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2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenle & Bresnick 2/21/2022

Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.. Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and research assistant. “Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate”, -- ECM

Biden has opted to use a calmer, more restrained tone with Beijing than did his predecessor, with the aim of avoiding escalation. Moreover, unlike some Trump administration officials, Biden’s team has made it clear that Washington is not seeking regime change in China. And though Biden criticized Trump’s lack of a clear set of goals or a coherent interagency policy framework for addressing the China challenge, his administration has yet to release its long-awaited China strategy (though China does figure prominently in its recently issued Indo-Pacific Strategy). Until that document is issued, the finer points of the administration’s plans to compete with Beijing, as well as the end goal of such competition, will remain fuzzy. A clear articulation of U.S. aims would be helpful in Washington’s efforts to secure greater international cooperation from allies and partners in addressing the challenges China poses. It would also provide Chinese and U.S. leaders a starting point from which to negotiate the future of bilateral ties.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenle & Bresnick 2/21/2022

Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.. Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and research assistant. “Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate”, -- ECM

By committing to this pragmatic approach, the United States and China may be able to find a way to put a floor under deteriorating relations, begin to build goodwill, and lay the foundation for taking on the larger structural issues in areas, like trade and technology, that will be key to determining the future health and welfare of the U.S.-China relationship over the long term. Despite the two nations’ differing mindsets and approaches to bilateral ties, starting small could prove the best method through which to, eventually, realize large gains.

2022 MGC Affirmative

China will not accept coop with US political obstacles ensure.

Sullivan 10/4/2021

Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM

AI Competition between the U.S. and China is not irredeemably zero-sum; in fact, collaboration and cooperation are not only necessary, but it is beneficial to both nations and carries the potential of helping all of humanity. In helping humanity address transnational issues, “power becomes a positive-sum game” as the U.S., according to Joseph Nye, approaches “power in terms of the ability to accomplish joint goals” where “empowering others can help us accomplish our own goals.”441 Competition does equate to conflict. Finding commonalities in this “inevitable and inescapable rivalry” allows our nations to accept our differences and search out commonalities or areas where values may align, much like companies such as Apple and Samsung.442 The idea of “rivalry partners” put forward by Graham Allison, or “coopetition” or “coevolution” by Elizabeth Economy, are alternative perspectives for the U.S.-China relationship, which with certain assumptions, retains competition as the centerpiece of the relationship while opening up opportunities for cooperation in areas that benefit all of humankind. The risk, however, is if cooperation becomes the objective, not the means, thus it “encourages the actor more committed to cooperation to excuse or even ignore the other’s missteps or malign actions out of fear that cooperation otherwise will not ultimately be realized.”443 A better approach to cooperation focuses on allies and partners, where values naturally align and working through the difficult challenges that AI presents may yield results more quickly. While China has a long history of pursuing bilateral agreements, especially on trade, they remain flexible in adapting to changing environments where their participation offers an opportunity for leadership roles or offsets U.S. interests in regional agreements. In the current geopolitical climate, China is unlikely to accept bilateral agreements or arrangements with the U.S. on AI, preferring multilateral engagements to further their platform for multipolarity and reserving bilateral agreements for economic trade or when opportunities appear to entice developing nations to the BRI or other China-led efforts. The U.S. should not avoid bilateral engagements with Beijing on critical security issues but prioritizing the needs of allies and recruiting nations with shared values presents a path to a more inclusive and diverse alliance. Such an arrangement should not exclude non-democratic countries such as Vietnam or Singapore, nor should it exclude China by design. The U.S. gains legitimacy through leadership that focuses not on division or conflict but by relying on clear values and norms to attract like-minded nations across geographical boundaries and political ideologies. Values more than any other element of competition impede cooperation with China and demonstrating to the world that the U.S. will stand up to China on human rights, while not closing the door on collaboration or cooperation on issues such as climate change, keeps the door open for China to participate, without giving them the power to block, delay or disrupt efforts.

2022 MGC Affirmative

2. AI’s millions of times more powerful

Alexey Turchin & David Denkenberger 18, Turchin is a researcher at the Science for Life Extension Foundation; Denkenberger is with the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) @ Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), “Classification of Global Catastrophic Risks Connected with Artificial Intelligence,” AI & SOCIETY, 05/03/2018, pp. 1–17

According to Yampolskiy and Spellchecker (2016), the probability and seriousness of AI failures will increase with time. We estimate that they will reach their peak between the appearance of the first self-improving AI and the moment that an AI or group of AIs reach global power, and will later diminish, as late-stage AI halting seems to be a low-probability event.

AI is an extremely powerful and completely unpredictable technology, millions of times more powerful than nuclear weapons. Its existence could create multiple individual global risks, most of which we can not currently imagine. We present several dozen separate global risk scenarios connected with AI in this article, but it is likely that some of the most serious are not included. The sheer number of possible failure modes suggests that there are more to come.

2022 MGC Affirmative

1. Unlike AI, nuke war’s not existential

Karina Vold & Daniel R. Harris 21, Vold is a philosopher of cognitive science and artificial intelligence & an assistant professor at the University of Toronto's Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology; Harris is a retired lawyer and Foreign Service Officer at the US Department of State, “How Does Artificial Intelligence Pose an Existential Risk?,” Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, Ed. C. Veliz., pp 1-34

The idea that AI might one day threaten humanity has been around for some time. In 1863, the novelist Samuel Butler (1863 ,185) suggested that machines may one day hold “supremacy over the world and its inhabitants”. By the mid-twentieth century, these concerns had left the realm of science fiction, as thinkers like Alan Turing (1951, 260) began to warn the public that we should expect intelligent machines to eventually “take control”. Still, for many years, academics did not spill much ink over these concerns, even while Hollywood filmmakers ran with them, producing countless blockbusters based on this “AI takeover” scenario (think: The Terminator or Battlestar Galactica). Over the last decade or so, however, many leading academics and entrepreneurs have notably increased their attention to existential risks from AI. These concerns are, as we will see, more subtle than those depicted in crude Hollywood-produced AI takeover scenarios. Indeed, those depictions have largely misrepresented the concrete issues scholars are concerned with by overly focusing on anthropomorphic concerns of conscious AI systems deciding to destroy humans.

This renewed scholarly interest in AI safety has been spurred on in part by the recent deep learning revolution. This period is defined by major advances in the accomplishments of deep neural networks— artificial neural networks with multiple layers between the input and output layers—across a wide range of areas, including game-playing, speech and facial recognition, and image generation. Even with these breakthroughs though, the cognitive capabilities of current AI systems remain limited to domain-specific applications. Nevertheless, many researchers are alarmed by the speed of progress in AI and worry that future systems, if not managed correctly, could present an existential threat.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Good AI invents solutions to present AND speculative future risks---but regs are key

Toby Ord 20, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, “5. Future Risks,” The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, First edition, Hachette Books, 2020, pp. 121–158

Even if these arguments for risk are entirely wrong in the particulars, we should pay close attention to the development of AGI as it may bring other, unforeseen, risks. The transition to a world where humans are no longer the most intelligent entities on Earth could easily be the greatest ever change in humanity’s place in the universe. We shouldn’t be surprised if events surrounding this transition determine how our longterm future plays out— for better or worse.

One key way in which AI could help improve humanity’s longterm future is by offering protection from the other existential risks we face. For example, AI may enable us to find solutions to major risks or to identify new risks that would have blindsided us. AI may also help make our longterm future brighter than anything that could be achieved without it. So the idea that developments in AI may pose an existential risk is not an argument for abandoning AI, but an argument for proceeding with due caution.

2022 MGC Affirmative

2. Empirics

Allan Dafoe & Stuart Russell 16, Dafoe is an assistant professor of political science at Yale University; Russell is a professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley, “Yes, We Are Worried About the Existential Risk of Artificial Intelligence,” MIT Technology Review, 11-02-16, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602776/yes-we-are-worried-about-the-existential-risk-of-artificial-intelligence/

Etzioni then repeats the dubious argument that “doom-and-gloom predictions often fail to consider the potential benefits of AI in preventing medical errors, reducing car accidents, and more.” The argument does not even apply to Bostrom, who predicts that success in controlling AI will result in “a compassionate and jubilant use of humanity’s cosmic endowment.” The argument is also nonsense. It’s like arguing that nuclear engineers who analyze the possibility of meltdowns in nuclear power stations are “failing to consider the potential benefits” of cheap electricity, and that because nuclear power stations might one day generate really cheap electricity, we should neither mention, nor work on preventing, the possibility of a meltdown.

Our experience with Chernobyl suggests it may be unwise to claim that a powerful technology entails no risks. It may also be unwise to claim that a powerful technology will never come to fruition. On September 11, 1933, Lord Rutherford, perhaps the world’s most eminent nuclear physicist, described the prospect of extracting energy from atoms as nothing but “moonshine.” Less than 24 hours later, Leo Szilard invented the neutron-induced nuclear chain reaction; detailed designs for nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons followed a few years later. Surely it is better to anticipate human ingenuity than to underestimate it, better to acknowledge the risks than to deny them.

2022 MGC Affirmative

1. Profit motive

Seth D. Baum 18, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, “Superintelligence Skepticism as a Political Tool,” 09/2018, Information, vol. 9, no. 9, p. 209

As is discussed in more detail below, certain factors suggest the potential for superintelligence to be a focus of risk–profit politicized skepticism. First and foremost, superintelligence could be developed by major corporations with a strong financial incentive to avoid regulation. Second, there already exists a lot of skepticism about superintelligence, which could be exploited for political purposes. Third, as an unprecedented class of technology, it is inherently uncertain, which suggests that superintelligence skepticism may be especially durable, even within apolitical scholarly communities. These and other factors do not guarantee that superintelligence skepticism will be politicized, or that its politicization would follow the same risk–profit patterns as the tobacco strategy. However, these factors are at least suggestive of the possibility.

Superintelligence skepticism may also be politicized in a different way: to protect the reputations and funding of the broader AI field. This form of politicized skepticism is less well-documented than the tobacco strategy, and appears to be less common. However, there are at least hints of it for fields of technology involving both grandiose future predictions and more mundane near-term work. AI is one such field of technology, in which grandiose predictions of superintelligence and other future AI breakthroughs contrast with more modest forms of near-term AI. Another example is nanotechnology, in which grandiose predictions of molecular machines contrast with near-term nanoscale science and technology [3].

2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenle & Bresnick 2/21/2022

Complicating matters further, the U.S. and Chinese publics are increasingly distrustful of each other. A whopping 89 percent of American respondents to a recent survey from the Pew Research Center consider China a competitor or enemy, while around two-thirds of Chinese respondents view the United States unfavorably or very unfavorably. Such negative mutual perceptions would likely hamper each side’s ability to recalibrate its approach to the other.

Finally, the two sides’ divergent framings of the relationship are contributing to the ongoing stalemate. Discussions with high-level Chinese scholars and former government officials have revealed that Beijing prefers to define the bilateral relationship as a peaceful coexistence guided by shared principles, consensus, and possible cooperation. China is frustrated that the United States is more focused on competing with and confronting Beijing. In Washington, however, great power rivalry, defined more by competition and confrontation than cooperation, has become the central framework for bilateral ties.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Zarnett 17

(David, University of Toronto, “What Does Realist Foreign Policy Activism Tell Us About Realist Theory?”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 13) DB

Mearsheimer’s critique of Waltz’s is premised on the idea that international outcomes cannot be explained without explaining state behavior, especially the behavior of six great powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Japan from 1868 to 1945, Germany from 1862 to 1945, the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, Italy from 1861 to 1945, Great Britain from 1792 to 1945 and the United States from 1800 to 1990. In examining the policies of these great powers, Mearsheimer finds that they consistently select offensive policies, taking advantage of opportunities to increase their power and achieve regional, and potentially international, hegemony. In distinguishing his view from other realist theories, Mearsheimer explains that offensive realists “believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system” (Mearsheimer 2001:21). In other words, the dominant pattern in international politics is not a recurring balance of power but rather the constant drive for hegemony by great powers. By pursuing offensive strategies, states act in concert with what the system demands of them. Mearsheimer claims that his theory is “mainly a descriptive theory.” Depicting Waltz’s theory as a theory of how states ought to act enables him to present offensive realism as a more empirically valid substitute. But Mearsheimer does not leave it there. He also notes that his offensive realism “is also a prescriptive theory.” That is, it not only asserts that great powers are “primed for offense” but also that they are right in doing so. The more powerful a rational state is relative to the other states in the system, the less likely it is that a reckless state would attack it. There is no guarantee that a state prone to foolish behavior would not start a losing war, but it is less likely if that potential aggressor is badly outgunned. Plus, if deterrence fails and there is a war, the rational state would be well positioned to win it quickly and decisively. Finally, a rational state that is the preponderant power in the system is likely to be able to contain a misguided aggressor by itself and not need a balancing coalition to do the job. This takes the problem of inefficient balancing off the table, as the rational state no longer has to worry about unreliable allies. (Mearsheimer 2009:252) Noting that states can act in foolish ways, Mearsheimer writes that “states should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world” (Mearsheimer 2001:11–12). If his goal were to develop a scientific theory of how states do behave, a different approach to state behavior would have been taken based on identifying the conditions under which states act offensively or defensively (Snyder 2002:173). But, Mearsheimer’s goal was to provide a realist theory of state behavior which, to remain consistent with realist tradition, includes a prescriptive component. In this tradition, theorizing is not simply for explanation’s sake. While good explanation is important, it is often sacrificed for good prescription. The result is a theory of international politics that uses a selection of state behaviors to identify the types of policies and strategies that increase the chances of success. While Mearsheimer’s prescription raises question about his theory’s empirical validity, as well as its methodological and ontological positions, it is overall remarkably consistent with the realist tradition. As Robert Gilpin explains, it is a “dual commitment, to practice and to theory, that sets realism apart from idealism and the abstract theorizing that characterizes so much of the contemporary study of international relations” (Gilpin 1984:303).

2022 MGC Affirmative

Fay 17

Matthew Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ The Niskanen Center, 11/16/17, “America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy,” https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf

A number of the arguments libertarians make in favor of retrenchment have merit, but the cost-benefit analysis derived from them is based on a deterministic view of international politics. Libertarian retrenchers assume that international politics would remain more or less the same absent American engagement and that America’s domestic politics would remain the same even if the international system become more conflict-prone. Given the inherent uncertainty of forecasting, the costs and benefits of engagement and retrenchment need to be considered in a more probabilistic fashion.86 This section begins by exploring a number of scenarios that could occur should the United States adopt a grand strategy of retrenchment. It then reassesses the costs and benefits of retrenchment for a free society. In a system with more independent states balancing against one another, is war more or less likely? Libertarians are placing a bet that all else would remain equal in international politics if the United States retrenches. While they assume a world where an increased number of states are balancing against one another would remain peaceful, the reality is not entirely clear. Using basic realist premises about state behavior under international anarchy, it is easy to identify a number of scenarios less rosy than the one libertarians assume would occur should the United States retrench. These scenarios might include a world of increased nationalism, eroding norms against military aggression, increased economic autarky, and the further spread of nuclear weapons as states look to produce security for themselves. Some states may also fail to balance against threats in the wake of American retrenchment, increasing the likelihood the United States will be drawn into a major war. Libertarians assume that in the absence of an alliance with the United States, other countries would simply increase their defense spending if they felt threatened. However, internal balancing is not a mechanical process. According to John Mearsheimer, leaders of states facing security competition are likely to use nationalism to garner support from their populations for the necessary regeneration of military capabilities.87 Writing at the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer suggested that Europe would revert to a pattern of recurrent warfare. The absence of the United States and the Soviet Union would leave Europe, once again, an anarchic multipolar system. The structure of the system would force the states to compete with one another, as they had prior to the Cold War. Mearsheimer argued that pre-1945 “hypernationalism” was a product of “security competition among the European states, which compelled elites to mobilize public support for national defense efforts.”88 American retrenchment could similarly lead to an anarchic, multipolar Europe—thus increasing the chances of war on the continent. Such a system could engender nationalist sentiments among the populations of Europe, heightening animosities between national groups. These heightened animosities could help erode norms against military aggression that have facilitated the decline in interstate war. Nationalist groups within a country can seize on these sentiments to pursue confrontational and expansionist policies.89 Encouraging support for increased military capabilities through nationalism might lead populations to see war as once again a means to national glory or maintaining national honor. Matters of national prestige and honor can lead to the initiation of wars when bound up in territorial claims, while at the same time increasing the intensity and duration of a conflict.90 Nationalism and security competition might also erode the pacifying effects of economic openness. Realism suggests states are concerned about relative gains.91 States in security competition might be wary of trading with one another due to concerns about how a potential rival’s economic gains might provide it with an advantage if translated into military power. They may also adopt autarkic policies for fear of undermining their economic and military self-sufficiency.92 Territorial conquest has become increasing anachronistic in international politics. However, the proliferation of protectionist policies might once again make aggression and preventive war seem like strategically sensible ways for states to secure the resources necessary to reduce the ability of potential rivals to cut them off economically. If the risk of territorial aggression increases, the possession of nuclear weapons would become an attractive option for some states whose security was previously guaranteed by the United States. Nuclear weapons are most useful for deterring major territorial aggression, meaning their potential utility increases as the potential for war does.93 A number of U.S. allies have either previously pursued nuclear weapons or have the capability to do so. They might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Put away your LIO defense – China actions in AI are both offensive and defensive. China DOESN’T SEEK to replace LIO BUT its actions are signs that China intends to establish a multipolar world

Sullivan 10/4/2021

Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM

Very few countries benefitted more from the current international system than China. Many in the West worry about China’s efforts to undermine or replace the current system with one that better represents Chinese values and interests. Those concerns are warranted, though it is important to highlight that China purportedly does not seek to replace the current liberal world order or promote an alternative structure. Reviewing Chinese declarations about the standing world order indicates that the CCP reportedly finds its key elements more than acceptable, desiring to emphasize some key features that traditionally have been underplayed by the U.S. and other western countries. However, these claims or reports should not be accepted at face value, given the CCP and Xi’s history of backtracking on promises not to militarize the SCS. Rather, a prudent approach would be to assume that China is unwilling to disrupt the current world order at this point in history; however, as China strengthens its economy and pursues legitimacy on the global leadership stage, China could pursue a restructuring of the present world order from a position of greater strength.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Wright 20

Thomas, Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, “The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can't Withdraw From the World.”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 DB

Global retrenchment is fast emerging as the most coherent and readymade alternative to the United States' postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it would be a grave mistake. By dissolving U.S. alliances and ending the forward presence of U.S. forces, this strategy would destabilize the regional security orders in Europe and Asia. It would also increase the risk of nuclear proliferation, empower right-wing nationalists in Europe, and aggravate the threat of major-power conflict. This is not to say that U.S. strategy should never change. The United States has regularly increased and decreased its presence around the world as threats have risen and ebbed. Even though Washington followed a strategy of containment throughout the Cold War, that took various forms, which meant the difference between war and peace in Vietnam, between an arms race and arms control, and between detente and an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States changed course again, expanding its alliances to include many countries that had previously been part of the Warsaw Pact. Likewise, the United States will now have to do less in some areas and more in others as it shifts its focus from counterterrorism and reform in the Middle East toward great-power competition with China and Russia. But advocates of global retrenchment are not so much proposing changes within a strategy as they are calling for the wholesale replacement of one that has been in place since World War II. What the United States needs now is a careful pruning of its overseas commitments--not the indiscriminate abandonment of a strategy that has served it well for decades. RETRENCHMENT REDUX Support for retrenchment stems from the view that the United States has overextended itself in countries that have little bearing on its national interest. According to this perspective, which is closely associated with the realist school of international relations, the United States is fundamentally secure thanks to its geography, nuclear arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the country has nonetheless chosen to pursue a strategy of "liberal hegemony," using force in an unwise attempt to perpetuate a liberal international order (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, is not so liberal, after all). Washington, the argument goes, has distracted itself with costly overseas commitments and interventions that breed resentment and encourage free-riding abroad. Critics of the status quo argue that the United States must take two steps to change its ways. The first is retrenchment itself: the action of withdrawing from many of the United States' existing commitments, such as the ongoing military interventions in the Middle East and one-sided alliances in Europe and Asia. The second is restraint: the strategy of defining U.S. interests narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless vital interests are directly threatened and Congress authorizes such action, compelling other nations to take care of their own security, and relying more on diplomatic, economic, and political tools. In practice, this approach means ending U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, withdrawing U.S. forces from the Middle East, relying on an over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer taking on responsibility for the security of other states. As for alliances, Posen has argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of NATO, replace the organization "with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement," and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the question of China, realists have split in recent years. Some, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, contend that even as the United States retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must contain the threat of China, whereas others, such as Posen, argue that nations in the region are perfectly capable of doing the job themselves. Since Trump's election, some progressive foreign policy thinkers have joined the retrenchment camp. They diverge from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States' current role. Like the realists, progressive retrenchers hold the view that the United States is safe because of its geography and the size of its military. Where these progressives break from the realists, however, is on the question of what will happen if the United States pulls back. While the realists favoring retrenchment have few illusions about the sort of regional competition that will break out in the absence of U.S. dominance, the progressives expect that the world will become more peaceful and cooperative, because Washington can still manage tensions through diplomatic, economic, and political tools. The immediate focus of the progressives is the so-called forever wars--U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the broader war on terrorism--as well as the defense budget and overseas bases. Although the progressives have a less developed vision of how to implement retrenchment than the realists, they do provide some guideposts. Stephen Wertheim, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute, has called for bringing home many of the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, "leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes," as part of an effort to "deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution." He argues that U.S. allies may believe that the United States has been inflating regional threats and thus conclude that they do not need to increase their conventional or nuclear forces. Another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan. IS LESS REALLY MORE? The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments. This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at too high a price--and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left--resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war. The progressives' view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has invaded two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea. The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about nuclear proliferation: nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation. Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim--such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France--while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia. A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-of-influence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence--the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded Taiwan to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law. A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people may favor greater burden sharing, but there is no evidence that they are onboard with a withdrawal from Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted in 2019 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found, seven out of ten Americans believe that maintaining military superiority makes the United States safer, and almost three-quarters think that alliances contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 Eurasia Group Foundation poll found that over 60 percent of Americans want to maintain or increase defense spending. As it became apparent that China and Russia would benefit from this shift toward retrenchment, and as the United States' democratic allies objected to its withdrawal, the domestic political backlash would grow. One result could be a prolonged foreign policy debate that would cause the United States to oscillate between retrenchment and reengagement, creating uncertainty about its commitments and thus raising the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals. Realist and progressive retrenchers like to argue that the architects of the United States' postwar foreign policy naively sought to remake the world in its image. But the real revisionists are those who argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical experiment of unprecedented scale in modern history. If this camp were to have its way, Europe and Asia--two stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions that form the two main pillars of the U.S.-led order--would be plunged into an era of uncertainty.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenel 18

June, Fabio Haenel currently works at the Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig. Fabio does research in Information Technology and Politics, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. “The Prospects and Dangers of Artificial Intelligence on International Security: The Case of a Sino-American Arms Race.”, – ECM

After all, it took Szilárd years to demonstrate the theoretical discovery of combusting controlled nuclear chain reactions in his lab but only a relatively insignificant time after that to create the first nuclear weapon.68 In 2014, the most optimistic forecast on AI beating human world champions in complex games was set not be ore a decade would run out, however, AlphaGo beat Ke Jie much earlier than that and long has taken over numerous other applications: “Progress in AI has been much faster [...] than most people expected.”69 Thus it is argued here that the rapid acceleration of development of Artificial Intelligence technology makes its adoption subjective to civil and strategic manipulation by private and state actors alike, prompting a technological landslide of societal changes akin to the development of nuclear power in the 1940s or the Industrial Revolution itself . Benefiting from an upward power trajectory and the parallel decline of U.S. global hegemony in the last decade the People’s Republic of China will close the strategic gap to the U.S. by heavily investing in AI research and development challenging U.S. supremacy in the future. This will usher in a new arms race to deploy fully automated weaponry on both sides of the Pacific and might drastically change the geopolitical dynamics of the international system in the unfolding century towards a bipolarity between Washington and Beijing. These developments threaten reckless AI adoption unable to be policed by civil authorities proactively, and thus needs to be prevented by proliferation on an international level.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Haenel 18

June, Fabio Haenel currently works at the Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig. Fabio does research in Information Technology and Politics, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. “The Prospects and Dangers of Artificial Intelligence on International Security: The Case of a Sino-American Arms Race.”, – ECM

In contrast to US-American pluralism fragmented between industrial and political interest groups in the ace of being torn at from both public debate and the deep state among the intelligence community, China’s growing centralization of its one-party government has recognized and internalized the of set potential of emerging technologies under the rule of President Xi more than any other nation-state. Nominally, the United States are holding an advantage in the numbers o high-tech startups and global corporations developing AI, an environment also nourished by long attracting the most eager and intelligent Chinese students to seek education at American campuses and thus feeding the need or talent in Silicon Valley and across the US to fill the telecommunications companies’ well-paid and highly competitive positions.136 But Beijing’s long-term attempts to push back US-American influence in the Greater Pacific region and to install China not only as a global economic power but a strategic power as well has recently been catalyzed by both heavy domestic and foreign investments in emerging technologies.

These include the rapid modernization of its naval and air force to gradually expand China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial zone away from its coastal borders,137 diversifying their domestically manufactured and designed state-owned civil and military satellite systems and pioneering cutting-edge quantum telecommunications in space,138 as well as boosting Chinese telecommunications companies with favorable budget plans and topdown state policy changes to cater to the needs o their research and development departments but also by continuously denying foreign corporations to enter and capitalize on the quickly growing middle-class within China.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Lemos 19

Robert. Veteran technology journalist of more than 20 years. Former research engineer. “Cybersecurity Experts Worry About Satellite & Space Systems” Dark Readings. 07-02-2019. https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/cybersecurity-experts-worry-about-satellite-and-space-systems/d/d-id/1335131

Information from satellites fuel a great deal of today's technology, from the intelligence gathering conducted by nation-states, to the global positioning system used for vehicle navigation, to the targeting used by "smart" weapons. Little surprise, then, that cybersecurity and policy experts worry that the relative insecurity of satellite systems open them to attack. In a paper released by The Royal Institute of International Affairs at the non-profit think-tank Chatham House, Beyza Unal, a senior research fellow in international security, warned that the reliance of space-based systems and satellites on civilian infrastructure means greater vulnerability to attack in times of conflict and espionage in times of peace. "During wartime, the greatest risk is to lose operational foresight and be unable to rely on data that comes through space," Unal says. "Receiving false or fake information may result in giving an advantage to the adversary." The warnings come as an increasing number of nations have ramped up their operations in space. What used to be a race between the United States and Russia has changed. China landed a rover on the moon in January and launched a quantum satellite into orbit in 2016. The European Space Agency has sent probes to Mars and put a gravitation wave detector into space. Japan launched a probe that successfully landed on a near-Earth asteroid and intends to bring back samples. A dozen nations have developed some level of space capability and have used it to launch satellites into space. The U.S. military, for example, relies on satellites to direct munitions. In 2003, during its engagement in Iraq, 68 percent of munitions were in some way guided by satellites or using intelligence from satellites, the Chatham House paper said. The importance of satellites make them a critical part of any nation's infrastructure and attacking those satellites a strategy that most nations need to consider. While kinetic attacks are possible, cyber attacks have the benefit of being inexpensive. "The most cost effective type of attack is the digital cyber vector," says John Sheehy, vice president of strategic services at IOActive, a security firm. "And, if you can disrupt satellite operations using cyber, unfortunately that greatly widens the pool of potential threat actors who have the capability to disrupt satellite operations." The Chatham paper pointed out that both China and Russia have both focused on using cyber attacks as part of their military and strategic doctrine. NATO has encountered GPS jamming and other cybersecurity attacks against satellite systems during military exercises, the report said, citing NATO officials, who attributed the attacks to Russia. Historically, satellite systems have only suffered occasional attacks over the past decade. In its 2011 Report to Congress, for example, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that "in recent years, two U.S. government satellites have experience interference apparently consistent with the cyber exploitation of their control facility." The two satellites—identified as Landsat-7 and Terra EOS AM-1—each experienced two incidents of interference between October 2007 and October 2008 lasting a combined 35 minutes, according to the report. The outages were consistent with attacks against the satellites' land-based systems, but no positive evidence was found at the time. However, since that report, satellites have been both successfully exploited and attacked. A Russian cyber espionage group known as Turla—as well as at least two other groups—have used unencrypted satellite links as command-and-control and exfiltration channels for their operations. At last year's Black Hat conference, one security researcher used vulnerabilities in satellite equipment to hack into an airplane's in-flight communications equipment from the ground. Finally, Russia has frequently disrupted the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for at least three years to prevent drone attacks and during times of military operations, such as its invasion of Crimea. The incidents have happened at least 9,883 times, according to research published earlier this year. "There is constant experimentation about pushing the envelope," says David Fidler, adjunct senior fellow for cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Because it is a cyber operation, we don't quite know where that line is yet. Countries are being cautious about it, but they are pushing in that line more and more." In the Chatham House paper, Unal points out that, while NATO owns some ground-based facilities and components, the group does not own its own satellites, but gets information from satellites from its member states. Typical attacks against such infrastructure includes the "five Ds"—attacks that disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, and destroy. In addition to actual cyberattacks, vulnerabilities in satellite can undermine the faith that member nations have in the intelligence provided by NATO, raising questions about the root justifications for action as well as potentially destabilizing the relationships between members, the report stated.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Goud ND

Naveen. Writer at Cybersecurity Insiders. “US and NATO Satellites are vulnerable to Russia and China Cyber Attacks” Cybersecurity Insiders. https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/us-and-nato-satellites-are-vulnerable-to-russia-and-china-cyber-attacks/

But now, new research conducted by a defense think tank says a different story. It’s believed that US and NATO command and control systems are themselves opening up their vulnerabilities to be exploited by hackers being funded by their adversaries. Yes, what you’ve read is absolutely true! Chatham House, a non-profit organization which helps the world understand international crisis has come up with the above-said conclusion after analyzing different threat analytics related to space assets. As attacks on satellites can wreak havoc on communications and strategic weapons, nations will for sure interested in intercepting them for their own means. It is a kind of modern warfare where vulnerabilities will be scanned to be exploited. Chatham House says that countries like Iran and North Korea do not have the expertise to launch such attacks. But Russia and China have all the sophistication to make things serious. As the United States is failing to cut down the influence of China and Russia on the world. It is on the verge of inviting a national security risk. Meanwhile, as the trade conflicts between China and Donald Trump are deteriorating with every passing day, China is alleged to have adopted an offensive cyber strategy by having state-sponsored hackers on a constant backdrop to retaliate to trade and security conflicts on an international note. As Military of every nation relies heavily on satellites, intercepting those related to certain countries can give an upper hand to adversaries during increasing tensions says the UK think tank. As nations are relying heavily on cyber warfare, satellites of US and NATO are termed to be super-vulnerable to cyber attacks by ‘The Royal Institute of International Affairs’. As it leads to a deep impact on decision making of how different operations are conducted, proving fatal to military systems which in-turn negatively influence the making of political decisions.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Hegenbart 14

Christine, Research Assistant at the Academy for Politics and Current Affairs of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Munich. She was a PfP Fellow at the Research Division at the NATO Defense College in the spring of 2013. “Semantics Matter NATO, Cyberspace and Future Threats.” NATO Defense College (2014). https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10385

All in all, the use of cyber weapons is especially problematic and is a very serious issue. Currently most states, and also NATO as a military alliance, focus on defending against cyber threats. This strategic orientation raises concerns about the ethical and legal implications of using cyber tools. But an increasing number of nation states see cyber capabilities as important instruments, and as weapons to be used in interstate conflicts. However, military and political decision-makers will have to pay close attention to the circumstances under which it is beneficial to use cyber weapons outside the ‘classic’ theater of military operations. There is the danger of miscalculating the result of cyber-attacks, thereby escalating the conflict and triggering retaliation outside cyberspace with conventional armaments.

Apart from these six types of cyber conflict, the term cyber-attack deserves particular notice. The word takes on a variety of meanings, according to the specific security fields. A precise and narrow definition would help de-escalate the rhetoric. In order to reduce confusion and uncertainty in a military context, the term cyber-attack should only be used to describe cyber conflicts with a military dimension. Their effects have to be significantly damaging: either disruptive (i.e. drastic, obvious and immediate) or corruptive (i.e. subtle and persistent).30 Consequently, only instances of cyber sabotage, cyber terrorism and cyber war(fare) should be identified as cyber-attacks.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Acton 20

Spring, James M. Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation”, -- ECM

Surveillance operations in cyberspace, even if conducted exclusively for defensive purposes, pose unique risks of escalation. Cyber surveillance of an adversary’s nuclear forces can serve purposes besides damage limitation. In any dyad involving two nuclear-armed states, each has a strong incentive to monitor the status of the other’s nuclear forces at all times–and particularly during a crisis or conflict–including for the exclusively defensive purpose of spotting any preparations for nuclear use. Several intelligence collection techniques, including overhead imagery and signals intelligence, are likely used for this purpose. Given the potentially unique advantages of surveillance in cyberspace, however, states may see good reason to adopt it alongside these other approaches, especially if they judge that the likelihood of cyber espionage being detected is small.

Depending on the sophistication of the malware used and the target’s defenses, the true likelihood of being detected may or may not be small, but the consequences of being caught could be significant. In fact, if the target detected ongoing cyber espionage of networks associated with its nuclear forces or C3I systems, inadvertent escalation could result from either of two concerns that are distinct from those that might plausibly be generated by other forms of surveillance.

2022 MGC Affirmative

Acton 20

Spring, James M. Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation”, -- ECM

This danger is likely to be exacerbated by any cyber vulnerabilities affecting nuclear forces and C3I systems. Most directly, the existence of such vulnerabilities could intensify existing fears of being disarmed–fears that are already acute in China and Russia (as well as in Pakistan and, most likely, North Korea).5 However, because of their unique characteristics and effects, cyber threats could create at least three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might come to the incorrect conclusion that its nuclear deterrent was under threat. First, the purpose of cyber interference could be misinterpreted. In particular, espionage could be mistaken for an attack. Second, a cyberattack could have a more significant effect than intended. Malware implanted into information technology (IT) systems associated with non-nuclear weapons could accidentally spread into more sensitive nuclear-related systems, for instance. Third, the initiator of a cyber operation could be misidentified. An operation carried out by a third party, for example, could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. What makes these pathways so pernicious is that the catalyst for escalation could appear to its initiator to be a relatively benign action.

To make matters worse, such pathways could lead to inadvertent escalation even if the target of the cyber interference were not afraid of being completely disarmed. Today at least, this description fits the United States. If, in a conflict against Russia, say, the United States wrongly concluded that its strategic early-warning system was under cyberattack, it might reason that Moscow was seeking to undermine U.S. missile defenses, which use early-warning data, prior to launching a nuclear attack.6 Given that U.S. declaratory policy explicitly highlights the option of a nuclear response to non-nuclear attacks on nuclear C3I assets, such a “misinterpreted warning” might lead Washington to use nuclear weapons.7 But even if it did not, its response, which might include nuclear threats, could still be escalatory.