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2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Alt › China Rise---Transition

A decline in US hegemony leads to a more stable bilateral or multilateral international order led by China

Aslan 21 – Dr. Alli, Associate professor at the Political Science and International Relations Department of Ibn Haldun University, 8/31/21, “ANALYSIS - The falling trend of US’s global leadership role”, Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-the-falling-trend-of-us-s-global-leadership-role/2351335#

Firstly, developments at the regional level may become more impactful compared to those at the global level in determining international outcomes, as a result of the US’s decline. This process has been in place for some time already. Regional dynamics have become more decisive in international politics as a result of the dominance of unipolarity and, thus, the global power struggle falling off the agenda. Conditions that would compel secondary states or regional powers to sit on the US’s tail in the context of global campaigns no longer exist. Despite all its efforts, the US has failed to unite countries against a common enemy. It wasn’t able to create a common enemy. Global politics was more effective in determining regional politics in the bipolar world of the Cold War and the unipolar, US-led world of the following 10-15 years. However, starting in the mid-2000s, regional dynamics began to be more decisive in the foreign policy of countries. The influence of global dynamics on international politics has decreased. For instance, the conflicts and institutionalization in regions such as the Far East, South Asia, Latin America, South Africa, and the Middle East have started becoming determined by the dynamics of the regions themselves, rather than by global dynamics. It wouldn’t be surprising to see this process reach the point where the regional level is determining the global level. In the not-too-distant future, the international order determined by US unipolarity may be replaced by a multipolar international order in which regional balances form the poles. Second of all, the significance of the regional level is embodied in the rise of China. China has gradually evolved into a regional hegemon in the last 50 years. The next step for China is to transform from a regional power to a global one. The US-centered unipolar and liberal international order is the biggest obstacle to China’s growth initiative. Today, we see that this struggle is continued through the diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The prolongation of the downward trend of the US and its withdrawal from certain regions will cause China to increase its sphere of influence. We see that China is approaching Afghanistan without wasting any time. Moreover, we also see that it’s intimidating the Asian countries that are trying to surround it, led by the US. Any bit of space withdrawn from by the US is a potential area of expansion for China. This process of expansion will gradually transform China from a regional power to a global one. It’s becoming more and more clear that the US can’t stop China. However, it’s also not so easy to say that China’s path is clear of obstacles. Bigger obstacles await China, other than the US. In the long run, other regional powers are more likely to be the biggest obstacle to China’s claim to global power. The future superpower candidate China may have to share the current superpower’s bitter fate as well. Thirdly, the global leadership role of the US will become more and more questionable. It’s natural for states to prioritize their own interests and act accordingly. In addition, it’s also a fact of international politics that states establish alliance relations with each other. Therefore, states must strike a healthy balance between protecting their own interests and coming together with other states. And, this becomes even more important in the hierarchical relations between a strong state and a secondary or weak state (or actors). When it comes to trust, secondary and small states are more sensitive, due to the power asymmetry. The great power losing its credibility causes brute-force calculations to form the basis of the relations. Therefore, the authority of the great power is undermined and its superiority is not seen as legitimate. This leads to the leadership of the great power being questioned further by the secondary and small states. Perhaps the US’s loss of soft power in international politics in the last 20 years and the gradual erosion of trust in its leadership is more important than the decline in its material capacities in recent years. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan may be a breaking point in this process. In fact, the thesis that Trump’s US, which turned its back on its allies, was an anomaly and that the US, with Joe Biden, is now standing by its allies once again has suffered a great wound with the events in Afghanistan. The idea that the US will easily leave an ally to its fate, regardless of who becomes president, is gaining ground. Fourthly, the Taliban’s victory may encourage violent groups in other regions. The Taliban quickly lost power following the 2001 invasion. It was out of the question for them to make a stand against an enormous power like the US. However, the material power of the US was not enough to establish an alternative power structure to the Taliban in the country. Obtaining military victory over small states or organizations is easy, but political victory difficult. Because, the institutional structure forms naturally in the historical process and gains legitimacy gradually. It’s nearly impossible to build an institutional structure while accelerating the process with outside interventions. The structure can't be seen as legitimate or comprehensive. The alternative to establishing an institutional structure is centralizing the power around individuals. In this case, corruption and instability would be inevitable. This is what happened in Afghanistan; initially with the government of Hamid Karzai and then with that of Ashraf Ghani. When the US understood that the first option was impossible, it went with the second one. The difficulty of obtaining political victories clearly demonstrates that time runs in favor of organizations like the Taliban. It reveals that there is opportunity for terrorist and violent organizations in societies damaged by outside interventions. This situation whets the appetite of such organizations. The clear application and validation of the theory in Afghanistan will encourage violent groups elsewhere. This, in turn, could lead to the US’s control over international politics to diminish further. Finally, leaving Afghanistan to the mercy of the Taliban will result in the credibility of the US’s democracy transfer policy hitting rock bottom and realism gaining strength against liberalism. We mustn’t forget that liberalism played an important role in the long-term survival of the US’s global supremacy. Liberalism has served many functions, from legitimizing intervening in the internal affairs of countries, to establishing an international institutional structure (or order) that would maintain the superior position of the US at minimum cost. The US withdrawing and abandoning countries to their own fates would lead to a more deeply ingrained realist world. As one would remember, during the presidency of Trump, the US had built its grand strategy on the acceptance of the realist world and acting in accordance with this new reality. It had given up on the carrying out of military interventions in other countries for regime changes or humanitarian purposes and the managing of international politics through multilateral institutional structures. And, this indicates the emergence of a world where states are left on their own, uncertainty increases, and the use of force is legitimized and widespread. The leadership of a single country in such a world is beyond consideration. And, the acceptance of a realist world would mean that the US has given up on leading the world. Even before he took office, Biden had stated that the US would be “back in the game”, that is, he would follow a foreign policy in which the US would once more assume the leadership role. He also carried on with his statements and actions in this regard after taking office. However, he must have realized that this liberal foreign policy perspective couldn’t be sustained that he recently started to follow a more realistic foreign policy, which also shows that Trump’s foreign policy decisions were not due to his own personal quirks but the structural imperatives and conditions faced. His decision to withdraw from Afghanistan should also be considered in this context. In conclusion, many indicators show that the US is in an unstoppable decline. This decline is, naturally, limited to the US losing its current global leadership role. With its huge resources, geographical advantage, and solid institutional structure, the US will continue to be an important force in international politics. The biggest challenge of the US in the medium and long term will be how quickly and how well it adapts to its new position. Adapting to international politics without the US will also be a significant challenge for other countries.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Alt › China Rise---Transition

China overtaking US hegemony will be peaceful - China uses economic measures rather than war to achieve hegemony

Bader 21 – [Julia, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam with a MA in Politics and Management from Konstanz University and a PhD in Political Science from Heidelberg University, 7/21/21, “Undermining American Hegemony”, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/undermining-american-hegemony/china-and-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-undermining-hegemony-through-goods-substitution/5D854284BD4A85BF0E465BECAD8DC42A]

When Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, unexpectedly announced the UK’s intention to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in mid-March 2015, an unnerved US official could not hold back his concern ‘about a trend [in the UK] toward constant accommodation of China’ (Reference Watt, Lewis and BraniganWatt et al. 2015). This rare instance of rebuking a close partner in public, however, did not prevent other US allies from following the British example: in a domino-like manner other European states, Australia and South Korea followed suit. By March 2015, fifty-seven countries, including non-Asian and G7 states, had applied for membership of the AIIB (AIIB 2020). Since then, membership has grown to 102 members. China is increasingly ready and able to openly challenge the hegemonic position of the United States in international relations. Indeed, the academic debate about the rise of China in international relations has long shifted from discussing whether China will affect the existing international order to debating about how it will do so. That is, the early literature investigating the nature of China’s rise in terms of a status quo or revisionist orientation towards the existing international order (Reference JohnstonJohnston 2003; Reference LegroLegro 2007; Reference ChanChan 2008; Reference BuzanBuzan 2010; Reference Schweller and PuSchweller and Pu 2011; Reference Kastner and SaundersKastner and Saunders 2012; Reference Wuthnow, Xin and LinglingWuthnow, et al. 2012) is being complemented by examinations of how China uses its economic cloud to effectively influence the policy preferences of others in order to protect its own (foreign) policy interests (Reference Flores-Macías and KrepsFlores-Macías and Kreps 2013; Reference Fuchs and KlannFuchs and Klann 2013; Reference KastnerKastner 2014; Reference StrüverStrüver 2017; Reference BaderBader 2019). Yet, the role that China has started to take on in the new millennium goes much further than employing economic statecraft in its bilateral relations (Reference Medeiros and FravelMedeiros and Fravel 2003; Reference EconomyEconomy 2010). China now sees the UN ‘as one of the key venues in which to demonstrate its responsible Great Power status and its willingness to provide global public goods’ so as to gain legitimacy at home and abroad (Reference FootFoot 2014:1088).Footnote1 Outside of the UN, Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative signals the readiness for leadership of the kind that ‘America has not shown since the post-war days of the Marshall Plan’ (The Economist 2017). More generally, experts have noted a trend in China’s foreign policy towards ‘re-engineering’ – or ‘shadow diplomacy’ as some have called it – which involves the construction of new, supplementary international platforms and institutions (Reference Heilmann, Rudolf, Huotari and BuckowHeilmann et al. 2014; Reference WesleyWesley 2015). The AIIB is a prime example thereof. To make sense of China’s recent power-political manoeuvres, this chapter builds on the concept of goods substitution and on the categorisation of orientation towards the international system as introduced in the earlier chapters of this book. While I am not intending to reduce the establishment of the AIIB to power-political considerations, I argue that the AIIB was initiated as a counter-hegemonic attempt targeted at the architecture of international finance and at US dominance therein. The initiative’s effects in terms of deconcentrating power were only limited. But, while largely conforming to the norms and standards of existing international financial institutions (IFIs) and development banks, China was successful in making all founding members subscribe to the principles of non-conditionality and non-interference, which largely deviate from current practices in development finance. The AIIB serves well as an illustrative case of goods substitution. It was seen primarily as a power-political maneuver by policy-makers in the United States who feared that the AIIB would undermine governance conditionality – and hence political influence in lending countries – in the short-term, and hollow out US supremacy in global finance in the long run (Reference Callaghan and HubbardCallaghan and Hubbard 2016). Hence, US opposition and its attempts to prevent others from joining the Chinese initiative. In addition, the case of the AIIB sheds light on the demand-side dynamics of goods substitution and illustrates how opportunistic hedging and uncoordinated herding by third states may inadvertently undermine the existing order. The chapter starts by placing the AIIB initiative in the context of the existing international arrangements which the AIIB sought to substitute. Then, I develop the argument that the AIIB – initially thought of as a revisionist counter-hegemonic initiative – transformed into an integrated part of the existing international financial architecture due to the engagement of Western third states. I conclude by arguing that goods substitution as an analytical lens may advance the study of international relations by placing the mechanisms of power politics at the centre of inquiry, being less obsessed with traditional security concerns and, most importantly, attributing more agency to non-hegemonic actors.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Alt › China Rise---General

If China woke from its slumbers, it would astonish the world.

Chas W. Freeman Jr, 2010 , USFS (https://mepc.org/speeches/chinas-challenge-american-hegemony)

Napoleon is said to have predicted that, when China woke from its slumbers, it would "astonish the world."  The Little Corporal was a loquacious fellow who got much wrong but he seems to have gotten this right. In a mere three decades, China has risen from impotence and backwardness to a leading position in global affairs. This year it will become the second biggest producer of goods and services, something projected just five years ago to happen only in 2020. China is clearly on the way to regaining its historic position as the world's largest economy, displacing the United States. (Given continued rapid growth in the Chinese economy, slow growth elsewhere, and progressive revaluation of the Renminbi Yuan, this could happen much sooner than many expect.) The prospect of transcendent Chinese wealth and power, coupled with America's devaluation of its own political and economic prestige, has led to mounting speculation about China's emergence as a global hegemon to rival and, perhaps in time, surpass the Uni ted States. 

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Alt › China Rise---General

No hegemon stays a hegemon forever – new countries naturally take the spot of old hegemons. This has happened for centuries; the present will be no different.

Lee and Zulkefli 21 – Pei and Nina, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia, “US-CHINA RELATIONS: TRADE WAR AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL HEGEMONY”, 12/30/21, Journal of International Studies, https://doi. org/10.32890/jis

The hegemon will rise and gradually die, just like any other being in the world, behaving in accordance with the natural order of the universe, to be replaced by an emerging power. Many great powers have risen to the top of the power hierarchy throughout history, including ancient Rome, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For a time, each was an indisputable hegemon, setting international rules and bending the international order to their own objectives, but, as with all other once-dominant powers, they too were forced to accept their predestined fate of fading away. It is said that the hegemon’s position is often at its most precarious when there is a new rising power that can pose a challenge to its hegemonic position. Such is the case with China’s rapid development in recent decades. Its high growth rates were startling, and over an extended period it continued to be one of the fastest-growing economies of the world. Therefore, it is not unexpected that its growth has made the leading power – the United States (US) – extremely uncomfortable. The rise of China is seen to threaten the US preponderance of power, which has eventually led to the US-China trade war. While there are numerous studies discussing the trade war, few have employed a theoretical approach. Therefore, this article intends to examine the dynamics of power relations between the US and China within and beyond the context of the US-China trade war from two approaches— power transition theory and soft power. We argue that China cannot unseat the position of the US as a global hegemon within the next decade. Using the example of the US-China trade war, this article also attempts to extend the explanatory potential of power transition theory by arguing that the outcome of a war initiated by a hegemon would likely be in its favour due to the hegemon’s ability to set and alter existing rules.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Alt › China Rise---General

Chinese hegemony is inevitable – increasing isolationism and decreasing global US influence opens a space for China to rise above the US

Roland 21 – Gerard, professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley, “China's rise and its implications for International Relations and Northeast Asia”, July 2021, ScienceDirect, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667111521000165

China's rise seems currently unstoppable, especially in light of the decline of the US and the West in general. While we are likely to see a continuation of these trends in coming years, China's rise will at some point reach its limits, given the intrinsic weaknesses we outlined in this article. Similarly, we will likely see further military retreat by the US. US isolationism is not a new phenomenon but took new forms under the Trump administration. Despite declarations of the Biden administration that “the US is back”, we will see a decrease in US presence abroad. The only countervailing factor will be demand for US presence by its allies. A big difference, however, between the Trump administration's policy and that of the Biden administration is that the former pursued a “go alone” policy, while the latter is pursuing a policy of strengthening its alliances with democratic countries. The rise of China and its increasing international assertiveness has led to a trade war under the Trump administration. Calls for decoupling from China may lead to a partial dismantling of globalization, which would be economically very hurtful. We can, however, not ignore the fact that China has been using other countries’ growing trade dependence on China as a political instrument in its strategy to create a system of tributary states. A possible solution in my view is to develop “political trade deals” under the auspices of the WTO. In such deals, countries would agree not to hold up each other in case of political frictions. To make such deals credible, there should be an agreed to system of sanctions in case of lack of respect of the trade deal by one of the parties. To make such a system of sanctions credible, countries participating in such deals would have to agree to deposit large sums of money with the WTO as a guarantee for possible future sanctions. Putting such a system in place is easier said than done and would require extensive multilateral negotiations and a restructuring of the current multilateral trade system as well as of the WTO. Whether the WTO is strong enough or the US-China tension is too strong to still make such a system possible is of course to be seen. It would nevertheless be preferrable to the current system of instability and the high risks of implosion of the international trade system as was the case in the 1930s.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Alt › China Rise---General

China is able to become the new global hegemon and is establishing ties with many US allies.

Ataman 21 – Muhittin, professor of political science at the Faculty of Political Science in the Department of International Relations at Social Sciences University of Ankara and PhD in political science, “Global leadership crisis: The U.S. hegemony vs. China”, 9/27/21, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/global-leadership-crisis-the-us-hegemony-vs-china

With its cutting-edge technology, economic growth, military power and huge population, China is the second most influential global actor after the U.S. On the one hand, China positions itself against Western hegemony. For this reason, it spearheaded the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is considered the new other of NATO. It has been preparing itself to introduce a new set of global rules in the near future. On the other hand, China has been trying to establish economic institutions as an alternative to the United Nations' specialized organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It is now ready to provide financial resources to other countries for different kinds of projects. It has hired or bought many seaports worldwide in order to solidify its position globally. It has begun to steal allies from the U.S. as well. Many countries that are close to the U.S., such as European countries and Israel, have begun to improve their relations with China. Many African and Middle Eastern countries consider China as one of their closest economic and political partners. Therefore, it can easily be assumed that the Chinese challenge for global hegemony is in the making. The only reason why China has not claimed global hegemony is timing. In other words, according to the Chinese leadership, China is not yet ready for global hegemony. When China begins to involve itself in the political and economic affairs of other countries and steer them away from the U.S., a global confrontation will become inevitable. At that time, the U.S. is not sure how many countries will continue to remain on its side. Many European countries may remain indifferent to a possible confrontation between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region. The position of some global powers such as India against Chinese global power is clear, while many others may remain neutral in case of increased confrontation. Although Russia seems closer to China and European countries seem closer to the U.S., their position may change over time. The position of many global and regional powers is not fixed. These states may swing between the two fronts.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › Mid-East War

US hegemony kills hundreds of thousands of people

Meisenhelder 20 – Thomas, retired Professor of Sociology from California State University, “Declining American Hegemony Could Be A Good Thing”, 10/11/20, Common Dreams,

Much of the U. S. hegemony has stemmed from the fact that the United States is surely the most heavily armed and most militarily active country in the world. The national myth is that we use military force reluctantly and only when it is necessary to insure human rights, peace, and security. But let’s look at the record: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Cuba, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Chile, Central America, Libya, Congo, Iran, Iraq, Panama, Afghanistan. Are any of these places were made better as a consequences of our covert and overt actions? We spend more on weapons of war than any other country in the world. Researchers at Brown University have found that since the horror of 9/11, the so-called “war on terrorism” has killed 800,000, displaced 37,000,000, and cost taxpayers $6.4 trillion.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › Mid-East War

US leadership empirically brings death and creates power vacuums

Bandow 20 - Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties who worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry, “The U.S. Should Not Lead the World”, 7/23/20, CATO Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-should-not-lead-world

After two decades of U.S. “leadership” in the Middle East, what is the result? A series of nations wrecked. New terrorist organizations created. Even more new enemies made. Thousands of Americans killed. Tens of thousands of U.S. personnel wounded. Hundreds of thousands of foreign civilians killed. Even more wounded. Millions of people displaced. Trillions of dollars squandered. Heckuva job, Washington! Let’s have some more American leadership. Yet even the slightest suggestion that the U.S. step back anywhere generates horrified, frenetic opposition. The president’s proposals to withdraw troops from countries as disparate as Afghanistan, Germany, Iraq, South Korea, and Syria triggered sustained bouts of wailing and gnashing of teeth in Washington and overseas. Not only must America lead, it must always lead, and once having led anywhere, it must forever lead everywhere. No retreats, substitutions, or transformations are allowed. This fixation on U.S. leadership amounts to a self‐​fulfilling prophecy. If nothing can be accomplished without America, then other nations will act as if nothing can be accomplished without America. Which means they will not act. And nothing will be accomplished without Washington.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › Imperialism

US Hegemony Hold up Imperialism and is Inherently Bad

Joseph Choonara 2022 - Joseph Choonara teaches International Political Economy at King's College London. He is the author of Unravelling Capitalism: A Guide to Marxist Political Economy, a columnist for the magazine Socialist Review and an editorial board member of International Socialism journal, “The devastation of Ukraine: NATO, Russia and imperialism”, Research Gate

After the Second World War, the configuration of imperialism changed in important ways. Many of the former colonies were able to throw out their rulers, achieving formal independence, even if remaining in a subordinate position economically. Meanwhile, the US’s rulers, having emerged from the war with by far the most powerful economy—a status they maintained in the decades that followed—sought to create an imperialist order based not on colonies but on open markets. Powerful corporations, built around the US’s mass production industries, would possess major advantages in this arena. Meanwhile, the dollar would underpin the global financial system, again conferring advantages on the US. Finally, US military power would outstrip that of any potential rivals within the Western world.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies were excluded from the liberal market system, instead organizing their economies as more or less autarkic “bureaucratic state-capitalisms”, each functioning somewhat like a single giant enterprise, with the state bureaucracy directing production.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › Endless War

Continued US Hegemony will DESTROY the Country – Never Ending Wars

Samir Amin 2008 – Samir is a leading member of the Egyptian Socialist Party and a co-founder of the World Forum for Alternatives, “Beyond US Hegemony”, 7/7, Bloomsbury Academic

The overweening character of the US project means that it is bound to fail in the end, though at a terrible human cost. The resistance of its victims — the peoples of the South — will grow stronger as the Americans become bogged down in the many war fronts to which they are forced to commit themselves. The resistance will eventually defeat the enemy, and perhaps also awaken public opinion in the United States, as it did in the case of the Vietnam War. But it would be much better to halt the catastrophe sooner — which international diplomacy could succeed in doing, especially if Europe measured up to its responsibilities.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › China – Trade

The fight for hegemony is a threat to global peace: drives US-China trade conflict and creates military and political friction

Kim 19 - Min-hyung; Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea; “A real driver of US–China trade conflict,” 4 February 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited,

According to the conventional wisdom, trade is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. In other words, by allowing countries to focus on producing the goods that they can produce relatively efficiently, free trade is largely beneficial for everyone involved. This is the theory of comparative advantage that underpins international trade. Putting up trade barriers makes it hard for people to access cheaper goods and raises the costs of living, thereby making everyone worst off in the long-run. Indeed, the efforts of the removal of trade barriers since the Second World War have driven the unprecedented world’s economic growth thus far. Then, why are the world’s two largest economies (i.e. the USA and China) currently engaged in a trade war, which is likely to hurt their own economies? The trade war between the USA and China will also have negative consequences on the global economy since it will slow down the world’s economic growth, among others. What is the driving force for the trade war between the two economic giants? The main goal of this paper is to offer an explanation of the underlying cause of the Sino–US trade war. In an effort to make sense of the trade war, the paper draws the insights from the two international relations theories – i.e. hegemonic stability theory (HST) and power transition theory (PTT). Its central thesis is that “US fear” about its declining hegemony and China’s rapid rise as a challenger of US hegemony is driving a US-launched trade war with China. Since the underlying cause of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is political (i.e. the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry) rather than economic (e.g. US attempts to improve the trade balance with China by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods), the article contends that the full understanding of the trade war requires close attention to the importance of power competition between the two superpowers. As China continues to threaten US hegemony in the world in general and East Asia in particular, the US–China competition for hegemony will intensify over time (Kim, 2016a). A s a result, the trade war between the two countries may persist longer than many anticipate. Further, even if the trade war between the two superpowers ends soon, a similar type of conflict is likely to occur later as long as the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry continues.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › China - SCS

China war escalates

Hu Bo 20, Chinese novelist and film director "China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction," xx-xx-xxxx, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-us-military-confrontation-in-the-south-china-sea-fact-and-fiction/, 7-17-2022, AB

No one doubts that the military competition and frictions are real and serious between China and the United States in the South China Sea, when they have rivalrous intentions, tit-for-tat strategies, and daily operational confrontations. China is accused of coercing U.S. allies and partners, militarizing disputed features, and seeking regional hegemony, and the United States is considered to be playing the South China Sea card and containing China’s rise as a maritime power. In the context of overall intensified strategic competition between the two countries, the South China Sea is even less likely to be an exception. But the question remains: how fierce will the competition be? When every day is filled with news of maritime standoffs between China and the United States, many may wonder, will China and the U.S. slip into military conflict? Both sides have reasons to maintain and expand their military presence in the South China Sea. China is the largest littoral state of the South China Sea, and has important interests at stake: territorial sovereignty, jurisdictional waters, and sea lanes of communication. With China’s military modernization, it is natural that more and more military platforms are active in the area. Meanwhile the United States thinks highly of maritime predominance, freedom of navigation, and security commitments to regional states. Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the most powerful military presence and executed a variety of complex military operations in the South China Sea. For a long time after World War II, due to China’s weak naval and air forces, there were not many chances for Chinese and American military forces to encounter each other at sea. However, much has changed in the past decade. On the one hand, China’s capacity has rapidly increased, and the progress of the navy and air force is particularly impressive. On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable. The U.S. military is used to being unparalleled and unchallengeable in the South China Sea and is not ready to accommodate China’s maritime rise. Although the People’s Liberation Army is already very strong materially, it is still a novice spiritually and in the process of learning how to interact with its American counterparts as a mature power. But neither side seems to have much to offer other than peaceful coexistence. If both sides develop normally, in terms of power, the future of the South China Sea would be a bipolar region, regardless what kind of intentions they have. Moreover, most countries in the region are reluctant to take sides in the China-U.S. power competition. Therefore, it is hard for either side to re-establish a dominant order here. As the power distribution becomes more balanced, the idea of a managed military conflict is fanciful. One side’s provocation will inevitably invite the other’s retaliation, where spiral escalation is highly possible. Considering that both sides have so many weapon platforms and both are major nuclear powers, the feasibility of a military solution has greatly diminished. The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. There are several maritime encounters between the two sides every day, and thousands every year. Most of them are professional and safe; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation. Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. China feels that Washington’s South China Sea policy is increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten to provoke China. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants. From mid-April to early May, the U.S. Navy dispatched several warships, including USS America LHA-6, to the so-called standoff area between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the West Capella to deter China’s operations. The PLA Navy was believed to have a similar number of warships there at the same time, which aroused heated discussion among the media and experts. Another less publicized but more intense case was the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning formation when it was conducting open sea cross-region mobile training while followed by American warships and multiple military aircraft. An anonymous PLA Navy officer revealed that the confrontation was so intense that one U.S. warship even once came within 100 meters of the Chinese carrier. Even so, both sides have remained largely professional and restrained. In fact, neither the Chinese military nor the American military has increased its activity significantly compared with the same period of 2019, despite the impression given by most media reports and expert commentaries. The problem is that these operations are over-exposed and over-focused. In the backdrop of power competition, especially amid the pandemic, in order to show their strength and determination, U.S. forces have given undue prominence to covering and publicizing military activities, giving the media and the public a lot to discuss and imagine. There are some hawks in both countries who take advantage of this and exaggerate the situation. Although most countries including the South China Sea claimants, do not want to see China-U.S. military conflict, some individual countries are indeed rejoicing over the growing competition between China and the United States, which may lead to some opportunity for them to expand. China-U.S. military confrontation or even war in the South China Sea has a huge market. China and the United States are, of course, preparing for any kind of military conflict and the worst scenarios in the South China Sea; however, there is no indication that the two sides want to resolve their contradictions by using force strategically or operationally — despite the repeated war rhetoric from some senior American officials. In daily military interactions, there are really increasing risks, but in the absence of a subjective desire for conflict, these risks are highly likely to be controlled. The most important thing for the Chinese and American militaries to prevent is miscalculation, considering the relatively backward or ineffective crisis management mechanisms of the two countries even compared with Soviet-U.S. and then Russia-U.S. military relations. In addition, we need to let professionals do their work. The China-U.S. military rivalry has been unduly influenced by the media, commentators, and some politicians, which amplifies the intensity of the competition and is likely to lead to self-fulfilling prophecies.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › Impact › China - SCS

US military operations in the South China sea scare Chinese military

Associated Press 21, The Associated Press (AP) is an American non-profit news agency headquartered in New York City. Founded in 1846 "China says US increasing military activity directed at it," 4-30-2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/04/29/china-says-us-increasing-military-activity-directed-at-it/, 7-17-2022, AB

Activity by U.S. military ships and surveillance planes directed toward China has increased significantly under President Joe Biden’s administration, a spokesperson for the Chinese Defense Ministry said Thursday. As an example, Wu Qian said the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Mustin had recently conducted close-in observation of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning and its battle group. That had “seriously interfered with the Chinese side’s training activities and seriously threatened the safety of navigation and personnel on both sides,” Wu said. The ship had been warned to leave and a formal protest filed with the U.S., he said. “Who wins when part of one force goes up against all of a hostile force? That’s the question we may see put to the test. The answer is far from obvious.” By Geoff Ziezulewicz Activity by U.S. military ships was up 20 percent and by planes 40 percent in areas China claims since Biden took office in January over the same period last year, Wu said. “The U.S. frequently dispatches ships and planes to operate in seas and airspace near China, promoting regional militarization and threatening regional peace and stability,” Wu said at a monthly briefing held virtually. China routinely objects to the U.S. military presence in the South China Sea, which it claims virtually in its entirety, as well as the passage of Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait. The country recently marked the 20th anniversary of the collision between a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese navy fighter near the Chinese island province of Hainan that resulted in the Chinese pilot’s death. He was called a hero who sacrificed himself for the defense of the motherland. The U.S. says its plane was in international airspace and the accident was the result of reckless flying by the Chinese side. Wu also blasted moves to beef up monitoring of Chinese aircraft movements by Taiwan, the self-governing island democracy claimed by China as its own territory to be annexed by force if necessary. Taiwan’s government to stave off what China refers to as inevitable unification are like “a mantis trying to stop a chariot,” Wu said. The U.S. maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan in deference to Beijing, but provides the island with defensive weapons and is legally bound to treat threats to it as matters of “grave concern.” Increased activity by the Chinese military around Taiwan has been raising concerns about the possibility of a conflict. In an interview with Britain’s Sky News, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry Joseph Wu reiterated recent warnings that the military threat from China is growing through “misinformation campaigns, hybrid warfare, and ... grey zone activities.” “And all these seem to be preparing for their final military assault against Taiwan,” Wu told Sky. “This is our country, this is our people and this is our way of life. We will defend ourselves to the very end,” Wu said. Biden did not address such military threats in his address to Congress on Wednesday night, instead emphasizing that China and others were “closing in fast” in economic and technological terms. “We’re in a competition with China and other countries to win the 21st century,” Biden said.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – China/NoKo – US heg counterbalance 1NC

00s crises devastated US econ allowing east Asia to counterbalance US globalization

Rui 19, Ding Rui, Doctor of philosophy in political science university of Macau, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, “Facilitating or Hindering? US Hegemony and Regional Integration in East Asia 1990–2018”, 2019, ()

In 1990, conservative political columnist Charles Krauthammer claimed that a “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, 1990) had arrived. The US, as the only superpower, clearly overlooked the rest of the world as the former Soviet Union collapsed, Japan fell into stagnation, and Europe was experiencing a difficult transaction period. After a short period, the US conducted a series of strategic propaganda based on the Washington Consensus to promote and enforce globalization, with the 1990s becoming the longest economic expansion in US history. However, during the 21 st century, with Europe successfully combining and expanding its economic map into an institution known as the European Union (EU), regional economic integration become a key feature that counter-balanced the influence of globalization. Furthermore, newly developing countries such as India, South Africa, Russia and, particularly, China rapidly merged into the global economy, claiming a significant share of the stake. On the other hand, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US found itself trapped in two wars against terrorism in the Middle East for more than a decade. These wars dramatically shifted the trajectory of the US’ politics, both domestically and internationally, and almost completely drained resources from the US economy. What made it worse for the US was the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, followed by the global financial crisis in 2008. These crises had a profound and devastating effect on the US with respect to its status as a super power and hegemon.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – China/NoKo – US heg counterbalance 1NC

China’s actions with the Pyongyang nuclear issue shows their desire for a counterbalance to US military presence in east Asia – US heg in east Asia is in danger

Yu, Sui ’22, Lei Yu a professor at Liaocheng University and Sophia Sui a research fellow at Deakin University, Korea observer vol. 53, issue 2, “Balancing between "Two Evils": US-China Competition and China's Strategy toward North Korea's Nuclear Issue”, 2022, (https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=8e63677c-3bec-4baa-a0de-80dbcdf12693%40redis)

The economic and military assistance provided by China since the demise of the former Soviet Union (the other most important ally of North Korea) has essentially sustained, if not survived, the Pyongyang regime. Consequently, a number of politicians, senior diplomats and scholars of international relations (IR) particularly in the West have gone to enormous lengths to persuade China to play a decisive role in containing Pyongyang's nuclear ambition by exerting on it economic, political and security pressure (Boyer & Miller 2017; Reuters 2017). China has to date displayed much reluctance in satisfying the request rendered primarily by the United States and its allies to place a comprehensive trade embargo on North Korea, let alone block its nuclear program by taking concrete measures in cooperation with the United States. As its largest trading partner, China accounts for more than 80% of North Korea's international trade and enjoys a large trade surplus (Denyer 2017). North Korea's economic interest will surely be hurt by a complete trade embargo and so will China's. But Pyongyang's nuclear program is jeopardizing regional peace and stability and, much worse, is likely to trigger a nuclear arms race in East Asia and result in a military intervention by the United States. Economic interest is more often than not described by academics of international relations (IR) as "low politics" whereas security, "high politics". Nonetheless, Chinese foreign policy-makers have to date adopted a strategy of a delicate balance between maintaining its economic relationship with Pyongyang and, to a limited extent, containing it nuclear ambition. As "a rational actor" in the international system, China's strategy indicates that there must be some significant motivations behind its delicate balance

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – China

China has Regional Hegemony Now – US Asia Hegemony Declining

Richard Hanania 2021 - Richard Hanania is the president at the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and a former Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, “THE INEVITABLE RISE OF CHINA: U.S. OPTIONS WITH LESS INDO-PACIFIC INFLUENCE”, Defense Priorities, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-inevitable-rise-of-china

This report investigates the long-term implications of Chinese regional hegemony. In a world in which the two powers are peer competitors, the future is uncertain, and leaders are free to make decisions across a wide range of possibilities likely to fundamentally change facts on the ground. When, in a certain region, one nation has an overwhelming preponderance of power, we can be more confident it will dominate that area as long as it desires to do so. While we cannot predict much about what China will use its power for, at the very least we should expect it to seek to gain more influence in its region at the expense of the U.S. and become more likely to succeed in disputes between the two nations in which each side seeks out the cooperation of others. China will be able to assert economic and diplomatic dominance over its own region even if the U.S. maintains or increases its military presence in nations like Japan and South Korea.

Checking the rise of China through alliances is unlikely, as the countries of East Asia generally do not see it as a threat to the same extent the U.S. does; nor do they share concerns about the internal human rights situation of that country or other issues, like autonomy for Hong Kong, that American policymakers have prioritized. Moreover, contemporary military alliances in East Asia actually give the U.S. little in terms of diplomatic advantage, as disputes over Huawei and other issues reveal. Even if other countries become more willing to let the U.S. defend them militarily, American influence can still decline. Given these facts, and the greater ability of China to bring about economic and diplomatic pressure on the region due to geography, East Asian countries are more likely to accommodate it than the U.S. while avoiding decisively aligning with either power.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – Unsustainable – Laundry List

US Heg is already dying--Trump, a rising China, Populism, and Nationalism

Boller et al. 21 – Florian Boller is from the Department of Political Science, University of Kaiseslautern, other contributors from array of different universities and institutions like JFKI, School of Government and International Relations, etc. “Hegemonic Transition,” 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74505-9

The current international order is unraveling. Its traditional hegemon, the US, has ceased to unequivocally support the institutions it helped to foster. Us President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy has exacerbated ongoing forces pushing international politics toward a hegemonic transition. China’s power surge, contestation by smaller states, and the West’s internal struggles with populism and economic discontent have undermined the liberal order from the outside, and from within. While a diagnosis of this crisis is hardly new (acharya, 2018;Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Hofmann, 2019; Friedrichs et al., 2019), its sources, scope, and underlying politics are still up for debate. This volume offers an assessment of the ongoing transformation of hegemonic order and its domestic and international politics. In doing so, it challenges the conventional wisdom in three ways. First, the role of the US under the Trump administration with regard to the liberal order is more complex than it may seem. It varies across regimes (e.g., trade and security), regions (e.g., Asia, Europe, the Global South), and is domestically contested by actors within Congress and society. After all, states are not unitary actors whose governments are free to decide the course of their countries, regardless of domestic institutions, voters' interest, and partisan politics. The upending of traditional leadership paths by the Trump administration, in fact, was contested by traditionalists within the executive, and, more importantly, within the legislature. Thus, this argument demands a closer look at the connection between domestic politics and international relations, and the resulting patterns of hegemonic politics across policy fields and regions. Second, there is significant variance in the responses of state and non-state actors toward this instability and disruptive transformation. Some actors forge new alliances, claim authority over policies or within institutions.? Others, in particular allies of the US, such as Poland within NATO, or Israel, who significantly depend on the hegemon's security provisions, reject leadership roles for themselves and try to entice the US to maintain its traditional role. Middle powers such as India and Brazil may find themselves wedged between the US and China, and their room for strategic maneuvering will be severely limited. It is thus a central aim of this volume to dissect contestation and support toward the current hegemonic order (and the traditional hegemon) among different actors. Third, while the topical focus of our endeavor is the age of Trump and the crisis of the international order, we recognize the longer-term trends that have paved the way toward the current hegemonic transition. Economic discontents within large swaths of the electorates in the US and in Europe have, for example, propelled populist and nationalism movements that, in turn, undermined support for maintaining policies and institutions within the liberal order (see Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lammert and Werner in this volume). Furthermore, the traditional bipartisan foreign policy consensus, which provided the domestic backbone of the liberal order, has begun to erode since the end of the Cold War (see Schultz, 2017). In that regard, we hold that the Trump administration and its policies are a symptom rather than the cause of the unraveling of global order (see ye, 2019, p. 76). Consequently, the crisis of the global order will not simply vanish with the leadership change in the White House on January 20, 2021. Against such a backdrop, this volume contributes to the burgeoning discussion within the international relations (I) literature by offering theoretically informed case studies. Our reading of hegemony diverges from a static concept toward a focus on the dynamic politics of hegemonic order. This perspective includes domestic support and the demand for specific hegemonic goods, the contestation and support by other actors within distinct layers of hegemonic orders, and the underlying bargaining between the hegemon and subordinate actors.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – Unsustainable – Inflation

Inflation is Decking U.S. Military Power Now

Thomas Spoehr 6/7 – Thomas Spoehr serves as director of Heritage’s Center for National Defense where he is responsible for supervising research on matters involving U.S. national defense, “The U.S. Army’s Untenable Trajectory: What Congress Should Do to Fix It”, The Heritage Foundation

Despite claims the Army’s fiscal year (FY) 2023 President’s budget request “sustains the force on a strategic path,” the opposite is true. The $46 billion cumulative loss of buying power that the Army has endured since FY 2020 has taken a severe toll on nearly every aspect of Army combat power. Budgets that have consistently failed to even keep pace with inflation have forced the Army to cut training standards, propose reducing its active end strength, cut military construction programs to historic lows, and pare many key modernization programs down to the bone. The latest rating from The Heritage Foundation’s authoritative Index of U.S. Military Strength assesses the Army as only “marginally” able to perform its role to protect the U.S. and its vital national interests. Any objective assessment would conclude the Army is on an unsustainable path.

The lack of publicly released national security and national defense strategies from this Administration makes it challenging to understand the thinking behind President Joe Biden’s decision to sharply reduce the Army’s buying power.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – Unsustainable - General

US Hegemony has been Fading since the Cold War

Ronald O’Rourke 2022 - O’Rourke is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field, “Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense - Issues for Congress”, Library of Congress Washington DC, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1159700

The post-Cold War era of international relations—which began in the early 1990s and is sometimes referred to as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power)— showed initial signs of fading in 2006-2008, and by 2014 had given way to a fundamentally different situation of great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.

The renewal of great power competition was acknowledged alongside other considerations in the Obama Administration’s June 2015 National Military Strategy. 2 It was placed at the center of the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS)3 and January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 4 which formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia. The Biden Administration’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance states that “we face a world of rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, and a technological revolution that is reshaping every aspect of our lives,” and that protecting the security of the American people “requires us to meet challenges not only from great powers and regional adversaries, but also from violent and criminal non-state actors and extremists, and from threats like climate change, infectious disease, cyberattacks, and disinformation that respect no national borders.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Heg Bad › UQ › UQ – Unsustainable - General

UQ - American hegemony is low—aftereffects of the Bush and Trump administrations

Alfredo Toro Hardy 22 Alfredo Toro Hardy is a Venezuelan retired diplomat, scholar, and public intellectual. He has a Ph.D. from the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations; master’s degrees from the University of Pennsylvania and the Central University of Venezuela and a postgraduate degree from the Ecole Nationale d’Ádministration, ENA. He has attestations for special courses from the University of Paris II and Harvard University and a Bachelor of Law degree from the Central University of Venezuela. “America’s Two Cold Wars,” 3/21/2022, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., P 77-78

The obvious questions to be asked are these: What has happened between the 1990s, when the power of the United States reached its apex, and now? How did America’s gigantic leverage upon a substantial part of the world weaken to the point of losing true relevance? Two names can provide the answers to these questions: George W. Bush and Donald Trump. In 2001, George W. Bush’s team came into government carrying an awkward notion about America’s might. Instead of understanding that the hegemonic system in place served their country’s interests exceedingly well, they felt that the system had to be rearranged in order to recognize the United States’ new position as sole superpower and its unmistakable primacy. As a result, they began to turn upside down a complex structure that had taken decades to build, precisely when America’s standing within it had reached its pinnacle. 78 A. T. HARDY In doing so they did not understand, as T.V. Paul asserts, that legitimacy lowers the cost of exerting power and that for a hegemonic power legitimacy results fundamental for the maintaining of supremacy. The United States had attained a stage where its supremacy was accepted by the international community as both benign and legitimate, which had required interweaving the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. However, proclaiming the futility of cooperative multilateralism, which from their perspective just constrained the freedom of action of America’s power, the Bush administration asserted the prerogatives of their country’s primacy. Moreover, the United States’ national interest had to take precedence to international law, as was made clear by President Bush before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During that time, he repeatedly emphasized that even if such invasion violated international law, his country would do whatever was necessary to ensure its security (Paul, 2018, Chapter 2). Unconcerned by international norms or by the United Nations’ rules, America became a free rider within the international system. Among many examples, the following are particularly telling: It refused to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol, as that would have imposed restraints upon its sovereignty, notwithstanding that with just 4 percent of the world’s population the country was responsible for 25 percent of the global pollution footprint; it refused to submit to the International Court of Justice, while pressuring other countries to follow suit, as its soldiers were being accused of human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq; it refused to pay its quotas to the United Nations and to other multilateral organizations that did not bow to Washington’s views (Prestowitz, 2003). The Bush administration’s world became one that searched for unconditional followers and not for allies’ worthy of respect; one of ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little meaning; one of punishment to dissidence and not of encouragement to cooperation; and one where preventive action prevailed over international law. Well-known neoconservatives such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, and John Bolton, proclaimed America’s supremacy and derided countries not willing to follow its unilateralism. Krauthammer labelled those nations an axis of petulance, whose main problem was their irrelevance. Kagan, referring to Europe’s insistence in adhering to international norms, talked about that continent’s weakness and about its incapability to understand that raw power was the ultimate enforcer of national security. Bolton asserted that if the United Nations’ Security Council wanted to reflect the real correlation of power in the world, it should only have one member: The United States (Kagan, 2003, p. 37; Krauthammer, 2002; Toro Hardy, 2006 [1, p. 139]).