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2022 Michigan Kritik
Baudrillard › Sovereignty stuff

The aff’s realism and claims of sovereignty disseminates the world into the hyperreal – Trump accelerated the road into the hyperreal and the plan loses the brink. That reproduces a violent reactivation of power that ends rationality.

Paul B. Richardson (2019) Sovereignty, the Hyperreal, and “Taking Back Control”, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 109:6, 1999-2015 //ONHS IF

The sovereignty delusion is by no means restricted to Brexit as the blurring of fact and fiction, and of 2006 Richardson reality and illusion, has been accelerated in the United States with the ascendency to the presidency of reality TV star, Donald Trump (for examples beyond Brexit, see Dunn 2010; Backman 2011; Cocks 2014; Juss 2017). In our age of the hyperreal, Trump has been called a “sovereign father” for our times (Connelly 2016), a leader who has risen on the tide of a sovereignty myth. It was a myth outlined by Trump at some length during his maiden speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2017 in which sovereignty dominated and defined his address, with the words sovereign and sovereignty mentioned twenty-one times (Tatar 2017). In the speech, Trump repeatedly equated sovereignty with global harmony, declaring, “Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty, to promote security, prosperity, and peace, for themselves and for the world” (Haldevang 2017). He declared that “strong, sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by God” (Miller 2018) and talked of a “great reawakening of nations, for the revival of their spirits, their pride, their people, and their patriotism.” That this has historically not been a recipe for “harmony and friendship” went unnoted in the speech (Chhabra 2017). In the Washington Post, Jaffe and DeYoung (2017) suggested that in his appearance at the United Nations, Trump had “cast his presidency as an avatar of international renewal,” a catalyst for a renewed patriotic spirit, national self-interest and cooperation among sovereign nations, which are posited as the solution for all international ills. Trump asked in his speech, “Are we still patriots? Do we love our nations enough to protect their sovereignty and take ownership of their future?” He also invoked sovereignty to attack the “mammoth multinational trade deals” that have supposedly empowered faceless global bureaucracies over nation-states, sent factory jobs overseas, and hollowed out the middle class (Jaffe and De Young 2017). Trump railed against the “unaccountable international tribunals and powerful global bureaucracies” that sap the sovereignty of nations (Jaffe and De Young 2017) and as a counter offered a passionate and populist defense of the principles of sovereignty and patriotism, which in his words could spark a “rebirth of devotion” across the world (Jaffe and De Young 2017). It is a devotion to a sovereign idyll and illusion through a missionary zeal anchored in the ether of hyperreality. As Nasr pointed out, Trump’s definition of sovereignty in the speech is derived “from a very narrow domestic prism” (cited in Landler 2017) out of which the United States emerges as the first among equals. It is a foreign policy doctrine that has been interpreted by some as the fusion of sovereigntism with “a style of big-power nationalism” and, in an echo of earlier presidencies, one that has been labeled by the president and his advisors as “principled realism” and “America first” (Bierman and Lauter 2017). For Patrick (2017a) it represents an invocation of sovereignty to “assert universal truths and to deflect messy realities.” Patrick suggested that Trump’s speech should be seen as part of a broader “sovereigntist” critique of the global order, which has been evident in policy stances from leaving the Paris Climate Agreement, to renouncing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the criticism of alliances like NATO, through to threats to ignore the World Trade Organization, and moratoriums on any new multilateral treaties (Patrick 2017b). It is in Trump’s sovereigntist agenda that we glimpse a mourning for the waning of U.S. hegemony in the face of “messy realities,” a lament for the absence of power, which “for some time now produces nothing but signs of its resemblance …; an obsession with its death; an obsession with its survival which becomes greater the more it disappears” (Baudrillard [1981] 1988, 180). Baudrillard ([1981] 1988) wrote of a “[m]elancholy for societies without power,” whereby “power is no longer present except to conceal that there is none” (180–81). It is out of this melancholy for power, and a rage against its loss, that the sovereigntist agenda can materialize in ever more disturbing ways. One such moment occurred on 4 April 2018, with the release of a memo by Trump titled, “Securing the Southern Border of the United States,” in which National Guard troops were ordered to the U.S.–Mexico border in response to a “caravan” of refugees traveling to the United States from Central America (Jacobs 2018). The first paragraph sets the scene of a sovereignty principle in crisis: 1) The security of the United States is imperiled by a drastic surge of illegal activity on the southern border. Large quantities of fentanyl, other opioids, and other dangerous and illicit drugs are flowing across our southern border and into our country at unprecedented levels, destroying the lives of our families and loved ones. … Deadly transnational gangs are systematically exploiting Sovereignty, the Hyperreal, and “Taking Back Control” 2007 our unsecured southern border to enter our country and develop operational capacity in American communities throughout the country. The anticipated rapid rise in illegal crossings as we head into the spring and summer months threatens to overwhelm our Nation’s law enforcement capacities. (Trump 2018, italics added) The memo stresses a border regime where the ability to ensure the sovereignty of the nation is in doubt (see Miller [2018] on Trump’s preference for the term nation), with it suggesting that “our American way of life hinges on our ability as a Nation to adequately and effectively enforce our laws and protect our borders. A key and undeniable attribute of a sovereign nation is the ability to control who and what enters its territory” (Trump 2018). Throughout the memo a sovereignty principle in crisis is invoked, with paragraphs 4 and 5 warning, “The lawlessness that continues at our southern border is fundamentally incompatible with the safety, security, and sovereignty of the American people. … the highest sovereign duty of the President is to defend this Nation, which includes the defense of our borders” (Trump 2018). The memo’s unsubtle generation of an existential threat to “our American way of life” works to regenerate the sovereign nation; it strives to revive a moribund “moral and political principle … in distress” (Baudrillard [1981] 1988, 172–73). From it emerges a pure and perfect U.S. sovereignty that contrasts with the disorder and chaos beyond, “a simulated real, which henceforth supplants the real and is its final solution, a virtual universe from which everything dangerous and negative has been expelled” (Baudrillard 2004). To maintain the illusion of sovereign perfection, in June 2018 children of asylum seekers were separated from their parents at the U.S. border, as Trump declared, “The United States will not be a migrant camp … You look at what’s happening in other places—we can’t allow that to happen to the United States. Not on my watch” (Gambino and Lartey 2018). In the simulated sovereignty of Trump’s America First, the “circulation of hyperreal signs of his ability and often his ability alone … deliver what he defines as truly in the US national interest” (Weber 2017, S-137, italics added; on Trump scripting himself as the superhero, see Dittmer 2018). In one sense, Trump is a continuation of U.S. presidents since Ronald Reagan who have each told us “a meta-theoretical story about Baudrillardian sign theory where presidents … mark different moments of the simulacrum” (Rubenstein 2008, 11). For example, on George W. Bush’s presidency, Suskind (2004) outlined a faith-based administration with a disdain for “the reality-based community.” A senior advisor to Bush at the time, stated to Suskind: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out.” Suskind described a presidency of “unflinching confidence [that] has an almost mystical power. It can all but create reality.” 3 Trump is also a continuation and confirmation of the practice of “statecraft as mancraft” (Weber 2016, 4; see also Ashley 1989), whereby the sovereign foundation of the modern state is presented as a “phantastical yet presumed-to-be-factual ‘sovereign man’—as if it were the singular, preexisting, ahistorical ground that authorizes all sovereign decisions in its political community” (Weber 2016, 4–5). Applied to our own phantastical times, Trump as sovereign man could claim on 5 April 2018—without any corroborating evidence—that in the caravan of refugees “women are raped at levels that nobody has ever seen before” (cited in Z. B. Wolf 2018). Then, in October 2018, as a group of mainly Honduran asylum seekers moved through Mexico toward the U.S. border, Trump called it an “onslaught of illegal aliens” (Darrah 2018). On 31 October he tweeted, “We will NOT let these Caravans, which are also made up of some very bad thugs and gang members, into the U.S. Our Border is sacred” (Evans 2018). In a speech at the White House on the same day, Trump added that if “they want to throw rocks at our military, our military fights back. I told them to consider it a rifle” (Weaver and Manson 2018). In such hypermasculine declarations and denunciations, a state of crisis and threat becomes the norm—a form of “banal geopolitics,” whereby crises and extreme remedy become “nothing out of the ordinary,” “routine,” “normal, taken-for-granted geopolitics” (Sidaway 2001, 606–7). These episodes also recall Brown’s interpretation of border walls and their paraphernalia and performance “as symbolic and semiotic responses to crises” (R. Jones et al. 2017, 2). For against Trump’s refrain that “a secure border is a sovereign right” (Swoyer 2016), Anderson (2018) noted in The San Diego UnionTribune that the immense efforts at securitizing the U.S.–Mexico border have had the counterfunction of 2008 Richardson jeopardizing U.S. sovereignty and human security as “[s]trong, militarized enforcement has resulted in a stronger militarized response by well-financed drug cartels and increased corruption, violence and death, but not a decrease in the flow of drugs.” Extreme violence and discipline were anticipated by Baudrillard ([1981] 1988), who noted that power threatened by simulation “risks the real, risks crisis, it gambles on remanufacturing artificial, social, economic, political stakes. This is a question of life or death for it” (180). It also becomes a question of life and death for those caught in the “collective demand for signs of power—a holy union which forms around the disappearance of power” (180). In the desert of “Making America Great Again” are the drowned of the Rio Grande and the missing of the arid U.S.–Mexico borderlands—victims of a melancholy for a society without power. While hyperreality’s scenario of power conceals the fact that the real power has disappeared (Baudrillard [1981] 1988), simulation does not exclude the violent counterconvulsions of a sovereign tormented by the ebb of its power. As Baudrillard (1983) insisted, the simulacrum of war does not make it “any less heinous for being a mere simulacrum—the flesh suffers just the same, and the dead ex-combatants count as much there as in other wars” (70, cited in Merrin 1994, 444). A condition of the hyperreal makes possible absolute sovereign authority and with it the full realization of sovereignty’s devastating foundational logic—the operation of a binary of those who are protected and those who could legitimately die (Agamben 1998). For Weber (2017), the Trump “campaign and presidency are part and parcel of earlier historical ‘experiments’—in white, Western, heteropatriarchal authoritarian leadership, in neoliberalism and the specific modalities of citizenship, governance and reason” (S-134; see also Adorno et al. 1950; Brown 2003; Bauman 2016; Connelly 2016). Weber saw Trump’s simulated form as president as akin to Badiou’s (2001) description of the function of the simulacrum under Nazism: in which a hyperreal national allegiance to the selfreferential simulacrum as heteropatriarchal leader piles specific fictions upon fictions. It does so not only to mask … the absence of the reality principle but to generate a dangerous, materializable, national fantasy that depends upon particularizing, identifying and regulating abstract allies and enemies. (74; see also Weber 2017, S-135) For Weber, Trump “opposes the ‘righteous’ to the ‘unrighteous’, who he variously named during the campaign as all or many of ‘the blacks’, ‘the gays’, ‘the Mexican rapists’ and the ‘radical Islamic terrorists’” (Weber 2017, S-136). In her polemic, Weber highlighted how simulation and dissimulation “re-code sovereignty … in the name of that particular abstract set of sovereign US subjects on whose behalf the administration (pretends to) claim(s) its authority to rule—‘righteous Americans’” (Weber 2017, S-138). In a haze of “fake news” and “alternative facts” (which are read by some as “real news”) the administration’s strategy is one “that attempts to overwhelm US democracy with … representations, simulations and dissimulations of facts and fictions, so all that remains intact is the authority of Trump and Trump as our authoritarian leader” (Weber 2017, S-137–39). These hyperreal simulations and dissimulations of sovereignty are far from intangible, unreal, or benign but effectively maintain violent exclusionary hierarchies through privileging “righteous Americans” and the elevation of “a particular people and its mode of life above those marked as alien” (Cocks 2014, 3; Weber 2017, 136). It is out of the sovereignty of the hyperreal that there emerge new terrains and possibilities for the “violent reactivation of a form of power that despairs of its rational foundations” (Baudrillard 1980, 110, cited in Kroker 1984, 58).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Baudrillard › AT Fem IR/Baudrillard Hates feminism

Baudrillard doesn’t disagree with feminism – his theories critique the lack of historical and cultural grounding within most modern feminist theory

Victoria Grace 2000, ‘Baudrillard’s Challenge: A Feminist Reading’, Routledge, London, accessed 17 July 2022, https://searchebscohostcom.proxy.lib.umich.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=60913&site=ehost-live&scope=site //ONHS IF

Feminist theory, discourse, action is infinitely diverse, traversed as it is by a multiplicity of positions and trajectories within constructs and experiences of identifications with numerous sources of ‘difference’, generally figured in terms of ‘politics’ in some form. The examples of contemporary western feminist theories of gender, or sexual difference, I have considered in relation to the challenges raised by Baudrillard have shown a tendency for these theories to pivot on combinations of concerns including the importance of the ‘female subject’, ‘women’s identity’, ‘women’s desire/feminine desire’, the ‘nomadic subject’, the multiplicities of ‘desiring subjects’, the notion of gender as ‘performative’, the intersection (and inextricability) of ‘gender’ with ‘other’ sources of ‘difference’ (race, culture, class, sexuality, and so on). Where there is a concern to subvert identity, all the tropes of the productive, of positivity in Baudrillard’s terms, remain firmly in place: ‘power’ understood as ‘productive’; the ‘real’ is produced and these productions are contested and resignified, re-produced; identity as self-same reappears in the guise of plurality, becoming, multiple subjects with no objects, nomadic and fluid. These concerns and foci of analysis and deconstruction are undeniably driven by an assumption of the inevitability of the economic (needs, production, value), the inevitability of the law (the bar that structures identity/ difference, subject/ object), even taking into account the attempts at deconstruction and rewriting from a position of a different ‘difference’, and of the inevitability of power. There is no seduction here. These theories unilaterally fail to engage the historically and culturally specific interweaving of the construct of the economic and the structure of representation which, in Baudrillard’s analysis, figures our ontological assumptions. Donna Haraway is a feminist theorist who departs from the constraints of some of the epistemological and ontological presuppositions critiqued by Baudrillard. Her ‘Manifesto for cyborgs’ (in Haraway 1991) shows a determination, like Baudrillard’s, to develop an analysis that is grounded culturally and historically. There are evident in Haraway’s work none of the universal questions or constructs that tend to creep into the works of those other feminist theorists discussed, in spite of their claims to support what Haraway has called ‘situated knowledges’. Nevertheless, Vicki Kirby (1997) takes Haraway to task for instituting the ‘specific’ as the binary opposite of the ‘universal’, a move Kirby questions as one potentially reinstalling ‘the cogito as the subject who only speaks for him or herself’ (1997: 161). Kirby’s interest in an ontology and epistemology that deconstruct this binary and rethink the question of ‘position’ in relation to the speaking subject is important. Haraway (1991) proposes the figure of the irreverent cyborg, a ‘creature in a post-gender world’, with whom she tracks a critical understanding of key facets structuring a world that is also postmodern. The breaching of the boundaries constructing the human is central to her inquiry. But these are boundaries that are still ‘transgressed’ (in accordance with the law). Haraway is concerned at what she views as the need to ‘resist world-wide intensification of domination that has never been so acute’ (1991: 154). This domination functions according to dynamics that are different from those confronted by a socialist feminism of an earlier era; the question of ‘political struggle’ remains, however, itself unquestioned by Haraway. A reading of Baudrillard throws the whole notion of the ‘political’, contemporarily, into question. Haraway’s cyborg manifesto recognises both the dangers (the grid of control) and the possibilities (ways out of the ‘maze of dualisms’) of the ‘New World Order’. Haraway develops a critical theorising on the situated decline in influence and potency of myths of origin (post-gender, a world without gender, without genesis, without end), of totalising epistemologies, of politics defined through immobile identities, of discourses both of unity and of contradiction. She proposes a schema of categories to distinguish the transition from what she describes as ‘the comfortable old hierarchical dominations’ to the ‘scary new networks’ which she calls ‘the informatics of domination’ (1991: 161). This chart of dual categories reflects, in idealised form, a listing characterising what we have moved from (on the left side) and what we have moved to (on the right). Haraway has no reference to Baudrillard in this work apart from the sole point of a definition of ‘simulacra’, yet her portrayal of contemporary social dynamics, and more specifically her chart, have significant resonances with Baudrillard’s analyses of hyper-reality and simulation. Indeed, at the top of Haraway’s list is ‘representation’ replaced by ‘simulation’, although the shift remains untheorised. The informatics of domination marks a world where: communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common move – the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange. (Haraway 1991: 164) Baudrillard’s work develops a critical theorising of precisely this phenomenon; a theorising that leads to a more cautious reflection on the possibilities for ‘political struggle’, and possibly a more nuanced questioning of the implications of a postgender world. It is noteworthy that Haraway’s chart does not include the ‘political’ on the left side, against which we might suggest ‘cool, ludic seduction’ on the right, as a simulated politics endlessly recast as yet another market niche. On the contrary, the ‘political’ appears in Haraway’s essay to assume a meta-position straddling both ‘eras’ (power as a universally applicable and non-situated concept?).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Baudrillard › AT Fem IR/Baudrillard Hates feminism

Baudrillard’s theories of liberation unearth feminist movements from neoliberal deceleration and can be used to further patriarchy abolition- the state cannot center a feminist ethic effectively

Hoofd, Ingrid M. “Between Baudrillard, Braidotti and Butler: Rethinking Left-Wing Feminist Theory in Light of Neoliberal Acceleration.” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, July 2010, baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/between-baudrillard-braidotti-and-butler. Accessed 7/16/22 //ONHS IF

The problem of re-grounding feminist politics by use of any subject-centred politics can quite easily be unearthed through Baudrillard’s critique of liberation. The complicity of feminist left-wing nostalgia and techno-salvation in late-capitalism lies in the illusion of subjective emancipation and communication that communicative capitalism upholds – communication technologies which are the main exponents of the deferred promise or aporia of Western humanism. Baudrillard claims throughout his oeuvre that any contemporary politics that fancies grounding itself in the idea of ‘expressing and liberating oneself through mediated communication’ is today accelerating the neoliberal machine while living in the hallucination of facilitating a subversive event. In light of this, it becomes clear that feminist nostalgic reminiscence as well as mediated techno-happy action problematically repeat the Eurocentric myth of the humanist European project as a truly emancipatory affair. They therefore facilitate the emergence of what I in my work call the speed-elite. Speed-elitist discourses typically validate connection, instantaneity, liberation, multiplicity and border-crossing, and often promote highly mediated spaces for action and communication. Such discourses suppress the colonial and patriarchal history of those technological spaces and dialogues. Speed-elitism, as the contemporary high-tech exponent of Euro-centrism, fosters an oppressive sort of unity of struggles through the fantasy of allowing for radical difference. So speed-elitism builds on the formalisation of racism and sexism. The vigorous reinstallation of mediated feminist-subjective activity, and the compulsive quest for salvaging the “subversive” European feminist project by remediating alterity, precisely marks the moment where such alterity gets usurped in the myth of transparent communication that undergirds neoliberal acceleration and disenfranchisement. This remediation of alterity currently runs through romantic feminist recuperations of “Muslim women” and “female migrants” – as if these groups somehow intrinsically challenge neo-liberalism. In Braidotti, it works through a misidentification of radical alterity in those who are becoming nomadic through technological means. In Butler, it runs through a tension in her work, which concerns her affirmation of a subjective politics of re-signification based on the notion of iterability, despite her understanding of such re-signification being borne out of the subject’s lack. The state of left-wing feminist despair should therefore also be read as pointing towards the suppressed history of discursive and material violence that has been inflicted on various raced and classed others in the past and present as an intricate part of European feminism and the techno-scientific project tout court. Feminist nostalgia and techno-salvation therefore function as false oppositions in the service of speed-elitism. This opposition dissimulates the feminist subject of politics’ complicity in the perpetuation of the violence of Western humanism. Let me make clear that my analyses of the feminist speed-elitist subject do not imply that this critique is itself above such a problematic. After all, this piece also performs, to use Butler’s apt yet often misused term, my stance as a left-wing feminist subject and as such accelerates academic production. This agrees with Baudrillard’s point that increasingly all forms of politics, insofar as they come to exist as mere simulations of politics, are wrapped up in a neoliberal logic that relies on the collapse of the semiotic into the axiomatic. This collapse is possible, argues Baudrillard, because the axiomatic has come to rely on the incessant mediation of signs through the consumption of differentiation between signs (2001a:105-106). Signs become objects for consumption, and difference merely sustains the exploitation of the fallacy of binary oppositions (“self” vis-à-vis “other”) for economic growth. The conceptual distinction between signifier and signified constitutes for Baudrillard not a universal truth about the generation of meaning, but marks a historical moment in the evolution of capitalism. The concept of the signified emerges alongside the capitalist model of exchange value as a supposed derivative of use value (Ibid.:103). Use value (in the form of needs and desires), says Baudrillard, just like the signified (or the referent), is simply conjured up as an ‘alibi’ (2001b:78) for a capitalism that justifies itself by positing those desires for emancipation of the (feminist) subject as natural. The conclusion for Baudrillard is (1990a), that all contemporary forms of (or signs of) otherness, and our desire to engage with it, liberate it, ally with it, and understand it, are effects of this new stage of capitalism. It relies on the fallacy that such otherness is empirically real and outside the capitalist logic of the reproduction. Otherness in feminist politics of alliance and liberation is then relative otherness, a transparent mirror image of the speed-elitist subject. The media in particular facilitate this logic because they allow for the incessant circulation and differentiation of signs. The media provide the user with the illusion, due to the humanist fantasy of media as transparent communication, that this “other” authentically wants such subjective empowerment and alliance – that we ourselves as much as any “other” naturally want to be or are foremost subjects (under neo-liberalism). But such empowerment and connection become mere moments in the recirculation of signs, and hence of the acceleration of capital. Baudrillard concludes that in this new stage of capitalism marked by a “humanitarian ecumenism” (1990a:131), the other becomes something to “be understood, liberated, coddled, recognised” (Ibid.:125), leading to an “obsession with becoming ‘other’” (Ibid.:129). Baudrillard even asserts that the increase of information in our media-saturated society results in a loss of meaning because it “exhausts itself in the act of staging communication” (Baudrillard, 1994:80). New media technologies exacerbate the subject’s fantasy of true communication, while increasingly what are communicated are mere copies of the same, a ‘recycling in the negative of the traditional institution’ (Ibid.:80). The “lure” (Ibid.:81) of such a system resides in its requirement of active political dissent. This translates in a call to “subjectivize” oneself – to be vocal, be active, to speak, participate, disagree, and “play the … liberating claim of subjecthood” (Ibid.:85). But radical alterity – that what or those who cannot be assimilated into this logic of humanism and capitalism – is in turn gradually exterminated. What therefore needs to be uncovered is how “difference qua illusion” (Ibid.:131) perpetuates the current logic of capitalism and its problematic reproduction of racism and sexism. Like Grace (2000) I believe that Baudrillard’s insistence on this major moment in capitalism is of great importance to feminist politics, and not sexist or nihilist as many feminists have made his analysis out to be. In fact, Baudrillard’s critique on the feminist compulsion to see (the subject of) empowerment, alliance and liberation as univocally positive is imperative for understanding how Western feminism can better address its complicity in exploitation. In this sense, Baudrillard simply brings the feminist insistence on dissecting the relationship between patriarchy, racism, technologies and capitalism to its logical conclusion. This analysis has also been present in some feminist critiques of alliance and desire. For instance Spivak (1993) discusses how the fantasy of the subject-agent as the centre for evolution and action, relies on the reproduction of marginality. She implies that subjugation is exercised as a discursive and technological form of imperialist violence. Any claim to authentic marginality becomes a commitment to this imperialist subjugation. Feminisms that rely on the idea of the empirical reality that these margins provide, profess to the belief system – humanism and capitalism – that assigns this marginality. The ones who can empower themselves through this claim for marginality become agents of this logic, since they are a “group susceptible to upward mobility” that function as “authentic inhabitants of the margin” (Spivak, 1990:59). They seemingly prove the universal applicability of the humanist subject and its technologies. Spivak therefore exclaims that all this involves “the creation of a general will for post-industrial finance capitalism … It’s a very different tactic than industrial capitalism” (2002:179). It is exactly this “very different tactic” that Baudrillard’s work helps us to understand in much more detail. Nearly all feminist engagements with Baudrillard have stopped short of following through the implications of his thought for a politics based on the humanist idea of subjective empowerment. Many feminists have been suspicious of the emergence of a critique of the subject at the very moment when women finally start to succeed in claiming subjectivity and decentre masculinity from its conceptualisation. Braidotti for instance states that ‘the high priests of postmodernism [may] preach the deconstruction … of the subject … truth of the matter is: one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully granted’ (1994:140-141). While this makes sense in terms of its critique on male philosophers problematically hallucinating the feminine as a site of redemption, I would nonetheless like to turn Braidotti’s remark on its head by asking if her insistence on attaining subject-status is perhaps itself a corollary of an intensifying neoliberal demand. Subject-centred politics and difference – like perhaps especially the enactment in conferences and articles of the difference in opinion regarding the subject between Braidotti and Butler – have become exponents of capitalist consumption. Feminist politics of the subject possibly have themselves developed into a simulation of politics that reinforces the neoliberal status quo. In light of this, it is not surprising that the dominant version of ‘the’ history of feminism starts with the first wave of claims for individual rights and equality, at a moment when industrial capitalism and its mechanical logic of reproduction emerged. This feminist claim and its later development in the second wave was then arguably not one that proved the next stage of Western humanist ‘progress,’ but was instead the result of a sort of command which trickily assigned to ‘women’ the semiotic status of being the relative other of ‘men.’ Nostalgia for these feminist waves in turn hallucinates an authentically progressive feminism in Europe’s history where there was foremost a complicity in the oppression and extermination of incommensurable forms of radical (female) alterity, at ‘home’ as well as abroad. Such feminist nostalgia for an imaginary lost origin indeed grounds a racist and classist narrative of feminist liberation as uncomplicated. We can see this logic even at work in Nancy Fraser’s indictment of second wave feminism as implicated in a new form of capitalism. While I agree with Fraser that there is a “disturbing convergence of [feminism’s] ideals with the demands of an emerging new form of capitalism”, she nonetheless narrates the origins of feminism as residing outside any logic of domination (2009:1). For Fraser then, it becomes a question of “reactivating … [and] recovering feminism’s emancipatory promise” (Ibid.:1-2) against the “new spirit of neo-liberalism” (Ibid.:7). I suggest instead that feminism’s current problem runs much deeper. Despite Fraser’s excellent analysis of the inefficacy of a cultural politics that “claims for recognition over claims for redistribution” (Ibid.:8), her attempt at feminism’s recuperation through “promising new form[s] of activism” and empowerment, like “utilizing communications technologies to establish transnational networks” (Ibid.) is precisely the kind of techno-salvation that the nostalgia for earlier feminism engenders. In fact, the element that Fraser ignores as a possible problematic moment in feminism is where it must “transform those positioned as passive objects of welfare … into active subjects” (Ibid.: 5, my italics). This is not to say that empowerment is unimportant, but to claim that its politics has become increasingly entangled with neoliberal structures of oppression – hence the sense of desperation at the Gender Conference.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

Yet at least for now, these standoffs almost appear staged. As each side, and each country’s opposition, takes political advantage of the moment, one can almost envision back-channel diplomats sending each other quiet thumbs up about the ramped-up rhetoric.

As with Ankara’s looming  to take on Kurdish militants, a bit of rhetorical sparring with Greece underscores Turkey’s military’s confidence while also sticking it to the “imperialist” West. Domestically, that’s a win-win.

Going to war with Greece, on the other hand, would be disastrous for Turkey, Greece, the US and Nato – not to mention the Nato-backed war effort in Ukraine. But as recent history has shown, that it is an exercise in futility doesn’t mean it won’t happen.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Impact – Its all staged

The conflict is all staged for domestic political purposes

David Lepeska, 6/15/22, veteran journalist who has reported widely across the region and contributed to top outlets including the New York Times, the Guardian, and the Atlantic, is the Turkish and Eastern Mediterranean affairs columnist for The National, “Turkey and Greece keep quarrelling, but don't expect conflict soon,” , BradAs

The most recent war of words may have domestic political purposes

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Impact - No Nukes

Greece doesn’t want to use nukes. Same author as their ev.

Efstathiou & Kappis ’21 (Yvonni & Bill, Political Officer at the EU Delegation to the United Arab Emirates & Deputy Director and Lecturer at the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies in the University of Buckingham (BUCSIS), as well as a visiting Professor at the War Studies University of Poland, “Weapons of Mass Debate - Greece: a Key Security Player for both Europe and NATO,” ) JHK

During the Cold War and until 2001, Greece hosted US nuclear weapons on its territory, as part of a NATO nuclear-sharing agreement. Yet, recent geopolitical developments - the US’s progressive military disengagement from the Middle East, its "pivot to Asia", debate around removing nuclear weapons from Turkey - highlight Greece’s potential to become a nuclear base again. Greece is sold to the idea of greater European strategic autonomy and is not suspicious of France, unlike other member states. However, Athen’s lack of reaction following French President Emmanuel Macron’s February 2020 speech is due to the country’s other internal priorities and its commitment to NATO as the only actor capable of offering nuclear deterrence at the moment. In this fifth episode of our series Weapons of Mass Debate, Yvonni Efstathiou, Programme Coordinator and Research Analyst for Defense and Military Analysis at IISS, and Bill Kappis, Lecturer at the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies in the University of Buckingham, analyze Greece’s position on the future of European security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Impact – Diversionary Peace

Diversionary peace, not war

Holger Albrecht, 2020, Professor at the University of Alabama in Comparative Politics, Diversionary Peace: International Peacekeeping and Domestic Civil-Military Relations, , BradAs

This article introduced the theory of diversionary peace, which improves our understanding of the link between foreign policy making and contentious civil-military relations. Contributing to peace abroad can have coup proofing effects at home quite like the decision to go to war. A thick description of Tunisia served as an empirical plausibility probe of the mechanisms linking peacekeeping to coup-proofing. Participation in peacekeeping establishes feasibility obstacles for coup coordination, the allocation of economic resources to officers, the institutionalization of the military apparatus, and a professionalized ethos in the officer corps. In an emerging research programme on the interplay of peacekeeping and domestic politics, studying Tunisia reveals three novel findings. First, coup-proofing can be the unintended outcome of dynamics in civil-military relations where political incumbents did not design specific strategies to keep officers in the barracks. In Tunisia, it was the military leadership pushing for peacekeeping participation more so than the Ben Ali regime. Second, the Tunisian case reveals that coup-proofing through peacekeeping is particularly effective in countries with small armies, where battalion strength mission participation immediately introduces a high percentage of officers into a career trajectory contributing to individual and collective professionalization. It is in larger armies, with larger officer corps, where military 96Author interview with Tunisian journalist, Tunis, 17 May 2017. 608 H. ALBRECHT leaderships and political incumbents remain more selective on mission participants. Greater competition creates winners and losers for the perks of peacekeeping and hence individual grievances among those officers deprived of opportunities at professional advancement. Third, and relatedly, Tunisia shows which mechanisms prove particularly effective in advancing coup proofing. While peacekeeping contributes to institutional professionalization and the development of a professional ethos, these remain slow-moving facets of a military’s social fabric. Other dynamics and events, such as international support for military training, the effect of economic development on recruitment and procurement, and a military’s deployment in domestic or external conflicts certainly have an impact on military professionalism as well, perhaps at a higher degree than the provision or troops for international peacekeeping. Rather than such corporate factors, it is the individual-level mechanisms highlighted in this article – feasibility obstacles and the provision of material resources – where peacekeeping generates the most significant impact on coup-proofing. These findings have important empirical and theoretical implications for scholars in various thematic fields across Comparative Politics and International Relations. Experts of Middle East politics and civil-military relations will note the empirical blind spot in the works on coup-proofing in Tunisia and beyond. Peacekeeping participation has so far not been fully addressed as an important element of the Tunisian military’s engagement and helps us better understand why, for instance, the military returned to the barracks in 2011, that is, at a point in time where it could have assumed power through the post-Arab Spring transition period. Scholars interested in the theory and empirical practice of diversionary war may consider a limitation to the theory’s applicability for weak armies. While war may not always be an option, contributing to peace can be equally attractive for its positive effects on civil-military relations. In turn, the theory of diversionary peace offers a contribution to the research programme on international peacekeeping in that it proposes novel ideas about the rationale for troop commitments beyond geostrategic considerations. Further research will be necessary to explore the external validity of the findings from the Tunisian case. The broader applicability of the diversionary peace appears to be particularly promising for civil-military relations during democratic transitions, such as in Latin America, and the post-conflict environments of small states in sub-Sahara Africa. In fact, initial observations appear to reveal the explanatory power of the diversionary peace in multiple cases including Ghana, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. While the diversionary peace should be seen as an important component in the toolbox of foreign policy making, it remains a medium-range theory with its explanatory power subject to important context factors. For one, the theory works well for small armies in authoritarian regimes that, at the time of increased coup threat, would entertain opportunities for participation in peacekeeping missions. Perhaps more importantly, participation in peacekeeping missions is not a coup-proofing strategy equally available to authoritarian incumbents across time and space. The very existence of a peacekeeping mission along with the mission sponsor’s invitation to participate come as necessary conditions for incumbents to consider sending troops abroad. These constraints ultimately limit the applicability of diversionary peace to post-Cold War international politics for the dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions after 1990. Yet, since the number of interstate wars has declined quite considerably during that same period, diversionary war becomes less likely and diversionary peace merits greater attention in contemporary international politics

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Impact - NATO Checks

NATO and EU checks – empirics prove

Neophytos Loizides, 2011, Professor in International Conflict Analysis at University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations, , https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Result-of-the-diversionary-theory-of-war_tbl1_44792522, BradAs

Although Greece and Turkey escalated their crisis behaviour, crisis escalation was actu-

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Internal Link – Not About Politics

Aff isn’t key - Its not just about politics – Erdogan’s concerns are real and will persist past him

Aaron Stein, 5/30/22, Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Resident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council, where he managed their Turkey-related research program, oversaw work on nonproliferation in the Middle East with a focus on Iran, and researched non-state actors in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq, “YOU GO TO WAR WITH THE TURKEY YOU HAVE, NOT THE TURKEY YOU WANT,” , BradAs

The Turkish government is using the Russian invasion of Ukraine to settle  with much of NATO. Sweden and Finland were expected to , in time for the June summit in Madrid. Instead, Ankara has upended this coronation. Turkey, which joined NATO during the alliance’s  in 1952, seeks to  from Sweden and Finland on combatting terrorism, extraditing citizens of Kurdish origin to Turkey, and lifting the arms embargo that much of the West placed on Turkey following its October 2019 invasion of Syria. The Turkish protests have underscored how Ankara’s narrow security concerns differ considerably from those of the rest of the NATO alliance, particularly at a time when the alliance has sought to move beyond the war in Afghanistan and return to its core mission of deterring Russia.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

Diversionary war is backwards---decline causes diversionary peace

Mattsson 16 (Linus Mattsson, Uppsala Universitet Department of Government, Fall 2016, “Unrest as Incentive for Cooperation? The Diversionary Peace Theory, Turkish-Syrian Relations and the Kurdish Conflict,” http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1067590/FULLTEXT01.pdf)

3. Theoretical framework 3.1 Diversionary War theory First, let us look at the founding theory again. The Diversionary war theory, as previously explained, is claimed to be an explanation of the outbreak of war. The theory assumes that in times of domestic turmoil or discontent, leaders initiate conflict in the international arena in order to divert the citizens' attention away from the politically unpopular domestic situation, thus making sure they stay in office. The breakout of a large number of conflicts in history, from the Middle Ages to modern times, has been explained in terms of diversionary use of force. The actions of Napoleon III have been interpreted as frequent uses of diversionary tactics: not only did the Emperor provoke the Crimean war (1852-1856) to “divert the eyes of Frenchmen from their own government's weaknesses” (Blainey, 1988:72), but also the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 has been interpreted in the same way. Perhaps the most well-known example is the RussoJapanese war of 1904. The Russian Interior Minister at that time, Plehve, is cited in the memoirs of Count Witte, Minister of Finance, as saying “you are not familiar with Russia's internal situation. We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution” (Blainey, 1988:76). The theory has been widely supported and is a long-lived one, appearing long before the established scholarly field of International Relations. Historically, it has been a conventional wisdom on the outbreak of war, based upon a number of ad hoc observations rather than a well-established theoretical scientific hypothesis. As Morgan and Bickers put it: “virtually every war since 1800 has been attributed, at least in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems” (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:27). However, throughout the years, this enigma has become widely researched by political scientists, resulting in a more developed theory. What theoretical arguments do the advocates of the Diversionary War theory rely upon? In summary, the main mechanisms of the DWT have said to be three: The In-group/Out-grouphypothesis or Rally-Round-The-Flag-Effect, Scapegoating and Gambling for Resurrection (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). The first one, the In-group/Out-group theory, or conflict-cohesion theory, originates from the field of sociology and the two sociologists Simmel and Coser. It suggests that identities of a group, in this case national identities, become stronger in times of external threats – that the in-group identity becomes more united during conflicts with the out-group (Levy, 1989:261). The Rally-Round-The-FlagEffect is a consequence of this. Not only does external pressure strengthen the group identities – in addition, it also leads to the group's unification around leader. The tenure of the leader should therefore be extended in times of external crisis (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). However, for the theory to be effective, there are some conditions that should be met: the group has to be fairly salient to begin with, has to already perceive itself as a group and also view the survival of the group as something worthwhile (Levy 1989:261). In addition, Simmel recognized that the outcome of conflict might be of importance: “[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation” (Levy, 1989:261). The second mechanism, Scapegoating, means that leaders retort to war to shift the blame of failed policies onto the states enemies (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). This is a consequence of the first theory, implying that leaders are aware of the psychological effect external pressure has on national identity and, in turn, their own tenure. The third mechanism, Gambling for resurrection, stemming from rational choice literature, argues that state leaders who are confronted with a possible loss of power can afford starting a foreign conflict, since their risk of losing office is imminent. If creating a conflict increases their chance of staying in office even by a small percentage, it would be worth it (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:446). Consequently, we should be able to observe the following patterns or mechanisms, according to the theory: When a domestic issue in a state threatens the legitimacy or political power of the ruling elite, said elite should a) be likely to use aggressive foreign policy behaviour as a tool to divert the attention of the public from the domestic issue, since a) the leaders are aware that the people will become more united or nationalistic under such external pressure, b) the people will give more support to the leader leading to c), a return of the popular support of the political elite. However, as already touched upon in the introduction, most of the research in support of the DWT have been either backed up by anecdotal evidence or lack quantitative evidence, which leads to both theoretical and empirical issues. 3.2 The Critiques of Diversionary War Theory The Diversionary War theory has been heavily criticized throughout the years. Only few modern scholars working on the subject ultimately support the initial theory. The main critique against the DWT is that there are insignificant links between the theory and the empirical findings (Levy, 1989:282). The historical and theoretical literature strongly suggests that political leaders should use diversionary force to strengthen their own positions, while the empirical studies, often quantitative, have found little or no support for the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The reasons for this are, in summary, two: 1. There might be something wrong with the theory itself. 2. The methodology used (mostly statistical analysis of a large number of states) might not be the right one (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:28). Regarding the theory, the idea that external enemies unite the group might not be as strong as initially thought. As Simmel himself explained, the in-group/out-group theory needs strict conditions to work – one of them is the in-group being fairly small. Thus, extrapolating the concept from small group psychological behaviour into a large, complex entity as modern day states might be difficult (Morgan and Bickers 1992:32). Although commonly treated almost as a general law, some scholars have paid attention to under what circumstances diversionary tactics would be used. The level of internal conflict should matter for the use of diversionary tactics. If the level of internal conflict is too low, aggressive foreign policy should be an exaggerated tool to use. If the level of internal conflict instead is too high, it would not be wise to turn to diversionary tactics. Blainey noted that during open civil war, diversionary use of force is rare since states turn to deal with their internal issue first as a part of its rational calculations (Blainey, 1988:86). In conclusion, we should only be able to observe diversionary actions at the moderate levels of internal strife. Another issue with the Diversionary War theory has to do with the assumptions that it makes regarding the management of conflict (or war). It presumes that war is something that can be easily managed. However, war requires a warring opponent who the state leaders cannot control. The situation is very likely to get out of hand and therefore open conflict should probably be an unlikely goal for leaders who seek to divert the attention of the public. Thus, actions short of war, like escalation of threat of force should be observable (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:29). However, this has also been challenged. Rummel, conducting a study on the link between internal and external conflict upon 77 states between 1955-57 found that “foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior” (Levy 1989:262). These two facts about the variables give us some clue to why the quantitative studies that have been conducted might fail to produce any results in favor of the DWT. Large scale studies of the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict using correlation analysis and regressions all rely on the assumption that the relationship between the variables should be linear. The problem is that the theory does not imply that this is the case. Rather, the relationship should differ depending on the level of internal strife. There are more clues as to why the large, statistical analyses have failed to produce any results. One reason could be that scholars mainly have focused on correlations rather than offering any explanations through causality. One such scholar is Blainey. In his observations, he finds support for the linkage between civil strife and foreign conflict, but not due to diversionary actions. Instead, a state torn by civil strife often end up in conflict because it is perceived as weakened, and thus easily become a target for other states seeking to exploit the shift in power balance (Blainey 1988:82). It has also been argued that the direction of the relationship between internal and external conflict could be reversed. Foreign conflict could easily lead to internal turmoil and finally revolution at the home front, giving us internalization of external conflict rather than externalization of internal conflict (Levy, 1989:267). However, that this could happen would not per se be a problem for the theory – it is only problematic when the direction of the relationship is unaccounted for, given that there probably should be different casual mechanisms active during externalization and internalization of conflict, which would affect the results. In summary, the biggest obstacle to the research is a common, cumulative theoretical framework. As Levy puts it: “Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kind of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites” (Levy, 1989:283). 3.3 Diversionary Peace Theory The Diversionary Peace Theory, as put forward by Fravel is an alternative critical engagement with the Diversionary War Theory. In a case study on China and its territorial disputes, he finds that in times of internal turmoil or regime insecurity, China seeks compromises with foreign states, rather than confrontation (Fravel, 2005:47). Internal or domestic turmoil is referred to as regime insecurity. Fravel specifically dwells on social discontent, such as protests and legitimacy crises, and ethnic violence or uprisings. His observations are that when China is in a state of regime insecurity, the state chooses not to escalate any of the territorial conflicts with the neighbouring states. Instead, China seeks cooperation, contrary to what the DWT predicts. Instead of diversion, good relations with foreign state is one key way to solve internal problems, in addition to domestic tools. This is connected to the theoretical concept of Omnibalancing (David, 1991:235), which explains that leaders of third-world countries would be inclined to cooperate with an adversary, if there is an enemy deemed as more threatening. There are several ways leaders could benefit from cooperating with other states to deal with regime insecurity: they can gain direct assistance in dealing with the domestic threat, such as an external state denying rebel groups a harbor, as in Syria harboring Öcalan in our case, or they can improve border patrols. They can avoid a costly two-front war, and focus their resources on the domestic issues instead of the defense budget. Cooperation could also lead to an improvement of the regimes' international recognition, which would delegitimize any domestic contestors (Fravel, 2005:52). According to Fravel, leaders have three strategy options in ongoing disputes: they can delay, i.e. maintain claims to the issue, escalate via threat or use of force, and finally cooperate by dropping claims or offering concessions (Fravel, 2005:52). The least costly alternative is the delaying strategy, whereas escalation is costly due to risk of ending up in a military defeat, and cooperation is costly since it can be perceived as weakness by domestic audiences and lead to a removal from office. However, his argument is that when facing regime insecurity, the cost of the cooperation strategy is significantly lowered, since whatever one might lose on domestic discontent is won through the assistance in dealing with the original threat (Fravel, 2005:53). This is especially true if the threat to the regime emerges in the form of a threat to territorial integrity, which would drastically enhance the incentives to offer concessions to the neighbouring countries to prevent them from aiding events such as uprisings (Fravel 2005:53). This has clear implications for our case. When the armed Kurdish struggle for independence (i.e. a threat to territorial integrity) escalates, Turkey would have strong incentives to cooperate with or give concessions to Syria, an adjacent state that could serve as a base for the rebels. Fravel mainly studies behavior in territorial issues as the main independent variable. In this study, I will broaden this framework and include other contested foreign policy issues as well as long as there is a bargain situation for the two related states where concessions can be made. Although he backs his claims by an empirical study, only some attempt is made by Fravel to theoreticize his findings. He claims it is a “counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic conflict on foreign policy” (Fravel, 2005:49). He does elaborate on why states would chose to cooperate, but does not offer any deeper explanation of the intervening variables in action. However, we can draw some theoretical conclusions from Fravel's observations and thoughts. First, we assume that leaders are rational. They would, in times of a crisis, assess the problem, identify possible courses of action and then choose the alternative that is most effective. By assuming this, we can draw the conclusion that leaders do not engage in a new conflict simply because the conflict is not manageable. The logic of the DWT is that leaders can control new conflicts – otherwise they would not be able to initiate them in order to divert attention. For Fravel, in contrast, leaders choose to focus on what they can control, which leads to cooperation rather than war. Secondly, we can assume that conflict is costly. The resources of the state might be too scarce to manage two crises. Therefore, it is not rational to engage in a new, foreign conflict before the domestic one is solved.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No diversionary war

Boehmer ‘7 – political science professor at the University of Texas [

Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA]

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

COVID thumps and disproves the theory

Stephen Walt 20. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University and a columnist for Foreign Policy. Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War? Foreign Policy. 5-13-2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/

But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes  COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.

Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link - Intellectual Property

Turkey is open to discussion on AI IP

Burak Özdağıstanli and Hatice Ekici Tağa, Turkish attorneys, “In review: key recent IP developments and trends in Turkey” , BradAs

The Turkish government strongly promotes the mediation system. In the near future, mediation is expected to be mandatory as a precondition to formal litigation relating to all IP disputes. In this regard, alternative dispute resolution methods will be more important and effective in practice. Further, as artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow across technical fields, the WIPO has started an open process to lead the conversation regarding IP policy implications. In the global IP world, the topic of whether AI can be the owner of a patent or not is being discussed. Even though there haven't been any decisions or changes in Turkey, it seems that changes regarding AI will be necessary.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link – Subs

Turkey likes subs

Daily Sabah, 4/23/22, Pro-government Turkish daily published in turkey, “Turkey to complete domestically made submarine in 6 months,” , BradAs

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Monday that Turkey expects to complete and deliver the domestically made submarines to the Turkish Naval Forces Command within five to six months.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link – Biotech

Turkey likes biotech investment

Anadolu Agency, 3/08/20, state-run news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, “Turkey eager to invest in biotech, boost domestic production,” dailysabah.com/business/turkey-eager-to-invest-in-biotech-boost-domestic-production/news, BradAs

Turkey's progress in the health sector has advanced beyond its economic significance, the Turkish president said Saturday.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link – Satellites/5G

Turkey has a vested interest in satellites – seen as a win for Turkish pride

Daily Sabah with AA, 12/19/21, Pro-government Turkish daily published in turkey, “SpaceX launches Turkey's Türksat 5B satellite into space,” , BradAs

Turkey's new telecommunication satellite was launched on Sunday by United States aerospace company SpaceX at 6:59 a.m. Turkish time (3:59 a.m. GMT).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link – Ethical AI/LAWs

Turkey likes international cooperation on responsible AI standards

Sebastian Moss, 9/8/2021, DCD's Editor-in-Chief. Regular beats: Data centers, supercomputers, artificial intelligence, cyber security, open source, submarine cables, climate change, chips, quantum computing, military infrastructure and government procurement, “Turkey publishes its National Artificial Intelligence Strategy” , BradAs

The government of Turkey has published the country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy for 2021-2025.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link – AI

Turkey likes international cooperation on AI

TRT World, 8/24/21, Turkish public broadcaster international news channel, “Turkey's AI roadmap looks to boost economy and add thousands of jobs,” , BradAs

A roadmap for an artificial intelligence sector is part of Turkey's digital transformation that seeks to make the country a global competitor in technology.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

No Link – OCOs/Cyber

Turkey likes OCOs – they see deterrence as their only route against national cyber threats

SpaceWatch, 06/2017, Independent Perspective on Space, “Turkey Establishing a ‘Cyber Army’ To Counter National Cyber Threats”, , BradAs

Turkey Establishing a ‘Cyber Army’ To Counter National Cyber Threats

2022 Michigan Disadvantage

Non UQ – Loses Now

Erdogan loses now

Buyuk 22 (Hamdi Fırat Büyük currently works as a Political Analyst and a Journalist at the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in Sarajevo). “Istanbul Mayor: Erdogan Won’t Win Next Presidential Race,” Balkan Insight, 4-26-22, )

Istanbul’s popular mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, from Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party, CHP, told BIRN during his visit to Sarajevo that the days of Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan are numbered.