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2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: Bilateral CP › Perm: Do CP – 2AC

“NATO” refers to member countries – the “North Atlantic Council” is the institution

Masters 22 Jonathan Masters, Deputy Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, MA social theory, the New School, BA political science, Emory University, “What Is NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, last updated 5-4-2022, /GoGreen!

Established during the Cold War, NATO is a transatlantic security alliance composed of thirty member countries, including the United States.

NATO has focused on deterring Russian aggression in recent years, but it has also conducted security operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: T/N – Bilats Bad – Miscalc

It reduces risk of miscalc

Cottey 2K Andrew Cottey, Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, and Department of History, University College Cork, “Europe's new subregionalism,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 23(2), 2000, pp.23-47, DOI 10.1080/01402390008437789 /GoGreen!

From the Barents and the Baltic Sea in the north, through Central Europe and the Balkans, to the Black Sea in the south a range of new subregional groups and cooperation processes have emerged in Europe during the 1990s. Compared to NATO and the European Union, these new subregional groups have received little attention. Their 'indirect approach' to security, however, plays an important role in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War, reducing the risks of military conflict and addressing nonmilitary security challenges. As NATO and the EU expand eastwards, subregionalism is assuming growing importance as a means of avoiding new 'dividing lines' in Europe. After the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, subregionalism is also gaining importance as a means of building cooperation in South-Eastern Europe. The challenge for the future is to give more substance and depth to Europe's new subregional cooperation frameworks.

Stretching from the Barents and the Baltic Sea in the north, through Central Europe and the Balkans, to the Black Sea in the south a range of new subregional groups and cooperation processes have emerged in Europe since the end of the Cold War.1

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: T/N – Bilats Bad – Generic

Bilateralization is NOT going to change – especially post-Afghanistan

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!

Surveying the evolution of NATO partnerships reveals several important takeaways. First, the era of doing big things with several partners across the alliance has largely come to a halt, at least for the time being. Absent a significant investment of energy to revive efforts like the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (which faces nearly intractable political hurdles and has not produced anything of substance since its policy for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2014)28 or to consider new ways to engage a broad range of partners, it is hard to see how this dynamic will change. NATO’s increasing tendency to engage with a more limited set of partners confirms that broader frameworks are no longer the preferred approach. If successfully implemented, NATO’s plans to streamline its partnership agenda under “One Partner, One Plan” may continue the trend of bilateralizing relationships with partner countries without facilitating broader networks of partner engagement.

Even NATO’s more recent mission-driven partnership efforts, like the Enhanced Opportunities Partnerships program (EOP), are running out of steam as members and partners consider winding down the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. The EOP has successfully deepened integration and interoperability of its six partners with NATO forces. But post-Afghanistan, it will be little more than a conglomeration of heterogenous partners that are more interoperable with NATO but are clearly guided by varying motivations. Georgia and Ukraine hope to ultimately join the alliance. Finland and Sweden want to be more interoperable to contribute to NATO efforts in line with their own defense and security concerns. For Australia and Jordan, it is about connecting to an institution that gives the opportunity for cooperation with a broad spectrum of nations in the Euro-Atlantic space. In the near-term, NATO is unlikely to undertake new out-of-area missions, particularly with increased reluctance of the United States to engage militarily. Translating the EOP into a broader flexible engagement is extremely unlikely given the varying political calculations of its participants. As a result, it is difficult to see how its successes can be carried forward, again reinforcing the need to think in new terms about the contours of NATO partnerships.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › Solvency – Cybersecurity

It solves cybersecurity cooperation better

Housen-Couriel 22 Deborah Housen-Couriel, Chief Legal Officer and Vice-President Regulation for Konfidas Digital Ltd., a cyber and data protection consulting firm, member of the International Group of Experts that drafted the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on state activity in cyberspace, teaches cyber law and policy and serves on the Advisory Board of the Hebrew University Law School’s Cyber Security Research Center, research fellow with the Reichman University’s Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya’s Institute for Counter-Terrorism, MPA-MC Harvard Kennedy School, LLB, LLM the Law School of Hebrew University, “3 - Information Sharing as a Critical Best Practice for the Sustainability of Cyber Peace,” Chapter 3, Cyber Peace: Charting a Path Toward a Sustainable, Stable, and Secure Cyberspace, eds. Shackelford, Douzet & Ankersen, Cambridge University Press, April 2022, ISBN:9781108954341 /GoGreen!

Building on previous chapters that treat the concept of cyber peace in depth, the following definition focuses on four specific elements:

Cyber peace is […] not […] the absence of conflict […]. Rather it is the construction of a network of multilevel regimes that promote global, just and sustainable cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime and espionage to levels comparable to other business and national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach to cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the public and private sectors to build robust, secure systems and couches cybersecurity within the larger debate on internet governance.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › Solvency – AI

It’s better suited to SC in AI in particular

Stanley-Lockman 21 Zoe Stanley-Lockman, analyst researching military innovation, emerging technologies, and defense cooperation, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “Military AI Cooperation Toolbox: Modernizing Defense Science and Technology Partnerships for the Digital Age,” CSET Issue Brief, August 2021https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Military-AI-Cooperation-Toolbox.pdf /GoGreen!

Bilateral Military AI Agreements and Cooperative S&T Blueprints

Whereas the two tools above consist of structured opportunities for military AI cooperation, a host of other initiatives offer additional useful ways forward on military AI cooperation. The selection here focuses on bilateral AI agreements that create linkages to foreign national security innovation bases, as well as pathways that do not yet orient toward AI but could with only minor adjustments.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Political Sustainability

CP’s more sustainable – bypassing NATO’s consensus requirement is key to prevent the US from giving up and going home

Jermalavičius 11 Tomas Jermalavičius and Anthony Lawrence, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?” Annual Baltic Conference on Defence, Summary 2011, /GoGreen!

“Smart defence” or more “pooling and sharing” and better burden sharing could provide a way to increase collective capabilities even while spending is declining. This is not an entirely new way of thinking if defined it as the sum of all cooperative efforts and initiatives within the EU and NATO, rather than just as common ownership of assets and capabilities. Initiatives such as cooperative capability, security cooperation, mutual development or multinational formations such as Eurocorps – all designed to increase the capacity of the military to work together – have existed for a long time. New initiatives such as NATO’s strategic airlift consortium further advance this thinking and practice. We are already witnessing the dividends of these approaches in operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, there are many areas where this must be taken further and produce more – all very well illustrated by capability gaps in operations in Libya: air-to-air refuelling, ISTAR, combat SAR, tactical airlift etc. It does not matter through what sort of arrangement or under which nation’s lead this is delivered, as long as it is actually delivered rather than producing the very modest results of many past initiatives (DCI, PCC etc.) or projects (e.g. helicopter initiative in NATO). Civilian capabilities will also have to be enhanced through cooperative efforts such as the Weimar initiative, since the management of many contemporary crises requires civilian inputs.

Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Interoperability

BUT, even if they’re right, fragmentation is net better for interoperability in their impact scenarios

Hura 2K Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Laron, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Dan Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, RAND Project Air Force, “Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations,” 2000, /GoGreen!

Although participation in coalition operations has varied greatly from situation to situation and over time (see Table A.4), a number of allies have been particularly reliable in their participation in recent coalitions in which the United States has also participated.

As shown in Table A.4, the most frequent NATO coalition partners in the 40 operations examined were the United Kingdom (29 of 40 operations), France (28), Turkey (23), Germany (22), and Italy and the Netherlands (21 each). Other NATO allies participated in fewer actions with the United States.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Interoperability

Solves their links to interoperability

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!

With NATO’s attempts to create flexible, quasi-minilateral formats within its own partnership program failing to produce lasting results to this point, questions remain about what it can learn from the increased ad hoc approach to addressing various challenges. How does the rise of minilateral arrangements impact NATO, what makes them successful, and how can it apply the experiences of these various formats to its own partnership policy?

Minilateral or flexible arrangements can create adaptable options for engaging in political dialogue, missions, or operations—even for larger multilateral organizations. They are not as constrained by consensus rules or lengthy decision-making processes. Instead, they provide opportunities for the “willing and capable” to take swift action. As such, they fill an important readiness and political gap. They also create connections with key partners and across institutions to foster greater consensus and interoperability among Euro-Atlantic states.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Norm-Setting

Counterplan’s ability to set effective norms is indistinct from the broader solvency debate – if we win the counterplan has greater scope for cooperation, then we necessarily also win better norm-setting

Tirkey 21 Aarshi Tirkey, Associate Fellow with Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme, “Minilateralism: Weighing the Prospects for Cooperation and Governance,” ORF Issue Briefs and Special Reports, 9-1-2021, /GoGreen!

Discussions on new areas of concern, such as critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity and supply chain resilience, could lead to the devising of new norms between a select group of countries. New sectors and issues particularly related to 5G, digital trade, ocean acidification, climate change and climate finance, are being increasingly discussed in minilateral platforms. While the norms discussed may be applicable only to the members of a minilateral grouping, they can point to an emerging consensus on the form and substance of new regulations. However, there is also a concern that such norms may become fragmented, lack consistency, and rather contribute to a weakening of global governance in the long run. The future impact of minilaterals—or multilaterals and global governance—will be based on their ability to foster cooperation and collaboration on international issues, rather than leading to a fragmentation of global governance mechanisms.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Undermines NATO

No trade-off – bilats do NOT snowball, they’re continually calibrated to optimize complementarity – AND current bilats thump or disprove

Hindrén 22 Rasmus Hindrén, Head of International Relations at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, “What Finland will bring to NATO – and how it might change the alliance,” Breaking Defense, 5-19-2022, /GoGreen!

Other defense cooperation structures, like JEF and strategic bilateral partnerships can support interoperability and developing new capabilities, but they might also offer flexible mechanisms for responding to crises where NATO as a whole would be unwilling or unable to act. On the other hand, there might be pressure to downscale some of the other elements of defense cooperation in the fear that they would be too duplicative or forcing Finland to spread its efforts too thin. In the end, Finland would calibrate its network of defense cooperation in the way that adds most value.

One area where bilateral cooperation will not drop off, however, is very clear. Every country in NATO cherishes their bilateral defense cooperation with the US and Finland would not be an exception. Finland would want to continue and deepen that bilateral cooperation, while understanding the longer-term trends of strategic competition will force the United States to focus its gaze more on the Indo-Pacific region.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – XT: All SC Is Bilat

Coordination in planning achieves multilat effects

--UCC = Unified Combatant Command(er) (ex. USEUCOM, the people who make Theater Security Cooperation Plans)

Szayna 4 Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; Adam Grissom, senior political scientist at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, senior political scientist and former manager of the International and Security Policy Group at RAND; Thomas-Durell Young, Brian Rosen, and Yuna Huh, research assistants at RAND; “U.S. Army Security Cooperation Toward Improved Planning and Management,” RAND Corporation, 2004, /GoGreen!

Security Assistance Training. In the case of certain kinds of security assistance training, the demanders believe that the demand exceeds by a large margin the available seats in U.S. Army schoolhouses and the funding available for International Military Education and Training.7 According to the interviewees, in some cases demand exceeds supply to such an extent that the shortfalls have affected the overall UCC theater security cooperation strategies. Contractors were cited as one possible solution, but only as a suboptimal last resort.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – XT: All SC Is Bilat

There is no such thing as multilat SC – their solvency advocates all mean the counterplan, NOT the plan

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, /GoGreen!

Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66

A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – AT: Thaler

AND, he admits it’s NOT a deal-breaker – planners stretch authority all the time

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, /GoGreen!

Similarly, authorities that restrict activities to specific mission areas are seen as inflexible in the face of quickly emerging threats, making it difficult to build partner capacity in intended mission areas and further impelling SC personnel to “game” the system to achieve their SC objectives. After 2001 and until recently, the priority for U.S. national security strategy and for SC (and DoD activity in particular) has been counterterrorism.24 Congress established Section 1206 and many other recent SC authorities on the basis of the need to rapidly respond (and help partners respond) to threats from al-Qaeda and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). But as the CT mission area has been addressed in the past ten to 15 years, other missions have emerged that are becoming priorities for the United States and its partners but that are not explicitly covered under the CT rubric (or under “stability operations,” another area addressed in authorities). These other emerging areas include cyber warfare and “hybrid” warfare of the type Russia has utilized to subjugate eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea (gaps are also addressed in a subsequent section of this chapter). Capstone DoD strategic planning guidance that defines priorities and directs the efforts of the CCMDs also identifies nontraditional threats, such as transnational border security, maritime security, and foreign fighters.25 While Congress and the administration have created some specific programs to bolster Ukraine and eastern NATO allies,26 existing authorities do not provide the flexibility for SC personnel to pursue these mission areas in other nations or regions. Thus, they are left with “stretching” existing authorities to achieve key objectives with partners.27

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Generic / Multilat Key

3 – informally access every NATO key warrant – by selectively utilizing NATO resources while remaining formally independent

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!

The 2014 Wales Summit then gave rise to other options. Members endorsed the Framework Nations Concept (FNC), proposed by Germany in 2013, as a viable flexible format within NATO. Voluntary and bottom-up, this approach enables individual NATO members—or framework nations—to work with a limited set of other members to fill critical capability and operational gaps. The FNC model creates more formal groupings and commitment among the participants than the +N model. Against the backdrop of strained defense budgets and varying threat perceptions, it was designed to combine the limited resources of large and small European members while decreasing redundancies. The concept builds on those of NATO’s “Smart Defense” and the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing,” taking a step further by creating a more structured, coordinated approach focused on outputs and measuring success against national capability targets set in NATO’s Defense Planning Process.

Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, as larger and more capable “framework nations,” head separate FNC initiatives. Although these differ quite significantly, there is a common denominator: they are voluntary, multinational frameworks led by members focused on furthering NATO’s mission. They may often rely on the alliance’s organizational and command structure, yet they remain independent of its operational structures. And all three have been expanded to include non-NATO countries, serving as an important link between the alliance and its partners.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Deficit – Generic / Multilat Key

2 – all of their advantage scenarios necessarily involve unilateral capabilities and organizations – there’s no terminal impact to any deficit

Obering 8 Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant General Kevin Campbell, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command; and Mr. Paul Francis of the Government Accounting Office; questioned by John P. Murtha, U.S. Representative (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations’ Defense Subcommittee; “DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009,” hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 110 Congress, 2-26-2008, /GoGreen!

Question. Several NATO allies have expressed concern about the Administration's decision to deploy missile defense on a bilateral basis (i.e., with Poland and the Czech Republic) rather than through a NATO process.

Why did the Administration decide to move forward on a bilateral instead of a multilateral process with NATO?

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: LTNB – Cohesion

Their ev’s acontextual – none of it says consensus-based decision-making is better – BUT increasing bilateralism now empirically proves it’s worse for cohesion

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!

While NATO navigated the “new challenge – new format” issue, minilateral arrangements thrived in the Euro-Atlantic space, proliferating in the aftermath of defining security events, from the end of the Cold War to 9/11. They have gained new prominence throughout the last decade as NATO finds itself torn between competing priorities and struggles to balance territorial defense and external stabilization efforts. Differences in threat perceptions among members in Eastern and Southern Europe have added to this trend, as have internal political tensions and a growing desire for greater strategic autonomy among some European countries.

NATO’s eastern flank has been a particularly fertile landscape for minilateral formats. Events, from the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, created a new impetus to enhance deterrence, readiness, and exchange within and outside of NATO.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: LTNB – Cohesion

Counterplan’s comparatively less likely to disrupt cohesion

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, /GoGreen!

With NATO’s attempts to create flexible, quasi-minilateral formats within its own partnership program failing to produce lasting results to this point, questions remain about what it can learn from the increased ad hoc approach to addressing various challenges. How does the rise of minilateral arrangements impact NATO, what makes them successful, and how can it apply the experiences of these various formats to its own partnership policy?

Minilateral or flexible arrangements can create adaptable options for engaging in political dialogue, missions, or operations—even for larger multilateral organizations. They are not as constrained by consensus rules or lengthy decision-making processes. Instead, they provide opportunities for the “willing and capable” to take swift action. As such, they fill an important readiness and political gap. They also create connections with key partners and across institutions to foster greater consensus and interoperability among Euro-Atlantic states.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Perm – Do Both

AND, holdouts are more likely to cave to pressure bilaterally

Jaeger 21 Dr. Markus Jaeger, Research Fellow in The Americas Program at German Council on Foreign Relations, “The Logic (and Grammar) of US Grand Strategy Implications for Germany and Europe,” DGAP Report, No.8, June 2021, /GoGreen!

As for security policy, the pressure on allies to shoulder a greater defense burden will initially increase given a diminished ability and willingness of US domestic interests to support overseas military commitments. The United States “economizes” its military power to extract economic advantages from its allies. Unlike in the realist scenario, this policy is primarily driven by domestic interests, not strategic considerations. As with economic policy, the United States has an increasing preference for dealing with its allies on a bilateral, rather than multilateral, basis, as this increases US leverage. To the extent that security guarantees are maintained, at least initially, allies will have to make economic and financial concessions – in terms of market access and resource transfers – in order to preserve US security commitments.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Perm – Do CP

Contextually, that makes the counterplan less than the plan

Tsuruoka 10 Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, “Japan–Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU,” English translation from the original Japanese version with the same title published in Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo, 13(1), October 2010, /GoGreen!

The first section will examine the value of NATO as a security partner for Japan from the following four perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; 3) as a means of cooperation with the US; and 4) a multilateral school. The second section will use a similar method to examine the significance of security cooperation with the EU, viewing it from the following three perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; and 3) as a “non-American” partner.

There are two things to be mentioned before going into substantial discussions below. First, from the perspective of “mutually using the other,” it would be necessary to examine the value of Japan as a partner for Europe. However, it goes beyond the scope of this article, which is focused on the Japanese side of the story. That said, it needs to be mentioned that it is necessary for Japan to be prepared and willing to be used by Europe as long as Japan wants to use Europe and that letting Europeans understand the value of Japan as a partner is in Japan’s interest.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG Bilateral CP › AT: Perm – Do CP

“NATO” is exclusively its institutional organizations, NOT its member states

Johnston 19 Seth A. Johnston, Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, former chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe, former Task Force Commander in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, PhD international relations, MA comparative politics, Oxford University, “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” Parameters, The US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2019, /GoGreen!

Today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no Cold War alliance. Few developments illustrate NATO’s capacity for adaptation more than its 21st century role in Afghanistan.1 NATO allies invoked the collective defense provision—Article 5—of its founding treaty for the first and only time just one day after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.2 Few present at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 could have imagined it would be invoked by European countries and Canada seeking to support the United States or that the Alliance’s largest and longest military operation would occur in central Asia. Fewer still might have predicted NATO allies would agree to the mission so soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a crisis the then US ambassador to NATO described as a “near death experience” for the Alliance.3 Yet NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and has remained in Afghanistan for the better part of two decades.

As the United States has begun negotiating a political settlement to the Afghanistan conflict with a view to the eventual withdrawal of international forces there, an assessment from the overall NATO perspective will complement the national initiatives.4 This effort will also support ongoing efforts to reassess NATO’s priorities in the face of other security challenges.5