled if Republicans win the presidency. The Biden administration’s reluctance to do this is understandable. Neither Democrats nor Republicans are particularly interested in yet another military conflict in the Middle East, and the White House likely worries that issuing threats would prompt Iran’s new, hard-line administration to refuse diplomatic engagement out of pique. But a credible U.S. military deterrent has three advantages worth considering. First, it would send a message to Iran that acquiring a nuclear weapon may be not simply costly but impossible. Second, it may offer assurance to U.S. partners in the region, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel, which may otherwise feel compelled to act against Iran themselves or pursue their own nuclear capabilities. Third, it is almost certainly the case that any U.S. president, regardless of party affiliation, would consider military action if confronted with urgent and credible intelligence that Iran had decided to dash for a nuclear weapon, given the threat such a development would pose to U.S. national security. It is thus far preferable that Iran understand the consequences of such a decision, rather than misperceive the risks and instigate a conflict with the United States owing to miscalculation. The real challenge is how to ensure that threats of military action are credible as the United States executes a long-delayed strategic shift away from the Middle East and toward Asia. The danger Iran poses to U.S. national security is real, but it cannot compare with the challenges presented by increasingly aggressive nuclear-armed states such as China and Russia. Maintaining the credibility of U.S. threats will require continuing to act when Iran and its proxies target American interests. However, rather than accompanying U.S. responses with a surge of heavy assets drawn from other regions, such as aircraft carriers and long-range bombers, the United States should work steadily to bolster its allies’ and its own ability to counter Iran’s probable responses. U.S. credibility will also be enhanced if Washington affirms its commitment to the region while articulating what American strategy in the Middle East will look like amid a greater focus on Asia. BUILDING A BETTER NUCLEAR DEAL Devising a Plan B for Iran should not mean abandoning diplomacy—worsening Iran’s alternatives will succeed only if a credible diplomatic proposal is also on offer. The Biden administration should focus on replacing rather than reviving the JCPOA, as the restoration of the 2015 accord is unlikely in the long run to satisfy either the United States or Iran. For its part, Tehran has already invited discussion of a completely new deal by requesting major changes to the JCPOA that would prevent the United States from once again withdrawing. Biden has also indicated that negotiating a stronger deal, not merely restoring the JCPOA, is his ultimate objective. And it seems inevitable that a restored JCPOA would be scuttled once again should Republicans retake the White House. Ironically, the most straightforward way for the Biden administration to offer Iran a “better” deal may be to present it with a diplomatic agreement that asks more of Tehran but is also able to attract bipartisan support and is thus more sustainable. Such a deal could take the form of a “JCPOA Plus,” which would aim to expand the nuclear restrictions on Iran and add limitations on its missile activities. The Biden administration, as well as JCPOA critics, has also suggested that regional issues such as Iraq or Yemen be included in these negotiations. But Washington should think twice about negotiating these issues bilaterally with Tehran—or, for that matter, with Moscow and Beijing. Such matters are arguably better handled separately, with a different set of parties engaged. Alternatively, the United States could put aside the JCPOA and pursue an entirely different model. One option would be an arms control–style agreement in which the obligations on both sides expire after a set period if the deal is not superseded—an improvement over the JCPOA, in which Iran’s obligations phase out but those of the United States and its partners never do. While adopting a new diplomatic paradigm would hold the considerable disadvantage of discarding an agreement that already enjoys wide international support, it would also allow the United States and Iran to jettison the baggage that has accompanied discussion of the JCPOA in recent years. Ultimately, reaching a diplomatic accord with Iran may not be strictly necessary. If the consequences for expanding its nuclear program are sufficiently strong and clear, it is possible that Iran could be deterred without an agreement. Nevertheless, a negotiated agreement should remain the preferred objective of U.S. policy, as a strong agreement can reduce the instability and potential for miscalculation that relying on containment and deterrence entails. It is becoming increasingly likely, however, that any new agreement between the United States and Iran will not be a revival of the JCPOA. Moving directly to the negotiation of a new agreement will undoubtedly be fraught with risk in the short term—but if the Biden administration takes care to build both domestic and international support for its efforts, it could deliver a more successful and sustainable result in the long run.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Iran War › 2AC---Iran War---Hard Power

Only maximum hegemonic pressure can prevent Iran from going nuclear and initiating conflict

Phillips and Brookes 6/30 – Phillips holds a master of arts (MA) as well as a master of arts in law and diplomacy (MALD) in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Brookes is a retired naval officer with the rank of Commander and holds a doctorate from Georgetown University and a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University, 6/30/22 (James and Peter, “Time for the Biden Administration to Get Tough on Iran”, The Heritage Foundation, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

The deadlocked negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resumed in Qatar on June 28, after European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell visited Tehran to coax Iran back to the negotiating table. Resuming the nuclear talks makes sense only if the United States and its allies step up pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Otherwise, Tehran is sure to continue its delaying tactics while pretending to take the negotiations seriously, advancing its nuclear program, and orchestrating proxy attacks on U.S. military forces and allies in the Middle East. If the Biden Administration fails to adequately ratchet up pressure on Tehran, then Iran’s radical regime will become a nuclear-armed menace that will pose much greater threats to the U.S., its allies, and partners and stability in the Middle East than it already does. The Biden Administration’s single-minded efforts to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, have been stalemated by Iran’s hard-line Islamist regime, which continues to push for additional, unwarranted concessions. Despite the Administration’s eagerness to renew the deeply flawed nuclear deal, the Vienna nuclear talks have been suspended since March because Iran has insisted on receiving two additional concessions that were not part of the original deal: the lifting of U.S. terrorism-related sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a guarantee that the U.S. will not withdraw from any nuclear deal again. Meanwhile, Iran has seemingly reduced its “breakout time” to a few weeks if not less, enriching enough uranium to build at least one nuclear weapon—and eventually more.1 Iran also continues to attack U.S. allies and U.S. military forces in the Middle East with rockets, armed drones, and its terrorist proxies. It is long past time for the Biden Administration to drop its soft-minded, soft-power diplomacy on Iran’s deeply troubling nuclear program and adopt a realistic and proactive strategy. This new strategy should penalize and undermine Iran’s outlaw regime and pressure it to end its hostile anti-U.S. policies; at the very least, Iran must pay a much higher price for them. Time for Plan B The Biden Administration’s complacent “diplomacy first” approach to Iran has amounted to little more than “diplomacy only.” The Administration’s reliance on open-ended diplomacy using “carrots” but few “sticks” gave Iran cover to rapidly advance its nuclear and missile programs and orchestrate multiple attacks on U.S. forces and its allies via its proxies. The Administration committed diplomatic malpractice by abandoning the Trump Administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy, turning a blind eye to Iran’s surging illicit oil exports to China, and downplaying the possibility and utility of using military force if Iran continues down its path to nuclear weapons. These self-imposed constraints enabled Iran to expand its oil exports and foreign currency holdings while minimizing the perceived risks to Tehran of potential military action. These miscalculations greatly reduced pressure on Iran to compromise at the negotiating table on its nuclear program. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, an ultra-hard-line protégé of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was inaugurated last August and is more willing than many past Iranian leaders to sacrifice national economic interests to advance the regime’s Islamist totalitarian and regional agenda. The Raisi regime has blocked any resolution of the nuclear issue unless the Biden Administration first lifts its designation of the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization and removes the economic sanctions on it.2 The IRGC controls key parts of Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic and cruise missile forces, and armed drone arsenal, and orchestrates Iran’s shadow war against the U.S. and its allies, including Israel, often using proxy attacks by terrorist and other militant groups.3 In addition to threatening Iran’s external enemies, the IRGC is a pillar of internal repression on which the Raisi regime increasingly depends to control Iran’s disaffected citizens,4 and also controls up to one-third of Iran’s economy,5 two more reasons that the regime is adamant about lifting U.S. sanctions on it. The Biden Administration initially sought to trade the lifting of sanctions for a public statement that Iran would not attack U.S. interests, but Tehran balked at making even such a weak and non-binding statement. Buoyed by high oil prices, which have eased the pain of sanctions, the Raisi regime is in no hurry to reach a deal while it fills government coffers. The regime also believes that its growing stockpile of enriched uranium, which puts it ever closer to fielding a nuclear weapon, gives it significant negotiating leverage and allows it to make a litany of demands of the U.S. at the table.6 Even if renewed negotiations yield another nuclear agreement, which looks increasingly unlikely, it will not be the “longer and stronger” agreement that the Administration promised,7 but a “shorter and weaker” one that will not address the JCPOA shortcomings, such as its “sunset provisions” and failure to capture Iran’s ballistic missile program—the largest in the Middle East.8 It is long past time for the Biden Administration to get tough on Iran to protect and advance U.S. interests. The Administration must bolster its diplomatic demands by fully using all the tools of national power, including punitive economic sanctions and military force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from deploying a nuclear weapon. To address Iran’s intensifying nuclear and regional challenges, the U.S. should: Ramp up U.S. sanctions on Iran. The Biden Administration relaxed its enforcement of sanctions in a misguided effort to lure Tehran back into the nuclear deal. It failed to stem the smuggling of illicit Iranian oil exports to China, Iran’s biggest customer.9 Adam Kredo, “Iranian Oil Sales to China Skyrocket as Experts Say Biden Admin Turns Blind Eye to Sanctions Enforcement,” The Washington Free Beacon, November 2, 2021, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/iranian-oil-sales-to-china-skyrocket-as-experts-say-biden-admin-turns-blind​-eye-to-sanctions-enforcement/ (accessed June 29, 2022). Washington should crack down on and penalize oil-smuggling entities and Chinese firms buying the illicit oil. To enable the vigorous enforcement of sanctions, the White House should order the intelligence community to prioritize the gathering of intelligence on how Iran circumvents economic sanctions. It should also order the Departments of State and the Treasury to update their lists of Iran’s front companies and foreign enablers of sanctions busting more frequently, and to share the lists with appropriate foreign governments to enhance enforcement. Work with European allies to “snap back” U.N. sanctions on Iran. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany also are part of the 2015 nuclear agreement and can trigger the automatic reimposition of multilateral U.N. sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA. The sanctions snapback would further isolate Iran politically, make it pay a higher economic price for its nuclear defiance, help to stifle Iran’s conventional military build-up, and discourage other countries from helping Iran to evade sanctions. One of the weaknesses of the Iran deal is that the snapback option expires in 2025, removing a major source of leverage over Tehran. Develop, with allies, a favorable military force posture in the Persian Gulf region to balance Iran. The Pentagon, its allies, and partners should develop the capability in the region to dissuade, deter, and deny (if necessary) Iranian acts of aggression. With U.S. military forces already stretched thin to meet global military commitments, regional allies and partners must do more to balance Iranian forces. In the current geopolitical environment, burden-sharing among U.S. partners is critical. The Biden Administration also must be prepared—in concert with allies and partners—to take military action against Iran’s nuclear program to prevent the development and deployment of a nuclear weapon capability. Strengthen the security of regional allies. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been frequently targeted by Iran and its proxy network. Through international arms sales, the U.S. should help them to bolster their defenses against Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and armed drones, with the goal of eventually building an integrated air defense system that also enhances the security of U.S. forces in the region. In addition to selling more air and missile defense systems to Arab partners, Washington should also encourage Israel to consider selling some of its own air and missile defense systems to Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Doing so would strengthen a burgeoning relationship that would protect and advance U.S. interests as well as enhance the security of U.S. troops located in the region. Washington should also strengthen Israeli deterrence of Iran by accelerating the sales of aerial refueling tankers, precision-guided munitions, and bunker-buster bombs capable of destroying Iran’s fortified underground nuclear facilities and missile bases. Expand the Abraham Accords. The Trump Administration brokered the Abraham Accords that normalized bilateral relations between Israel and Bahrain and between Israel and the UAE in 2020. Morocco and Sudan later signed similar agreements to normalize relations with Israel. The Biden Administration should strongly support the expansion of the accords to include Saudi Arabia and other Arab states threatened by Iran. Establishing this diplomatic framework would clear the way for expanded Arab–Israeli security cooperation in a regional partnership to defeat Iranian threats. Iran Must Be Stopped, Not Appeased After complacently allowing U.S. sanctions on Iran to be undermined and tolerating a drumbeat of Iranian proxy attacks for almost 18 months, the Biden Administration needs a realistic and proactive approach to defeat Iran’s nuclear, regional, and terrorist challenges. The United States must hold Iran accountable for its accelerating nuclear program and multiple proxy attacks against U.S. forces and interests.10 It must compel Iran’s regime to pay a much higher price for those actions, or Tehran will continue to act with impunity. And, the U.S. must develop policies that will prevent Iran from becoming the world’s tenth nuclear-armed state.11 The nine states that currently possess nuclear weapons are the U.S., Russia, China, U.K., France, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. The failure to do so will result in a nuclear-armed radical regime that will threaten the U.S., its allies, and partners in the Middle East and beyond, support international terrorism, drive nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and destabilize the region through crisis and conflict, deeply undermining American interests.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Iran War › 2AC---Iran War---Hard Power

Only containment solves escalation with Iran – every other policy empirically fails

Cook 20 - holds a BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and an MA and a PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, 3/11/20. (Steven, “The Only Sensible Iran Strategy Is Containment”, The Council on Foreign Relations, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons, daily Nightline updates, and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States. People actually walked around with “Fuck Iran” buttons on their jackets, and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “Ayatollah”—to the tune of the Knack’s “My Sharona”—that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation. It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the world beyond soccer practice, the New York Yankees, and Wonderama. The subject hasn’t gotten any less confusing since. In the past 40 years, U.S. policymakers have endlessly debated a central issue in U.S.-Middle East policy: What should the United States do about Iran? The answer has often proved to be elusive in large part because of domestic politics. The traumas of the late 1970s and early 1980s have rendered parts of the U.S. policy community needlessly bellicose, others credulously dovish, and the remaining wary of both in search of a “just right” strategy to modify Iran’s behavior. But the central question has now taken on a new urgency. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to kill Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a drone strike on Jan. 3 has raised fears of violent escalation—even war—between the United States and Iran. It’s time to directly address the question of what exactly the United States can do about Iran—and fortunately, there’s a good answer available, even if it’s not satisfying for anyone in Washington. What’s already clear is that the current U.S. approach needs improvement. Despite his hit on Suleimani, it is not at all clear what the president wants to achieve regarding Iran. He has combined hawkish rhetoric with periodic offers to negotiate with Tehran while pursuing a “maximum pressure” policy that until recently did not employ military force. Depending on whom one asks or who is doing the asking, the administration is seeking either full-scale regime change or simply a more robust nuclear deal than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the agreement negotiated by the Obama administration, which set limits on Iran’s nuclear program. This confusion comes against the backdrop of the Democratic presidential primary, in which all the leading candidates have declared their intention to return to the JCPOA so long as Iran maintains its commitment to the agreement (Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren)—or, in the case of Bernie Sanders, without any conditions at all. Yet just because the Trump administration and the politics of U.S.-Iran relations have imposed a binary choice on policymakers—regime change or the existing nuclear agreement—does not mean that there are no other possibilities. The U.S. government could pursue, for example, a “grand bargain” with Iran that would settle all the outstanding issues—notably, the nuclear program, Iran’s use of proxies to meddle in the region, and the release of Americans held in Tehran—between the two countries. Yet the most rational option under the present circumstances is another strategy that no longer goes mentioned in Washington: containment. Consider the other potential strategies in turn. Regime change has, for obvious reasons, become a scary term and a policy one would think officials and analysts would want to avoid given the U.S. experience in Iraq, but it remains an option if only because influential people continue to advocate for it. It would not necessarily require a march on Tehran, but it would be costly, requiring the United States to provide far more military, political, and financial resources to Iran’s opponents around the region than current policy. This seems an unlikely scenario for two important reasons: 1) The potential for further regional chaos is high, and 2) the American people and Congress would likely be reluctant to support policies that would undoubtedly include augmenting the already sizable deployment of almost 45,000 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the Persian Gulf. Returning to the JCPOA or negotiating a new nuclear deal that addresses some of the defects in the original agreement—for example, the failure to set limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program—is the flip side of Washington’s Iran debate. Reviving the JCPOA would mean acceptance of Iran’s alleged right to develop nuclear technology, sanctions relief, and the normalization of Tehran’s commercial ties with the world. It would also require implicit acceptance of Iran’s role in the region, especially its influential positions in Lebanon and Syria. The problems with returning to the JCPOA or an enhanced agreement that addresses Iran’s missile program, for example, are similar to the one’s the Obama administration encountered, including opposition from regional allies and hawks in Washington determined to scuttle a deal, with one additional, notable challenge: Iran’s leaders would likely be reluctant to enter an agreement with the United States after the Trump administration breached the JCPOA in May 2018. The Iranians would also resist limits on their ballistic missiles given their reliance on those weapons for regional deterrence. There are also constraints on the U.S. side: In order for the Trump administration to make a new agreement work, it would need to convince its regional allies of its wisdom. This would be a hard sell—not only because the Israelis, Emiratis, and Saudis continue to have zero trust that the Iranians would uphold their commitments in a deal but because leaders in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh are no longer confident that Trump would hold Tehran accountable for whatever violations might occur. This is especially the case after the Trump administration’s halfhearted response to Iran’s provocations during the summer of 2019, culminating with the attack on Saudi oil processing facilities. A return to the nuclear agreement or a new JCPOA would create the same dynamics as the original deal, in which the authors and signatories have incentive to overlook violations or other related problems, such as Iran’s irredentist approach to the region. This gives other regional powers incentive to push back on their own, thus further destabilizing the region. The inadequacy of an updated and expanded JCPOA raises the possibility of a grand bargain. In this scenario, Iran would relinquish its nuclear capabilities for an explicit U.S. recognition of the country’s role as a regional leader and a partner in developing the regional rules of the road. The underlying assumption of a grand bargain is that once Iran’s demands for a seat at the table are recognized, it will end its malevolent activities around the region. It’s a tempting thought—but entirely unrealistic, given the utter absence of trust in the region. The safeguards that would be needed to persuade Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates of the wisdom of such a deal—including an end to Iran’s support for allies around the region, restrictions on its military, and a clear statement from Tehran renouncing territorial claims on its neighbors—would render it anathema to the Iranians, who would likely view it as little more than regime change by another name. The United States, of course, could forgo restrictions on Iran that would satisfy its allies and instead pressure Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to accept a grand bargain. But that would not diminish the ability of U.S. allies to leverage their political clout in Washington and make mischief regionally in an effort to undermine a grand bargain. In other words, a grand bargain would likely meet the same fate as the Obama administration’s JCPOA or a JCPOA 2.0. That leaves the United States with the most realistic option: containment. The record over the last four decades indicates that the United States cannot change Iran’s behavior through either coercion or incentive. And it does not have the kind of influence to force other countries in the region to alter their own approaches to Iran and the broader region. Under these circumstances, anything that’s possible is better than aspirations that bear little resemblance to reality—and what’s possible is containment. Containment, which guided Washington in its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a way in which the United States can restrain Iran and its effort to undermine U.S. policies and goals in the region. The Clinton administration pursued this policy—along with containment of Iraq—with success in the 1990s. Sure, there were problems with Tehran at the time, but the relationship between the United States and Iran was more stable in that outright conflict and escalation were less likely. That is because the United States and Iran established an equilibrium of sorts in which everyone understood some basic rules of the game that made it possible to manage crises. Containment requires U.S. forces in the region, and possibly the application of violence, in order to demonstrate what is acceptable. It is not risk-free for the United States. But the approach does reduce the possibility of escalation because U.S. policymakers would cease to consider regime change an option. With both the idea of regime change and the necessity of defending a flawed nuclear deal taken off the table, the stakes for the U.S.-Iranian relationship will be demonstrably lower, thereby stabilizing Gulf. This leaves the gnarly issue of what to do about an Iranian nuclear program unfettered by any international agreement. But containment is capable of handling any outcome that produces. Indeed, that is precisely what U.S. policy has been toward nuclear-armed North Korea. Nobody would argue that this has been an ideal outcome, but it has been better than any easily identifiable alternatives—and it’s hard to understand why it should be anathema when it comes to Iran. Indeed, the Gulf states are less worried about Iranian nukes and more concerned about its desire to extend its influence around the region. The Israelis would eventually need more security assistance, but that shouldn’t be a deal breaker for containment, given the other available policy options. Containment would not preclude dialogue between Iran and the United States and may even improve it, given the way it would produce implicit but well-understood rules for behavior. It would also provide the United States some much needed diplomatic room to help manage regional crises like Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The Iranians are more apt to press their advantages in these places so long as they believe the United States might end their regime or look the other way. Most important, containing Iran represents the most realistic assessment of what either U.S. or Iranian politics can bear. It is not as romantic as the idea of secret meetings in Oman or long negotiation sessions in Vienna. It lacks the bravado of bringing down leaders of a system that has vexed, maimed, and killed Americans. Containment is nevertheless the best option. It simultaneously reduces the risk of war, protects Americans, and renders the U.S. presence in the region less expensive. It would be foreign-policy malpractice not to embrace it.