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2022 UTNIF Kritik
NEG – Cap K › 1NC – K › Shell 1NC – K

The alternative is to reject the plan in favor of commitment to organizing anti-capitalist international revolution.

Tavan '21 [Luca; 3/7/21; writer for Red Flag; "Worldwide revolution is possible and necessary," ]

From the moment Marx and Engels urged workers of the world to unite at the climax of the Communist Manifesto, the goal of international revolution has been at the core of Marxist politics.

International revolution isn’t just a romantic dream, but an urgent necessity. It’s the only means by which capitalism can be permanently uprooted and replaced with socialism. This is because capitalism, unlike previous class societies, is a globally integrated system. “For the first time in history”, wrote British Marxist Colin Barker of this phenomenon, “capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate”.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
NEG – Cap K › 1NC – K › Shell 1NC – K

Capitalism is terminally unsustainable and causes extinction.

FOSTER 19 – Professor of Sociology @ the University of Oregon, Ph.D. in Political Science @ York University, editor of the Monthly Review, former critical Essay Editor/Archives Editor, Organization & Environment, editor and author of numerous books and articles about economics, environment, and capitalism [John, “Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?” 2/1/2019, , DKP]

Less than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialization, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war. To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3 Indications of this failure of capitalism are everywhere. Stagnation of investment punctuated by bubbles of financial expansion, which then inevitably burst, now characterizes the so-called free market.4 Soaring inequality in income and wealth has its counterpart in the declining material circumstances of a majority of the population. Real wages for most workers in the United States have barely budged in forty years despite steadily rising productivity.5 Work intensity has increased, while work and safety protections on the job have been systematically jettisoned. Unemployment data has become more and more meaningless due to a new institutionalized underemployment in the form of contract labor in the gig economy.6 Unions have been reduced to mere shadows of their former glory as capitalism has asserted totalitarian control over workplaces. With the demise of Soviet-type societies, social democracy in Europe has perished in the new atmosphere of “liberated capitalism.”7 The capture of the surplus value produced by overexploited populations in the poorest regions of the world, via the global labor arbitrage instituted by multinational corporations, is leading to an unprecedented amassing of financial wealth at the center of the world economy and relative poverty in the periphery.8 Around $21 trillion of offshore funds are currently lodged in tax havens on islands mostly in the Caribbean, constituting “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”9 Technologically driven monopolies resulting from the global-communications revolution, together with the rise to dominance of Wall Street-based financial capital geared to speculative asset creation, have further contributed to the riches of today’s “1 percent.” Forty-two billionaires now enjoy as much wealth as half the world’s population, while the three richest men in the United States—Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett—have more wealth than half the U.S. population.10 In every region of the world, inequality has increased sharply in recent decades.11 The gap in per capita income and wealth between the richest and poorest nations, which has been the dominant trend for centuries, is rapidly widening once again.12 More than 60 percent of the world’s employed population, some two billion people, now work in the impoverished informal sector, forming a massive global proletariat. The global reserve army of labor is some 70 percent larger than the active labor army of formally employed workers.13 Adequate health care, housing, education, and clean water and air are increasingly out of reach for large sections of the population, even in wealthy countries in North America and Europe, while transportation is becoming more difficult in the United States and many other countries due to irrationally high levels of dependency on the automobile and disinvestment in public transportation. Urban structures are more and more characterized by gentrification and segregation, with cities becoming the playthings of the well-to-do while marginalized populations are shunted aside. About half a million people, most of them children, are homeless on any given night in the United States.14 New York City is experiencing a major rat infestation, attributed to warming temperatures, mirroring trends around the world.15 In the United States and other high-income countries, life expectancy is in decline, with a remarkable resurgence of Victorian illnesses related to poverty and exploitation. In Britain, gout, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and even scurvy are now resurgent, along with tuberculosis. With inadequate enforcement of work health and safety regulations, black lung disease has returned with a vengeance in U.S. coal country.16 Overuse of antibiotics, particularly by capitalist agribusiness, is leading to an antibiotic-resistance crisis, with the dangerous growth of superbugs generating increasing numbers of deaths, which by mid–century could surpass annual cancer deaths, prompting the World Health Organization to declare a “global health emergency.”17 These dire conditions, arising from the workings of the system, are consistent with what Frederick Engels, in the Condition of the Working Class in England, called “social murder.”18 At the instigation of giant corporations, philanthrocapitalist foundations, and neoliberal governments, public education has been restructured around corporate-designed testing based on the implementation of robotic common-core standards. This is generating massive databases on the student population, much of which are now being surreptitiously marketed and sold.19 The corporatization and privatization of education is feeding the progressive subordination of children’s needs to the cash nexus of the commodity market. We are thus seeing a dramatic return of Thomas Gradgrind’s and Mr. M’Choakumchild’s crass utilitarian philosophy dramatized in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times: “Facts are alone wanted in life” and “You are never to fancy.”20 Having been reduced to intellectual dungeons, many of the poorest, most racially segregated schools in the United States are mere pipelines for prisons or the military.21 More than two million people in the United States are behind bars, a higher rate of incarceration than any other country in the world, constituting a new Jim Crow. The total population in prison is nearly equal to the number of people in Houston, Texas, the fourth largest U.S. city. African Americans and Latinos make up 56 percent of those incarcerated, while constituting only about 32 percent of the U.S. population. Nearly 50 percent of American adults, and a much higher percentage among African Americans and Native Americans, have an immediate family member who has spent or is currently spending time behind bars. Both black men and Native American men in the United States are nearly three times, Hispanic men nearly two times, more likely to die of police shootings than white men.22 Racial divides are now widening across the entire planet. Violence against women and the expropriation of their unpaid labor, as well as the higher level of exploitation of their paid labor, are integral to the way in which power is organized in capitalist society—and how it seeks to divide rather than unify the population. More than a third of women worldwide have experienced physical/sexual violence. Women’s bodies, in particular, are objectified, reified, and commodified as part of the normal workings of monopoly-capitalist marketing.23 The mass media-propaganda system, part of the larger corporate matrix, is now merging into a social media-based propaganda system that is more porous and seemingly anarchic, but more universal and more than ever favoring money and power. Utilizing modern marketing and surveillance techniques, which now dominate all digital interactions, vested interests are able to tailor their messages, largely unchecked, to individuals and their social networks, creating concerns about “fake news” on all sides.24 Numerous business entities promising technological manipulation of voters in countries across the world have now surfaced, auctioning off their services to the highest bidders.25 The elimination of net neutrality in the United States means further concentration, centralization, and control over the entire Internet by monopolistic service providers. Elections are increasingly prey to unregulated “dark money” emanating from the coffers of corporations and the billionaire class. Although presenting itself as the world’s leading democracy, the United States, as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy stated in Monopoly Capital in 1966, “is democratic in form and plutocratic in content.”26 In the Trump administration, following a long-established tradition, 72 percent of those appointed to the cabinet have come from the higher corporate echelons, while others have been drawn from the military.27 War, engineered by the United States and other major powers at the apex of the system, has become perpetual in strategic oil regions such as the Middle East, and threatens to escalate into a global thermonuclear exchange. During the Obama administration, the United States was engaged in wars/bombings in seven different countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan.28 Torture and assassinations have been reinstituted by Washington as acceptable instruments of war against those now innumerable individuals, group networks, and whole societies that are branded as terrorist. A new Cold War and nuclear arms race is in the making between the United States and Russia, while Washington is seeking to place road blocks to the continued rise of China. The Trump administration has created a new space force as a separate branch of the military in an attempt to ensure U.S. dominance in the militarization of space. Sounding the alarm on the increasing dangers of a nuclear war and of climate destabilization, the distinguished Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved its doomsday clock in 2018 to two minutes to midnight, the closest since 1953, when it marked the advent of thermonuclear weapons.29 Increasingly severe economic sanctions are being imposed by the United States on countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua, despite their democratic elections—or because of them. Trade and currency wars are being actively promoted by core states, while racist barriers against immigration continue to be erected in Europe and the United States as some 60 million refugees and internally displaced peoples flee devastated environments. Migrant populations worldwide have risen to 250 million, with those residing in high-income countries constituting more than 14 percent of the populations of those countries, up from less than 10 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, ruling circles and wealthy countries seek to wall off islands of power and privilege from the mass of humanity, who are to be left to their fate.30 More than three-quarters of a billion people, over 10 percent of the world population, are chronically malnourished.31 Food stress in the United States keeps climbing, leading to the rapid growth of cheap dollar stores selling poor quality and toxic food. Around forty million Americans, representing one out of eight households, including nearly thirteen million children, are food insecure.32 Subsistence farmers are being pushed off their lands by agribusiness, private capital, and sovereign wealth funds in a global depeasantization process that constitutes the greatest movement of people in history.33 Urban overcrowding and poverty across much of the globe is so severe that one can now reasonably refer to a “planet of slums.”34 Meanwhile, the world housing market is estimated to be worth up to $163 trillion (as compared to the value of gold mined over all recorded history, estimated at $7.5 trillion).35 The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38 If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40 Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity. Capitalism is best understood as a competitive class-based mode of production and exchange geared to the accumulation of capital through the exploitation of workers’ labor power and the private appropriation of surplus value (value generated beyond the costs of the workers’ own reproduction). The mode of economic accounting intrinsic to capitalism designates as a value-generating good or service anything that passes through the market and therefore produces income. It follows that the greater part of the social and environmental costs of production outside the market are excluded in this form of valuation and are treated as mere negative “externalities,” unrelated to the capitalist economy itself—whether in terms of the shortening and degradation of human life or the destruction of the natural environment. As environmental economist K. William Kapp stated, “capitalism must be regarded as an economy of unpaid costs.”42 We have now reached a point in the twenty-first century in which the externalities of this irrational system, such as the costs of war, the depletion of natural resources, the waste of human lives, and the disruption of the planetary environment, now far exceed any future economic benefits that capitalism offers to society as a whole. The accumulation of capital and the amassing of wealth are increasingly occurring at the expense of an irrevocable rift in the social and environmental conditions governing human life on earth.43

2022 UTNIF Kritik
NEG – Cap K › 1NC – K › Shell 1NC – K

NATO-US security cooperation is a militarized project of racial capitalism. Despite its intentions, the aff merely expands Western imperialism.

Campbell 19 (Horace, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science @ Syracuse University, “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”, Counter Punch, April 9)

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Colebrook 2020

[Michael Colebrook- U.S. Army officer who holds a Ph.D. in Political Philosophy from the University of Dallas, 4-27-2020, "The Rhymes of History: Beijing’s Nightmare Strategic Scenarios," RealClearDefense, ]

History does not repeat itself. With the exception of general platitudes about the permanence of international tension and the sporadic recurrence of violent conflict, statements about historical patterns and cycles of warfare can at best lead to historiographical confirmation bias and, at worst, can prejudice policymakers into taking counterproductive and unnecessary escalatory measures.[1] Diplomats, intelligence professionals, and politicians must tread with care when approaching history and any patterns that emerge from it, especially when trying to draw parallels with present-day events. History and policy are ultimately about particulars—particular interests, particular leaders, particular decisions, and particular crises. Specific policies matter and can go a long way towards avoiding war altogether or minimizing its impact should it occur. History and policy are ultimately about particulars—particular interests, particular leaders, particular decisions, and particular crises. Simplifications aside, a close study of history does have its merits. To borrow a phrase attributed to Mark Twain, history may not repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes. While the circumstances that cause state and sub-state groups to engage in open conflict are unique, the geographical, ethnic, and cultural conditions leading to tensions among these groups remain at least semi-permanent. The challenge before policymakers is to accurately assess present realities, many of which have historical precedents, and act within the small but undeniable window of choice these realities offer. Recently, few issues have received as much attention as Sino-U.S. relations, and none have invited so many historical parallels. Phrases like “Senkaku Paradox” and “Thucydides Trap” are common parlance among young strategists and military leaders.[2] Comparisons with the pre-World War I Anglo-German rivalry or Athenian-Spartan relations before the Peloponnesian wars abound. These analogies fit into a specific version of the realist outlook on international affairs. According to these theories, sovereign states exist in perpetual latent conflict—a war of all against all—in an anarchic global environment. In the end, they must rely only upon themselves and the acquisition of power to achieve security. In this framework, status-quo hegemons find themselves in unavoidable conflict with hegemonic challengers. It violates the presumed axioms of realism for two hegemonic superpowers to coexist peacefully. Conflict—both cold and hot—is preordained. Yet the preceding reflects only one particular strand of realist analysis. It is possible to adopt a more open-ended outlook on historical development while acknowledging the semi-structural elements that govern international issues. As states pursue their national interests—a fundamental principle of realism—opportunities arise not only for de-escalation of tension but even cooperation on particular matters. Indeed, if the international situation is suitable for it, cooperation between rivals can make the most strategic sense. The Helsinki Accords and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I/II) treaties at the highpoint of the Cold War, as well as the collaboration between U.S. and Iranian negotiators during the talks that eventually led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, demonstrate the potential for cooperation between apparently hostile countries. Assessing bilateral relations between the U.S. and China today suggests areas where cooperation is possible.[3] A future Sino-U.S. war is far from inevitable, at least if leaders manage relations delicately and with sufficient mutual appreciation for each other’s unique history, culture, and strategic ambitions. Strategists cannot emphasize the point enough: China is not Sparta or Germany; the U.S. is not England or Athens. Each has a horizon for interpreting international relations that are unique to it, and American policymakers must make a genuine effort to understand the Chinese outlook. Beijing holds a number of nightmare scenarios coloring their strategic worldview, and U.S. policymakers should keep this in mind if they want to avoid rhetoric and actions that could inadvertently trigger Chinese fears of escalation. Strategic Nightmare Scenario #1: Strategic Encirclement In his influential assessment of China’s history, Henry Kissinger claims China’s greatest geopolitical fear is strategic encirclement—that a single hegemonic rival or an alliance of multiple weaker ones will surround its vast territory and work to destabilize its periphery.[4] This fear is strongly rooted in geography and history. In terms of security, geography has not been kind to China. Twelve different countries share its borders, and many of them have a history of aggressive action and outright cruelty toward the Middle Kingdom. What is more, several maritime powers lie within a few hundred miles of its coastline. Fate has positioned China precariously, explaining in no small measure the mistrust that has characterized its diplomacy. While China has often been regionally ascendant, it has always remained keenly aware that national tragedy or embarrassment are close-at-hand if these surrounding nations were to band together against it. China’s Belt and Road (Shutterstock) China’s two most significant geopolitical initiatives over the last decade confirm this lesson. For China, The Belt and Road Initiative serves primarily as a peaceful way to buy influence with many countries on its western periphery. For instance, many Central Asian countries have secured sizeable funding for infrastructure projects in the Belt and Road. Likewise, the maritime aspects of Belt and Road aim to construct a logistical basis for sea routes whose accessibility does not rely upon the goodwill of China’s island neighbors. Furthermore, China’s gradual militarization of the South and East China seas suggests an effort to secure its eastern and southern maritime flanks. Considering this element of China’s strategic horizon, the Belt and Road as well as the militarization of the South and East China Seas take on a new meaning. They are attempts to avoid the strategic disaster encirclement entails by creating a Eurasian sphere of influence less susceptible to maritime embargo or land-based intrusion. For China, The Belt and Road Initiative serves primarily as a peaceful way to buy influence with many countries on its western periphery. It is thus not surprising these initiatives are experiencing significant push-back from several rivals in China’s neighborhood who fear that their room for maneuver in the region will diminish. Among these encircling states, three stand out: Russia, Japan, and the United States.[5] All have complicated economic relations with China today, with points of tension coexisting with cooperation on many fronts. All have engaged in military conflict with China at some point in its history, and Beijing holds them primarily responsible for orchestrating its “century of humiliation.”[6] Although currently not a potent military superpower, Japan’s proximity perpetually stokes memories of its brutal occupation of Manchuria and illustrates the real and present dangers of domestic political instability and military weakness.[7] Shinzo Abe’s efforts to remilitarize the island nation of Japan have understandably provoked consternation on the continent. These efforts are one of the motivating forces behind the Belt and Road and the militarization of the South and East China Seas. The tit-for-tat steps of military buildup on both sides risk feeding into narratives that make de-escalation difficult.[8] Russia, on the other hand, currently enjoys relatively stable and cooperative ties with Beijing. But such was not always the case and may not be in the future. Talk of a budding alliance between the two powers ignores the severe headwinds around the corner.[9] Both view the Eurasian landmass as their backyard, and both seek to develop stronger economic and military ties with Central Asian nations. Russian initiatives tied to the Eurasian Economic Union, whose objectives include creating a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor, as well as promoting deeper integration of the post-Soviet space, collide with China’s own visions for the future of the Eurasian landmass. In the short term, China and Russia are engaged in a high level of cooperation aiming to integrate the two projects.[10] However, the long-term prospects of cooperation are less bright. If either party begins to perceive any asymmetry in influence, an increasingly hostile and mutually suspicious attitude will inevitably emerge, especially if their common enemy, the United States, follows through with President Trump’s desire to withdraw entirely from the region.[11] A hostile Russia on China’s borders would create a situation reminiscent of the 1970s, when the U.S. was able to exploit the discord to its own advantage. Looking into the future, it seems localized great power competition between Russia and China, without the U.S. as a participant, could benefit the U.S. significantly more in an area that matters very little to American vital interests. Perceptions of Strategic Encirclement (OrientalReview.org) Currently, the chances of a complete U.S. withdrawal from the region appear slim. In fact, the American presence only seems to be growing, with Beijing perceiving the U.S. as the most likely contender to carry out this nightmare strategic scenario. Therefore, the pervasiveness of America’s imprint along its entire periphery strikes an emotional chord with the Chinese leadership.[12] American troops and strategic partnerships in South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Taiwan, Australia, India, and the Philippines, not to mention recent efforts to gain influence among the Central Asian countries critical to the Belt and Road, represent a textbook case of hegemonic strategic encirclement that understandably worries Beijing. One area of controversy rarely mentioned in the American press is the war in Afghanistan. Despite America’s perception of the region as the heart of the so-called War on Terror, China’s perspective on this war differs considerably. Not only does Afghanistan share a border with China, but more importantly, strong cultural ties link Afghanistan to China’s most restive region, Xinjiang.[13] China initially supported the coalition effort to overthrow the Taliban—which has, Beijing believes, trained and provided refuge for Uighur separatists in Xinjiang—and promotes initiatives aimed at stabilizing the troubled country.[14] But a growing cohort in the Chinese leadership fears the conflict is morphing into a new arena for “Great Game” competition. The Chinese believe this transformed conflict risks leading to more instability on its periphery, not less.[15] Because China believes instability in Afghanistan means instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese leadership could perceive this conflict in one of two ways. In the first, China views this instability as a headache inadvertently caused by the U.S. presence. China will have to dedicate substantial resources—both military and financial—to dealing with a problem that it sees as indirectly rooted in a U.S. military presence. In the second, China could suspect a deliberate U.S. hand in stoking instability in Xinjiang. As implausible as this suspicion may be, Washington cannot ignore Chinese perceptions of the nineteen-year conflict. The U.S. must come to terms with the reality that it may be inadvertently feeding Chinese fears of strategic encirclement. Strategic Nightmare Scenario #2: Domestic Chaos Understanding how Beijing behaves on the international stage also requires a deep appreciation of its complex domestic conditions. What often strikes western observers as an unnecessary violation of human rights represents, for the Chinese leadership, not only a matter of regime survival but also, more importantly, a matter of averting national catastrophe. Memories of the bloody civil war between 1927 and 1949—in which as many as 3 million people died—still haunt many Chinese. Illustrative of this lesson in more recent history are the 1989 Tiananmen Square anti-government protests. Western observers believed these protests were a prelude to the full democratization of the Chinese mainland. So the eventual government crackdown on the demonstrations—leading to the deaths of thousands and the arrests of even more—struck democratic societies as exceptionally cruel. For many Westerners, Tiananmen symbolized the promise of China, what it could be if only the current communist regime decided to make necessary political and economic reforms. Protesters in Tiananmen Square, 2 Jun 1989 (CNN) As Kissinger astutely observes, understanding the political and historical context of Tiananmen shows that this event symbolizes something much darker for the Chinese leadership. In the lead-up to the unexpected death of Hu Yaobang, whose funeral was the trigger for the Tiananmen protests, Deng Xiaoping’s political reforms and economic restructuring were beginning to expose latent fissures within Chinese society. While many in the West marveled at surging Chinese economic growth, the tens of thousands of students sent abroad, and the incredible changes in the standard of living inside the country, there emerged significant indications that new, potentially destabilizing currents were churning within. On the economic side, attempts to make prices reflect real costs inevitably led to price increases, at least in the short term, which in turn led to a run to buy up goods before prices went even higher. This rush created a vicious cycle of hoarding and higher inflation. Also, to recast the command economy on the model of the European system, Deng Xiaoping dismantled many central institutions and streamlined the bureaucracy.[16] Reforms thus enraged many established interests. As Kissinger points out, “The relative success of economic reform produced constituencies at the core of the later discontent. And the government would face declining loyalty from the political cadres whose jobs the reforms threatened.”[17] Significantly, many of the Tiananmen protesters were not of the liberal-democratic mindset, but disgruntled communists whom liberal-democratic reforms had hit hard.[18] On a cultural level, economic reform had raised Chinese expectations on standard of living and personal liberties, while simultaneously creating tensions and inequities that many Chinese believed could only be resolved by a more open and participatory political system. Discontent was thus growing on all sides of the political spectrum. At the same time, in the far west of the country, Tibetans and the Uiygur Muslim minority in Xinjiang were beginning to agitate. For the communist leadership and Deng Xiaoping in particular, the ubiquitous protests stirred the historical Chinese fear of chaos. Regardless of the stated goals of the demonstrators, they recalled both the civil war and the bloody Cultural Revolution.[19] Deng carried out the eventual crackdown reluctantly. In his mind, it was a necessary measure to avoid national disaster.[20] Presently, Beijing appears more confident domestically and internationally. Over the last two decades, China has enjoyed sustained growth rates well above those of Western democracies and has managed to weather the storms of an international financial crisis in 2008-2009 and a trade war with the U.S. with only a relatively minor effect on its overall growth. Standards of living continue to rise and poverty rates are the lowest they have ever been.[21] At the parade for the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 2019, this self-assurance was clearly on display, as enormous crowds gathered to admire the overwhelming might of a nation resurrected from the dustbin of history. Nevertheless, as Matthew Goodman, Elizabeth Economy, and other commentators have suggested, all of this optimism masks a much bleaker reality for the Chinese leadership.[22] The regime’s legitimacy has come to rely almost entirely on its ability to continue to deliver high levels of economic growth, something that will become increasingly difficult as its population ages and the economy becomes more consumer-driven. Industrial production growth slowed to a 17-year low in August of 2019, and anecdotal evidence suggests that ordinary Chinese are starting to feel the effects of slower wage growth and higher prices.[23] Furthermore, many respected Chinese economists are calling attention to the fact that government efforts to spur growth in the face of these obstacles are less and less effective.[24] The marginal efficiency of capital, measured by the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR), is declining sharply since it takes more and more units of investment to generate one additional unit of growth.[25] All of this could potentially spell disaster for a financial system already racked with increasing debt and a forecasted growing disproportion between retirees and workers. Confrontation between the U.S. and China? (Shutterstock) It will be necessary for Chinese leadership to cultivate other sources of legitimacy over the coming years if these economic trends continue. U.S. policymakers should be sensitive to these necessities and not overreact to any rhetoric that aims primarily at shifting the basis of legitimacy within China, even if it strikes an ostensibly anti-western or nationalistic tone outside of China. Xi Jinping’s position may require at least three levels of communication, one with other world leaders, one within the Communist Party, and another that serves primarily to protect domestic stability and the regime’s standing within China. Historical perspective shows that, in China, a weak regime means increasing domestic instability. It also shows this instability can take on a life of its own, leading to civil war, mass-murder, and vulnerability to foreign interference in its affairs. Beijing will do everything in its power to avoid this scenario, so leaders in Washington must be realistic about what it can expect from the Chinese leadership in the years ahead. Historical perspective shows that, in China, a weak regime means increasing domestic instability. An Uncertain Future Current Sino-U.S. relations are a complicated affair, and though strategists should never rely on history to provide an accurate picture of future developments, it can be a useful, albeit incomplete, guide to the particular concerns, interests, and strategic outlook of their Chinese counterparts. China’s two strategic nightmare scenarios outlined above are deeply rooted in its history, culture, and geography. They by no means explain all of its domestic and international behavior, but they can provide context for much of its rhetoric and many of its geostrategic initiatives. If the U.S. wants to elude the maelstrom of unavoidable war over relatively small strategic stakes, it would do well to avoid measures that feed China’s fears about these scenarios. Although Washington should not be naïve in its dealings with Beijing, it should also make a deliberate effort to adjust its rhetoric to appease these legitimate concerns. Above all, it should demonstrate that its economic and military endeavors in China’s neighborhood intend, not to actualize some sort of strategic strangulation, but to serve Asia’s long-term interests by providing stability and prosperity to a region that, without a U.S. presence, would be much more dangerous for everyone. The U.S. should be more honest about the fact that its future prosperity depends largely upon China’s success. What is more, Washington should make clear that, while it does stand for human rights and the gradual reform of China’s political institutions, it understands that given China’s domestic conditions, these reforms cannot be made overnight. Perhaps the most challenging consequence of a non-repetitive history is that the future is mostly undetermined, a mystery revealed only by the unfolding of particular events. This uncertainty puts the onus of decision and responsibility squarely on the shoulders of political, diplomatic, and military leadership, who must navigate this challenging terrain with incomplete knowledge of its features. A Sino-U.S. war is not preordained, nor is it an impossibility. If it ever does happen, it will be the result of the particular choices, words, and deeds of particular leaders, not a pattern embedded in the structure of history.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Multiple years of empirical research disprove Chinese revisionism

Jalil 19 (Ghazala; 4-3-2019; Research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies at Islamabad; “China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism”; ; SML)

The test of the offensive realism theory would be to determine whether China displays the revisionist tendencies, acts aggressively towards its neighbours and shows power maximising behaviour. In sum, it would entail determining whether China displays revisionist tendencies or acts like a status quo power. Under Mao (1949-1976), China had the policy of overturning all the imperialist regimes in Asia and the world. During this period, China actively supported revolutions in many developing countries that it considered imperialist or saw them as imperialist proxies. This threatened China’s neighbouring states especially the US allies.28 China essentially wanted to export its socialist ideology to other states. During this time, China’s policy can be described as operating under the principles of offensive realism. At the same time, during this era, China was operating with limited capabilities in an international environment characterised by bipolarity. It was operating within an environment where global politics was driven by the intense Cold War rivalry of the two great powers ─ the US and the former Soviet Union.29 However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China. However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for China as well as for the region as a whole. Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s. China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Foremost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes. On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort towards norms of interdependent behaviour among states. It has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also advances China’s national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power.36 This is also an indicator that China is willing to work in the existing Western-dominated systems of international institution and regimes rather than challenge the system or seek to break it up. Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the foundation of its strategy for economic development. It has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment while, at the same time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them. Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that China adopted a policy of active defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign policy today. Many analysts, however, argue that participation in the international institutions is not an adequate indicator but compliance with the norms, rules and goals of these institutions is a better indicator of whether a country is a status quo state or not. Along these lines, Alastair Johnston considers China’s compliance with five global normative regimes: these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self determination and human rights.38 As far as sovereignty is concerned he writes: “Today China is one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept (of sovereignty).”39 Similarly, free trade is another international norm that is seen as an indicator of status quo behaviour. China has moved to support the norms of global free trade. China’s membership of WTO in 2001 is a testament to its support for free trade. China’s tariff rates have declined from over 40 per cent in 1992 to less than 20 per cent in 1997.40 In 2015, the tariff rate was 3.4 per cent.41 China has gradually embraced global capitalist institutions and system. In the Belt and Road Forum that China held in May 2017, hosting 30 world leaders, it released a communiqué, which was signed by all 30 world leaders present on the occasion that emphasised the need to “build an open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade (and) oppose all forms of protectionism.”42 However, the ongoing trade war with the US has forced China to increase its tariffs. Since 2017, the US had imposed three rounds of tariff on the Chinese products worth US$250 billion. China has retaliated by imposing US$110 billion on the US goods. Beijing has accused the US of starting the “largest trade war in economic history.” 43 This damages the global free trade regime. China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is envisaged as a journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is expected to be beneficial for China and Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its primary aim is to promote geographical linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity. It would also result in a higher flow of trade and businesses in the region.44 Its ultimate aim is to have a well-connected region, promote harmony and accelerate economic development. This is also a clear indication that China is focused on economic development and regionalisation instead of displaying aggressive hegemonic behaviour. As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international nuclear non-proliferation norms. The prevailing concerns mostly centred on the transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, China has not signed the 1987 MTCR, so it does not amount to any violations of China’s treaty obligations. On the positive side, in 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which a major nuclear non-proliferation proponent like the US has not done till date.45 It has been cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and has installed four new International Monitoring System (IMS) stations, bringing the total number of certified stations in China, to five. Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed. Moreover, along with Russia, China has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive weapons in outer-space. For nearly two decades, now there have been the Chinese and Russian efforts to negotiate a treaty for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Many proposals have been put forward including the two Chinese working papers and a joint China-Russia working paper in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, PAROS remains blocked due to the US refusal to negotiate any such treaty because it goes against its missile defence and space plans.46 China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even after the breakdown of the six-party talks in 2009 and the recent high tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 with the US, China played the role of a stabiliser, urging both sides to show restraint and emphasising that war was not an option for any country. China has, thus, helped strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation norms. Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that it is not an aggressive, power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural and diplomatic influence around the globe. Its growing soft power is not only evident in Southeast Asia but also in Beijing’s economic partnerships in Latin America and Africa.48 The fact that China is able to attract and appeal the states in the region through its soft power is an indicator that its neighbours are increasingly viewing China as less of a threat. However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the Latin America, the “Beijing Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market economics and democratic government which was popular in the past.49 With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under President Donald Trump, China seems to be positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an emphasis on soft power. Taiwan issue is one instance where China’s policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo. However, the issue can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last few decades, America continued selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, mainland China considers these developments to encourage Taiwan’s independence and a threat to its interests. According to Yiwei Wang, “on the Taiwan issue, America’s logic is that peace comes from “balance of power.” China has time and again protested the matter of arms sales to Taiwan with the US but to no avail. China sees these moves as an effort to change the distribution of power in the region. In turn, China has threatened Taiwan against moves for independence and deployed missiles on the mainland as well. Consequently, this makes the US suspicious of China’s revisionist intentions towards Taiwan – locking the two powers in a security dilemma. Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the South China Sea. The dispute centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The area provides valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging from 25,000 Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.51 China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. The dispute has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last few years. China has been island-building since 2014 and has also increased naval patrols. It can be argued that China’s actions are defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the area. Under the garb of “freedom of navigation” operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep access to key shipping and air routes.52 In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the South China Sea under the garb of “freedom of navigation.”53 Another week-long US and British Naval exercise took place in January 2019.54 These are meant to send a signal to China to rescind claims over the disputed area. These exercises have angered China. China does not have expansionist or hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains are not something new. Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful. However, a military conflict over the dispute is not an option. Moreover, the US influence over other claimants of the territory complicates matters for China. This has resulted in China acting more assertively in the South China Sea in order to defend its interests. In fact, the US would act more aggressively if any country was to interfere in matters close to its borders. Overall, from the above analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power rather than as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China’s engagement with its neighbours, its participation in the regional and international institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as well as its emphasis on projecting its soft power. The claims of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are in contrast with Waltz’s defensive realism on several points. While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence. 56 Therefore, a robust defence and careful balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances. “This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.”57 Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region.”59 It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Krulak and Friedman 2021

[Charles C., former President of Birmingham-Southern College, former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, M.S. from George Washington University, Alex, former Chief Financial Officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, J.D. from Columbia University, “The US and China Are Not Destined for War,” Project Syndicate, 08-17-2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-china-not-destined-for-war-by-charles-c-krulak-and-alex-friedman-1-2021-08]

First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century’s tripwire, just as the “Fulda Gap” in Germany was during the Cold War. But the same dynamic of “mutual assured destruction” that limited US-Soviet conflict applies to the US and China. And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that a potential nuclear conflict did not materialize, given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and – unlike climate change – immediate. A US-China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran, or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber, and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. Second, it is important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game. Although Chinese military power has grown dramatically, it still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters. And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalizers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development. If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China – a fixation with overtones of the US-Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war. Notwithstanding accusations that COVID-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump’s four-year presidency. China’s leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically. Despite Trump’s trade war, Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around $650 billion, and China was America’s largest trade partner. The two countries’ supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds more than $1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it cannot easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses.

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Norrlof 2021

[Carla; March 23; Visiting Professor at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council and at Massey College, Associate Professor at the University of Toronto, and Research Associate at The Graduate Institute of Geneva; The Washington Quarterly, “The Ibn Khaldûn Trap and Great Power Competition with China,” vol. 44]

The return of great power rivalry has been the defining feature of the 21st century. Since the beginning of the new millennium, China and Russia have openly defied the United States and upset the stability of the liberal international order. Both China and Russia share physical and material attributes possessed by the United States that are traditionally required for great power status: land mass, a sea portal, a large population, and technology to field and develop a competitive military capability. Most scholars and policymakers agree that China presents the largest challenge to US interests and the US-led liberal international order. Economic and military growth in China has been astounding, surpassing Russian expansion. China’s outward extension is not primarily resource-based as is Russia’s but multidimensional, posing a structural challenge to US military and economic dominance. Much ink has been spilled over the nature of US-China rivalry and whether the two great powers are destined for war. Structural factors figure prominently when predicting US-China relations. A famous deadly Greek trap describes how the fear of a hegemonic power sparks catastrophic war with a rising power. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides writes, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” 1 Thucydides’ statement has been widely adopted as a metaphor for the dangers associated with great-power transition. Both A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory and Robert Gilpin’s realism see great-power wars as most likely to occur when a rising challenger is about to surpass a declining hegemonic power. 2 Today, the Thucydides Trap is highly relevant insofar as we have a clear incumbent power, the United States, and according to many measures of great powerhood, a clear rising power—China—with military, manufacturing, and commercial, and corporate power. However, the analogy mismatches international hierarchy and regime type. In classical times, the incumbent land power, Sparta, was the authoritarian power who feared the rise of the democratic maritime power, Athens.3 This incongruity is not even the biggest problem with the analogy. In order for the Thucydides Trap to apply, China would have to significantly narrow the power gap with the United States. While China has caught up with the United States in important respects, it has not caught up with the United States in terms of the logic and networks that inform dominance in the key economic and security areas required for power transition.4 Apart from the obvious inhibiting factors of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, the United States and China are nowhere close to the power parity likely to spark a major power war between them. The Thucydides Trap is a powerful analogy for bellicose dynamics between a hegemonic power and a rising power, but in the near term, war between the United States and China for the reasons proposed in the Thucydidean analogy is highly unlikely.

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Lowry 5/19/2022

[Rich, editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine, “Opinion | Why Even America-First Conservatives Should Back Aid to Ukraine”, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/05/19/america-first-conservatives-back-ukraine-aid-00033762]

Hawley further contends that the $40 billion distracts from the need to focus on China. It is not a zero-sum game between Europe and East Asia, though. We will need a robust trans-Atlantic alliance to help contain China. If we leave Europe to deal with the Ukraine crisis on its own, it’s less likely to be there for us on China. On top of this, Beijing is obviously watching how we deal with the Russian invasion as part of its calculations with regard to Taiwan. If Russia gets it way, or if we pull up short in our support of Ukraine, it will send the wrong message.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Liptak 5/19/2022

[Kevin, CNN, “Biden turns his attention back to Asia after months focused on Russia's war in Ukraine”, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/joe-biden-asia-trip-preview/index.html]

After months of all-consuming attention on Russia's war in Ukraine -- a conflict that has summoned Cold War comparisons and revitalized alliances built last century -- Biden's debut visit to Asia is an opportunity to renew what he views as this century's challenge: Confronting a rising China through a system of renewed economic and military partnerships. "We think this trip is going to put on full display President Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy and that it will show in living color that the United States can at once lead the world in responding to Russia's war in Ukraine, and at the same time chart a course for effective, principled American leadership and engagement in a region that will define much of the future of the 21st century," national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters a day ahead of Biden's departure for Asia. Sullivan discounted the suggestion that the President and his team were distracted from their Asia initiatives by the crisis in Ukraine. "We actually don't regard this as a tension between investing time, energy and attention in Europe and time, energy and attention in the Indo-Pacific. We regard this as mutually reinforcing," he said, adding: "For us, there is a certain level of integration and a symbiosis in the strategy we are pursuing in Europe and the strategy we're pursuing in the Indo-Pacific and President Biden's unique capacity to actually stitch those two together, is, I think, going to be a hallmark of his foreign policy presidency." Even as Biden turns his attention to Asia, the crisis in Ukraine remains his administration's dominant foreign policy focus. Before he departs Thursday, Biden will meet at the White House with the leaders of Finland and Sweden, who filed emergency applications this week to join NATO following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Reuters 6/22/2022

[“U.S. Congress moves to boost Biden's record defense budget”, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-congress-moves-boost-bidens-record-defense-budget-2022-06-22/]

WASHINGTON, June 22 (Reuters) - The U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on Wednesday backed a proposal to increase spending for the Department of Defense by $37 billion on top of the record $773 billion proposed by President Joe Biden. The vote paved the way for a Pentagon budget of at least $810 billion next year after the Senate Armed Services Committee already backed a $45 billion increase in its version of the bill. The two chambers will decide the ultimate level when they meet in conference on the bill at an undecided date. The vote in favor of the $37 billion amendment to the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was 42-17, as more than a dozen Democrats joined Republicans in favor of higher spending. The amendment included $2.5 billion to help pay higher fuel costs, $550 million for Ukraine, funding for five ships, eight Boeing Co-made (BA.N)F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets, five Lockheed Martin Co-made (LMT.N) C-130 Hercules planes, and about $1 billion for four Patriot missile units. Biden requested a record peacetime national defense budget of $813 billion which earmarked $773 billion for the Pentagon. About $40 billion of Biden's national defense budget is set aside for other national security-related programs at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy and other agencies. read more Biden's budget requested a 4.6% pay raise for troops and the largest research and development budget in history, as Russian aggression in Ukraine spurs demands for more military spending. Last year, the NDAA authorized $778 billion in defense spending, which was $25 billion more than requested by Biden.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Madhani and Megerian 3-17-2022

[Aamer and Chris, AP News reporters, “Biden’s China ‘pivot’ complicated by Russia’s war in Ukraine”, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-biden-business-china-d47d4b2215de708b55a12bc4b648818d]

President Joe Biden set out to finally complete the “pivot to Asia,” a long-sought adjustment of U.S. foreign policy to better reflect the rise of America’s most significant military and economic competitor: China. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made that vexing move even more complicated. China’s government has vacillated between full embrace and more measured responses as Russian President Vladimir Putin prosecutes his war, making the decisions for Biden far more layered. Biden and China’s Xi Jinping are scheduled to speak by phone on Friday, a conversation that the White House says will center on “managing the competition between our two countries as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine and other issues of mutual concern.” The Biden administration is left needing to focus east and west at the same time, balancing not simply economic imperatives but military ones as well. “It’s difficult. It’s expensive,” Kurt Campbell, the coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the White House National Security Council, said during a recent forum of maintaining a high-level U.S. focus in two regions. “But it’s also essential, and I believe we’re entering a period where that’s what will be required of the United States and of this generation of Americans.” Biden has been deeply invested in rallying NATO and Western allies to respond to Russia with crippling sanctions, supplying an overmatched Ukraine military with $2 billion in military assistance — including $800 million in new aid announced Wednesday — and addressing a growing humanitarian crisis. Eastern flank NATO allies, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, have made clear to the Biden administration that they want the U.S. to increase its military presence in the region and do more to address the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. More than 3 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their country in recent weeks. Though the war in Ukraine has dominated Biden’s focus of late, White House officials insist they haven’t lost sight of China — and are watching intently to see how Xi decides to play his hand.

2022 MGC Evidence
A2 Pursuit Inevitable

Pursuit of heg isn’t inevitable – grand strategy moderates based on relative US power

Kitchen 20 (Nicholas, Department of Politics, University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom, “Why American Grand Strategy Has Changed: International Constraint, Generational Shift, and the Return of Realism”, Global Affairs, Vol. 6) DB

From this review of the strategic postures of the last four US administrations, it’s striking the extent to which each defined itself in contrast to what had come before: if the post-Cold War period really was characterised by continuity, this certainly wasn’t the image incoming administrations had of themselves. Rather, they not only sought, but succeeded, in changing course: we can see significant variation in both second order adjustments to the instruments used to pursue US interests, and also third order shifts in terms of how US interests ought to be constituted. The first two post-Cold War administrations differed in how they understood the goal of primacy, and enacted second-order changes in the means by which the United States pursued it. But the last decade has seen an even more fundamental rethinking in terms of the logics of American foreign policy. Ben Rhodes’ characterisation of the foreign policy establishment as ‘the Blob’ points to the Obama administration’s claim to have recast American grand strategy in ways that explicitly rejected what consensus there was between liberal internationalist democrats and republican neoconservatives. That consensus revolved around the idea that American leadership was indispensable in the world, that hegemonic management should be activist, and that the continued flourishing of the United States at home required liberal democratic governance and open markets abroad. The questioning of this consensus reveals divergent ideas about both how the world works and what policies are most likely to succeed, but also more fundamentally about what it means for the United States to be powerful (Quinn & Kitchen, 2018). Whilst employing very different ideas about the question of what constitutes American power, both Obama and Trump’s foreign policies might be cast as declinist, in that they seek to respond to an international system that is less permissive of the direct application of American power (Kennedy, 1992, pp. 239-240). Obama’s response to perceived decline might be characterised as politeness (Quinn, 2011). Reaffirming commitments to multilateral institutions, reinvigorating alliance partnerships, and above all, seeking to steer clear of policy choices that might further hasten decline – the administration-endorsed bumper stick was “don’t do stupid shit” (Rothkopf, 2014) – were all designed to slow the pace at which the United States’ unipolar position was inevitably eroding, and to extract greater returns from structural power (Kitchen & Cox, 2019). Trump’s response to perceived decline is the opposite, not least because in his dystopic rhetoric Trump used decline as a political strategy, as Oz Hassan highlights in this issue. In a thoughtful reflection on Kennedy’s Rise and Fall thesis in 1991, the Australian historian Neville Meaney wrote that “no treatment of American decline is adequate which does not face up to the problem of American nationalism and its impact on American social psychology.” (Meaney, 1991) It is not simply the nationalist and reactionary character of Trump’s rhetorical response to decline: his mercantilism, alliance backsliding, and focus on great power relations over institution-building has echoes of Nixon’s foreign policy in a former period of economic malaise and status anxiety (Cha & Seo, 2018). Indeed, the United States’ strategic approach during the course of the last decade has echoes of American grand strategy in times when American power was less obviously dominant. Through the nineteenth and early twentieth century, before Washington’s post-war ascension to the position of ‘leader of the free world’, American foreign policy was steeped in realism: geographically focused, cautious, and suspicious of grand designs. In this sense, the Cold War period is an outlier, characterised by ideologically fuelled global ambition. Now that the generation of foreign policy establishment that experienced the Cold War is fading away, replaced by a younger coterie animated by the damage caused by American adventurism in the post-Cold War period, the cognitive frameworks of US foreign policy have changed. For all Trump’s particular capriciousness, a sense of realism is returning to the heart of American grand strategy.

2022 MGC Evidence
No Heg Impact

No heg impact

Fettweis 2017

[Christopher, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, 5/8/17, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 423-451]

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a high-level US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

2022 MGC Evidence
No Heg Impact

Liberal order is resilient – no collapse.

Mousseau 2019

[Michael James Mousseau, Political Science Professor at the Univeristy of Central Florida, focuses on the link between economics and conflict, PhD at Binghamton University. The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace, 44(1), Summer 2019, ProjectMUSE]

Reports of the demise of the liberal order, however, are greatly exaggerated. First, Hungary and Poland are newly contractualist states. The sociological nature of economic norms theory means that contractualist values should be more firmly rooted in older contractualist societies than in newer ones. This is corroborated with the natural experiment of Germany: in 1962 West Germany embraced contractualism (see table 1), but it was only after 1991 that East [End Page 191] Germany could have become contractualist, when massive investments from the Federal Republic caused incomes in the marketplace to become higher than incomes obtainable from status relationships. Today, Germany's populist movement is concentrated in the eastern part of the country and is largely nonexistent in the western part,83 which corroborates the expectation that some newly contractualist societies retain some of their status values even after a generation of robust opportunity in the marketplace. Deeper changes in values may not occur until generational cohorts initially socialized into status or axial economies have passed on. Second, the electorates in most of the thirty-five contractualist states listed in table 1 in 2010 have not experienced substantial increases in populist sentiment. Italy's Five Star movement is often called populist but largely because of its anti-immigrant stance. Although an embrace of immigrants would seem consistent with contractualist values, opposition to large numbers of immigrants is arguably a rational response to what is essentially a huge external shock that has intensified in recent years. Britons voted to leave the European Union, but largely because they believed they were being treated unfairly in it. The rejection of unfair terms of trade, whether perceived correctly or not, is consistent with contractualist values. Third, the strength of institutions far exceeds that of any one person, including the president of the United States. Liberal values and institutions are rooted in contractualist economic norms and will not disappear simply because some leaders choose not to abide by them. For instance, although Trump may want the United States to withdraw from the North Atlantic alliance, this is not a view shared by Congress and the American people. Even members of Trump's administration have often restrained him in ways consistent with contractualist values and institutions.84 In economic norms theory, the only way the United States' contractualist values could shift to status or axial values would be through radical economic change. As mentioned above, economics is ultimately at the mercy of politics, as an influential coalition of rent-seekers could potentially collapse a contractualist economy by failing to sustain the highly inclusive marketplace or uphold the state's credibility in enforcing of contracts. In recent years, the U.S. economy has begun tilting toward rent-seekers, given the growing role of private money in electoral campaigns and the increasing sophistication of rent-seekers [End Page 192] in masking their activities though the manipulation of public opinion, including through their concentrated ownership of media outlets. Such rentierism could precipitate a change in U.S. values if it results in a retraction of the market substantial enough that newer generations began to obtain higher wages in newfound status networks than in the marketplace. In this way, the Trump phenomenon may reflect a pathology in U.S. governing institutions; but at least so far, it arguably has not extended to the American people. Most of Trump's supporters seem to be drawn to him not for his expressions of status values, but for his pledges to fight a "rigged" system and create well-paying jobs. Whether or not Trump means what he says, many of his supporters saw a vote for him as an act of protest against the increasing corruption occurring in the United States, a clear contractualist expression.85 Although a collapse of the U.S. economy and transition to an axial or a status economy is always possible, the feedback loop of popular insistence on economic growth and a highly inclusive marketplace makes this unlikely. Aside from an external shock (such as nuclear war or climate devastation), such a transition could happen only if the rentiers somehow manage to remain in power long enough to institutionalize a permanently underemployed underclass. Fourth, even if the U.S. economy were to collapse and the United States became an axial or a status power, the combined economic might of all the other contractualist countries in the world is nearly twice that of the United States. The soft power of the United States in world politics lies not in its power to persuade, but in it being the largest of the contractualist states, and in its willingness to provide the public good of global security since the collapse of the pound sterling in late 1946. If the United States withdrew from its leadership role, the remaining contractualist powers would fill the vacuum. None of them has an economy relatively large enough to enable it to act as a natural leader and principal provider of global security, but it is the temperament of these states that they can easily form an international organization to coordinate and act on their shared security interests, even if some may choose to free ride. Fifth, current events need to be viewed within a larger context. Fernand Braudel pinpoints the rise of the modern world economy as starting around the year 1450 in northwestern Europe.86 The first contractualist economy emerged more than two centuries ago. Since then, contractualist states have [End Page 193] confronted numerous shocks and threats to their systems, including the American Civil War, the Great Depression, two world wars, and the Cold War. The present populist mini-wave and pathologies in U.S. democracy are mere trifling episodes in a larger historical frame.

2022 MGC Evidence
AI/Tech Not Key

No AI arms race.

Drezner 2019

[Daniel W. Drezner, international politics professor at Tufts University. “What if AI is just BS?”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/01/what-if-ai-is-just-bs/]

The hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts has been attending way too many conferences in the past half-year or so. Big conferences with thousands of political scientists. Small conferences with just a few political scientists. Posh conferences with lots of management consultant types and I am the academic brought in for the sake of intellectual diversity. There has been one constant running through all of them: people who want to sound savvy keep talking about artificial intelligence as the New New Thing. This is what you read in the popular press as well. There are lots of ways that AI could affect the social fabric: there is the potential of lost jobs, or at least a radical reorientation of what jobs would look like. There are the unexpected effects of artificial intelligence, which I believe the sci-fi genre has tackled with a great deal of enthusiasm. And for my bailiwick of international relations, there is a lot of talk about an AI “arms race” that could alter the balance of power in the future. Are these people correct? I am legitimately unsure, but I confess to wariness about claims of technological game-changers. All too often, I hear colleagues reference AI the way that they would reference “globalization” or “Big Data” — terms so amorphous that there is no consensus about the definition. On that question and many others, I strongly recommend perusing Michael Horowitz’s essay in the Texas National Security Review, which makes some very useful distinctions. Horowitz points out that AI is more of a continuum than a precise technology. He also acknowledges that the future of AI is far from clear. He writes, “even experts disagree about whether artificial general intelligence of the type that could outpace human capabilities will emerge in the short to medium term or whether it is still hundreds of years away. AI experts also disagree about the overall trajectory of advances in AI.” For Horowitz, one of the key questions is whether the engine of innovation comes from the private sector (because of AI’s utility as a general purpose technology) or the defense sector (because of AI’s utility for the military). I have some skin in this game, because I wrote something about technological change and international relations for the centennial anniversary of the journal International Relations that was just published. My interest is more in whether AI is a technology that gets standardized pretty quickly, or whether it requires massive fixed costs to develop properly. If it is the former, then industrial policies do not matter much, because the technology will diffuse rapidly. First-mover advantages might matter in terms of standard-setting but not much else. If it is the latter, however, then industrial policy could matter a great deal, with all sorts of unpleasant international implications. Another problem that AI exemplifies is the ways in which old metaphors are applied to news technologies — sometimes inaccurately. In the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Heather Roff has an interesting essay on this very question, in which she notes, “It would help matters if artificial intelligence discussions were framed in an ‘AI +’ framework, because in many cases, AI is merely a tool included in a system involving other functions or capabilities. The news media should stop framing the global artificial intelligence competition as an ‘arms race.’ This misrepresents the competition going on among countries.” I am old enough to remember all the times that a new technology was declared to be the New New Thing. In the late 1980s, it was high-definition television. In the 2000s, it was nanotechnology or biotechnology. AI is the big thing now, unless it is 5G. None of this means that AI is not a significant technology. But it does mean that very often the people proclaiming that are selling you something.

2022 MGC Evidence
AI/Tech Not Key

U.S. tech leadership is high and resilient.

Levanon 2020

[Gad. Forbes manufacturing contributor. “Reports Of US Decline Are Greatly Exaggerated.” 08/27/20. ]

Despite what many suspect is an eroding US global standing, 2020 may be remembered as the year when the US became even more globally dominant economically. Why? The tech sector’s share of the US economy is much larger than in most countries. And the pandemic-driven recession has greatly accelerated the shift to online activity and digital transformation by businesses and consumers, which would otherwise have taken years. That lead to faster growth in the global demand for technology. In addition, the US is especially dominant in the tech industries that are likely to grow the fastest in the coming years. Stock prices certainly support this story. The S&P 500 is already above pre-pandemic highs despite the deepest recession in 80 years, and most of the stock prices’ strength comes from tech sector. The companies that have seen the strongest gains since the pandemic focus on online shopping and payments, cloud computing services, cyber security, business related software, social media, online advertisement, and on-demand entertainment content. Stock prices are volatile and so are a treacherous guide for predicting the future, but there is a plausible explanation for the large tech gains – and why they might last. [Chart omitted] There are several objective and subjective reasons for why the US is so successful in technology compared with other countries. It has: 1The best universities, which attract many of the best students from all over the world – most of whom tend to stay in the US after completing their studies 2A large inflow of experienced talent from other countries 3 Unrivaled access to venture capital 4 Fluency in English, the global language in both business-dealing and content 5 An economy big enough to make achieving scale relatively easy 6 Silicon Valley, the home and heart of the tech revolution 7 A culture that welcomes innovation and disruption and strongly encourages entrepreneurial behavior Given these factors, US tech leadership should continue. What about the competition? One factor helping the US stand out is the weakness of the European tech sector. The market cap of the largest European tech company, SAP SAP -0.3%, is about one-tenth of Apple AAPL +1.6%’s. In other sophisticated industries like pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles and aircraft, European companies are strong competitors to their US counterparts. Europe’s relative technology weakness is perhaps as unusual as the US strength in the sector, and is only reinforced by the fact that US technology companies are already big players in European economies. Most of the top tech companies from East Asia – places like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea – are in hardware and semiconductors manufacturing. They are serious competitors in these areas, but these technology sectors are not growing as quickly. No discussion of the future of technology is complete without China. The Chinese internet companies are huge and growing rapidly, but their ability to expand beyond China and its periphery is questionable. In almost all sophisticated industries, Chinese companies are not yet major players in Western economies. Also, recent events suggest that Western countries will be more cautious in dealing with China, perhaps limiting its expansion. The latest developments with Huawei and TikTok are good examples. In addition, US companies are slowly moving their supply chain elsewhere, further weakening China. So, the technology sector will perform well in the next several years, benefiting countries that are strong in that area. The US, more than any other country, has a large and successful tech sector that seems to be especially concentrated in the fastest-growing tech industries. What does this mean for the US economy overall? First, it is important to mention that the boost the US is getting from its tech sector has been larger than what most other advanced economies have gotten for quite a while, and is one of the reasons the US has been growing faster than them in recent years. But now, this trend is likely to accelerate. Here is some back of the envelope math for the difference between the technology sector’s contribution to GDP growth in the US versus a typical advanced economy: Suppose in the US the tech sector is 12 percent of GDP and is growing at 10 percent a year. In another typical advanced economy the tech sector is 7 percent of GDP and is growing at 5 percent a year. That means that the annual contribution to GDP from the tech sector is 1.2 percent for the US versus 0.35 percent for the other country. That is 0.85 percent faster growth for the US every year. The net effect may be smaller because some of the growth in tech companies come at the expanse of companies from other sectors. But when the average annual GDP growth rate is 1.5-2 percent in advanced economies, even a 0.5 percent a year difference is meaningful. The gains from the rapid growth in technology would disproportionately go to tech companies’ owners and workers. As most of these are high earners, this trend is likely to increase income inequality. But some of the gains will spread more widely. After all, owners and workers, and the companies themselves, spend a large share of their income in the communities they live and operate in. It will also increase geographic inequalities. Not surprisingly, within the US, areas close to Silicon Valley benefited the most from the technology demand-surge. Between 2013-2018, among the 382 metro areas in the US, San Jose and San Francisco metro areas had the fastest growth in personal income per-capita. During that time, personal income per-capita in the San Jose Metro area rose by 48 percent, more than twice as fast as the national rate (22 percent). The surrounding metro areas, Napa, Santa Rosa-Petaluma, Santa Cruz-Watsonville, Stockton, Vallejo, were all ranked in the top 40. Seattle, another technology Hub, is ranked 13. All of these data points add up to an enduring strength. Despite concerns about US’s standing in the world, its tech sector may keep it at the forefront of the global economy in the foreseeable future.

2022 MGC Evidence
NATO Not Key

NATO isn’t key to heg

Roach 2018

[Christopher. Attorney, commentator in The Federalist, the Washington Legal Foundation, the Marine Corps Gazette, and the Orlando Sentinel. "What Good Is NATO?" American Greatness. 7-16-2018. https://amgreatness.com/2018/07/16/what-good-is-nato/]

NATO’s weakness stems not only from dubious grand strategy, but also from its limited practical value. Consider the Libyan Campaign. No longer Europe’s hour, NATO’s member states aligned with one another to persuade the U.S. to join a dubious campaigns, where highfalutin rhetoric of human rights masked realpolitik concerns for things like oil. The NATO tail ended up wagging the American dog, and the U.S. military had to make up for key NATO deficiencies in logistics, electronic warfare, surveillance, and airpower. In the end, the NATO allies worked together and toppled Qaddafi, but the place fell apart, jihadis exploited the ungoverned space, a U.S. ambassador was killed, and the campaign did little to contribute to U.S. or European security interests. A paragon of the managerial class, Hillary Clinton summed it up with her callous retort: “What difference at this point does it make?” Libya is not the exception. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO’s European members repeatedly have shown very meager power projection capabilities. In Afghanistan, where many of our NATO allies assisted our campaign after the 9/11 attacks under NATO’s Article 5, individual NATO participants often operated under wildly different rules of engagement, limiting the effectiveness of various nations’ contingents. While there are common standards across NATO, ties of history and friendship, as well as a common Western culture, it’s not so clear that these factors have ever overcome the divergent abilities of NATO members when called to action. In short, as it has expanded its membership and its mission, NATO has become less effective. And, to the extent it is effective at all, the United States has always had to do most of the work.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Brands 2017

[Hal, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 12/14/17, “Trump Could Actually Make Democracy Great Again. Don't Scoff.,” ]

Third, the best way of promoting liberal values over the long run is to sustain a broader international system in which democracies, rather than hostile autocracies, are geopolitically dominant -- even if that requires working with friendly authoritarians in the short run. When Woodrow Wilson spoke of making the world safe for democracy during World War I, he was not calling for a crusade to spread democracy across the globe. He was arguing that America must stop authoritarian regimes -- in that case, the Kaiser’s Germany -- from becoming geopolitically dominant in a way that would ultimately make it difficult for democracies anywhere to thrive. Likewise, during the Cold War, the U.S. regularly cut deals with friendly dictators in China, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the service of containing communism, and thereby preserving an international system in which liberal values could survive and flourish. Today, the single most important thing the U.S. can do to enhance the long-term prospects for the spread of democracy is to prevent Russia and China from overturning -- or even severely disrupting -- the stable and broadly liberal international system it has long worked to construct. To the extent that Washington can keep China from becoming the supreme power in East Asia, to the extent it can stop Moscow from restoring its lost sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it can create the ideological and geopolitical space for liberal values to flourish -- even if doing so requires cooperating with questionable regimes in Bangkok, Singapore and Warsaw along the way.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Friedberg 2018

[Aaron L, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Competing with China”, Survival, Vol. 60, No. 3]

The sources of Chinese conduct While novel in certain respects, the policies now being pursued by Xi Jinping are a response to the same forces, and to a similar blend of ambition and anxiety, as those that shaped the policies of his predecessors. Indeed, rather than being a radical departure from the past, Xi’s approach is actually a lineal descendant of the one put in place under Deng in the early 1990s. Before turning to a brief description of current Chinese strategy and the process through which it evolved, it is important to identify the underlying factors that have been central in shaping it. Three, in particular, stand out. Geopolitics Like virtually every other fast-rising power in history (including the United States), China seeks to reshape the international environment, starting with its immediate neighbourhood, in ways that better reflect its strength and serve its interests. The nation’s rulers want to secure China’s ‘place in the sun’: they aim to alter geographical boundaries, institutional structures, rules, norms and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when their country was relatively weak, and which they therefore regard as illegitimate and, in certain respects, threatening. History China is not just any rising power; it is a nation with a long and proud history as the leading centre of East Asian civilisation and a more recent, inglorious experience of domination and humiliation at the hands of foreign intruders. China’s leaders see their country as not merely rising, but rather returning to a position of regional pre-eminence that it once held and which they (and many of their people) regard as natural and appropriate. Regime China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian regime that is determined at all costs to retain its exclusive grip on political power, and which feels itself to be constantly under threat from enemies, foreign and domestic. These facts have a profound impact on every aspect of policy, internal and external. A democratic China would no doubt have its differences with other countries, including the United States. But the illiberal character of the current regime shapes how it perceives threats, and how it defines its interests and goes about pursuing them. CCP leaders believe that the United States and its liberal-democratic allies are implacably opposed to them on ideological grounds and that the US, in particular, seeks not only to encircle and contain China but to undermine its current regime by promoting ‘splitism’ (that is, separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan) and ‘peaceful evolution’ (that is, the spread of liberal-democratic beliefs among the Chinese population).24 Warding off these threats requires that Beijing exert greater control over events around China’s periphery and in the international system as a whole, while continuously refining its capabilities for domestic surveillance and repression. In addition to coercion, the regime has sought to guard against ideological subversion and to bolster domestic political support; it has done this by managing the national economy in ways intended to sustain growth and employment, and by promulgating a distinctive, state-manufactured form of popular nationalism. China’s pervasive (and still expanding) system of domestic propaganda and ‘patriotic education’ emphasises the wrongs done to China by foreign powers during the ‘century of humiliation’ and the essential (and as yet unfinished) role of the CCP in righting those wrongs. Together with the promise of continuing improvements in living standards, nationalism is the primary prop on which the regime relies for its legitimacy. In recent years Beijing has also made increasing use of crises and confrontations over issues of history, territorial control and national pride to mobilise popular sentiment and deflect the frustrations of the Chinese people outwards, toward alleged foreign enemies, including Japan and the United States. Especially if economic growth falters, militant nationalism and ‘standing up’ to foreign enemies are likely to become increasingly important parts of the CCP’s strategy for retaining its hold on power. Insecure about their own legitimacy, China’s rulers believe that the stronger their country appears abroad, the stronger the regime will be at home.

2022 MGC Disadvantage

Roy 2019

[Denny, Senior Fellow at the East–West Center, “Assertive China: Irredentism or Expansionism?”, Survival, Vol. 61, No. 1]

What is driving Chinese behaviour? Beijing’s explanation of its own foreign policy draws a sharp distinction between China’s general external orientation and the specific case of territorial-sovereignty issues. According to the Communist Party, China is fundamentally a peace-loving, defence-oriented, non-expansionist country that is harmless in most situations. Since the early 1990s, Chinese officials, media and scholars have consistently made the case for Chinese exceptionalism: that for cultural and historical reasons, China is a ‘principled’ country that eschews the usual great-power avarice, and therefore the world need not fear that a strong China will bully weaker countries. In Xi’s own words, ‘No matter how strong its economy grows, China will never seek hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence.’8 This has become a mantra from Xi and other senior Chinese leaders. A similar formulation – one that has often been repeated by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang – is ‘we will not take or occupy an inch of others’ land’.9 At the same time, however, China is uncompromising and resolute to the point of being willing to use military force when it comes to asserting Chinese control over territory the country claims for its own. In one of many speeches in which he recommitted to opposing ‘acts and tricks to separate the country’, Xi warned that ‘The Chinese people … have the spirit of fighting the bloody battle against our enemies to the bitter end.’10 The recovery of lost national territory has been a major theme of modern Chinese history, and the Communist Party has staked its own legitimacy on how successfully it accomplishes this goal. Since the 1980s, the regime has strongly promoted the notion of China as a victim of foreign predation prior to Mao Zedong’s establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 in order to mobilise public support for the government and its policies.11 Party officials place ‘lost’ territory in the context of what they call the ‘Century of Humiliation’ by emphasising that foreigners invaded these areas during times when China was too weak to defend itself. Accordingly, the Communist Party is obligated to distinguish itself from unworthy governments of the past by re-establishing Beijing’s control over Chinese-claimed territories. In recent years, Beijing has introduced the idea that China’s ‘rejuvenation’ cannot occur without the recovery of lost Chinese territory.12 This principle is most often applied to Taiwan. The political unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland has long been deemed a ‘core interest’ of the party, a designation that signals its highest level of commitment – and a willingness to go to war if necessary. Thus, a Chinese diplomat posted to the Chinese embassy in Washington DC responded to the suggestion that US ships might visit Taiwan by saying, ‘The day that a U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force.’13 Compared with the Taiwan issue, Beijing’s commitment to securing uncontested ownership of uninhabited maritime territories in the East and South China seas, or the Indian-occupied region of Arunachal Pradesh, is less insistent.14 Nevertheless, Chinese behaviour over the past couple of decades suggests Beijing intends to solidify rather than bargain away its claim over most of the South China Sea.15 The trend is toward China’s hardening of even its non-core claims. Focusing on irredentism as the driver of the foreign policies most worrisome to China’s neighbours allows the communist regime to claim that its pugnacious and uncooperative posture in its near abroad is not typical of how great-power China will conduct its foreign relations. This approach is well suited to Beijing’s purposes: it conveys to China’s neighbours that they cannot prevail in any territorial disputes with China, but that otherwise they have nothing to fear. As Xi put it in June 2018, ‘We cannot lose even one inch of the territory left behind by our ancestors. What is other people’s, we do not want at all.’16 The expansionist explanation An alternative explanation for assertive Chinese behaviour on the country’s periphery – one that Beijing explicitly denies – is that China is growing more expansionist as its relative power increases. It is demanding more because it can. Typical great powers strive to establish a sphere of influence, regardless of whether they have grounds for irredentist claims. They are usually dissatisfied if their influence over the international system falls short of their perceived relative power.17 Seen in this way, assertive Chinese behaviour is not necessarily limited to the special case of disputed territory. This raises the possibility that China’s determination to prevail in these disputes, through the use of military force if necessary, might also manifest itself in future Chinese strategic disagreements with regional countries that do not involve Chinese sovereignty claims. The essential features of a sphere of influence are control and exclusivity: the dominant country enjoys privileges in a geographic region outside of its recognised borders that other states do not enjoy. These privileges serve the dominant country’s economic or security interests, or both. The United States, for example, has tried to make itself the sole great power in its own hemisphere. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against further colonisation of the New World. The Roosevelt Corollary in 1904 asserted the right of the US government to resolve legitimate European complaints in Latin America, and afterward American forces frequently intervened in the hemisphere in support of US interests. During the first half of the twentieth century, an upstart Japan acquired an economic hinterland in eastern Asia, administered by colonial or puppet governments, to provide the Japanese home islands with resources and markets. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union sought to establish a political and military buffer zone in Eastern Europe. Moscow organised the Warsaw Pact in 1955 out of a fear of a resurgent West Germany allied with the United States and the other Western European countries. Determined to maintain satellite governments in the region, the Soviet government sent military forces to quell dissent against the ruling regimes in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, Beijing demands exclusive control, mainly based on ownership rights, over areas on the Chinese periphery for both economic and security reasons. The Chinese government insists that other states must not take resources from Chinese-claimed areas in the South China Sea. Hence the annual fishing ban, the expulsion of non-Chinese fishing boats and the harassment of survey ships making preparations to drill for hydrocarbons. Additionally, Beijing’s complaints about US military surveillance and the US Navy’s ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols make clear that the Chinese want to create a zone near China’s borders in which US military activity is constrained and subject to veto by Beijing. Much depends on whether outside observers accept China’s own characterisation of its foreign policy as having limited aims, or whether the country is perceived as having much broader goals. A policy motivated by irredentism has limited aims by definition, because the set of geographic areas over which China can make a reasonable claim of sovereignty is finite. A policy of expansionism, on the other hand, is potentially open-ended in its aspirations. Beijing’s arguments have, in fact, established a foothold internationally. Some analysts say China’s behaviour in its near abroad is reasonable and should not alarm foreign governments. Rob Green has argued that China ‘feels entitled to defend its interests in its own backyard, especially when history is on its side regarding the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas’. In particular, he describes China’s East China Sea ADIZ as a ‘long-delayed response, under severe provocation from the US and Japan, to the Japanese ADIZ’, adding that ‘The US, Russia, UK and France have had their own unilaterally declared zones for years.’18 Similarly, Richard Turcsanyi sees Chinese ‘assertiveness’ in the South China Sea as a defensive reaction to acts by other governments, such as the Philippines’ attempts to bolster its position on Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, and Washington’s announced policy of ‘pivoting’ or ‘rebalancing’ to Asia.19 Gavin Choo has argued that assertive Chinese behaviour is less threatening if the presumed motivation for it is irredentism. He says an understanding of the deep-seated Chinese sense of entitlement to regional leadership and historical grievance over the loss of this position leads to a ‘more benign interpretation of Beijing’s foreign policy’.20 Some observers contend that Chinese policies toward the disputed territories are not a harbinger of expansionism. ‘One should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large’, writes Alastair Iain Johnston.21 Likewise, Kyle Haynes asserts that: there is little indication that Chinese leaders harbor territorial ambitions beyond what was claimed in the immediate post-World War II period … The more aggressive pursuit of longstanding claims does not necessarily portend new, more expansive claims down the road.22 Although some critics accused him of being anti-China, Malcolm Turnbull said during his premiership of Australia that in the context of international security, ‘We do not describe China as a threat’ because ‘we do not see any hostile intent from China’.23 Mark Valencia characterises Chinese claims in the South China Sea not as a manifestation of China’s will to power, but rather as a product of nationalism combined with a sense of historical victimisation. ‘China has publicly positioned its sovereignty and claims in the South China Sea as a matter of national dignity and redemption for its “century of humiliation”’, he writes. Consequently, the Chinese government ‘need[s] to accommodate’ the demands of a nationalistic Chinese public ‘to maintain legitimacy’, making it ‘very difficult for China’s leadership to back down’. Valencia concludes that US challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are ‘ill-advised and even dangerous’.24 Similarly, Charles Glaser argues that China is willing to fight to take ‘disputed’ territory such as Taiwan and the South China Sea islands but not for the territory of US allies ‘when the status quo is crystal clear’, implying that the main driver of Chinese behaviour is irredentism and not a desire for a sphere of influence. Aside from the areas where China claims sovereignty, ‘there is actually little reason to believe that [China] has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond’, says Glaser.25 Doug Bandow argues the United States should avoid confronting China over Beijing’s South China Sea claims because ‘the existing territorial and juridical order was established at a time of Chinese isolation and weakness’. He claims that Chinese actions are motivated by national pride, and that acquiescence to Chinese claims would have insignificant negative strategic impact on US interests.26 Similarly, Erwin Blaauw sees no intrinsic Chinese aspiration to control its external strategic environment. ‘In the end,’ he writes, ‘the over-arching driving factor behind foreign policy in China, and the common denominator to most of China’s global activities, is China’s own domestic economic development. China does not view itself as a superpower or a hegemon.’27 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard seems to buy the Communist Party’s historical and cultural arguments, writing that ‘The Chinese have no recent history of sweeping territorial expansion (except Tibet) … [T]he Confucian ethic will over time incline China to a quest for global as well as national concord.’28 A critique of the irredentist paradigm Beijing’s irredentist paradigm rests on three key propositions: that China is an exceptional great power with limited aims; that China is belligerent and uncompromising only over the territory it now claims as rightfully its own, but nothing beyond; and that China will never seek hegemony or a sphere of influence. For the purposes of accurately assessing Chinese intentions and crafting appropriate policy responses, accepting this paradigm is deeply problematic, for several reasons. It lends undue credence to Chinese propaganda While the official Chinese narrative offers a plausible explanation for China’s combative behaviour, it does not necessarily follow that the country will not be assertive in other areas. To make the point bluntly, if an adversary says ‘I will kill your neighbour, but I will not kill you’, and then kills your neighbour, this does not prove that you are safe, only that your adversary is capable of murder. It lowers the costs of aggression for China and could mitigate the effects of the security dilemma Many theorists, including defensive realists, argue that the security dilemma acts as a powerful disincentive against a state taking strong, unilateral action to enhance control over its external environment. Other states might interpret that action as indicative of aggressive intentions and therefore see it as threatening, causing them to take counteractions. As a result, the state that acted first might find that it has effectually decreased rather than increased its own security.29 This dynamic could be attenuated, however, if a state found a way to cloak strong, even aggressive external action in a rationale that limited the alarm caused to other states. In such a circumstance, even a closeted revisionist30 state could pay a discounted price, in the form of relatively weak counteraction by its neighbours, for moves that would ordinarily galvanise more determined and multilateral opposition. It legitimises questionable Chinese territorial claims The territorial holdings and borders of a state tend to fluctuate through history. These fluctuations are greater in the case of a large state with a long history. The principle that a state should today control every bit of territory it claims to have controlled at some time in the past is naive and unrealistic. Many of today’s states have ‘lost’ territory, yet do not demand its return under the threat of military action. As Frank Ching points out, China has been much more of a beneficiary than a victim of expansionism: ‘China grew by subjugating neighbouring peoples,’ he writes, ‘such as those who lived in what’s now called Xinjiang, whose very name – “new territory” – confirms the fact that it didn’t use to be part of China.’31 The willingness of the Chinese government to resort to violence to defend its territorial claims is out of proportion to the strength of many of these claims. In particular, the country’s claim over almost the entire South China Sea based on ‘historical usage’ by Chinese mariners is patently absurd, analogous to the United States claiming ownership of the Pacific Ocean between the US west coast and the Hawaiian islands. This claim, along with China’s occupation of features within the EEZ of the Philippines, and its insistence that Chinese-held rocks, shoals and sandbars in the Spratly group are entitled to the rights legally bestowed on ‘islands’, have all been invalidated by the arbitration process provided for in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which Beijing is a signatory. China could make a reasonably good case for some of its other claims if it chose to respect the accepted process that is already in place. Other countries should encourage China to take full advantage of the applicable international laws and institutions to seek redress for its grievances. Acquiescing in any way to the idea that China has the right to settle its political disputes with its smaller neighbours through coercion or brute force is a moral and political failure, with negative long-term consequences for the project of civilising international affairs. It allows China to practise a form of extortion against other states All governments recognise that the notion of defending national territory under threat of being seized by foreigners has a powerful mobilising effect on public opinion. The territorial disputes involving China tap into deep historical wellsprings of wounded national pride. Consequently, China benefits from a mass-public version of the ‘madman theory’,32 whereby the Chinese public is beyond thinking rationally about this issue, and the Chinese government unable to resist citizens’ demands for fear of being overthrown, meaning that other countries must accommodate Chinese claims. Many have warned that foreign governments should avoid making policies that inflame Chinese nationalism.33 It is questionable, however, whether nationalistic public opinion really drives Chinese behaviour with regard to the disputed territories. To at least some extent, the reverse is true.34 Moreover, Beijing has frequently facilitated demonstrations of public outrage against foreigners and then used this outrage as leverage in China’s foreign relations.35 Other governments make Beijing’s problems their own when they honour the communist regime’s need to satisfy the demands of a nationalistic Chinese public. They reward Beijing for bad behaviour – for its playing up of territorial disputes in domestic propaganda, sometimes with unintended results, and its intentional cultivation of visible public anger as a means of signalling to foreigners that the Chinese government has no room to retreat or compromise. It could incentivise China to raise new irredentist claims in the future Beyond the territory now encompassed or claimed by the People’s Republic, there are additional territories over which China might claim some form of historical association. The late historian Ramesh Chandra Majumdar observed, ‘It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire forever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.’36 Chinese claims have evolved, or more properly expanded, in keeping with its evolution from a poor, revolution-wracked underachiever into an emerging great power. The Republic of China cartographers who first drew a nine-dashed line on a map of the South China Sea in 1946 intended it to delineate Chinese-claimed islands, but not the surrounding ocean. The People’s Republic’s 1958 ‘Declaration on the Territorial Sea’ claimed ownership of South China Sea islands and the territorial waters around them, but recognised that they were separated from the Chinese mainland by ‘high seas’. The Chinese government did not begin to assert that it had ‘historic rights’ to all the resources contained within the nine-dashed line until 1998.37 Similarly, China’s claims in the East China Sea are of recent vintage. A 1953 edition of the People’s Daily noted that the ‘Senkaku’ (not Diaoyu) islands belonged to the Ryukyu archipelago, then and now Japanese territory. An atlas published by a government-owned press in 1958 depicted the Senkakus as part of Japan.38 A possible future target is strategically important Okinawa. In 2013, Chinese commentators with government connections publicly questioned Japan’s ownership of the Ryukyu islands, which include Okinawa and its many US military bases. Separate articles making this point appeared in the Communist Party-run People’s Daily and Global Times, as well as a magazine affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.39 Additionally, Chinese PLA General Luo Yuan said in a media interview in 2013 that the islands were part of the Chinese tributary system as early as 1372, and that Japan stole them in 1872 during a period of relative Chinese weakness. In making this argument, Luo added the Ryukyus to the list of territories lost during the Century of Humiliation alongside Taiwan. ‘We can say with certainty’, Luo concluded, ‘that the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan.’40 A sphere-of-influence mentality China’s irredentist claims cover an area so vast that it is already tantamount to a sphere of influence. On China’s lengthy eastern coast, for example, the disputed land and maritime territories form a seamless geographic region beginning with the Yellow Sea in the north and continuing southward through the East China Sea, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and the upper and lower halves of the South China Sea, apparently stretching as far south as the Natuna islands. Chinese officials have repeatedly said that they would continue to allow commercial shipping through major sea lanes in these areas, and it is possible that Beijing would make additional concessions to individual rival claimants that accepted its standing invitation to settle claims through bilateral negotiations. But China would nonetheless retain the unequalled privilege of setting the rules for the activities of other states in this zone. Moreover, China has shown itself to have a sphere-of-influence mentality that is independent of its irredentist claims. On occasion, Chinese senior officials have revealed that they see China as deserving of deference from ‘smaller countries’. This attitude is apparent in Beijing’s demands that its neighbours grant privileges to China.41 The Yellow Sea, for example, is the site of a dispute between China and South Korea over overlapping EEZs. China has exhibited domineering behaviour in this area that has less to do with any sovereignty dispute than with a sense of entitlement due to China’s status as a larger country. The South Korean coastguard has frequently clashed with Chinese fishermen in areas of the Yellow Sea that are unambiguously under Seoul’s administration. Chinese boats approached by South Korean coastguard vessels have frequently tried to ram them and repel boarding officers with pipes, iron bars, knives and hammers. Between 2008 and 2016, Seoul reported that Chinese fishermen had killed two of its coastguardsmen and injured 73.42 In 2010, Washington announced a US aircraft carrier would join US– South Korean naval exercises in response to North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan. Chinese media unleashed a storm of opposition to what it termed US ‘gunboat diplomacy’. The basis of this opposition was not a territorial-sovereignty claim, but rather the lack of deference shown by the United States to China’s desire that a US aircraft carrier not be present in the region. ‘The decision should be made with consideration given to China’s wishes’, said one Chinese commentator. ‘It’s a matter of the dignity of a big country’, said another.43 A few years later, a worsening North Korean missile threat prompted Seoul to consider deploying the US-made Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. Beijing strenuously objected, even though China itself has a similar system in Shandong province to protect the country from North Korean missiles.44 Beijing argued that THAAD could slightly compromise China’s nuclear second-strike capability by using its powerful radar to track Chinese missile launches. The US government said China’s stated concerns were unfounded and invited China to send a delegation for a technical briefing, but the Chinese side refused. When Seoul made the decision in 2016 to deploy THAAD, China responded with several months of economic punishment that ended only when Beijing extracted three important concessions from South Korean President Moon Jae-in about limiting further US–South Korea security cooperation. In this case, China insisted that a marginal Chinese security concern outweighed the compelling security concern of its smaller neighbour, and that Seoul’s insubordination justified harsh Chinese retaliation. While Beijing criticises the US military for conducting patrols and surveillance in the western Pacific rim, Beijing simultaneously claims the right to carry out its own patrols near neighbouring Japan. For example, in July 2017, a PLA Navy surveillance ship sailed through Japanese territorial waters between the main islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. When Japan publicised the incident, the Chinese government said, ‘Japan has ulterior motives with its accusations and hyping up of the situation.’45 That same month, after Japan complained about six Chinese bombers flying over the Miyako Strait that separates the Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa (but that does not lie within Japanese territorial airspace), China’s defence ministry released a statement saying, ‘The relevant side should not make a fuss about nothing or over-interpret, it will be fine once they get used to it.’46 Beijing has gone so far as to demand that Japan stop scrambling aircraft to observe Chinese planes and ships operating near its territory – something every country with an air force does routinely, including China. On one occasion in 2015, a Chinese defence-ministry spokesman said Japan’s ‘following of, surveillance and interference with Chinese ships and aircraft’ was ‘threatening [their] safety’. He called on Japan to ‘stop behavior that hampers Chinese freedom of flight’.47 The statement was blatantly hypocritical considering the crash between the Chinese fighter aircraft and the American P-3 in 2001, and the multiple cases of Chinese vessels ramming foreign ships. Elsewhere, Beijing does not refrain from leveraging its strong economic position to influence other countries’ views on important political issues in which China has an interest. Phnom Penh’s effort to support Beijing by blocking Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) criticism of China’s South China Sea claims, for example, is well known.48 Cambodia has also helped China to achieve its aim of reducing the US military presence in the region. It cancelled military exercises with the United States and Australia in 2017, and it sent home a US Navy Seabee construction unit that had been providing humanitarian assistance for nine years.49 As elsewhere, the Chinese have demonstrated a hankering for exclusivity and control in Cambodia. * * * To the extent that Beijing is successful in promoting the perception that its assertive foreign and military policies are motivated by legitimate national grievances and overwhelming public pressure, China’s neighbours are more likely to see the country’s policies as reasonable, its aims as strictly limited and its profile as that of an exceptionally benevolent great power. Given that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that China is a revisionist state disguised as a status quo state, and that it would still desire a sphere of influence even in the absence of any territorial disputes, this may be a strategic miscalculation. International-relations theory offers two competing models of inter-state conflict: the deterrence model and the spiral model.50 The two models prescribe nearly opposite policy responses to an assertive state, depending on the diagnosis of its root motivations. The deterrence model treats assertive states as expansionist and sees their primary goal as grabbing territory, resources and power. In this view, appeasement will only encourage further expansionism. The proper response by threatened states is to signal resolute resistance as early as possible: the assertive state will be harder to defeat the more resources it gains control of. The spiral model, on the other hand, sees conflict as a tragic misunderstanding. In this model, the assertive state perceives itself as fundamentally insecure, and its seeming bellicosity is driven by an impulse to protect itself. Other states are advised to make themselves appear less threatening to pacify the assertive state and alleviate the risk of conflict, in particular by making unilateral concessions demonstrating a decrease in both their intent and ability to harm the assertive state. China’s neighbours face a choice between acquiescing to Beijing’s territorial demands and trusting in its assurances that China is a harmless giant, or standing firm against what may be viewed as unreasonable Chinese demands stemming from an appetite for power limited only by opportunity and feasibility. In making this decision, they would be wise to remember that other historical great powers did not rely on claims of recovering ‘territory left behind by our ancestors’ to establish the Monroe Doctrine, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the Warsaw Pact. Wrapping the country’s policies in a cloak of irredentism may serve China’s interests well, but could be diverting attention away from the threat of Chinese encroachment.