What is driving Chinese behaviour? Beijing’s explanation of its own foreign policy draws a sharp distinction between China’s general external orientation and the specific case of territorial-sovereignty issues. According to the Communist Party, China is fundamentally a peace-loving, defence-oriented, non-expansionist country that is harmless in most situations. Since the early 1990s, Chinese officials, media and scholars have consistently made the case for Chinese exceptionalism: that for cultural and historical reasons, China is a ‘principled’ country that eschews the usual great-power avarice, and therefore the world need not fear that a strong China will bully weaker countries. In Xi’s own words, ‘No matter how strong its economy grows, China will never seek hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence.’8 This has become a mantra from Xi and other senior Chinese leaders. A similar formulation – one that has often been repeated by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang – is ‘we will not take or occupy an inch of others’ land’.9 At the same time, however, China is uncompromising and resolute to the point of being willing to use military force when it comes to asserting Chinese control over territory the country claims for its own. In one of many speeches in which he recommitted to opposing ‘acts and tricks to separate the country’, Xi warned that ‘The Chinese people … have the spirit of fighting the bloody battle against our enemies to the bitter end.’10 The recovery of lost national territory has been a major theme of modern Chinese history, and the Communist Party has staked its own legitimacy on how successfully it accomplishes this goal. Since the 1980s, the regime has strongly promoted the notion of China as a victim of foreign predation prior to Mao Zedong’s establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 in order to mobilise public support for the government and its policies.11 Party officials place ‘lost’ territory in the context of what they call the ‘Century of Humiliation’ by emphasising that foreigners invaded these areas during times when China was too weak to defend itself. Accordingly, the Communist Party is obligated to distinguish itself from unworthy governments of the past by re-establishing Beijing’s control over Chinese-claimed territories. In recent years, Beijing has introduced the idea that China’s ‘rejuvenation’ cannot occur without the recovery of lost Chinese territory.12 This principle is most often applied to Taiwan. The political unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland has long been deemed a ‘core interest’ of the party, a designation that signals its highest level of commitment – and a willingness to go to war if necessary. Thus, a Chinese diplomat posted to the Chinese embassy in Washington DC responded to the suggestion that US ships might visit Taiwan by saying, ‘The day that a U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force.’13 Compared with the Taiwan issue, Beijing’s commitment to securing uncontested ownership of uninhabited maritime territories in the East and South China seas, or the Indian-occupied region of Arunachal Pradesh, is less insistent.14 Nevertheless, Chinese behaviour over the past couple of decades suggests Beijing intends to solidify rather than bargain away its claim over most of the South China Sea.15 The trend is toward China’s hardening of even its non-core claims. Focusing on irredentism as the driver of the foreign policies most worrisome to China’s neighbours allows the communist regime to claim that its pugnacious and uncooperative posture in its near abroad is not typical of how great-power China will conduct its foreign relations. This approach is well suited to Beijing’s purposes: it conveys to China’s neighbours that they cannot prevail in any territorial disputes with China, but that otherwise they have nothing to fear. As Xi put it in June 2018, ‘We cannot lose even one inch of the territory left behind by our ancestors. What is other people’s, we do not want at all.’16 The expansionist explanation An alternative explanation for assertive Chinese behaviour on the country’s periphery – one that Beijing explicitly denies – is that China is growing more expansionist as its relative power increases. It is demanding more because it can. Typical great powers strive to establish a sphere of influence, regardless of whether they have grounds for irredentist claims. They are usually dissatisfied if their influence over the international system falls short of their perceived relative power.17 Seen in this way, assertive Chinese behaviour is not necessarily limited to the special case of disputed territory. This raises the possibility that China’s determination to prevail in these disputes, through the use of military force if necessary, might also manifest itself in future Chinese strategic disagreements with regional countries that do not involve Chinese sovereignty claims. The essential features of a sphere of influence are control and exclusivity: the dominant country enjoys privileges in a geographic region outside of its recognised borders that other states do not enjoy. These privileges serve the dominant country’s economic or security interests, or both. The United States, for example, has tried to make itself the sole great power in its own hemisphere. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against further colonisation of the New World. The Roosevelt Corollary in 1904 asserted the right of the US government to resolve legitimate European complaints in Latin America, and afterward American forces frequently intervened in the hemisphere in support of US interests. During the first half of the twentieth century, an upstart Japan acquired an economic hinterland in eastern Asia, administered by colonial or puppet governments, to provide the Japanese home islands with resources and markets. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union sought to establish a political and military buffer zone in Eastern Europe. Moscow organised the Warsaw Pact in 1955 out of a fear of a resurgent West Germany allied with the United States and the other Western European countries. Determined to maintain satellite governments in the region, the Soviet government sent military forces to quell dissent against the ruling regimes in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, Beijing demands exclusive control, mainly based on ownership rights, over areas on the Chinese periphery for both economic and security reasons. The Chinese government insists that other states must not take resources from Chinese-claimed areas in the South China Sea. Hence the annual fishing ban, the expulsion of non-Chinese fishing boats and the harassment of survey ships making preparations to drill for hydrocarbons. Additionally, Beijing’s complaints about US military surveillance and the US Navy’s ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols make clear that the Chinese want to create a zone near China’s borders in which US military activity is constrained and subject to veto by Beijing. Much depends on whether outside observers accept China’s own characterisation of its foreign policy as having limited aims, or whether the country is perceived as having much broader goals. A policy motivated by irredentism has limited aims by definition, because the set of geographic areas over which China can make a reasonable claim of sovereignty is finite. A policy of expansionism, on the other hand, is potentially open-ended in its aspirations. Beijing’s arguments have, in fact, established a foothold internationally. Some analysts say China’s behaviour in its near abroad is reasonable and should not alarm foreign governments. Rob Green has argued that China ‘feels entitled to defend its interests in its own backyard, especially when history is on its side regarding the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas’. In particular, he describes China’s East China Sea ADIZ as a ‘long-delayed response, under severe provocation from the US and Japan, to the Japanese ADIZ’, adding that ‘The US, Russia, UK and France have had their own unilaterally declared zones for years.’18 Similarly, Richard Turcsanyi sees Chinese ‘assertiveness’ in the South China Sea as a defensive reaction to acts by other governments, such as the Philippines’ attempts to bolster its position on Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, and Washington’s announced policy of ‘pivoting’ or ‘rebalancing’ to Asia.19 Gavin Choo has argued that assertive Chinese behaviour is less threatening if the presumed motivation for it is irredentism. He says an understanding of the deep-seated Chinese sense of entitlement to regional leadership and historical grievance over the loss of this position leads to a ‘more benign interpretation of Beijing’s foreign policy’.20 Some observers contend that Chinese policies toward the disputed territories are not a harbinger of expansionism. ‘One should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large’, writes Alastair Iain Johnston.21 Likewise, Kyle Haynes asserts that: there is little indication that Chinese leaders harbor territorial ambitions beyond what was claimed in the immediate post-World War II period … The more aggressive pursuit of longstanding claims does not necessarily portend new, more expansive claims down the road.22 Although some critics accused him of being anti-China, Malcolm Turnbull said during his premiership of Australia that in the context of international security, ‘We do not describe China as a threat’ because ‘we do not see any hostile intent from China’.23 Mark Valencia characterises Chinese claims in the South China Sea not as a manifestation of China’s will to power, but rather as a product of nationalism combined with a sense of historical victimisation. ‘China has publicly positioned its sovereignty and claims in the South China Sea as a matter of national dignity and redemption for its “century of humiliation”’, he writes. Consequently, the Chinese government ‘need[s] to accommodate’ the demands of a nationalistic Chinese public ‘to maintain legitimacy’, making it ‘very difficult for China’s leadership to back down’. Valencia concludes that US challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are ‘ill-advised and even dangerous’.24 Similarly, Charles Glaser argues that China is willing to fight to take ‘disputed’ territory such as Taiwan and the South China Sea islands but not for the territory of US allies ‘when the status quo is crystal clear’, implying that the main driver of Chinese behaviour is irredentism and not a desire for a sphere of influence. Aside from the areas where China claims sovereignty, ‘there is actually little reason to believe that [China] has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond’, says Glaser.25 Doug Bandow argues the United States should avoid confronting China over Beijing’s South China Sea claims because ‘the existing territorial and juridical order was established at a time of Chinese isolation and weakness’. He claims that Chinese actions are motivated by national pride, and that acquiescence to Chinese claims would have insignificant negative strategic impact on US interests.26 Similarly, Erwin Blaauw sees no intrinsic Chinese aspiration to control its external strategic environment. ‘In the end,’ he writes, ‘the over-arching driving factor behind foreign policy in China, and the common denominator to most of China’s global activities, is China’s own domestic economic development. China does not view itself as a superpower or a hegemon.’27 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard seems to buy the Communist Party’s historical and cultural arguments, writing that ‘The Chinese have no recent history of sweeping territorial expansion (except Tibet) … [T]he Confucian ethic will over time incline China to a quest for global as well as national concord.’28 A critique of the irredentist paradigm Beijing’s irredentist paradigm rests on three key propositions: that China is an exceptional great power with limited aims; that China is belligerent and uncompromising only over the territory it now claims as rightfully its own, but nothing beyond; and that China will never seek hegemony or a sphere of influence. For the purposes of accurately assessing Chinese intentions and crafting appropriate policy responses, accepting this paradigm is deeply problematic, for several reasons. It lends undue credence to Chinese propaganda While the official Chinese narrative offers a plausible explanation for China’s combative behaviour, it does not necessarily follow that the country will not be assertive in other areas. To make the point bluntly, if an adversary says ‘I will kill your neighbour, but I will not kill you’, and then kills your neighbour, this does not prove that you are safe, only that your adversary is capable of murder. It lowers the costs of aggression for China and could mitigate the effects of the security dilemma Many theorists, including defensive realists, argue that the security dilemma acts as a powerful disincentive against a state taking strong, unilateral action to enhance control over its external environment. Other states might interpret that action as indicative of aggressive intentions and therefore see it as threatening, causing them to take counteractions. As a result, the state that acted first might find that it has effectually decreased rather than increased its own security.29 This dynamic could be attenuated, however, if a state found a way to cloak strong, even aggressive external action in a rationale that limited the alarm caused to other states. In such a circumstance, even a closeted revisionist30 state could pay a discounted price, in the form of relatively weak counteraction by its neighbours, for moves that would ordinarily galvanise more determined and multilateral opposition. It legitimises questionable Chinese territorial claims The territorial holdings and borders of a state tend to fluctuate through history. These fluctuations are greater in the case of a large state with a long history. The principle that a state should today control every bit of territory it claims to have controlled at some time in the past is naive and unrealistic. Many of today’s states have ‘lost’ territory, yet do not demand its return under the threat of military action. As Frank Ching points out, China has been much more of a beneficiary than a victim of expansionism: ‘China grew by subjugating neighbouring peoples,’ he writes, ‘such as those who lived in what’s now called Xinjiang, whose very name – “new territory” – confirms the fact that it didn’t use to be part of China.’31 The willingness of the Chinese government to resort to violence to defend its territorial claims is out of proportion to the strength of many of these claims. In particular, the country’s claim over almost the entire South China Sea based on ‘historical usage’ by Chinese mariners is patently absurd, analogous to the United States claiming ownership of the Pacific Ocean between the US west coast and the Hawaiian islands. This claim, along with China’s occupation of features within the EEZ of the Philippines, and its insistence that Chinese-held rocks, shoals and sandbars in the Spratly group are entitled to the rights legally bestowed on ‘islands’, have all been invalidated by the arbitration process provided for in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which Beijing is a signatory. China could make a reasonably good case for some of its other claims if it chose to respect the accepted process that is already in place. Other countries should encourage China to take full advantage of the applicable international laws and institutions to seek redress for its grievances. Acquiescing in any way to the idea that China has the right to settle its political disputes with its smaller neighbours through coercion or brute force is a moral and political failure, with negative long-term consequences for the project of civilising international affairs. It allows China to practise a form of extortion against other states All governments recognise that the notion of defending national territory under threat of being seized by foreigners has a powerful mobilising effect on public opinion. The territorial disputes involving China tap into deep historical wellsprings of wounded national pride. Consequently, China benefits from a mass-public version of the ‘madman theory’,32 whereby the Chinese public is beyond thinking rationally about this issue, and the Chinese government unable to resist citizens’ demands for fear of being overthrown, meaning that other countries must accommodate Chinese claims. Many have warned that foreign governments should avoid making policies that inflame Chinese nationalism.33 It is questionable, however, whether nationalistic public opinion really drives Chinese behaviour with regard to the disputed territories. To at least some extent, the reverse is true.34 Moreover, Beijing has frequently facilitated demonstrations of public outrage against foreigners and then used this outrage as leverage in China’s foreign relations.35 Other governments make Beijing’s problems their own when they honour the communist regime’s need to satisfy the demands of a nationalistic Chinese public. They reward Beijing for bad behaviour – for its playing up of territorial disputes in domestic propaganda, sometimes with unintended results, and its intentional cultivation of visible public anger as a means of signalling to foreigners that the Chinese government has no room to retreat or compromise. It could incentivise China to raise new irredentist claims in the future Beyond the territory now encompassed or claimed by the People’s Republic, there are additional territories over which China might claim some form of historical association. The late historian Ramesh Chandra Majumdar observed, ‘It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire forever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.’36 Chinese claims have evolved, or more properly expanded, in keeping with its evolution from a poor, revolution-wracked underachiever into an emerging great power. The Republic of China cartographers who first drew a nine-dashed line on a map of the South China Sea in 1946 intended it to delineate Chinese-claimed islands, but not the surrounding ocean. The People’s Republic’s 1958 ‘Declaration on the Territorial Sea’ claimed ownership of South China Sea islands and the territorial waters around them, but recognised that they were separated from the Chinese mainland by ‘high seas’. The Chinese government did not begin to assert that it had ‘historic rights’ to all the resources contained within the nine-dashed line until 1998.37 Similarly, China’s claims in the East China Sea are of recent vintage. A 1953 edition of the People’s Daily noted that the ‘Senkaku’ (not Diaoyu) islands belonged to the Ryukyu archipelago, then and now Japanese territory. An atlas published by a government-owned press in 1958 depicted the Senkakus as part of Japan.38 A possible future target is strategically important Okinawa. In 2013, Chinese commentators with government connections publicly questioned Japan’s ownership of the Ryukyu islands, which include Okinawa and its many US military bases. Separate articles making this point appeared in the Communist Party-run People’s Daily and Global Times, as well as a magazine affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.39 Additionally, Chinese PLA General Luo Yuan said in a media interview in 2013 that the islands were part of the Chinese tributary system as early as 1372, and that Japan stole them in 1872 during a period of relative Chinese weakness. In making this argument, Luo added the Ryukyus to the list of territories lost during the Century of Humiliation alongside Taiwan. ‘We can say with certainty’, Luo concluded, ‘that the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan.’40 A sphere-of-influence mentality China’s irredentist claims cover an area so vast that it is already tantamount to a sphere of influence. On China’s lengthy eastern coast, for example, the disputed land and maritime territories form a seamless geographic region beginning with the Yellow Sea in the north and continuing southward through the East China Sea, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and the upper and lower halves of the South China Sea, apparently stretching as far south as the Natuna islands. Chinese officials have repeatedly said that they would continue to allow commercial shipping through major sea lanes in these areas, and it is possible that Beijing would make additional concessions to individual rival claimants that accepted its standing invitation to settle claims through bilateral negotiations. But China would nonetheless retain the unequalled privilege of setting the rules for the activities of other states in this zone. Moreover, China has shown itself to have a sphere-of-influence mentality that is independent of its irredentist claims. On occasion, Chinese senior officials have revealed that they see China as deserving of deference from ‘smaller countries’. This attitude is apparent in Beijing’s demands that its neighbours grant privileges to China.41 The Yellow Sea, for example, is the site of a dispute between China and South Korea over overlapping EEZs. China has exhibited domineering behaviour in this area that has less to do with any sovereignty dispute than with a sense of entitlement due to China’s status as a larger country. The South Korean coastguard has frequently clashed with Chinese fishermen in areas of the Yellow Sea that are unambiguously under Seoul’s administration. Chinese boats approached by South Korean coastguard vessels have frequently tried to ram them and repel boarding officers with pipes, iron bars, knives and hammers. Between 2008 and 2016, Seoul reported that Chinese fishermen had killed two of its coastguardsmen and injured 73.42 In 2010, Washington announced a US aircraft carrier would join US– South Korean naval exercises in response to North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan. Chinese media unleashed a storm of opposition to what it termed US ‘gunboat diplomacy’. The basis of this opposition was not a territorial-sovereignty claim, but rather the lack of deference shown by the United States to China’s desire that a US aircraft carrier not be present in the region. ‘The decision should be made with consideration given to China’s wishes’, said one Chinese commentator. ‘It’s a matter of the dignity of a big country’, said another.43 A few years later, a worsening North Korean missile threat prompted Seoul to consider deploying the US-made Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. Beijing strenuously objected, even though China itself has a similar system in Shandong province to protect the country from North Korean missiles.44 Beijing argued that THAAD could slightly compromise China’s nuclear second-strike capability by using its powerful radar to track Chinese missile launches. The US government said China’s stated concerns were unfounded and invited China to send a delegation for a technical briefing, but the Chinese side refused. When Seoul made the decision in 2016 to deploy THAAD, China responded with several months of economic punishment that ended only when Beijing extracted three important concessions from South Korean President Moon Jae-in about limiting further US–South Korea security cooperation. In this case, China insisted that a marginal Chinese security concern outweighed the compelling security concern of its smaller neighbour, and that Seoul’s insubordination justified harsh Chinese retaliation. While Beijing criticises the US military for conducting patrols and surveillance in the western Pacific rim, Beijing simultaneously claims the right to carry out its own patrols near neighbouring Japan. For example, in July 2017, a PLA Navy surveillance ship sailed through Japanese territorial waters between the main islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. When Japan publicised the incident, the Chinese government said, ‘Japan has ulterior motives with its accusations and hyping up of the situation.’45 That same month, after Japan complained about six Chinese bombers flying over the Miyako Strait that separates the Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa (but that does not lie within Japanese territorial airspace), China’s defence ministry released a statement saying, ‘The relevant side should not make a fuss about nothing or over-interpret, it will be fine once they get used to it.’46 Beijing has gone so far as to demand that Japan stop scrambling aircraft to observe Chinese planes and ships operating near its territory – something every country with an air force does routinely, including China. On one occasion in 2015, a Chinese defence-ministry spokesman said Japan’s ‘following of, surveillance and interference with Chinese ships and aircraft’ was ‘threatening [their] safety’. He called on Japan to ‘stop behavior that hampers Chinese freedom of flight’.47 The statement was blatantly hypocritical considering the crash between the Chinese fighter aircraft and the American P-3 in 2001, and the multiple cases of Chinese vessels ramming foreign ships. Elsewhere, Beijing does not refrain from leveraging its strong economic position to influence other countries’ views on important political issues in which China has an interest. Phnom Penh’s effort to support Beijing by blocking Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) criticism of China’s South China Sea claims, for example, is well known.48 Cambodia has also helped China to achieve its aim of reducing the US military presence in the region. It cancelled military exercises with the United States and Australia in 2017, and it sent home a US Navy Seabee construction unit that had been providing humanitarian assistance for nine years.49 As elsewhere, the Chinese have demonstrated a hankering for exclusivity and control in Cambodia. * * * To the extent that Beijing is successful in promoting the perception that its assertive foreign and military policies are motivated by legitimate national grievances and overwhelming public pressure, China’s neighbours are more likely to see the country’s policies as reasonable, its aims as strictly limited and its profile as that of an exceptionally benevolent great power. Given that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that China is a revisionist state disguised as a status quo state, and that it would still desire a sphere of influence even in the absence of any territorial disputes, this may be a strategic miscalculation. International-relations theory offers two competing models of inter-state conflict: the deterrence model and the spiral model.50 The two models prescribe nearly opposite policy responses to an assertive state, depending on the diagnosis of its root motivations. The deterrence model treats assertive states as expansionist and sees their primary goal as grabbing territory, resources and power. In this view, appeasement will only encourage further expansionism. The proper response by threatened states is to signal resolute resistance as early as possible: the assertive state will be harder to defeat the more resources it gains control of. The spiral model, on the other hand, sees conflict as a tragic misunderstanding. In this model, the assertive state perceives itself as fundamentally insecure, and its seeming bellicosity is driven by an impulse to protect itself. Other states are advised to make themselves appear less threatening to pacify the assertive state and alleviate the risk of conflict, in particular by making unilateral concessions demonstrating a decrease in both their intent and ability to harm the assertive state. China’s neighbours face a choice between acquiescing to Beijing’s territorial demands and trusting in its assurances that China is a harmless giant, or standing firm against what may be viewed as unreasonable Chinese demands stemming from an appetite for power limited only by opportunity and feasibility. In making this decision, they would be wise to remember that other historical great powers did not rely on claims of recovering ‘territory left behind by our ancestors’ to establish the Monroe Doctrine, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the Warsaw Pact. Wrapping the country’s policies in a cloak of irredentism may serve China’s interests well, but could be diverting attention away from the threat of Chinese encroachment.