2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › Cohesion
Christian 20 (Christian, Joshua D,, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, 2020-06), 6/6/20, accessed 6/24/22, “Russian CYber Operations to Destabilize NATO”, (JB)
This thesis uses a case study analysis to better understand the effects of Russian cyber operations. This approach is best to grasp how the cyber operations have become more effective and efficient over time. This has enabled Russia to conduct operations of similar ends against multiple states in order to further its own objectives. Russia views NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russia and reasoning behind this will be analyzed to discover where it fits into Russian grand strategy. Lack of political cohesion within the NATO Alliance creates a vulnerability for Russia to exploit. Political instability and distrust in the government can be analyzed through the 2016 presidential election, as well as the election tampering in Europe, because both are important case studies to showcase how Russia has adapted the use of cyber and technology to further the effectiveness of its activities. Civil preparedness and resiliency are key parts of NATO strength that Russia has attempted to exploit to diminish NATO’s capacity to respond during a crisis. Dragonfly and NotPetya displayed the progression of Russian cyber capabilities against critical infrastructure in a short period of time. The effectiveness and concerns highlighted by these cases are important to analyze in order for NATO states to better prepare to defend against cyber operations of this type. The disruption and damage that can be caused through critical infrastructure attacks has a global impact that far exceeds that of the United States and NATO.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › Cohesion
Maigre 22 (Merle Maigre is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Leadership Program and CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, 4/6/22, accessed 6/24/22, “NATO’s Role In Global CyberSecurity”,
(JB)
Four sets of actions for NATO are proposed. First, denying covertness by attribution: NATO should persuade opponents that they cannot be clandestine in their cyber actions. NATO and its members need to demonstrate that it is difficult or impossible to act covertly and be clear about attributing responsibility for cyberattacks.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › Cohesion
Marcus Kolga 21, Marcus Kolga is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Centre for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad., 10-5-2021, accessed 6/28/2022, "Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat: Marcus Kolga for Inside Policy," Macdonald-Laurier Institute, //3AM
A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.
If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › Cohesion
Shea 18 (Jamie Shea, Dr. Jamie Shea is deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges at NATO, “Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations What Is NATO’s Vision and Strategy?” MCU Journal, vol 9, no 2, Fall 2018, LH
In sum, 2016 was the year when the cyberthreat ceased being a concern primarily for individual entities, such as banks, critical infrastructure providers, or hospitals worried about losing data, to become an instrument of hybrid warfare, where the state and society are virtually under permanent attack. The problem with cyber is that, because it is so easy to use, states may decide to attack targets and risk an increase in international tensions that they would probably refrain from doing if they had to use more conventional and overtly aggressive means. So cyber blurs the clear distinction between war and peace and creates a sense that everything a state normally believes it has under control (its administration, election processes, critical infrastructure, key supply chains, and economy) is now being contested or is even under permanent siege.
Given this multiplicity of cyber threats and attack vectors, the concept of what a state needs to defend has shifted. It is now no longer a specific strategic asset, such as an oil refinery or airfield, or a particular invasion route, such as the Fulda Gap in Germany during the Cold War, but it becomes virtually any kind of critical national infrastructure—from undersea internet cables to banks; electricity grids; industrial control systems (ICS); telecommunications; and gas, oil, and water pipelines.13 The scope is almost endless. The state cannot hope to achieve full protection of all these complex and often interdependent networks alone. It has to prioritize and delegate protective responsibilities to the regional or local level or to the private sector that owns and operates much of this critical infrastructure. In terms of basic cybersecurity, it becomes the duty of care and risk calculation of the individual citizen. Cyberspace has rapidly become a domain where everyone is calling upon everyone else to take action. The individual calls on the bank to provide better protection, the bank demands better software from the tech company, the tech company recommends better insurance coverage, while claiming that it is only a platform to post and transmit data and has no particular responsibility for the content. Meanwhile, the state has to decide whether regulation or voluntary effort is the best way to induce companies and individuals to improve their cyber hygiene and restore trust in a cyberspace that is an increasingly important part of economic growth.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › Cohesion
NATO 20 (Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, NATO 2030; United for a New Era, 11/25/2020, ) -LH
In spite of these challenges, NATO remains indispensable. In fact, the fundamental purpose of NATO is more demonstrably clear today than it has been for decades. NATO has weathered stormy times before, surviving the Soviet threat, the Suez Crisis, divisions among Allies over the Vietnam war, dictatorships in its own ranks, the Euromissile debates, disagreements over enlargement, and the Iraq War—just to name a few. Now, as then, Allies have remained bound together by a combination of shared principles, democratic institutions, and the benefit that all Allies derive from collective security. Looking out to 2030, the need for a collective defence Alliance to protect Europe and North America against threats to their physical security and democratic way of life is as strong as ever.
Yet NATO will have to continue to adapt. In a world of systemic challengers and proliferating threats, the Alliance, in complementarity with the comprehensive military adaptation it has undergone, must cement its ability to act as the principal political forum for the strategic and geopolitical challenges facing the transatlantic community. Fulfilling this role will require even greater cohesion than NATO has possessed in recent years. As it has since NATO’s founding, cohesion resides in the ability and will to act collectively against shared threats. This is the lifeblood that ensures the vitality, credibility, and durability of the Alliance; it becomes all the more important in a sharpened competitive environment that requires collaboration and effective networks to deal with growing threats.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---Perm Russia in NATO
Charles A. Kupchan 10, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “NATO's Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010,
Third, Russia's integration into NATO would enable Georgia and Ukraine to join the alliance without provoking a crisis with Moscow. According to the Russian political scientists Sergei Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev, the admission of these countries into NATO would increase "the risk of a conflict with unforeseeable consequences." Stopping the enlargement of NATO could avert this problem but would leave another one unsolved: How can Russia and its neighbors be integrated into a unitary Euro-Atlantic order? As Andrew Monaghan of the NATO Defense College notes, "Even if enlargement stops, Russia remains excluded from Euro-Atlantic mechanisms."
The solution, then, is for Georgia and Ukraine to join a NATO in which Russia is already, or is soon to be, a member, ensuring that their entry would cause little, if any, geopolitical tension. More generally, if membership in the CIS remains separate from membership in NATO, Europe's East and West will be subject to indefinite geopolitical division and jockeying over zones of influence. In contrast, if NATO opens its doors to members of the CIS, such dividing lines and the competition that accompanies them will likely fade away. There is a precedent for this evolution: all of the CIS members already cooperate with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---Perm Russia in NATO
Charles A. Kupchan 10, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “NATO's Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010,
Nonetheless, the West is making a historic mistake in treating Russia as a strategic pariah. As made clear by the settlements after the Napoleonic Wars and World War II -- in contrast to the one that followed World War I -- including former adversaries in a postwar order is critical to the consolidation of great-power peace. Anchoring Russia in an enlarged Euro-Atlantic order, therefore, should be an urgent priority for NATO today.
Russia has been disgruntled with the expansion of NATO ever since the alliance began courting new members from the former Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. However, Russia's economic and military decline and the West's primacy encouraged NATO members to discount the potential consequences of Russian discontent. "As American capabilities surged and Russian capabilities waned," the political scientists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have observed, "Washington policymakers increasingly acted as though Russia no longer mattered and the United States could do whatever it wanted."
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---Perm Do Both---Cyber
Adina Ponta 21, advisor to the Committee on Information Technology and Communications in the Romanian Parliament, teaching lecturer at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania and a postdoctoral researcher at the Law School’s Center for Business Law & Information Technology, “Legal Instability in Cyberspace and OSCE’s Mitigation Role,” Juridical Tribune, vol. 11, no. 3, 12/28/2021, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.24818/TBJ/2021/11/3.01
Fourth, strengthening the regional structures for conflict prevention requires a great amount of political will. However, for broader inclusion, coherence, and complementarity of efforts, and to avoid risks of duplication, international partners should enhance their cooperation at all working levels. More synergy among regional organizations will enhance common understanding of threats, exchange of lessons learned, and promote cooperation over competition. These efforts can provide advanced legal policy training for diplomats and local capacity building, which is crucial to follow-up on the implementation of CBMs. The OSCE should avail itself of the dialogue channels in place and establish new partnerships for a comprehensive picture of regional views and conflict prevention mechanisms.
Cyberpolicy cooperation and understanding of States’ views and concerns should build on the significant overlap in membership of the EU, the OSCE, and NATO, organizations with highly complementary mandates. While the EU focuses on strengthening resilience through finance and diplomacy, the OSCE’s model of regional security, and NATO’s crisis management capacities could merge into meaningful synergies with the purpose of conflict prevention and early warning, common features of these organizations’ mandates.51
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---Perm Do Both
Anton Sergeevich Gavrilov 18, Антон Сергеевич Гаврилов, researcher at Mariisk State University, “Международные организации как механизмы регулирования международных отношений (ООН, ОБСЕ, НАТО),” or “International Organizations as Mechanisms for Regulating International Relations (UN, OSCE, NATO),” Марийский государственный университет, 2018, pp. 490–492, translated by Yandex
На сегодняшний день систему международных отношений невозможно представить без таких организаций, как ООН и ОБСЕ. Современный мир все больше сталкивается с проблемами вооруженных столкновений, с самого разного типа кризисными ситуациями. И лучший ключ к разрешению подобных проблем — деятельность данных организаций. Нельзя недооценивать всю значимость миротворческих операций, проводимых ООН, невозможно выразить всю благодарность деятельности ОБСЕ за проводимые ей планы по урегулированию кризисных ситуаций, возникших в том или ином регионе. Это лишь немногие плюсы данных международных организаций. Подводя итог в данном вопросе, стоит сказать, что значимость ООН и ОБСЕ огромна. Военнополитический блок НАТО, несмотря на свои сомнительные и далекие от доверия средства решения возникших проблем, также представляет собой важного игрока на международной арене и оказывает существенное влияние на нее. НАТО так же, как ООН и ОБСЕ, способствует эффективному предотвращению конфликтов и активно участвует в кризисном регулировании.
Помимо собственных целей, которые ставят перед собой данные международные организации, они также следуют и целям коллективного характера. Ярким примером взаимодействия двух игроков международной арены в рамках коллективного целеполагания является взаимодействие НАТО и ООН.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---NATO Key---OSCE Fails
A. M. Skryabina 18, А. М. Скрябина, researcher at at Mariiskii State University, “ОБСЕ как субъект контроля за соблюдением прав человека в Европе, или почему неэффективна ее деятельность,” or, “The OSCE as a subject of monitoring the observance of human rights in Europe, or why its activities are ineffective,” Марийский государственный университет, 2018, pp. 392–394, translated by Yandex
ОБСЕ или Организация по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе – довольно молодая организация по поддержке безопасности и стабильности относительно своих коллег, таких как ООН, ЕС или НАТО, создана лишь в 1975 году. Создание Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе было направлено на закрепление 10 принципов хельсинкского Заключительного акта Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе: суверенного равенства, неприменения силы и ее угроз, нерушимости границ, территориальной целостности государств, мирного урегулирования споров, невмешательства во внутренние дела, уважение прав человека и основных свобод, включая свободу мысли, совести, религии и убеждений, равноправие и право народов располагать своей судьбой, сотрудничество между государствами и добросовестное выполнение обязательств по международному праву. И по сей день, со времен образования первых организаций по обеспечению мирного порядка, таких, как Лига Наций, главной целью мирового сообщества остается поддержание безопасности и контроль за соблюдением прав человека.
В 1995 году ОБСЕ стала первой организацией, отвечающей за общеевропейский порядок. Ее спектр действий направлен на предупреждение кризисов и конфликтных ситуаций, их урегулирование и постконфликтная реабилитация. Помимо решения вопросов экономики и экологии, укрепления мира и безопасности в Европе, немаловажным аспектом деятельности ОБСЕ является защита прав людей. Уважение прав человека и основных свобод является ключевым элементом всеобъемлющей концепции безопасности ОБСЕ. Во-первых, идет борьба с торговлей людьми. Действия ОБСЕ против торговли людьми координируются Управлением Специального представителя и координатора по борьбе с торговлей людьми. Во-вторых, идет обеспечение гендерного равенства, свободы религии, слова, передвижения, СМИ. В-третьих, ОБСЕ выявляет, ищет пути разрешения напряженности между этническими представителями и устанавливает стандарты прав для групп меньшинств. Создано Бюро по демократическим институтам и правам человека (БДИПЧ), которое представляет собой институт по содействию обеспечению прав человека, развитию демократии и утверждению верховенства закона.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---NATO Key---OSCE Fails
Philip Remler 21, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights,” Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2021, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30942
Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has unwillingly been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities and look for ways to overcome them.
A brief historical review is necessary. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) established by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act was one manifestation of Europe’s aspiration to establish an international order to keep the peace and, as Andrei Sakharov wrote in his Nobel speech that year, to stress “the link between defense of peace and defense of human rights”.1
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---NATO Key---Interop
Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco 22, Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by Justin Bullock et al., Oxford University Press, 03/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69
One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77
To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
AFF › OSCE CP---2AC
Daniel Mügge 21, Professor of Political Arithmetic at the University of Amsterdam, “Cooperation á la carte is the way forward for EU AI regulation,” London School of Economics, 11/26/2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/11/26/cooperation-a-la-carte-is-the-way-forward-for-eu-ai-regulation/
Earlier this year, the EU became the first major jurisdiction to publish a set of draft rules for artificial intelligence (AI). There are good reasons to keep close legislative tabs on AI technology. Concerns range from algorithmic discrimination and distorted democracy to ubiquitous surveillance and outright oppression.
Beyond these questions loom deeper concerns. A world saturated with machines able to predict and exploit our fears and desires fundamentally challenges human autonomy. At the same time, AI-led automation has the potential to deprive many people of their jobs once the government debt-fuelled post-pandemic boom peters out. Already, automation has driven a wedge between the upper and lower echelons of labour markets. Aided by smart machines, many highly educated workers have seen their productivity rise, while jobs with more routine tasks, in contrast, have slowly disappeared.
2022
Georgetown
Topicality
AFF T-cybersec (draft) › A2 deterrence by denial vs. punishment
Paulauskas ‘16, PhD in Philosophy & International Relations and is Senior Strategy Officer in the Allied Command Transformation as well as a former NATO employee. “NATO Review - On Deterrence” NATO Review, 08/05/2016,
Deterrence is a relatively simple idea: one actor persuades another actor – a would-be aggressor – that an aggression would incur a cost, possibly in the form of unacceptable damage, which would far outweigh any potential gain, material or political. The involvement of at least two actors makes deterrence a complicated social interaction. It is very much about human nature, psychology and basic human emotions: fear, courage, trust, lust for power, and revenge. Elevate all this to the level of state actors, with all the intricacies inherent in statehood and statesmanship, add the stakes of national survival, add nuclear weapons to the mix, and deterrence becomes a highly complex, volatile, intangible, but also combustible concept. From deterrence by denial to denial of deterrence – and back. During the Cold War, NATO pursued deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment was based on the notion of ‘unactable damages’, including through massive nuclear retaliation for any Soviet attack – conventional or nuclear. Deterrence by denial was about making it physically difficult for the aggressor to achieve his objective, which NATO pursued through forward defense at its eastern border with the Soviet Union.
2022
Georgetown
Topicality
AFF T-cybersec (draft) › Standards---Not Much Lit
Nathan L. Fenell 11, Operations/Administration Management Professional and Military Veteran with over 20 years of experience in the United States Marine Corps, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined,” University of San Francisco, 12/12/11,
The literature review will establish the premise that security cooperation as an academic area of study receives little attention.17 The paucity of literature on the subject contributes to the current misunderstanding of the definition as well as its improper strategic utilization. Authors who participate in scholarly conversation on the topic fall into one of two categories, doctrinal use or modern misconception.18 The contradictory nature of the literature further supports my hypothesis that the definition of security cooperation is frequently not applied in Afghanistan.
2022
Georgetown
Topicality
AFF T-cybersec (draft) › 1AR
As ransomware attacks continue to increase and cybercriminals are becoming more sophisticated, the federal government has implemented a more proactive approach when it comes to cybersecurity. As evidenced by its stated strategy to adopt a , the federal government is taking measures to reduce the risk of cyberattacks against its digital infrastructure, and setting specific security goals for agencies to quickly detect, isolate and respond to threats. This approach is also exemplified by the extension of its , which is aimed at facilitating the deployment of technologies and systems that provide cyber-related threat visibility, indicators, detections and warnings to the water infrastructure.
An offensive mindset is key to ensuring the best cyber defense. To ensure success, there are three main components for organizations to consider when developing a defensive strategy based on an offensive cyber model: re-envisioning recruitment, thinking like a hacker, and promoting offensive training in tangent with defensive training.
2022
Georgetown
Topicality
AFF T-cybersec (draft) › 2ac – oco’s=cybersec
Stephen M.W 21, technology, business, and compliance journalist for TechGenix “The Dangers of Offensive Cybersecurity,” TechGenix, 04/14/2021, .
Governments and corporations have realized that a passive, defensive approach to cybersecurity has limited success. Instead, there is growing recognition of the need for persistent engagement that infiltrates and degrades an attacker’s systems and infrastructure. Also known as hacking back, offensive cybersecurity operations refer to the proactive attack on hackers to cripple or disrupt their operations and deter future attacks. Offensive cybersecurity has the advantage of stopping or preempting cyberattacks before they impair target systems or penetrate cyber-defenses. The operations can also introduce uncertainty in an attacker in addition to influencing their behavior.
2022
Georgetown
Topicality
AFF T-cybersec (draft) › 2ac – oco’s=cybersec
Garromone ’19 Jim Garromone, journalist for the US Federal Government’s Depart of Defense. “Esper Describes DOD,” U.S. Department of Defense, Accessed 27 June 22
''Training to operate in a degraded environment is now regularly built into our exercises, and our service members are quickly becoming aware of our cyber vulnerabilities,'' the secretary said. But winning in cyberspace requires an offensive strategy, Esper told the summit audience. ''We need to do more than just play goal line defense,'' he said. ''As such, the department's 2018 Cyber Strategy articulates a proactive and assertive approach to defend forward of our own virtual boundaries. ''Just as we do on land, at sea, and in the air, we must posture our forces in cyberspace where we can most effectively accomplish our mission,'' he continued. ''Defending forward allows us to disrupt threats at the initial source before they reach our networks and systems. To do this, we must be in a position to continuously compete with the ongoing campaigns being waged against the United States. Not only does this protects us day-to-day, but enacting this strategy builds the readiness of our cyber warriors so they have the tools, skills and experience needed to succeed in conflict.''
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › neg › !! – AT Cyber
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
But despite these measures, NATO’s members have continued to face increasing cyberattacks since 2016, primarily from state actors. In 2017, Russia launched the huge NotPetya attack against Ukraine, wiping data from the computers of banks, energy firms, senior government officials and an airport.34 Although Ukraine is not part of the Alliance, the virus still affected member states because it spread to the rest of the world. It crippled the Danish shipping company Maersk and the American pharmaceutical giant Merck, causing an estimated $10 billion in damages.35 NATO itself faces hundreds of significant hacking attempts every month, principally from Russia, North Korea and China.36
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › misc › IHL stuff—not complete
Hughes 09 (Dr Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,” The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare, 2009, ) -lh
Does cyber warfare fall under the international humanitarian law (IHL)? Jeffrey Kelsey holds that IHL ‘should evolve to encourage the use of cyber warfare in some situations and provide states better guidance in the conduct of these attacks’ [16]. He argues that for a decade or more the ‘potential threat and opportunity of cyber warfare’ have confronted military planners while the ‘international community has yet to reach consensus on the application of IHL’. This lack of consensus may be due to a variety of reasons, from holding that the ’current IHL framework can be applied to cyber warfare by analogy’ to the realization that vast growth and fluidity of technology would make potential international agreements obsolete [16]. Kelsey further maintains that ‘IHL applies to cyber warfare by analogy but contends that IHL must evolve to accommodate and, in some cases even encourage cyber warfare over conventional methods’ [16].
The movement in a cyber attack across a neutral state becomes more than a ‘mere communication signal’, for cyber weapons can cause damage to states as have more conventional weapons. A weapon the ‘size of a electron’ could be a violation of the territory of a neutral state according to the Hague Convention that ‘forbids the movement of weapons’ across a neutral state which risks being drawn into a wider cyber conflict when its Internet nodes are engaged by a belligerent [16]. What obligations would a neutral state have as a conduit for cyber attack and mischief? Kelsey argues against establishing new treaties and in favour of states and their military commanders to follow established legal principles in cyber combat [16]. The question remains: What standards should emerge for a cyber security regime under established peace and war legal principles? Since cyber warfare is still in its infancy, some would argue that regulating it is a difficult if not an impossible challenge. However, the so called catastrophic cyber attack is to be avoided, it would be foolish and impractical not to establish some type of international rules of the game as deterrence.