2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Unilateral/Domestic CP › 2AC — DOD Procurement Process Reform Fails
Sisson 22 — Melanie W. Sisson, Fellow in the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution, former Vice President of Analysis at Govini—an early-stage national security artificial intelligence and machine learning technology company, former Senior Fellow and the Director of the Defense Strategy and Planning Program at the Stimson Center, hold a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado-Boulder, 2022 (“Why can’t the Pentagon buy the cutting-edge technology it needs?,” Tech Stream—a Brookings Institution blog, February 23rd, Available Online at https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/why-cant-the-pentagon-buy-the-cutting-edge-technology-it-needs/, Accessed 07-15-2022)
Silicon Valley’s frustration with the Department of Defense is both well-known and well-founded. All too often, the department provides initial funding to develop a promising technology, only to fail to deliver funding adequate to sustain a scaled capability. This gap between initial and sustained funding is so well-known that it has nickname—the so-called “valley of death”—and it makes the Pentagon an unreliable partner. It has gotten bad enough that when defense and technology officials recently convened for the annual Reagan National Defense Forum in California, investors and technologists made clear that their collective tolerance for the Pentagon’s inability to work effectively with the defense innovation base is nearing the point of no return.
The Defense Department is aware of this criticism and has sought to address it via meaningful reform. In a report from earlier this month on competition in the defense industrial base, the DoD reports that these efforts have achieved creditable success in increasing engagement with small businesses through the use of tools like the “Other Transaction Authority,” the “Small Business Innovation Research,” and the “Small Business Technology Transfer” programs. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes similar reform provisions instructing the DoD to streamline contracting—especially of systems that enable software development and adoption—and to expand engagement with new and underused vendors. It also includes an important provision establishing a committee to review and to make recommendations about how to best revise the Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution Process (PPBE), the means through which the Pentagon allocates its resources.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — Plan Solves India-NATO Cooperation
Mohan 22 — C. Raja Mohan, Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies—an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute (India), former Professor of South Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (India) and at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2022 (“India’s NATO Engagement: Old Inhibitions and New Imperatives,” Institute of South Asian Studies Brief, July 12th, Available Online at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/indias-nato-engagement-old-inhibitions-and-new-imperatives/, Accessed 07-18-2022)
Traditionally, India has been stone-cold in its responses to the offers of engagement from the world’s most powerful military alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). India’s reluctance is rooted in its traditional policy of non-alignment and its enduring strategic partnership with the Soviet Union and later Russia.
India’s stand-off attitude, however, faces a new context that at once limits the possibility for New Delhi’s engagement with the alliance and generates new imperatives to engage NATO.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — Status Quo Solves U.S.-Israel EDT Cooperation
Sarantinos 21 — Argie Sarantinos, Public Affairs Specialist at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, 2021 (“DEVCOM opens office in Israel, fosters partnerships with foreign allies,” DEVCOM Press Release, October 18th, Available Online at https://www.army.mil/article/251266/devcom_opens_office_in_israel_fosters_partnerships_with_foreign_allies, Accessed 07-18-2022)
The Israeli-U.S. technology partnership got a boost recently when DEVCOM stood up its newest International Technology Center, ITC-Mediterranean, in Tel Aviv, Israel. The two-person team is small, but its core mission – to find innovative companies in Israel with cutting-edge technologies – is large.
U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, or DEVCOM, reaches across international borders to ensure Soldiers have the best technology available by leveraging ITCs strategically located around the world. The ITCs seek opportunities to partner with foreign companies on technologies that support the Army’s key priorities.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — Plan Solves Israel-NATO Cooperation
Bassist 22 — Rina Bassist, Senior Editor at Al-Monitor, International Correspondent at The Jerusalem Post, former Diplomat at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022 (“Israel draws closer to NATO,” Al-Monitor, June 30th, Available Online at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/israel-draws-closer-nato, Accessed 07-18-2022)
Jerusalem is closely following the annual NATO summit convening this week in Madrid. The dramatic news of an agreement with Turkey for Sweden and Finland to join the alliance has far-reaching implications for the Middle East, Israel and beyond. The new Strategic Concept endorsed yesterday by NATO leaders is also likely to affect its relations with its major non-member partners such as Israel.
Diplomats in Jerusalem and Brussels told Al-Monitor this week that while these geopolitical developments are expected to alter Israel-NATO relations, the changes could actually benefit Israel and make the partnership grow.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — Pakistan DA
Roblin 20 — Sebastien Roblin, 2020 (“Why India-Pakistan's Nuclear Rivalry Is Deadly Serious,” The National Interest, March 3rd, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/buzz/why-india-pakistans-nuclear-rivalry-deadly-serious-129087, Accessed 07-18-2022)
Key Point: If peace ever collapsed, an Indian-Pakistani conflict might not stay regional. Fall out from any nuclear weapons use would devastate the entire world.
While the United States is preoccupied by the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries such as Russia, China or North Korea, the danger of nuclear conflict may actually be greatest between two of its allies, Pakistan and India. The two nations have engaged in four wars starting since their partition along religious lines in 1947. A fifth could be drastically more costly, as their nuclear capabilities continue to grow and diversify.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — Pakistan DA
Sultaana 21 — Saddaf Sultaana, Ph.D. Candidate in the Strategic Studies Department at the National Defence University (Pakistan), 2021 (“India-Israel Defence Cooperation: Security Implications for Pakistan,” Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses, Volume 7, Number 1, Available Online at http://thesvi.org/ojs/index.php/ojs/article/view/131/93, Accessed 07-18-2022, p. 156-160)
India-Israel Defence Ties: Security Implications for Pakistan
The defence and military partnership of India and Israel seems to be enduring because of their mutual strategic interests and continuous collaboration. Israel is facilitating India to acquire requisite defence equipment’s, defence production capability and upgraded weapons to maintain their alliance and sustain its ambition to be a major regional as well as a global power. Sophistication in military technology with the help of Israel and the allocation of high budget for defence purpose indicates that India wants to counter the joint threat of Pakistan and China. Hence, India’s regional and global hegemonic approach and growing defence cooperation with Israel is not only destabilizing the regional strategic balance but also carries severe consequences for the stability of South Asian region. Their clandestine relations during the Cold-War era and strong alliance after the Cold-War period proved to be a potential threat especially for Pakistan’s security. India’s obsession with power projection against strategically compatible Pakistan and strong rival China tempts it to find a reliable defence partner and Israel comes in handy.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — No India-Israel-U.S. Alliance Net-Benefit
Kamal 22 — Hassan M. Kamal, Assistant Editor at the Associated Broadcasting Company (India), 2022 (“Explained: Why the new grouping I2U2 is not a West Asian Quad,” News 9, July 14th, Available Online at https://www.news9live.com/world/explained-why-the-new-grouping-i2u2-is-not-a-west-asian-quad-182479, Accessed 07-15-2022)
For the India-Israel-UAE-US alliance to be equated with the Quad, the I2U2 bloc must agree to work together on defence and security, which seems unlikely given the members' competing interests.
The heads of states of India, Israel, the UAE and the US will come together for the first virtual summit of a new bloc known by the moniker I2U2 today. The 'I' stands for Israel and India while the 'U' stands for the UAE and the US.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Trilateral India-Israel-U.S. CP › 2AC — Status Quo Solves India-Israel-U.S. Alliance Net-Benefit
Magid 22 — Jacob Magid, U.S. Correspondent at The Times of Israel, 2022 (“Israel, India, US, UAE unveil joint food security, energy projects at virtual summit,” The Times of Israel, July 14th, Available Online at https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-india-us-uae-unveil-joint-food-security-energy-projects-at-virtual-summit/, Accessed 07-15-2022)
The leaders of Israel, India, the United States and the United Arab Emirates announced on Thursday a pair of massive collaborative projects in the fields of food security and clean energy after they met at a virtual summit during US President Joe Biden’s visit to Jerusalem.
Biden, Prime Minister Yair Lapid, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made the announcement in a joint statement their offices issued during their virtual meeting — the highest-level gathering to date of the new, US-formulated I2U2 forum.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue CP › 1AR — No Quad Net-Benefit
Holmes 20 — James R. Holmes, J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, former Faculty in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, former Surface Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 2020 (“The Quad Is An Important Partnership, But It Is Not NATO,” The National Interest, August 30th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/quad-important-partnership-it-not-nato-192783, Accessed 07-18-2022).
[***Note: This article was probably published in 2020. The date listed is 2021, but there is a note at the bottom that says “This piece first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.” The National Interest does this frequently and it is often confusing.***]
China grumps that the Quad, a league of like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies, is an “Asian NATO” or “mini-NATO” hellbent on “containing” China.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue CP › 1AR — No Quad Net-Benefit
Chowdhury 21 — Debasish Roy Chowdhury, Hong Kong-based Editor and Author specializing in Asian current affairs with a focus on India, former Senior Research Fellow at the Sydney Democracy Network at the University of Sydney (Australia), former Deputy China Editor at the South China Morning Post, holds an M.A. in Economics, 2021 (“Quad is Key to Biden's Strategy in Asia, But the Four-Way Alliance Is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” Time, March 18th, Available Online at https://time.com/5947674/quad-biden-china/, Accessed 07-18-2022)
The clarity with which Biden is mending fences with traditional allies is commendable. But the same can’t be said of the fancy new Asian mega alliance touted as the centerpiece of his Asia play. Biden has cemented an informal grouping of four maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. After over a decade of dithering, the leaders of the U.S., Australia, Japan and India summitted for the first time—albeit virtually—as a strategic bloc last week. The so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, is supposedly an Asian Nato that will act as a bulwark against a rising and assertive China. But its confusing alliance logic, foundational contradictions and deliberate ambiguity make it more like that king of multilateral duds, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—a grouping of nations with nothing in common besides an acronym plucked out of a Goldman Sachs report.
The hype aside, Quad in reality bears no resemblance to Nato. The latter represented a grand strategy of culturally similar Western nations with a mutual history of trust and cooperation forged through conflicts and crises. Nato countries equally shared a perception of Moscow as a threat, resulting in a clear strategy of countering and containing the Soviet Union. Zero commercial entanglement between Nato and the insular Soviet bloc made the goal of containment an uncomplicated exercise.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue CP › 1AR — No Quad Net-Benefit
DePetris 21 — Daniel R. DePetris, Fellow at Defense Priorities, Middle East and Foreign Policy Analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., Researcher at the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, Columnist at the National Interest, The American Conservative, The Huffington Post, and The Washington Examiner, holds an M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, 2021 (“Biden should be aware of the limits of the Quad,” The Hill, September 27th, Available Online at https://thehill.com/opinion/international/574023-biden-should-be-aware-of-the-limits-of-the-quad/, Accessed 07-18-2022)
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi received the red-carpet treatment at the White House last week for the first in-person meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. President Biden’s decision to host the summit comes about six months after the Quad released a joint leaders statement pledging to “commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order” in the Indo-Pacific region.
For Biden, the leaders’ summit is a golden opportunity to elevate a broad theme of his presidency: utilizing international partnerships to manage the challenges of the 21st century, in particular China’s quest to become Asia’s dominant power. But if the Biden administration seeks to turn the Quad into an anti-China balancing coalition or, more dramatically, a new NATO in Asia, it will be setting itself up for disappointment. While Australia, Japan and India all have strong disagreements with China and are growing increasingly concerned about Beijing’s behavior in the region, none of these countries seem especially interested in allowing Washington to dictate its policy in Asia. Unlike Washington, the Japanese, Indians and Australians live in the Indo-Pacific and have to be especially careful before rocking the boat with Beijing.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue CP › 2AC — No Solvency and No Quad Net-Benefit
Menon 21 — Rajan Menon, Emeritus Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair in Political Science at the City College of New York/City University of New York, Senior Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, Global Ethics Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs, former Monroe J. Rathbone Professor and Chairman in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University, former Fellow at the New America Foundation, former Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Special Assistant for Arms Control and National Security to Congressman Solarz, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2021 (“The Quad Is a Delusion,” Foreign Policy, June 28th, Available Online at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/28/quad-delusion-china-power-containment/, Accessed 07-17-2022)
One specific facet of U.S. China policy that also blurs the Trump-Biden distinction is strengthening the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad. Comprised of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, it emerged in 2007 as a brainchild of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and held its first summit this March, after which its members issued a joint statement. Following the conclave, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled to northeast Asia to maintain the momentum. Austin also added India to his itinerary. Chinese officials promptly lambasted the Quad as the real threat to peace and even warned smaller Indo-Pacific countries—Bangladesh for one—not to cooperate with it, essentially repeating the message it delivered to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last fall.
The Quad’s emergence shouldn’t surprise Beijing. Rising powers routinely evoke countervailing coalitions, and shared anxiety about an adversary can contribute to their cohesion—but that’s just a starting point. The Quad’s problem is it doesn’t have much else to run on and hence will ultimately amount to U.S. power with a multilateral veneer.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue CP › 2AC — Quad Innovation Fails
Goodman 21 — Matthew P. Goodman, Senior Vice President for Economics and Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Director for International Economics and Director for Asian Economic Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, former Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, former International Economist at the U.S. Treasury Department, holds an M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, 2021 (“Allied Technology Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 23rd, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/allied-technology-cooperation-opportunities-and-challenges, Accessed 07-18-2022)
On March 12, U.S. president Biden, Japanese prime minister Suga, Indian prime minister Modi, and Australian prime minister Morrison attended the first leader-level summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad. The resulting joint statement pledged to deepen the nascent grouping, which arose in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami but lay dormant from 2008 to 2017, and to expand its focus beyond military exercises and humanitarian aid. Notably, the Quad leaders established three working groups to collaborate on Covid-19 vaccine distribution, climate action, and critical and emerging technologies. The technology working group is the latest of several recent efforts to formalize cooperation among like-minded countries on protecting, regulating, and developing strategic technologies. Since the election of President Biden, such proposals have gained steam, ranging from new multilateral bodies to narrowly scoped technical efforts. Yet there remain significant hurdles to the sort of broad technology partnerships envisioned.
Q1: What is the impetus for cooperation on critical technologies?
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Germany-Italy CP › 2AC — No Strategic Autonomy Net-Benefit
Davidson 22 — Jason W. Davidson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of Mary Washington, Nonresident Senior Fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at The Atlantic Council, holds a Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University, 2022 (“European Strategic Autonomy Is Dead,” The National Interest, June 28th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/european-strategic-autonomy-dead-203222, Accessed 07-15-2022)
On the eve of NATO’s Madrid Summit, one fact of European security has become increasingly clear: NATO is the only feasible guarantor of the security of European states and, thus, the European Union’s (EU) objective of achieving strategic autonomy is unlikely to become a reality anytime soon.
In the early days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would have been reasonable to expect the war would provide the necessary impetus for the European Union to finally achieve strategic autonomy. Unity develops in response to a common threat and Russia’s attack demonstrated its aggressive intentions. Moreover, the Russian threat was such a shock that it seemed to cause a “sea change” in defense policy for many European governments. The Biden administration had already rightfully signaled that it would welcome greater European responsibility for defense and security, as it would allow the United States to focus more on the greater threat posed by China. In a further positive development, the EU published a “Strategic Compass,” outlining its plans for improved defense and security cooperation, only a month after the Russo-Ukrainian War began.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: CPs (General) › 1AR — Alliance Fragmentation Deficit
Simón 22 — Luis Simón, Argyros Family Foundation Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director of the Brussels Office of the Elcano Royal Institute (Spain), Research Professor in International Security and Director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance (Belgium), holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of London (UK), 2022 (“Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 12th, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/bridging-us-led-alliances-euro-atlantic-and-indo-pacific-inter-theater-perspective, Accessed 07-15-2022)
An inter-theater approach to capability development can help preserve the dominance of U.S.-led alliances in both theaters. Even though some U.S. capabilities are global, others will be theater-specific and require adaptations. For instance, “theater-range” missiles may need to adapt to specific range or platform requirements (i.e., sea-borne vs. land-borne) depending on whether they are intended for Europe or Asia. This applies to both offensive and defensive missiles. Including allies in U.S.-led capability planning initiatives can generate economies of scale and make it easier for the United States to develop skeleton concepts that can draw on allied support and participation to bring about appropriate adaptations for each theater. Moreover, the need to preserve dominance at sea and in other global commons should also incentivize inter-allied cooperation in developing naval, air, cyber, and space capabilities and technologies.
Strengthening links between U.S.-led alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific in the area of operational planning would give both sets of allies greater insight into the military-strategic picture in each other’s region and how such a picture may affect U.S. and allied planning in real time. It would also allow them to assess possible implications for their home region and identify opportunities to add value in each other’s region, as well as in underpinning U.S. and allied dominance at sea and in the other global commons. Thus, allies could consider the establishment of permanent liaison officers from AP4 countries in Supreme Allied Command Europe and throughout NATO’s command structure, as well as a NATO liaison cell in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and more joint exercises.42
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: CPs (General) › 1AR — NATO Emerging Tech Key
Magula and Alvarez-Couceiro 21 — Justin Magula, Army Strategist in the Strategic Landpower and Futures Group at the U.S. Army War College, holds an M.A. in International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University, and Paula Alvarez-Couceiro, Analyst at Martin+Crumpton Group LLC—a global strategic advisory company based in Washington, DC, holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies and International Economics from Johns Hopkins University, 2021 (“Maintaining and Improving NATO’s Technological Edge,” Wavell Room, September 30th, Available Online at https://wavellroom.com/2021/09/30/maintaining-improving-natos-technological-edge-technology/, Accessed 07-04-2022)
What happens when an alliance’s competitors quickly improve their technology and capabilities to place the alliance at increased risk? The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) addressed this dilemma during a recent summit in Brussels. At the summit, the North Atlantic Council built upon NATO’s 2030 strategic outline and presented targets for increased technological collaboration to counter growing threats from Russia, China, and non-state actors. While NATO’s scientific and technical superiority has historically allowed it to outpace competitors, its adversaries are quickly closing the gap.
NATO members still hold advantages in their development of new technologies. According to the Global Innovation Index, seven of the top ten most innovative countries globally are part of NATO, while the other three are key NATO partners. Even so, NATO can do more to harness the alliance’s combined technological prowess to better compete and win in a future conflict. As China seeks to become the world’s innovation leader and Russia continues to undermine the alliance’s security, NATO will need to out-innovate its competitors and prepare for an uncertain future.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: CPs (General) › 2AC — NATO Emerging Tech Key
Korb and Cimbala 22 — Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, former Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, former Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense (from 1981 to 1985), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the State University of New York at Albany, and Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University at Brandywine, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2022 (“How NATO Can Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century,” The National Interest, June 7th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-nato-can-meet-challenges-twenty-first-century-202852, Accessed 07-10-2022)
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s February attack on Ukraine was a strategic blunder. NATO had already established itself as the most successful and longest-lasting military alliance in modern history. Putin’s invasion has only served to strengthen NATO by rallying an unprecedented post-Cold War consensus within the alliance in favor of military preparedness and a shared commitment to deter aggression against any member. In addition, NATO member states have strongly supported the economic sanctions and other political measures to isolate Russia and raise the costs attendant to Russia’s continued fighting in Ukraine. Additionally, in May, political leaders in Finland and Sweden announced their intention to apply for NATO membership. The likely addition of two formerly neutral states to the alliance will further add to Russia’s discomfiture and NATO’s optimism about its ability to deter further aggression in Europe.
In the aftermath of Putin’s invasion and NATO’s likely expansion, however, complacency among member states should be avoided. Deterring Russia in the short term understates the demands that the international system and European politics will impose on an expanded NATO in the years to come. NATO’s political cohesion, military readiness, and escalation management skills will be essential for dealing with a variety of challenges and open questions. Among these include what to do with a post-Putin Russia; deterring and defeating transnational terrorism; the alliance’s relationship with a rising China; member states’ ability to maintain stable democratic regimes within their own countries and promote democratic institutions among non-NATO states; and adapting the alliance’s military strategy to a new world of technology that privileges cognitive warfare, space, and cyber capabilities.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › Case Backlines › They Say: “Status Quo Solves”
Grabar-Kitarović 22 — Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, Member of the Advisory Committee of the Future Security and Defence Council at GLOBSEC—a think tank in Slovakia, former President of Croatia (from 2015 to 2020), former NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy, former Croatian Ambassador to the United States, holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Zagreb (Croatia), 2022 (“NATO Must Ensure Defense and Civilian Industries Work Together,” Defense One, June 16th, Available Online at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/nato-must-ensure-defense-and-civilian-industries-work-together/368250/, Accessed 07-03-2022)
The internet, microwaves, and synthetic rubber came into our lives as products invented for military purposes. Even everyday things, such as undershirts and concentrated fruit juice were created to improve the combat readiness of armed forces. Though many people typically associate the military with war and suffering, this industry has been a source of incredible progress, producing inventions that made our lives longer, healthier, and easier. These days, innovation is likely to run the other way, with the military benefiting from inventions developed with private funding.
A symbiotic relationship between military needs and human progress is not necessarily the default. Instead, it requires a well-oiled innovation ecosystem in which military and civilian industries share their expertise and knowledge with one another. NATO has recently announced several initiatives to build on past success, but more are needed—particularly as members increase their military funding.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Pettyjohn and Wasser 22 — Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, Adjunct Professor in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, former Senior Political Scientist and Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, and Becca Wasser, Fellow in the Defense Program and Co-Leader of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, Adjunct Instructor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, former Program Officer and Research Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK), holds an M.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, 2022 (“A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear: War-Gaming Reveals How a U.S.-Chinese Conflict Might Escalate,” Foreign Affairs, May 20th, Available Online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear, Accessed 07-12-2022)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.
A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › 1AC (Less Highlighted) › 1AC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage
Colby 22 — Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of The Marathon Institute—a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development at the U.S. Department of Defense, Recipient of the Distinguished and Exceptional Public Service Awards from the U.S. Department of Defense and of the Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the U.S. Department of State, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2022 (“China, Not Russia, Still Poses the Greatest Challenge to U.S. Security,” The National Interest, July 1st, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-not-russia-still-poses-greatest-challenge-us-security-203228, Accessed 07-12-2022)
American foreign policy after—indeed, during—the Russo-Ukrainian War should promptly head to the world’s most decisive region: Asia. This will require that American foreign and defense policy genuinely put Asia first—in our military investments, in our allocation of political capital and resources, and in our leaders’ attention.
Nothing that has happened since Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine has changed a set of facts: Asia is the world’s largest market area, and it is growing in global share. Located in the middle of Asia is China which, alongside the United States, is one of the world’s two superpowers. China’s behavior has become increasingly aggressive and domineering and appears oriented toward establishing Beijing’s hegemony over Asia. If Beijing achieves this goal, the resulting consequences for American life will be dire.