2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Deterrence/Disclosure DA
Comninos and Seneque 14 --- Alex, Justus-Liebig University Giessen, and Gareth, Geist Consulting, “Cyber security, civil society and vulnerability in an age of communications surveillance,” GIS Watch, 2014,
Cyber security and vulnerability Cyber security discourse should focus more on information security vulnerabilities, rather than on threats and responses. This focus would help to delineate what constitutes a cyber security issue, avoid cyber security escalating to a counter-productive national security issue, and place a practical focus on the protection of all internet users.
A security vulnerability, also called a “bug”, is a piece of software code that contains an error or weakness that could allow a hacker to compromise the integrity, availability or confidentiality of information contained, managed or accessed by that software.17When a vulnerability is discovered, a malicious hacker may make an “exploit”18 in order to compromise data or access to a computer. Malware – viruses and Trojan horses – require exploits (or collections of exploits) that take advantage of vulnerabilities. Expertise in fixing vulnerabilities is improving but not keeping up with the pace of the growth. Compared to 15 years ago, all popular and contemporary desktop operating systems (Windows, Linux and Mac) offer regular automated security updates which fix or “patch” known vulnerabilities. While we are finding more vulnerabilities in code and viruses than ever before, we are also getting better at finding them. At the same time we keep producing more software code, meaning that the net number of vulnerabilities is increasing.19
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Deterrence/Disclosure DA
Jardine 20 --- Eric Jardine Assistant Professor, Political Science, Virginia Tech, “Optimizing Cyber Deterrence”, In The Cyber Deterrence Problem, Aaron F. Brantly, ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), page 87-104, 2020, https://osf.io/ns7b3
Deterrence is not straightforward in cyberspace. Maximizing deterrence by trying to maximize the retaliatory potential of the NSA will fail. Upwards of 20 percent of the weapons that the NSA attempts to hoard for a rainy day are likely to be found by adversaries and could then be used to target American systems. By keeping this 20 percent of zero-days under wraps, the NSA weakens the US deterrent by diminishing the costs that an adversary would need to undertake in order to successfully target US networks and devices. Punishment and denial are interconnected. Simple maximization of deterrent outcomes by maximizing the inputs to deterrence does not work.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Midterms
Bacon 10-7 [Perry Bacon Jr. is a Washington Post columnist 10-7-2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/10/07/perry-bacon-america-election-obsession/]
Every day is not Election Day. Most days are not Election Day. Most of what happens in the years between elections won’t affect what happens on Election Day. Yet the United States’ political culture has become singularly obsessed with elections, directing us away from important debates about issues and turning every question into an analysis of Wisconsin swing voters.
Of course elections matter, because they decide who gets to set policy. And with the Republican Party becoming more authoritarian by the day, state and federal elections matter especially now. If the GOP wins enough state legislative, gubernatorial and congressional races over the next few years, it may well use gerrymandering, voting-law changes and other moves to create entrenched one-party rule.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Midterms
Rogers 1-4 [Kaleigh Rogers is FiveThirtyEight’s technology and politics reporter., 1-4-2022 https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/5-things-to-watch-going-into-the-midterms/]
Though 2022 has only just begun, the midterm elections are already looming over the political horizon. Democrats’ loss in the Virginia governor’s race last year — and their surprisingly narrow win in the New Jersey governor’s race — both suggested that we could be heading for a red wave in this year’s midterm elections. And overall, the political environment is looking favorable for Republicans. Based on House retirements — which can give us some clues about how the congressional elections might unfold — it also seems like Democrats are more worried than Republicans. Those worries aren’t unfounded, either, since the president’s party almost always struggles in midterm elections, usually losing ground in the House and often in the Senate too.
But there are also a lot of factors that could shake things up. Over the past year, Republican legislatures across the country have passed an unprecedented slew of laws to restrict voting access, including some states that will be most closely watched this November. Fears about inflation are simmering, but the labor market is recovering, albeit unevenly. Meanwhile, COVID-19 cases have surged to an all-time high, driven by the omicron variant, even if so far deaths and hospitalizations have not been as bad as last year. And finally, state lawmakers are in the process of redrawing congressional maps based on the results of the 2020 census, setting the geographic boundaries that will shape congressional power for the next decade (if the courts don’t strike them down).
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2: Disads › A2: Midterms
Cook 22 --- Charlie Cook, One of the nation's leading authorities on U.S. elections and political trends,, Cook Political Report, Foreign Policy Unlikely To Save Democrats in the Fall, Feb 2022 https://www.cookpolitical.com/analysis/national/national-politics/foreign-policy-unlikely-save-democrats-fall
Given how monolithic partisans are in their approval ratings and actual voting, it is always useful to look only at independents, the ‘jump ball’ Americans. Biden’s overall rating among them was 35 percent (5 points below his approval among all adults). His best marks were on dealing with the coronavirus (45 percent approval), followed by foreign policy (37 percent), Russia (35 percent), and the economy (30 percent). It is pretty clear the president and his administration’s denial of the threat of inflation and slow reaction to it was exceedingly damaging to him. (While we are on the subject, it is fascinating to see Senate Democrats, after so passionately advocating for more infrastructure spending this past year, propose suspending the gasoline tax for the rest of the year, no matter that the gas tax is the primary regular funding source for transportation infrastructure. Panic is never pretty.)
While we don’t know the trajectory that the Russia/Ukraine crisis will take, and there are many factors that can impact on midterm elections, we do know that in the absence of a large number of U.S. military deaths, Americans rarely vote on foreign-policy issues, particularly in midterms. The state and direction of the economy, particularly change in real disposable personal income, is far more determinative.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2s: T › A2: Security Cooperation
Watts & Biegon 17 --- Tom Watts, PhD candidate in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, and Rubrick Biegon, associate lecturer and research administrator in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, “Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation”, Remote Control, November 2017, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ORG_RemoteControl_SecCoop.pdf
Security cooperation is embedded in the institutional structures of foreign military assistance, as authorised under Titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code. Conceptually, ‘security cooperation’ (SC) overlaps with ‘security assistance’ (SA). They are distinct but closely-related tools of ‘building partner capacity’ (BPC), a term first coined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. BPC constitutes a ‘broad set of missions, programs, activities, and authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations to achieve… securityoriented goals they share with the United States’.9 In the fallout from the Iraq war, BPC became an urgent goal of US policy. It allowed the US to maintain a ‘long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where US forces do not traditionally operate’.10 In this respect, both SC and SA are tools to build the capacity of foreign partners to combat security threats with minimal (or no) involvement of US ‘boots on the ground’. SC encompasses all Department of Defense interactions, programmes and activities with foreign security forces to build relationships that promote US interests; enable partners to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information and resources; and/or to ‘build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives’.11 DOD-administered SA programmes are one element of this, which also includes combined exercises, information sharing and other types of military-to-military collaboration. SC has long been valued by Combatant Commanders as a tool for shaping the security landscape in their area of operations to favour American interests.12 It has been extensively used to develop relationships and interoperability between the American military and its overseas partners.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2s: T › A2: Security Cooperation
Donnelly & Maginnis 11 --- Brigadier General Edward P. Donnelly, U.S. Army, recently completed two years as the Army’s deputy director for strategy with responsibility for, inter alia, the International Affairs and Security Cooperation portfolios, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis, U.S. Army, Retired, MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA542464.pdf
1. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), 2010 Guidance for Employment of the Force (draft 30 April 2010) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], TBP), 166. Security cooperation is defined as “All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”
2. Ibid. The Guidance for the Employment of the Force consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching document.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2s: T › 2AC A2: Cybersecurity
ENISA 16 --- European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, “Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)”, Website first archived June 2016,
Information sharing between national stakeholders but even in cross country cases is one important aspect for cyber security. Knowledge on tackling cyber attacked, incident response, mitigation measures and preparatory controls can be shared between the relevant stakeholders.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff A2s: T › 2AC A2: Cybersecurity
Stadnik 21 --- Ilona Stadnik, PhD candidate at the School of International Relations, St Petersburg State University, “Seeking a new order for global cybersecurity: the Russian approach to cyber-sovereignty”, in “NATO’s evolving cyber security policy and strategy”, Print publication date: January 2021, https://ebrary.net/173503/political_science/seeking_order_global_cybersecurity_russian_approach_cyber_sovereignty
The most common definition of cybersecurity refers to an operational and infrastructural level of information sharing, but not to its content per se. The common cybersecurity triad includes the principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. That means that information is available only for an intended circle of users, information is correct and complete without any breaches or unauthorized modifications, and that information can be accessed any time it is necessary. Parker (2002) added three more principles to the triad: possession or control, authenticity, and utility. The first principle indicates the necessity to maintain control over information because its loss threatens the security despite saving its confidentiality and integrity. The second principle is about the originality of authorship of the information. And finally, utility means that information is still usable after all other security precautions.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Solvency › Ext --- Increased Info-Sharing Solves Resilience / Attribution
Ford 22 --- Christopher A. Ford, Distinguished Policy Advisor at MITRE Labs and a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “Conceptualizing Cyberspace Security Diplomacy”, SPRING 2022,
I. Improved information sharing is a way to help drive situations rightward along the information strength (X) axis in ways that would, all other things being equal, create a greater likelihood of agreement. This could mean doing more to share with international partners intelligence reporting that supports attribution analysis, either passing it directly to partners with whom one has good cyber-intelligence relationships (e.g., within the “Five Eyes” partnership) or by downgrading information to be shared with others. Information sharing can also occur via public criminal indictments—which must meet due process standards and ultimately survive beyond a reasonable doubt proof standards for conviction if they get to court—or perhaps in connection with the imposition of sanctions.[43]
Whatever the means, however, building more effective mechanisms for secure sharing of attribution-relevant information would probably have the effect of making attribution agreement more likely. It can also help strengthen interlocutors’ perceptions of trust in the sharer, potentially causing agreement-conducive movement along the graphical Y-axis as well. (A country sharing more information with a second-party partner that is more trusted by the third-party target of diplomatic suasion than is the first country can also help spur movement along both axes: it enables the recipient of this information to leverage its own relationship of trust with the ultimate target.) Augmented information sharing can thus result in movement within the cubic situational space along both the X and Y axes, as depicted in Case I in Figure 13.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Solvency › Ext --- Increased Info-Sharing Solves Resilience / Attribution
Skopik et al 16 --- Florian Skopik Senior Scientist of the research program “IT Security”., Giuseppe Settanni joined AIT in 2013 as scientist and is currently working on national and European applied research projects regarding security in communication and information systems, Roman Fiedler is Scientist at the AIT Austrian Insititute of Technology and runs projects in the areas of telehealth and ICT security, “A problem shared is a problem halved: A survey on the dimensions of collective cyber defense through security information sharing”, Computers & Security Volume 60, July 2016, Pages 154-176,
Although cooperation between international stakeholders is hampered by many obstacles, it is beneficial for all sides. Cooperating international cyber incident response teams get most benefit in terms of joint incident handling, project conducting, resource and information sharing, and (social) networking.
Having an ecosystem of (international) interconnected sharing entities (critical infrastructure providers, governments, security organizations, etc.), like the one proposed in Kaufmann et al. (2014), would indeed ease the gain of situational awareness, allowing consciousness on the current cyber security situation of all the monitored infrastructures. This is the initial step required to effectively perform cyber defense and incident response. Being part of such ecosystem enables the participating organizations to get access to a large amount of relevant security information that can be essential while defending against ongoing cyber threats. Best practices, resolved security issues, newly discovered vulnerabilities and any other relevant information included in this shared knowledge are fundamental for protecting the organizations' infrastructures and prevent future incidents. Eventually, coordinated incident response methods can produce more effective results, thanks to the diversity of available resources and skills within the sharing community.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Solvency › Ext --- Increased Info-Sharing Solves Resilience / Attribution
Abraham & Daultrey 20 --- Chon Abraham Associate Professor of Management Information Systems William & Mary Sally Daultrey Chief Intelligence Analyst Adenium Group, “Considerations for NATO in Reconciling Challenges to Shared Cyber Threat Intelligence: A study of Japan, the US and the UK”, in “Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis”, Dec 2020, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CCDOE), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf
While the requirement for multinational cyber cooperation is challenged by unbalanced technical capabilities, strategic cultures and legal frameworks, NATO is well-positioned to enable partner and allied nations to share CTI, particularly by assisting with enabling use of its MISP and encouraging best practice in provisioning cyber authority structures for threat intelligence sharing as part of a potential international cyber security maturity, resilience development and assessment programme. For this programme, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence could take the lead in:
(1) reconciling incompatibilities and promoting level setting of threat intelligence capabilities across partner and allied nations to speed the flow of information;
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Solvency › Ext --- Increased Info-Sharing Solves Resilience / Attribution
Abraham & Daultrey 20 --- Chon Abraham Associate Professor of Management Information Systems William & Mary Sally Daultrey Chief Intelligence Analyst Adenium Group, “Considerations for NATO in Reconciling Challenges to Shared Cyber Threat Intelligence: A study of Japan, the US and the UK”, in “Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis”, Dec 2020, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CCDOE), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf
Cyber threats are fundamentally changing the nature of warfare and the digital economy with implications for international collaboration and security cooperation (NATO, 2019). Governments and the leadership of multinational companies must understand threat vectors and threat actors to activate their collective response, both in peacetime and during targeted cyber operations. Efforts for developing approaches to exchange information on security incidents, known as Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sharing, is an international imperative (Menges et al., 2019) and governments can no longer rely on voluntary compliance across business ecosystems and supply chains to operationalise international cyber defence. Cyber operations are increasingly understood as linked to strategic campaigns, particularly when initiated by adversarial countries seeking to shift the relative balance of power amongst targeted countries with rippling global effects (Harknett and Smeets, 2020; NATO CCDCOE, 2017). CTI sharing is therefore essential for all directly and indirectly targeted societies and countries to build a collective understanding of these cyber operations and strategic campaigns in terms of: (1) their true nature; (2) the global reach of effects; (3) the duration; and (4) the extent of data exfiltration and aggregation compromising national security. The sophistication and proliferation of cyber threats are outpacing the capacities of countries to respond using conventional decision structures, to be replaced by dynamic bilateral and regional collaboration architectures. CTI sharing is vital to protecting the global business ecosystem and shared security interests, yet not all nations have comparable capabilities to effectively share and act on threat information.
2022
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Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Attribution Add-On › Add-On --- De-escalation
Goel 19 --- Sanjay Goel, Professor in the School of Business at the University at Albany, SUNY (UAlbany) , “How Improved Attribution in Cyber Warfare Can Help De-Escalate Cyber Arms Race”, Connections QJ 19, no. 1 (2020): 87-95, https://procon.bg/system/files/19.1.08_goel_cyber_warfare_attribution.pdf
The prevalence and risk of cyberattacks continue to rise in parallel with our increasing reliance on the Internet for systems of economic production, supply and distribution chains, finance, power, transportation, and other critical infrastructures. Cyber warfare is becoming the next serious threat to national security 1 that can impact not only life and property but also financial markets. 2 According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the total number of cyber-attacks against government agencies, defense and high-tech companies, or economic crimes with losses of over one million dollars rose from 21 in 2014 to 58 in 2017. 3 This CSIS list, built on open-source data only, depicts a worrisome trend of rising cyberattacks attributed to state-sponsored groups acting against the political or economic interests of other states.
In testimony delivered to the US Armed Services Committee in January 2017, James Clapper, former US Director of National Intelligence, stated that more than 30 nations were developing offensive cyberattack capabilities as of late 2016. He further opined that “the proliferation of cyber capabilities coupled with new warfighting technologies will increase the incidence of standoff and remote operations, especially in the initial stages of conflict.”4 As policymakers warn of the dangers of cyber conflicts and exalt the virtues of cyber peace, most states consider cyberspace the fifth operational domain, with equal, or perhaps greater future importance to the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. State military and intelligence agencies continue to conduct cyber espionage and covert attacks on computer systems and networks in pursuit of strategic political or military objectives, both before and during conflicts. Yet, there is limited transparency on how states consider using their cyber capabilities, as only a few countries have publicly announced their cyber doctrines and underlying strategies. For example, McAfee, the global computer security software company, estimated in 2007 that over 120 countries were working on cyber commands, 5 whereas Dévai listed 114 countries that, as of 2013, were developing civilian and military cyber capabilities, policies, doctrines and organizations at varying levels of maturity or focus. 6 Considering that many of the officially declared ‘defensive’ cyber capabilities could easily be deployed in offensive cyber operations, as well as the fact that data assembled by cyber experts is often based on publicly available information only, it is not surprising that such estimations vary, and that the true state of cyber warfare preparedness and capabilities worldwide is difficult to ascertain. This high degree of uncertainty, when coupled with the low cost and easy acquisition of cyber weapons, ample and growing target selection, and multiplicity of types of attacks that may go unnoticed for a long time, contributes to a prevailing state of cyber insecurity in the international community. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no commonly accepted terminology of critical cyber terms (e.g., ‘cyber’ vs. ‘information’ security) among key cyber actors, which affects the ability of most likely strategic adversaries to establish common ground as a prerequisite for dialogue.
2022
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Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Bad --- Secessionism
Barry Blechman et al. 15. Dr. Barry M. Blechman is co-founder and a Distinguished Fellow of the Stimson Center. Alex Bollfrass, Former Nonresident Fellow. Laicie Heeley, Former Fellow with Stimson’s Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense program "Reducing The Risk Of Nuclear War In The Nordic/Baltic Region. Stimson Center". Stimson Center. 12-15-2015. https://www.stimson.org/2015/reducing-risk-nuclear-war-nordicbaltic-region-0/
Europe is currently experiencing escalating political and military tensions that are rekindling fears of war between Russia and NATO. Any such conflict would inherently include a risk of nuclear weapons use. The Stimson Center, partnered with Project High Hopes, is examining the results of such nuclear exchanges and, more importantly, developing initiatives to avoid such catastrophes.
Vladimir Putin has revealed that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine crisis and would protect ethnic Russian populations through any means necessary. There are significant ethnic Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia with a history of disagreements and some conflict with the national governments. Any armed conflict between a Russian secessionist movement and a Baltic government could provide Russia an excuse for military intervention, which could easily devolve into a war with NATO and a risk of nuclear use.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War Bad --- Secessionism
Frydenborg 20 --- Brian Frydenborg, MS in Peace Operations from George Mason University's School of Public. BA from Washington and Lee University in Politics and History. Former intern in the United States Senate. "The History of Russia’s Cyberwarfare Against NATO Shows It Is Time to Add to NATO’s Article 5". Real Context News (RCN). 12-24-2020. https://realcontextnews.com/the-history-of-russias-cyberwarfare-against-nato-shows-it-is-time-to-add-to-natos-article-5/
The NATO Alliance has served for over seventy years not only as a foundation of preventing armed attacks from Russia and other major powers against most of Europe and North America, but also a foundation of one of the most peaceful and prosperous eras in world history. But there is one major type of warfare that has been hitting NATO member states intensely for years and increasingly so: cyberwarfare. And virtually all cybercampaigns of this cyberwarfare have been waged by Russia, part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s overall war against the West, especially NATO but also even Western democracy.
Apart from some Chinese hacking/cyberespionage known to have begun at least by 2003, the first two serious cyberassaults (in these cases carried out much more so as part of geopolitical cyberwarfare campaigns) were Hezbollah’s and Israel’s surprising cyberattacks against each other during their 2006 war and Russia’s less-surprising but far larger cybercampaign against NATO-member Estonia in 2007, just three years after it had joined the Alliance. It was not long after that when it became clear Russia was absolutely a bad-faith actor with which we have needed, since the last years of the George W. Bush Administration and through the Obama and Trump Administrations, to take a much tougher stance, as I have argued before.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Impacts
Halperin 11 (Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, )
As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collapse. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It must come from the people of a nation working to get on the path of democracy and then adopting the policies necessary to remain on that path. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, the outside world can make an enormous difference in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much in America's interest to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Impacts
Albright 17 [Madeline Albright, currently a professor of International Relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, PhD from Columbia University, former US Secretary of State, Mehdi Jomaa is a Tunisian engineer and was the acting Prime Minister of Tunisia from 29 January 2014 to 6 February 2015 September 17 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/fp_20170912_liberal_democracy__peace_security.pdf]
Scholars and practitioners of diplomacy and international relations have long considered the proposition, articulated by theorists like Immanuel Kant, that societies governed democratically are more inclined to avoid armed conflict with each other. The accumulated evidence, in fact, remains strong that established liberal democracies do not go to war against each other. Leaders accustomed to the negotiated trade-offs of shared power and accountable to citizens through free, fair, and periodic elections, embedded in constitutional systems with independent judiciaries, free media, and civilian control of the military, have built-in checks against belligerence toward similar liberal democratic countries. Healthy democracies are better at credibly signaling their intentions to their citizens and to other states. Such transparency reduces the likelihood of miscalculations and is more likely to lead to peaceful settlements before the onset of direct military conflict. At least in the realm of interstate conflict, the empirical record suggests that a world of stronger democracies will be more peaceful.
With the decline of interstate war over the last many decades, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the international community has struggled instead with the persistence of internal armed conflicts of varying intensities, some of which also have international dimensions. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the number of civil wars has increased with a significant uptick since 2010. Notably, 70 conflicts involving nonstate actors were recorded in 2015, dwarfing the yearly average of 35 between 1989 and 2015. Similarly, armed conflicts between governments and rebel groups increased from 41 in 2014 to 50 in 2015—making it the second highest tally since 52 were recorded in 1991. Factors contributing to internal conflict, including defining elements of democracy and human rights such as elections and political repression, are complex and diverse. The historical record shows, however, that countries with strong records of respect for democracy and human rights are far less likely to experience civil wars than hybrid regimes.2
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Impacts
Albright 17 [Madeline Albright, currently a professor of International Relations at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, PhD from Columbia University, former US Secretary of State, Mehdi Jomaa is a Tunisian engineer and was the acting Prime Minister of Tunisia from 29 January 2014 to 6 February 2015 September 17 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/fp_20170912_liberal_democracy__peace_security.pdf]
Given these trends, the Community of Democracies has a new imperative: to demonstrate to itself and to the world that the core values of democracy and human rights are not only goods in and of themselves, but also the most promising path to peace and security in an increasingly turbulent world. The report we present here to their representatives and to all engaged citizens from civil society, parliaments, businesses, and youth seeks to show that the norms and practices of liberal democracy and human rights do in fact lead to better security outcomes over time and across multiple dimensions.
Based on a year-long research project gathering the empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and security, and on accumulated experience with combating the scourge of extremist violence and terrorism, we can say with confidence that liberal democracy, when allowed to consolidate and flourish, is the best path toward achieving domestic and international peace and security. A series of policy briefs covering a range of security-related issues from civil war to digital technology were commissioned by the Community of Democracies’ Permanent Secretariat and prepared by the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Program and the Institute for Security Studies.1 This research, which was complemented by consultations with policymakers, academic experts, and civil society during workshops held in India, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Poland, Sweden, and the United States, examines these linkages in substantial detail.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff › Aff Extensions / A2s --- Attribution › Ext --- Democracy Impacts
Kasparov 17 ---- Garry, chairman for the Human Rights Foundation, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues, 2/16, **Modified for ableist language
The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat.
American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great.