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Cole 21 Emily Cole, program officer for governance, justice and security in the Applied Conflict Transformation Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, MALD Fletcher School at Tufts University, BA Amherst College; and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, security governance advisor at USIP, formerly worked at the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism, served in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, PhD, MA international relations, University of Cambridge, BA world politics Hamilton College; “To Consolidate Democracy, Change U.S. Security Assistance,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 12-16-2021, /GoGreen!
Ample evidence—including the global surge in coups d’états and crises of police violence from Brazil and Nigeria to the Philippines—shows that dozens of countries must improve not only the “kinetic” capacities, but also their governance, of police, military and other security institutions. Yet a first outline last week of the new U.S. “initiative for democratic renewal” omits any mention of this vital task. The United States and its allies must re-shape their assistance to support democracy and human rights. In some countries—for example Egypt and Uganda—U.S. security sector assistance has helped to consolidate authoritarianism. Current trends risk exacerbating the problem in a “race to the bottom” among the United States, Russia and China.
U.S. policies too often set aside the nation’s commitment to democratic values on a flawed assumption that this is necessary to advance U.S. interests amid great-power competition. Yet democratic backsliding and authoritarianism create long-term risks of violence, instability and extremism. Even measured by the narrower metric of strategic military alliances, these risks weaken U.S. security interests. Serious democratic backsliding preceded Turkey’s decision to purchase one or more Russian S-400 missile defense systems. Democratic backsliding in the Philippines weakened the U.S.-Philippine security relationship to the point of endangering the agreement that has enabled a U.S. troop presence in the Philippines. Worldwide, democratic deficiencies help push countries into the arms of China or Russia.
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Henry 20 Iain D. Henry, Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, 44(4), Spring 2020, pp.45-83, DOI 0.1162/isec_a_00375 /GoGreen!
This interdependence debate has usually focused on adversarial interactions and reputations for resolve, defined as “the extent to which a state will risk war to keep its promises and uphold its threats.” Loyalty is usually assumed to be the obvious “flip side” of resolve, and is not often studied in its own right.8 Some studies of reputation and alliances exist, but are predominantly focused on alliance formation rather than management.9 Because loyalty has not received the significant scholarly attention centered on resolve, alliance interdependence is undertheorized.10 But as the contemporary debate about Taiwan highlights, beliefs about loyalty and alliance interdependence could be a decisive influence on policy today. If alliance interdependence exists, scholars and policymakers urgently need to know how it works.
I argue that both the deterrence theorists and the reputation skeptics are wrong. Alliance interdependence exists—what happens in one alliance can affect others—but this is not determined by a national moral character of innate loyalty. When a state observes its ally's behavior in another alliance, it does not hope to see loyalty per se. Instead, it hopes to see proof that the ally's interests align with its own. In some cases, it will be in the observer state's interest for its ally to fulfill a separate alliance commitment—that is, the state will want its ally to be loyal to the other ally. But in other cases, where loyalty would not be in the observer state's interest, it will want its ally to be disloyal to the other ally. This reasoning contrasts starkly with other theories, which expect that a state will always want its ally to demonstrate inherent, pure loyalty. I argue that the state is unconcerned about whether its ally's behavior is loyal or disloyal in any objective or moral sense. Rather, when the state is confident that its ally's interests align with its own, and therefore the alliance poses no risk of either abandonment or entrapment, then the ally is reliable.11 Observed reliability—not innate loyalty—is what states want from allies. If an ally poses risks of entrapment, abandonment, or both, then it is unreliable, and the state will act to mitigate these risks. Responses could include hedging, diplomatic restraint initiatives, intra-alliance bargaining, threats of defection, attempts to entrap the ally, or, in extremis, alliance abrogation, bandwagoning, or nuclear proliferation.12
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Hoffman 15 Frank G. Hoffman, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University, former Senior Director, Naval Capabilities and Readiness, Department of the Navy, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) US Marine Corps Reserve, PhD War Studies, King’s College, London, MA Security Studies, Naval War College, MEd George Mason University, “Just How Dangerous Is It Really?” War On The Rocks, 3-17-2015, /GoGreen!
In his recent Congressional testimony, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Marine Lt. Gen. Vince Stewart provided a worldwide threat assessment that noted “A confluence of global political, military, social, and technological developments, which, taken in aggregate, have created security challenges more diverse and complex than those we have experienced in our lifetimes.”
This judgment runs directly counter to the arguments in a new book with a question as its title: A Dangerous World? The central theme of this anthology is that perceptions of the threats the United States faces are unrealistic or manifestly exaggerated. The contributors to this anthology are commendably consistent on these points, to a fault. They want the country and the Pentagon to confront real threats rather than preferred demons and warn the reader to be leery about accepting the “revealed wisdom” about the dangers the people of the United States face. In that regard, this book is a healthy (but not entirely convincing) exercise in challenging longstanding threat perceptions.
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Shaw 21 Ryan Shaw, Senior Advisor and Professor of Practice in History and Strategy at Arizona State University, PhD, MA history, Yale University, BA American Government and Politics, US Military Academy at West Point, “In Defense of Competition,” Real Clear Defense, 11-11-2021, /GoGreen!
As the Pentagon readies its new National Defense Strategy, the commentariat—unsurprisingly—has some thoughts. While the perspectives are, no doubt, as varied as the array of think tanks and universities from which they spring, there seems to be a significant piling on against both the “Great Power Competition” that animated Trump-era guidance and the (allegedly distinct) “Strategic Competition” terminology advanced by the Biden administration. But “competition” is a rare instance of bipartisan continuity because it speaks to real and important dynamics in the international system, and it has led to important new thinking in our approach to national security. We should not be so quick to discard it.
Rather than abandoning competition, it is time now to double down. The Pentagon strategy should embrace a robust concept of integrated deterrence, and the White House should lead with a National Security Strategy (NSS) rooted in a holistic approach to Competitive Statecraft.
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McNerney 16 Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland, “Department of Defense and Security Cooperation: Improving Prioritization, Authorities, and Evaluations,” testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, U.S. Senate, 3-9-2016, /GoGreen!
Addressing the challenges of evaluation also requires breaking down the process of evaluation into its component parts, which we think of as “AM&E”: baseline assessments, monitoring of performance, and evaluations of effectiveness. But before looking at AM&E—and this relates to my earlier point about prioritization—senior leaders must decide what is worth measuring. In command headquarters in Afghanistan, Germany, Iraq, Honolulu, and Tampa, I have seen massive slide presentations and spreadsheets analyzing various security cooperation activities until it all becomes a blur, and I surrender to the operations researchers and engineers who have designed them. How much more difficult is this process for congressional overseers who review an even greater scope of national security issues? These slides and spreadsheets may well be important for the organizations in which they reside, but evaluations must translate into something that can highlight a few key areas of progress and problems.
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McNerney 16 Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland, “Department of Defense and Security Cooperation: Improving Prioritization, Authorities, and Evaluations,” testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, U.S. Senate, 3-9-2016, /GoGreen!
Make no mistake: Working with foreign militaries is more art than science. But it certainly shouldn’t be abstract art. Security cooperation is most effective when it’s based on coordinated planning and informed by rigorous analysis. But ultimately, it must be tailored by the dedicated men and women serving overseas to meet the realities they face on the ground. Clear guidance and intensive training are crucial to ensure that they can overcome the many challenges that arise in this line of work.
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Van Eerden 20 Captain James R. R. Van Eerden, deputy director, chief operations officer, and Marine detachment officer-in-charge, National Security Agency, graduate of the Expeditionary Warfare School, Marine Corps University, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise: A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11(1), Spring 2020, DOI 10.21140/mcuj.2020110105, pp.113-126 /GoGreen!
Despite the many benefits of adopting the methodology, there are also some drawbacks. One potential problem with the methodology is that it can create a culture of chasing the data, where security cooperation teams and partner forces are motivated by test performance at the expense of genuine teaching and learning. Although this challenge is worth consideration, it is not enough to overcome the need for assessments. When properly trained, security cooperation instructors recognize that assessments are only one aspect of effective education. A healthy educational culture is established by team leadership, and trainers must be willing to adjust the format and frequency of the assessments to prevent unhealthy obsession about data. One method for reducing the focus on assessments during partner force engagements is to ensure that the assessment results are anonymous. Reflecting on his time as a security cooperation team leader in Gabon and Ghana in 2017, First Lieutenant Brendan Gallahue summarized his approach to testing: “At the end of the initial assessment, we debriefed the group on how they performed and explained the average score for the collective unit, without posting each individual’s scores.”20 Security cooperation teams can mitigate an unhealthy assessment culture by promoting groupwide improvement and retaining close control of assessment results.
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Shah 18 Hijab Shah, research associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program; “Security Cooperation as a National Defense Strategy Tool,” Commentary, 10-3-2018, /GoGreen!
Security cooperation has long been a vital tool of U.S. foreign policy. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) elevates its importance. “Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners” is one of the three pillars delineated in the NDS as a major line of effort against strategic competitors such as Russia and China. As the United States evolves its global approach in the face of increasingly complex security challenges, the U.S. government may find that it is more reliant than ever on allies and partners in the pursuit of shared security goals in key conflict theatres and broader regions of interest. This will involve a spectrum of activities including institutional capacity building, training, exercises, education, and arms sales, to meet operational, transactional, and broader foreign policy objectives. Historically, this has been a source of strength for the United States, building a network of partners and allies to address common problems beyond which the United States may be able to accomplish alone. Security cooperation is thus a way to ensure U.S. superiority in this era of strategic competition. However, countervailing priorities in the current U.S. administration challenge this formulation. In addition, questions remain as to how the Department of Defense—and more broadly, the U.S. national security interagency—will organize for and resource the strategic application of security cooperation.
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McNerney 16 Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland, “Department of Defense and Security Cooperation: Improving Prioritization, Authorities, and Evaluations,” testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, U.S. Senate, 3-9-2016, /GoGreen!
Evaluation is the ultimate goal of AM&E and requires that all other components work well. Providing a piece of equipment or training a military officer is not an end unto itself. Investments require following up to make sure that they yield the full potential benefits that were expected. Many organizations inside and outside the U.S. government have put a heavy emphasis on the ability to evaluate progress toward objectives. The Gates Foundation and World Bank have been trailblazers in this field. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S. Agency for International Development, and State Department have all found at least some success in evaluations, even in areas that are not amenable to quantifiable metrics. Within DoD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict oversees a promising evaluation process for its Section 2282 Train and Equip program.
In the case of the Section 2282 program, DoD uses a small team of independent outside evaluators who have established reasonable, common standards of capability and performance for the types of missions supported by this authority. These standards are applicable to all partner nations that receive assistance. The team visits the recipient partner organizations about one year after training and equipment is provided, both to monitor use of the assistance and to evaluate the effects of that assistance. Results— the good, the bad, and the ugly—are consolidated into an annual report that highlights key points for the Secretary of Defense to transmit to Congress. The teams have been to 20 countries in the past four years and have documented their approach in a handbook to ensure consistency of application.
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Marquis 16 Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Policy Researcher at RAND; Merrie Archer, Senior Pol-Mil Policy & Plans Advisor, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, MA International Affairs, Economic and Political Development, Columbia University; Jeremy Boback, assistant policy researcher at RAND; and David Stebbins, senior policy analyst at RAND; “Developing an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Framework for U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation,” RR1611, RAND Corporation, 2016, /GoGreen!
AME focused on measuring and improving return on investment is a powerful tool for strategic decisionmaking, including resource allocation in support of current and future programs and activities. A standardized AME regimen applied across activities helps policymakers and implementers make more informed decisions that maximize immediate outcomes and help ensure programmatic sustainability and impact in the longer term.
Although the thrust of the AME effort is still being determined within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, there are indications of the direction in which important elements of DoD would prefer to head. Interviews conducted by officials in OSD in 2015 with security cooperation stakeholders, decisionmakers, and practitioners throughout DoD and within relevant interagency circles8 on their priorities for AME revealed an overwhelming concern with informing better outcomes now and improving future policy and programs, closely followed by improving utilization of security cooperation as a tool and informing resource allocation decisions.
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Pretelt 21 Maj. Carlos De Castro Pretelt, U.S. Army, Foreign Area Officer serving as the Operations Section Chief at the Office of Defense Coordination in Mexico City, MA International Policy and Practice, George Washington University, MA International Management, University of Phoenix, BS social psychology, Park University, “Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation,” Small Wars Journal, 7-17-2021, /GoGreen!
Measuring the effectiveness of security cooperation has long been an elusive, pervasive and complicated ordeal. Due to congressional guidance, there is a building impetus to ameliorate the established approach and develop new ways to meet this challenge. To remain relevant, security cooperation practitioners must become creative, methodical, and rigorous in their assessments of past and future initiatives to unambiguously demonstrate the positive impact of their proposals. Customized training will go a long way towards addressing this, but there will also have to be organizational changes. Security cooperation is an important program that grants the DoD the opportunity to develop stronger bilateral ties with partner nations and strengthen alliances. Unfortunately, its effectiveness has greatly varied due to the frequent creation of poorly justified and/or planned initiatives that oftentimes have no discernable long-term effect, at best, and, at worst, create more security challenges for our partners.
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Tankel 15 Stephen Tankel, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment and assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University; and Dafna Rand, former deputy director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta fellow at the Center for a New American Security; “Security Assistance Isn’t the Quick Fix the US Thinks It Is,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8-6-2015, /GoGreen!
Security assistance and cooperation has been a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft for decades. The post-9/11 interest in using assistance and cooperation to incentivize and enable local partners contributed to the creation of a slew of new authorities and programs. Yet, despite its strategic centrality and large price tag, our report argues that many security assistance and cooperation programs fail to achieve U.S. objectives because of strategic and structural deficiencies.
Strategically, U.S. policymakers are often not clear about the specific outcomes they intend to achieve with security assistance and cooperation. Even when objectives are clear, there may be too many of them for a single program, which results in conflicting objectives. This is especially troublesome when pressing, short-term objectives subvert long-term U.S. goals. Also, there is currently no system in place to adequately assess outcomes. This not only risks wasting taxpayers’ dollars. Failure to assess progress and adjust programs accordingly can actually reduce U.S. influence with recipient states, which may believe they can free-ride or begin to view assistance as an entitlement. The practice of using security assistance to build relationships sometimes contributes to this problem. So does the fact that policymakers too often look to security assistance as a quick fix or way to address demands to “do something.”
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Pretelt 21 Maj. Carlos De Castro Pretelt, U.S. Army, Foreign Area Officer serving as the Operations Section Chief at the Office of Defense Coordination in Mexico City, MA International Policy and Practice, George Washington University, MA International Management, University of Phoenix, BS social psychology, Park University, “Taking a Bite out of the Elephant: How to Improve Security Cooperation,” Small Wars Journal, 7-17-2021, /GoGreen!
Measuring the effectiveness of security cooperation has long been an elusive, pervasive and complicated ordeal. Due to congressional guidance, there is a building impetus to ameliorate the established approach and develop new ways to meet this challenge. To remain relevant, security cooperation practitioners must become creative, methodical, and rigorous in their assessments of past and future initiatives to unambiguously demonstrate the positive impact of their proposals. Customized training will go a long way towards addressing this, but there will also have to be organizational changes. Security cooperation is an important program that grants the DoD the opportunity to develop stronger bilateral ties with partner nations and strengthen alliances. Unfortunately, its effectiveness has greatly varied due to the frequent creation of poorly justified and/or planned initiatives that oftentimes have no discernable long-term effect, at best, and, at worst, create more security challenges for our partners.
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Munson 13 Peter J. Munson, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation, retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War On The Rocks, 9-10-2013, /GoGreen! *added [warrantless]
As the Arab world continues to unravel, violence re-escalates in Iraq, and withdrawal from Afghanistan portends, this appears to be a good time to consider U.S. security cooperation (SC) policy. Security cooperation is a cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy, especially as the Department of Defense looks ahead at attenuated budgets and force structure. Planners imagine that security cooperation is a force multiplier; a way to do more with less. At face value, it extends U.S. influence and enables and influences partners to foster and improve security in their region, forestalling crisis, and replacing U.S. presence with like-minded regional guardians of the international status quo. While the idea makes much sense in the abstract, once it collides with the messy reality of military institutions and domestic politics in the world’s most troubled region, it becomes sometimes comically, sometimes disastrously, out of touch with reality.
Security cooperation is defined in the Security Assistance Management Manual as,
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Van Eerden 20 Captain James R. R. Van Eerden, deputy director, chief operations officer, and Marine detachment officer-in-charge, National Security Agency, graduate of the Expeditionary Warfare School, Marine Corps University, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise: A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11(1), Spring 2020, DOI 10.21140/mcuj.2020110105, pp.113-126 /GoGreen!
Abstract: Despite the billions of dollars invested in the security cooperation enterprise each year, the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense (DOD) have failed to implement standardized metrics and processes for evaluating security cooperation engagements at the tactical level. Without such data, it is nearly impossible for the security cooperation enterprise to accurately assess progress in achieving national security objectives, such as partner nation basing access and partner force capacity building. Without clear signposts of progress, cooperation engagements will continue to be hampered by redundant or irrelevant training that limits the return on investment for the DOD and strategic U.S. partners.
Keywords: security cooperation, Marine Corps, Department of Defense, cooperation agreements, national security objectives, return on investment, data, metrics
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Clare 22 Stephen Clare, Research Fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, MSc Renewable Resources, McGill University's Department of Natural Resource Sciences, BA, BS, Sustainability Studies, McMaster University, “Modelling Great Power conflict as an existential risk factor,” Effective Altruism Forum, 2-3-2022, /GoGreen!
First, I want to show how tensions between Great Powers can affect existential risk even if they don’t lead to direct conflict.
The history of nuclear risk demonstrates this effect. Nuclear weapons are arguably the greatest threat to the long-term future that humanity has created so far. While they were invented during World War II, their proliferation and the invention of new delivery mechanisms such as submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles occurred after the war, amid mutual fear of conflict between the US and Soviet Union.
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Frühling 21 Stephan Frühling, Associate Dean, Partnerships and Engagement in the College of Asia and the Pacific at The Australian National University, former ‘Partner across the Globe’ research fellow in the research division of the NATO Defense College; and Andrew O’Neil, Acting Dean of the Graduate Research School and Professor of Political Science at Griffith University, formerly worked with Australia’s Department of Defence; “Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation,” Chapter 1, Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century, eds. Frühling & O’Neil, ANU Press, 2021, ISBN 9781760464912, pp.1-5 /GoGreen!
As great power competition once again assumes a central place in international relations, alliances have taken on renewed importance in the security calculations of Australia and other US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Deterrence of an attack on allies is a core function of US alliances, as are mechanisms through which states seek to manage the risk of escalation—the movement through increasing intensity of conflict up to, in the extreme, global nuclear war.1 Alliances seek to prevent escalation in the form of an attack on its members through strategies of deterrence and extended deterrence that are themselves predicated on credible threats of escalation. Nuclear weapons are central to deterrence and escalation considerations and form a key component of America’s strategic toolkit to reassure Japan, South Korea and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the Euro-Atlantic.
However, allies cannot afford to be passive actors in their interactions with Washington. They need to prepare for and seek to manage escalation in a broader geostrategic, technological and political context that shapes the ability of alliances to adapt to a new security environment. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This volume brings together contributors from Europe, North-East Asia, the United States and Australia to better understand these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence in twenty-first century alliances. It focuses on nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and strategic competition between the US and China; the role of non-nuclear US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe in supporting US extended nuclear deterrence; political-military challenges in alliance plans for escalation; allied perspectives on the consequences of new non-nuclear capabilities, including cyber and hypersonic weapons, for deterrence and strategic stability; and lessons on how the US and allied nations can better engage their respective publics on questions relating to nuclear deterrence.
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Shaw 21 Ryan Shaw, Senior Advisor and Professor of Practice in History and Strategy at Arizona State University, PhD, MA history, Yale University, BA American Government and Politics, US Military Academy at West Point, “In Defense of Competition,” Real Clear Defense, 11-11-2021, /GoGreen!
As the Pentagon readies its new National Defense Strategy, the commentariat—unsurprisingly—has some thoughts. While the perspectives are, no doubt, as varied as the array of think tanks and universities from which they spring, there seems to be a significant piling on against both the “Great Power Competition” that animated Trump-era guidance and the (allegedly distinct) “Strategic Competition” terminology advanced by the Biden administration. But “competition” is a rare instance of bipartisan continuity because it speaks to real and important dynamics in the international system, and it has led to important new thinking in our approach to national security. We should not be so quick to discard it.
Rather than abandoning competition, it is time now to double down. The Pentagon strategy should embrace a robust concept of integrated deterrence, and the White House should lead with a National Security Strategy (NSS) rooted in a holistic approach to Competitive Statecraft.
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Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!
The proliferation of complicated authorities has led to a number of pernicious effects in DoD’s SC enterprise. Two deserve mention here. First, authorities and related programs require that staff in DoD stakeholder organizations—particularly the CCMDs, OSD, and the agencies—are available to plan their use and develop initiatives or events, shepherd them through the myriad justification and approval processes, and manage and report on their execution. The greater the number of authorities required to achieve stakeholder objectives, the larger the staff required to properly manage them. But at the same time, the catalog of authorities has expanded, while budget cuts have required staff contraction across DoD. This leaves stakeholders with “too many programs…and not enough people to execute” because “we are losing people who manage the programs.”28 While OSD has at times sought to hone a reach-back capacity to provide advice to the CCMDs, the expanding catalog of authorities still requires a larger staff to properly manage them. This forces SC personnel to consider the cost-benefit of doing some events with multiple funding sources given the man-hours and workload required to manage use of separate authorities, whereby “small programs aren’t worth the time.”29 This also leads to programs that are not executable in the field.30
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O’Mahony 18 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; Ilana Blum, researcher at RAND; Gabriela Armenta, researcher at RAND; Nicholas Burger, senior economist at RAND and director of RAND’s Washington office; Joshua Mendelsohn, researcher at RAND; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Steven W. Popper, researcher at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; “Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation,” RR2165, RAND Corporation, 2018, /GoGreen!
Evaluating the effectiveness of security cooperation in a systematic and rigorous way, however, is challenging, particularly at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) levels. First, while security cooperation activities tend to be short term and specific, the strategic theater objectives that security cooperation activities are designed to accomplish are often long term and not well defined. Second, the causal relationships that link security cooperation activities to desired outcomes are often not well understood. Finally, collecting information relevant for evaluating security cooperation effectiveness can be difficult. Although all Army security cooperation activities should be assessed through objective and rigorous after-action reporting and all security cooperation tasks should be evaluated through measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, current Army security cooperation is constrained by poor collection of relevant information.
Regardless of the difficulties inherent in evaluating security cooperation activities, the Army and, more broadly, the Department of Defense (DoD) are facing congressional pressure for increased accountability. In response, the DoD is developing an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) policy for its security cooperation enterprise. In the DoD’s AM&E construct, assessment refers to baseline assessments for leaders and planners that address questions like these: What is the security environment in which these activities will take place? What are the partner’s existing capabilities, and what does the United States want to improve? How well aligned are the partner’s interests and values with those of the United States? Monitoring means tracking efforts to determine whether inputs (e.g., money and effort) are translating into outputs (e.g., equipment, training, education, and information). These outputs then serve as the basis for tracking progress toward objectives (i.e., outcomes). Evaluation examines outcomes and is crucial to understanding what is working and what is not. Success is not ultimately measured by the provision of equipment or training; it is measured by the extent to which security cooperation activities help achieve U.S. objectives. Investments require following up to make sure that they yield the full potential benefits that were expected.1 This study provides a framework and a tool to help the Army improve its