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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › perm do counterplan
Gil Fried, University of New Haven and Robin Ammon, Slippery Rock University, 2001
“What is Appropriate Signage for the Sport Industries?,” Journal of Legal Aspects of Sports, p. 190
The everyday use of signage affects the efficient and safe flow of vehicular traffic. Tort liability for traffic signage related issues is predicated upon standards established by each states' Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). Under these guidelines government entities are required to develop uniformity in communicating safety concerns. Uniformity means that the same type of device should be used for the same type of road condition, which helps drivers to develop and maintain certain expectancies (Blashke, 1990). The MUTCD uses terms such as "shall," "should," and "may" to suggest or demand the application of traffic control devices. If the word "shall" is used it is a mandatory term and the state has to follow the guidelines. In contrast, the term "should" indicates only a strong recommendation, but not a mandatory recommendation. A good example of this difference can be seen with stop signs. The MUTCD states that stop signs "shall" be an octagon and further provides that when two highways intersect the stop sign "should" be posted on the minor street (Blashke, 1990). The difference between "shall" and "should" is very significant for traffic sign cases since liability is harder to prove if the state was not required to post a sign when compared with instances where the state failed to post a required sign.
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Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › perm do counterplan
Ryan Williams, received his law degree in 2008 from Louisiana State University , graduating with honors. He was a member of the Law Review and served as a Senior Editor during his Senior year, 2008
“Reputation and the Rules: An Argument for a Balancing Approach under Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct”, 68 La. L. Rev. 931, p. 936
As in Canon 29, use of the permissive "should" implies that the Georgia Rule is merely hortatory; it encourages reporting misbehavior without requiring it. Georgia Rule 8.3 goes a step further than Canon 29, in fact, by explicitly disclaiming any threat of disciplinary proceedings for failure to comply.
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Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › perm do counterplan
Sam Foster Halabi, Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2010
“ARTICLE: THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION'S FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES”, 39 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 121, 136
The purpose, scope, and applicability of the guidelines variously declare that States "should," "should consider," "should endeavour," "should ensure," and "should require" the measures adopted by the COP. 66The text of the FCTC uses the word "shall" as to certain of Parties' obligations. 67The use of the word "should," in most contexts, is "precatory, not mandatory." 68Yet the word "should" may also be used to express a duty or obligation albeit with a degree of flexibility or discretion. 69FCTC Article 11.1(b)(iv) illustrates this distinction, requiring that warnings and messages "should be 50% or more of the principal display areas but shall be no less than 30% of the principal display areas." 70Furthermore, many of the measures adopted without objection by the COP are styled "recommendations," the ordinary meaning of which does not entail mandatory action. 71In the following sections, the treaty language is juxtaposed with key language from the guidelines in an effort to sort out obligations imposed by the treaty language, obligations clarified by virtue of guidance from the guidelines, and non-obligatory provisions of the guidelines that are precatory or recommendatory. 72
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › perm do counterplan
Judge Mulrroney, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration Chief Administrative Law Judge and Katherine Legel, Judicial Law Clerk at the Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017
“CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW: HIDDEN ROCKS IN SHALLOW, MURKY, DRUG-INFESTED WATERS,” Marquette Law Review, p. 384
The Agency disagreed with the ALJ's interpretation of the Oklahoma provisions, and held that "should" does not really mean "should," at least in those provisions, but actually means "must," and connoted a mandatory obligation in the context of the provisions at issue. 292 The Agency based its decision on its interpretation of cases from the Seventh Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, a federal district court in Florida, and a dictionary definition of "should," as well as an analysis of the Oklahoma Medical Practice Act and a Policy Statement. 293 Interestingly, a Tenth Circuit (which includes Oklahoma) case which held that ""should' indicates a recommended course of action, but does not itself imply the obligation associated with "shall,'" received no mention in the Agency's decision in Pope. 294 Thus, contrary to the Agency's view, the pertinent Circuit Court of Appeals holds the view that the most reasonable interpretation of the word "should" is really "should" - a discretionary term. 295 The Agency did not discuss the fact that there is some level of conflict in the circuit courts about whether to treat "should" as mandatory or permissive, 296 but the Agency has apparently taken the position that, if the state law supplying the practice standard in a DEA case uses the word "should," the Agency is likely to read that word as "must," irrespective of federal circuit law on the issue. 297
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Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say no › backlash – russia
West 22 – John West, adjunct professor at Tokyo’s Sophia University, executive director of the Asian Century Institute (“Saving democracy from Russian rage”, The Interpreter, 3/14/2022, ) FGY
Much is being written about Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, and much more will surely be said in the months and years ahead of this potentially epoch-defining event. But some of the most insightful and almost prescient analyses were made well before the conflict, such as in Larry Diamond’s excellent 2020 book, .
Diamond, a professor at Stanford University, documents the political transformation of the world through the “third wave of democratisation”, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a big bang after the fall of the Berlin wall, with the democratisation of central and eastern Europe. But then began a global democratic recession.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say no › backlash – russia
Tafuri 22 – David Tafuri, international lawyer at Arent Fox, opinion contributor to The Hill, served as the US Department of State’s Rule of Law Coordinator for Iraq at the US Embassy in Baghdad and an outside foreign policy advisor to President Barack Obama (“Putin doesn’t fear NATO or Ukraine – he fears democracy”, 2/10/2022, ) FGY
As the world waits to learn if will order a full-scale military offensive in Ukraine, Washington seems to be stumbling over a simple question: How much does Russian aggression in Europe matter to U.S. interests? One is that Ukraine’s status is more important to Russia than to us, especially because Ukraine is not a part of NATO. Others go further, questioning whether even NATO members, guaranteed protection by , are worth defending.
Media have Tucker Carlson’s growing influence in Republican circles on this question. Two years ago, he previewed his stance when I him on his show. He argued that NATO members Estonia and Latvia, are, like Ukraine, not worth defending if invaded by Russia. I countered, as I explain in more detail here, that it’s in America’s vital interest to support these sovereign nations — precisely because Putin is targeting them for their decision to turn away from the governance model on offer from Russia.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say no › --- gwinn rehighlgiht
“security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably
Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, ) FGY
Hard Is Not Impossible
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say no › backlash – general
Oleg Svet, PhD and Defense Analyst, 2017
“When Pushing Democracy On Others Backfires,” The American Conservative, , (accessed 6-2-2022)
In her July 13 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, “How U.S. Officials Can Craft Innovative Human Rights Policy,” former Ambassador Sarah Mendelson recalls her work as a senior, politically-appointed foreign policy official in the Obama administration. Her personal mission, as she recalls, was to “elevate human rights”–first within USAID, and later when she worked for the US Mission to the United Nations. Her initiatives to promote civil society and human rights within small powers such as post-Ben Ali Tunisia are admirable. However, her implicit suggestion that we ought to elevate human rights in our relations with great powers such as China and Russia is strategically incorrect. Our country’s policies vis-a-vis great powers (and to some extent medium powers, such as Turkey) must be guided, first and foremost, by a grand strategy rooted in our strategic interests, not one that aims to reflect our values.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say no › backlash – general
Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015
“The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)
Finally, the one-model-fits-all approach commonly used by the EU in the application of political conditionality limits the effectiveness of conditionality policy and can no longer be used. Indeed, in the context of democratizing a country, several factors might infuence the outcome other than just the willingness of the government. These include the presence or absence of a strong opposition and civil society, the degree of development of the country, the socio-economic situation in the country, and the country’s history.80 The complexity of these intervening factors clearly indicates that a countrybased democracy promotion’s approach appears a must in order to enhance the effectiveness of political aid as an instrument of democracy promotion in SSA. A great step has been made in this sense by the EU in the revised CPA (in 2010), where more attention is given to flexibility and to the individual circumstances of each ACP country.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say no › backlash – general
Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, 2021
“NATO Should Finally Take its Values Seriously,” War on the Rocks, , (accessed 6-1-2022)
Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio warned that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.” Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – general › uneven enforcement
Barone 22, MA in Public Management @ JHU (John, “A PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE LEAHY LAWS TO ALIGN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY COOPERATION POLICIES WITH NATIONAL STRATEGY,” https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/66912/Barone-Capstone%20Project-2022.pdf?sequence=1)//BB
Enforcement of human rights initiatives will often damage relations when the US finds that a foreign partner has violated them and then imposes military aid restrictions or sanctions on the guilty units or nations. The issue is compounded when the US does not hold states equally accountable to the US code on foreign aid and policy standards. Until recently, many US embassies did not share vetting results with partner nations, despite legal requirements to share the data with the host nation to avoid damaging relationships.2 As of 2017, the DOS publishes an annual list of suspended units on its website.3 This year, an advisor to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh disclosed that the country is debating whether it should follow procedures established by the Leahy Laws that would remediate Bangladeshi units sanctioned from receiving aid, noting that Bangladesh would then go to the PRC for support. The advisor identified inconsistencies in how the US administered its human rights policies to close allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.4 The US must stand up for human rights abroad but must evenly enforce a policy that does not damage relations, ultimately preventing the US from influencing partners to adhere to human rights concepts.
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Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – general › conditioning fails
Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015 “The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)
Negative conditionality is generally criticized to be ineffective because sanctions imposed as a result of conditionality might hit the poor instead of the targeted government25 and the recipient country’s government might easily find access to alternative funding resources. In contrast, the application of positive conditionality is much less contested in the critical discussion. The EU’s enlargement strategy is generally used as a clear example of the effectiveness of positive conditionality to boost the democratic space in the Eastern European countries. In fact, the desirability of EU membership appears to have prompted candidate countries to adhere to a host of conditions contained in the so-called Acquis Communautaire. Yet, there are still problems with the way EU uses positive conditionality: it does not always deliver the incentives promised (extra aid, for example), or at least it does not deliver them quickly. Governments may even pretend progress without actually achieving a policy change.26
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – general › conditioning fails
Andrew Boutton, assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida, 2018 “POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Texas National Security Review, , (accessed 5-24-2022)
Positive conditionality requires the United States to verify the efforts undertaken by the partner government, which in turn necessitates more intrusive monitoring. Many countries will balk at this as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States should insist upon it as a condition of military assistance. A larger presence will not only enable better monitoring of the host government’s coup-proofing actions, but may also mitigate the internal security dilemma that drives such behavior. The worst paranoid excesses of the Maliki regime did not occur until after 2011, when the United States was no longer present on the ground as a safety net protecting his regime.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – general › conditioning fails
Stephen Tankel, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017 “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, , (accessed 5-24-2022)
Wielding influence and securing tactical cooperation is the second. This may translate into trading assistance for access to bases, airspace, or other transit routes. The United States sometimes uses assistance to incentivize short-term tactical cooperation against shared threats. In other cases, assistance is intended to reassure allies and partners of America’s commitment to its security, either in general or against common enemies. Here it is worth noting that plans to slash the State Department’s budget and cut foreign assistance compound concerns about U.S. abandonment and further reduce American influence. Finally, the United States has tried, often without success, to use assistance as a lever to shape a recipient’s behavior either domestically or internationally. Some U.S. objectives overlap with one another. Others conflict. And lest we forget, our partners also get a vote. American objectives for security assistance often do not align with theirs, due in large part to differences in how the United States and a recipient prioritize and perceive threats. The number of different objectives at play complicates efforts to condition assistance; enforcing conditions to achieve one set of objectives could hamper efforts to achieve another set. For example, after the Bahraini government’s security forces launched a major crackdown on protesters during the Arab uprisings, the United States temporarily restricted arms sales to the country. Some members of the Obama administration also argued for placing conditions on security assistance. Others worried that this would undermine Bahrain’s support for U.S. basing and access, which is important for Afghanistan, Iran deterrence, and counterterrorism operations. As a result of competing priorities, the United States often chooses not to condition assistance, as was the case with Bahrain, or attempts to do so in an ad hoc manner. Worst of all, the United States sometimes imposes conditions, but then blinks first and backs down when they are not met.
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Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – terror !
Lewis 19 – Dr. Larry Lewis, head of the CNA’s Center for Autonomy and AI, previous Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for human rights, lead analyst and co-author for the Joint Civilian Casualty Study in support of GEN Patraeus, subject matter expert on the subjects of joint and coalition interoperability, combat identification, and fratricide, Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Rice University (“Promoting Civilian Protection during Security Assistance: Learning from Yemen”, May 2019, ) FGY
Information gap: preventing an evidence-based approach During the US advisory effort to the coalition in 2015–2016, a key question was: is this assistance having a positive effect? And even more broadly, could the US determine how its support, in terms of bombs, aircraft, intelligence, and refueling, was being used? To what degree was US assistance contributing to the disaster on the ground in Yemen? How accurate were the findings of the JIAT? As the US wrestled with policy decisions, having this information would have enabled more of an evidence-based approach to US strategy in Yemen. However, there is no established assessment process to help answer these questions regarding security assistance to partners. Operational end use monitoring It is worthwhile to note that the US has some processes in place to address accountability when defense equipment, including weapons, are sold or transferred to foreign militaries. This process, mandated by the Arms Export Control Act, is called end-use monitoring (EUM).51 As part of the foreign military sales process, the receiving nation must agree to certain conditions to enable EUM. These conditions include: The equipment must only be used for the purpose intended; No equipment can be transferred to a third party without the prior approval of the US; The receiving nation must protect the equipment to US standards; and The receiving nation must allow monitoring processes to verify the conditions above.52 Several programs conducted under the EUM process include Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern. These US end-use programs focus on verifying equipment presence and security.53 This matches their intended purpose: they were developed to protect against unauthorized exports and technical espionage involving sensitive military equipment. These programs do not address how US equipment are used operationally. For example, in the Vignette on page 2 where the Saudi-led coalition struck a school bus full of children, the US government had no idea that a US-provided bomb was used until third parties performed open source analysis and disclosed that fact. While the US has no process for capturing how its equipment and weapons are used operationally – what we refer to as operational end use monitoring – this information is relevant for the US. For example, understanding how partners use US-provided weapons should inform policy and assistance decisions. This information is also relevant for foreign policy and national security, since the theme of US-provided weapons killing civilians is a frequent and powerful subject of messaging and terrorist propaganda, influencing US relations with other countries and contributing to radicalization and support to terrorist groups that can then threaten the US homeland and its interests.54 Three sources of information If a government wanted to conduct operational end-use-monitoring, how can this information be obtained? Governments providing security assistance can leverage three different types of information for operational end use monitoring. They are: Partner forces. Getting information from partner forces is invaluable for helping to understand the operational effects of assistance. For example, the Saudi-led coalition created a spreadsheet with mission reports documenting basic details on every strike conducted in the campaign, including the type of aircraft and weapon used. It is also helpful to know the rationale and intent for particular strikes. For example, if there are allegations that non-combatants were targeted, what was the intended target? What types of intelligence were used in that strike? And what is the partner force assessment for what happened? While such access is not guaranteed, this information was at times made available to the US when it specifically requested it. And greater access could be made a requirement for future assistance in order to strengthen monitoring efforts. Government information. In Yemen, the US sometimes also had intelligence or other information that could be useful in helping to determine what was happening on the ground. This was not frequent, since the conduct of partnered militaries like the Saudiled coalition was not an intelligence requirement for the Intelligence Community. It is possible that making this a priority would enhance the value of intelligence in this operational end use monitoring process. Open source information. Another rich information source for determining the outcome of operations is using open sources. This can range from civil society groups that do on-the-ground investigations to open source investigators leveraging social media. While militaries and governments are often dismissive of these types of sources, considering military data to be more reliable and accurate, the reality is that a complete picture of operational outcomes requires a merging of military and open source data. This is not limited to the Saudi-led coalition: a recent study by the US military determined that external allegations, based on open source data, were the source for the majority of the civilian casualties confirmed by the US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria. Militaries lack the full picture, and open source information can help complete that picture.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – rule of law !
Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY
The United States’ national security and defense strategies, as well as trends in U.S. military operations around the globe, reflect a preference for working by, with, and through partners to achieve common security objectives. Partnership may enhance the capacity of a partner government to maintain effective control over territory. It can also signal unity in deterring or degrading a common adversary or threat, for example in the U.S.-led coalition and partnered approaches to confront the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As outlined in our policy brief, Civilians and “By, With, and Through,” security partnerships can take a wide range of forms, from support operations and advise, assist, and accompany missions, to direct participation in hostilities through “joint” or “partnered” operations and coalitions.2 Here, we report the practical experiences of policymakers and practitioners in security and humanitarian fields in positively shaping the conduct of armed forces partnering with U.S. forces. Their combined experience— supported by the available research—suggests that it is possible, with the right conditions for success, to affect the conduct of both state and non-state armed actors to minimize harm to civilians. Practitioner lessons also suggest that in some cases, the risk of harm to civilians may be too great and the options to control risk too few to continue the partnership in an accountable manner which both effectively spares civilian lives from the effects of conflict and respects human rights. This report outlines considerations and recommendations for policymakers, military actors, and humanitarian professionals, all of whom play a role in encouraging improved policies and practices of armed forces with whom the United States partners. Partnerships in armed conflict can aggravate or reduce the risk of harm to civilians, depending on the form and significance of the partnership and the technical and political attributes and tendencies of each partner. Effectively reducing the risk of harm to civilians and optimizing positive results depends on candidly assessing the most likely sources of harm and using available options to address them throughout a partnership (i.e., before, during, and after active fighting). Partnered military operations in armed conflicts expose civilians to a wide array of risks, including injury, death, trauma, displacement, and the destruction of homes, schools, infrastructure, and livelihoods. Harm may occur because of negligence or deliberate misconduct by state and non-state actors; harm may also occur in spite of cautious and purposeful attempts to avoid it. Hostilities in urban areas can particularly disrupt civilian life: water, health, electricity, and sanitation systems are often interconnected and interdependent, and the destruction of part of the system impacts the whole.3 When explosive remnants of war contaminate the area and infrastructure damage is significant, the consequences of conflict last well beyond the end of active fighting. These challenges are evident in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria, both of which will take decades to rebuild after intense urban conflict. Breakdowns in services and social cohesion significantly impact stability, governance, and the security of populations, creating challenges for restoring the rule of law. When the United States partners with state and non-state forces, the United States must consider what costs these partnerships will inflict on civilians, security, governance, rule of law enforcement, and transitional justice. Whether a partnership is initiated in the context of an ongoing conflict or in preparation for one, the United States can and should institute adequate protections to minimize the risk of civilian harm. In order to effectively reduce harm to civilians from military operations conducted by U.S. partners, whether jointly or alone, the U.S. government must have internal clarity about desired outcomes, political and strategic commitment to those outcomes, adequate resources and technical competence, and coherence and coordination among government agencies. Adding more than one partner to an operation increases the complexity of these variables. Fighting collectively only serves to underscore the importance of defining desired outcomes, as the actions of one partner affect the efficacy, reputation, and legitimacy of the other. Many of these factors for success are seldom implemented. The following policy approaches and practical suggestions may help minimize harm to civilians in the context of security partnerships.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – turns cyber
Grady 19, former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News (John, “Panel: Rise of Authoritarian Governments Pose Biggest Threat to NATO,” USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2019/06/28/panel-rise-of-authoritarian-governments-pose-biggest-threat-to-nato)//BB
Among NATO Members, the rise of populist authoritarian governments eschewing democratic values poses more of a threat to the alliance than an aggressive Russia on its borders or an expansionist China elbowing its way into Europe militarily and economically, a panel of security and diplomatic experts said Thursday.
“NATO should be in this game” of promoting independent judiciaries, free and open political debate and a free press, “and not just the EU” in advocating bedrock freedoms and ways of governing, Charles Kupchan, from the Council of Foreign Relations, said at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – turns case
Hamilton 21, Director, Global Europe Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC; former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe (Daniel, “Democratic Resilience is Foundational to the Alliance,”
In recent years, much strategic discussion has focused on competition among states of “great power.” It is becoming clear, however, that this competition extends beyond traditional measures of power; it centers increasingly on forms of governance. Adversaries big and small are selling autocracy as “efficient.” They tout their own systems and use a broad array of tools to amplify fissures and undermine confidence within democracies. When they can’t do that successfully, they use diplomatic and other means of coercion. They support illiberal democracies. Others are beginning to follow their model. This puts democratic resilience at the heart of the new international system and international competition. It is a fundamental issue for the next few decades. NATO must focus on it. The Security Case for Democratic Resilience Integrating democratic resilience more fully into NATO’s mission is not a task that is additional; it is foundational. The democratic values and institutions upon which the Alliance has been founded are under assault from external and internal challengers. Countries with weak protections for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are vulnerable to subversion, corruption, and mis- and dis-information. Waning attention to NATO’s core values has resulted in some Allies prioritizing unilateral national decisions over collective Alliance interests, or using their position to block Alliance activities as a way to gain leverage in bilateral disputes. Some Allies are themselves manipulating information and distorting data, engaging in direct cyberattacks on their opponents, undermining democratic processes and the rule of law, even threatening each other. These points of disunity could be used by strategic competitors to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole. Malign influences within Allied states could mean that non-NATO countries could influence NATO decision-making. In each of these ways, deficits in internal values can become external threats. Celeste Wallander has called democratic fragility “the alliance’s Achilles’ heel.” The 2020 NATO Experts Group report warns that “a drift toward NATO disunity must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.”2
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – turns case
Wallander 18, resident and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors. From 2013 to 2017, she served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council (Celeste, “Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, 97.4)//BB
NATO today faces multiple challenges. Terrorists have attacked European capitals, migration is putting pressure on border and homeland security systems, Russia is both able and will- ing to use military force and other instruments of influence in Eu- rope, and U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to scrap the alliance altogether. But the most serious problem is not one of these obvious threats; rather, it is the breakdown of liberal democracy within the alliance itself. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has never been a typi- cal alliance. From its inception in 1949, NATO has not only deterred and defended against external threats; it has also advanced the principles of liberal democratic governance. Although its cohesion initially rested on the common threat of the Soviet Union, NATO was more unified than most multilateral organizations thanks to the common character of its members. Nearly all were democratically elected governments that were accountable to their citizens, bound by the rule of law, and dedicated to upholding political and civil rights. Article 2 of NATO's founding treaty committed members to "strength- ening their free institutions." Countries facing a common threat have often banded together for defense and survival, but most alliances don't last long once that threat is eliminated. That is why so many observers feared that NATO would disappear with the end of the Soviet Union. But thanks to the internal cohesion created by its democratic values, and the incentives its stan- dards created for aspiring new members, the alliance defied predictions. Instead of disintegrating, NATO adapted to new challenges and became a cornerstone of transatlantic security after the Cold War. Today, the Kremlin once again poses a serious threat in Europe and beyond. But unlike the last time the alliance faced down Russia, now NATO is in peril. Multiple members are dismantling the institutions and practices of liberal democracy that emerged triumphant in the Cold War, and things may get worse if autocratic demagogues exploit populist fears to gain political clout in other member states. Just when the alliance is needed as much as ever to meet challenges from with- out, the foundations of its power are at risk of crumbling because of challenges from within. THE PRICE OF ADMISSION After the fall of the Soviet Union, the liberal democratic credentials of NATO's members became even more important to the alliance. Al- though many experts and policymakers hoped that Europe would emerge from the Cold War whole, free, and at peace, others warned that without a shared enemy, the region might return to past cycles of instability and conflict fueled by revanchist, chauvinistic, and il- liberal European regimes. Far from being irrelevant, these observers argued, NATO would play a key role in bolstering liberal democracies and creating trust among countries that had spent centuries fighting one another. As if on cue, border disputes and simmering ethnic conflicts in eastern Europe began to threaten the peace almost immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. And with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, they ultimately broke it. In the face of these challenges, NATO sought to leverage the desire for member- ship to encourage political reforms by requiring that new members meet its standards for good governance. This decision was based on the belief that liberal institutions, practices, and values would pre- vent a return to the nationalist, nativist, extremist, and intolerant dynamics that had driven destructive conflicts in Europe for centu- ries. To foster security within Europe, NATO required that new members leave autocratic practices behind. Fulfilling these requirements was often politically contentious, and aspiring members did not always succeed. Countries that had spent decades under authoritarian communist rule had to root out the linger- ing influence of intelligence agencies, overturn politicized control of the military in favor of apolitical professional defense forces, establish legislative oversight for military procurement, and implement person- nel policies that would combat corruption. All of that has taken time: Montenegro set the goal of achieving membership in 2007 but had to wait ten more years to earn admission. And mere aspiration is not enough: Bosnia, for example, has yet to fulfill the criteria that the alliance set in 2010 for the country to be granted the Mem- bership Action Plan, a procedural pre- cursor to joining. These requirements may have slowed the process of NATO's expansion, but liberal institu- tions and practices are central to creating security and trust among Europe's diverse societies. Anything less would have weakened the alliance instead of strengthening it. Beyond its stabilizing effect on the broader continent, there is an- other reason NATO's liberal democratic character came to matter: in the absence of a shared external threat, the binding force of liberal democratic values and institutions has become essential to the alli- ance's effectiveness. NATO's ability to conduct security operations depends on its political cohesion as much as its members' military capabilities. Few question NATO's cohesion when Article 5 of its found- ing treaty is invoked—that is, when an ally is directly attacked. Com- mon external threats generate unified responses. After 9/11, for example, NATO members quickly joined the U.S. campaign against Taliban- ruled Afghanistan.
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Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › net benefit › 2nc – turns case
Katz and Taussig 18, * director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, **was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. She was also a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe (Jonathan and Torrey, “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/)//BB
An even greater risk than Russian short-term exploitation, however, is a possibility that in 10 years’ time the NATO alliance becomes unrecognizable—a hybrid club of autocratic, illiberal, and liberal democratic states that, devoid of shared values, do not agree on security threats or areas for cooperation. In the long term, dictators tend to maintain their power and legitimacy through strongmen power plays at home and sometimes abroad. And almost always, they leave a legacy of destruction, chaos, human rights violations, social strife, and other grievances. They rarely contribute to international peace, stability, and prosperity, which are the central objectives of an effective security alliance. The alliance should be a clear-eyed about this risk. Like a cancer, illiberal practices can metastasize if not addressed. Deepening autocracy among member states would be a death knell for NATO as an alliance that has provided protection for the Euro-Atlantic community over the last 69 years.