Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—DoD Overstretch › O/S – CP Solves AM&E

AM&E is a net benefit – it’s part of our reform plank, AND its impacts of redundancy, waste, mismanagement, unintended consequences and blowback are the same warrants already embedded in all our DoD bad cards

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

Build in assessment, monitoring, and evaluation programs at the outset of security assistance programs

Effective monitoring mechanisms should be built in from the outset in reforming the State Department’s security assistance programs. In the current system, there is little evidence of what works or what does not in terms of improving a partner country’s capacity or will to achieve shared security objectives. Some reforms to DOD security assistance programs were an important step toward building assessment, monitoring, and evaluation into the DOD’s security assistance programs.95 Similarly, recent efforts to reform monitoring in the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations accounts have had notable success. These reforms should be copied and mandated for all programs conducted by the State Department and the DOD moving forward. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation programs should be regularized and aggregated in order to be useful for U.S. officials implementing security assistance programs.96 This will be a significant undertaking, and so building up a professional workforce that can effectively monitor and evaluate security assistance programs must be a significant component and priority in personnel reforms at the State Department and the DOD. Further reforms should be considered, such as mandating that a small portion of funds for each security assistance program be set aside for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation purposes.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Politics › PTX – CP Popular

Bipartisan consensus in favor of the counterplan

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

Centralizing authorities and resources to the State Department would simplify the interagency process. As noted above, moving security assistance authorities to the State Department would represent a huge realignment in the interagency process. But this reform effort would align with long-term broad, bipartisan consensus that there is a diplomacy-defense imbalance in U.S. foreign policy agencies.21 Realigning assistance resources must be fundamental to any effort to reempower the State Department and would eventually improve interagency functionality by resulting in better-managed policymaking. The costs of moving authorities would be well worth the improvements in overall U.S. policy by making it more coherent, less wasteful, and more effective.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Politics › PTX – CP Popular

Support is bipartisan and more powerful than opposition

Gould 22 Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, “For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?” Defense News, 4-11-2022, /GoGreen!

With the world transfixed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and debates breaking out on Twitter over whether the U.S. should send the country fighter aircraft and missile defense systems, security assistance ― usually a wonky topic ― is having a moment.

But it’s not just about public attention. With Democrats holding the reins in Washington, State Department officials have recommended a list of reforms to America’s globe-spanning security aid programs.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Politics › PTX – CP Unpopular

No support

Thompson 21 Natalie Thompson, PhD candidate, political science, Yale University, former research analyst for the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, research assistant and James C. Gaither junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Laura Bate, senior director with the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 2021 Next Generation National Security Fellow and former policy analyst with the Cybersecurity Initiative at the Center for a New American Security; “The Right Way To Structure Cyber Diplomacy,” War on the Rocks, 8-25-2021, /GoGreen!

The unfortunate political reality is that reorganizing the State Department is hard. That alone is not a reason to forgo reform, but it does introduce constraints on what may be feasible. Any new office or bureau will need leaders, but current law strictly limits the rank that they can hold. Creating a new under secretary, or even a new assistant secretary, would require significant changes to the State Department Basic Authorities Act, and there is limited political momentum for that particular undertaking. The law currently authorizes the appointment of 24 assistant secretaries and six under secretaries. Although the Cyberspace Solarium Commission initially recommended creating an assistant secretary position to lead a new cyber bureau — and although it has been clear for two decades that the State Department’s structure should be overhauled — making such drastic changes to the necessary legislation may be a nonstarter on Capitol Hill for the foreseeable future. The Cyber Diplomacy Act provides the best available work-around by placing an ambassador-at-large at the head of the new bureau, ensuring that the position has the stature necessary for effective leadership.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Politics › PTX – CP Unpopular

CP costs PC – the support their ev assumes (Foreign Relations/Affairs committees) will evaporate during the process – their author

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

Hypothetical costs of reforming the system and disrupting current implementation of U.S. security assistance are likely to be significantly outweighed by improvements in the policymaking process and well worth the political capital a new administration and Congress would need to expend.

Landscape of the security assistance system today

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Politics › PTX – CP Unpopular

CP costs PC – DoD and Senate Armed Services oppose

Gould 22 Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, “For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?” Defense News, 4-11-2022, /GoGreen!

Any effort to uproot authorities and funding, to then shift them toward the State Department, would likely face an uphill fight with the Pentagon and potentially with the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee has on its side the only reliable annual legislative vehicle in the National Defense Authorization Act.

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: Turn – Cohesion

No risk of their impacts – cohesion in an Article 5 scenario is inevitable – our links are key to all the other impacts to cohesion

Wallander 18 Celeste A. Wallander, President and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council, “NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 97(4), July/August 2018, pp.70-81, JSTOR /GoGreen!

Beyond its stabilizing effect on the broader continent, there is another reason NATO's liberal democratic character came to matter: in the absence of a shared external threat, the binding force of liberal democratic values and institutions has become essential to the alliance's effectiveness. NATO's ability to conduct security operations depends on its political cohesion as much as its members' military capabilities. Few question NATO's cohesion when Article 5 of its founding treaty is invoked that is, when an ally is directly attacked. Common external threats generate unified responses. After 9/11, for example, NATO members quickly joined the U.S. campaign against Talibanruled Afghanistan.

However, when the alliance faces a security issue that does not invoke Article 5, alliance cohesion is less certain because members have different priorities that guide their cost-benefit calculations. In such cases, liberal commitment to the rule of law has played an important role. The alliance has proved cohesive when acting outside Europe and when the stakes are well grounded in international law, as was the case during its 2011 intervention in Libya, which was backed by a un Security Council resolution.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: Turn – Cohesion

AND impact uniqueness – all their impacts to cohesion are already happening

Katz 18 Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at USAID, former senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State; and Torrey Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, former foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office; “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” 7-10-2018, /GoGreen!

Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will exacerbate already tense divisions in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them.

1 Russia is already benefiting from and effectively leveraging its relationships with Hungary and Turkey to exacerbate discord within Europe and NATO. Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin see one another as allies in their disdain for the European Union and Orbán has courted Russian financial and political support as he builds an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Russian propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungarian media. A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that Russian state-owned media content “by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hungary.” The report cited Orbán as the EU and NATO’s most supportive leader of Putin’s worldview and leadership. Acting as the Russian “camel’s nose under the tent,” Orbán is thwarting Ukraine and NATO’s partnership efforts by blocking the Ukraine-NATO Commission from meeting at the upcoming summit.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: Turn – Cohesion

We control link uniqueness – democratic values are the only possible source of cohesion

Antúnez 18 David Deulofeu Antúnez, MA candidate, Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA political science, Baylor University, “NATO’s Trojan Horse: How Democratic Deconsolidation and Populism are Weakening the Alliance,” International Affairs Review, 26(2), Summer 2018, MSU-KM

Nationalist-populist ideologies and the erosion of democratic institutions are inherently opposed to the international liberal order under which the North Atlantic Treaty was conceived. Their emphasis on an identity in which there is “us” and “the other” fosters an environment where differences are highlighted between countries and nationalities. The growth of authoritarian tendencies puts civilian control of the military at peril and greatly reduces governments’ accountability to their people, while alienating democratic partners. “In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War, the NATO alliance saw its share of illiberal and autocratic members. However, a hegemonic America was effective in wielding its influence and acting as a guarantor of the Alliance’s main tenets. This is not the case today given America’s retreat from the world stage; authoritarians are more emboldened to flout and subvert the alliance’s established norms. In a multicultural, multiethnic, and multilinguistic NATO, the only common ground the allies have is their liberal democratic commitment. If taken away, the Alliance will fracture under the weight of its own disunity.”

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: Turn – Cohesion

Even if, our link outweighs theirs

Ellehuus 21 Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; and Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with CSIS’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, former deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service; “NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously,” War On The Rocks, 6-9-2021, /GoGreen! *added [halting]

This was the wrong choice then and an even worse one today. The risks of ignoring NATO’s internal strains far outweigh the benefits of addressing them. Some of the reasons are longstanding: A country’s treatment of its own citizens reflects, positively or negatively, on NATO’s brand, and an unstable domestic environment inhibits that country’s ability to meet its international obligations.

Today, though, ignoring democratic decline carries new risks. NATO’s adversaries have become increasingly skilled at taking advantage of and, in some cases, actively exacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities. A compromised media environment allows disinformation campaigns to flourish, while corruption opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Moscow is also preying on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: Turn – Cohesion

Implementation shields their link to cohesion – diplomats have the skills to avoid backlash

Katz 18 Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at USAID, former senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State; and Torrey Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, former foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office; “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” 7-10-2018, /GoGreen!

Holding NATO’s democratic backsliders to account is not without risk or consequence, and the effort is even more complicated amid growing competition between the West and authoritarian states including Russia and China. The United States and NATO allies must carefully navigate internal NATO challenges and avoid pushing some members further from the alliance and closer to Russia. Calling for the defense of democracy could deepen fissures between democratic and illiberal states that are not going away anytime soon.

An even greater risk than Russian short-term exploitation, however, is a possibility that in 10 years’ time the NATO alliance becomes unrecognizable—a hybrid club of autocratic, illiberal, and liberal democratic states that, devoid of shared values, do not agree on security threats or areas for cooperation. In the long term, dictators tend to maintain their power and legitimacy through strongmen power plays at home and sometimes abroad. And almost always, they leave a legacy of destruction, chaos, human rights violations, social strife, and other grievances. They rarely contribute to international peace, stability, and prosperity, which are the central objectives of an effective security alliance.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: No Solve Backsliding

It’s reverse causal – DoD control bypasses DoS conditionality, causing backsliding and coups – counterplan solves that, even if nothing else – BUT also boosts global cred and momentum

Cole 21 Emily Cole, program officer for governance, justice and security in the Applied Conflict Transformation Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, MALD Fletcher School at Tufts University, BA Amherst College; and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, security governance advisor at USIP, formerly worked at the U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism, served in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, PhD, MA international relations, University of Cambridge, BA world politics Hamilton College; “To Consolidate Democracy, Change U.S. Security Assistance,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 12-16-2021, /GoGreen!

Ample evidence—including the global surge in coups d’états and crises of police violence from Brazil and Nigeria to the Philippines—shows that dozens of countries must improve not only the “kinetic” capacities, but also their governance, of police, military and other security institutions. Yet a first outline last week of the new U.S. “initiative for democratic renewal” omits any mention of this vital task. The United States and its allies must re-shape their assistance to support democracy and human rights. In some countries—for example Egypt and Uganda—U.S. security sector assistance has helped to consolidate authoritarianism. Current trends risk exacerbating the problem in a “race to the bottom” among the United States, Russia and China.

U.S. policies too often set aside the nation’s commitment to democratic values on a flawed assumption that this is necessary to advance U.S. interests amid great-power competition. Yet democratic backsliding and authoritarianism create long-term risks of violence, instability and extremism. Even measured by the narrower metric of strategic military alliances, these risks weaken U.S. security interests. Serious democratic backsliding preceded Turkey’s decision to purchase one or more Russian S-400 missile defense systems. Democratic backsliding in the Philippines weakened the U.S.-Philippine security relationship to the point of endangering the agreement that has enabled a U.S. troop presence in the Philippines. Worldwide, democratic deficiencies help push countries into the arms of China or Russia.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: No Solve Backsliding

Yes solves backsliding – their ev assumes trying to create democracy from whole cloth

Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, /GoGreen!

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: SQ Solves

NATO can’t do anything about it now

Katz 18 Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at USAID, former senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State; and Torrey Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, former foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office; “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” 7-10-2018, /GoGreen!

In practice, NATO needs a new mechanism to hold members accountable when there is democratic backsliding and when the principles of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding document, are violated. Celeste Wallender, President Obama’s special assistant to the president and senior director for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council, argues persuasively for several measures here. As she and others have noted, NATO currently has no options to suspend, expel, or penalize a NATO member, for example Hungary, for violating a core tenet of the alliance’s democratic values. There is not even a proper venue at NATO—for example the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s main decisionmaking body—to raise matters that some consider a direct threat to the alliance’s core principles. The NAC already has over a dozen committees, but none deal directly with democratic backsliding and human rights violations in the alliance.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: SQ Solves

No other actors have the means NOR political will – leveraging security assistance is key

Ellehuus 21 Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; and Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with CSIS’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, former deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service; “NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously,” War On The Rocks, 6-9-2021, /GoGreen!

This was the wrong choice then and an even worse one today. The risks of ignoring NATO’s internal strains far outweigh the benefits of addressing them. Some of the reasons are longstanding: A country’s treatment of its own citizens reflects, positively or negatively, on NATO’s brand, and an unstable domestic environment inhibits that country’s ability to meet its international obligations.

Today, though, ignoring democratic decline carries new risks. NATO’s adversaries have become increasingly skilled at taking advantage of and, in some cases, actively exacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities. A compromised media environment allows disinformation campaigns to flourish, while corruption opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Moscow is also preying on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: US Not Key

Only the US can generate sufficient pressure through linkage with security assistance

Corke 19 Susan Corke, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund and Director of Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, “Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding our Shared Democratic Values,” Prepared Statement for the Record, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, U.S. House of Representatives, 11-13-2019, /GoGreen!

Moving forward, democracy must be shown to work. Our Democracy Playbook14 (attached for reference) highlights strategies and tactics for pro-democracy actors to not only push back against illiberal and authoritarian-leaning actors, but also to renew the promise and resiliency of democratic institutions. While there will be no single, perfect strategy to best counter these illiberal challenges and rebuild trust in our alliance, we are dedicated to doing our part to equip democratic actors to defend and rebuild our democratic institutions, revitalize trust in democracy, and come together in common cause.

Before I conclude by sharing a few of our recommendations, I wanted to summarize five of the key points that should underpin a strategic approach to reinvigorating democracy as a security imperative for the alliance.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: US Not Key

US key – relative power

Wallander 18 Celeste A. Wallander, President and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council, “NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 97(4), July/August 2018, pp.70-81, JSTOR /GoGreen!

But procedural fixes to inoculate the alliance against weak links are not enough. NATO might be able to deal with, say, a repressive Turkey by pushing it to the sidelines of core missions and decisions. NATO rules do not formally provide for such an approach, but the organization is good at finding procedural workarounds, and it is at least possible that the Turkish leadership would not object. It would be quite another matter if a core NATO member departed from the alliance's liberal democratic foundations. How could NATO sideline or work around France, or Germany, or the United States?

The best defense lies within the member states themselves. NATO can structure disincentives and punishments for backsliders, but only citizens can hold elected leaders accountable. Most important, the United States must rise to meet the challenge. The decline of liberalism among core NATO allies is concerning: Germany represents the transatlantic phoenix rising from fascism's ashes; France is the symbol of resistance through occupation; the United Kingdom was where Europe kept hope alive in World War II. But it was the United States that saved the twentieth century from dictatorship and helped Europe achieve prosperity, security, and stability. NATO might survive European publics toying with fascism (although it should limit the experiments). It cannot survive if U.S. liberal democracy fails.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: US Thumps

It only demonstrated the resilience of democracy, does NOT thump

Walsh 21 Nate Walsh, Emmy award-winning CNN International Security Editor, “America was lucky to be saved by its democracy -- even if some don't realize it,” CNN, 1-8-2021, /GoGreen!

Even in the aftermath, America might not see how fortunate it is.

Most "attempted coups" elsewhere in the world leave a hangover of giddying uncertainty - shops shuttered, presidents in hiding, the television playing a nature documentary or half the staff in the hotel you are staying in not turning up for work.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: Ukraine Thumps

Ukraine does NOT thump – only has a global effect if NATO backsliding is solved

Tharoor 22 Ishaan Tharoor, columnist on the foreign desk of The Washington Post, authors the Today's WorldView newsletter, former senior editor and correspondent at Time magazine, “The war in Ukraine underscores a moment of democratic crisis,” The Washington Post, 4-20-2022, /GoGreen!

Such visions send ripples through the post-Soviet world. A handful of countries once in Moscow’s orbit are doing their best to toe a different line. The Baltic states, members of both NATO and the European Union, have flung themselves into the resisting the Russian advance next door; tiny Estonia, for example, has already committed nearly 1 percent of its total gross domestic product in support of Ukraine’s fight. They comprise the spearhead of a galvanized Western response to Putin’s war.

But beyond the conflict, there’s a deeper disquiet in many other countries that were once in the Soviet sphere. A new report from Freedom House, a Washington-based think tank that tracks democracy around the world, found that only six of 29 countries spanning from Central Europe to Central Asia managed to maintain a “consolidated” democracy, while most others drifted toward authoritarianism or a bleak “gray zone” where the trappings of democracy truss up illiberal or autocratic political project. This is certainly on view in Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orban recently won reelection in a political context widely seen as unfair and stacked against the opposition.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › NB—Democracy › AT: !/D – Collective Action

Best studies prove short-termism, truth decay, and weak multilateralism are NOT inherent to democracy, but to backsliding – and democracy’s net better at overcoming collective action problems

Lindvall 21 Daniel Lindvall, researcher at the Climate Change Leadership Initiative at the Department of Earth Sciences in Uppsala University, PhD sociology, “Democracy and the Challenge of Climate Change,” International IDEA Discussion Paper 3/2021, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021, /GoGreen!

Although democracies do better on average than authoritarian systems, climate change is an issue that poses specific challenges to the governing capacity of democracy. The challenge of climate change is complex and has sometimes been described as a ‘wicked problem’. It is an issue in the interface between natural and human systems, and therefore it affects all spheres of life, but in unpredictable ways. The complexity of climate change is one of the prime reasons why democracies have failed to deal adequately with the crisis. The climate crisis is moreover a global challenge, and democracies have not sufficiently managed to act beyond the constraints of the national states. The short-term focus of most democratic decision-making has been an additional weakness. Democracy is a system limited by time and space, while the problem of climate change runs across generations and national borders. Moreover, the influence of fossil fuel lobbyism, corruption, policy capture and weak institutional capacity have hampered democracies from acting responsibly.

As this paper demonstrates, democracies nevertheless possess several advantages when it comes to tackling the climate crisis. Governing systems that allow civil participation, a free flow of information and processes of assessment and evaluation seem to be more capable than authoritarian regimes in dealing with issues of great complexity. Studies on climate change cooperation have also shown that, in general, democracies are more active in international negotiations and more likely to keep their political commitments. The international cooperation on climate change relies to a great extent on open and democratic societies, providing a base for journalists and civil society organizations covering and reporting on the negotiations and monitoring compliance. Moreover, technological innovation, particularly on renewable energy, has made the solutions to the climate crisis less cross-border intensive and extensive, motivating both individual countries, regions and cities, and companies, communities and individuals, to act on their own. Active engagement by individuals and civil society organizations can create pressure for strong policy responses on a local, national and global level.