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2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Alliances !

No war from abandonment nor entanglement

Fisher 16 Max Fisher, foreign editor at Vox, former reporter and founding editor of the WorldViews foreign affair blog at The Washington Post, MA International Relations and Affairs, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “The Credibility Trap,” Vox, 4-29-2016, /GoGreen!

If reputational credibility has been so repeatedly debunked, both in specific instances and as a theory, why does it continue to loom so large in America's foreign policy discourse?

Tufts University's Michael Beckley hinted at one possible explanation in a much-discussed article last year in International Security: Could it have something to do with America's uniquely broad network of alliances?

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: GPC !

Their impact theorizations overstate the scope of competition – it’s NOT all-encompassing, revisionism is selective – our advantages have greater explanatory power – theirs backfire

Ashford 21 Emma Ashford, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster,” Foreign Policy, 4-1-2021, /GoGreen!

“America is back,” blared headlines following President Joe Biden’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in February, an address clearly designed to draw a line under the Donald Trump presidency and mark a new start in trans-Atlantic relations. “We are not looking backward,” Biden promised. “We are looking forward, together.” Yet one big plank of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is apparently sticking around: great-power competition. “We must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition,” Biden told conference attendees, adding that “competition with China is going to be stiff.”

Unfortunately, for all that great-power competition has been Washington’s favorite buzzword in recent years, it remains frustratingly poorly defined. Indeed, most commentators skip right past the big questions (Why are we competing? Competing over what?) and go straight to arguing about how to achieve victory. Since the possible answers to these questions range from the entirely reasonable (i.e., that Western states should engage in collective defense of liberal democracy) to the dangerous and utterly unrealistic (i.e., that Washington should be pursuing regime collapse in Beijing), it’s hardly something we should ignore.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: GPC !

“Strategic competition” is meaningless and counterproductive

Nexon 21 Daniel H. Nexon, Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Against Great Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, 2-15-2021, /GoGreen!

In his first days in office, U.S. President Joe Biden has worked to signal a clean break with his predecessor. He rejoined the Paris climate accord, offered to extend the New START nuclear weapons treaty, and reversed the “Mexico City” policy curtailing overseas abortion access. His appointees have repeatedly emphasized that the administration will prioritize diplomacy and multilateralism over former President Donald Trump’s “America first” nationalism.

But the fate of a central plank of Trump’s foreign policy remains uncertain: the focus on great-power competition, which according to his administration’s National Security Strategy has “returned.” In a major address at the U.S. State Department, Biden underscored his intention to “work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interests to do so,” but days later noted the likelihood of “extreme competition” with China. This rhetoric may reflect either pragmatism or that great-power competition is on its way to assuming a dominant place in Biden administration policy. Even if Biden aims to de-emphasize competition in certain areas, though, Republicans are certain to criticize the administration for being weak and ineffective in the face of international challenges. Absent some major change in the global threat environment, great-power competition will remain a focal point in debates over U.S. foreign and national security policy.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: Thumper – Taiwan

Taiwan does NOT thump – it’s priced in – appropriated separately – and there’s a massive backlog anyway, so new stuff just goes to the bottom of the docket – plus, funding isn’t implicated until it’s cleared – unlike plan’s fiated change in priorities

Harris 22 Bryant Harris, Congress reporter for Defense News, formerly wrote for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News, “Document reveals $14 billion backlog of US defense transfers to Taiwan,” Defense News, 4-14-2022, /GoGreen!

Pandemic-related acquisition issues have sparked a backlog in the U.S. delivering $14.2 billion worth of military equipment to Taiwan that the island has purchased since 2019.

With much of Washington’s attention focused on how to rapidly deploy a steady stream of military aid to Ukraine, some lawmakers are concerned the Taiwan delay is undermining its ability to deter a potential Chinese invasion.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: Thumper – Ukraine

Ukraine is special, Congress will re-up as soon as it runs out – unlike small programs like AM&E

Kheel 5-19-22 Rebecca Kheel, congressional reporter for Military.com, former defense reporter for The Hill, BA newspaper journalism and history, Syracuse University, “Pentagon Can Ship More Weapons to Ukraine After Congress Replenishes Aid Funding,” Yahoo! Finance, 5-19-2022, /GoGreen!

The Senate gave final approval Thursday on a multibillion-dollar bill that will extend the Pentagon's ability to ship weapons to Ukraine the same day arms funding was set to dry up.

The Senate voted 86-11 to approve $40 billion in security and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, including nearly $20 billion in Pentagon funding to send more weapons to the front lines of the three-month-old war with Russia and support U.S. troops stationed elsewhere in Europe. All the "no" votes came from Republicans.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: Thumper – Ukraine

Most of the stuff their ev’s about comes from DoS assistance, NOT DoD cooperation – AND Congress has been adding supplemental funding specific to Ukraine to cover it all regardless

CRS 22 Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” IF12040 version 9, CRS In Focus, updated 6-6-2022, /GoGreen!

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through June 1, 2022, the United States has provided more than $7.3 billion in security assistance “to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.” Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed a total of more than $4.6 billion in security assistance to “provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.”

FY2022 security assistance packages are being funded via more than $23 billion in regular and supplemental appropriations, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N), and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). In total, FY2022 appropriations include $12.55 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority; $6.3 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI); and $4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.” FY2022 supplemental appropriations also have included funds for additional U.S. troop deployments to Europe.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: Thumper – Ukraine

Even “unexpected” increases are priced in – AND the Ukraine account still has more to give

Psaki 22 Jen Psaki, White House Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” 4-20-2022, /GoGreen!

Q: And on an unexpected announcement of another round of assistance to Ukraine, could you walk us through any specifics, if you have any, on that and when that's happening?

And just big picture on this: The U.S. has already given more than $2.5 billion since this war started. How long can the U.S. expect to continue to bankroll so much of this war?

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: N/U – Deprioritized

Capacity and processes are expanding

Stroul 21 Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Security Assistance In The Middle East,” prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 8-10-2021, /GoGreen!

The Department conducts assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of its security cooperation initiatives to inform decisions about security cooperation strategy, policy, programs, and resources. The Department is building its capacity and processes to design, develop, and implement AM&E to track progress through the development of front-end assessments and performance monitoring of security cooperation initiatives. In addition, the Department conducts independent strategic evaluations to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of SC programming.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: N/U – Deprioritized

Implementation is gaining momentum

Pretelt 21 Maj. Carlos De Castro Pretelt, U.S. Army, Foreign Area Officer serving as the Operations Section Chief at the Office of Defense Coordination in Mexico City, MA International Policy and Practice, George Washington University, MA International Management, University of Phoenix, BS social psychology, Park University, “Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation,” Small Wars Journal, 7-17-2021, /GoGreen!

In 2017, Congress sought to address this conundrum through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to implement an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) framework to improve the accountability of all security cooperation initiatives; something akin to what PM/SA had been working on since 2015.[v] In theory, all security cooperation initiatives should be assessed to ensure USG funds are being used to advance or achieve a specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) objective that ultimately benefit US interests.[vi] It has been a number of years since the release of the NDAA, but this mandate is finally creating substantial ripples across the security cooperation community.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: N/U – Deprioritized

Next year’s budget proposal proves

DoD 22 Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 President’s Budget Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding,” April 2022, /GoGreen!

The Department has made significant reforms to align strategic guidance with resource allocation; establish an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) program; and create a comprehensive, common picture of the Department’s budget for security cooperation activities as well as related programs that engage foreign partners. This budget display is a representation of the Department’s progress to date in achieving security cooperation reform and realizing congressional intent in Title 10, Chapter 16, security cooperation.

Section 381(a) of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires a consolidated budget of security cooperation programs and activities be included annually along with the President’s Budget request to Congress. The consolidated budget display is intended to enhance planning and oversight of security cooperation programs and related activities across the DoD. This annual budget display demonstrates how DoD plans, programs, and budgets for programs and activities to align with the Department’s strategic objectives.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: N/U – Deprioritized

NATO planners specifically are prioritizing AM&E

White House 21 The White House, “United States Strategy On Countering Corruption,” December 2021, /GoGreen!

Building accountable, effective, and resilient security institutions: The United States, led by the Department of Defense (DOD), will work towards elevating, prioritizing, and surging funds to institutional capacity building (ICB) activities to leverage DOD’s significant history of, and expertise in, improving resiliency through support of democracy and anti-corruption efforts with our global partners. DOD’s ICB efforts, which also align with NATO’s Building Integrity program, are particularly well-placed to simultaneously integrate key principles of advancing democratic civil-military relations, building transparent and resilient security sectors, and strengthening civilian leadership across multiple institutional functional areas. In addition to continued support to NATO’s Building Integrity program, DOD will coordinate with State and USAID and can adapt the approaches presently used in DOD ICB to apply them more comprehensively toward democratization and anti-corruption outcomes. This effort will nest with DOD’s assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework, as required by the FY17 NDAA. It will also advance DOD’s use of learning agendas to create positive feedback loops and better identify new ways of establishing responsible defense governance and internal controls in order to help build more accountable, effective, and transparent defense institutions with partners.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: U O/W – Requirements

Implementation is NOT inevitable

Marquis 16 Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Policy Researcher at RAND; Merrie Archer, Senior Pol-Mil Policy & Plans Advisor, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, MA International Affairs, Economic and Political Development, Columbia University; Jeremy Boback, assistant policy researcher at RAND; and David Stebbins, senior policy analyst at RAND; “Developing an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Framework for U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation,” RR1611, RAND Corporation, 2016, /GoGreen!

At a time when the United States is increasingly relying on foreign partners for its security and attempting to build their military capacity, security cooperation activities and expenditures can no longer be justified with anecdotal evidence. In order to gauge security cooperation’s “return on investment,” senior leaders in the presidential administration and Congress are requesting a rigorous accounting of what is being done, what is being spent, and what is being achieved and not being achieved in relation to specific planning objectives across the security cooperation enterprise. Although many parts of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) already conduct some form of security cooperation–related assessments, monitoring, and/or evaluation, understanding and implementation vary widely. Without high-level DoD leadership, these efforts will likely remain ad hoc and difficult to regularize and aggregate in a manner useful for planning and management at various levels of DoD or for coordination and collaboration with security assistance sector partners outside the department.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: U O/W – Requirements

The pace of implementation is everything – the whole problem’s that checking the math is hard and resource-intensive so gets repeatedly deprioritized in the face of more immediate demands on planners – which means link controls uniqueness – plus, there’s no sufficiently fast threshold for which we can be certain of beating competitors, it’s a relative, NOT absolute question

Yayboke 19 Erol Yayboke, senior fellow with the International Security Program and director of the Project on Fragility and Mobility at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, teaches global fragility and resilience at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, MPA, BBA international business, University of Texas at Austin; MacKenzie Hammond, research associate at CSIS; Hijab Shah, research associate at CSIS; and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program; “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation in Action for Security Sector Assistance,” Commentary, Center for Strategy and International Studies, 6-27-2019, /GoGreen!

Although elements of DoD and DoS have begun to incorporate AM&E into their SSA programming after recent policy changes—examples being the 2017 DoD Instruction 5132.14: Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, as well as DoS’ 2016 Program and Project Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy and the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act —these efforts are nascent and could benefit significantly from lessons learned from the development community including monitoring and evaluation frameworks, data collection methodologies, and feedback mechanisms.

Adapting traditional AM&E from the development community for SSA programming will not only require closer interagency coordination and dialogue around best practices but will also necessitate significant skill building and workforce development. These practices include shared fluency in the various roles, authorities, and capabilities that currently exist in the interagency around AM&E-type activities; iterative processes that build in adaptability and flexibility to change and improve as the environment necessitates; and a common lexicon around AM&E that DoD, DoS, and USAID can all leverage as they seek to coordinate AM&E in SSA programming.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › UNIQUENESS › AT: U O/W – Requirements

It’s NOT inevitable – despite legal requirements

Walther-Puri 21 Andrea Walther-Puri, PhD candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, research focuses on the effects of U.S. military counterterrorism programs on longer-term security governance transformation in the Sahel, “Afghanistan: A Tragic Lesson of the US Military’s Flawed Approach to Capacity Building,” Just Security, 9-6-2021, /GoGreen!

There were many flaws in the way the United States measured the effectiveness of its efforts. While the U.S. Defense Department (DOD) is required by law to conduct assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of its capacity building programs, whether this is carried out and the quality of those efforts is not always guaranteed. Standardized methods to measure results did not exist in Afghanistan. During the 20-year effort, operational assessments from top U.S. military leaders exhibited entrenched optimism, which “bore no resemblance” to conditions on the ground.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Not AM&E

Short-term bias makes the most useful AM&E particularly likely to get deprioritized in the face of plan’s fiat of an urgent new priority

Dyekman 7 Gregory J. Dyekman, Colonel, U.S. Army, Chief of Effects Assessment and Targeting in the Strategic Operations Directorate, MultiNational Force Iraq, MSS Army War College, MS Management, Troy State University, “Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007, /GoGreen!

Resource challenges to security cooperation derive from fiscal constraints, Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), Global Force Posturing, and outdated authorities. From a fiscal standpoint, the strategic environment will make the task of addressing our security challenges problematic for the foreseeable future. DoD’s 2007 budget is projected to be 3.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). As a percentage of GDP, DoD outlays are historically low and have not kept pace with the growth of GDP over the last 40 years.31 However, the rising costs of mandatory government entitlement spending associated with Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are projected to account for 11 percent of the U.S. GDP by 2016 and will exert pressures on a budget that economic growth alone is unlikely to alleviate.32 Entitlement obligations will likely result in political pressure to further reduce defense discretionary spending in order to forestall greater budget deficits. Despite the constrained fiscal environment, DoD outlays must continue to grow to meet our global engagement requirements. This should be a continuous strategic communication message implemented by DoD senior leadership to Congress and the American people to counter a growing view that the federal government already spends too much on national defense.33

Despite having the authority to plan and conduct security cooperation within their area of responsibility (AOR), GCCs currently lack sufficient dedicated resources to support their security cooperation strategy. In addition, existing resources are limited by multiple and conflicting policy and legislation. Up to 30 sources of funding regulated by various authorities and guidelines are required to implement GCC security cooperation strategies.34 Security Assistance programs like international military education and training (IMET), foreign military financing (FMF), and financial management service (FMS) are State Department funded, and COCOMs have limited ability through the interagency process to influence where and how this money is spent.35 Other sources like Warsaw Initiative Funding (WIF) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding support military exercises and capacity building efforts but continue to come under increased program management scrutiny. In the past, security cooperation funding by Service Components has contributed significantly to COCOM plan execution. However, Service Chiefs face growing fiscal obligations. As an example, the Army delayed submitting its 2008-13 Program Objective Memorandum in an effort to avoid a QDR strategy and resource mismatch.36 A mismatch still exists, and the Army faces a growing problem in funding current equipment wartime reset requirements and its modernization efforts. In recent congressional testimony, the Army Chief of Staff outlined the Army equipment reset bill at $17.01 billion for FY 2007, with expected requirements beyond 2007 to be $12 to $13 billion per year though the conflict and a minimum of 2 to 3 years beyond.37 Additionally, the Army will need nearly $200 billion for the Future Combat System and its associated spin-off technologies to meet modernization requirements.38 These fiscal realities suggest Service components will have fewer resources to dedicate to security cooperation, as Service Chiefs, who already have less interest in engagement programs, struggle to meet their Title 10 responsibilities to train, organize, and equip their forces.39 To overcome these hurdles, funding streams must be consolidated and reforms initiated that provide GCCs more influence in the allocation of funding resources for security cooperation.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Not AM&E

It’s the most likely to be deprioritized – at which point, the window of opportunity will close

Yayboke 19 Erol Yayboke, senior fellow with the International Security Program and director of the Project on Fragility and Mobility at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, teaches global fragility and resilience at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, MPA, BBA international business, University of Texas at Austin; MacKenzie Hammond, research associate at CSIS; Hijab Shah, research associate at CSIS; and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program; “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation in Action for Security Sector Assistance,” Commentary, Center for Strategy and International Studies, 6-27-2019, /GoGreen!

From the faltering of the Iraqi security forces in the face of the so-called Islamic State in 2014 to the current controversy surrounding U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, U.S. security sector assistance (SSA) to allies and partners has undergone significant scrutiny and reform recently. Jumpstarted by the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), one focus area of the SSA reform effort has been assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E). Long a core component of international development programming, the push to institutionalize AM&E in SSA programming is a result of recent congressional and executive branch efforts to increase accountability, transparency, and empirically-driven planning and design into SSA in the pursuit of U.S. interests and values.

AM&E is perhaps the weakest link of the SSA reform effort, yet it is the area that could most effectively help the U.S. government measure the impact and return on investment of the billions of dollars spent on SSA programs. The SSA goals, however, are ambitious—coordinating AM&E efforts and lessons across cross-funded, multi-year, multi-sectoral programs to address national security and broader foreign policy objectives. With policy and lawmakers’ attention focused on improving SSA, there is a window of opportunity for the primary SSA program implementers, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS), to leverage the lessons learned by the U.S. development community—including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) alongside other private and non-governmental organizations—to critically examine and strengthen AM&E for SSA.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – Compartmentalized

The disad’s NOT about overstretching the people publishing the studies, rather the people planning and implementing the programs that are supposed to be studied – those people do trade off

Dyekman 7 Gregory J. Dyekman, Colonel, U.S. Army, Chief of Effects Assessment and Targeting in the Strategic Operations Directorate, MultiNational Force Iraq, MSS Army War College, MS Management, Troy State University, “Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007, /GoGreen!

COCOMs will also likely face continued challenges in finding sufficient resources in the form of military personnel to conduct security cooperation programs. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) does not apportion forces specifically for security cooperation, and they must come from forces assigned to a COCOM’s AOR or that temporarily deploy for engagement activities.40 For the foreseeable future, the deployment requirements to support the GWOT will continue to leave few opportunities for active and reserve component units to participate in coalition and multinational exercises. In struggling to meet its surge requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is falling short in its ability to resource the steady-state deterrence and partner enabling missions called for in the QDR strategy.41 To address this shortcoming, President George W. Bush’s 2008 budget contains proposed funding for an additional end-strength increase of 92,000 troops for the Army and Marine Corps by 2013.42 This increase is not only necessary now, but also is required post-Iraq/Afghanistan. The Army must be forthright and convincing with the nation’s civilian defense leadership about the future force structure required to meet the myriad of “Boots on the Ground” tasks necessitated by an uncertain and complex environment.43

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – No Tradeoff

Mission creep supercharges the link – plan’s NATO-specific authorization will be stretched by non-NATO planners who game the system

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!

Similarly, authorities that restrict activities to specific mission areas are seen as inflexible in the face of quickly emerging threats, making it difficult to build partner capacity in intended mission areas and further impelling SC personnel to “game” the system to achieve their SC objectives. After 2001 and until recently, the priority for U.S. national security strategy and for SC (and DoD activity in particular) has been counterterrorism.24 Congress established Section 1206 and many other recent SC authorities on the basis of the need to rapidly respond (and help partners respond) to threats from al-Qaeda and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). But as the CT mission area has been addressed in the past ten to 15 years, other missions have emerged that are becoming priorities for the United States and its partners but that are not explicitly covered under the CT rubric (or under “stability operations,” another area addressed in authorities). These other emerging areas include cyber warfare and “hybrid” warfare of the type Russia has utilized to subjugate eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea (gaps are also addressed in a subsequent section of this chapter). Capstone DoD strategic planning guidance that defines priorities and directs the efforts of the CCMDs also identifies nontraditional threats, such as transnational border security, maritime security, and foreign fighters.25 While Congress and the administration have created some specific programs to bolster Ukraine and eastern NATO allies,26 existing authorities do not provide the flexibility for SC personnel to pursue these mission areas in other nations or regions. Thus, they are left with “stretching” existing authorities to achieve key objectives with partners.27

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – No Tradeoff

It’s NOT a one-shot deal – it’s an ongoing, ever-expanding commitment to thirty countries – planners perceive multiplicative, NOT just additive, opportunity costs

Gold 21 Zack Gold, Ralph Espach, Douglas Jackson, and Nicholas Bradford, researchers in the Strategy, Policy, and Plans division of the Center for Naval Analyses, where they have conducted numerous evaluations of security cooperation activities for the U.S. military in recent years, “A Better Way to Measure Returns on U.S. Security Cooperation Investments,” Defense One, 6-16-2021, /GoGreen!

Second, even if the returns were quantifiable, the real costs of security cooperation for the U.S. military are often unmeasurable. For example, past analysis indicates that the structure of the Navy’s cost accounting system makes it impossible to know the full, exact cost of any security cooperation deployment or activity. Additionally, there is opportunity cost in every decision about security cooperation. In Washington, the focus in recent years has been on realigning resources for great power competition. However, each geographic combatant command has dozens of partners. How, for example, can one accurately calculate the real and opportunity costs of conducting a bilateral exercise with Brazil as opposed to Colombia; or even with the UAE navy versus the UAE armed forces?

Third, return on investment focuses on the wrong unit of analysis. By trying to quantify the costs and returns of isolated security cooperation activities, evaluations fail to capture the full context of security cooperation with U.S. partners. The U.S. conducts security cooperation as integrated, iterative, or mutually supporting activities that involve multiple countries or multiple elements of a single country. For example, providing a patrol craft, training a crew, and exercising patrol operations are all discrete security cooperation activities, but which is responsible for building a partner’s maritime patrol capability—and can any of these activities achieve that desired outcome without the others? The outcomes of these activities are therefore not an additive result of individual security cooperation activities, but oftentimes a multiplicative one, further reducing the utility of return on investment as a useful tool.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
NEG DA—DoD O/S › LINKS › AT: N/L – No Tradeoff

Structural limitations compound – scarce staffing and budgetary constraints, a spaghetti bowl of conflicting authorities, funding cycles, and reporting requirements, and high turnover ALL make tradeoffs in DoD planning unavoidable – they cannot walk and chew gum

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!

First, the proliferation and complexity of authorities make it difficult to develop security cooperation initiatives with partners, especially ambitious efforts that integrate several types of activities requiring multiple authorities. Every authority details different requirements and constraints concerning which partners are eligible, under what circumstances, and with what reporting requirements. Military planners in the field often have little experience managing security cooperation and rotate every two to three years, while more experienced DoD civilians are few in number with perhaps a handful to support a combatant command. Many initiatives require several authorities using different sources of funding on different cycles with different processes and restrictions, and different congressional reporting requirements. Should funding for one of these authorities fall through, major events may be canceled or radically restructured. Despite its value in helping deploy partners to Afghanistan, the Coalition Readiness Support Program example discussed earlier provided only one of the five authorities necessary to support four infantry battalions from the country of Georgia. Similarly, it was one of only six authorities required to loan Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to another country. In addition to the inefficiencies created by this patchwork approach, the delays and changes that result from associated planning problems can generate confusion with partners and setbacks in strengthening relationships and building a partner’s capabilities. Even more-modest efforts can require multiple authorities, leading some planners to avoid smaller programs because they may only have time for one or two high-visibility efforts. Finally, greater complexity has required greater involvement by DoD lawyers to interpret what is and is not allowed, with different interpretations by different individuals or organizations or at different times. For example, can a particular maritime training event be considered a counterterrorism effort? Can a particular exercise pay for certain civilians to attend? Legal uncertainties like these have resulted in delays and cancellations, generating further frustration and confusion between U.S. and foreign military planners.