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2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Space-based systems

R&D will advance SAR imaging

NTI 21- NTI’s team brings unparalleled vision and expertise to tackling current and future threats. (“Submarine Detection and Monitoring: Open-Source Tools and Technologies,” September 24, 2021, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/submarine-detection-and-monitoring-open-source-tools-and-technologies/)//mcu

Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is a type of space-based imaging that uses radar echoes to create very high resolution 2- or 3-dimensional representations of landscapes, bodies of water, buildings, and other objects.10 SAR sensors can pick up tiny changes to landscapes—such as vehicular and foot traffic—that optical sensors cannot detect. SAR imagery first became commercially available in 1995, however companies did not launch high-resolution SAR sensors until 2007. It’s relative newcomer status in the commercial sector means it is less accessible than optical imagery and often prohibitively expensive.11 SAR sensors routinely image the ocean for a variety of environmental, scientific, and law enforcement applications. SAR sensors can also detect the wakes of large surface ships. However, SAR’s ability to detect submarine wakes for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) purposes remains inconclusive. SAR’s ability to enable analysts to detect even tiny changes makes the technology potentially useful for monitoring submarine construction at naval shipyards. For example, SAR imagery could help analysts to monitor North Korea’s Sinpo South Naval Shipyard, and any construction on North Korea’s expanding SSB fleet, by imaging materiel movement. Additionally, SAR sensors could be used to monitor China’s Bohai for frequent updates on the construction of additional Jin-class SSBNs.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Space-based systems

Satelite imagery is key to monitor adversaries—China and NoKo prove

NTI 21- NTI’s team brings unparalleled vision and expertise to tackling current and future threats. (“Submarine Detection and Monitoring: Open-Source Tools and Technologies,” September 24, 2021, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/submarine-detection-and-monitoring-open-source-tools-and-technologies/)//mcu

Readily accessible high-resolution commercial satellite imagery is one of the most important tools for open-source analysis of submarine activity. Imagery enables researchers to monitor naval shipyards and bases for activity visually, such as those in China and North Korea. For example, over the years, researchers have used satellite imagery to glean important information about China’s efforts to expand and modernize its fleet of nuclear submarines. In 2007, just as several of China’s new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBs were commissioned, Federation of American Scientists analyst Hans Kristensen began using Google Earth imagery to count the number of operational Jin-class submarines at various bases and shipyards around the country, and later to study the expansion of China’s submarine infrastructure (a network of shipyards, naval bases, underground facilities for missile storage, and submarine demagnetization facilities).4 Imagery of construction at Longpo Naval Base—the home of China’s southern SSBN fleet—revealed interesting clues about China’s SSBN program. For example, Kristensen observed the installation of China’s first submarine demagnetization facility, which strips submarine hulls of residual magnetic fields, pointing to Chinese efforts to deploy less detectable submarines.5 Catherine Dill of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) published an article revisiting efforts to count China’s operational Jin-class submarines, but unlike Kristensen, she did so using high frequency satellite imagery from Planet Labs.6 High frequency imagery has revolutionized open-source analysis because it is characterized by a high revisit rate. Often, Planet Labs prioritizes frequent imaging of the same sites (up to twice daily) to enable rapid change detection, as well as comparison of images across multiple sites over the same time periods. Dill captured images of two critical Chinese submarine facilities—the Bohai shipyard and the Longpo Naval Base—on the same day. This enabled her to count Chinese SSBNs more accurately; when using images from different dates, there is a risk of double counting or other errors. North Korea maintains one of the largest submarine fleets in the world, estimated at between 64 and 86 submarines. The fleet is comprised primarily of conventionally-armed submarines; however, satellite imagery analysis in recent years has uncovered North Korean efforts to build a class of diesel-electric SSBs and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).7 In 2014, open-source analysts spotted North Korea’s first Gorae-class (aka Sinpo-class) ballistic missile submarine at the Sinpo South Naval Shipyard.8 At the same time, analysts watched the development and testing of a solid-fueled SLBM that could potentially arm Gorae-class submarines.9

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Alternate Sub-Tracking CPs › CP—Space-based systems

R&D expedites spaced based monitoring systems— allows tracking of Russian subs

CSIS 16- a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe,” CSIS, July 21, 2016, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf)//mcu

The use of space-based systems for ASW missions is not new. Overhead imaging has been used to track naval deployments that include submarines for at least two decades. Because of this fact, many nations have built covered bases for their submarine fleets to prevent or limit the ability of other nations to monitor their deployments from space. Unclassified sources point to new uses for space-based monitoring systems for ASW. Such systems fall into a broader category of nonacoustic tracking of submerged vessels. These technologies generally include aerial- and space-based sensors, but almost all require the synthesis of multiple sensors in order to accurately track an adversary's submarine. This requires substantial processing and band¬width to achieve. It is believed that the Soviet Union was investing in these technologies before the end of the Cold War. The present state of Russian research in this area is unclear to the CSIS study team. A breakthrough in this technology area could create a paradigm shift in undersea warfare. Desired Effect: In the near term, space-based systems will provide some measure of warning before submarine deployment. In the long term, space-based systems could transform undersea warfare. Any such breakthrough is likely decades in the future, but the potentially disruptive nature of these future systems along with potential Soviet/Russian research efforts in this sphere merit some amount of consideration.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › Coop CP › 1NC --- CP Shell

US modernization drives Russian development – the counterplan ensures de-escalation.

Woolf 22 – Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy. ("Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization," CRS, 4-21-2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)

Others argue that the United States is spurring the arms race, in that the expansive U.S. modernization program might heighten the mistrust between the two nations and provide Russia with an incentive to expand its programs beyond what was needed to replace aging Soviet-era systems.155 Former Secretary of Defense William Perry raised this point in an interview in 2015, when the Obama Administration offered its support to the full scope of U.S. nuclear modernization programs. He noted that “we're now at the precipice, maybe I should say the brink, of a new nuclear arms race” that “will be at least as expensive as the arms race we had during the Cold War, which is a lot of money.” 156 Some have disputed the notion that the modernization programs are either evidence of an arms race or an incentive to pursue one. Both nations are modernizing their forces because existing systems are aging out; neither is pursuing these programs because the other is modernizing its forces, and neither would likely cancel its programs if the other refrained from its efforts. As former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted in 2016, “In the end, though, this is about maintaining the bedrock of our security and after too many years of not investing enough, it’s an investment that we, as a nation, have to make because it’s critical to sustaining nuclear deterrence in the 21st century.” 157 Russia seems to be in a similar position; it delayed a planned modernization cycle in the late 1990s and has been pursuing a number of programs at a relatively slow pace since that time. Moreover, the new types of strategic offensive arms introduced recently seem to be more of a response to concerns about U.S. missile defense programs than a response to U.S. offensive modernization programs.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › AUKUS CP › 1NC --- CP Shell

Consulting AUKUS solves broader relations

Moroney 22 – Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for Department of Defense clients. (Jennifer, "Making AUKUS Work," 3-22-2022, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/making-aukus-work.html, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)

An unprecedented U.S. legislative framework would include not only information sharing agreements on nuclear propulsion, but also on much broader areas in key sectors. Such a framework could allow for innovation to flourish, particularly as AUKUS looks for opportunities in artificial intelligence, quantum, and other key defense technologies. The role of the private sector, and the complications therein, is an under analyzed aspect to AUKUS. For example, Lockheed Martin was going to provide Australia with the weapons systems for its recently terminated French submarine contract; now the company may well be the supplier of the weapons systems for newly planned Australian nuclear submarine. And yet, just two days after the announcement of AUKUS, BAE and Rolls Royce won the contract to design a new nuclear powered submarine for the UK, which may have implications for Australia's new submarine, and Lockheed, too. The involvement of defense industry will also raise issues regarding commercial data sensitivities and intellectual property issues—both of which should be studied, as they may require additional legislative attention.

AUKUS would need to be adequately resourced to take on these tasks, which would entail a distributed governance framework with shared responsibilities and committed staff and resources, including political and organizational support from Canberra, London, and Washington. In the U.S., for example, the Departments of Defense, State and Energy would have roles to play. It has been assumed that AUKUS is largely focused on the Indo-Pacific, thus drawing interests from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. That said, given the broad technology interest in AUKUS, it also draws in the Defense Technology Security Agency and Cyber Command. The U.K. would see input from the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Royal Navy. In Canberra the primary interests will be from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Royal Australian Navy and the Department of Defence. Two Australian cabinet officials have defence portfolios relevant to AUKUS, including the minister for defence as well as the minister for defence industry.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › AUKUS CP › 1NC --- CP Shell

Solves AI Subs better and re-invigorates the alliance

Bondy 21 – Matthew Bondy is vice-president of external relations at Communitech, a Kitchener, ON-based innovation hub. (Matthew Bondy, "AUKUS Is Not Just about Subs: It’s about Advanced Technology," Centre for International Governance Innovation, 12-10-2021, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/aukus-is-not-just-about-subs-its-about-advanced-technology/, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)

When, in mid-September, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the new “AUKUS” security pact among the three partners, it was clear that their first priority was nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.

As US Naval War College Professor Andrew S. Erickson wrote in Foreign Policy, the nuclear submarine play is a “no brainer” for Australia. Even though the deal to procure nuclear subs through technology sharing with the United States and the United Kingdom upset France, which had been set to sell conventional attack submarines to Australia, the move was a diplomatic and security master stroke for Australia, which seeks closer security integration with the United States as tensions with China continue to rise.

2022 Michigan Negative
Counterplans › DOS CP › AT: Intel Deficit

The DoS solves---ordering agreements ensure DoS access to AI data

Ludwigson and Wright 22. Jon Ludwigson is a Director in GAO’s (US Government Accountability Office) Contracting and National Security Acquisitions (CNSA) team. Candice Wright is a Director in GAO’s Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics team. She oversees GAO’s work on federally funded research, intellectual property protection and management, and federal efforts to help commercialize innovative technologies and enhance U.S. economic competitiveness; “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for Weapon Systems”; Feburary 2022; United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate; //BY

Data readiness for AI. To address concerns regarding the availability of usable data to develop and train AI, the Joint AI Center plans to establish a framework agreement to ensure data readiness for AI. In particular, it is developing a basic ordering agreement—which generally is a written agreement with one or more vendors to provide specified services at a future point in time—that DOD components can use to prepare their data to develop and train AI capabilities.54 This agreement, which DOD intends to award to multiple vendors, will allow DOD components and other government agencies to access commercial data preparation services through an approved list of private vendors to meet their AI data needs. These needs may include data curation, data labeling, securing and encryption, and packaging. Data services acquired or developed by vendors under this agreement will be required to integrate and operate with new or existing DOD cloud platforms and leverage standardized intellectual property terms to ensure government ownership of prepared data, as well as other intellectual property protections for AI. These agreements are expected to be awarded and available in February 2022, according to Joint AI Center officials.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › 2NC---AT: Naval Dominance

Chinese unmanned sumbarines are developed due to increased UUV’s – gives them the lead

Chen 18 Stephen Chen 7-23-2018 "China military develops robotic submarines to launch a new era of sea power" (Stephen Chen investigates major research projects in China, a new power house of scientific and technological innovation. He has worked for the Post since 2006. He is an alumnus of Shantou University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and the Semester at Sea programme which he attended with a full scholarship from the Seawise Foundation.)//Elmer

China is developing large, smart and relatively low-cost unmanned submarines that can roam the world’s oceans to perform a wide range of missions, from reconnaissance to mine placement to even suicide attacks against enemy vessels, according to scientists involved in these artificial intelligence (AI) projects. The autonomous robotic submarines are expected to be deployed in the early 2020s. While not intended to entirely replace human-operated submarines, they will challenge the advantageous position established by Western naval powers after the second world war. The robotic subs are aimed particularly at the United States forces in strategic waters like the South China Sea and western Pacific Ocean, the researchers said. China boosts naval power with Asia’s most advanced warship The project is part of the government's ambitious plan to boost the country's naval power with AI technology. China has built the world's largest testing facility for surface drone boats in Zhuhai, Guangdong province. Military researchers are also developing an AI-assisted support system for submarine commanders. As the South China Morning Post reported earlier this year, that system will help captains make faster, more accurate judgments in the heat of combat situations. The new class of unmanned submarines will join the other autonomous or manned military systems on water, land and orbit to carry out missions in coordinated efforts, according to the researchers. The submarines will have no human operators on board. They will go out, handle their assignments and return to base on their own. They may establish contact with the ground command periodically for updates, but are by design capable of completing missions without human intervention. China is developing autonomous robotic submarines to join other manned military systems such as the Chinese navy's Type 039A diesel electric submarine (pictured) to carry out coordinated missions on water, land and orbit. Photo: Handout But the researchers also noted that AI subs had limits, especially at the early stages of deployment. They will start with relatively simple tasks. The purpose of these projects is not to replace human crews entirely. To attack or not to attack, the final decision will still be in the hands of commanders, the researchers said. Current models of unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs, are mostly small. Their deployment and recovery require another ship or submarine. They are limited in operational range and payload capacity. Now under development, the AI-powered subs are “giants” compared to the normal UUVs, according to the researchers. They station in dock as conventional submarines. Their cargo bay is reconfigurable and large enough to accommodate a wide range of freight, from powerful surveillance equipment to missiles or torpedoes. Their energy supply comes from diesel-electric engines or other power sources that ensure continuous operation for months. The robotic submarines rely heavily on artificial intelligence to deal with the sea’s complex environment. They must make decisions constantly on their own: changing course and depth to avoid detection; distinguishing civilian from military vessels; choosing the best approach to reach a designated position. They can gather intelligence, deploy mines or station themselves at geographical “chockpoints” where armed forces are bound to pass to ambush enemy targets. They can work with manned submarines as a scout or decoy to draw fire and expose the position of the adversary. If necessary, they can ram into a high-value target. Lin Yang, marine technology equipment director at the Shenyang Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, confirmed to the South China Morning Post this month that China is developing a series of extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles, or XLUUVs. “Yes, we are doing it,” he said. The institute, in China’s northeast Liaoning province, is a major producer of underwater robots to the Chinese military. Lin developed China’s first autonomous underwater vehicle with operational depth beyond 6km. He is now chief scientist of the 912 Project, a classified programme to develop new-generation military underwater robots in time for the 100-year anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021. Naval drill row signals rough seas ahead for China-US military ties Lin called China’s unmanned submarine programme a countermeasure against similar weapons now under intensive development in the United States. He declined to elaborate on technical specifications because the information was “sensitive”. “It will be announced sooner or later, but not now,” he added. The US military last year made a deal with major defence contractors for two prototype XLUUVs by 2020. The US Navy would choose one prototype for the production of nine vehicles. Lockheed Martin’s Orca system would station in an area of operation with the ability to establish communication to base from time to time. It would return home after deploying payloads, according to the company’s website. “A critical benefit of Orca is that Navy personnel launch, recover, operate, and communicate with the vehicle from a home base and are never placed in harm’s way,” the company said in a statement announcing the system. Technical details on Orca, like its size or operational endurance, are not available. The company did not respond to the Post’s queries. Snubbed in world’s biggest war game, will Beijing make waves in South China Sea? Boeing is developing the other prototype, basing it on its Echo Voyager, a 50-ton autonomous submarine first developed for commercial uses like the mapping of the sea floor. The Echo Voyager is more than 15 metres long and 2.6 metres in diameter, according to Boeing. It can operate for months over a range of 12,000km, more than enough to sail from San Francisco to Shanghai. Its maximum speed reaches 15km an hour. The vessel needs to surface periodically as its batteries need to be recharged by air-breathing diesel engines. It can dive to 3km while carrying up to eight tons of cargo, Boeing said. Russia has reportedly built a large underwater drone capable to carry a nuclear weapon. The Status-6 autonomous torpedo could cruise across large distances between continents at high speed and deliver a 100-megaton warhead, according to news accounts. China enlists top scientists in mission to become military tech superpower The Chinese unmanned submarine would not be nuclear-armed, according to a researcher involved in a separate programme in China. The main advantage of the AI subs is that they can be produced and operated on a large scale at a relatively low cost, said the researcher, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. Traditional submarines must attain a high level of stealth to increase the chance of survival. The design has to consider other things including safety, comfort and the mental health of the crew to ensure human safety. All these elements add costs. In the 1990s, an Ohio-class submarine for the US Navy cost US$2 billion. The research, development and purchase of the first 12 of its new Columbia-class submarines, scheduled for delivery in the early 2020s, is more than US$120 billion. In contrast, the budget of the entire Orca programme is about US$40 million, according to Lockheed Martin. An AI sub “can be instructed to take down a nuclear-powered submarine or other high-value targets. It can even perform a kamikaze strike,” said the researcher, referring to the suicide attacks some Japanese fighter pilots made in the second world war. “The AI has no soul. It is perfect for this kind of job,” the researcher added. Luo Yuesheng, professor at the College of Automation in Harbin Engineering University, a major development centre for China’s new submarines, contended that AI subs would put the human captains of other vessels under enormous pressure in battle. It is not just that the AI subs are fearless, Luo said, but that they could learn from the sinking of other AI vessels and adjust their strategy continuously. An unmanned submarine trained to be familiar to a specific water “will be a formidable opponent”, he said. AI submarines are still at an early stage, Luo noted, and many technical and engineering hurdles remain before they can be deployed in open water. Hardware on board, for instance, must meet high standards of quality and reliability, since no mechanics will be on board to fix a broken engine, repair leaking pipes or tighten a screw, he said. The missions of unmanned submarines will also likely be limited to specific, relatively simple tasks, Luo said.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › AT: AI Intel Sharing---1NC

Lack of infrastructure means data pooling is impossible AND allies say no

Ludwigson and Wright 22. Jon Ludwigson is a Director in GAO’s (US Government Accountability Office) Contracting and National Security Acquisitions (CNSA) team. Candice Wright is a Director in GAO’s Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics team. She oversees GAO’s work on federally funded research, intellectual property protection and management, and federal efforts to help commercialize innovative technologies and enhance U.S. economic competitiveness; “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for Weapon Systems”; Feburary 2022; United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate; //BY

Lack of cross-service digital infrastructure to support AI. DOD does not have the necessary digital infrastructure in place to develop and scale AI across the department, a point echoed by the National say no Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and various DOD officials. According to Joint AI Center documentation, AI development requires tools, technologies, and computing infrastructure and lack of access can be a deterrent to adopting or experimenting with AI capabilities. Additionally, officials across DOD headquarters entities and the military services told us that the department’s current approach to AI development—in which each component works in isolation—is a hindrance as it inhibits the sharing of data and development tools.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › AT: AI Intel Sharing---1NC

Dozens of structural factors within the DoD make AI data-sharing with other countries impossible---storage, bandwidth, interoperability, incomplete documentation, murky ownership

Tarraf et al. 19. Dr. Danielle C. Tarraf is a Senior Information Scientist at the RAND Corporation. She was previously on the Electrical and Computer Engineering faculty at Johns Hopkins, and has been a visiting/summer faculty fellow at the Air Force Research Lab. She is the recipient of multiple awards, including an NSF CAREER award in 2010 and an AFOSR Young Investigator award in 2011. She received her Ph.D. from MIT in 2006; “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence”; 2019; RAND Corporation; //BY

Data The study team interviewed and collected input from many DoD stakeholders with responsibility for data and infrastructure. The team also interviewed DoD personnel who use these data and infrastructure for analytics or AI purposes. One striking aspect of our interviews was the general enthusiasm expressed for the JCF, with “wish lists” that included the development of uniform policies for sandboxing and application programming interfaces,32 the development of common algorithm libraries and repositories for open source projects, and reuse of code components and documentation of best practices (see section “Organization: At the OSD Level” in Appendix B). A notable development within DoD is the recent creation of the CDO role, with Michael Conlin in place as DoD’s first CDO as of August 2018. We anticipate that with time, the data posture of DoD will significantly evolve. Nonetheless, through our interviews, we identified several serious obstacles and impediments in regard to data at present. Data are not collected and stored at every opportunity. DoD’s software infrastructure exists in an environment in which storage space remains a scarce resource and many opportunities to record data are missed. Even if modern storage infrastructure capacities were acquired, additional barriers might prevent the mass collection and storage of 32 Sandboxing refers to providing an isolated environment for experimentation with software. Sandbox environments would ideally have some amount of test data and computing resources but are set up so that what happens in the sandbox is isolated from the production environment that supports actual real-world operations. 58 The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence data. In particular, DoD still faces significant constraints on network bandwidth, which can hamper the ability to move data collected from sensors in the field to a location where they can be stored. Additionally, DoD’s suite of software was designed for and implemented in an era in which applications stored only data for which DoD had an immediate use, rather than speculatively storing data that could be mined for insights by professionals. This situation has resulted both in inadequate data storage and in storage of less-appropriate data; in addition, too much of the data collected have already been transformed from a raw, foundational form into an intermediate or aggregated result. These transformations, although an appropriate optimization at the time, strip away crucial context from information needed to train modern ML-based algorithms. Finally, outdated collection processes result in some data not being collected and digitized; recent RAND work on acquisition data within DoD illustrates this point.33 Access to existing data is limited. Several barriers within DoD present substantial obstacles to data-sharing today. First, personnel might view data as a means of retaining power or value in DoD or of protecting their work from extensive oversight, and therefore those personnel resist data-sharing. Additionally, many data owners resist sharing their data out of security concerns and the worry that another organization might suffer a security breach. Finally, the security clearance process and other bureaucratic procedures can introduce a significant lag before an individual will be allowed to access data. This problem presents a particular difficulty in recruiting new talent into DoD, and substantially lowers productivity, even for long-standing DoD personnel. Some of these issues, as they pertain to acquisition data, were highlighted in a recent RAND report.34 Informal networks can substantially reduce the delay in gaining access to data, but based on our interviews, these workarounds appear to be haphazard. Lack of interoperability in systems across DoD creates challenges. Interoperability of data collected by different systems, even within the same functional domain, remains a problem. Software applications within DoD have not typically been designed to work with other DoD applications—even applications in the same functional domain. Consequently, establishing relationships between data collected by one system and data collected by another can be virtually impossible. Even worse, it appears that DoD leadership is often presented with inconsistent values originating from different systems for the same data point, undermining leadership’s willingness to trust data from DoD systems or make decisions based on data at all (see section “Data” in Appendix B). The data that exist are not always understandable or traceable. DoD systems frequently lack the documentation or metadata required to provide context as to what particular data actually mean or how they were generated. For example, an Army database might store a numeric value for the number of tanks at a particular facility, but it might not explain whether this number indicates all functional tanks, all tanks assigned to a particular unit, or all tanks of any status present at the location. Other data values with less descriptive names will frequently be even more difficult to comprehend and use. The lack of any centralized tool for data service means that it is difficult for DoD personnel, even in leadership, to discover what data might be available to inform a question. Instead, discovering new data sources and interpreting them typically requires personal networks or other informal mechanisms. In sum, all indications are that DoD data are not currently being used to their full potential. Overall, the problems we noted here represent a formidable obstacle to implementing AI algorithms,35 even at the level of enterprise AI. Both Project Maven and the JAIC’s preventative maintenance prototype have found that issues around data quality and availability are a primary barrier to progress (see section “Data” in Appendix B). These issues, if left unresolved, will continue to hamper the development and deployment of AI throughout DoD. Additionally, we highlight the following friction point. There is ambiguity in data ownership where external vendors are involved. In theory, data that originate in DoD should be owned by DoD. In practice, when DoD data are analyzed or otherwise worked on by external vendors, the ownership of the data, albeit in a new modified form, becomes murky. This issue was highlighted in recent unpublished RAND work addressing weapon system intellectual property and data rights. This ambiguity of ownership leads to multiple problems beyond the specific ownership and potential loss of control of the data, including vendor lock to retain use of the data, the inability to aggregate data across multiple vendors, and the inability to use the data for additional internal purposes, among others. Although this problem is not unique to DoD, as some of our industry interviewees described (see section “Industry: Data” in Appendix C), it is one that DoD also needs to come to terms with.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › AT: Detection ---2NC

defensive measures prevent detection regardless of the plan

Gates 16 [Jonathan Gates, Jonathan Gates is a defence consultant with a career spanning 35 years. His initial work in the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors concentrated on the design of warships, their sensors and weapons. Subsequently, in the defence industry, he managed multidisciplinary projects and spent a period as Engineering Director of the Al-Yamamah contract. 12-21-2016, accessed on 7-2-2022, Proxy.lib.umich, "Is the SSBN Deterrent Vulnerable to Autonomous Drones?", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2016.1265834 mimou]

Aircraft use one type of sensor to search for submarines that has been proposed for UAVs – magnetic anomaly detectors. These sense the disturbance of the Earth’s magnetic field produced by the submarine’s ferromagnetic hull and steel components. The steel hull of a submarine (and of most surface ships) not only acts asalarge magnet, but its movement through the water generates additional magnetic effects. These effects can be mitigated if a submarine uses a degaussing system – coils of wire within the vessel that carry an electrical current to generate an equal and opposite magnetic field to that of the hull. This ‘magnetic cloaking device’ cancels out the magnetic disturbance. The latest ‘closed-loop degaussing system’ is very effective at reducing a submarine’s magnetic signature. Nevertheless, close to the vessel the magnetic field of the submarine is irregular and difficult to cancel out completely. This gives some opportunity for the small residual magnetic disturbance to be detected within about 1 km, meaning that magnetic anomaly detectors are very short-range sensors.

Advances in technology have led to the miniaturisation of magnetic anomaly detectors so they could be mounted on UAVs; these detectors are now being considered for the ship- and aircraftlaunched MagEagle version of the ScanEagle autonomous UAVs. 11 These UAVs would be useful for anti-submarine warfare forces to confirm the exact position of a submarine that has already been detected. However, their detection range is so modest that searching the vast spaces of the unpredictable oceans is unlikely to be the best use of UAVs. Moreover, advances in detection technology are usually countered by advances in signature reduction (improved degaussing) and consequent further reduction of detection ranges. The introduction of new countermeasures to confuse the detector would also mitigate the advances in detection technology.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › AT: Detection ---2NC

They are strategically useless

Shah 22 [Akash Shah, Akash Shah works as a Research Officer at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. His work focuses on developments and militarization in outer space. 6-19-2022, "Could the Orca Autonomous Submarine Forever Change Nuclear War?," National Interest, mimou]

One of the crucial elements of a secure second-strike capability is an early warning of incoming nuclear missiles and launch platforms being communicated to strike back. However, communication with a submerged vessel is one of the most challenging aspects of underwater warfare. The stealth feature of a submarine is only viable if it is underwater as the probability of detection and interception increases when it is closer to the surface. This conundrum of communication while maintaining stealthiness is somewhat addressed by using the extremely low frequency of 3 Hz to 30 Hz.

However, in the case of autonomous unmanned submarines carrying nukes, one can never be sure if the transmitted message is conceived in time and in the manner it was intended. When compared with the potential for autonomous underwater platforms to enhance a country’s deterrence capabilities, the risk and cost, if things go wrong, are simply too high.  

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › AT: Detection ---2NC

Laundry list of structural factors that make detection impossible

Gates 16. Jonathan Gates is a defence consultant with a career spanning 35 years. In the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, he managed multidisciplinary projects and spent a period as Engineering Director of the Al-Yamamah contract. Since 1998 he has been visiting professor at University College London’s department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering; “Is the SSBN Deterrent Vulnerable to Autonomous Drones?”; December 21, 2016; The RUSI Journal Volume 161, 2016 - Issue 6; //BY

Conclusion There are many types of autonomous vehicles currently available or in development for a potential ASW role. UAVs, UUVs and USVs are all being developed, and the tasks that they are being designed to perform are varied. However, what emerges is that the environmental conditions experienced by the different types of drone are different and this limits the types of operations that they can carry out. Unlike many of the tasks undertaken by drones in general, searching for submarines is extremely difficult as the latter are designed to disappear. For this reason, autonomous vehicles are unlikely to represent a revolutionary change, although their emerging capability will have implications for submarine and ASW operations. There is a potential evolutionary path that incorporates autonomous vehicle technology into naval operations that will improve effectiveness or lower costs. The use of autonomous vehicles (especially large, fast USVs, large ship-deployed UUVs and UAVs) could deny areas of operation to submarines, but such overt surveillance would be open to avoidance, and could be challenged by other naval vessels and countermeasures as part of a layered defence. The below-water sensors available to UAVs (laser, magnetic anomaly) and UUVs (high-frequency sonar) have very short detection ranges. Even if a submarine-like target were detected, the autonomous vehicle would need to track and classify the target as an enemy submarine and to report back to headquarters. This would require a further degree of sophistication with cost implications to be developed. The assumption that large numbers of ‘lostcost’ autonomous vehicles will make the oceans transparent is misleading because it would take an immense number of vehicles to cover even a fraction of an SSBN’s operational areas.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › AT: Detection---1NC

Laundry list of structural factors that make detection impossible

Gates 16. Jonathan Gates is a defence consultant with a career spanning 35 years. In the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, he managed multidisciplinary projects and spent a period as Engineering Director of the Al-Yamamah contract. Since 1998 he has been visiting professor at University College London’s department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering; “Is the SSBN Deterrent Vulnerable to Autonomous Drones?”; December 21, 2016; The RUSI Journal Volume 161, 2016 - Issue 6; //BY

Conclusion There are many types of autonomous vehicles currently available or in development for a potential ASW role. UAVs, UUVs and USVs are all being developed, and the tasks that they are being designed to perform are varied. However, what emerges is that the environmental conditions experienced by the different types of drone are different and this limits the types of operations that they can carry out. Unlike many of the tasks undertaken by drones in general, searching for submarines is extremely difficult as the latter are designed to disappear. For this reason, autonomous vehicles are unlikely to represent a revolutionary change, although their emerging capability will have implications for submarine and ASW operations. There is a potential evolutionary path that incorporates autonomous vehicle technology into naval operations that will improve effectiveness or lower costs. The use of autonomous vehicles (especially large, fast USVs, large ship-deployed UUVs and UAVs) could deny areas of operation to submarines, but such overt surveillance would be open to avoidance, and could be challenged by other naval vessels and countermeasures as part of a layered defence. The below-water sensors available to UAVs (laser, magnetic anomaly) and UUVs (high-frequency sonar) have very short detection ranges. Even if a submarine-like target were detected, the autonomous vehicle would need to track and classify the target as an enemy submarine and to report back to headquarters. This would require a further degree of sophistication with cost implications to be developed. The assumption that large numbers of ‘lostcost’ autonomous vehicles will make the oceans transparent is misleading because it would take an immense number of vehicles to cover even a fraction of an SSBN’s operational areas.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › No cooperation

Plan fails—other countries don’t want to data share and infrastructure barriers

CSIS 16- a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe,” CSIS, July 21, 2016, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf)//mcu

Achieving this vision will be difficult given national sensitivities about data sharing in this domain. Some countries may also be unwilling to share data produced by national intelligence assets with their own tactical units. The United States faced this problem at certain points during the Cold War and it has the potential to again complicate efforts to achieve the clearest possible picture of the undersea domain. These efforts will also be hindered by the physical challenges of wirelessly transmitting large quantities of data from disparate sensors to centralized processing locations. Bandwidth limitations and national sensitivities surrounding encrypted communications are well understood within certain intelligence communities, especially those that work with unmanned aerial systems (UAS), but are not uniformly understood across the policy community.

2022 Michigan Negative
Solvency Answers › 1NC Stuff › No cooperation

Submarine trading is the key final straw; wrecks NATO cohesion

Daniel Williams 21, Daniel Williams is a former foreign correspondent for The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Miami Herald and an ex-researcher for Human Rights Watch, 9/18/21, “US-Australia submarine deal rocks NATO alliance,” Asia Times, , JH

The United States, by elbowing France aside in a deal with Australia over military submarine purchases, has once again raised doubts about  Washington’s commitment to the NATO alliance.

Washington has also highlighted the speed with which President Joe Biden is pivoting, at least militarily, to East Asia.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Accidents Answers › No China-Japan War

No China Japan war.

Viehmeier 19 - International Relations Master graduate from the University of Amsterdam, in the Netherlands, and holds a Bachelor degree in Political Science from the Georg-August-University in Göttingen, in Germany. In his research, he focuses on Chinese foreign policy, the relations between China and the United States, the South China Sea as well as the Indian Ocean Region. Alexander, Chinese ambitions in the East China Sea, Global Risk Insights, https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/11/chinese-ambitions-in-the-east-china-sea/

Yet, we should not be too worried about a possible conflict erupting between China and Japan, because of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. The chances of a war between the neighbours are highly unlikely. Besides certain similarities to the South China Sea strategy, Beijing faces a much more powerful opponent in Japan than those it opposes in the waters to the south. Both countries are highly intertwined and share a large trade volume; that would suffer much should both parties engage militarily. Furthermore, the prospect of the United States being drawn into the conflict would be too dangerous for China, especially with a large number of U.S. troops positioned on nearby Okinawa. In conclusion The concrete case of Beijing publicly displaying the islands as a part of the Chinese territory is unlikely to have a direct consequence, as it does not represent a military threat to Japan and will not alter the current status quo. Furthermore, China has been known to use such means of state propaganda before. In conclusion, the chances of a fully-fledged conflict between both nations are remote. This was reiterated by Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe at a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore while condemning the prospect of a war between China and Japan, and the eventual involvement of the United States.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Accidents Answers › No Miscalc War --- 1NC

Miscalc doesn’t cause conflict

Steven Stashwick, Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve, completed graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths”, Sept 25th 2015,

This concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger “incidents at sea” poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an incident between “peppery young ship captains” could “lead people to shoot at each other with results that might…be impossible to control,” in the words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost commonplace. Yet despite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over the four decades of the Cold War escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral in these incidents through diligent diplomacy and luck. But more likely, it suggests that this type of maritime incident is insufficient on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned. Mitigating the miscalculation concerns of officials and the extreme scenarios of some commentators is that these maritime incidents do not occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national interests. In a famous 1988 Cold War incident, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships Yorktown and Caron (a controlled collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately contesting what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S. vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would likely try to enforce them. Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either side’s objectives. Thus, neither side was going to start shooting in confusion; the Soviet vessels even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships. While not “safe” in the strictest sense (ships do not like to “swap paint” with each other), footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed shows the actions to be intense but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to combat. While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which served to moderate concern over escalation. Similarly, a shouldering incident between the U.S. cruiser Cowpens and a Chinese warship in 2013, while concerning to the U.S. from a safety-at-sea perspective, was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around testing their new aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities. Nonetheless, concerns over maritime incidents, miscalculation, and spiraling conflict contain enough intuitive logic to have endured. A shared Cold War concern over miscalculations led to accords that are still in effect, such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) and Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement, and may be credited with helping keep incidents between the U.S. and U.S.SR under “control.” However, the fact that agreements were reached at all is likely more significant than their content. Such agreements indicated a shared belief between U.S. and Soviet military leaderships that despite their feverish preparations for war against one another, neither wanted war to come as the result of a tactical-level incident between individual ships and aircraft. This suggests neither would let an incident, however serious, become an independent casus belli. The substance of these accords (and those reached in the South China Sea) further strengthens this thesis. While INCSEA and DMA contained rules of behavior, these were, again in Zumwalt’s words, “little more than a reaffirmation of the [maritime] Rules of the Road” (international rules that direct how ships stay safe around each other at sea). What was groundbreaking was that in concluding the accords, the U.S. and U.S.SR implicitly recognized their intentions to violate those rules and practices when advantageous (consider the Yorktown and Caron). The accords created new parallel rules by which each could do so “safely,” as well as new communications protocols to inform one another of their intentions. Together, this affirms that both sides were playing a (serious) game to establish positions and assert rights more than they were interested in war. Of course, incidents intended to reinforce maritime claims and hostile actions can look the same right up until ordnance is exchanged, but now both sides could be more confident that if shooting did start, it was an intentional act of war. Precedent for Restraint In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere ‘incident’ of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea’s armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Accidents Answers › No Accid War w/Russia

No U.S.-Russia accidents

Mel Deaile and Al Mauroni, 15 Dr. Mel Deaile and Al Mauroni work at the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies, "The Need for Nuclear Alerts", warontherocks.com/2015/05/the-need-for-nuclear-alerts/

The Global Zero report states that the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict has not decreased proportionally with the significant reductions of nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War. They insist that a “hair-trigger” alert could result in a nuclear exchange during this period of high acrimony on the international stage. By doing so, they ignore geopolitical context. While tensions between the United States and Russia are undoubtedly higher than we’d like, we are not facing anything approaching the massive competition for global dominance that was the Cold War and the tensions that came along with it. This argument and the others advanced by Global Zero commission reveal their effort as just another excuse for taking nuclear weapon systems offline. The Accident Red Herring Another Global Zero argument for eliminating the ICBMs and returning non-strategic nuclear weapons to the United States is that it would reduce nuclear incidents or accidents. (An accident would be an unexpected error due to a failure of procedures such as an unauthorized launch or the loss of a nuclear weapon. An incident would be an intentional hostile event involving a nuclear weapon, facility, or component.) This is a red herring. There have been32 known “broken arrows” (accidents involving nuclear weapons) in the history of nuclear operations. The majority of these accidents involved aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, and a majority of those occurred in the 1960s when Strategic Air Command was flying airborne alert. A significant accident happened in 1980 when a dropped wrench socket hit a fuel line that eventually caused a liquid-fueled rocket to explode and jettison the nuclear warhead some 600 feet downrange. Today’s nuclear weapons are much more safe and secure than during the Cold War. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has no liquid-fueled rockets (they are all solid fuel) and no bombers flying on alert loaded with nuclear bombs. Finally, those who would de-alert the nuclear force claim that the slightest misinterpretation could lead to a nuclear exchange. History refutes this claim as well. During the Cold War, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft routinely penetrated the airspace of both sides. This was a commonly-accepted practice to test resolve, prod air defenses, and to signal displeasure with current policy or practices. Even today, Russian bombers enter U.S. and European airspace and U.S. reconnaissance planes loiter on the boundaries of Russia. The United States sends its B-2 Spirit bombers to Europe and Southeast Asia to demonstrate political resolve. It did not lead to nuclear war in the past and it will not in the future, because political and military leaders recognize this for what it is — strategic messaging, not acts of war. During the early days of George W. Bush’s administration, a Chinese fighter aircraft ran into a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft forcing it to land on Hainan Island. While this was an international incident between two nuclear-weapon states, it did not lead to nuclear war or even a change in the nuclear posture of both countries. Additionally, previous misinterpretations of launches did not lead to a nuclear exchange because both sides understand the importance of strategic context. Some like to claim a false target on a radar screen, a fly landing on the scope, or some other fanciful scenario might happen that could cause an unauthorized nuclear first strike. The Dr. Strangelove scenario of a Gen. Jack Ripper launching the nuclear fleet on an attack to preserve the United States’ “purity of essence” makes for great entertainment but is hardly based on fact. As noted above, the president is the only person who can authorize a U.S. nuclear release and constant communications between the United States and Russia (through the White House “hot line,” the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, the State Department, and the United Nations) work to prevent such scenarios. While the Cold War is over and tensions between the two sides have recently increased, there is no current strategic context under which either side would launch a bolt out of the blue. So does this mean nuclear weapons should be pulled off alert? Absolutely not. No one can forecast the future security environment of Russia and China. We are in a multipolar world in which nuclear weapon states other than Russia also pose an existential threat. It is because our nuclear forces are on alert that the United States remains free from the threat of nuclear or WMD attack. If there are people who cannot get out of the Cold War mentality of “Dr. Strangelove,” it is the Global Zero community and not the Air Force.

2022 Michigan Negative
Advantage Answers › Accidents Answers › No Accid War w/Russia

No miscalc-induced US-Russia war---existing CBMs solve

Saradzhyan 20, MPA @ JFK School of Government, Director, Russia Matters Project; Assistant Director, U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Simon, “What Stops US and Russia From Stumbling Into War?,” Russia Matters, )

As we are all well aware, the original Cold War, which officially ended 30 years ago last month, featured a number of close calls that almost turned it into a hot war. Thankfully, neither the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 nor the Able Archer exercise of 1983 (nor any other perilous incidents), led to a war between Washington and Moscow. More recently, however, respected statesmen have again begun to sound alarms. “Not since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis has the risk of a U.S.-Russian confrontation involving the use of nuclear weapons been as high as it is today,” former U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn warned in a recent article in Foreign Affairs. I have expressed some doubts about this proposition, but it is nevertheless worth asking what it is—other than the fear of mutually assured destruction—that keeps the U.S. and Russia from stumbling into a war today or tomorrow. Part of the answer lies in the bilateral and multilateral agreements specifically designed to prevent incidents that could escalate into a war. As is clear from the list below, there are at least half a dozen bilateral agreements between Moscow and Washington that have been concluded for the purposes of preventing dangerous military incidents. These deals include the 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of incidents on and over the high seas and the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous military activities. Some other NATO members—including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, Greece and Portugal—have agreements with Russia on prevention of incidents on the high seas that are similar to the 1972 agreement between Moscow and Washington, while Canada and Greece also have agreements with Russia on prevention of dangerous military activities. However, almost a dozen NATO members have no such agreements with Russia, even though they abut seas. These countries include Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. Nor are there any multilateral NATO-Russia (or NATO-Collective Security Treaty Organization) agreements on prevention of dangerous military incidents, though a NATO-Russia Memorandum of Understanding on avoiding and managing such incidents has been discussed in Track II. The U.S. and its NATO allies should consider forming a unified position and approach Russia about formal negotiations on how some of the existing U.S.-Russian agreements on avoiding incidents could be multilaterized, shifting from a bilateral format to a multilateral NATO-Russia format. In particular, NATO and Russia should also discuss multilaterizing the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous military activities. NATO and Russia could discuss including concrete mechanisms on actual prevention of incidents in such existing multilateral agreements as the 2011 Vienna Document and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, including, perhaps, a requirement for warplanes to fly with their transponders turned on at all times while in international airspace.1 The U.S. and its NATO allies should also, of course, discuss how to save the Open Skies Treaty of 1992. In addition to enhancing the legal framework for prevention of incidents, Russian and Western leaders should also make sure their military commanders do not take unauthorized actions that increase the risk of an accident that could unintentionally lead to a conflict. There have been quite a few instances when the U.S. and Russian militaries have accused each other of unsafe behavior during one and the same encounter. For instance, in June 2019 the U.S. Navy accused the Russian Navy’s Admiral Vinogradov anti-submarine destroyer of “maneuver[ing] from behind and to the right of [U.S. missile cruiser] Chancellorsville, accelerat[ing] and clos[ing] to an unsafe distance" as the U.S. warship was recovering a helicopter within 50 meters of the Russian ship in the Philippine Sea. The Russian Navy in turn accused the Chancellorsville of unsafe maneuvers, saying this cruiser crossed the Russian destroyer’s path and then abruptly changed direction. Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin had commented on risk-taking by his senior military officials after Russia’s taking of Crimea: In a documentary-style film about those events, which aired on Russian state television in March 2015, the then commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Alexander Vitko, describes how a Su-24 attack plane was sent to fly low over the deck of the USS Donald Cook in April 2014: “It was decided to show use and resolve to use force.” When the documentary’s creator Andrei Kondrashov asks Putin to comment, the Russian president says: “It was not my decision. It was hooliganism on their [the commanders’] part and they didn’t even tell me anything about it.” Last but not least, the sides should discuss how to prevent incidents in one domain that did not exist during the original Cold War. That domain is cyber and it is essential that the U.S. and Russia, which both now have cyber troops, and their allies discuss how to prevent incidents in that domain that could ultimately lead to an accidental war. In doing so they could take a cue from various sources, among them the aforementioned U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous military activities of 1989, which warns against “interfering with command and control networks in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party.” A new Cold War may indeed be inevitable. Some say it has already started. However, that doesn’t mean the U.S., its allies and Russia cannot jointly work to reduce grave but common risks potentially posed by unintended military incidents. I. Agreements on prevention of military incidents and accidents I.A. Bilateral U.S.-Russian agreements on prevention of military incidents and accidents I.A.1. U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link of 1963 Contents: At the Pentagon, the hotline system is located at the National Military Command Center. The hotline was first used by the United States and Russia in 1967 during the Six-Day War. Meant to avoid war, but U.S. President Barack Obama used it in October 2016 to warn Putin against using hackers to disrupt the U.S. election. Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.2. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War (Accidents Measures) of 1971 Contents includes: A pledge by each party to take measures each considers necessary to maintain and improve its organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; Arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems or from any accidental, unauthorized or other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and Advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party. Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.3. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of 1972 Contents: Not interfering in the "formations" of the other party; Avoiding maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic; Requiring surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance from the object of investigation so as to avoid "embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance"; Using accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one another; Not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward or illuminating the bridges of the other party’s ships; Informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; Requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party. Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.4. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973 Contents: the signatories agree “[T]hat an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.” That they “will refrain from the threat or use of force against” each other. That “if at any time relations … involve the risk of a nuclear conflict," then they "will immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk." Operational status: Remains in force, “of unlimited duration.” I.A.5. U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous military activities of 1989 Contents: “Each Party shall take necessary measures directed toward preventing dangerous military activities, which are the following activities of personnel and equipment of its armed forces when operating in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party during peacetime: “Entering by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstance brought about by force majeure, or as a result of unintentional actions by such personnel … “Interfering with command and control networks in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party. “Hampering the activities of the personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party in a Special Caution Area2 in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment;” The agreement covers not only personnel but also “any ship, aircraft or ground hardware of the armed forces of the Parties.” Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.6. Moscow Declaration by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin of 1994 Contents: “The presidents announced that they would direct the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by not later than May 30, 1994, those missiles will not be targeted. Thus, for the first time in nearly half a century—virtually since the dawn of the nuclear age—the United States and Russia will not operate nuclear forces, day-to-day, in a manner that presumes they are adversaries.” Operational status: Unclear. I.A.7. U.S.-Russia Memorandum on safety of fights in Syria of 2015 Contents: The memorandum contains specific protocols for air crews to follow to avoid an inadvertent clash over Syria, calling for U.S. and Russian aircraft to maintain a safe distance. The memorandum provided for creation of a ground communications link between the two sides in the event air communications fail, and the communications link was established. The memorandum also provided for formation of a working group to discuss any implementation issues. The U.S. has also told Russia where its special forces are in Syria so that Russia would not bomb them. Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.8. U.S.-Russian agreement of early November 2017 on dividing line in Syria. U.S. and Russian officers reportedly agreed on the Euphrates River as a dividing line in Syria and on a system of advance notifications prior to any river crossings. Operational status: Unclear. I.B. Multilateral agreements on prevention of military accidents and incidents I.B.1. International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972 (both U.S. and Russia are signatories, as is China) Contents: Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other. When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel. A vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver when engaged in an operation for the maintenance of safety of navigation in a traffic separation scheme is exempted from complying with the Rule [on traffic separation schemes] to the extent necessary to carry out the operation. Operational status: Remains in force. I.B.2. Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea of 2014 (signed by Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, the United States and Vietnam at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium) Contents: Calls on naval warships and planes to maintain a safe separation between vessels. When conducting exercises with submarines, surface naval ships should consider the display of appropriate signals to indicate the presence of submarines. Naval ships should generally avoid the simulation of attacks, discharge of signal rockets and weapons, illumination of navigation bridges and aircraft cockpits, aerobatics and simulated attacks in the vicinity of ships encountered. Does not apply to coastguards. Operational status: Remains in force, but non-binding. II. Confidence-Building Measures II.A. Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures II.A.1. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 1987 Contents: Each party agreed to establish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital and to establish a special facsimile communications link between these centers. The centers are intended to supplement existing means of communication and provide direct, reliable, high-speed systems for the transmission of notifications and communications at the government-to-government level. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers do not replace normal diplomatic channels of communication or the "Hot Line," nor are they intended to have a crisis management role. Operational status: Remains in force. II.A.2. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (BML) of 1988 Contents: Provides for notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area and area of impact for any launch of an ICBM or SLBM. The agreement also provides that these notifications be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. II.A.3. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises (MSE) of 1989 Contents: The agreement provides for each party to give the other advance notification of one major strategic-forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bombers each year. Operational status: Remains in force.