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2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › 1NC — Conflict Resolution Advantage

4. Arms control is already strong…The NPT has already created powerful norms against proliferation, strong verification systems, and has moved the world toward nuclear disarmament.

Robert Einhorn, 3/30/2020 (Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect,” , Retrieved 3/30/2022)

As we mark the 50th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force, there is much to celebrate. Without the treaty, the powerful norm against proliferation it created, its associated controls on exports of sensitive technologies, the rigorous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring system, and the threat of sanctions for violating nonproliferation obligations, we would be living in the world of many nuclear-armed states that President John F. Kennedy predicted. As Mike points out, today there are only nine countries with nuclear weapons, the same number as 25 years ago — a remarkable indication of the NPT’s durability and its contribution to international stability. Without the treaty, and the confidence provided by its IAEA verification system that nuclear equipment and materials would not be diverted to the production of nuclear weapons, the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would not have been possible — not just for electricity generation, but also for the production of isotopes for use in medicine, agriculture, and industry. While the NPT’s central goal was to prevent additional nuclear-armed states, it sought to assure non-nuclear weapon states (who were required to renounce nuclear arms) that the asymmetry between them and the five original nuclear powers (who were allowed to keep their nuclear weapons) would not last forever. It therefore obligated the five — China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. — to make “good faith” efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In the last 50 years, the United States and the USSR/Russia have made huge progress toward nuclear disarmament, reducing their nuclear weapons inventories by close to 90% from Cold War levels. Mike is right that they pursued nuclear arms limitations and reductions primarily because they believed such arms agreements would serve their own security interests, not because they were obliged to do so under the NPT. But Mike is also right that the NPT helped create the stable strategic framework in which such agreements were acceptable to the superpowers. And the desire of Washington and Moscow to ensure the success of the treaty and its nonproliferation goal gave them additional incentive to pursue nuclear disarmament.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › 1NC — Conflict Resolution Advantage

3. TURN: AI increases nations vulnerability to cyber-attacks.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

It is now thought to be possible that a cyberattack could infiltrate a nuclear weapons system, threaten the integrity of its communications, and ultimately (possibly unbeknownst to its target) gain control of its nuclear as well as non¬nuclear command and control systems. Advances in AI might, therefore, exacer¬bate this challenge by enabling improvements to the cyber offense, thereby con¬ferring further advantages to first movers in this domain.14 For example, machine learning and AI could dramatically reduce the high levels of labor inten¬sity and technical skill required to execute advanced persistent threat (APT) oper¬ations—or “hunting for weaknesses.”15 Future AI APT tools could offer a would-be attacker a cheap and easy way to replicate powerful cyber weapons, which would require minimal technical knowledge to employ. While manipulations and system subversions are possible with existing cyber offense tools, AI and increasing degrees of military autonomy could amplify the potential speed, power, and scale of future attacks in cyberspace. In response to these anticipated vulnerabilities and to achieve the first-mover advantage, China, Russia, and the United States have continued to harden their AI cyber defenses.16 For example, open sources indicate that Chinese analysts view the vul¬nerability of China’s nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems to cyber infiltrations as highly escalatory, even if an attacker’s objective was limited to cyber espionage.17 China’s fear that its early-warning missile systems are inadequate to respond to a disarming first strike by the United States has prompted Beijing to prioritize mitigating false negatives, when early-warning systems fail to warn of an imminent attack (as opposed to a false positive that warns of an attack that does not exist).18 AI-enhanced cyber capabilities sim¬ultaneously bolstering deterrence and incentivizing others to attack could intensify a paradox of enhanced capabilities and increased vulnerabilities in the cyber domain.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › 1NC — Conflict Resolution Advantage

2. Emerging technologies won’t lead to arms control—nations value their nuclear weapons too highly.

Michal Onderco & Madeline Zutt 21 Associate Professor, International Relations, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Research Associate, Erasmus University Rotterdam, "Emerging Technology and Nuclear Security: What Does the Wisdom of The Crowd Tell Us?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pg. 299-302, 2021, , Retrieved 3/30/2022)

Table 3. Nuclear disarmament and emerging technologies. CSVDisplay Table Given that experts and policymakers agreed that emerging technologies are unlikely to carry out strategic tasks, it is perhaps not surprising that they also believed that emerging technologies are unlikely to supplant nuclear weapons. This is reflected in the fact that most experts disagreed that complete nuclear disarmament would occur when leaders believe emerging technologies will make nuclear weapons unnecessary. This finding strongly suggests that the value of nuclear weapons goes beyond their roles as deterrents. Some decision-makers agreed, noting that not only are nuclear weapons the “ultimate security guarantor” (Interviewee F) but they are also seen as a guarantor of independence and sovereignty (Interviewee B). These views support the existing literature: Scholars have long recognized the symbolic value of nuclear weapons, going well beyond their military utility (Abraham, 1998; Harrington de Santana, 2009; Hecht, 2012; Sagan, 1996). The view that emerging technologies are unlikely to supplant nuclear weapons also reflects the difficulty of verifying and monitoring the nuclear weapon ban. These difficulties have been broadly recognized. Some scholars are positive about the potential future normative developments (Considine, 2019; Egeland, 2018; Ritchie, 2019), others see risks associated with looking at the nuclear weapon ban and disarmament from an arms control perspective (Onderco, 2017; Müller, 2020).

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › Conflict Resolution Answers › 1NC — Conflict Resolution Advantage

1. TURN: AI tech increases the risk of accidents and false alarms—leading to nuclear conflict.

James Johnson, 2020 (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonprolifera¬tion Studies, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, “Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?”)

AI technology fused with advanced weapons (potentially simultaneously across multiple combat zones) could allow these systems to react at machine speed and boost the overall pace of combat. Despite the tactical advantages of being able to react in real time, especially in asymmetric contested environments, experts warn that massive increases in the speed of combat could result in machines react¬ing to combat situations at a pace that surpasses human comprehension—so much so that commanders might be unable to control, contain, or terminate events.5 Because human commanders would be unable to react quickly enough, the decision to delegate control to an autonomous system would be a challenging ethical and tactical dilemma. Thus, while AI-enabled autonomous early-warning systems would theoretically allow defense planners to identify and monitor threats faster and more reliably than before, the lack of human judgment and supervision coupled with the inherent brittleness (or lack of real-world common sense to deal with new situations) and black box (or opaque and unex¬plainable) characteristics of AI machine-learning algorithms mean that the risk of destabilizing acci¬dents and false alarms will likely rise. As strategist Thomas Schelling argued, “when speed is critical, the victim [in this case a nuclear-armed state] of an accident or a false alarm is under terrible pressure.”6 This point is especially true of the time pressures associated with AI. Fear created by the unpredictability and uncertainty of an enemy conducting warfare at machine speed may, therefore, tempt nuclear states to automate their nuclear retaliatory capability. That is, all else being equal, a nuclear-armed state less confident in its second-strike capabilities (i.e., China, North Korea, Pakistan, and perhaps Russia) will be more inclined to use automation. The high speed associated with AI and autonomy can have unexpected and escalatory outcomes. For example, the 2010 stock market flash crash—which reduced the stock market value by one trillion dollars within a matter of minutes—was, according to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), enabled and amplified by the use (or misuse) of autonomous financial trading algorithms.7 Unlike the financial markets, however, there is no overarch¬ing authority in international relations to enforce pre-programmed fail-safe mech¬anisms based on a shared set of rules. Thus, the prospect of a flash crash-like event occurring in adversarial, loosely regulated, offense-dominant, and strategically competitive domains, such as cyberspace, missile defense, or anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), is especially alarming. Military AI systems functioning at machine speed could push the pace of combat to a point where the actions of machines eclipse the ability of human decision-makers to control (or even comprehend) events. In extremis, human commanders might lose control of the outbreak, course, and termination of warfare. Were humans to effectively lose (or pre-delegate) control of warfare to machines, inadvertent escalation pathways and crisis instability would increase, potentially with catastrophic results.8 Compelled by the speed and pre¬cision of AI to make decisions in a compressed timeframe, a state might accept higher risks and escalate a conflict with the belief it was in a use it or lose it situation, or a lack of confidence in its ability to guarantee the safety and control of its nuclear arsenals.9

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Taiwan Defense

No Taiwan war, even if Beijing thinks it has a military advantage

Natasha Kassam 20, Research Fellow in the Diplomacy and Public Opinion Program at the Lowy Institute, Bachelor of Laws (Hons I) and a Bachelor of International Studies from the University of Sydney, and Richard McGregor, Senior Fellow at the Lowy Institute, Former Fellow at the Wilson Center and Visiting Scholar at the Sigur Center at George Washington University, “Taiwan’s 2020 Elections”, Lowy Institute Report, 1/7/2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/taiwan-s-2020-elections

In Taiwan, political leaders worry that Xi wants to cement his legacy with a breakthrough on Taiwan. Once shy about revealing its strengths, Beijing under Xi has adopted a different approach, flaunting its wealth and power and strengthening the People’s Liberation Army to deter any challengers. Regionally, the conventional balance of military power is tipping towards China. The People’s Liberation Army has long equipped itself and planned for a cross-straits conflict. However, a full-frontal Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely in the near term. There are numerous factors that would deter such an invasion, including Taiwan’s unwelcoming geography and climate, the difficulties of staging an amphibious landing, the unknown appetite in the United States for intervention and Japan’s interests in the Taiwan Strait. Other military options which would be less risky, and potentially less disruptive to trade, include a targeted naval blockade.[36] Even if Beijing were to take over Taiwan militarily, Hong Kong has illustrated how difficult it would be to occupy the island in the face of near certain local resistance. The resulting political and security crisis for China and the broader region would be unprecedented since World War II. Taiwanese resistance, both on the island and by a mobilised Taiwanese diaspora, would be a test for national politics around the world, including in Australia. The People’s Liberation Army is untested, both in battle and in the business of occupation, and China’s institutions and military resources would be stretched by such a war.[37] It is unsurprising then that Beijing is pursuing its current strategy of multi-front hybrid warfare against the island to force an opening of talks, rather than military action.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Taiwan Defense

No China-Taiwan war—multiple reasons—

Harlan Ullman, 2/18/2022 (Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Despite Beijing’s longstanding desire to invade and conquer Taiwan and achieve “one China,” China simply lacks the military capability and capacity to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, to undertake an invasion, China would need over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million) that would have to be transported in many thousands of ships. Although Beijing is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, given China’s strength, autocratic government, and ambitions, the United States cannot totally ignore the risk of such an attack. At the same time, however, Washington should develop an overall strategy designed to deter the most likely scenarios—such as imposing economic and financial embargoes on Taiwan, imposing a maritime blockade of the island, or attempting a regime change from within—or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. China does have many other options for pressuring Taiwan. What’s the issue? The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The current and former heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault. If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change. Further, Taiwan is not conducive to any form of amphibious assault. A handful of landing sites on the west coast are blocked by proximate mountainous areas running the length of the 250-mile-long island, some approaching 10,000 feet in height. Defenders could fall back using this difficult terrain to wage a guerrilla war. Moreover, Taiwan lacks the infrastructure to support over a million invaders and their logistical needs, most of which would have to come from the mainland. Fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels. Nevertheless, given China’s size, strength, autocratic government, ambitions, and commitment to “one China,” the United States cannot totally rule out the possibility of an amphibious assault. Focusing US resources primarily on such a scenario would be a grave mistake, however. If the danger of Chinese aggression against, and indeed an invasion of, Taiwan is considered among the likely or plausible scenarios, the response must be to plan to defeat that outcome. Any military conflict with the United States beyond a Taiwan scenario would be a home game for China and an away game for the United States and those who might be persuaded to join the fight. Substantial resources would be needed to compensate for the disadvantages of geography and external lines of communications. Taiwan is only 100 miles off the Chinese coast. With China’s DF-21 and other missiles with ranges of 1,500-2,000 miles, a reinforcing naval force would come under fire for at least two or more day’s steaming before reaching the combat area. They would also have to avoid submarine and other maritime threats. The same problem applies to aviation units that would enter China’s air defense zones. To complicate this matter of reinforcement and coming to Taiwan’s defense, some polls show that Americans are more worried about a Chinese invasion than are the Taiwanese. Defending a friend is more difficult when that friend is less preoccupied or concerned with the threat than US citizens are. The United States cannot be successful in defending Taiwan if it regards the Chinese threat as more dangerous than the country it intends to protect. Finally, fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels. An expeditionary force designed to protect Taiwan may not fit more relevant roles such as supporting formal treaty allies, responding to other contingencies, and influencing China by force dispositions—especially if there is no appetite to invade in the first place. It was no accident that Napoleon and Hitler failed to cross the 25-mile wide English Channel! The United States must consider and plan for many contingencies with respect to Taiwan. China has options other than a full-scale amphibious invasion. It could seize small islands belonging to Taiwan, such as Kinmen and Matsu, to exert leverage. It could impose economic and financial embargoes. It could impose a physical blockade with its maritime militia physically denying access to the island. It could attempt a regime change from within, using the equivalent of Russia’s “Little Green Men” who seized the Crimean Parliament in 2014. China could infiltrate the political parties and Taiwanese government and use influence operations to change public support. It could contrive or provoke a crisis to force Taiwan to accept a settlement that could lead to annexation. It could obliterate Taiwan under a rain of missiles. However, unless Taiwan were to declare independence, it is very unlikely that—barring a crisis—China would attempt any direct annexation. Moreover, an amphibious assault is not now a serious or feasible option. Why does it matter? Misunderstanding an adversary in developing a strategy leads to failure, or worse. Hitler thought Russia would fold in 1941. The Japanese thought Pearl Harbor would force an American capitulation. Gen. Douglas MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would intervene in Korea as his forces raced toward the Yalu River in late 1950. Washington believed it could bomb North Vietnam into submission, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraqis could easily takeover governing their country after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. The Pentagon’s civilian leaders have declared China to be “the pacing challenge for the US military.” Many Americans are fearful that a rising China’s increasing diplomatic assertiveness, military buildup, militarizing small islets in the China Seas, and pursuit of the ambitious Belt-and-Road Initiative is a danger not only to the United States, but to much of the world. However, the nature of the specific threats is not clear. A possible Taiwan invasion must be plausible and based on why and how China could or would embark on that course of action. Thus far, no US administration has explained how such an invasion would be carried out. This focus on a single contingency distorts defense planning, especially given the Russian buildup around Ukraine. The US Army and Marine Corps are pivoting to the Pacific. However, neither service has justified this shift beyond pointing to the rise of China; nor have they explained how China would be contained, deterred and, if war comes, defeated. Without a rationale for a substantial increase of land forces in the region, it is impossible to judge the value of this redeployment. With the Marines eliminating tanks and much of their heavy artillery, the traditional role of amphibious operations will have to be redefined. The Navy has long considered the Pacific its familial home. Under the Obama administration, the Navy had planned to shift 60 percent of the fleet to Asia by 2020. Unfortunately, because the size of the Navy did not meet its growth objectives, the actual number of ships in the Pacific will be less than before the pivot. Just as the Army and Marines have not specified the rationale for this shift except in general terms, neither has the Navy. What is the solution? 1 Understand China’s true intentions and capabilities. The first and most obvious solution is the most difficult to achieve: rely on objective, unbiased, fact-based analysis of the likelihood of a Chinese amphibious invasion and the measures required to deter or defeat it. In today’s fractured, contentious, and hyper-partisan political environment, fact, truth, and objectivity have become casualties. For example, the current debate should cover more details over what size force China might require in these contingencies, although Operation Causeway would seem to be the definitive guide. 2 Learn how to win wars, not just battles. No matter how much effort is placed on developing policy and strategy, successive US administrations have ignored the following contradiction: The US military has become adept at winning battles, but the United States has become adept at losing wars. This must change. US policymakers and strategists should take account of the failures of the last several decades and incorporate these lessons into discussions of what a war with China would entail and how it might end. 3 US strategy to address the threat to Taiwan must change. The US military is based on an offensive, firepower-intensive strategy that requires highly expensive, often vulnerable, complicated systems for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as large platforms that can only be produced by major defense contractors. Many are “legacy systems,” meaning that their use was important in the past but is less so today. Today’s military may not need some of these systems, contributing to a misallocation of resources and taxing an overly strained defense budget. However, a Taiwanese invasion scenario—implausible though it may be—plays to sustaining the current force design and the weapons that are being procured. Rather than persisting with an offensive-minded approach based on costly and vulnerable platforms, US and Taiwanese planners must adopt a Porcupine Defense and its Pacific variant, a Mobile Maritime Defense, to keep China’s military within the first island chain that runs from Japan in the Pacific northeast through Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The concept has been detailed elsewhere, including in References A and B. The purpose of the Porcupine and associated defenses, like the metaphorical quilled creature, is to counter the enemy’s strategy and disrupt any attack by deploying daunting defensive measures that would cause great pain to an assailant and thus complicate and deter a possible attack. In the case of Taiwan, the Porcupine Defense entails a combination of massive numbers of drones and unmanned vehicles along with anti-air and armor missiles, such as Stingers and Javelins, as well as sea mines, to disrupt any attack. Major anti-command-and-control cyber and influence operations are essential, along with heavy use of deception and misdirection to disrupt and confuse any enemy attack. Such a strategy would greatly complicate any future bid by China to take the island by force. But can Taiwan be convinced to undertake this approach? Taiwan has chosen to buy systems to attack China. This is a mistake. Taiwan will never have the capacity to deter a Chinese assault by threat of retaliation. However, at lower cost, this Porcupine capability can be bought. Takeaway The overriding issue for the United States is whether it is able to develop an overall strategy that will deter the most likely scenarios, or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. Such a strategy must be affordable. If not, the United States will be pursuing the wrong response to a highly unlikely Chinese contingency, rather than a strategy based on current and future reality. That is not a prescription for success.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › South China Sea Defense

No war in South China Seas—both sides acting in a restrained and responsible manner:

Hu Bo, 6/12/2020 (Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Research and Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University, “China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction,” , Retrieved 1/16/2021, rwg)

China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. By Hu Bo June 12, 2020 China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction The amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) transits the Pacific Ocean Feb. 15, 2020. Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas V. Huynh No one doubts that the military competition and frictions are real and serious between China and the United States in the South China Sea, when they have rivalrous intentions, tit-for-tat strategies, and daily operational confrontations. China is accused of coercing U.S. allies and partners, militarizing disputed features, and seeking regional hegemony, and the United States is considered to be playing the South China Sea card and containing China’s rise as a maritime power. In the context of overall intensified strategic competition between the two countries, the South China Sea is even less likely to be an exception. But the question remains: how fierce will the competition be? When every day is filled with news of maritime standoffs between China and the United States, many may wonder, will China and the U.S. slip into military conflict? Both sides have reasons to maintain and expand their military presence in the South China Sea. China is the largest littoral state of the South China Sea, and has important interests at stake: territorial sovereignty, jurisdictional waters, and sea lanes of communication. With China’s military modernization, it is natural that more and more military platforms are active in the area. Meanwhile the United States thinks highly of maritime predominance, freedom of navigation, and security commitments to regional states. Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the most powerful military presence and executed a variety of complex military operations in the South China Sea. For a long time after World War II, due to China’s weak naval and air forces, there were not many chances for Chinese and American military forces to encounter each other at sea. However, much has changed in the past decade. On the one hand, China’s capacity has rapidly increased, and the progress of the navy and air force is particularly impressive. On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable. Neither side is comfortable with the changing situation. The U.S. military is used to being unparalleled and unchallengeable in the South China Sea and is not ready to accommodate China’s maritime rise. Although the People’s Liberation Army is already very strong materially, it is still a novice spiritually and in the process of learning how to interact with its American counterparts as a mature power. But neither side seems to have much to offer other than peaceful coexistence. If both sides develop normally, in terms of power, the future of the South China Sea would be a bipolar region, regardless what kind of intentions they have. Moreover, most countries in the region are reluctant to take sides in the China-U.S. power competition. Therefore, it is hard for either side to re-establish a dominant order here. As the power distribution becomes more balanced, the idea of a managed military conflict is fanciful. One side’s provocation will inevitably invite the other’s retaliation, where spiral escalation is highly possible. Considering that both sides have so many weapon platforms and both are major nuclear powers, the feasibility of a military solution has greatly diminished. The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. There are several maritime encounters between the two sides every day, and thousands every year. Most of them are professional and safe; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation. Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. China feels that Washington’s South China Sea policy is increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten to provoke China. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants. From mid-April to early May, the U.S. Navy dispatched several warships, including USS America LHA-6, to the so-called standoff area between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the West Capella to deter China’s operations. The PLA Navy was believed to have a similar number of warships there at the same time, which aroused heated discussion among the media and experts. Another less publicized but more intense case was the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning formation when it was conducting open sea cross-region mobile training while followed by American warships and multiple military aircraft. An anonymous PLA Navy officer revealed that the confrontation was so intense that one U.S. warship even once came within 100 meters of the Chinese carrier. Even so, both sides have remained largely professional and restrained. In fact, neither the Chinese military nor the American military has increased its activity significantly compared with the same period of 2019, despite the impression given by most media reports and expert commentaries. The problem is that these operations are over-exposed and over-focused. In the backdrop of power competition, especially amid the pandemic, in order to show their strength and determination, U.S. forces have given undue prominence to covering and publicizing military activities, giving the media and the public a lot to discuss and imagine. There are some hawks in both countries who take advantage of this and exaggerate the situation. Although most countries including the South China Sea claimants, do not want to see China-U.S. military conflict, some individual countries are indeed rejoicing over the growing competition between China and the United States, which may lead to some opportunity for them to expand. China-U.S. military confrontation or even war in the South China Sea has a huge market. China and the United States are, of course, preparing for any kind of military conflict and the worst scenarios in the South China Sea; however, there is no indication that the two sides want to resolve their contradictions by using force strategically or operationally — despite the repeated war rhetoric from some senior American officials. In daily military interactions, there are really increasing risks, but in the absence of a subjective desire for conflict, these risks are highly likely to be controlled.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › South China Sea Defense

Covid and weakening Chinese economy causing them to back down in the South China Seas.

Sean Quirk, 4/7/2020 (JD/MPP joint-degree student at Harvard Law School and Harvard Kennedy School. He holds a BA in Political Science from Columbia University and served as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy for five years, “Water Wars: Coronavirus Spreads Risk of Conflict Around the South China Sea,” /water-wars-coronavirus-spreads-risk-conflict-around-south-china-sea, Retrieved 1/16/2021, rwg)

Around the South China Sea, rival Southeast Asian claimants Malaysia and the Philippines are preoccupied with enforcing mandatory quarantine measures. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte previously self-quarantined as a precaution, and the Philippine armed forces chief of staff recently recovered from COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus. Vietnam and Indonesia are also enforcing measures to limit the spread of the virus. Yet Chinese naval movements in the South China Sea appear lackluster for the time being. Some reporting speculates that a decelerating Chinese economy and a military hampered by COVID-19 could force China to scale back its maritime ambitions in the South China Sea.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Heg Defense

Hegemonic stability doesn’t lead to peace.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconser¬vative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Heg Defense

Peace is unrelated to hegemony.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

Despite a few persistent, high-profile conflicts in the Middle East, the world is experiencing an era of unprecedented peace and stability. Many scholars have offered explanations for this “New Peace,” to borrow Steven Pinker’s phrase, but few have devoted much time to the possibility that US hegemony has brought stability to the system. This paper examines the theoretical, empirical, and psychological foundations of the hegemonic¬stability explanation for the decline in armed conflict. Those foundations are rather thin, as it turns out, and a review of relevant insights from political psychology suggests that unipolarity and stability are probably epiphenomenal. The New Peace can in all likelihood continue without US dominance and should persist long after unipolarity comes to an end.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Heg Defense

Hegemony doesn’t cause peace—areas of the world where the US has little influence are still peaceful.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hege¬monic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a com¬mon enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explana-tions, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the non¬aligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counter¬terrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Heg Defense

Hegemony doesn’t cause peace—defense spending statistics prove.

Christopher J. Fettweis, 2017 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University), SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 26 2017.

How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 per-cent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irre¬sponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense bud¬get has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dra¬matically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance com¬mitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › East China Sea Defense

Japan won’t escalate—they’ll just give up the Senkakus:

Grant Newsham, 8/12/2020 (retired US Marine Corps officer and former US diplomat, currently is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and the Center for Security Policy, “Why Japan may cede the Senkakus to China,” , Retrieved 9/17/2020)

The People’s Republic of China is turning up the heat around Japan’s Senkaku Islands, which the Chinese also claim and call the Diaoyu Islands. It is challenging Japanese control and has warned Tokyo not to complain the next time a host of Chinese fishing boats swarm the area with Chinese Coast Guard and PLA Navy ships providing cover. And this is likely to happen sooner rather than later. Japan’s defense minister, Taro Kono, said at an early August news conference that the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) “will act firmly when necessary while joining hands with the Japan Coast Guard.” Kono declined to provide details, saying: “We do not want to show our cards.” Many Western observers have long assumed that if backed into a corner Japan would fight – despite its reticence about things military. The prospect of losing territory to the Chinese is presumably such a corner. Map: Wikimedia And despite their shortcomings, the Self Defense Forces – particularly the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) with its highly professional surface, submarine and anti-submarine forces – have the capability to bloody an opponent’s nose. But maybe the assumption is wrong. It could be that in Japan – or, better said, in those parts of its ruling political and business classes that make such decisions – there is no intention of “going kinetic” to defend the Senkakus. If the Chinese presence becomes overwhelming, Tokyo may simply cede the area to the PRC. It would complain of course, but would it shoot? Or would it reckon that the cost of military confrontation with China would far exceed the value of “some rocks”? Far-fetched? Maybe not. A recently retired JSDF officer, unprompted, recently confided his belief that, even if the Senkaku Islands are invaded by China, the “Japanese government will not choose war.” He expained: “I’m very sorry but Japanese statesmen[people] think these affairs” – in this case he was referring both to the Senkakus and the South Korean-controlled Takeshima Islands – “are not military matters but political matters.” I take his point. The Japanese would sort of resist but my own guess is that, if the only way to remove the Chinese were to shoot, Japan wouldn’t do it. This assumes the Chinese don’t start shooting first. If China just comes in and parks itself and even lands some people on the Senkakus and says, “wuddyugonnadoaboutit?,” the government of Japan just might do nothing much. Activists shout slogans and wave the Chinese flag aboard a vessel in Hong Kong, October 22, 2006. Japan and China have sparred over a group of uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku Islands to Japanese and the Diaoyu Islands in China. The area is believed to lie near oil and gas reserves. In October 2006, a boat carrying activists from the Hong Kong-based Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands sailed within 20 km of the main island in the chain before they were warned off by a Japanese patrol boat. Chinese writing on a banner reads: "Japan get out of the Diaoyu Islands". Photo: Reuters/Paul Yeung Activists shout slogans and wave the Chinese flag aboard a vessel bound from Hong Kong to a group of uninhabited islands known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands. Photo: Agencies Recall that the Barack Obama administration allowed the PRC to take de facto control of the South China Sea without putting up a fight – or much of an argument. And back then the US military still had the advantage over the People’s Liberation Army. There are of course Japanese – including factions in the ruling LDP and most members of the JSDF – who think Japan should defend all of the territories it claims. But there were also Americans who thought Obama should forcefully defend US partners and interests in East Asia in the 2010s. If letting go is what Japan’s leaders are thinking of doing, they can’t exactly publicly declare it. For one thing, Japan’s public might be outraged – if public opinion polls, overwhelmingly negative toward China, are anything to go by. But the citizenry doesn’t always matter much in Japan and the government can always simply say, after the fact, “Shoganai” – it couldn’t be helped. One suspects that Japan Inc might be in the “Senkakus aren’t worth a war” camp. The Abe administration recently allotted US$2 billion to help Japanese companies move operations out of China. However, a Japanese friend whom I trust told me the other day that Keidanren – Japan’s powerful business federation – is soon to issue a call for deeper economic ties with China, while citing the PRC’s post-Corona V-shaped recovery. Toyota, Japan’s leading company, is planning to go all-in on electric vehicle production in China. There is a precedent for Japanese business interests shaping defense policy. In 2012 anti-Japanese riots broke out in China – over the Senkakus – and targeted a Japanese supermarket chain’s stores in the PRC. Around the same time, a prominent official close to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda convinced the leader to cancel an upcoming amphibious exercise near Okinawa that I was directly involved with after the Chinese complained. The official’s family owned the stores being targeted in China. No doubt this isn’t unique to Japan. Wall Street and the American business community have pressured successive US administrations to accommodate the PRC for decades. Japanese Special Defense Force personnel marched in a parade in Asaka, Japan, in a file photo. Image: AFP Forum via EPA In fairness, Japan is not ignoring defense. But it almost seems to be going through the motions – hoping China is somehow frightened off or loses interest. Defense spending doesn’t increase much. Recruitment is lackluster. The services can’t easily operate together. Japan’s home-built stealth fighter is scheduled for operations in 2035. And the government still can’t figure out missile defense – or offense. Closer to the Senkakus, the GSDF is fortifying several of Japan’s southern islands and is in the process of installing anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft systems. The MSDF and Japan Coast Guard diligently patrol near the Senkakus, and the Japan Air Self Defense Force intercepts intruding PLA jets intruding into Japanese airspace. However, these activities are disjointed and reactive rather than part of a coherent defense scheme. And Japanese forces are increasingly outmatched numbers-wise by Chinese ships and aircraft. Nor is Senkaku defense a fully joint US-Japan effort, even though the need has been obvious for years. If Japan does give up the Senkakus it may avoid an immediate problem, from Tokyo’s perspective – but that won’t be the end of Chinese demands. Chinese PLA Navy soldiers on a naval vessel in a file photo. Photo: Twitter And where would this leave the Americans? US forces have operated on the assumption that each side will do its part to defend Japan’s territorial integrity. Cede the Senkakus and it raises doubts about Japanese reliability and commitment, as well as complicating US and Japanese military operations in the East China Sea and beyond. And the Americans might reasonably ask: Are there other parts of Japan you intend to give away? Or other instances where you will stand down? If the new American ambassador ever does arrive in Tokyo, his first order of business should be to ask the Japanese what they have in mind for the Senkakus. After 60 years of alliance, one would think both sides would know by now.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › East China Sea Defense

No Senkakus conflict—four reasons:

M. Taylor Fravel, 8/19/2019 (Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program at MIT), “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,”

The dynamics of the Senkaku Islands dispute since the 1970s present a puzzle. At first glance, one might expect that this dispute should be fraught with tension and even violence. Territorial disputes often serve as proxies for broader conflicts of interests, especially between states that might be characterized as enduring or strategic rivals, such as China and Japan.21 Although the China-Japan economic relationship has continued to deepen since the end of the Cold War, political relations have oscillated between pe¬riods of heightened friction and relative calm.22 At the same time, both sides see the islands as important real estate, endowed with strategic significance and economic value, characteristics that increase a state’s willingness to use force in a territorial dispute.23 China has also used force in other disputes over offshore islands, most notably over the Paracels in 1974 and the Spratlys in 1988 and 1994.24 Finally, given the history of Japan’s occupation of parts of China, one might expect territorial issues to be especially prominent as a source of friction between the two countries and one that leaders might manipulate to mobilize society, perhaps for diversionary ends.25 Since 1949, however, China has never used force against Japan over the Senkaku Islands, although it did display its potential to use force once, in 1978, during the peace treaty negotiations.26 The fact that armed conflict over the islands has been avoided is a major accomplishment and one that deserves detailed examination because, in many ways, it is unexpected. The analysis below focuses mostly on China for several reasons. First—unlike Japan—China, as noted above, has used force in its other territorial disputes since the end of World War II and in half of its offshore island disputes. Second, as the “challenger” in the Senkakus dispute, force remains a vi¬able option for China to regain sovereignty of the islands to improve its otherwise weak position or to compel concessions from Japan. By contrast, because Japan already occupies and controls the islands, force is not necessary to improve its claim and would only be used to deter or prevent a Chinese attack. Nevertheless, even as the “defender,” the use of force for Japan remains a viable option under certain conditions. In par¬ticular, because Japan already controls the islands, it may be more willing to use force to arrest or reverse decline in its position in the dispute in the face of increasing Chinese provocations, such as the dispatch of mainland survey ships within the territorial waters of the islands in December 2008. Indeed, reflecting concerns about China’s growing military power and naval activities in the East China Sea, Japan’s military drafted a contingency plan in November 2004 “to defend the southern remote islands off Kyushu and Okinawa from possible invasion.”27 Explaining state inaction or the absence of a particular outcome such as the use of force presents a challenge for social scientists. One of the core problems is that patterns of inaction or nonevents are likely to be overdetermined; that is, they are consistent with multiple if not overlap-ping variables and explanations. As a particular behavior is not observed, it is more challenging to identify those factors that vary with inaction as opposed to using force or offering to compromise. Nevertheless, four reasons help explain the absence of violent conflict in the Senkaku dis¬pute since 1972: deterrence, de facto control, regional rivalry, and active dispute management. Deterrence The first and most important reason is deterrence. Put simply, China has lacked the military means to execute a limited-aims operation to seize and defend the islands from any counterattack. Although China did clash with South Vietnam in 1974 and Vietnam in 1988 in other offshore island conflicts, those countries possessed very limited naval power and China was able to achieve victory after short clashes. By contrast, Japan possesses the strongest and most professional navy of any East Asian country.28 More importantly, however, the US alliance with Japan has arguably deterred China from taking any armed action over the islands. Given Article V, use of force over the Senkakus would run the very real risk of conflict with the United States—conflict that China would prefer to avoid. As discussed below in the section on dispute management, public US statements regard¬ing its commitment under the treaty that were issued during moments of tension in the dispute represent subtle deterrent actions. De Facto Control The continuous occupation of the disputed islands by Japan during the period when their sovereignty has been contested is a second reason for the absence of escalation. Continuous occupation by one state in a territo¬rial dispute significantly increases the cost for the other side (in this case China) of using force, as the international community would view any use of force as a clear sign of revisionist behavior. Occupation by one side, in other words, reinforces the status quo bias of the international system. By contrast, although China did use force in the Paracels and the Spratlys, it seized islands and coral reefs that were claimed but not occupied by other states and vacant real estate (with the exception of Pattle Island in the Paracels). In disputes on its land border, China has not seized large amounts of disputed territory through the use of force, especially when contested territory has been occupied by other states. In its 1962 war with India over disputed areas along its southwestern frontier, for example, China won a military victory but then withdrew to the line of actual control that had existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities.29 Regional Rivalry A third reason for the absence of escalation stems from the continuing competition between China and Japan for diplomatic influence within East Asia. For different reasons, both countries likely want to maintain reputations as constructive and benign powers in the region. Escalation or use of force over the Senkakus would tarnish that reputation. In particular, China’s current diplomatic strategy revolves around the notions of “peaceful development” and “reassurance.”30 Belligerence over territory would send a signal to most states in the region that a more powerful China might also be more aggressive, thus increasing suspicion and uncertainty about China’s long-term intentions. Active Dispute Management A fourth and underexamined reason is how both sides have sought to manage the dispute to avoid unwanted spirals of hostility and tension that might culminate in the use of force. Several aspects of dispute management must be stressed, as they have received little attention in analyses of the Senkaku dispute or, for that matter, in the international relations scholar¬ship on territorial disputes. Even if China has been deterred by US power, Japanese control of the disputed islands, or potential reputational costs, the management of tensions in this dispute is also important. All three countries have played a role in the successful management of the dispute, where success is defined as the absence of conflict. Limited Access Perhaps the leading source of friction in the dispute over the past two decades has been efforts by citizen activists to land on the islands to demonstrate their countries’ sovereignty claims. These ac-tions then compel governments to get involved in the dispute, increasing the potential for armed conflict. In the 1990s, several crises over the is¬lands occurred when activist groups from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan journeyed to the disputed rocks. Japanese activists, most notably from the Japan Youth League, frequently visited the islands in the 1990s to main¬tain a lighthouse on Uotsuri (Diaoyu) Island that was first built in 1978.31 In response, individuals from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China sought to land on the Senkakus to support China’s claims. In 1996, a Hong Kong citizen, David Chan, drowned as he attempted to land and plant a flag on one of the islands.32 A number of other unsuccessful attempts have also been made by groups supporting China’s claim, but in 2004, activists from Mainland China successfully landed on the islands. As a private citizen owns three of the five main islands, the Japanese government was unable (or perhaps just unwilling) to prevent its own citi¬zens from making symbolic visits and increasing the potential for conflict in the dispute. Since 2002, however, the Japanese government has taken a number of steps to enhance its control over the islands and limit access by Japanese citizens, thereby reducing incentives for Chinese patriotic groups to land on the islands in response. First, in April 2002, the Japanese government entered into a lease for the three islands remaining outside of government control. This placed all of the disputed features under the direct control of the Japanese government, and because the government became a leaseholder, it could both prevent the sale of the islands to activists who might seek to make use of them for political goals and block activists from all sides from landing on the islands.33 Second, just one month after the first successful landing on the islands by Mainland Chinese activists in March 2004, the Japanese government decided to station two Coast Guard vessels near the islands in order to prevent individuals from landing on them in the future.34 Third, in February 2005, Japan further consolidated control over the islands when it announced that it had assumed control of the lighthouse on Uotsuri that had been built and maintained by the Japan Youth League. These actions elicited sharp protests in Beijing and Taipei as they were viewed as unilateral assertions of sovereignty over contested territory and consolidation of Japanese control. Nevertheless, they lowered tensions by removing perhaps the greatest irritant in the dispute, the actions of activ¬ist citizens. In the past, the rationale for these visits by Japanese activists was the need to maintain the lighthouses and replace their solar-powered batteries. Indeed, according to public news sources, no Japanese activists have successfully landed on the islands since 2003.35 Although this has not prevented subsequent attempts by Chinese and Taiwanese patriotic groups to land on the islands, the Japanese government has been able to intercept these ships rapidly through the deployment of Coast Guard ves¬sels in surrounding waters. Similarly, the Chinese government has sought to restrict the activities of its own citizens around the islands. For most of the 1990s, only activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, not Mainland China, sought to land on the islands in protest. In 2003, however, a mainland-based group, the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, began preparations for a voyage to the islands.36 After several reconnaissance trips, the federation landed seven members on Uotsuri in March 2004.37 These individuals were detained by the Japanese Coast Guard and deported to China 48 hours later. Although it is not clear what the Chinese government’s policy toward such groups was before this landing, since then it has sought to prevent any further landings or maritime excursions to the islands by its citizens from Chinese ports. In July 2004, local officials in Fujian prevented members of the federation from using Chinese fishing vessels for noncommercial purposes such as traveling to the islands.38 And, following anti-Japan protests in April 2005, the government raided the federation’s offices in Beijing in July 2005.39 In October 2007, four members of the federation who had entered Japanese territorial waters in an attempt to land on the islands were placed under house arrest when they returned to China.40 Avoidance of Social Mobilization A second aspect of dispute manage-ment that deserves mention is that China has avoided mobilizing the public around the dispute. Indeed, despite its potential to rally people around the flag and its role in past patriotic education campaigns, the Senkakus dispute rarely appears in official newspapers. As figure 1 demonstrates, the total number of articles that refer to “Diaoyu Dao” (Senkaku Islands) in the title that have appeared in the People’s Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao) and the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) since 1987 is low. In some years, no articles appeared at all. Moreover, as shown in figure 2, the frequency of articles on the Senkakus is roughly one-tenth of those published on the Spratlys and an even smaller fraction of those concerning Taiwan. No clear trend exists in the frequency or timing of articles on the Senkakus either. Analysis of individual news reports suggests that the publication of articles is caused by events linked to the dispute, especially activists’ attempts to land on the islands as well as Japan’s own administrative actions.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #4: Liberal International Order Defense

Can’t repair the LIO—three reasons

John J. Mearsheimer, 2019 (professor of international relations @ Chicago, “Bound to Fail,” , Retrieved 9/19/2021)

By 2019, it was clear that the liberal international order was in deep trouble. The tectonic plates that underpin it are shifting, and little can be done to repair and rescue it. Indeed, that order was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The fall of the liberal international order horrifies the Western elites who built it and who have benefited from it in many ways.1 These elites fervently believe that this order was and remains an important force for promoting peace and prosperity around the globe. Many of them blame President Donald Trump for its demise. After all, he expressed contempt for the liberal order when campaigning for president in 2016; and since taking office, he has pur-sued policies that seem designed to tear it down. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the liberal international order is in trouble solely because of Trump’s rhetoric or policies. In fact, more funda¬mental problems are at play, which account for why Trump has been able to successfully challenge an order that enjoys almost universal support among the foreign policy elites in the West. The aim of this article is to determine why the liberal world order is in big trouble and to identify the kind of inter¬national order that will replace it. I offer three main sets of arguments. First, because states in the modern world are deeply interconnected in a variety of ways, orders are essential for facilitating efficient and timely interactions. There are different kinds of inter-national orders, and which type emerges depends primarily on the global dis-tribution of power. But when the system is unipolar, the political ideology of the sole pole also matters. Liberal international orders can arise only in unipo-lar systems where the leading state is a liberal democracy. Second, the United States has led two different orders since World War II. The Cold War order, which is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a “liberal international order,” was neither liberal nor international. It was a bounded or-der that was limited mainly to the West and was realist in all its key dimen-sions. It had certain features that were also consistent with a liberal order, but those attributes were based on realist logic. The U.S.-led post–Cold War order, on the other hand, is liberal and international, and thus differs in fundamental ways from the bounded order the United States dominated during the Cold War. Third, the post–Cold War liberal international order was doomed to col-lapse, because the key policies on which it rested are deeply flawed. Spreading liberal democracy around the globe, which is of paramount importance for building such an order, not only is extremely difficult, but often poisons rela¬tions with other countries and sometimes leads to disastrous wars. National¬ism within the target state is the main obstacle to the promotion of democracy, but balance of power politics also function as an important blocking force. Furthermore, the liberal order’s tendency to privilege international in-stitutions over domestic considerations, as well as its deep commitment to po-rous, if not open borders, has had toxic political effects inside the leading liberal states themselves, including the U.S. unipole. Those policies clash with nationalism over key issues such as sovereignty and national identity. Be¬cause nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, it in¬variably trumps liberalism whenever the two clash, thus undermining the order at its core. In addition, hyperglobalization, which sought to minimize barriers to global trade and investment, resulted in lost jobs, declining wages, and rising income inequality throughout the liberal world. It also made the international finan¬cial system less stable, leading to recurring financial crises. Those troubles then morphed into political problems, further eroding support for the liberal order.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #4: Liberal International Order Defense

Multiple alt causes for the collapse of the LIO they don’t solve:

Luke Amadi, 2020 (Department of Political & Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, “Globalization and the changing liberal international order: A review of the literature,” , Retrieved 9/19/2021)

Recent trends across Europe and America suggest that the liberal international order is increasingly changing. The changes are evident in the rise of new nationalism following the Brexit referendum of 2016 and subsequent exit of the UK from EU, the Catalonia independence referendum of 2017, the 2018 New Caledonia referendum in France, plus decline in multilateralism and rise in trade protectionism at the heels of the new US- led trade war with China. Other signs of change include the new US immigration policies and the proposed wall on the US/Mexico border, a shift of U.S. policy from openness to isolationism, and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. This article – traces the causal linkages between globalization and the changing international order. It revisits some of the assumptions and promises of globalization and argues that the changes suggest the decline of the liberal international order on which the world had been situated for decades. Conclusion reflects on the future of global governance.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #3: Chinese International Leadership Good

Chinese leadership will lead to peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

Global Times, 2021 CHINA WINS INCREASING SUPPORT AT UN DURING 50 YRS, OPPOSING UNILATERALISM, PROTECTIONISM AND HEGEMONY. Oct. 22, 2021. Retrieved May 5, 2022 from

China's stance on political security, human rights and development has gained acceptance among UN members as they have been made based on UN principles and represented the stance of the majority of developing countries, Zhang said. "The cooperation between China and the UN represents the future direction of the world with peaceful coexistence and cooperation, and the US' hegemonic policy will be isolated," Hua said.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #2: AI Tech Not Key to Military Power

The AI technology itself is not key to military power—it is how it is used.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from )

Military and economic history suggests that the effect of narrow AI could be quite large, even if suggestions of AI triggering a new industrial revolution are overstated. Adoption capacity theory shows that changes in relative military power become more likely in cases of military innovations that require large organizational changes and the adoption of new operational concepts. Even if the United States, China, and Russia were to end up with similar levels of basic AI capacity over the next decade, the history of military innovations from the phalanx to blitzkrieg suggests it is how they and others use AI that will matter most for the future of military power.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #2: AI Tech Not Key to Military Power

Competition for AI technology will be multilateral and not bilateral.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from )

The commercial drivers of AI technology, and the speed with which new algorithms diffuse, would make competition much broader than it was during the bilateral space race. Competition is much more likely to be multilateral, featuring countries and companies around the world. A better analogy might be to the competition surrounding the development of Second Industrial Revolution technologies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. France, Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and others vied for supremacy in steel production, chemicals, petroleum, electricity, and other areas.

2022 SDI Negative
Case Advantage Answers › AI Leadership Advantage Answers › Extensions #2: AI Tech Not Key to Military Power

Technological innovation rarely influences the balance of power.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from )

Decades of research demonstrates that the impact of technological change on global politics — whether it is change in economics, society at large, diplomacy, or military power — depends much more on how governments and organizations make choices about the adoption and use of new capabilities than on the technologies themselves.48 Scholarship on military innovation by Barry Posen, Stephen P. Rosen, and others shows that technological innovation alone rarely shapes the balance of power.49 Instead, it is how militaries use a technology that makes a difference.50 A military’s ability to employ a technology depends in part on the complexity of the technology, how difficult it is to use, and whether it operates in predictable and explainable ways. These factors influence the trust that senior military leaders have in the technology and whether they use it.51 Additionally, the more bureaucratically disruptive it is to adopt a technology, the more challenging it can be for older, more established organizations to do so — particularly if the organization is underinvested in research and development designed to integrate new technologies and ideas.52