Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Internals › Internals --- Prioritize k Deterrence

Broad strategic concept that doesn’t prioritize certain threats waters down NATO and causes disunity – the 2010 strategic concept proves.

Ringsmose and Rynning 21 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish”; Survival; September 28, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203]//eleanor

The 2010 Strategic Concept displays all the signs of an Alliance faced with a range of security challenges but no major threats. It was drafted and approved at a time when NATO forces were heavily engaged in a war of choice in Afghanistan, and when the vast majority of allies did not perceive Russia – let alone China – as an adversary, but rather saw it as a potential strategic partner. Certainly, some allies wanted NATO to ‘come home’ and focus its energies on Europe, Russia and collective defence, but most allies, including the United States, preferred NATO to be global in orientation and better prepared for crisis management. Thus, there was little consensus as to what NATO’s key strategic focus should be in an indeterminate security environment.7 Unsurprisingly, the Strategic Concept does not set any clear strategic priorities. It merely identifies three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Collective defence is catalogued first, but there are no indications that the order in which the tasks are listed is meant to signify a hierarchy of priorities. Several new initiatives and forward-looking schemes are introduced, yet the concept stops short of giving precedence to any core task. Likewise, the potential threats, risks and challenges identified by the concept, most of which are unconventional and transnational in nature, appear to be listed in no particular order. Tellingly, the concept describes the security environment as being characterised by ‘a broad and evolving set of challenges’ that include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology-related trends and environmental constraints.8 The 2010 concept’s ambiguity concerning threats and strategic priorities predictably spills over into its (lack of) military guidance. Unlike the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 2010 version does not include a detailed section on ‘Guidelines for Defence’ that lays out comprehensive directions for military planners. It speaks in generic terms of new defence initiatives and lists aspirations to develop future capabilities, yet it is silent on concrete measures, desired military effects and objectives. Compared with its forerunners, and particularly the Cold War concepts, the 2010 document is thus extraordinarily political in character and oriented towards public diplomacy, and by implication rather disconnected from the military side of NATO. Any bridge linking the Alliance’s political masters to its military authorities, as previously established by the ‘Guidelines for Defence’ in 1991 and 1999, is awkwardly missing.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Internals › Internals --- Competing Priorities

Concept must balance competing priorities --- Russia deterrence focus with global issues like EDT

Simon 6/2/22

(Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance, “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasize societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. Even though the Strategic Concept is meant to inform long-term strategy, the salience of the war in Ukraine and the fact that it is likely to reverberate for years to come, makes the crisis important when developing the Concept. That said, uncertainty as to the fate of Russia’s operations in Ukraine or how they may impinge on Russia’s power and strategic posture along the Eastern border of the Alliance, mean that any reflection on NATO’s strategy in the East will need to go beyond the Strategic Concept. More broadly, the Strategic Concept must look beyond immediate challenges in Europe and take stock of the broader shift in global power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. The Strategic Concept from a historical perspective The current NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, aims to strike a balance between the Alliance’s so-called three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In many ways, the Lisbon Strategic Concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallisation of NATO’s experience in the post-Cold War period, an era characterised by Western military-technological supremacy, and the seeming absence of peer competitors. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the belief that former adversaries like Russia and even emerging great powers like China could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order was still widely held. This was a truly exceptional period. The power surplus enjoyed by the United States and its allies gave the West a free hand (both politically and militarily) to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavours, and leverage crisis management operations and collective security initiatives to expand the remit of the so-called open and rules-based international order, not only in the broader Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood but also beyond. During the long-post Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though they constituted the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of Western military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day. But this world is gone and great power competition is back. That reality was illustrated by Russia’s annexations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014, and even more starkly by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also striking has been China’s strategic rise and growing assertiveness in East Asia and beyond. Peer competitors are once again challenging security, and geopolitical and security architecture in the important regions of Europe and East Asia, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the open, rules-based international order. Adapting the Alliance to this new wave of great power competition is arguably the main challenge in the coming decade. Beyond Ukraine Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and potentially as far back as the industrial revolution – the Euro-Atlantic region has been the undisputable centre of gravity of global politics. Developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic region typically had a profound impact upon geopolitical and strategic balances elsewhere. However, in today’s and tomorrow’s worlds, the opposite is likely to be true. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the center of gravity of global economic growth, military competition and technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a growing impact on other regions, including the Euro-Atlantic. Thus, the geopolitical and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region is likely to be increasingly affected by exogenous factors. In a world that no longer revolves around the Euro-Atlantic region, and is increasingly defined by China’s strategic rise and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance will need to think more globally about security. To be sure, the Euro-Atlantic region will remain NATO’s direct referent. However, the future of that region – and that of NATO itself – will likely become increasingly affected by broader geostrategic dynamics to a degree and in ways that are unfamiliar to NATO and its member countries. NATO must therefore adapt to a world in which the Euro-Atlantic region will remain important, but will probably become a secondary theatre in world politics, as well as in the context of US geostrategy. These changes should push the Alliance to develop a more global approach to security. Beyond the more specific question of whether NATO itself should act globally (e.g., by developing a presence in the Indo-Pacific region), the Allies ought to think more systematically about the main communicating vessels between Euro-Atlantic security and broader geostrategic dynamics, specifically the Indo-Pacific. Three stand out: the global implications of China’s rise; the evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship; and America’s need to prioritise between Europe and Asia, and what that may mean for NATO, European security and the longstanding debate about a transatlantic division of labour. The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones. For one thing, China- and Asia-centric considerations have featured prominently in debates about how the United States should respond to Russia’s aggression in Europe. Some experts argue that the United States should avoid getting bogged down in a European war – lest this should distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others have contended that a strong U.S. response will deter adversaries and reassure allies elsewhere, notably in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise significant pressure on US defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will probably remain intertwined. This underscores the importance of greater political and military coordination between NATO and its key partners in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. For another thing, it is also important that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners have a common picture on Russia and China, and how their relationship may evolve. Without ignoring existing frictions, if the Sino-Russia relationship remains broadly cooperative, attempts to drive a wedge between them may prove challenging. The broader point, however, is that whatever the United States and its European and Asia-Pacific allies think they can do in relation to engaging Russia or China, or manipulating their relationship, they must remain aligned. Otherwise, there is a risk they may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how their relationship may evolve, and thus frame their policies on the basis of different premises. This could conceivably trigger competition between the United States and its allies, and among NATO Allies themselves. Conclusion The war in Ukraine has become an important aspect in the debate about NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. Discussions on how to continue to assist Ukraine and bolster deterrence along the Eastern part of the Alliance will no doubt take center stage in Madrid in June. This is understandable: deterring a war in Europe is what NATO was created for. In fact, when it comes to the main questions informing the debate on the Strategic Concept - i.e. the balance between the three core tasks; state vs. non-state threats; military vs. non-military; Russia vs. China, etc. - the war in Ukraine may make the pendulum swing closer to the former than many would have anticipated just prior to the invasion. However, preparing the Alliance for a context increasingly defined by great power competition requires looking beyond the current crisis in Eastern Europe, and taking stock of broader geo-strategic developments. This is particularly important in light of the decreasing centrality of the Euro-Atlantic region in global strategic competition, and the fact that security dynamics in and around Europe will be progressively affected by extra-European developments. Critically, the Alliance will need to develop a more global approach to security, and more specifically a better understanding of geo-strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific region, and their likely implications for Euro-Atlantic security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Internals › Internals --- Defense Priorities

Diverging threat perceptions impact decisions --- discussions over how to allocate scarce resources impact stability and cohesion

Kunz ‘21

(Barbara, PhD from Stockholm University/Sweden and a Master's degree from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. She is a Member of the steering committee OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions., “NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond.,” Ch. 7 pg Muse //um-ef)

It would, however, be erroneous to solely limit the analysis of disagreements among NATO members to the actions of Turkey as the current ‘problematic ally.’ Even Western European Allies sometimes hold positions that are incompatible with each other. Key disagreements pertain to threat perception and hence defense priorities as well as to the likelihood of continued US security guarantees. These disagreements run deep—sometimes so deep that they are not always visible at the surface level of every-day policy issues. Yet, they clearly shape positions, as a closer look at the ongoing European defense debate reveals. In past years, many important aspects of this debate revolved around the notion of European strategic autonomy. Long known and used in a French national context,14 the 2016 European Union Global Strategy lifted “strategic autonomy” to the European level. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not provide a concise definition of the notion’s content or implication.15 The ensuing and There is No “Europe” 161 at times heated debate among Europeans was not particularly enlightening at the conceptual level and is today considered in need of being “detoxified.”16 Yet, the debate has offered many meta-level insights into the various national approaches to European security and defense. Two variables are key in this context: threat perception and assessments of the likely future of US security guarantees for Europe. Threat perception is an absolute classic in European defense debates: the question of against what or whom Europe needs to be defended. Diverging threat perceptions translate into different and even incompatible views on what policies the Alliance should adopt regarding certain key issues, notably in its relationship with Russia as the single most important issue for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century. Moreover, given that threat perception requires translation into defense planning, this is also a debate about allocating capabilities and defining priorities in light of scarce resources. Most important in the context of threat perception is how Europeans should deal with Russia, notably in a wider vision of Euro-Atlantic security. The second variable pertains to the United States and its engagement in European security. Here, the key question is that of the mid- and long-term reliability of US security guarantees and the conclusions Europeans need to draw for their own security cooperation, which, in turn, has ramifications for NATO.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Internals › 2NC --- Internals --- Unity k NATO

Unity and burden sharing are critical to NATOs effectiveness

Ellehus ‘21

(Rachel, is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “NATO Futures: Three Trajectories,” pg online @ //um-ef)

As ever, the key to NATO’s continued survival will be its ability to adapt to a changing external security environment in keeping with the security needs of its members. Merely raising the level of ambition without ensuring political cohesion and adequate resources will only undermine the alliance’s credibility and relevance for the next decade. An examination of the above potential trajectories can assist NATO allies in effecting the future they wish to see. While the future is inherently unpredictable, keeping the alliance on the positive trajectory will require more equitable burden sharing within NATO; leveraging the competencies of other capable actors, such as the European Union and like-minded global partners; investing in innovation to maintain NATO’s technological edge; and building resilience to counter adversaries’ attempts to divide the alliance. Conversely, if unity of purpose and shared values are lost, the security burden is carried by only a few allies, internal resilience is unaddressed, and U.S. leadership is absent, NATO will find itself on the negative trajectory. And while the status quo of “muddling through” may seem good enough for now, it will likely also land NATO on the negative trajectory over time.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › AT: Link Turns › 2NC Internals --- Disagreements S/Over

Disagreements spillover and tube cooperation on an entire NATO program

Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis

NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38

While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Biotech › Links --- Cognitive Biotech

Cognitive Biotech requires agreement and governance strategies to develop

Bernal et al ‘21

(Johns Hopkins University: Alonso Bernal, Cameron Carter, Mohamad Elgendi, Melanie Kemp, Richard Kim, Gabriel Ramirez, Ishpreet Singh, Ujwal Arunkumar Taranath, Klinsman Vaz, Alysia Mirilia Martins and FNU Mallika Imperial College London: Sophia Mexi-Jones and Bridget Shidok, “Cognitive Biotechnology: opportunities and considerations for the NATO Alliance,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Ethical issues and responsible use There are several ethical considerations for CBT that may transcend even AI in their complexity. First is the issue of personal agency. If CBT is able to motivate, enable, and even control human decision making and action, where does individual responsibility end? Are soldiers responsible for their actions when under the influence of advanced CBT, and under what conditions? Relatedly, how does the Alliance ensure that there is sufficient consent for the use of CBT for individuals tasked to use the technology? These technologies can be invasive, both physiologically and mentally, and have the potential to cause harm, particularly as we do not fully understand their unintended cognitive and biological consequences. In addition, significant privacy concerns will be raised once these technologies can enter our minds and see our most private thoughts and memories. What are the limits of such searches? And what are the protections for physiological and cognitive data, and who may store and control their dissemination or cause their deletion? More generally, what protections will we have against the potential of mind control, cognitive erasure, and reprogramming? The Alliance’s success with CBT will depend upon well-designed principles and practices relating to these ethical considerations, since the adoption and integration of these technologies will be based on the consent and acceptance of Allied governments and their societies at large. As in the case of AI, the Alliance and member governments will need to develop principles of responsible use, addressing such issues as privacy, consent, lawfulness, responsibility and governability.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- AI › Links --- LAWS

NATO allies don’t agree on LAWS regulations or implementation --- plan ignites a firestorm

Konaev and Chahal ‘21

(Margarita Konaev Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst, Husanjot Chahal, “The Path of Least Resistance,” pg online @ //um-ef)

That said, there is no international consensus on how to regulate the process of integrating AI into military systems or the development and potential use of AI-enabled weapons. In international forums, the United States alongside allies like Australia, France, Israel, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, have opposed negotiating a new international treaty preemptively banning autonomous weapons. 10 Yet France as well as Germany have also expressed interest in a nonbinding declaration on the regulation of LAWS, while others like Canada are open to transparency and confidence-building measures on the development and potential use of such weapons systems. 11 In January 2021, the European Parliament released a report on military uses of AI that called for an European Union (EU)-wide strategy against LAWS, which the report defined as “weapons 4 Center for Security and Emerging Technology | systems without meaningful human control over the critical functions of targeting and attacking individual targets.” 12 As a whole, U.S. allies differ in their positions. Meanwhile, the main outlet for international deliberations on this issue—the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, established by the contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons—has made little progress beyond agreeing on the principles to guide the discussions themselves.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- AI › Links --- AI Governance

AI governance causes massive infighting within the alliance – divergent priorities between allies makes cohesion impossible and hampers NATO efficacy.

Heikkila ’21 -- (Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- AI › Links --- AI Standardization

Political fights over AI undermine allied coordination

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ‘22

(Zoe Stanley-Lockman was previously an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and contributed to this chapter in a personal capacity. Lena Trabucco is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. Both authors contributed equally to this chapter, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” pg online @ //um-ef)

More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research. On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- AI › Links --- Best 2NC AI Link

NATO’s strategy on AI is uncoordinated and under-developed --- the plan’s coordination efforts cause time and effort and result in backlash and disagreement

Dr. Sharma 5/30/22

(Sanur, Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability. The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process. NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems. Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber = Russia War

The aff expands NATO beyond its military purpose to cyber which is hybrid – that increases the risk of escalation and overstretches the agenda.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

One way to explain this is through the existence and dominance of a largely unspoken but widely accepted norm. For decades, the predominant actors in cyberspace have been intelligence agencies; and the norms that characterize interactions between intelligence agencies are not primarily concerned with military concepts such as conflict escalation and deterrence.67 In the world of intelligence agencies, success is not about keeping a distance between oneself and the adversary by signalling one’s intentions and capabilities. It is about being able to outmanoeuvre adversaries in a space of constant contact.68 There are always risks, and the work usually takes place in legal grey zones where a clear distinction between war and peace is not the guiding principle. This is an arena where the opportunity to annoy, cheat and delay opponents is taken when it arises. In short, espionage and counter-espionage do not fit well with the thorough military operational planning that characterizes NATO operations. Intelligence operations, on the other hand, fit perfectly with a dynamic cyberspace where anonymity is easy to achieve and uncertainty a constant condition.69 The states that embrace cyberspace as a domain where the intelligence norm dominates are able to use a broader array of tools to pursue or respond to various foreign political objectives than only those that relate to military operations. In its 2018 ‘vision’, the US Cyber Command built implicitly on the dominant intelligence norm. Here, the objective is to become more agile and act as close to the adversary as possible (‘defend forward’).70 The United States considers ‘constant contact’ and ‘persistent engagement’ as the necessary guiding principles to achieve superiority in cyberspace and to take full advantage of the broader potential for pursuing its political objectives through cyberspace. During the 2018 US midterm elections, for example, the US Cyber Command worked closely with the NSA to disrupt servers operated by the Russian Internet Research Agency aiming to spread fake news and stir up tension in the United States.71 More recently, the US Cyber Command responded with various cyber effects against Iran after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards apparently placed mines on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.72 These practices illustrate that, for the United States, cyber effects provide political options when one does not want to escalate existing tensions into military confrontation. Defensive coordination between allies through CYOC supports such defensive use of cyber effects, increasing the possibility that US Cyber Command will be allowed to ‘defend forward’ and work persistently through allied networks.73 A more cyber-active NATO, however, risks being counterproductive to the ambition to ‘defend forward’ through allied networks. Unintended conflict escalation from ongoing cyber activity is mainly a risk if military analysts—in a strategic environment with heightened attention to military confrontation—ignore the dominant intelligence norm. If that happens, it becomes more likely that ‘persistent engagement’ and active cyber defence will be misinterpreted as military preparation, armament or the initial phase of an attack. If NATO, an organization that has publicly returned to its original raison d’être of deterrence and collective defence, becomes the entity that coordinates cyber effects below the threshold of armed conflict, then the likelihood increases that Russia misinterprets these effects as escalatory and acts accordingly. In other words, a more active NATO in the current strategic environment increases the risk that the existing intelligence norm will be undermined and replaced by a more militarized norm.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- General Cyber Ops

Cybersecurity is a divisive issue – divergent European and American approaches result in intra-alliance tensions.

Burton ’15 -- (Joe Burton, 2015, “NATO’s cyber defence: strategic challenges and institutional adaptation,” Defence Studies, 15:4, 297-319, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2015.1108108, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

NATO has frequently been beset by intra-alliance tensions and in the cyber security arena there appears to be at least some evidence of a divergence in European and US policy approaches. Recent revelations by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, for example, have exposed transatlantic tensions around surveillance, and the alleged NSA hacking of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone, which led to an angry phone call between Obama and Merkel and the summoning of the US Ambassador to Germany, was a major embarrassment for the US government (Wilder 2013). The US has arguably taken a harder security stance on cyber issues since 9/11 because of its desire to protect the US homeland, and because it faces increased strategic rivalry from rival global power centres. A more aggressive cyber posture can certainly be seen in the establishment of the US Cyber Command, a unified and expanding military command structure tasked with coordinating defensive and offensive cyber operations for all branches of the US military, the deployment of the Stuxnet software against Iranian nuclear centrifuges, the Patriot Act, and the mass surveillance programmes run by the NSA, including the Prism programme. The use of offensive and even pre-emptive operations by the US government has also grown in recent years, with a high number of ICT specialists employed to penetrate foreign networks (Gellman and Nakashima 2013). In 2012, Obama signed Presidential Decision Directive 20, a classified document that gave the US military the authority to conduct more aggressive cyber operations to thwart cyber attacks against US systems (Nakashima 2012). The wealth of cyber resources and capabilities that exist within the US military and associated agencies may be a reason in and of itself why the US approach to managing cyber conflict has been dominated by that branch of the US government. Mary O Connell takes up this line of argument, suggesting that the US government has become “trapped in an ideology of militarism” (O’Connell 2012, p. 191) and claiming that “the US military today has the largest concentration of expertise and legal authority with respect to cyberspace” (O’Connell 2012, p. 187). She further notes that in 2009, following the Estonia attacks, the Russia Georgia war and the release of the Stuxnet virus, the US government “began releasing a number of policies on cyber security that were predominantly military in orientation” (O’Connell 2012, p. 188). This would seem to support the line of argument advanced by this article, that threats from state rather than non-state actors explain the elevation of cyber security as an issue within the transatlantic security community. This hard power approach to cyber security in the US could also be explained by the rhetoric being used to describe cyber attacks in the American context. Former Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s claim that the US could face a “cyber Pearl Harbour” is a prime example of the securitisation and militarisation of cyber discourse. When there is a propensity at the highest levels of government to adopt Second World War and cold war analogies to characterise cyber conflict, this can shape US policy and doctrine in a certain direction. Shachtman and Singer (2011) argue that clear links can be found between cold war strategic thinking and the formulation of current US policy, especially the idea that cyber attacks might be met with conventional attacks; an idea “lifted” from the 1960s strategy of flexible response. Commercial and political motives might also have led to the US taking a more military-based approach to cyber security issues. They further argue that “there is a massive amount of threat inflation going on in Washington’s discussion of online dangers, most frequently by those with political or profit motives in hyping the threats” Shachtman and Singer (2011). While we should be careful in suggesting that a new “cyber industrial complex” is forming in America, the huge US government spending on cyber protection for the federal government, such as a $1 billion contract awarded to Raytheon by the Department for Homeland Security in 2015, may create incentives for responses to cyber security threats to be militarised. Equally, threat inflation may displace attention from the arguably more pervasive problem of cyber crime. In Europe, at least on the surface, a softer cyber security approach is evident. EU responses to cyber security have typically emphasised criminal and civil procedures for dealing with cyber attacks, reflecting a European preference for soft power over hard power, and there has been a broader reluctance in Europe to militarise cyberspace. The new European Union Cyber Security Strategy, for example, is based on promoting norms in cyberspace, encouraging dialogue between nations, enhancing technical capacity and resilience, and fighting cybercrime (Ashton 2013). The most controversial aspect has been the requirement for businesses in Europe, and particularly critical infrastructure providers, to report cyber attacks to a central authority. Overall though, the strategy is defensively orientated and non-militaristic.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Security

Tempo

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ //um-ef)

There is also the question of tempo: how to synchronise operations in cyberspace with the delivery of effects in other domains (Reilly, 2020). Though cyber attacks might initiate in a moment, the underlying tools and exploits may take years to develop and the lead times and scale of their eventual effect may be difficult to predict or measure given the difficulties with battle damage assessment in cyberspace or the EMS (Patrikarakos, 2017; US Joint Staff, 2019). Similarly, commanders may lack awareness or understanding of available cyber instruments and their limitations and effects compared to more familiar weapons in the physical domains, limiting inclusion in joint planning and decision-making (Carbonell, 2017).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Security

Private Sector

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Problematically, authorities associated with using cyber capabilities are typically held at the strategic and national level; how tactical or operational commanders might call upon cyber means as part of future MDO remains unclear (Nettis, 2020). Responsibilities for cyberspace also often fall at least partly to civilian agencies, adding the complexity of cross-government cooperation. The private sector’s role developing and applying technologies in the cyber domain (and, increasingly, space) also necessitates that NATO work more closely with industry, academia and others than for land, maritime or air operations (Ablon et al., 2019). This presents operational, policy and legal difficulties for C2, and cybersecurity challenges associated with reliance on industry-owned networks, though Allies continue to evolve novel mechanisms for partnering with industry to address cyber threats (Carr, 2016).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Security

Cyber Info-Sharing stresses alliance cohesion

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Policy differences exacerbate conceptual ones. Allies differ in their policy and legal constraints, strategic cultures, threat perception, resources, planning and budgetary cycles and forces (Sondhaus, 2006). While solidarity ultimately remains NATO’s strongest asset, these differences create seams that adversaries can exploit. This is especially so with cyberspace, where there is more sensitivity and less commonality to emerging national approaches than in more established domains, and to MDO, which is inherently predicated on integration and interoperability (Sharpy, 2020). Information sharing is especially problematic for the cyber dimension of MDO, with Allies reticent to share details of their capabilities across NATO given security concerns and political sensitivities. The issue of permissions is also a ‘significant challenge in the development of cyber capabilities’, especially where reconnaissance on Allied soil and networks is required to detect hostile cyber activity (Watling & Roper, 2019). Nations also have differing policy, legal and ethical stances on key technologies on which MDO relies. This includes the use of offensive cyber capabilities or basing of hypersonic missiles or longrange penetrating fires in Europe, which some fear could be destabilising and escalatory (Quintin & Vanholme, 2020). NATO similarly lacks a common approach to governance and use of AI, autonomy and automation, all envisaged as essential enablers for JADC2 (Williams, 2020). This affects the levels of autonomy (with the human in, on or out of the loop) used for sensor data fusion and decision-making, or to deliver effects using uncrewed platforms, automated cyber systems and human-machine teaming (Scharre, 2018).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Security

Burden-Sharing --- Cyber coop increases costs in a time of pressure on defense budgets --- risks backlash and cohesion

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ //um-ef)

In considering cooperation and burden-sharing, Allies face several dilemmas depending on their ambitions and resources for both cyberspace and MDO. The US must overcome domestic inter-service rivalries and decide how to integrate partners, including whether it can accept a multinational vision of MDO that is not imposed on smaller allies—or excludes them entirely, at NATO’s expense—but rather is genuinely collaborative (Watling & Roper, 2019). Larger European nations face the dilemma of whether to buy into a US-led architecture and system-of-systems with implications for freedom of action, data-sharing and procurement choices, or shoulder the costs of sovereign or multinational alternatives.11 They also face choices over how best to contribute to multinational MDO: whether to aspire to full-spectrum capabilities to allow sovereign action and offer redundancy to Allies’ capabilities or to specialise in certain domains (e.g. cyber) to offer niche capability and buy leverage with the US and NATO by making themselves indispensable. Smaller nations must decide how to influence larger Allies and NATO, and what to do if they lack cyber capabilities (or others deemed central to MDO, e.g. long-range fires) or their forces are too small to operate or gain MDO experience at echelons above brigade (Watling & Roper, 2019). The economic fallout of COVID-19 also raises renewed questions about affordability and the extent to which Allies are willing and able to invest in new cyber capabilities—though some may see these as cost-efficient alternatives to land, air or maritime forces—and how they time investments in ambitious transformation programmes such as MDO (Clark, 2020). Timing presents both threats and opportunities from a cyber perspective. Rapid, hasty transformation risks undermining NATO cohesion and interoperability or creating vulnerabilities in JADC2 systems with immature cyber defences (Donaldson & Sciarini, 2019b). Conversely, overly cautious change risks ceding ground to adversaries such as Russia and China which are investing heavily in asymmetric means, including offensive cyber capabilities, to gain an information advantage over NATO (Kilcullen, 2020).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber/OCOs Aff

1AC evidence concedes the issue of OCOs is rife with allied disagreements and causes loss of trust in NATO – memorandum can’t solve if consensus is virtually impossible

1AC Smeets ’19 -- (Max Smeets, 10-14-2019, "NATO Allies Need to Come to Terms With Offensive Cyber Operations," Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

In May 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense and the German Ministry of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding concerning “Cooperation on Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense.” Computer network defense (CND) refers to actions taken on computer networks to monitor and protect those networks. It is not the only memorandum the U.S. Department of Defense has signed with allies on cyber defense. In late 2016, U.S. Cyber Command operators wiped Islamic State propaganda material off a server located in Germany. The German government was notified in some fashion but not asked for advance consent, causing much frustration. While U.S. Cyber Command’s reported action may have violated Germany’s sovereignty, it didn’t explicitly violate the memorandum. It wasn’t an act of CND; it was a computer network attack (CNA), seeking to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy. This reveals an uneasy situation within cyber cooperation: Allies do not agree on the appropriate procedures and boundaries for offensive cyber operations. More specifically, there is no agreement on when military cyber organizations can gain access to systems and networks in allied territory to disrupt adversarial activity. As I have argued previously, this issue may end up causing significant loss in allies’ trust and confidence. My proposed solution: NATO allies should establish memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory. Objectives of Out-of-Network Operations in Allied Networks Allied states may operate in each other’s systems or networks in at least three ways: as an observer, gathering intelligence on adversarial activity in others’ networks; as a passerby, transiting through allied systems and networks to access a certain adversarial target; or as a disrupter, seeking to cause friction for an adversary’s operation within an ally’s network or system. The German case discussed above is the only publicly known case of a state acting as a disrupter in an allied network. But we can expect that more of these cases will be publicly disclosed in the future. It has now been widely discussed that the U.S. Cyber Command has undergone a significant shift in strategic thinking away from deterrence toward persistent engagement and defend forward. Following these recent changes in strategic thinking, U.S. Cyber Command seeks to cause friction “wherever the adversary maneuvers,” operating “globally, continuously and seamlessly.” In a similar vein, NSA director and Cyber Command head Gen. Paul Nakasone writes in an article for Joint Force Quarterly: “We must … maneuver seamlessly across the interconnected battlespace, globally, as close as possible to adversaries and their operations, and continuously shape the battlespace to create operational advantage for us while denying the same to our adversaries.” While one may expect adversaries to maneuver in allied networks, the U.S. is currently the only NATO state that makes causing friction in allied networks a necessary and explicit component of its strategy. Other military cyber organizations could follow in the near future. And we already see countries moving in this direction. On Aug. 1, the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE) came into force in Canada. According to the Canadian government, “CSE could be authorized to proactively stop or impede foreign cyber threats before they damage Canadian systems or information holdings, and conduct online operations to advance national objectives.” The Canadian government does not explicitly talk in its latest strategy about the need to operate “globally, continuously and seamlessly” or to cause friction “wherever the adversary maneuvers.” In that regard, it needs to do more strategic thinking—as other countries do—on the exact role of cyber operations on allied networks in the military context. But the proposed memorandum of understanding on cyber offense addresses exactly this possibility.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber = Distrust

NATO cyberoperations exacerbate distrust between members – cyber exploits require secrecy which results in allied deconfliction.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

The third challenge to the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations relates to a well-known military concept, deconfliction. The coordination by allies and military units of their efforts to avoid confliction, between for example an air operation and a special forces operation in the same area, is a central element in every military campaign. Deconfliction is all about openness and communication between allied partners. But in cyberspace, deconfliction comes with several difficulties. At the core of these difficulties is the fact that the tools and techniques that produce cyber effects—which are often also used and heavily depended on for intelligence collection—are developed in secret and must stay secret until the effect is achieved. If the IT vulnerabilities and exploits are known, vendors or adversaries can fix or replace the software and thereby render the effect impossible to achieve.39 In an alliance not known for sufficient mutual trust among members to share intelligence,40 there is little indication that allies will become more open about the cyber tools and techniques they currently have at their disposal. The request-based model is the result of that lack of trust. And the unwillingness to share cyber intelligence seriously challenges NATO’s ambition to use CYOC to facilitate information-sharing to increase situational awareness and thereby achieve the ‘cyber readiness’ and ‘cyber resiliency’ that NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană hopes to attain.41 Furthermore, lack of coordination and discussion about the use of military cyber capabilities, both internally in each state and among allies, can have negative implications for intelligence activities and general network security. A conventional military decision to deliver cyber effects is rarely concerned with maintaining access and staying secret after an effect is achieved. Even though it is customary to try to obscure the vulnerabilities that are being exploited, it is difficult to ensure that those operating the targeted system or third-party network analysts do not identify and fix the vulnerabilities in, for example, commercial products used all over the world. Thus, military plans to engage other state entities need to weigh the benefit of delivering cyber effects against the risk of losing intelligence capacity, as well as the risk that other actors (allies, corporations, adversaries, criminals, etc.) will use the same exploits against oneself. In other words, there is a conflict of interest between attack, intelligence collection and internal defence in each NATO member state.42 The desire of the US Cyber Command to become more independent from the National Security Agency (NSA) is precisely an attempt to gain a stronger voice when the US government assesses whether a vulnerability should be disclosed to vendors, retained for intelligence purposes or used to deliver ‘loud’ cyber effects.43 The risk of confliction among allies arises from the fact that a similar assessment procedure does not exist across NATO. As conversations with several national representatives at the CDC reveal, such a procedure is unlikely to be agreed upon owing to the different perspectives on offence, defence and espionage in cyberspace currently prevailing among member states.44 If the Netherlands, for example, offers to deliver a ‘loud’ cyber effect in a NATO operation, British or American intelligence operations could end up being disturbed because they rely on the same vulnerabilities which—when used in military operations—risk being exposed and subsequently fixed.45 When deploying ‘loud’ cyber effects, malicious actors such as criminals are also given the opportunity to identify and exploit the same vulnerabilities in unpatched systems in allied countries. The ransomware incidents known as WannaCry and NotPetya are examples of the damage that can emerge from government exploits becoming publicly available—even though the specific vulnerabilities were already patched by Microsoft and updates released to supported systems.46 In short, there is a dilemma both internally, between intelligence agencies and the military, and externally, between allies. While it is difficult to do much about the latter, the internal power dynamics in most states, with the intelligence agencies as the primary cyber actors, are likely to limit the willingness of most states to deliver military cyber effects—whether offensive or defensive—when CYOC makes requests. They also limit the willingness to share cyber threat information across the alliance through CYOC. This section has pointed to three characteristics about cyberspace that limit the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations. In a complex and constantly changing cyberspace, it continues to be difficult to develop and maintain sophisticated exploits for targeted cyber effects. This is especially the case if the cyber effects are requested for a specific time and place in order to guarantee operational success, and if they simultaneously have to be verifiable and conform to international legal principles. Neither the member states, which face an internal dilemma between attack, intelligence collection and defence in cyberspace, nor the NATO commander, who will prefer to control the capabilities used, are likely to feel sufficiently confident about the targeted or highly integrated cyber effects to choose that option if other capabilities are available.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber undermines Cred

The nature of cyber operations undermines NATO credibility – impossible to ensure proportionality and discrimination.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

How likely is it that the requested cyber effect will be delivered? The answer to this question is not clear, in respect of either its preparation or its execution. This is not only because IT vulnerabilities are constantly discovered and patched; it is also because of the difficulty of assessing the effects and possible side-effects of an exploit when navigating and analysing complex IT infrastructures. In other words, reconnaissance is difficult in cyberspace, and so is the containment of effects. The Russian attempt to use ransomware aimed at disrupting critical Ukrainian infrastructure in 2017, for example, succeeded—but simultaneously encrypted computers globally, causing substantial economic damage to multinational businesses such as Maersk and FedEx.34 Collateral damage and unintended consequences are serious issues for NATO. The alliance takes pride in its adherence to the principles laid out in international law, such as proportionality and discrimination, as former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General Jamie Shea has emphasized.35 Thus, disruptions of servers with huge negative implications for civilians, or the use of generic cyber tools that risk spreading their effects far and wide, are most likely not going to be considered for use in NATO operations. Indeed, one of the main challenges to US efforts to disrupt servers in working against ISIS was finding ways to ensure that civilians were not hit by their cyber effects.36 Another aspect of the difficulty of assessing the cyber effect relates to adversaries’ cyber defence efforts. For the more sophisticated players in cyberspace, cyber defence has developed into more than simply patching, clearing and updating systems. Cyber defence is also increasingly about following an intruder’s activity in one’s own network and creating ‘honeypots’ or ‘honeynets’; or about following data traffic back to the intruder’s network. In short, cyber defence is also about deception and active defence.37 This approach to cyber defence offers valuable insights into the intruder’s techniques and strategies; but the mere knowledge that deception is becoming a predominant defensive strategy also introduces doubts into the intruder’s assessment of possible effects. Consequently, as Russia is considered a peer competitor with considerable cyber-defensive capacities, one informant expressed scepticism about the extent to which smaller member states are confident in their ability to deliver a cyber effect when it is requested by NATO.38 This is especially the case if operational success depends on a specific effect. Even if a state has developed the appropriate exploit, it must also be able to verify that the effect is achieved and ensure that the effect is contained to minimize collateral damage. And even if a state is confident about its current ability to contain and verify an effect, it must also be confident that it can deliver, verify and contain the effect at the specific time in the future when CYOC requests it. The process of integration is further complicated by the fact that NATO must be willing to hand over to contributing states the responsibility for making battle damage assessments and collateral damage estimations. As the following subsection shows, states are generally unwilling to share classified information about exploits. Hence, the delegated NATO commander is unlikely to receive much useful information about how cyber effects are delivered before a decision about their deployment must be taken. As commanders would prefer to have control over the capabilities used, member-state cyber effects are likely choices of method only if alternative, conventional effects are unavailable.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Time Consuming

Cyber policy changes are slow and cause divisive reactions within NATO

Lonergan and Moller ’22 -- (Erica D. Lonergan and Sara B. Moller, 4-27-2022, "Opinion: NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea." POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable. One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO. After Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that NATO policy on collective defense and cyberspace holds strong, noting that NATO has “decided to make clear that a cyberattack can trigger Article 5.” And following an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and government on March 24, the alliance reinforced that it is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace.” But despite this rhetoric, exactly how and when Article 5 applies to cyberspace remains unclear. This ambiguity is a problem — with potentially disastrous consequences. Staking the credibility of Article 5 to what are often murky activities in cyberspace threatens to undermine the broader principle of collective defense. We can’t risk fracturing the transatlantic alliance at a critical juncture in its history over a debate on what constitutes a major or minor cyberattack. For that reason, NATO should move quickly to clarify its policy on cyberattacks and explicitly state the threshold for what would trigger an Article 5 response. Furthermore, NATO members should commit to treating cyberattacks that do not rise to the level of a major attack as a national matter — not one for the alliance. Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.” This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time. This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage. These challenges have major strategic implications for NATO. After years of publicly and repeatedly linking Article 5 to cyberspace and reinforcing that policy in response to the Ukraine conflict, a failure to achieve consensus and respond to a Russian cyberattack against a NATO member could imperil Article 5 in other areas. The disunity that is likely to be revealed during NAC deliberations would then undermine the broader political cohesion that has, for the most part, been remarkably strong throughout the war in Ukraine. This would make it more difficult for the alliance to respond to other forms of Russian behavior. As Biden emphasized at a press conference last month, “the single-most important thing is for us to stay unified … We have to stay fully, totally, thoroughly unified.” NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now. We live in an age in which more people have access to highly sophisticated technologies and almost every social, economic or military asset has become ‘securitized’ or vulnerable to disruption – whether temporary or more lasting – from an outside attacker or even an inside source.