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Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!
There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.
It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.
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Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!
There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.
China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.
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McCarthy 19 Deborah A. McCarthy, Visiting Senior Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “The Militarization of US Foreign Policy,” FIIA Comment 13, November 2019, /GoGreen!
Much has been written on the “militarization” of US foreign policy. Since 9/11, the Department of Defense expanded its non-combat activities into areas normally reserved for traditional diplomacy. In 2005, it was given a mandate to build “indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society”. While the initial focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan, it allowed the Department to do the same in other regions.
In 2009, the Department’s international mandate broadened to “strengthening governance and the rule of law and fostering economic stability and development”. Congress added new authorities, most recently allowing the US military to work with non-military security forces. The Defense Department now manages a greater portion of security assistance than the Department of State. The Trump Administration continues to favor the use of the US military over US diplomacy to address great-power competition. It has increased the defense budget while slashing that for diplomacy; for 2020, it requested a 4.9% increase for the Defense Department and proposed a 21% cut for the State Department. Today, the Department of Defense plays an important role in US foreign policy.
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House 16 Carole N. House, former Captain, U.S. Army, served in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division as assistant chief of operations and intelligence collection manager, graduate student, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, B.A. University of Georgia, “Proposal of an Unconventional Warfare Strategy to Dominate the Human Domain,” Small Wars Journal, 3-7-2016, /GoGreen!
Some broader changes necessary to support long-term strategic operations are more elusive to accomplish. Most government agencies and military leadership will resist working under to the State Department’s direction. U.S. leadership must engineer a transformation of the traditions of tension into a tradition of cooperation and respectful understanding of each element’s role in accomplishing the mission. Establishing a regular rotation of joint assignments among government agency and military personnel could support interagency understanding and repair relationships for the conduct of joint operations.[xvii] The State Department must also accept its role as the institution responsible for achieving all U.S. foreign policy objectives and the task of leadership within the government inherent in this responsibility. All of the other departments must embrace their critical role in supporting U.S. foreign policy with direction and expertise in political warfare provided by the OUW.
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Reveron 7 Derek S. Reveron, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, PhD public policy analysis, MA political science, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8-30-2007, /GoGreen!
Setting this aside, the military’s active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude cooperation with the State Department. In fact, a combatant commander works extremely closely with his Political Advisor (POLAD) and the country teams where his engagement programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, there are tensions with strategic impact. “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”73 However, both U.S. ambassadors and combatant commanders understand they need each other’s cooperation. If done well, military shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans. 74 Yet an ambassador’s focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessitate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coordination, but also interagency and combined planning.
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Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]
With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.
This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.
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Butler 17 Larry Butler, Ambassador (ret.), served nearly 38 years in the Foreign Service in the Balkans, Scandinavia, South America and the Middle East, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iraq, U.S. ambassador in Macedonia, and acting chief of mission in the former Yugoslavia, “Creeping Foreign Policy Militarization or Creeping State Department Irrelevance?” The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017, /GoGreen!
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have seen a steady outpouring of books and articles lamenting the trend in Washington to see foreign policy through a military lens: Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Lorelei Kelly’s Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense, and Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray’s Mission Creep—The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, among others.
Why might one have this view? Is it that the Defense Department’s huge budget, personnel and other capabilities give it an advantage? Is it due to how the military is organized—with geographic combatant commands that have effective control over policy and activities across their areas of responsibility, whereas State’s regional bureaus are misaligned with military counterparts and assistant secretaries deal via turf-conscious bilateral ambassadors numbering up to 40 or more, and have little say over how USAID spends its money?
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Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, /GoGreen!
This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.
Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.
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Quainton 18 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, March 2018, /GoGreen!
The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.
It was and is still true that the Combatant Commanders have at their disposal substantial resources. They can offer foreign governments materiel, training and in some cases development assistance. They are also a remarkably well-educated and impressive group. Many have doctoral degrees. All have over thirty years of military service. They are not amateurs. In comparison, successive administrations of both political parties have regarded diplomacy as an amateur business, reflected in the fact that about a third of Ambassadors are appointed from outside the career service, often to key posts. In this new Trump administration, politicians or business friends of the President have already been appointed to Moscow, Tokyo, Beijing and London, continuing a practice which goes back across the last five or six presidencies. Even more disturbing from a career Foreign Service point of view is the Administration’s decision to appoint a non-career Director General of the Foreign Service, for the first time in the Department’s history.
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Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, /GoGreen!
“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State’s traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or “concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.
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GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, /GoGreen!
House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.
[FOOTNOTE 4]
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DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, /GoGreen!
G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.
country-specific security cooperation section. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.
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Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Euro-Pacific Alignment Not Key”
Bandow 22 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2022 (“Great Power folly? NATO’s ill-timed turn to China,” Responsible Statecraft, July 5th, Available Online at https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/07/05/great-power-folly-natos-ill-timed-turn-to-china/, Accessed 07-15-2022)
So what does NATO plan on doing in the Asia-Pacific? If European alliance members still are not serious about their defense from Moscow, they aren’t likely to confront an even more formidable power thousands of miles away, one with which many of them have significant economic ties.
They do know the talk, however. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept released in Madrid devoted two paragraphs to China. The first complained that the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” China was accused of conducting “malicious hybrid and cyber operations,” seeking “to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains, using “its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence,” and subverting “the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.”
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Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Alliance Fragmentation Inevitable”
Binnendijk 22 — Hans Binnendijk, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, former Vice President for Research at the National Defense University at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, Daniel S. Hamilton, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe, served as executive director of the American Consortium on European Union Studies, Alexander Vershbow, former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, former U.S ambassador to Russia, 2022 (“Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense,” Brookings Institute, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/)
The term “strategic autonomy,” popular in some European circles and anathema in others, stems originally from an earlier discourse within the French strategic community to describe France’s ambition to boost its military capabilities and reduce its dependencies so that it could act alone if necessary to protect French interests, beginning with crisis management operations in Africa and along Europe’s southern periphery. Of course, the European Union (EU) has been trying to develop its capacity for military action for some decades. Yet it was only in 2016 that the “strategic autonomy” term was lifted to the EU level, with the publication of the bloc’s Global Strategy. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not define the notion’s content or its implications.[2]
In the years that followed, the term gained traction in some EU countries as concerns in Europe mounted about U.S. reliability as an ally under President Donald Trump, China’s rising technological and norm-setting challenges, and signs that the EU could be trampled as the American and Chinese elephants collided. Debate was further energized by signs of faltering European technological prowess, and especially by the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed European dependencies across a number of health-related sectors.
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Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Alliance Fragmentation Inevitable”
Galic 21 — Mirna Galic, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Asia Security Initiative and the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at The Atlantic Council, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State, holds an M.P.A. in International Relations from Princeton University, 2021 (“Opportunity knocks for NATO and its partners in the Asia-Pacific,” The Atlantic Council, March 26th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/opportunity-knocks-for-nato-and-its-partners-in-the-asia-pacific/, Accessed 07-14-2022)
NATO’s Asia-Pacific partner countries—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea—are easily among the Alliance’s most undervalued assets. All four are established democracies that share NATO’s values and have contributed to NATO initiatives. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia are also US treaty partners and boast some of the world’s most sophisticated militaries—outmatching those of the vast majority of NATO allies—according to global military rankings. Although NATO and these partners have developed their relations over the past two decades, various constraints have limited the ambition and potential of these relationships. A recent report from a group of experts, charged by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with identifying ways to strengthen the Alliance for the future, could lead to a change in this status quo.
The report calls on NATO to devote increased attention and resources to the security challenges posed by China—a relatively new focus for the Alliance—in part through deepened consultation and cooperation with its Asia-Pacific partner countries. Engagement between NATO and these partners on China is certainly important, but the increased attention paid in this context toward the Asia-Pacific partners also serves as an opportunity for both NATO and these countries to assess—and where possible address—the constraints that have thus far limited their relations. Doing so would enable NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners to maximize the potential of these partnerships going forward—both in regard to China and more broadly.
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Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Alliance Fragmentation Inevitable”
Fraser 22 — Dominique Fraser, Research Associate at the Asia Society Policy Institute, former Researcher at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland (Australia), holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Switzerland), 2022 (“An Alignment with Limits: NATO and its Partners in the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Society, July 7th, Available Online at https://asiasociety.org/australia/alignment-limits-nato-and-its-partners-indo-pacific, Accessed 07-15-2022)
Last week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit was a landmark event in trans-Atlantic relations, positioning Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to European security and agreeing to NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, a previously almost unthinkable outcome.
But the Summit was also significant for the Indo-Pacific: the Alliance officially designated China as a “systemic challenge” and, for the first time, all four NATO partners from the Indo-Pacific attended: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.
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Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Status Quo Solves”
Inagaki et al 22 — Kana Inagaki, Tokyo bureau chief at the Financial Times, covered tech in Tokyo for The Wall Street Journal, covered the foreign exchange and stock markets as a business reporter for Kyodo News, Nic Fildes, Australia & Pacific Correspondent at the Financial Times, former technologies and communications editor at The Times, Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S-China correspondent at the Financial Times, served as Washington Bureau Chief, 2022 (“China’s rise pushes Asia-Pacific nations to embrace Nato,” Financial Times, July 2nd, Available Online at https://www.ft.com/content/497f116b-4c03-4d19-a5b1-da4490c183bb)
One US official said Washington had pushed for Japan and the other three nations to attend Nato as part of a strategy by President Joe Biden’s administration of building and expanding coalitions of like-minded allies to counter China.
The US official said Japan wanted to expand and diversify its security ties as an insurance policy to protect itself from China in case the 2024 US election produced a president who was weaker on the alliance with Tokyo. “Japan is trying to build capacity outside of its relationship with the US,” he said.
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Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Status Quo Solves”
Galic 22 — Mirna Galic, senior policy analyst for China and East Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace, fellow of Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, served as a special advisor in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations, 2022 (“Despite Ukraine Focus, Asia-Pacific to Play Prominent Role at NATO Summit,” United States Institute of Peace, June 27th, Available Online at https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/despite-ukraine-focus-asia-pacific-play-prominent-role-nato-summit)
Why are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea being invited to the NATO summit at the highest level?
NATO’s endeavor to include its Asia-Pacific partners in the Madrid Summit is part of a larger effort in recent years to streamline these partners into NATO’s structures and functions. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea have been formal partners of NATO since the early 2010s, part of a slate of “partners across the globe,” but they are seen as an increasingly important subset of NATO’s global partners. There is even an informal nickname for these countries, the Asia-Pacific Four or AP4. There are several key reasons for NATO’s special interest in these partner countries.
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Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Status Quo Solves”
Mohan 22 — Garima Mohan, Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, former Acting Team Leader and Coordinator at the Asia-Pacific Research and Advice Network of the European Union, former Head of the Global Orders Program at the Global Public Policy Institute (Germany), holds a Ph.D. from the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies at Freie Universität Berlin (Germany), 2022 (“The New US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for Europe,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, February 17th, Available Online at https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-us-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-implications-europe, Accessed 07-15-2022)
The Biden administration’s long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy, published on February 11, confirms what became evident in its first year—a clear shift of focus to the region and a push to strengthen the collective capacities of US partners and allies there. Coming almost five months after the announcement of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that rattled most European countries, the strategy shows a clear effort to acknowledge the value an “engaged Europe” could bring to the Indo-Pacific.
The document builds on the engagement of previous US administrations with Asia and reflects a broad bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Indo-Pacific as “vital for the security and prosperity” of the United States. The goal is to work toward a free, open, connected, secure, and resilient region by anchoring the United States more firmly in it.
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Negative
Emerging Tech Innovation Negative › Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers › Extend: “Status Quo Solves”
Legarda 22 — Helena Legarda, Lead Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies—a German think tank, holds an M.P.P. in Public Policy from Harvard University, 2022 (“China and Russia Bring NATO and the Indo-Pacific Together,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, July 14th, Available Online at https://ip-quarterly.com/en/china-and-russia-bring-nato-and-indo-pacific-together, Accessed 07-14-2022)
The upswing in engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, alongside NATO’s inclusion of the European Union as a “unique and essential partner” in its Strategic Concept, however, will create new opportunities and formats for cooperation and coordination across regions and institutions.
It is important, however, to distinguish between NATO’s potential collective involvement in the Indo-Pacific and that of its member states. While the former remains exceedingly unlikely (in spite of Beijing’s claims), individual allies may leverage the alliance’s growing engagement with its global partners to step up their own presence in the region.