2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – generic
Belin 19 - Interim Director at the Center on the United States and Europe. (“NATO matters, but the EU matters more,” Brookings. April 2nd, 2019. ) CTF
As it turns 70 this week, the Atlantic alliance has no shortage of champions in Washington, even if it lacks one in the Oval Office. Yet, the focus on NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—alone can be misleading by magnifying the importance of the defense alliance in the European project. In reality, the trans-Atlantic community has relied on two pillars: a successful defensive alliance and an even more successful project of European integration.
Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later—and 16 new members later—the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – generic
Menon 22 – Rajan Menon is the director of grand strategy at Defense Priorities. (“A NEW AND BETTER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE,” Defense Priorities. February 15th, 2022. ) CTF
UPDATE OUR COLD WAR STRATEGY FOR TODAY’S GEOSTRATEGIC REALITIES
The premises and practices that underpin current U.S. strategy toward Europe amount to a tweaking of those that prevailed during the Cold War, never mind that the conditions in Europe are now wholly different. Europe has long since become an economic and technological powerhouse, even a rival of the United States in global markets. No country with military power comparable to the Soviet Union now threatens the European balance of power (Ukraine is not critical to that balance). The European Union, most of whose members also belong to NATO, has a GDP that is more than nine times larger than Russia’s: €13 trillion versus €1.4 trillion. Europe is also technologically far superior to Russia.10 Clearly, then, Europeans have the material wherewithal to develop the capacity to deter Russia.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › fill in - eu
Rayess 21 – Rami Rayess is a Lebanese writer and journalist, a University Instructor and translator, and holds a master’s degree in political science from the American University of Beirut. (“The proposed European Army with global influence will replace NATO,” Al Arabiya English. September 2st, 2021. ) Edgemont PF
NATO is in its death throws with Russia and China looking on happily, but not that this military force was ever a real threat to either country.
When you have Estonia and Lithuania and all the other former Eastern Bloc countries as powerless NATO members it isn’t of great concern to Moscow.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › fill in - eu
Nestoras 3/28/22 (Dr. Antonios Nestoras is head of policy and research at the European Liberal Forum and adjunct professor at VUB Brussels School of Governance, “The EU must replace the US as a security provider in Europe”, )//MargaretE
Lately, however, Europe has been waking up to a new reality. From Obama to Trump to Biden, US foreign policy has been steadily looking for a way out of Europe. With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict dating from 2014, Russia has been looking for a way back in. Finally, the EU has been talking for years about becoming an autonomous security provider, which requires Germany to rise above its self-absorbing pacifism. After a period of gradual transformation, Russia’s war on Ukraine is a tipping point that makes Lord Ismay’s one-liner seem genuinely outdated. When a threshold is reached, expect the system to change rapidly. This is exactly what seems to be happening in Europe after Putin invaded Ukraine. Judging from a common, united, and firm response to the war, the Versailles Declaration, and the EU’s Strategic Compass, both the EU and the national capitals are in tune with the historic shifts in the post-war order in Europe. With the Americans on their way out, and the Russians on their way in, the EU will have to imagine a new European security order. Two weeks into the war, and after Russia became the most-sanctioned country in the world, the French president invited the other 26 heads of EU states and governments for a two-day informal summit in Versailles. The EU leaders adopted a strong declaration against Russian aggression and committed to the broadest possible diplomatic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. The Versailles declaration – which was then added to the Annals of the European Union – talked about the common responsibility to “protect EU citizens, values and democracies and the European model”. It also described the new fundamentals of European security focusing on three key dimensions: “bolstering EU defense capabilities, reducing energy dependencies, and building a more robust economic base”. 10 days later, the EU approved the strategic compass, probably the most ambitious plan for a common foreign and security policy in the history of European integration. On March 25, in Brussels, the European Council endorsed it. Self-described as a “quantum leap forward” the compass aims to improve the EU’s ability to “act decisively” and turn the EU into “a stronger and more capable security provider”. The document is a roadmap for developing military capabilities, improving defence spending and cooperation, responding to information-based threats, and strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries. The Versailles declaration and the strategic compass have set the agenda for future EU action and geopolitical orientation. However, they likely understate or disregard even the long-lasting and possibly permanent effects of the changes that the post-war order is undergoing.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › fill in - osce
CND 2021 (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is a UK based organization that researches best ways to avoid nuclear conflict in Europe, “No to NATO”, )//MargaretE
CND believes that a vital step towards global nuclear disarmament would be achieved with the removal of all US nuclear weapons from European bases. Britain should withdraw from NATO, and all foreign military bases on British soil should be closed. Working to prevent cold war and war with Russia and China remains a strong focus for our work. The UK should be opting for diplomatic solutions to complex political problems, not participating in an alliance that is backing Russia and China into a corner through military expansionism. This will not help stop a war, instead the danger is it will start one. NATO should not be expanded but rather disbanded and the influence, resources and funding of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) extended towards a nuclear-free, less militarised and therefore more secure Europe.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › china deterrence turn
Odgaard 2022 (Lisa Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on US-China-Europe relations, NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, )//MargaretE
NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions. With the summit statement of the North Atlantic Council released June 14, 2021, NATO extended a commitment to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance,” since “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”1 China’s coercive policies, nuclear arsenal, military modernization, military cooperation with Russia, lack of transparency, and use of disinformation are listed as main areas of concern for the alliance. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it. Compared to the United States, Europe took a long time to acknowledge its stake in managing security challenges from China. As Beijing pushed beyond its traditional zones of interest in East and Southeast Asia toward the Indian Ocean in the 2000s, US security policies began to focus more on China as Washington sought a new geopolitical equilibrium in Asia.2 Since 2014, France and the UK have spearheaded Europe’s naval diplomacy to counter the displays of force and increasing tensions in maritime Asia to which China contributes. This engagement has focused on regular exercises with the US and its Asian allies, operations in support of freedom of navigation, and base-sharing agreements. 3 In 2021, the EU recognized that these geopolitical dynamics directly impact its security and announced the establishment of supportive mechanisms in its Indo-Pacific strategy.4 However, NATO has been conspicuously absent in these transatlantic endeavors designed to counter challenges to US and European security. Reflecting NATO’s absence from the main arena of US-China strategic competition, the alliance is hardly ever mentioned in off-the-record conversations on Indo-Pacific security between diplomats and think tank personnel. NATO’s reluctance to take on the China challenge is perhaps not surprising, given its inherent assumption that the European continent is the jewel in the crown of the US alliance system, which is thought to guarantee US assistance in the event of a military threat against Europe. This assumption was challenged during the Trump administration, which openly questioned the US commitment to Article Five’s collective defense obligation. The invasion of Ukraine has given NATO a new lease on life and put it at the frontlines of transatlantic cooperation on deterring Russia from further military action in future. However, NATO’s focus on its eastern frontline carries the risk that the alliance turns into a Russia-focused European institution and ignores that China is a global great power competitor which also constitutes a major challenge to the security of all NATO member states. Washington increasingly looks to the EU rather than NATO for guidance on Europe’s future security policy. One reason is that NATO’s toolbox is lagging in domains such as cyber and outer space, although cyber and outer space operations are key enablers of actions in all domains including air, sea, and land. One indication of this is the US-EU negotiations surrounding a common response to cyber threats which took place during the first US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2021. In addition, during Trump’s presidency, longstanding US dissatisfaction with Europe’s modest defense spending threatened to put NATO on the backburner in transatlantic security debates.5 Since then, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elicited a sea change in German defense policy with the announcement in February 2022 that defense spending will increase to more than 2 percent of its gross domestic output annually.6 While this may be a convincing signal that Europe will finally devote the resources required for its own defense and revive NATO’s central role in transatlantic security, there is also a risk that China will be moved to the periphery of the alliance’s agenda.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › china deterrence turn
Chellaney 2022 (Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), “America is Focusing on the Wrong Enemy”, )//MargaretE
This may explain why US President Joe Biden is treating a “rogue” Russia as a peer competitor, when he should be focused on the challenge from America’s actual peer, China. In comparison to Russia, China’s population is about ten times bigger, its economy is almost ten times larger, and its military expenditure is around four times greater. Not only is China more powerful; it genuinely seeks to supplant the US as the preeminent global power. By contrast, with its military buildup on Ukraine’s borders, Russia is seeking to mitigate a perceived security threat in its neighborhood. Hastening the decline of US global leadership is hardly the preserve of Democrats. A bipartisan parade of US leaders has failed to recognize that the post-Cold War unipolar world order, characterized by unchallenged US economic and military predominance, is long gone. The US squandered its “unipolar moment,” especially by waging an expensive and amorphous “Global War on Terrorism,” including several military interventions, and through its treatment of Russia. After its Cold War victory, the US essentially took an extended victory lap, pursuing strategic maneuvers that flaunted its dominance. Notably, it sought to expand NATO to Russia’s backyard, but made little effort to bring Russia into the Western fold, as it had done with Germany and Japan after World War II. The souring of relations with the Kremlin contributed to Russia’s eventual remilitarization. So, while the US remains the world’s foremost military power, it has been stretched thin by the decisions and commitments it has made, in Europe and elsewhere, since 1991. This goes a long way toward explaining why the US has ruled out deploying its own troops to defend Ukraine today. What the US is offering Ukraine – weapons and ammunition – cannot protect the country from Russia, which has an overwhelming military advantage. But US leaders made another fatal mistake since the Cold War: by aiding China’s rise, they helped to create the greatest rival their country has ever faced. Unfortunately, they have yet to learn from this. Instead, the US continues to dedicate insufficient attention and resources to an excessively wide array of global issues, from Russian revanchism and Chinese aggression to lesser threats in the Middle East and Africa and on the Korean Peninsula. And it continues inadvertently to bolster China’s global influence, not least through its overuse of sanctions. For example, by barring friends and allies from importing Iranian oil, two successive US administrations enabled China not only to secure oil at a hefty discount, but also to become a top investor in – and security partner of – the Islamic Republic. US sanctions have similarly pushed resource-rich Myanmar into China’s arms. As Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, whose country has faced a US arms embargo over its ties to China, asked last year, “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?” Russia has been asking itself the same question. Though Russia and China kept each other at arm’s length for decades, US-led sanctions introduced after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea drove President Vladimir Putin to pursue a closer strategic partnership with China. The bilateral relationship is likely to deepen, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. But the raft of harsh new sanctions the US has promised to implement in the event of a Russian invasion will accelerate this shift significantly, with China as the big winner. The heavy financial penalties the US has planned – including the “nuclear option” of disconnecting Russian banks from the international SWIFT payments system – would turn China into Russia’s banker, enabling it to reap vast profits and expand the international use of its currency, the renminbi. If Biden fulfilled his pledge to block the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is set to deliver Russian supplies directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, China would gain greater access to Russian energy. In fact, by securing a commitment from Putin this month to a nearly tenfold increase in Russian natural gas exports, China is building a safety net that could – in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – withstand Western energy sanctions and even a blockade. China could also benefit militarily by demanding greater access to Russian military technology in exchange for its support. For the US, a strengthened Russia-China axis is the worst possible outcome of the Ukraine crisis. The best outcome would be a compromise with Russia to ensure that it does not invade and possibly annex Ukraine. By enabling the US to avoid further entanglement in Europe, this would permit a more realistic balancing of key objectives – especially checking Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific – with available resources and capabilities. The future of the US-led international order will be decided in Asia, and China is currently doing everything in its power to ensure that order’s demise. Already, China is powerful enough that it can host the Winter Olympics even as it carries out a genocide against Muslims in the Xinjiang region, with limited pushback. If the Biden administration does not recognize the true scale of the threat China poses, and adopt an appropriately targeted strategy soon, whatever window of opportunity for preserving US preeminence remains may well close.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › china deterrence turn
Binnendijk 2021 (Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as the U.S. National Security Council’s senior director for defense and arms control and as director of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, “NATO’s focus on China is too narrow”, )//MargaretE
At the recent NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, China was on the front burner. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that China is not considered by NATO to be an adversary, but that China’s rise has direct consequences for alliance security. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken listed China first when speaking of major power threats to other countries. China will have a prominent place in NATO’s emerging new Strategic Concept. But many of America’s trans-Atlantic partners still take a fairly narrow view of China’s military impact on the alliance. The focus tends to be on security aspects of Chinese investments in European infrastructure, the vulnerability of defense supply chains containing material made in China, the consequences of Chinese technology embedded in communications systems, China’s political influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and small-scale Chinese naval exercises in European waters. Europe is now taking constructive steps to deal with many of these critical problems, but NATO also needs to open its aperture beyond Europe as it assesses the broader security challenge posed by China. A report released recently by the Atlantic Council, called “The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition,” makes the case that this Euro-centric view misses four interrelated elements that could have a profound impact on NATO. First, the United States will increasingly focus on China as the pace-setter for its own military modernization. China’s defense budget measured in purchasing power parity may soon approach that of the United States. China’s time and distance advantages, its focus on a naval and missile buildup, and its growing tactical nuclear capabilities have already created a major challenge for America’s forces in the Indo-Pacific theater. With future U.S. defense budgets likely to be flat, at best, America’s defense priorities may need to concentrate on China. The European theater may get less attention than when Russia presented the primary major power threat. Next, the ever-growing Sino-Russian defense relationship portends further difficulties for the alliance. While a formal Sino-Russian defense alliance may not be in the cards for now, the two nations are toying with the idea. Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “we don’t need it [an alliance], but, theoretically, it’s quite possible to imagine it.” China reacted warmly. The two nations hold multiple joint military exercises and conduct intense defense-industrial cooperation. Russia’s ability to produce military platforms coupled with Chinese digital capabilities will provide both nations with better weapons systems to confront America’s allies. And having strong Chinese support, Russia may become more assertive in its military activities in Europe. Third, Chinese behavior in the global commons plus the security implication of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its Polar Silk Road, and its Digital Silk Road all have negative consequence for Europe beyond NATO’s borders. Whether it is efforts to limit freedom of the seas, malign cyber behavior, creating digital dependencies or growing anti-satellite capabilities, the challenges China poses in the global commons are relevant to all trans-Atlantic partners. Regarding the Belt and Road Initiative, investments and debt traps create coerced political influence. Along the Polar Silk Road, investments in resources and science are laying the groundwork for greater future Chinese involvement. Finally, and perhaps most important, aggressive Chinese sovereign claims in the South and East China seas and on Taiwan could lead to unwanted conflict between the United States and China. Should this happen, Europe would be far from immune. A Sino-American war would probably not be regionally contained, as were America’s previous Asian wars in Korea and Vietnam. At a minimum, Europe would find itself in a costly economic confrontation with China. NATO’s mutual defense clause, Article 5, could be triggered. And the United States would probably need to pivot significant military assets to Asia, leaving Europe more vulnerable to Russian adventurism. Several suggestions for NATO flow from these four broader concerns. Europe should enhance its own military capabilities so that Europe has effective defenses, should conflict in Asia divert U.S. forces. Europe should contribute to deterrence in Asia by clarifying to China that NATO allies would, at a minimum, take political and economic action should China attack U.S. forces in Asia. NATO needs to seek ways to help defend international freedoms in the global commons. Europe should limit further Chinese strategic investments in NATO countries that would stall NATO decision-making or mobilization during a crisis. And NATO needs to create new mechanisms to strengthen its ties to America’s Asian allies. These steps are in Europe’s interest. They need not be seen as belligerent, but rather steps to avoid Chinese miscalculation and to further deter Russia. They can be combined with U.S.-European Union-China cooperative measures in areas like managing global warming, fighting pandemics and reducing nuclear proliferation.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › china deterrence turn
Hille and Sevastopulo 6/7/22 (Kathrin Hille is a Greater China Correspondant and Taiwan Correspondant for the Financial Times, Demetri Sevastopulo served as Washington Bureau Chief from 2015 to 2021, covering the White House, Trump administration and the 2016 and 2020 presidential races. During his more than 13 years reporting from Washington, he spent six years covering the Pentagon and intelligence agencies during the Bush and Obama administrations, “Taiwan: Preparing for a potential Chinese Invasion” )//MargaretE
Although there is growing concern about a possible invasion, the timeframe of any military action — and China’s real intentions — are still the subject of intense debate. The year Davidson sees as the potential time horizon for a Chinese attack, 2027, is the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army. In November 2020, the Chinese Communist party said it wanted to “ensure that the 100-year military building goal is achieved by 2027”, called for faster military modernisation and reiterated the goal of making the Chinese military fit for networked, “intelligentised” warfare. Although those are stock phrases China has used before, the Pentagon calls 2027 a “new milestone”. “If realised, the PLA’s 2027 modernisation goals could provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency,” it said in its annual report on the Chinese military last year. Some analysts doubt Davidson’s date. But one year on from his testimony, government and military officials in both Taipei and Washington say the window from now to 2027 is a genuine threat. Last October, Taiwan’s defence minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said the PLA would have the “complete capability” to attack Taiwan by 2025. “The current situation is really the most dangerous I have seen in my more than 40 years in the military,” he told lawmakers. Avril Haines, the US director of national intelligence, recently told Congress that the threat to Taiwan was “acute” between now and 2030 — lending credence to Davidson’s sense of urgency. John Aquilino, the current head of Indo-Pacific command, recently told the FT that the invasion of Ukraine underscored that the Chinese threat to Taiwan was not abstract. Taiwanese experts see 2024 and 2025 as a particularly dangerous period. They believe Xi might be tempted to use force if the ruling Democratic Progressive party, which insists on preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence, wins again in the next presidential election in early 2024, or if he senses a political vacuum in the US after its next presidential election in late 2024.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › china deterrence turn
Feng 6/1/22 (John Feng is a contributing editor for Newsweek in their Asian research department, “Will China Invade Taiwan?” )//MargaretE
Chen believes Xi will secure an unprecedented third term in office this November, but says the legitimacy of his rule "will be greatly challenged" as a result of an economic downturn, created in part by Xi's sweeping zero-COVID policy. "This mounting internal pressure is pushing Xi and the CCP leadership to divert internal opposition through more external aggression," Chen says. "There are signs that China will escalate and cause conflicts," she notes. This is the backdrop against which Biden's comments should be read. That China will "go the military route on Taiwan" isn't an inevitability, argues Bryce Barros, an analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy, a think tank at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. "However, I do think hawks within the CCP and PLA might become more emboldened to take military action against Taiwan in some way as it becomes more apparent that Taiwan will not peacefully unify," he says. Taiwan's public has shown little interest in being governed from Beijing, and its government has gradually increased the country's defense spending in recent years. Clear commitments from Washington, like the one given by Biden, may reinforce China's belief that the U.S. plans to foil any military action by Beijing, Barros says. Whether China invades Taiwan will revolve around the central theory of deterrence, chiefly as it pertains to the United States, postwar Asia's foremost power. To deter Beijing from a course of military action, both Taipei and Washington will need to have a clear understanding of Chinese interests and motives, and seek to shape China's own perceptions of a potential attack by raising the costs of war. According to Washington-based defense analyst Gerald Brown, a commitment to defend Taiwan on paper isn't enough—it must be matched by capabilities. "We definitely need to worry about having the capability to beat back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and we must actively ensure we rapidly work towards this," he tells Newsweek. "Simultaneously, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is already incredibly difficult and costly for the PRC, and while U.S. forces are not where they need to be, a U.S.-Chinese war is something the PRC desperately wants to avoid if possible," says Brown, who advocates "strategic clarity" to reinforce deterrence. "Now, having the capability is critical here, but, if the CCP is unsure that the U.S. would step in and it has no commitment to do so, not having the proper capability to defend Taiwan plus having room to back out would actually serve as a far less effective deterrent," he says. "The CCP may well assume that without a definitive capability to defend Taiwan and with the lack of a formal commitment allowing room for the U.S. to maneuver out and not defend Taiwan, if the PRC launched an attack the U.S. would be compelled to stay out, encouraging Chinese aggression," Brown says.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › econ turn (needs terminal !)
Eland 12 – Ivan R. Eland is Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty. (“The US Should Leave NATO, Not Shore It Up,” Independent Institute. May 23rd, 2012. ) CTF and MargaretE
The recent intervention in Libya, ostensibly with the United States following the Europeans’ lead, actually proved the indispensability of American military power. Since 9/11, as the NATO “free rider” problem got worse with American defense budgets exploding and those of allied countries contracting, the gap between U.S. and allied military capabilities has widened. In Libya, the Americans had to undertake the heavy lifting of initially knocking down the Libyan air defenses. After the United States set up the allies to take over airstrikes, it then had to provide surveillance, intelligence, logistics, and refueling for allied air operations. The meager allied surveillance capability is the reason President Obama wants NATO to buy five Global Hawk surveillance drones.
And the free riding is not going to get any better with the Europeans in worse fiscal shape—at least for the moment—than the United States. Thus, the Europeans will continue to enjoy a U.S. nuclear and conventional shield while not even fully opening their markets to American goods and services—as has always been the case in the post–World War II world. American defense contractors do get a little back from the Europeans, as do U.S. policymakers, who get vague “influence” in European capitals, but the American taxpayer, as usual, gets the short end of the stick by funding the defense of countries that can afford to do so themselves.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › finland/sweden turn
Kendall-Taylor 5/13. Interviewed by Steve Inskeep. Andrea, enior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “With Finland poised to join NATO, how will Russia respond?” https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735670/with-finland-poised-to-join-nato-how-will-russia-respond JH-NCP
INSKEEP: A strange question to ask, I suppose, given the rhetoric of the last several months, but I'm going to ask it. Does Vladimir Putin really care about NATO expansion? And here's why I say this. He gave NATO expansion as a reason for invading Ukraine, but he seemed to have all these other reasons for invading Ukraine about history and Ukraine being a part of Russia and his idea of Russia. Does he even care if Finland joins NATO really?
KENDALL-TAYLOR: Yeah, I do think he cares. I mean, for a very long time - Finland has been neutral for 80 years. I think both the Finns and the Russians view that neutrality as one reason why they've had such a stable and pragmatic relationship. So this is really a sea change, and I would expect that this will lead to a fundamental change in that historically very stable Russia-Finnish relationship. And, you know, it could lead to things like the greater militarization along that border there. So it will be consequential. And for Putin, it does underscore this idea, this fear that he has long held that Russia is being encircled by NATO. And so it will amplify those concerns.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 2nc
Donato 20 – Giulia Di Donato is a journalist at ISPI. (“China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response,” ISPI. May 8th, 2020. ) CTF
Today, the European Union, as the final destination of the BRI and a key targeted export market for Chinese products, has critical strategic importance for the success of this ambitious Chinese project. Although the ports of Piraeus in Greece and Venice in Italy have been indicated in the official maps as the main end points of the BRI, it still remains unclear whether Chinese interests could be further expanded into other routes and whether other terminals will be targeted as entry points in the EU and the Mediterranean[15].
In 2015, Hungary was the first European country to sign a MoU with China under the BRI and, by 2019, another 22 European countries had signed BRI co-operation agreements, with the latest being Luxembourg and Italy[16]. However, leaders of countries like France and Germany, which refused to officially participate in the BRI, adopted a more cautious approach and expressed their concerns about the Chinese-sponsored project. In particular, they advocated for more balanced rules to avoid a “one-way trade road” and the increase of China’s influence in the Balkans[17].
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 2nc
Jing 15 – Lu Jing is the director of the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University. (“China’s rise will restore history of peaceful benefits for its neighbors,” The Global Times. February 15th, 2015. ) CTF
Early this year, a special seven-part series of documentary titled Super China, which was produced by the state-run Korean Broadcasting System, have sparked South Korean discussions about the "China threat."
The "China threat" theory has been widely circulated and constantly hyped by Western countries during China's rise and is often cited by China's neighboring countries. It typically reflects the Western thinking of realpolitik in international relations.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 2nc
Wuthnow 17 – Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University. (“Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative:
Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications,” INSS “China Strategic Perspective” Chapter 12. October 2017. ) CTF
One common argument in Chinese analyses of the BRI is that regional integration will contribute to a more stable security environment, especially around China’s southern and western periphery. This argument both reflects and supports Xi’s broader vision for a new regional order—often described as a “community of common destiny” or “community of shared interests”—in which economic development and cooperative security reinforce each other.27 China’s 2017 white paper on Asia-Pacific security explains the logic:
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 2nc
Beeson and Crawford 2/10 – Mark Beeson is Professor of International Politics at the University of Western Australia in Perth. Corey Crawford is a professor at the University of Western Australia. (“Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony and Geoeconomics,” Springer. February 10th, 2022. ) CTF
The ‘rise of China’ or—more accurately—China’s re-emergence as the most important actor in what we now think of as East Asia is one of the most important developments in world history. This may strike some readers as an extravagant claim, but it is not without foundation. Not only is the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on track to overtake the United States’ (US) as the world’s largest economy in the near future (Cheng and Lee 2021), but it is the first credible candidate to become a non-Western hegemonic power. The fact that it is from Asia is noteworthy enough; the idea that it is a ‘communist’ power that subscribes to a very different idea about the best ways of organising social, political, economic, and strategic activities is even more remarkable. At the very least, the PRC’s ascension provides a striking illustration of the possibility that very different routes to global power are conceivable. The key questions in this context are not just whether ‘Chinese hegemony’ is possible, but how it might differ from the more familiar American variety that has dominated the international system and the world views of nearly everyone alive today.
To try and answer these questions, we focus on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). If successfully realised, the BRI will be the most ambitious and expansive developmental project the world has ever seen. While there has been an unsurprising flurry of interest inside and outside China about the development of the BRI (Beeson 2020a, b; Clarke 2017; Winter 2019), there have been few attempts to place the BRI in comparative perspective, or to consider it as an expression of possible hegemonic influence. Given that the BRI is not unprecedented, this is surprising. After all, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the US developed what was then an equally unprecedented and ambitious initiative designed to simultaneously facilitate the (re)development of some of the world’s key economies and reinforce its own position as the leader of the non-communist world (Pollard 1985).
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 2nc
Grimes 16 - William W. Grimes is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. (“The Belt & Road Initiative as Power Resource: Lessons from Japan,” The Asian Forum. April 15th. ) CTF
Of course, BRI is not just an economic exercise. The promise of trillions of dollars in new investment and a reordering of production networks on a regional basis will necessarily have significant political effects. But what will they be? While it may appear obvious that such a large venture would create political benefits for China, it is worth examining how it might do so. There are three main ways in which economics translates into power: transactional power, structural power, and “soft power.”6 Here, I consider each, in turn, as it applies to BRI.
Transactional power is, at its core, a quid pro quo.In economic terms, a transaction implies a price at which an exchange takes place. This makes for a fairly simple measure of power—having sufficient resources to pay a counterpart the price it requires to forgo its own preferred course of action in favor of the payer’s preferred course of action. In the political economy literature, such transactions are often referred to as “side payments,” and are described approvingly as a way to induce cooperation. More broadly, a powerful actor can shape the behavior of its counterpart by promising benefits for compliance or threatening consequences for non-compliance. A classic example at the international level is aid—by offering grant aid (or even loan aid, if it is concessional or if the recipient is credit-constrained), the aid provider may be able to affect either specific behaviors (e.g., an infrastructure project that privileges firms based in the providing country) or more indirectly buy “friendship,” in the form of political support or security cooperation.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 2nc
Donato 20 – Giulia Di Donato is a journalist at ISPI. (“China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response,” ISPI. May 8th, 2020. ) CTF
During the last four decades, China experienced impressive economic growth, becoming one of the leading powers of the global economy. After a century of humiliation imposed by Western and Japanese colonial powers, today the country is demonstrating a strong desire to achieve its national rejuvenation (guojia fuxing). Indeed, under the iconic leadership of President Xi Jinping, China is adopting an increasingly assertive international behavior, balancing the need to protect its sovereignty and strategic interests related to economic and security issues, and the ambition to restore its role of a great power[1]. In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - a massive infrastructure project to improve connectivity between the East and the West, increase regional cooperation and facilitate trade and investments - has been described as China’s grand strategy championing its global governance ambitions[2]. Indeed, BRI-participating economies represent more than one-third of global GDP, and over half of the world’s population (OECD 2017).
From the perspective of the Western world, the BRI has been the most highly debated, heavily criticized and poorly understood policy framework of the 21st century. Considering that the European market is the key strategic destination for the BRI, the Chinese project and a new manifestation of China’s soft power have been perceived as a threat to a global order shaped by the US’ hegemony. In the past two decades, China and the European Union, two of the three largest economies in the world and major trading partners, increasingly tightened their economic and political relations[3]. However, promising potential for cooperation is repeatedly undermined by major political differences (Farnell & Crookes 2016), and EU member states failed to adopt a common response to the Chinese initiative.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 1nc
Tanious 19 – Mina E. Tanious is a political science expert. (“The impact of economic interdependence on the probability of conflict between states: The case of “American–Chinese relationship on Taiwan since 1995,” Enmerald Insight. January 23rd, 2019. .) CTF
Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression; interdependent states would rather trade than invade. As long as high levels of interdependence can be maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism (Copeland, 1996, p. 5).
Liberals view that increasing ties between countries in some fields encourages them to achieve greater cooperation in other fields. These linkages are supposed to strengthen communication and reduce misunderstandings which may cause tension and creates cultural and institutional mechanisms capable of mediating conflicts that may arise between them. At the same time, mutual recognition of mutual benefits enhances peace.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › bri turn – 1nc
Hillman and Sacks 21 – Jennifer A. Hillman is a senior fellow for trade and international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relation. David Sacks is a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Co-chairs were Jacob J. Lew (former Secretary of Treasury) and Gary Roughead (former Navy Admiral). (“China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States,” Council on Foreign Relations. March 23rd, 2021. ) CTF
BRI’s size and scope give it the potential to boost global gross domestic product (GDP) by as much as $7.1 trillion by 2040 and reduce global trade costs by up to 2.2 percent.30 It promises to provide much-needed financing to developing countries, helping build the infrastructure necessary to erase blackouts, ease transportation bottlenecks, and make many economies more globally competitive. The United States, even if not formally part of BRI, would likely benefit in some ways if BRI builds infrastructure that accelerates global economic growth.
Were U.S. companies able to sell equipment and material required in the production, maintenance, or operation of the infrastructure built in BRI countries, those U.S. firms would stand to profit. To the extent that modern infrastructure lowers transportation and communications costs in BRI countries, U.S. producers trading with and operating out of those countries would also benefit. Global political stability usually accompanies sustained economic growth, and the United States would benefit from greater stability throughout the developing world.