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2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › turn

AI cooperation is key to Nato’s threat response – turns the da

van der Merwe 21

(Joanna, “NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability”, ) DB

In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › +Uniqueness

We’re losing the ai race now – cooperation is key

Wodecki 22

(Ben, “NATO at risk of losing AI innovation race to Russia, China”, ) DB

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should standardize and regulate AI to keep up with rivals, according to findings published by the U.S. think tank, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Impact › Yes impact

Causes extinction through uncontrolled risks from emerging tech.

Jain ’20 [Ash; 2020; Senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; Strategic Studies Quarterly; “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System,” ]

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way.

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this lisgt similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Impact › Magnitude

It makes conflicts more peaceful – regulating weapons fails

Yoo 17

(John, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, “Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies”, California Law Review, Vol. 105, Issue 2) DB

A rationalist approach to war also provides an answer to the broader critique of the new weapons technologies as facilitating war. Recall that some UN officials and scholars share the concern that drones and cyberweapons will encourage states to wage war more often. Critics argue that these weapons remove a nation’s soldiers from the battlefield, thereby emboldening leaders to choose force more frequently. But, understanding war as a bargaining failure reveals the importance of signaling to resolving international disputes. New weapons create more opportunities for signaling, which allows nations to communicate their intentions and capabilities more effectively. Greater signaling should allow nations to share more information, which on the margins will lead to more international deals and therefore an overall reduction of major wars. Ironically, an effort to ban new weapons may well produce more war, not less.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Impact › Magnitude

We outweigh on magnitude – wars using new AI weapons prevent conventional weapons, which are worse

Yoo 17

(John, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, “Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies”, California Law Review, Vol. 105, Issue 2) DB

Such mistaken arguments confuse jus in bello and jus ad bellum. The means of fighting a war do not bear on the justifications for the war. A war that rests on just grounds need not be fought in an evenhanded fashion. One might want a war that has a just purpose to come to a quick and rapid conclusion, with the least loss of life as possible, which should be more likely if one side has a great advantage over the other. Again, the Kosovo War provides a good example. If we agree with the goal of stopping Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of the provinces of the former Yugoslavia, we should want NATO to execute the war with the maximum dispatch and effectiveness. A faster war, fought with precision weapons and reduced combat casualties, could end the human rights catastrophe earlier and save more lives. Similarly, if a nation were defending itself, we should want it to have the most advanced weapons possible. Superiority itself may not just deter an attack; it could also inflict such high costs in an actual war that the attacker may give up.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Impact › Turns heg

Integrating AI into military tech makes heg sustainable

Etzioni 17

(Amitai, “Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems”, ) DB

Military advantages. Those who call for further development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems generally point to several military advantages. First, autonomous weapons systems act as a force multiplier. That is, fewer warfighters are needed for a given mission, and the efficacy of each warfighter is greater. Next, advocates credit autonomous weapons systems with expanding the battlefield, allowing combat to reach into areas that were previously inaccessible. Finally, autonomous weapons systems can reduce casualties by removing human warfighters from dangerous missions.1

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Impact › Turns case

The thesis of the da turns case – other countries will develop new weapons regardless of international norms – that only makes the US’s position worse

Yoo 17

(John, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, “Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies”, California Law Review, Vol. 105, Issue 2) DB

Cyberweapons and drones do not yet appear to bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will not be even across nations, but instead may be asymmetric. Some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber and drone technology. Or put differently, prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations. Chinese military doctrine, for example, emphasizes using such technologies to offset U.S. advantages in conventional sea and air power. 116 Drones might be used to overwhelm the defenses for U.S. carrier groups in the Western Pacific, while cyber weapons could interfere with U.S. command-and-control, communications, or even military readiness. Just as the Germans resorted to submarines to offset British and American naval superiority in World Wars I and II, the Chinese may well turn to robotics and network attacks in a future contest. Reciprocity will not hold because international limitations on new weapons would have the effect of favoring the United States’ existing advantage in conventional arms.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Link › Norms/regulation

Setting ethical standards for use of military AI undermines US competitiveness and causes a switch to worse weapons

Yoo 17

(John, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, “Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies”, California Law Review, Vol. 105, Issue 2) DB

THE DANGERS OF OVERREGULATING NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES These new types of weapons allow nations to coerce and pressure each other in novel ways. This Part argues that banning these new weapons will prove futile. It will first base its analysis on a realist approach to international relations, which assumes that nations pursue their interest in security above all other interests and that cooperation will prove difficult due to the anarchic nature of the international system. It then shows why nations will not agree on the regulation of new weapons systems. It follows these predictions about international agreements by arguing that these new weapons may actually reduce the harm to both combatants and civilians in armed conflict. Counterintuitively, heavy regulation of drones or cyberweapons may have the unforeseen consequence of making war more dangerous and destructive. A. Realism and Weapons Before we can develop a sensible approach to regulation, we first must present a theory about international conflict. Without a theory, the international system might adopt standards without any understanding whether it is making the problems of war better or worse. Excessive regulation of new weapons technologies might unintentionally exacerbate the harms of war by forcing combatants to use more destructive weapons. Unduly lax standards might have the unintended consequence of allowing both sides to inflict grievous harms on each other to no military advantage. Without a theory of war, we do not know what values our legal rules should maximize and what costs it should minimize. We are not applying a philosopher’s attitude to war. Some believe that nations have followed laws during armed conflict out of a sense of morality that can trace its origins to Christian and, before that, Roman just war theories.81 We do not discount the intellectual tradition of just war theory or its recent appearances in the works of Michael Walzer, John Rawls, and others.82 But the history of war does not reveal a universal morality that imposes consistent restraints on warfare.83 This should come as no surprise in light of the diversity of the world’s religions and political, economic, and moral belief systems. Nations have often rejected moral appeals when they can achieve military advantage in combat. Instead, we follow a more instrumental approach. Like realist scholars in the field of international relations, we assume that the international system fundamentally suffers from anarchy. Anarchy does not mean that anything goes. Anarchy does not mean that the world lacks order, but only that no world authority can enforce international rules in the same way that domestic governments maintain law and order. The world is composed of independent sovereign states with no higher sovereign above them. Under realism, states are obsessed with their own security because they cannot rely upon a supranational body to guarantee it. Nor can nations hold 100 percent certainty about other nations’ motives. As a result, states will fear each other’s military capabilities and political intentions. They will take self-help measures and act strategically to guarantee their own survival, regardless of their internal politics.84 As Kenneth Waltz famously argued, a state’s place within the anarchical international system, rather than its domestic nature, will dictate national policy.85 Realists believe that international organizations and international law can do little to affect the pursuit of power and security. States may sign treaties, but the legal effect of the agreement does not affect their calculations. They will always pursue a course of conduct that maximizes their interests regardless of the presence or absence of a treaty. “Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world,” John Mearsheimer argued during the heady days of the end of the Cold War. “They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior.”86 Realism does not prevent nations from cooperating for mutual benefit. But the competition of states will make agreements difficult. First, because nations worry about their security from attack by other nations, they will be concerned by the relative gains of cooperation. Two nations might improve their situations in a deal, but if one of the two increases its relative advantage as a result, the balance of power might shift enough to sink the deal. In other words, states may refuse to cooperate, even if they were to enjoy absolute gains, if other nations gain even more. Second, nations may not cooperate even if they were to gain because they will worry that their partners will cheat. Without a world government, no higher authority can force sovereign states to keep their promises.87 These challenges make it unlikely that nations can commit to end the use of force in their relations. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which purported to ban all war, stands as a failed symbol of such utopian efforts.88 Other forms of international cooperation may employ soaring rhetoric but—by design— produce little real world effect, such as the many resolutions of the UN General Assembly. But nations can cooperate in limited areas, so long that the resulting treaties or laws mirror the existing balance of power. Trade agreements, for example, allow comparative advantage to improve the economies of all signatories. Nations can cooperate to solve problems that cross borders, such as pollution or drug trafficking, or to divide valuable resources, such as underground oil fields or fisheries. States may even cooperate on matters of war if they can both benefit without either gaining a military or political advantage. State practice in waging armed conflicts produces customary practice that coalesces, over time, into the laws of war. Rules that will come to have the force of law must leave states better off in pursuing their interests. Nations will reject rules—no matter how noble their intent or humanitarian their goal—that leave them worse off. NATO allowed the United States and Western Europe to band together to contain the Soviet Union. NATO, however, did not alter the balance of power between Washington and Moscow. Instead, the institution served as a mechanism for the United States to better organize the forces on its side.89 NATO did not alter the balance of powers within Europe, but allowed the United States to rebuild Germany without reigniting security fears on the part of France and the United Kingdom.90 International agreements might also regulate wartime tactics, operations, and strategy. Nations at war, for example, might treat prisoners humanely if they can expect that their opponents will behave similarly.91 They might agree to foreswear chemical weapons if their use inflicts great suffering without giving either side an advantage.92 War’s high stakes, however, will tempt nations to cheat when battlefield conditions may make reneging harder to detect. It is also important to recognize that the success of a legal regime on war will depend on the international context. In a certain period of history, for example, a few great powers might protect their own security not just by building defenses, but also by maintaining a rough equality of power with their rivals. War might occur when nations band together to prevent a rising nation from upsetting the balance of power. In 1849, Great Britain and France dispatched troops across Europe to fight the Russian Empire in Crimea. Even though they had few interests there, London and Paris believed that Moscow’s move into Ottoman territory would upset the European balance of power. Using machine guns and trench warfare for the first time, the combatants fought to a stalemate. Under conditions that produced the static defenses of trench warfare, a balanced distribution of power and restrained national goals might make limitations on arms possible. No state would enjoy an advantage either before or after an agreement. It should be no surprise that the first treaties regulating warfare, the Hague Regulations of 1899, hail from the highpoint of Europe’s classic balance of power. Different circumstances, however, might not yield to noble goals. In the wake of World War I’s carnage, for example, the great powers sought to limit the naval arms race that they thought had caused British-German antagonism. If nations had built great fleets simply to keep up with their neighbors, a common limit on dreadnoughts might have restrained competition, thereby saving resources and reducing conflict. In the Washington Naval Treaty of 1920, the major western powers and Japan agreed to permanent limits on battleships, with the United States and Great Britain permitted to maintain the largest fleets, followed by Japan, France, and Italy.93 The Treaty of Versailles subjected Germany to far stricter limits on naval building.94 Wracked by the Great Depression and the rise of fascism, however, the Axis powers embarked on a campaign of territorial expansion. They circumvented the Washington and Versailles Treaties, either by concealing vessels (such as the Bismarck), building weapons that skirted the rules (Germany’s “pocket battleships”), or developing new naval weapons unforeseen by the drafters (aircraft carriers). As history suggests, changes in the international system and in war will have critical consequences for the nature and success of international rules. Several developments have set the environment that will surround the new military technologies. Perhaps the most important is that the destructiveness of war has rapidly declined since World War II. This seems counterintuitive in light of the deployment of vastly more destructive weapons by the superpowers and their allies. The United States used two fission bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a level of destructive power that rivaled entire air campaigns of the day. A single modern fusion bomb would exceed the total destructive power of all of the conventional bombs dropped in World War II. Ballistic missile technology allows nations to deliver nuclear weapons anywhere in the world without having to deploy vast naval or air fleets. Throughout the 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union fielded more than twenty thousand nuclear weapons each and thousands of air, sea, and ground missiles capable of delivering them. During the Cold War, both nations kept their nuclear forces at high levels of alert and could have destroyed the world many times over. But they did not. Though still present, conventional war has become less harmful. By some counts, the period from the end of World War II to the present day has seen the level of armed conflict between nations fall by an order of magnitude from the Peace of Westphalia to the mid-twentieth century.95 When corrected for the higher number of nations, wars between states have dropped both in their frequency and destructiveness. War no longer characterized the relations between European states. Indeed, for the first time in centuries, no major war between the great powers broke out in Europe or Asia. Historians now appreciate the Cold War as “the Long Peace.”96 But deaths from war have not disappeared. They have not even significantly declined. They have only dropped in wars between the great powers. While the number of conflicts between nations has steeply fallen, it has jumped inside states.97 Civil wars have replaced and even exceeded the scourge of great power war in terms of their casualties and frequency. By some estimates, post-World War II conflicts have killed forty million, including both combatants and civilians who have died on the battlefield or from related starvation and disease.98 Studies report that between 70 and 80 percent of these casualties occurred in civil wars.99 Conflict has become less global and more local. Globe-spanning wars between broad alliances of great powers, such as the Allies against the Axis in World War II, have receded. No great power has directly fought a war with another for the last seventy years. Instead, wars have remained limited to specific areas, such as the Balkans or the Middle East, with Africa generating the greatest share of conflicts and deaths. Realists account for the decline in war in two ways. First, and most important, the postwar world soon divided into a contest between two superpowers. Despite the arms race and proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, this “bipolar” system had the counterintuitive effect of producing global stability. With only two superpowers, calculations of war and peace became simpler, less friction occurred, and the interest in superpower deterrence suppressed national interests that might have once caused war. According to this view, the multipolarity between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries made war more likely because of the heightened opportunities for conflict between more great powers. Second, the emergence of nuclear weapons only reinforced the balancing effect of bipolarity. The great powers could achieve greater security with a nuclear deterrent and the possibility of a nuclear exchange caused them to exercise greater caution in the use of force. The United States and the Soviet Union did not come into direct military conflict, it is argued, because of the fear that conventional war could escalate quickly into a nuclear conflict with devastation for both sides.100 As Waltz observed near the end of the Cold War, “[t]he probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.”101 The decline in interstate wars has accompanied greater international cooperation on nonsecurity areas, such as commerce, trade, and the environment. Nations have increased global welfare by lowering trade barriers within regional free-trade areas, such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, and internationally through the World Trade Organization. These developments have encouraged scholars to see greater opportunities for international institutions and law to help build stability and peace. Such benefits usually arise from a hegemonic power, like Great Britain in the nineteenth century or the United States in the twentieth century, which can establish an international order built on free navigation and trade. Realist theory, however, would predict disorder when a dominant great power declines. Nevertheless, institutional scholars, as they are sometimes known in political science, argue that self-interested nations can cooperate to create international regimes that can maintain global order in the absence of a hegemon. In After Hegemony, for example, Robert Keohane argues, “Realist assumptions about world politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements.”102 In other words, self-interested states that worried only about their security might still cooperate if they can realize benefits that leave them better off than before. There is little doubt that cooperation has advanced in the world economy even as the absolute and relative power of the United States has declined after the end of the Cold War.103 International agreements have successfully lowered tariffs and trade barriers and improved coordination in economics, science, environment, and health. Political economists theorize that these regimes help nations escape “the prisoner’s dilemma.” In this stylized game, the optimal outcome for two suspects is to remain silent under police questioning, but because they cannot communicate with each other there is a strong incentive to bargain for a reduced sentence and implicate the other criminal. The prisoner’s dilemma has become a shorthand in the social sciences for situations in which two parties, in pursuit of their rational self-interest, will do themselves short-term harm, when they could have achieved longer-term benefits if they had cooperated. Nations might engage in ruinous trade wars or arms races because of the prisoner’s dilemma. A classic example would be the nuclear arms race between the superpowers during the Cold War. Even though the United States and Russia apparently believe today that they need no more than 2,500 warheads each, during the 1950s and 1960s their nuclear stockpiles reached more than 25,000 weapons. Only decades of negotiation, verification, and trust-building deals on smaller weapons—like the 1988 intermediate-range missile ban—gave the superpowers the confidence to agree to reductions in their strategic arsenals. Liberal institutionalists argue that international agreements can help overcome the prisoner’s dilemma through repeated interaction. They believe that regimes offer states the chance to communicate and learn about each other over time in order to gain information and generate trust. As Andrew Guzman argues, a history of contact allows nations to develop reputations for keeping promises or retaliating against cheaters.104 Regimes can also improve the opportunities for cooperation by linking more issues together, which increase the benefits of performance and the tools for tit-for-tat responses to shirking. Permanent institutions can enhance these effects by spreading reliable information on the compliance of states and reducing transaction costs to future negotiations and deal making. Leading political scientists argue that the successful record in trade and finance should set an example to regulate other areas of global concern. There are several reasons to doubt, however, whether the structure of cooperation in areas such as the international economy will transfer easily to global security. First, and most important, cheating in a security agreement could inflict greater harms on a nation. If a nation suffers a surprise attack, loses a military advantage, or is left without its promised allies, it may encounter a long-term, permanent drop in its territory, population, resources, and ultimately power. Germany’s surprise 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, and the breaking of their nonaggression pact, led to grievous losses and almost knocked Moscow out of the war. Withdrawal from a trade or financial agreement, by contrast, may cause economic pain, but likely cannot equal the severity and immediacy of a wartime defeat.105 Second, nations may have much greater concerns about “relative gains.” 106 In economic affairs, nations may remain content with gains in their GDP growth, increases in exports, and drops in the cost of imports, even if their trade partners do better. But in security affairs, as Joseph Grieco has argued, nations may refuse to cooperate if doing so would benefit a competitor in a relative sense.107 Cooperation is not impossible, but it is most likely in situations where both the use of force is not a serious threat between the nations concerned and they can engage in a long practice of tit-for-tat reciprocity to encourage cooperation.108 Cooperation itself does not disappear during armed conflict, but it is doubtful that formal legalization produces lasting rules of war. Nations have sought to follow some basic norms in combat, such as eliminating weapons that cause unnecessary human suffering. Despite the recent deterioration in practice, nation-states have generally refrained from using chemical weapons since the end of World War I. They have followed the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war, though not consistently. Nations have observed others norms in the breach, such as the immunity of the civilian population and resources from attack. World War II included the aerial bombing of cities and the nuclear attacks on Japan, while the years since have seen precision targeting of terrorists off the battlefield, attacks on urban infrastructure, and the acceptance of high levels of collateral damage among civilians. International lawyers and diplomats may proclaim that nations follow universal rules on combat, either because of morality or a sense of legal obligations, but the record of practice tells a far different story. We should also not mistake temporary restraint in combat for a nations’ lack of military capacity. Human rights activists, for example, often hold up as an example of progress the 1998 Ottawa Convention banning land mines.109 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) led a decades-long campaign to persuade nations to give up antipersonnel mines, which can kill large numbers of civilians years after fighting has ended. In 1997, the Nobel Prize committee ultimately awarded the peace prize to Jody Williams, the director of the international campaign. The apparent success of the treaty, which now includes about 80 percent of the world’s nations, led to visions of a new approach to the laws of war in which groups and individuals, rather than states, would mobilize to force states to control war. Ottawa “spawned a new politics, new partnerships, new ways of thinking about the international environment. It was the forerunner of a clear notion of global citizenship,” writes Lloyd Axworthy, a former Canadian foreign minister and current university president. 110 “It challenged conventional notions of sovereignty and set in motion a form of coalition politics at the global level that could be used to shift power and political relationships.”111 NGOs and international activists have sought to duplicate the perceived success of the Ottawa Convention by extending its scope to regulate cluster munitions and small arms.112 Such efforts, however, unintentionally reaffirm the enduring importance of power. While the great majority of the world’s nations foreswear antipersonnel mines, most of them do not field large militaries or fight major conventional wars. Latin American states, for example, signed Ottawa in large numbers, but they have not fought a major war against each other for many decades. Nations with power projection capabilities, such as the United States, Russia, China, and India, did not commit to the agreement. Smaller states, such as Korea and Israel, faced with aggressive neighbors and local instability, also declined. Eliminating mines would place these nations at a serious disadvantage because they would reduce their ability to deter invasion or maintain a regional status quo. Despite their costs on civilians, mines actually may enhance stability and advance peace—they maintain borders by raising the cost of a ground invasion and have no offensive capability. Nations that live under threat of conflict will have little reason to agree to abandon such a defensive advantage that does not produce a corresponding reduction for offensive weapons. For similar reasons, the “Ottawa Process” will have little impact on other weapons. Nations with small militaries, peaceful neighbors, or large allies, such as many in Europe and Latin America, may promote new arms control agreements. But because the impact on their military performance is negligible and the chances that they will engage in war are small, these states experience very little loss in expected benefits—such as security gains by deploying these weapons—by signing on. Nations with large militaries and greater possibilities for conflict will not join agreements that could force a significant shift in their ability to prevail. Instead, nations will reach agreements whose reciprocal reductions in arms will leave no nation with an advantage. As James Morrow has observed, the laws of war treaties succeed when they guarantee minimum standards of treatment for captured soldiers that leave both sides to a conflict better off without giving either an advantage.113 A similar dynamic gives the agreements on chemical and biological weapons their strength: these weapons cause undue suffering and are difficult to control, and eliminating them leaves nations in the same relative power position as before. But if a nation can narrow a large gap in military power with a competitor by developing these weapons, it may violate an agreement banning their possession. Thus, nations at a disadvantage in conventional or nuclear forces have turned to biological and chemical weapons because reciprocity no longer holds. Nations, of course, will also follow humanitarian treaties even when they do not depend on reciprocity. But they will do so when compliance still advances their national interests. In the Korean and Vietnam Wars, for example, the United States followed the Geneva Conventions even though its opponents had not adopted the agreements. Rather than reciprocate, North Korea and the Viet Cong engaged in the systematic mistreatment of American prisoners of war. The United States, however, could have benefited from following Geneva anyway. Treating prisoners humanely may increase the willingness of enemy fighters to surrender, while a history of cruel treatment might cause opposing soldiers to fight to the death. These objectives may have even greater force if the contending armies are fighting for the support of the local populations. Extending Geneva protections to local guerrillas might help persuade the local populace to side with the government, for example. We should not overstate the influence of reputation on the decisions of nations at war. Human rights advocates, for example, might believe that nations should follow the Geneva Conventions to build a track record of compliance that will lead to better treatment for their soldiers in the next war. Under this argument, the United States should extend Geneva protections to al-Qaeda terrorists, even if the latter execute U.S. prisoners and civilians, because its soldiers will benefit in a future conflict with Iran or China. This claim, however, runs counter to the self-interest of nations at war. China would have little interest in punishing U.S. soldiers captured in a United States-China conflict because of American conduct toward terrorists in a separate contest. Such incentives might even cause a nation to conduct itself differently depending on the corresponding policies of its enemies. In World War II, for example, Germany generally followed the Geneva Conventions on the western front, where the United States and the United Kingdom treated prisoners of war well. The eastern front followed completely different rules: Germany and the Soviet Union descended into the barbaric treatment of each other’s troops and civilians. This detour into international humanitarian treaties here underscores the workings of reciprocity. Nations will follow the human rights treaties when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost. Their captured troops will receive good treatment at the hands of the enemy even though Geneva will require them to bear costs in maintaining security, providing housing, and keeping prisoners in good health. Limitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic. Nations will refrain from using new weapons technologies only when they provide little benefit or their use by both sides leaves no one better off. Robots and cyberweapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where the laws of war have succeeded. They do not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages, as do poisoned bullets or blinding lasers. Rather, these weapons improve the precision of force such that they reduce human death and destruction in war. Nor do these new weapons technologies yet engage nations in a useless arms race. Nuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal. Mutual reductions could leave both sides in the same position as they were before the agreement. Today, the marginal cost of nuclear weapons for the United States and Russia so outweigh their marginal benefit that it is not even clear that a binding international agreement is needed to reduce their arsenals. Russia, for example, reduced its arsenal below New START’s ceilings of 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 strategic launchers even before the United States approved the deal.114 Some experts estimate that the United States requires less than even those numbers to maintain an adequate deterrent, and it is possible that future presidents may reduce the nuclear arsenal without any international agreement.115 Cyberweapons and drones do not yet appear to bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will not be even across nations, but instead may be asymmetric. Some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber and drone technology. Or put differently, prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations. Chinese military doctrine, for example, emphasizes using such technologies to offset U.S. advantages in conventional sea and air power. 116 Drones might be used to overwhelm the defenses for U.S. carrier groups in the Western Pacific, while cyber weapons could interfere with U.S. command-and-control, communications, or even military readiness. Just as the Germans resorted to submarines to offset British and American naval superiority in World Wars I and II, the Chinese may well turn to robotics and network attacks in a future contest. Reciprocity will not hold because international limitations on new weapons would have the effect of favoring the United States’ existing advantage in conventional arms. Even if there might be some mutual advantage to a universal limit on these new weapons technologies, it is still doubtful that nations would accept a legal agreement. Nations would still develop these weapons because they improve their military capabilities at lower cost. Aerial drones, for example, can achieve the objective of attacking an enemy target at lower cost. An F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter/bomber costs $85 million under the best estimates, while Predator and Reaper drones cost about $4 million and $16.9 million respectively.117 The U.S. Air Force can not only purchase twenty Predators for the cost of a single F-35, but it can operate them at a far lower cost per hour, keep them on station for far longer (a predator can fly over a target area for up to fourteen hours) but also not risk the lives of pilots who may be captured or killed.118 Militaries will have an incentive to replace expensive manned aircraft with fleets of drones, regardless of whether their rivals choose to match them or not. Cyber and robotic weapons today resemble the emergence of the new weapons borne of the industrial age. At the time of their emergence, the impact of high-capacity firearms, long-range artillery, warplanes, submarines, and motorized vehicles was not well understood. World War I’s carnage can be attributed to the failure of nineteenth century tactics and strategy, still influenced by Napoleonic theories, to adapt to the greater firepower of modern weapons. Although nations and experts proposed the regulation of aerial and submarine warfare, their asymmetric benefits and the uncertainty of their effects on the balance of power precluded any agreement among the combatants. Nations may prove even more reluctant to adopt arms control schemes for weapons that have strong defensive qualities, such as the machine gun and artillery, because upgrading defensive systems may pose little offensive threat to neighbors.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Link › Cyber

Cyber ambiguity is prevents attacks – clarifying cyber redlines undermines deterrence

Davis 19

(Susan, US General Rapporteur, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE”, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1, October, ) DB

28. Although cyber security and defence capabilities continue to improve, most experts argue that the offence has the advantage in cyber space and that this is unlikely to change soon. Given sufficient time, skills, and resources, attackers can perpetrate a cyber attack, finding the targeted system’s vulnerabilities, gaining access, and delivering their payload. This is a key reason why the Alliance must complement dissuasion with strategies of deterrence by punishment. In other words, they must try “to prevent an attack by threatening unacceptable damage so that in the attacker’s cost-benefit calculations the best choice is not to attack” (Morgan, 2009). It should be noted some experts would argue that offence is not as dominant. For example, the more sophisticated cyber weapons are, the more opportunities the defender has to stop an attacker and the more errors the attacker is likely to make. Additionally, continued organisational deficiencies could be a key reason why attackers have had the advantage thus far (Slayton, 2017). 29. NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages. If the Alliance were to set a clear threshold, the opponent would better understand how to stay below that threshold. This would strengthen deterrence of threats above the threshold but would encourage the opponent to increase attacks just below the threshold. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers to tread lightly. A similar deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War. 30. However, ambiguity on where the threshold lies could indeed lead an opponent who is sufficiently comfortable with taking risks to continuously exploit the “grey zones”, test the defender’s resolve, and conduct ever more daring cyber attacks. Arguably, the solution for such attacks cannot be found in deterrence alone, but rather in a clearly defined policy response for hybrid operations. Allied nations, individually and collectively, continue to develop such options. This is where the United States military saw a need to shift to an innovative strategy of Persistent Engagement. The Rapporteur encourages Allies to explore if and how such a strategy can be most effectively embraced together. 31. NATO’s ambiguity also extends to the type of punishment it threatens were it to suffer a cyber attack. The Alliance has made clear that it neither limits punishment to similar cyber attacks nor excludes them. Instead, it keeps the option open to use the full range of Allied capabilities to deter and counter cyber attacks. Once again, this introduces useful doubt in an opponent’s mind. A more technical reason for the difficulty of restricting retaliation to cyber attacks is that it is hard to credibly threaten the assets of the attacker in a similar fashion. If an attacker shuts down a power plant, would the Alliance have cyber options to attack an opponent’s power plants or similar infrastructure? Would NATO even want to if it could, as it complies with the principle of proportionality and international law in all its activities? NATO’s ambiguity on the type of retaliation serves a convincing purpose. It produces doubts in the would-be attacker’s mind and presents more options to tailor and scale a response to re-establish deterrence. 32. A key feature of a stable deterrence situation is the ability to signal retaliatory capabilities and resolve to enforce the deterrence threat. However, such signalling is difficult when it comes to cyber deterrence. States can hardly display malicious codes at a military parade or a defence exhibition. They must, therefore, find different ways to signal capabilities and resolve impending conflicts. For example, demonstrating capabilities in real-world situations typically makes deterrence threats more plausible (Nye, 2017). Indeed, many experts argue that recent, limited cyber attacks should, at least in part, be seen as such demonstrations (Lewis, 2018). Additionally investing in cyber capabilities in a way visible to an opponent “generally can help to signal resolve” (Lindsay, 2015). In other words, transparency on cyber security and defence measures also serves as a deterrence signal. In the limited way they can signal their cyber security and defence capabilities, NATO and individual Allies appear to be making progress. In the public realm, NATO should therefore remain as transparent as possible when it comes to its cyber capabilities. In areas where public disclosure is not an option, communicating with potential opponents through non-public channels should happen as frequently as possible.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Link › General – ai coop

AI cooperation undermines innovation due to diverging perspectives

HEIKKILÄ 21

(MELISSA, “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.”, ) DB

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Uniqueness › Military ai high

The DoD’s focused on AI integration and development now

Horowitz and Kahn 22

(Michael C and Lauren, “Why DoD’s New Approach to Data and Artificial Intelligence Should Enhance National Defense”,

The ability of the United States to compete in the 21st century depends on U.S. leadership in data and artificial intelligence (AI). In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a new and much-needed approach to U.S. defense efforts in data and AI. David Spirk, the departing Chief Data Officer of the Pentagon, made clear yesterday that the office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), in addition to its other functions, will be the successor organization for and replace DoD’s much-touted Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). While the JAIC symbolized DoD’s efforts to get smart on AI beginning in 2018, the integration of data and AI represents a maturation of the U.S. AI approach—one that elevates the importance of AI in national defense. The JAIC itself was not as important as what the JAIC stood for—DoD’s commitment to U.S. defense AI leadership. In paving the way forward and getting AI on the agenda, the JAIC succeeded. From this point on, a more cohesive approach to AI and data through the CDAO is more likely to accelerate AI adoption throughout the U.S. military because it links DoD’s AI efforts with data, the fuel AI requires. For U.S. defense AI adoption, in particular, aligning these organizations could be game-changing. Addressing DoD’s siloed data, standardizing and improving its quality and access, is a precondition to having the data necessary to train algorithms for many defense uses, and any future technologies that rely on collecting, processing, and using information. Implementation will be critical and heavily dependent on two things. First, to catalyze AI adoption, the CDAO will need to develop close relationships with the military services and combatant commands. Second, the CDAO will need to coordinate with DoD’s research and development organizations, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, leading on AI experimentation and research. There is hard work ahead, but the new organizational design is promising.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
1nc

US leadership in emerging tech prevents war with Russia and China – goes nuclear

Kroenig and Gopalaswamy 18

(Matthew, Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy, and Bharath, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/12, ) DB

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
1nc

Incorporating new ethics standards on AI causes the US to scale back development and transition to autonomous weapons – that makes every conflict worse

Yoo 17

(John, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, “Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies”, California Law Review, Vol. 105, Issue 2) DB

Governments and scholars are not always clear about when such attacks meet the legal standards for an armed attack or something less. For example, the new United States Law of War Manual, issued by the Department of Defense in 2015, declares that the existing laws of war should apply to what it calls “cyber operations.”11 But it then concedes that the rules here are “not well-settled” and are “likely to continue to develop.”12 The United States even takes the position that it may not have a position, as the manual declares that it does not “preclude the [Defense] Department from subsequently changing its interpretation of the law.”13

2022 MGC Affirmative

Miller 17

Ron, “Artificial intelligence is not as smart as you (or Elon Musk) think”, TechCrunch, 7/25, DB

In March 2016, DeepMind’s AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol, who at the time was the best human Go player in the world. It represented one of those defining technological moments like IBM’s Deep Blue beating chess champion Garry Kasparov, or even IBM Watson beating the world’s greatest Jeopardy! champions in 2011. Yet these victories, as mind-blowing as they seemed to be, were more about training algorithms and using brute-force computational strength than any real intelligence. Former MIT robotics professor Rodney Brooks, who was one of the founders of iRobot and later Rethink Robotics, reminded us at the TechCrunch Robotics Session at MIT last week that training an algorithm to play a difficult strategy game isn’t intelligence, at least as we think about it with humans. He explained that as strong as AlphaGo was at its given task, it actually couldn’t do anything else but play Go on a standard 19 x 19 board. He relayed a story that while speaking to the DeepMind team in London recently, he asked them what would have happened if they had changed the size of the board to 29 x 29, and the AlphaGo team admitted to him that had there been even a slight change to the size of the board, “we would have been dead.” “I think people see how well [an algorithm] performs at one task and they think it can do all the things around that, and it can’t,” Brooks explained. Brute-force intelligence As Kasparov pointed out in an interview with Devin Coldewey at TechCrunch Disrupt in May, it’s one thing to design a computer to play chess at Grand Master level, but it’s another to call it intelligence in the pure sense. It’s simply throwing computer power at a problem and letting a machine do what it does best. “In chess, machines dominate the game because of the brute force of calculation and they [could] crunch chess once the databases got big enough and hardware got fast enough and algorithms got smart enough, but there are still many things that humans understand. Machines don’t have understanding. They don’t recognize strategical patterns. Machines don’t have purpose,” Kasparov explained. Gil Pratt, CEO at the Toyota Institute, a group inside Toyota working on artificial intelligence projects including household robots and autonomous cars, was interviewed at the TechCrunch Robotics Session, said that the fear we are hearing about from a wide range of people, including Elon Musk, who most recently called AI “an existential threat to humanity,” could stem from science-fiction dystopian descriptions of artificial intelligence run amok. “The deep learning systems we have, which is what sort of spurred all this stuff, are remarkable in how well we do given the particular tasks that we give them, but they are actually quite narrow and brittle in their scope. So I think it’s important to keep in context how good these systems are, and actually how bad they are too, and how long we have to go until these systems actually pose that kind of a threat [that Elon Musk and others talk about].” Brooks said in his TechCrunch Sessions: Robotics talk that there is a tendency for us to assume that if the algorithm can do x, it must be as smart as humans. “Here’s the reason that people — including Elon — make this mistake. When we see a person performing a task very well, we understand the competence [involved]. And I think they apply the same model to machine learning,” he said. Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg also criticized Musk’s comments, calling them “pretty irresponsible,” in a Facebook Live broadcast on Sunday. Zuckerberg believes AI will ultimately improve our lives. Musk shot back later that Zuckerberg had a “limited understanding” of AI. (And on and on it goes.) It’s worth noting, however, that Musk isn’t alone in this thinking. Physicist Stephen Hawking and philosopher Nick Bostrom also have expressed reservations about the potential impact of AI on humankind — but chances are they are talking about a more generalized artificial intelligence being studied in labs at the likes of Facebook AI Research, DeepMind and Maluuba, rather than the more narrow AI we are seeing today. Brooks pointed out that many of these detractors don’t actually work in AI, and suggested they don’t understand just how difficult it is to solve each problem. “There are quite a few people out there who say that AI is an existential threat — Stephen Hawking, [Martin Rees], the Astronomer Royal of Great Britain…a few other people — and they share a common thread in that they don’t work in AI themselves.” Brooks went onto say, “For those of us who do work in AI, we understand how hard it is to get anything to actually work through product level.” AI could be a misnomer Part of the problem stems from the fact that we are calling it “artificial intelligence.” It is not really like human intelligence at all, which Merriam Webster defines as “the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations.” Pascal Kaufmann, founder at Starmind, a startup that wants to help companies use collective human intelligence to find solutions to business problems, has been studying neuroscience for the past 15 years. He says the human brain and the computer operate differently and it’s a mistake to compare the two. “The analogy that the brain is like a computer is a dangerous one, and blocks the progress of AI,” he says. Further, Kaufmann believes we won’t advance our understanding of human intelligence if we think of it in technological terms. “It is a misconception that [algorithms] works like a human brain. People fall in love with algorithms and think that you can describe the brain with algorithms and I think that’s wrong,” he said. When things go wrong There are in fact many cases of AI algorithms not being quite as smart as we might think. One infamous example of AI out of control was the Microsoft Tay chatbot, created by the Microsoft AI team last year. It took less than a day for the bot to learn to be racist. Experts say that it could happen to any AI system when bad examples are presented to it. In the case of Tay, it was manipulated by racist and other offensive language, and since it had been taught to “learn” and mirror that behavior, it soon ran out of the researchers’ control. A widely reported study conducted by researchers at Cornell University and the University of Wyoming found that it was fairly easy to fool algorithms that had been trained to identify pictures. The researchers found that when presented with what looked like “scrambled nonsense” to humans, algorithms would identify it as an everyday object like “a school bus.” What’s not well understood, according to an MIT Tech Review article on the same research project, is why the algorithm can be fooled in the way the researchers found. What we know is that humans have learned to recognize whether something is a picture or nonsense, and algorithms analyzing pixels can apparently be subject to some manipulation. Self-driving cars are even more complicated because there are things that humans understand when approaching certain situations that would be difficult to teach to a machine. In a long blog post on autonomous cars that Rodney Brooks wrote in January, he brings up a number of such situations, including how an autonomous car might approach a stop sign at a cross walk in a city neighborhood with an adult and child standing at the corner chatting. The algorithm would probably be tuned to wait for the pedestrians to cross, but what if they had no intention of crossing because they were waiting for a school bus? A human driver could signal to the pedestrians to go, and they in turn could wave the car on, but a driverless car could potentially be stuck there endlessly waiting for the pair to cross because they have no understanding of these uniquely human signals, he wrote. Each of these examples show just how far we have to go with artificial intelligence algorithms. Should researchers ever become more successful at developing generalized AI, this could change, but for now there are things that humans can do easily that are much more difficult to teach an algorithm, precisely because we are not limited in our learning to a set of defined tasks.

2022 MGC Affirmative

East-West Center.Org

“US-CHINA RELATIONS: IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE ABYSS?”, --ECM

Mingjiang Li, an associate professor and provost’s chair in international relations at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said that US-China relations are at a “very crucial moment,” and many analysts worry that the relationship could “slip into a new Cold War.”

Li suggested, however, that the US could smooth tensions by focusing less attention on human rights issues that China says are internal matters. “Too much US intervention in China's domestic politics may actually not be helpful in changing China politically,” he said.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Andrews 3/16/2022

Edmund L. Andrews is a economics reporter for The New York Times, “China and the United States: Unlikely Partners in AI”, -- ECM

The startling trend highlights a paradox. Even as China and the U.S. race for leadership in what they view as a strategically important technology, researchers on both sides appear to see benefits in sharing expertise and working together.

“What’s clear is that the amount of collaboration between the United States and China has gone up dramatically, and it has gone up much more than collaborations between any two other countries,” says Raymond Perrault, Distinguished Computer Scientist at SRI International in Menlo Park and co-chair of the AI Index Steering Committee.

2022 MGC Affirmative

No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19,

Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, **Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, ***Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6, pg. 728-729

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7 Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

2022 MGC Affirmative

Andrews 3/16/2022

Edmund L. Andrews is a economics reporter for The New York Times, “China and the United States: Unlikely Partners in AI”, -- ECM

Despite both rivalry and rising tensions between the United States and China, the two nations have become the world’s leading collaborators in research on Artificial Intelligence.

The newly released AI Index Report, which tracks AI trends on a host of fronts and is published by the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, finds that U.S. and Chinese AI researchers teamed up on far more published articles than collaborators between any other two nations.