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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 2NC --- UQ --- Cohesion/Focus Now

The new Strategic Concept breeds cohesion and refocuses on Russia and China. There is no mention of AI and biotech, and the approach to cyber and space are uncontroversial nods about “norms” not security cooperation.

William Alberque 6-30-2022. Director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control at the IISS. "The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control". The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/06/the-new-nato-strategic-concept-and-the-end-of-arms-control. DL

The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept significantly downgrades the focus on arms control as the principle tool for managing conflict and arms races in favour of risk reduction, conflict management and confidence-building measures – compared to the last Strategic Concept released back in 2010. This was to be expected in an era when the concept of negotiating with Russia on any topic remains out of bounds. The Russia and China policies expressed in the new Strategic Concept are also important and break with past policies in several key areas. The fact that the Strategic Concept mentions China at all is notable because NATO documents very rarely do so. And it uses Cold War-style language regarding Russia that is stronger than that which has been used in any of the post-Cold War strategic concepts (in 1991, 1999 or 2010).

More specifically, the new Strategic Concept describes Russia as a ‘direct threat’, which is the strongest use of language to describe Russia since 1991. The 1991 Strategic Concept (the first to be issued publicly by NATO) hailed cooperation with the Soviet Union in the context of breakthroughs in arms control with the United States and Europe. However, quite presciently, it also said that potential future malign changes in Soviet forces were ‘a factor of which the Alliance has to take account’. The 2022 Strategic Concept lays out a new Russia policy, stating that ‘[t]he Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.’ Russia had been NATO’s strategic ‘partner’ in the previous Strategic Concept, and this is a clear statement that it has become a threat.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 2NC --- UQ Wall

Concept shifted AWAY from non-deterrence issues --- the alliance is focused on deterrence and defense and supporting Ukraine militarily

Gotkowska et al 7/5/22

(Justyna, graduated from University of Warsaw and RWTH Aachen University. Since 2008 she has been working at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), at the beginning as an expert in German foreign and security policy. Since 2013 she has coordinated an OSW research project on security and defence in Northern Europe, in 2020 renamed the Regional Security Programme.Jacek Tarociński“NATO after Madrid: how much deterrence and defence on the eastern flank?,” pg online @ //um-ef)

NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid summit defines Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security and does not rule out the possibility of an attack against any of the Allies. NATO intends to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, but there will be no revolutionary change in its military presence on the eastern flank. The compromise reached at the summit implies there will be limited reinforcements of the existing battlegroups and a pre-assignment of forces stationed primarily in Western Europe. Additionally, NATO will develop a new Force Model by increasing the pool of higher readiness forces fitted into defence planning and subordinated to SACEUR. This may prove to be a much more far-reaching decision for the future of the allied deterrence and defence posture but it remains to be seen how it will be implemented in practice. Nor will changes be seen in the US military presence on the eastern flank from rotational to permanent – with the minor exception of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post. Washington will, though, place a second rotational brigade in the Black Sea region. Overall, the security of the eastern flank will be strengthened in the coming years, but not to the extent expected by those NATO members bordering Russia. Redefining the threats and challenges The Madrid summit will above all be remembered for the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which defines what kind of organisation it is to become. Collective defence will remain its core mission, with three associated core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. The approach to these tasks is different than twelve years ago and linked with the need to strengthen individual and collective resilience and to enhance the technological edge which NATO has over its adversaries. The document also emphasises the importance of the transatlantic bond and NATO’s role as a forum for consultations and coordination – thus fulfilling various demands of the Allies. The strategic environment is defined very differently in the new Concept. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace and an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be ruled out. The Russian Federation is defined as the most significant direct threat to the security of NATO members, and its military build-up and military integration with Belarus are seen as a challenge to NATO security. This is a significant change from the 2010 Strategic Concept, which referred to NATO’s wish to develop a strategic partnership with Russia. The current document mentions neither the NATO-Russia Council nor the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, intended to be the basis for developing cooperation and strengthening stability in Europe in part through restrictions on the permanent stationing of substantial NATO combat forces in the new member states. There is no consensus within NATO to officially denounce the Founding Act, but there is agreement to avoid adherence to the constraints which arise from it due to the changed security situation. Some members still want to keep open the possibility of returning to the Act as a basis for future relations with Russia. Any change in NATO’s relationship with Moscow, however, will be dependent on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law. At present, the response to hostile Russian actions is to strengthen deterrence and defence as well as resilience. At the same time, NATO seeks stability and predictability and will want to maintain channels of communication to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency with Russia. Although Russia is defined as the main threat in the document, due to the 360-degree approach and indivisibility of allied security, NATO wants to take into account all threats coming from all directions. Therefore, terrorism is described as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO’s citizens and international peace. Conflicts and instability in Africa and the Middle East are also perceived as a challenge. For the first time in history, NATO’s Strategic Concept mentions China, whose ambitions and policies challenge NATO’s interests, security and values. It is worth noting that the strengthening of the strategic partnership between China and Russia and their attempts to undercut the rules-based international order is at odds with NATO’s interests. Other challenges mentioned in the document include cyber-attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies developed by adversaries, the erosion of arms control, the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and climate change. A remake of the deterrence and defence posture NATO’s three core tasks have been redefined by three factors: the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the move away from large-scale out-of-area operations sealed with the withdrawal from Afghanistan; and the rivalry with China. The priority is deterrence and defence, with the goal of denying any potential adversary opportunities for aggression. NATO is to develop forces, capabilities, plans and infrastructure to deter and defend, including for high-intensity warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. The new Strategic Concept places greater emphasis on the role of nuclear deterrence in NATO’s strategy than the 2010 document. With regard to conventional deterrence, however, there will be no revolutionary changes when it comes to the deployment of forces on NATO’s eastern flank and no shift from a forward presence to forward defence, which Poland and the Baltic states favoured and which would bring a significant increase in the allied presence. There are several reasons for this – the diagnosis of Russia’s relative military weakness and the conviction of some NATO members that Moscow is not able to take aggressive actions against NATO after the invasion of Ukraine.; the reluctance of the largest member states to engage significant forces in the region on a permanent basis, as they want to retain flexibility to operate in other theatres; and the lack of political will among some members for significant and rapid investments in a military build-up. For these reasons, a compromise was developed that consists of limited reinforcements of existing NATO battlegroups on the eastern flank and pre-assigned combat-ready forces there if necessary, (without stationing them there). In total, these combined forces will reach brigade-size units (3,000–5,000 troops) in the Baltic states and Romania. This is to be complemented by the prepositioning of ammunition and equipment, improved military mobility, investments in military infrastructure, intensified training and exercises, strengthened NATO Command and Force Structure, a faster decision-making process and a new generation of military plans. The lack of significant changes in the deployment of NATO forces will be offset by the implementation of the new NATO Force Model. This is briefly mentioned in the Madrid summit declaration, but without entering into detail.[1] According to Jens Stoltenberg, NATO will increase the size of its higher readiness forces from the current 40,000 within the NATO Response Force (NRF) to over 300,000 troops in the new Force Model.[2] These forces will be pre-assigned to specific NATO defence plans, will have specific tasks and areas of responsibility and will be subordinated to SACEUR. They will have an increased level of readiness of up to ten days (100,000 troops), around 10–30 days (200,000 troops) and up to 30–180 days (500,000 troops).[3] The plans for the new NATO Force Model are to be completed next year.[4] The first country to publicly declare units for the new Force Model was Germany. Berlin wants to assign 15,000 troops, including an armoured division with two brigades, 65 combat and transport aircraft, 20 warships and special forces units.[5] The UK has also announced the assignment of one brigade, an unspecified number of multi-role aircraft and warships, including an aircraft carrier.[6] While crisis management was an important task in the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO has far less ambition in this area now. It wants primarily to prevent conflicts and to engage less in managing them. It will continue to maintain capabilities to conduct crisis management operations, but will rather focus on supporting its partners in building their military and civilian crisis response capacity. Similarly, the 2022 Strategic Concept is much less focused on cooperative security, which was a top priority in 2010. NATO wanted then to concentrate on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, on an open-door policy and partnerships, including with Russia. Nowadays, NATO underlines the importance of enlargement policy, mainly in connection with the planned accession of Finland and Sweden. Before the Madrid summit, it was not entirely clear whether Turkey would lift its objections to them joining NATO. In the end, the three countries signed a trilateral memorandum on, among other issues, countering terrorism, which opened the way for both countries to be invited to join NATO, to sign the accession protocols and for NATO members to ratify those documents. The memorandum does not however spell out how long Turkey will take to ratify the process, and it retains the possibility to prolong or block it.[7] In 2022 the development of relations with partner countries is also important for NATO. Relations with the Western Balkan and Black Sea countries are considered as crucial – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine were explicitly mentioned. NATO will continue to support Ukraine cautiously, sticking to the consensus that sending military aid is the responsibility of member states and is coordinated outside NATO. Nonetheless members have agreed to an updated comprehensive assistance package to Ukraine that includes the supply of secure communications, fuel, medical assistance, protective equipment and portable anti-drone systems. In the long term, NATO also wants to support Ukraine in the transition from Soviet-era military equipment to modern Western weapons systems but with regard to technical support rather than arms supplies. In second place, the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Indo-Pacific region were mentioned in the Strategic Concept. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea were invited to the NATO summit for the first time.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 2NC --- UQ Wall

Implementation key to ensure effective deterrence through cohesion and unity

Monaghan 6/28/22

(Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Resetting NATO: The Sword and the Shield Redux “What we are looking for from NATO in this next phase is long-term planning for how it will contain Russia post Ukraine and provide resilience and reassurance to countries that cannot do that on their own. That could be permanent basing or it could be rapid readiness—being able to deploy quickly, instead of being stuck in a big base in one place. That is all up for development, which I think is incredibly important.” – Ben Wallace MP, UK Defence Secretary, May 19, 202268 NATO’s defense and deterrence reset will begin in Madrid when its leaders open the next chapter of their alliance with its eighth strategic concept. Like its predecessors, the concept will set the vision and basic principles that will guide NATO through this testing time.69 But the devil will be in the detail. As Britain’s defense secretary Ben Wallace stated recently, the finer points of NATO’s new strategy, such as whether it will rely on deterrence by reinforcement or through permanently forward-based forces, will require development by NATO’s military planners in the weeks and months after Madrid. What can they learn from the history of NATO’s strategic concepts? Plan against Russian “Maximum Intentions” The guidance that accompanied NATO’s first strategic concept advised that for defense planning purposes: “Precise Soviet intentions are not known and cannot be predicted with reliable accuracy. For military planning purposes, however, it is essential to consider maximum intentions and capabilities.”70 This is sound advice considering the inherent uncertainty in estimating adversary intentions and plans.71 It is also best practice for military planning.72 Moreover, in light of Russia’s current actions, NATO’s 1956 assessment of Soviet intentions and their implications are strikingly resonant today. Beyond the following highlights, the assessment is worth reading in full:73 Circumstances may develop, however, in which the Soviet leaders may harden their attitude and be prepared to take greater risks than theretofore. They have indulged in the use of threats, including the threat of war and even of nuclear attack, as blackmail to attain their ends. The Soviets are thus not likely to launch such [conventional] attacks, provided that the West maintains its defence commitments, such as the stationing of overseas troops in Western Europe, its firm purpose to defend itself, appropriate nuclear retaliatory strength and adequate conventional forces to ensure that local armed intervention by Soviet or satellite forces does not offer a prospect of easy success. However, the following possibilities of action . . . must be included among those requiring consideration: (a) General attacks against NATO. The USSR might launch general attacks with conventional weapons against NATO if the Soviet leaders estimated that the Alliance would be deterred from employing nuclear weapons . . . for example: - because of assumed Western reluctance to be the first to use nuclear weapons. - because [the West feared] it was more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to nuclear attack. - because of assumed Western division or demoralisation. (b) Local attacks against NATO. If the Soviets believe that NATO . . . were not able to defend itself against all types of limited aggression . . . [they] might initiate, instigate, support or condone such aggression. (c) Attacks against peripheral non-NATO countries. If . . . the Soviet leaders thought that a non-NATO country on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc would not or could not receive effective support of the Western powers, the Soviets might be tempted to use their preponderance in conventional forces either for armed intervention in the country in question or to exert pressure on it in order to influence it towards alignment with the Soviet camp.74 Revitalize the Sword and the Shield The second insight logically follows the first. The assessment of Soviet intentions set out above led to NATO adopting its strategy of the sword and the shield in its 1957 strategic concept—a combination of strategic nuclear forces to deter attack through the threat of massive retaliation, alongside the forward defense of NATO’s eastern front through the basing of significant forces as far east as possible.75 If NATO’s assessment of Russia today is anywhere close to that made by NATO’s planners of the Soviet Union then, the option of revitalizing this strategy must be on the table. Several questions for NATO defense planners flow from this insight. For example: What force posture—in terms of location, scale, and capabilities—is required to meet the basic aim of shield forces: “To make it credible to a potential aggressor that he will have to contend with an immediate and effective response by NATO?”76 What is the optimum balance between the sword and the shield, or deterrence by punishment versus denial?77 How can shield forces and NATO members in Eastern Europe best support NATO’s strategic nuclear forces? What is the utility of a revitalized “flexible response” or “graduated deterrence” doctrine for deterring a range of Russian aggression? What levels of response should this doctrine consist of?78 To what extent should out-of-area operations drive NATO defense planning?79 Modernize the Sword and the Shield The third insight builds on the second: if NATO revitalizes its sword and shield, both must meet the demands of the contemporary strategic and operational context. Further defense planning questions stem from the need to modernize NATO’s sword and shield. For example: Are NATO’s strategic nuclear forces resilient to threats from emerging technologies?80 What opportunities do emerging technologies present for enhancing the capability—and therefore deterrent effect—of shield forces?81 What is the contribution of “total defense” (through national and whole-of-society resilience and civil preparedness) to the aim of deterring conventional and hybrid aggression by denial?82 How does assistance to non-NATO partner nations support deterrence?83 Final Word: Political Cohesion and Military Strength NATO is the world’s largest, most powerful, most successful, and preeminent military alliance of nations. One reason for its longevity is continuous adaptation. The main mechanism for this process has been the alliance’s most important document: its strategic concept. NATO’s new concept will guide its latest evolution as the alliance resets to deal with a situation it has never faced in its history: a full-scale land war in Europe. Yet resetting NATO’s defense and deterrence posture is not simply a military-strategic matter. It is above all a political one, requiring unity and solidarity. In facing this crucial task, the allies of NATO must recall one of the basic principles from its founding strategic concept, taken from the North Atlantic Treaty itself: “They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” Or, in the words of NATO secretary general Joseph Luns from 1976, which resonate today: “our efforts can only succeed if they are based on political cohesion and on military strength of a scale sufficient to resist military or political pressures. Then we shall be able to face with confidence the constant challenges which we must expect to be our lot over the months and years ahead.”84

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 2NC --- UQ Wall

***NATO is unified from the Concept and has bolstered its deterrence and collective defense --- CONTINUED implementation is CRITICAL to prevent Ukraine spill-over

Kochis 7/5/22

(Daniel, master's in comparative political science from Fordham University in New York, where he received the Richard A. Bennett Graduate Assistantship, senior policy analyst in European Affairs at the Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom in Washington, D.C. He specializes in trans-Atlantic security issues and writes regularly on U.S. policy on Europe, NATO, U.S.-Russia relations and Arctic issues, “For NATO, a Big Step Forward,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Now that the summit is over and the dust has begun to settle, it’s possible to say that, by and large, the summit delivered. President Biden and the other NATO leaders came together to take many, though not all, of the steps necessary to stand up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The transatlantic community, including the United States, will be stronger and more secure as a result. There was remarkable unity, capped by Turkey dropping its de facto veto of Finnish and Swedish NATO accession with the surprise signing of the trilateral memorandum that led to an invitation to the two Scandinavian countries to join the alliance. In the leadup to the summit, despite feverish efforts by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and others, it seemed likely that Turkish President Erdogan’s objections to Finnish and Swedish membership would cast a pall over the gathering, and hand the Russian’s a huge propaganda victory. That, however, was not to be. Thanks to some likely carrots offered by the U.S. to Turkey, Finland and Sweden are now poised to become the 31st and 32nd NATO members. While far from official, the likelihood of Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO is a cause for celebration especially since their joining the alliance had only been a remote possibility just a few months ago. At the summit, NATO also adopted a new Strategic Concept, a document that details the alliance’s key purpose and tasks going forward and its first mission update in 12 years. The document reflects the new geostrategic reality facing the alliance, stating: The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. This differs substantially from the treatment of Russia in the 2010 Strategic Concept, when NATO still saw the possibility for “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia.” The new Strategic Concept, along with the summit declaration and the statements of the allied leaders, also stress collective defense. Specifically, they all reiterate, nearly verbatim, the message of the Strategic Concept, aimed squarely at Moscow: “While NATO is a defensive Alliance, no one should doubt our strength and resolve to defend every inch of Allied territory, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Allies and prevail against any aggressor.” The alliance also took actions to back up its words, announcing the expansion of the NATO Response Force from its current 40,000 military personnel to 300,000, as well as continued growth in prepositioned weapons and equipment stockpiles. The NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg noted of the Response Force expansion, “For the first time since the Cold War, we will have pre-assigned forces to defend specific Allies so that we can reinforce much faster if needed.” In fact, some allies have already stepped up, with Germany pledging 15,000 soldiers and the U.K. offering a Carrier Strike Group. In response to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO created an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four multinational battalions in each of the Baltic states and Poland. These large deployments of forces at the edge of NATO’s eastern flank are intended to deter any attacks against the alliance’s most vulnerable members. This March in Brussels, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the alliance announced the creation of four additional EFP battalions, one each stationed in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The four new multinational battlegroups are already up and running. Moreover, NATO recently announced each EFP battlegroup would be increased to a brigade-level force; a doubling of their size to between 3,000-5,000 soldiers apiece. Some countries have already announced increases to their Enhanced Forward Presence contributions. For instance, the United Kingdom has roughly doubled its deployment to the EFP battlegroup in Estonia to over 1,600 troops. In early June, Germany announced that a further 500 troops would be stationed in Lithuania, as part of the German-led EFP battalion, increasing its footprint there to 1500 troops, up from 500 before the war began. The battlegroups have alliance-wide participation. Today, putting aside the three Baltic states that host EFP battalions to bolster their own forces, Greece, Portugal and Turkey are the only NATO members that do not contribute to an EFP battalion. What’s more, Portugal frequently contributes forces, including recently temporarily deploying troops to the NATO battlegroups in both Lithuania and Romania. On top of this and in conjunction with the summit, the U.S. announced a raft of new European deployments. These include two F-35 squadrons to be based in the U.K.; the establishment in Poland of the permanent V Corps headquarters (to provide command and control “focused on synchronizing U.S. Army, allied, and partner nation tactical formations operating in Europe”); a new rotational brigade combat team deploying to Romania; enhanced rotational deployments to the Baltics, which will include “armored, aviation, air defense, and special operations forces”; the forward stationing of an “an air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade headquarters” in Germany, as well as a short-range air defense battery in Italy. Meanwhile, NATO countries continue to make greater defense investments. In 2022, for instance, Slovakia will join the list of countries that spend the 2% of GDP or more on defense (there are 9 total) required of NATO members. And many more member states have pledged to reach the 2% threshold in the coming years. With this additional spending, allies are not merely padding military pensions, they’re investing in real capabilities. Indeed, all but six member states now meet the second NATO benchmark to invest 20% or more of defense expenditures in major new capabilities, 17 more than did in 2014. In Madrid, NATO also took off its rose-colored glasses regarding China, declaring in the new Strategic Concept that “The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” and warning, “The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.” In the 2010 iteration, China was not even mentioned. It is perhaps then no surprise that the leaders of allies in the Pacific theater, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea participated for the first time in a NATO summit. The need to counter Russia with a united front including the engagement of allies in Asia, coupled with the rising challenge of China (now firmly on NATO’s radar) means it’s likely we will see similar participation of Asian allies in future alliance summits, probably beginning at the next meeting in 2023 in Lithuania. Much Left To Be Done Even though the Madrid summit should largely be billed as a success, how much of a success remains to be seen. Much depends on implementing the decisions just taken. For instance, will the alliance reach its goal of finding 240,000 new troops for its response force? And will it continue its progress on increasing allied defense spending? Despite significant improvements, fewer than one-third of member states are currently spending 2% of their GDP on defense. Even Finnish and Swedish accession could still be a sticky wicket. For instance, the language of the memorandum inviting the two countries to apply for membership was vague enough to allow them to join the alliance without having many actual responsibilities. This possibility is on Turkey’s mind because the ink on the agreement was barely dry before Erdogan created new caveats for the two countries, saying: “The key thing is for promises to come true,” and “we will monitor the enforcement of the elements in the memorandum and will take our steps accordingly.” Turkey’s about-face on Swedish and Finnish membership was suspiciously timed to the announcement of Biden administration support not only for the sale of F-16 upgrade kits to Turkey (which they had previously endorsed), but also the sale of new F-16 fighter jets. At the same time, while President Biden may be confident of congressional approval for the sales, it is far from assured. And on support for Ukraine, which not surprisingly was a focus of the summit, the proof will be in the pudding. Russia’s war in Ukraine shows no sign of abating, and the ability and willingness of the West to continue its essential support for Ukraine long term is not guaranteed. Domestic economic pressures, coupled with increasingly drawn down munitions and weapons stocks (as well as atrophied defense industrial bases that are necessary to backfill them), will combine to test the long-term resolve of NATO members to stand shoulder to should with Ukraine as Russia’s war there rages on. Finally, while the standing up of the four new NATO battlegroups with nearly alliance-wide participation is a big positive, the forces remain a tripwire rather than the core of an adequate defense. So far, NATO has failed to move beyond a tripwire concept in Eastern Europe and toward a force posture of deterrence with broad and, more importantly, robust participation across the alliance. In failing to do so, NATO members missed a historic opportunity and may have left room for dangerous ambiguity as to the alliance’s resolve. In Madrid, NATO successfully continued to flesh out promises made at its Brussels gathering this past spring, strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe—and in turn, making a spillover conflict from the Russian war against Ukraine less likely, an outcome squarely in U.S. national interest. Now it remains for the U.S. and its allies to fulfill the decisions made in Madrid and close down avenues of ambiguity regarding NATO resolve to stand up to aggressors and defend every inch of its territory.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 2NC --- Impact Overview

Prolif causes nuclear conflict

Sam Kleiner 6/3/16 — postdoctoral fellow at Yale Law School, “With His Finger on the Trigger,” The Atlantic,

A new nuclear-arms race, moreover, could be even riskier than the one Reagan and others worked so hard to end. In retrospect, the Cold War standoff between two massive, nuclear-armed superpowers offered some stability; among other things, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union could destroy each other, or any other challenger, in a nuclear confrontation ended up preventing either side from using nuclear weapons. Global alliances were structured in a bipolar system, with smaller powers picking one side or the other, which meant fewer possible avenues for conflict. But that world came to an end when the Cold War finished. We now live in a multipolar world that is, in many ways, a more dangerous one. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn warned in 2011 that “the growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.” One particularly risky and region right now is East Asia, where competing territorial claims and an unpredictable North Korea threaten to flare into conflict. If Japan, which is revising its pacifist post-World War II foreign policy toward a more assertive one, or South Korea, where there is broad popular support for weaponization, go nuclear, the chances grow for a regional arms race—and for nuclear war. One possibility, as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted: “North Korea might be tempted to launch a preemptive attack at a time when the U.S. defense commitment [to South Korea] might no longer apply.” But even “short of this worst-case scenario, rather than negotiate disarmament, North Korea more likely would claim the South’s actions as a justification for stepping up its own nuclear program.” These are by no means the only risks. There is, for example, the risk of an accidental firing or a rogue officer deciding that he or she wants to launch a nuclear weapon. There is the risk of “loose nukes” falling into the wrong hands, and the risk that individual scientists will be willing to transfer nuclear technology to the highest bidder, as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan did in selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. When the nuclear bomb was first being developed, Secretary of War Henry Stimson offered a poignant warning about how devastating the weapon would be. He told President Henry Truman that “such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power.” Today, America’s “greater size and material power” can’t necessarily stop a nuclear strike, particularly if the materials fall into the hands of terrorists.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 2NC --- Impact Overview

United NATO focused on Deterrence prevents war with Russia and China

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 2NC --- Impact Overview

Overstretching the alliance turns the case --- results in allies pulling funds from the aff and withdrawing from NATO altogether

Bazin ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Political and economic factors. The group of political and economic factors points to the risks of severe disagreements among the allies, which could lead to the weakening of the transatlantic bond, disintegration tendencies within the European Union, or even withdrawal of a NATO nation from the Alliance. At the level of political elites, the participants identified the crisis of political leadership in NATO nations among the most probable causes of weakening alliance cohesion in the future. Particularly, populist leaders who prefer narrow, short-term political gains at home and who are prepared to “undermine an international institution to gain consensus internally” represent a serious threat to multilateralism, on which the Alliance has depended. Oftentimes, national leaders “use NATO as a scapegoat for their domestic political games,” while “NATO does not [and cannot] fight its own nations.” At the level of domestic population, the support for the Alliance in member states can decline due to NATO’s unclear purpose. This could become an acute problem, especially if national leaders continue to frame security problems exclusively in domestic terms instead of treating them as NATO-wide. Particularly, concerns over sovereignty could override the relative value of the Alliance’s collective good and make governments pull limited funds away from NATO.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 2NC --- Impact Overview

Collapse of Allied Conventional Deterrence causes full-scale nuclear war with Russia

Kroenig ‘21

(Dr. Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and the director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” pg online @ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-4/D-Kroenig.pdf)

If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global commitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commitments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pressure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces. Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt- out- of- the- blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could retaliate against any Russian nuclear “de- escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low- yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

C --- Failing to contain Ukraine conflict escalates to wider Euro war, prolif, collapses U.S. cred and alliances in Asia and causes China adventurism

Graham ‘22

(Thomas, PhD in political science from Harvard University, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University and sits on its faculty steering committee. He is also a research fellow at the MacMillan Center at Yale, Foreign Service officer for fourteen years. His assignments included two tours of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the late Soviet period and in the middle of the 1990’s during which he served as head of the political internal unit and acting political counselor, “Preventing a Wider European Conflict,” pg online @ )

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity. The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense. To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack. A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support. A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response. The U.S. and NATO response to Russian actions will impact Moscow’s decisions on the conduct of the conflict. Both a weak response and an excessively harsh one could lead to escalation. In the first case, Moscow could be tempted to press militarily even further into Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin has demanded that NATO withdraw its forces back to the lines they held in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and the first wave of post−Cold War expansion remained in the future. His remarks announcing the start of hostilities against Ukraine hinted at a broader effort to restore Russia’s control over all of the former Soviet Union. That could include military action against the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, through which Moscow could try to carve out a land corridor to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. NATO would have little choice but to provide military aid to those states if it did not want to forfeit its role as the central pillar of European security. Crippling sanctions, meanwhile, could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence. If Putin felt cornered, he could escalate the conflict either horizontally to other countries or vertically to the nuclear level in a desperate effort to save himself, his regime, and, in his mind, Russia itself. And he could find considerable public support for such a reaction. Already, some Russians believe that U.S. and EU sanctions are aimed not simply at the leaders behind the war but, by cratering the economy, at all Russians. Warning Indicators As is the case with the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s intentions will remain ambiguous. The indicators of an approaching escalation in the conflict beyond Ukraine are likely to fall into three categories. The first indicators that political and military conditions are increasing the risk of broader conflict include a breakdown in channels of communication with Moscow. The absence of active diplomatic ties would preclude a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. An end to U.S.-Russian military-to-military channels would undermine any effort to avoid direct military conflict between the two countries. Another indicator would be major insurgent successes that dramatically increase Russian casualties. Moscow would be tempted to move more aggressively against insurgent safe havens rather than capitulate on what it considers to be its vital interest in Ukraine. Second are the indicators that Moscow is preparing for a broader conflict, which it would undoubtedly argue had been forced by Western actions. Such signs include Kremlin efforts to prepare the Russian public for a wider conflict, which could entail official statements, greater media focus on escalating Western “aggression,” an increased pace of civil defense drills, and mobilization of reserves. Another indicator includes the massing of Russian forces in the Baltic region. It could include such moves as aggressive hybrid actions to destabilize Poland and the Baltic states, coupled with efforts to rally indigenous ethnic Russian communities against their governments. Third are the indicators that Moscow is intentionally seeking to widen the conflict. This could include greater support for Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, such as diplomatic and financial backing, and provision of weapons. They could also encourage Serb leaders to more assertively pursue their grievances against Kosovo. Implications for the United States A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. It would test the durability of its global system of alliances and the efficacy of international regimes and institutions that have guarded world peace, security, and prosperity. The challenge would come at a time when the United States itself is in immense disarray, as a deeply polarized polity confronts massive domestic problems—the pandemic, inflation, racial justice, and cultural wars—that leave less time and fewer resources for foreign matters. The United States will be tested to see whether it can muster the will, energy, and creativity to execute an effective policy toward the unfolding crisis in Europe. At home, public attention has been focused on developments in and around Ukraine, but the Joe Biden administration cannot ignore the home front. In response to U.S.-levied sanctions, Russia can be expected to step up its cyber operations against the United States. It will more actively sow disinformation, seek to exacerbate domestic tensions, and paralyze critical infrastructure. The severity of the attacks will likely rise in proportion to the harshness of the sanctions Washington levies on Moscow. Abroad, the fate of the transatlantic community, a central pillar of U.S. security and prosperity, would be a stake. One of the Biden administration’s priorities, as laid out in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021, is repairing U.S. alliances—especially with Europe—after four disruptive years under President Donald Trump. Although relations are more cordial, significant substantive differences remain and the willingness of allies to align behind a common purpose for the long haul remains questionable. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO, as will most likely be the case. Putin will seek to exploit divisions through differentiated levels of pressure on NATO members, targeted energy cutoffs, offers of negotiation, and the like to advance two long-standing Russian goals: the end of NATO as a collective defense organization and the erosion of the foundations of the EU. Should he succeed, the new order that would emerge in Europe is far from certain. But Russia would undoubtedly play a central role in its formulation, and almost any conceivable new order would diminish the power and role of the United States on the continent. A similar situation obtains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration spent 2021 bolstering relations with its allies and partners—energizing the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), and cutting a submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia—to meet the growing strategic challenge posed by China. A major, prolonged European distraction could undo further efforts to pivot to Asia, raise doubts among allies and partners about the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and free China to pursue its objectives with greater vigor. The United States could avoid this outcome by pursuing lesser goals in Europe—leading to the quicker development of a new order less favorable to American interests—or by a massive buildup of its military capabilities that would enable it to play a major, perhaps decisive, role in both regions. The latter would have to come at the cost of the Biden administration’s domestic priorities. Whether the Biden administration could muster sufficient domestic political support, if it decided to move in this direction, is far from certain. In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

B --- The plan pushes the alliance outside of its core tasks --- undermines the concept strategy and guts NATO focus and cohesion

Larsen 22 [Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.; “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China”; Lawfare; May 22, 2022; https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china]//eleanor

NATO’s main task in the foreseeable security environment is to adapt to the threat posed by Russia while also trying to reach a precise understanding of the challenge posed by China. At the planned Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO will adopt a new Strategic Concept to guide the alliance’s future political and military development, which is the right starting point for a new strategy to manage renewed great power competition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to eliminate any doubts about its ability and resolve to defend its eastern territory against a Russian attack. NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values. Containing Russia, Watching China NATO’s adaptation to Russia’s revisionist foreign policy has so far focused mostly on the military threat that the country poses. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO enhanced its capacity for rapid reaction and placed multinational battlegroups in Poland and each of the Baltic states as a “tripwire” to remind Russia of NATO’s collective defense guarantee. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO will likely aim to demonstrate its ability and resolve to repel an attack by Russia’s forces stationed near allied territory by improving its reinforcement capability to deter major Russian military buildups like the one around Ukraine. NATO already boosted its existing forward deployments, while the rise in European defense expenditure will enable the alliance to shoulder a broader deterrence effort. Conversely, NATO has not fully found its foothold when it comes to Russia’s political warfare, by which it has attempted to diminish the alliance’s ability to act cohesively. The digital age has enhanced the opportunities for Russia to engage in information and psychological warfare, including hack-and-leak operations to influence and discredit elections. The polarization of the political landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic over the past decade has made countries more receptive to Russian disinformation and narratives seeking to discredit the democratic process. Moreover, Russian assassination and sabotage operations on NATO territory have contributed to a public sense of vulnerability to heavy-handed authoritarian methods and doubt about the coping power of democratic institutions. China does not compare to the direct threat that Russia poses but has nevertheless appeared on NATO’s strategic radar as an economic great power with a high-tech edge that Russia is unlikely to ever match. Chinese 5G network provider Huawei remains a pertinent topic for NATO, as several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Hungary, are still undecided about relying on its potentially compromised technology or de facto allowing their national operators to use Chinese providers. Moreover, Chinese investments in continental Europe without conditionalities attached and targeting critical infrastructure (railway stations, ports and airports) raise suspicions about Beijing’s underlying political and military motives. Moreover, China is pressing ahead with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), and its space ambitions are growing. Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities. NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR › Top Shelf › 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

A---NATO Strategic Concept shifted to a defense and deterrence posture driven by increased spending and troop commitments in support of Ukraine --- Failure to commit and stay unified risks overstretch and alliance collapse

Arnold 7/1/22

(Ed, is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI, MA War Studies from King’s College London and a BA (Hons) in International Politics from the University of Stirling, Scotland, “New Concepts but Old Problems: NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Operationally, NATO has announced a significant hardening of its defence and deterrence posture to be able to ‘defend every inch of Allied territory’ and recommitted to a 360-degree approach to security through several enhancements. First, there is a doubling from four to eight multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe, which has already led to a near-tenfold increase in troops deployed to the Eastern flank. Moreover, these battlegroups will soon include brigade headquarters to rapidly scale up posture if necessary, with associated NATO reinforcement plans at ‘short and no notice’. Second, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been expanded from 40,000 to over 300,000 troops, to be held at higher levels of readiness. Third, in a complete antithesis to President Vladimir Putin’s intent, Sweden and Finland will now be able to join the Alliance, after Turkey withdrew its objections in time for Madrid, significantly enhancing political unity. The eventual accession of Finland and Sweden will expand the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) land area of operations by over 866,000 square kilometres. It also changes the European security architecture in more subtle ways. For example, it means that seven out of eight Arctic Council members will also be NATO members, changing the dynamic at a time when NATO needs to cooperate with Russia on climate security, which is also heavily stressed in the new Strategic Concept. Moreover, NATO and the EU are now more closely aligned in terms of their membership – only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are members of the EU but not NATO – at exactly the moment when European states need to step up defensively. These announcements are politically momentous, but also entail a huge risk. The big troop increases will be very expensive as member states experience increasing spending pressures. If these statements are not backed up (there are a total of 71 ‘we will’ commitments across 11 pages), the Alliance could lose trust and credibility, and therefore effective deterrence. There is also the real possibility of opening old wounds on burden sharing, especially between the US and European allies, which could further destabilise the Alliance, especially if a Trump-like character is able to secure election to the White House in 2024. European security documents and communiques, both from NATO and the EU, are graveyards of unrealised rapid reaction force ambitions which were luckily never tested by the security environment. It is politically unacceptable to Eastern members to continue to tolerate this risk. There are already reports that cast real doubt on the ability to realise the new force model. How Much Does the Strategic Concept Actually Matter? Politically, the Strategic Concept and the unity it represents are very important. However, militarily and operationally, it is less significant. The 2010 Strategic Concept had been moribund since at least 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but of course NATO has still been operating effectively since. While a lot of effort has gone into building consensus for Madrid, in many ways the hard work starts now. There is a coherence issue. The Strategic Concept, as NATO’s strategy, comes after the two main plans – SACEUR’s Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the future NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept – have already matured. There was tacit acknowledgement at the Madrid summit that many underlying operational plans would have to be revised. However, with NATO’s strategy transforming, mere tweaks to plans do not seem sufficient, and their core assumptions should be revisited. For NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept – how it fights in the future – it is imperative that analysis of Russia’s military performance in Ukraine now becomes the backbone for its development. Moreover, despite the collective might of NATO, it cannot do everything, and the commitment at the 2015 Warsaw summit to a ‘360-degree approach’ to security – both thematically and geographically – risks overstretch. In a hardening world, the Alliance must take the opportunity to go back to its roots and seek support from other actors, such as the EU. It is still expected that a NATO–EU joint declaration will materialise before the end of the year. NATO’s Russia Problem The new Strategic Concept identifies and defines the Russian threat for the remainder of the decade. But threat identification is only half of the job, and ‘threat mitigation’ – or the actual activity – is the priority. In this regard, the document lacks the vision and a realistic timeframe for understanding the parameters of the NATO–Russia confrontation. This is not just a NATO issue, but its self-declared ‘unique, essential and indispensable’ role in European security is important in influencing and managing Russian behaviour. The Strategic Concept states that ‘Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our security’. To achieve this, it is first critical to understand which key tenets of European security, or parts thereof, are still in play; what can be built on; and what must be discarded. This applies to the Washington Treaty 1949; the Helsinki Final Act 1975; the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990; the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997; the OSCE Istanbul Document 1999; and the Vienna Document 2011. Moreover, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987, the Treaty on Open Skies 1992, and the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 all appear moribund, albeit for different reasons. It is important that future engagement with Russia is designed in a way that incentivises cooperation and builds a structure for dialogue that reflects the future strategic environment, rather than the context of the Cold War. The fundamental problem is a lack of trust on both sides, and therefore a low likelihood of compliance if an agreement could be achieved. Collective security is not necessarily dead, but it might have to take a back seat for a while as we return to balance-of-power politics for the foreseeable future. NATO members need to be prepared for the consequences. In for the Long Haul Despite Ukraine not being a member of the Alliance, the outcome of the war is critical to NATO, European security, and the principle that aggressors cannot redraw international borders by force. NATO has now stated that ‘A strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area’, and it must follow through with action. However, the announced enhancements to NATO’s defence and deterrence posture will come at an eyewatering cost to NATO common funding, which will fall on national defence ministry budgets that are already under strain when it comes to delivering extant equipment budgets. Moreover, with economies hit by the coronavirus pandemic, the cost of living, and inflationary pressure, the ability to sustain political will on NATO funding will diminish. Critical to this will be the ability of governments to communicate the Russian threat to their populations clearly and transparently. They need to effectively bring to life national security risk assessments to make the case for sustained higher spending, and ‘Putin equals bad’ messaging is insufficient. This struggle goes beyond Putin, and we need to ensure we don’t make the mistake of assuming that what comes next is automatically better. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was a wakeup call that the Alliance didn’t fully grasp. Some modest transformation did occur, such as the creation of the NRF and Enhanced Forward Presence, as well as the recommitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2024 at the 2014 Wales summit. However, the political rhetoric was not backed by commitment, which weakened NATO deterrence and might have inadvertently influenced Putin’s decision-making calculus towards Ukraine. If NATO fails to translate words into action now, it could be fatal for the Alliance.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – Eagleman

Eagleman’s a hack and internet won’t save civilization

Mnookin 12

Seth Mnookin teaches science writing at MIT and blogs at the Public Library of Science, Download the Universe, March 23, 2012, "The Frozen Future of Nonfiction", http://www.downloadtheuniverse.com/dtu/2012/03/why-the-net-matters-how-the-internet-will-save-civilization-by-david-eagleman-canongate-books-2010-for-ipad-by-set.html

At least, that’s what I assumed before I read Why The Net Matters, Eagleman’s frustrating 2010 e-book about how and why the Internet will save civilization. (I reviewed the $7.99 iPad version, which is the platform it was designed for; a stripped-down, text-based version is available on the Kindle for the portentous price of $6.66.) The problems start with Eagleman’s premise, which is so vague and broad as to be practically meaningless. There are, he writes, just “a handful of reasons” that civilizations collapse: “disease, poor information flow, natural disasters, political corruption, resource depletion and economic meltdown.” Lucky for us (and Eagleman does offer readers “[c]ongratulations on living in a fortuitous moment in history”), the technology that created the web “obviates many of the threats faced by our ancestors. In other words...[t]he advent of the internet represents a watershed moment in history that just might rescue our future.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – No Internet Crash

No Internet collapse

Dvorak 2007 (John; Will the Internet Collapse?; May 1; www.pcmag.com/article2/0%2c2817%2c2124376%2c00.asp; kdf)

When is the Internet going to collapse? The answer is NEVER. The Internet is amazing for no other reason than that it hasn't simply collapsed, never to be rebooted. Over a decade ago, many pundits were predicting an all-out catastrophic failure, and back then the load was nothing compared with what it is today. So how much more can this network take? Let's look at the basic changes that have occurred since the Net became chat-worthy around 1990. First of all, only a few people were on the Net back in 1990, since it was essentially a carrier for e-mail (spam free!), newsgroups, gopher, and FTP. These capabilities remain. But the e-mail load has grown to phenomenal proportions and become burdened with megatons of spam. In one year, the amount of spam can exceed a decade's worth, say 1990 to 2000, of all Internet traffic. It's actually the astonishing overall growth of the Internet that is amazing. In 1990, the total U.S. backbone throughput of the Internet was 1 terabyte, and in 1991 it doubled to 2TB. Throughput continued to double until 1996, when it jumped to 1,500TB. After that huge jump, it returned to doubling, reaching 80,000 to 140,000TB in 2002. This ridiculous growth rate has continued as more and more services are added to the burden. The jump in 1996 is attributable to the one-two punch of the universal popularization of the Web and the introduction of the MP3 standard and subsequent music file sharing. More recently, the emergence of inane video clips (YouTube and the rest) as universal entertainment has continued to slam the Net with overhead, as has large video file sharing via BitTorrent and other systems. Then VoIP came along, and IPTV is next. All the while, e-mail numbers are in the trillions of messages, and spam has never been more plentiful and bloated. Add blogging, vlogging, and twittering and it just gets worse. According to some expensive studies, the growth rate has begun to slow down to something like 50 percent per year. But that's growth on top of huge numbers. Petabytes. To date, we have to admit that the structure of the Net is robust, to say the least. This is impressive, considering the fact that experts were predicting a collapse in the 1990s. Robust or not, this Internet is a transportation system. It transports data. All transportation systems eventually need upgrading, repair, basic changes, or reinvention. But what needs to be done here? This, to me, has come to be the big question. Does anything at all need to be done, or do we run it into the ground and then fix it later? Is this like a jalopy leaking oil and water about to blow, or an organic perpetual-motion machine that fixes itself somehow? Many believe that the Net has never collapsed because it does tend to fix itself. A decade ago we were going to run out of IP addresses—remember? It righted itself, with rotating addresses and subnets. Many of the Net's improvements are self-improvements. Only spam, viruses, and spyware represent incurable diseases that could kill the organism. I have to conclude that the worst-case scenario for the Net is an outage here or there, if anywhere. After all, the phone system, a more machine-intensive system, never really imploded after years and years of growth, did it? While it has outages, it's actually more reliable than the power grid it sits on. Why should the Internet be any different now that it is essentially run by phone companies who know how to keep networks up? And let's be real here. The Net is being improved daily, with newer routers and better gear being constantly hot-swapped all over the world. This is not the same Internet we had in 1990, nor is it what we had in 2000. While phone companies seem to enjoy nickel-and-diming their customers to death with various petty scams and charges, they could easily charge one flat fee and spend their efforts on quality-of-service issues and improving overall network speed and throughput. That will never happen, and phone companies will forever be loathed. But when all is said and done, it's because of them that the Internet will never collapse. That's the good news. The bad news is they now own the Internet—literally—and they'll continue to play the nickel-and-dime game with us.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – AT: Military

New suitcase internet set up solves

McCaney June 5, 2014 (Kevin; Army boosts bandwidth with new suitcase-sized satellite terminals; defensesystems.com/articles/2014/06/05/army-t2c2-high-bandwidth-satellite-terminals.aspx; kdf)

Portable network access for soldiers in the field is about to get a lot faster with the Army’s latest satellite kit in a suitcase. The Transportable Tactical Command Communications, or T2C2, boosts the bandwidth for small detachments and teams connecting to the Army’s battlefield network, thus increasing the situational awareness and functionality of early-entry teams and helping to improve communications throughout the tactical edge, the Army said in a release. T2T2 comes in two flavors: a larger transportable dish that serves company-level operations and the smaller T2C2 Lite, which the Army said is about the size of carry-on luggage and which can be set up and working in about 10 minutes. The small model is similar to the Global Rapid Response Information Package, or GRRIP, which soldiers have been using in Afghanistan, for example, as network infrastructure leaves with the drawdown. But GRIPP uses only the L Band in the satellite communications spectrum, limiting transmission to kilobits per second. T2C2 Lite adds the Ka and X bands, boosting performance to megabits per second and allowing soldiers to use advanced applications. Last month, T2C2 was designated a program of record (GRRIP is not), enabling the Army to institutionalize training on the system. The equipment connects to the Army’s battlefield network, the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, via the military’s Wideband Global SATCOM constellation, and will work as a companion to the Enroute Mission Command Capability, a WIN-T program that gives rapid-response forces a view of their drop zones and allows for mission planning while in flight. For the Army, the bigger bandwidth, combined with T2C2’s portability, advances the cause of seamless, mobile battlefield communications.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › AT: Starlink isn’t running

Starlink is available now

TomsGuide 3/7 - https://www.tomsguide.com/reviews/starlink

In our initial Starkink review, we found it simple to set up and faster not only than DSL lines but also quicker than what many basic cable packages are actually able to deliver. Certainly as the only option for sparsely populated areas, Starlink could prove to be a godsend, albeit an expensive one. The basic hardware package is $499, plus $99 a month for service.(Shipping and taxes put the initial total at $581.94).

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – AT: Halappanavar

Their card is about China – says they fill-in

Halappanavar 20, [Author is Engineering Graduate and a Software professional based in Bangalore, he is a contributor to Diplomatist, Submarine Cable Network: The Global Sovereign Asset, July 3, https://diplomatist.com/2020/07/03/submarine-cable-network-the-global-sovereign-asset/]

The uncertainty around the intentions and track records of countries like Russia and China give rise to policing of strategic interests in the marina. Asia Direct Cable (ADC) Consortium, on 11th June 2020, announced that it is connecting the Philippines, China (Hong Kong and Guangdong Province), Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam via a 9,400-kilometer submarine cable through the South China sea. This would act as an enabler for the Chinese to patrol and justify their territorial claims in the disputed regions on grounds of protecting its vital interests at the same time misuse of this network by China would be a concern in the already troubled waters.

Their card strats

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – Redundancy

Steps are in place now

Roblin 18, [Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China, Russian Spy Submarines Are Tampering with Undersea Cables That Make the Internet Work. Should We Be Worried?, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-spy-submarines-are-tampering-undersea-cables-make-internet-work-should-we-be]

The U.S. has begun responding to the threat, with 2018 defense budget authorizing construction of a second cable-laying/repair ship costing $250 million to supplement the only one currently in U.S. military service, the USS Zeus. Sanctions imposed on Russia in June 2018 have targeted a Russian mini-submarine builder associated with cable-tampering operations. A newly formed joint-U.S./Europe Atlantic Command will also strengthen NATO’s ability to monitor submarine activities. A logical additional step would be to strengthen international law around cables to make the act of cutting them more transgressive in a non-wartime context.

They start cutting Roblin

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – AT: Interoperability

Their Article 5 cards are about Active Endeavor – that’s in the Mediterranean – no reason the plan disrupts that.

NATO 2016 - https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships patrolled the Mediterranean and monitored shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – L/T

Arctic presence is counter-productive for NATO

Auerswald 2020 - professor of security studies at the U.S. National War College "NATO IN THE ARCTIC: KEEP ITS ROLE LIMITED, FOR NOW," Oct 12, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/nato-in-the-arctic-keep-its-role-limited-for-now/

While NATO members are facing several challenges to their interests in the Arctic, developing a common policy within the alliance on what to do about this is incredibly difficult. NATO decisions depend on consensus, or at least on members withholding a veto of a pending initiative. Just because there are five NATO members in the Arctic does not mean that each supports a greater NATO role in the Arctic. Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, for instance, repeatedly emphasizes “Canada’s enduring Arctic sovereignty,” and the need to “enhance Canada’s military presence” and “Canada’s domain awareness” (emphasis added), with some references to bilateral security cooperation but no mention of NATO. Canada is not the only country that might object to a stronger alliance role in the Arctic. Alliance members in Southern and Eastern Europe might see an increased Arctic focus as syphoning away NATO resources from security challenges in the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, Ukraine, or the Baltic Sea. In short, a greater alliance role in the Arctic requires convincing skeptical allies, and doing that might not be worth the diplomatic effort.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1AR – L/T

Focusing NATO’s output on force plans and strategy best improves interoperability and cohesion---otherwise, spending is meaningless.

Cappello 8-13-18, a former B-1B pilot, served as the Air Force Attaché to the U.S. Embassies in Belgrade and Tel Aviv, and is currently a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, (John, August 13th, 2018, “NATO’s Two Percent and Burden Sharing”, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/08/13/natos_two_percent_and_burden_sharing_113713.html?utm_campaign=755f44acff-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_08_12_12_56&utm_medium=email&utm_source=RC%20Defense%20Morning%20Recon&utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-755f44acff-81835773)

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, however, noted how all allies have halted cuts to their defense budgets and have begun implementing plans to their defense budgets to two percent of their respective GDPs, with a majority planning to reach that goal by . While Stoltenberg credited President Trump with delivering a “clear message” on burden sharing, this debate misses an important point. Simply spending more does not equate with actual burden sharing.

According to NATO’s , collective defense, crisis management, and collective security are the alliance’s core tasks. These missions require capable, mobile, and interoperable forces. Real burden sharing would require every ally to contribute forces ready to deploy for such missions.