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2022 Michigan Evidence
Aff AT Democracy QPQ › AT Russia/Say No

Hungry says no – their economy is completely dependent on Russia imports.

Tim Gosling, 7-24-2022, Tim Gosling is a Prague-based journalist who has covered the Central European region for several years. He has contributed to Politico Europe, Deutsche Welle and the Financial Times, among other publications, and also provided analysis on the region for the Economist Intelligence Unit and IHS Markit.,Hungary’s energy dalliance with Russia, POLITICO,https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-energy-dalliance-with-russia, jkap

Many Central and Eastern European countries are trying to cut their energy ties to Russia, but not Hungary, which is chasing a new gas deal. The reason? It's crucial to the ruling Fidesz party's hold on power. “Low energy prices for households are a key plank for this government,” said Pál Ságvári, Hungary’s ambassador-at-large for energy security. He confirmed that Budapest is preparing to discuss a new long-term gas contract with Moscow, adding: “It’s now a buyers’ market. It’s a good time to start talks.” Government officials in Budapest said that Russia, which is facing increased competition from liquefied natural gas, is keen to do a deal. Moscow is also widely viewed as sympathetic to the Hungarian government’s need for a bargain. “Cheap energy was a central focus of Orbán's first term” — Ákos Hadházy, independent MP Cheap energy prices are a key political buttress for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Ahead of Hungary’s 2014 parliamentary election, energy bills dropped into household post boxes included how much cash Fidesz policies had saved consumers. The government had just implemented price cuts that reduced household energy bills by a third — a step that prompted many foreign-owned energy companies to sell their Hungarian assets to the state. Fidesz won a thumping majority in the election. “Cheap energy was a central focus of Orbán's first term,” said Ákos Hadházy, a former member of Fidesz who is now an independent MP. “This caused big losses for providers but of course it was very popular.” The price cuts didn’t end in 2014, and Hungarian household gas and power prices are now the lowest in the EU. “The government’s priority goals include maintaining the security of energy supply and preserving the results of the cut in utility costs,” Zoltán Kovács, state secretary for public diplomacy and relations, told POLITICO. “The energy expenditure of families must not increase.” Russia's helping hand Maintaining this system requires competitively priced imports, and Russia's assistance is crucial. Russia is Hungary's dominant supplier of both gas and nuclear — together accounting for about half of its energy mix; by 2030 they are expected to grow to about 60 percent, according to the government’s energy strategy. “The logic is that Russia provides cheap energy and Orbán causes trouble for the EU and NATO,” said Tamás Pletser, an energy analyst at Erste Bank in Budapest, explaining why Russia would be interested in a relationship with a country often at odds with most of its fellow EU members. Russia supplies practically all of the 8 billion to 10 billion cubic meters of gas Hungary consumes annually. In 2015, Gazprom cut Hungary's gas import price by about 25 percent, said Attila Holoda, who was deputy secretary of state for energy in 2012 and now runs Aurora Energy, a consultancy. That wasn’t the only sweet deal from Russia. With Hungary’s long-term gas delivery contract expiring, Gazprom in 2013 waived take-or-pay clauses — which require a client to pay for a certain volume of gas whether used or not and which have been a source of tension with other customers in the region. That allowed the Russian energy giant to continue delivering gas to Hungary under the contract until the end of 2018. Fidesz remains acutely aware that its cap on household bills is a vital component of its political success A temporary deal has kept supplies flowing since, but Budapest now needs to open talks on a new permanent agreement, Ságvári said. However, any long-term agreement with Gazprom would go against the grain in a region where most countries are looking for other energy sources to reduce their dependence on Russia. Hungary remains focused on price, and analysts expect Budapest to secure a bargain; Fidesz also has fewer geopolitical worries about Moscow's intentions than other former communist countries in Central Europe. Facing increased competition from LNG, Gazprom is scrambling to secure market share in Europe. The coronavirus crisis and oil price crash will likely only strengthen the customer’s hand. Critics still worry that Hungary will be dependent on Moscow for a major chunk of its energy mix. The new contract will ensure stable prices for households, said Ságvári. The less politically sensitive commercial sector will depend on the liberalized market, where suppliers are free to negotiate prices with customers. Political cash Cheap Russian gas has also helped fund Fidesz’s political campaigns. In 2015, state-owned utility MVM’s net profit was 14.7 billion forints (€42 million). When Russia’s price cut took effect the following year, earnings boomed to 48.4 billion forints. Ahead of the 2018 election, MVM donated 500 million forints to Civil Unity Forum, a government-linked NGO that had attacked opposition politicians and the EU. The Kremlin is also involved in MVM’s nuclear operations. Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom is the lead contractor on the €12 billion project to expand the Paks nuclear plant, where Moscow is providing 80 percent of the financing. Ságvári said the government plans to deepen its reliance on Paks. “Nuclear is an important backbone of the energy mix, and the strategy is to push it to 40 percent as part of the decarbonization drive,” he said. “We believe we got a good deal from Russia.” Critics, including Brussels and the U.S., still worry that whatever the price tag for Paks and for Russian gas, Hungary will be dependent on Moscow for a major chunk of its energy mix. But Fidesz remains acutely aware that its cap on household bills is a vital component of its political success, and insists it will continue to do whatever it takes to keep cheap energy flowing to voters. Low power bills are an implicit bargain with voters, said Michael Labelle, Jean Monnet Chair in Energy and Innovation Strategies at Central European University. "A change in government will result in more expensive gas.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
Aff AT Democracy QPQ › Say No - Hungary

Hungary says no to democratic reforms – CFDR proves.

Andrew Desiderio et. al. 22, 6-28-2022, a congressional reporter for POLITICO, covering the Senate, national security and foreign policy. He previously covered House investigations and oversight of the Trump administration. He joined POLITICO from The Daily Beast, where he covered Congress with a focus on national security, foreign affairs and Senate campaigns. He previously worked at BBC News and RealClearPolitics; Alex Ward is a national security reporter and anchor of “National Security Daily.” Before joining POLITICO, Ward was the White House and national security reporter at Vox. He was also an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and U.S. foreign policy. And he previously wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter for War on the Rocks where he covered the 2016 presidential election and the candidates' views on national security; Quint is a breaking news reporter for POLITICO, Hungary is being another NATO Budapest, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/06/28/hungary-is-being-another-nato-budapest-00042773, HKeef

The Hungarian government is the lone objector blocking the establishment of a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO, a yearslong effort by Rep. GERRY CONNOLLY (D-Va.), who serves as president of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly.

It can sound like a tale out of the U.S. Senate, where one member can grind the chamber’s business to a halt. In NATO, all member-nations must consent to a decree in the Strategic Concept or expansion of the alliance. The center, as billed, would advise governments on best practices for maintaining and building a 21st-century democracy.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Aff AT Democracy QPQ › Say No - Hungary

Hungary says no – anti-democratic backsliding and blockage

Andrew Desiderio et al, Alexander Ward, and Quint Forgey, 06/28/2022, [Andrew Desiderio is a congressional reporter for POLITICO, covering the Senate, national security and foreign policy. He is a graduate of The George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs, where he studied journalism and Italian language and literature.] "Hungary is being another NATO Budapest," bfu

MADRID — Turkey isn’t the only “problem child” of the NATO family at this year’s annual summit. The Hungar[y]ian government is the lone objector blocking the establishment of a Center for Democra[cy]tic Resilience within NATO, a yearslong effort by Rep. GERRY CONNOLLY (D-Va.), who serves as president of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly. It can sound like a tale out of the U.S. Senate, where one member can grind the chamber’s business to a halt. In NATO, all member-nations must consent to a decree in the Strategic Concept or expansion of the alliance. The center, as billed, would advise governments on best practices for maintaining and building a 21st-century democracy. Hungary’s anti-democratic slide is no secret, so it’s not necessarily a surprise that its government is objecting to the creation of such an entity within NATO. VIKTOR ORBÁN, Hungary’s DONALD TRUMP-endorsed prime minister, has engineered crackdowns on the press and undermined election laws and the independent judiciary, leading critics to dub him an authoritarian. “With the horror we’re witnessing in Ukraine, how could you not want to build democratic architecture within NATO to counter what we are experiencing in Ukraine?” Connolly told NatSec Daily here on day one of the summit. “You can’t argue the two aren’t related. Of course, they’re related. What do you think Putin is fighting against?” Connolly, who leads what is effectively NATO’s legislative body, is pleading with Hungary to harken back to its roots — specifically, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which was an effort to push back against Soviet influence. “1956 was in some ways eerily like Ukraine in the aspirations being represented in the revolt of Soviet occupation in Hungary. There had been an uprising in East Germany prior to that, but that was the first big break in the Soviet bloc,” said Connolly, who once worked for then-Sen. JOE BIDEN on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “So my hope is Hungary will remind itself of its own history [and] return to its own struggle for freedom over many generations.” The purpose of a Center for Democratic Resilience is “to serve as a resource and a clearinghouse of best practices and cross-fertilization on democratic benchmarks available to member, partner, and aspirant states, upon request,” according to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Connolly has referred to it as NATO’s “sin of omission,” and has cited the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol and efforts by pro-Trump forces to overturn the 2020 election as evidence that democracy is fragile. Back home, Connolly and Rep. MIKE TURNER (R-Ohio) led House passage of a resolution supporting the establishment of such a center within NATO, though 63 Republicans opposed the effort. But in order for it to actually happen, Hungary needs to drop its opposition. Connolly declined to describe the nature of Budapest’s objections, but noted that the rest of NATO’s members were skittish about his proposal when he first unveiled it and eventually came around. “I’m ever the optimist. But I’ll tell you this, we will not give up,” Connolly said. “We will stick with this and pursue this until it comes to fruition.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Queer IR › AFF AT – War Turn

Sexual desires lead to arms buildup and subsequent war

Lloyd Demause 15 (April 1, 2015) Lloyd Demause, an American social thinker known for his work in the field of psychohistory. He did graduate work in political science at Columbia University and later trained as a lay psychoanalyst, which is defined as a psychoanalyst who does not have a medical degree. He is the founder of The Journal of Psychohistory. (Accessed 7/22/2022) {“Nuclear War as an Anti-Sexual Group Fantasy”} [https://web-s-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=e34b52a8-59d7-4513-aad4-82e4b9f27495%40redis]

Psychoanalytic writing on nuclear war has, to date, mainly concentrated on the variety of defenses people have against the realization that a nuclear holocaust will mean the real death of hundreds of millions of people and the end of most of civilization, as we know it. Lifton's work on "numbing," for instance, has eloquently described the numerous denials, evasions, idealizations, displacements and other defenses so often used by those in power and by the average person when thinking about the nuclear holocaust (Lifton and Falk, 1982). Mack (1981), Brenman-Gibson (1986) and other psychoanalysts have made telling cases for the proposition that most people have severe emotional resistances against acknowledging the ghastly realities of nuclear war. In each of these works, however, the assumption has been made that the reason people so badly distort their perceptions of reality in the case of nuclear weapons is that the reality of nuclear war is so horrifying. Yet I know of no other clinical psychoanalytic studies that trace the source of psychic defenses to fear of reality. Defenses are usually thought to be constructed against wishes, against the unacceptable Id wishes, not against unpleasant reality. If a patient denies the destructiveness of his or her current actions, it is because he or she feels guilty about the wish to destroy someone. The Journal of Psychohistory 42 (4) Spring 2015 Nuclear War as an Anti-S exual Group Fantasy 321 If this is equally true in thinking about nuclear war, then one must suspect that the defenses have in fact been constructed against a wish to have a nuclear holocaust. Could this be possible? Could it be that the world's greatest fear is also unconsciously the world's greatest wish? Is it possible that we are mesmerized by nuclear weapons because the promise of a nuclear war is for some reason overwhelmingly attractive to us, and plays an extremely important intrapsychic role in our lives? Carrying the parallel between the clinical and the social one step further, the following question might be asked: Is it possible that the world's addiction to nuclear weapons might be fueled by both aggressive and sexual drives, both destructive and erotic wishes, as in the case of other addictions? Most analysts do not usually consider that the drive toward a nuclear holocaust might have sexual origins. To begin with, it seems too obvious, too “pop-psychological," to point out that the language of those proposing nuclear war is filled with continuous phallic references, such as "standing tall," "displays of firmness," "stiffening of the national will," "making the Russians impotent." "knocking their balls off," and so on (Caldicott, 1984; deMause, 1985b). When those who imagine or witness nuclear explosions describe the "beauty" of the phallic mushroom cloud or the "orgiastic release" of the explosion (Chernus, 1986), it seems almost embarrassing to draw attention to the all-too-obvious sexual language being used. And when a magazine describes a nuclear bomber as "a breathtakingly beautiful airplane with slim-silhouette wings that meld into a fuselage that breathes speed, the swanlike aircraft is designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses, unleashing nuclear-tipped missiles at targets deep inside the country" (Time, 1987), it seems almost superfluous to point out that the bomber in question is in fact an ugly world-destroyer, not a "swanlike" phallus depositing its load "deep inside” its target. Sensitive reporters who interview hundreds of nuclear war planners are not too embarrassed to observe that these experts are mainly people sublimating sexual—indeed, often homosexual—preoccupations. Thomas Allen describes the world of those in the War College who play nuclear war games: There is a football-stadium excitement about the game . . . the players get together in a kind of locker-room camaraderie. (The towel-snapping image is not overly drawn. Women players are as rare in the male world of the war game as they are in football locker rooms. To further the jock image, players call their post game analysis a "hot wash-up.") (Allen, 1987) 322 Lloyd deMause Carol Cohn, in reporting on her experiences in observing the nearly all-male world of nuclear war experts, found their language dominated by sexual imagery. "Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship," she begins. "I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis." Yet she found no way to sidestep the fact that while rational analysis was in short supply, the subject of male potency appeared to be the central topic of every lecture: I thought that at least at some point in a long talk about "penetration aids," someone would suddenly look up, slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Going On Here. Of course, I was wrong. There was no evidence that any feminist critiques had ever reached the ears, much less the minds, of these men. American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as "irresistible, because you get more bang for the buck." Another lecturer solemnly and scientifically announced, "to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff." Other lectures were filled with discussion of vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump." There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles and the need to "face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are." Disbelieving glances would occasionally pass between me and my one ally in the summer program, another woman, but no one else seemed to notice. (Cohn, 1987) If even untrained journalists notice that nuclear war discussions are filled with "homoerotic excitement" (Cohn, 1987, p. 695), need the psychoanalyst be so inhibited in investigating the possible sexual sources of war? What surprised me most in preparing this paper is that when I finished reading through most of the several hundred books and articles written by psychoanalysts on the causes of war since Freud's 1932 essay, "Why War?" I found that clinical studies of the actual words and motivations of real people going to actual wars were exceedingly rare. Most psychoanalytic theories of war are non-clinical and repeat in one form or another Freud's conclusion that war is caused by "the instinct for hatred and aggression" (Freud, 19321 p. 209). But this conclusion is not based on empirical studies of the actual words used by people as they bring about wars.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Queer IR › Queer Theory Fails

their project’s not strong enough to overcome oppression-

Prokhovnik 02

(Raia, Senior lecturer in politics at the Open University, UK, “Rational woman: a feminist critique of dichotomy “2002. p. 134)

Walters’ conclusions are well-made. On the positive side she argues that ‘we should embrace [queer theory’s] recognition that much slips out of the rigid distinctions of hetero/homo, man/woman and that our theoretical and political engagements need to reckon creatively with the excess that dares not speak its name’. She also commends the ‘queer attempt to understand that sexuality and sexual desire is not reducible to gender’ (Walters 1996: 963). Nevertheless she is skeptical that destabilizing gender can ‘top the power of gender- a power that still sends too many women to the hospital, shelter, rape crisis center, despair’ (ibid.: 866). She observes, “we cannot afford to lose sight of the materiality of oppression and its operation in structural and institutional spaces’, and she suspects that queer theory fails to understand that ‘[d]estabilizing gender (or rendering its surface apparent) is not the same as overthrowing it’ (ibid.).

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Queer IR › Queer Theory Fails

Alt creates a monolithic view of queer bodies rooted in Western, privileged frames- this recreates dangerous hierarchies, forces normative dichotomies and prevents institutional change-turns the k

Mizzi MEd 08

(Robert C, Queer Peace International, Journal of Gay & Lesbian Issues in Education, “Queer Global Education: Finding Me, Finding You,” 2008, Taylor and Francis//wyo-mm)

Additionally, Morland and Willox do not include formal education, which is a founding block of our anti-queer taboos and inhibitions. Addressing LGBT/Queer issues in education, however, is an intrinsic part of social and moral change. For instance, in rural Saskatchewan, a twelve-year old Two-Spirited youth is courageously attempting to attend and be successful at school in her/his preferred gender. The absence of culturally relevant material in the curriculum, support from educators, and a gender flexible state-controlled institution makes such efforts difficult. When discussing the shake-up of social and moral taboos, Queer Theory fails to acknowledge and analyze that some of our most severe battlegrounds are taking place within such institutions like this eighth grade rural Canadian classroom. Morland and Willox analyses what the closet door might be for different queers: Perhaps you become queer by being seen reading this book or Maybe you are hiding its cover behind Cosmopolitan or Men’s Health. Alternatively, if you are queer, are your actions queer enough? Are you in the closet or are you out and proud? (p. 1) Queer Theory sets the tone that being in the closet (whatever shape, size, colour or texture that closet door might be) is bad; being out is good. Paradoxically, this text on queer theory then perpetuates a binary position. In my work with Queer Peace International, I have worked with queers who are refugees, displaced persons, and/or live in a homophobic community. These individuals must remain in the closet in order to grow, remain strong, and ultimately survive. There, too, have been those who have “come out” but, when they didn’t fit into the foreign based LGBT culture, returned to the closet where they retained some form of normalcy and acceptance. There is a certain a-critical “promosexual” cultural viewpoint underlyingQueer Theory.It insufficiently addresses those on the periphery or those affected by North American or Western queer exports in different world regions and communities. The contributors call for acceptance and embracing plural identities and, although this book does present several realities, it does not venture outside of the white, middle/upper-class American psyche.Queer Theory lacks a post-colonial/globalization analyses that speaks to plural identities in developing world contexts that this book could have drawn from.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Queer IR › Queer Theory Fails

Their focus on multiplicity and fluid identities leads to the erasure of materiality embedded in other identities, necessitating exclusion and no way to translate into a praxis that can be shared by other identities- makes solvency impossible and turns the K

Johnson 10

(E. Patrick, Text and Performance Quarterly, “"Quare" studies, or (almost) everything I know about

queer studies I learned from my grandmother,” November 5, 2010, Taylor and Francis//wyo-mm)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › UQ – Russia

Hungary derails Russian strategy.

Andras Gergely 22, 7-1-2022, Senior Editor for Bloomberg, Hungary’s Orban Strikes Softer Tone on Sanctions, Ukraine, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-01/hungary-s-orban-strikes-softer-tone-on-sanctions-ukraine-war#xj4y7vzkg, HKeef

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban appeared to strike a milder tone regarding Europe’s policy on Ukraine, all the while proceeding with a controversial nuclear project backed by Russia.

Hungary won’t keep standing in the way of European Union sanctions except on vital matters of energy policy, he told public radio in his weekly interview on Friday. While Budapest will still oppose any sanctions on natural gas imports, it can’t constantly “go against the flow of traffic” in the bloc on non-energy issues, as that would be inappropriate in a union built on “cooperation, loyalty and mutual trust,” he said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › UQ – Backsliding Now

It’s not too late, Hungary backsliding can still be reversed. Biden must engage.

Michael O'Shea, 5-18-2022, Time to reset U.S.-Hungary relations, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/time-reset-us-hungary-relations-opinion-1706521, GBN/ RW

Early last month, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán won a and expanded his party's existing parliamentary supermajority. That triumph represents a role reversal from just a year and a half ago, when Trump-ally Orbán had to confront the fact that his country's transatlantic policies would be markedly different after 's presidential victory. Now, it is time for the Biden administration to reach the same inescapable conclusion and cultivate relations with a country it has consistently shunned.

Orbán himself seemed to welcome such a reset when he addressed his country's relationship with the United States in his victory on election night—something he had not done after any of his previous victories. At least one side of the Atlantic is seeking dialogue.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › UQ – Backsliding Now

Hungary and Poland backsliding now.

Person, & Baczynska, G. (2022, February 15). Poland, Hungary turning more authoritarian, rights group says. Retrieved July 22, 2022, from , ANikkumbh

BRUSSELS, Feb 15 (Reuters) - Hungary and Poland are turning increasingly authoritarian, a European rights group said on Tuesday, a day before the European Union's top court rules on whether to cut funding to member states flouting democratic rights and freedoms.

The Berlin-based Civil Liberties Union for Europe singled out the two formerly communist EU countries in a broader report highlighting how the rule of law has deteriorated across the 27-nation bloc during the coronavirus pandemic.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › UQ – Backsliding Now

Hungary and Poland backsliding now – must reverse Russian and Chinese influence.

Laurenz Gehrke, 7-22-2022 [Gehrke is a politics reporter to cover German politics and the general election. Prior to that, he completed his Master’s degree in Economic History at the London School of Economics and a Bachelor’s degree in American Studies at the University of Munich.], "Hungary no longer a democracy: report," POLITICO, // bfu

Hungary is no longer a democracy, Poland is about to go down the same path, democracy in the Balkans is eroding because of Chinese and Russian influence, and the EU is doing nothing to stop it all, according to the NGO Freedom House’s latest , out Wednesday. In the study, which covers 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia, the authors describe “a stunning democratic breakdown,” saying that there are “fewer democracies in the region today than at any point since the annual report was launched in 1995.” According to the report’s methodology, Hungary is now a “hybrid regime,” having lost its status as a “semi-consolidated democracy” due to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s continued assaults on the country’s democratic institutions. The adoption of an that allows the government to rule by decree indefinitely, brought in after the coronavirus pandemic struck, “has further exposed [and] the undemocratic character of Orbán’s regime,” the authors wrote, adding that “Hungary’s decline has been the most precipitous [they have] ever tracked.” Poland isn’t far behind, according to the report, which says there have been spectacular attacks on the judiciary by the ruling Law and Justice party. And Brussels gets much of the blame. “Neither Poland nor Hungary has faced repercussions for damaging the rule of law at home, and Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party has even remained a member of the mainstream European People’s Party, the largest grouping in the European Parliament,” according to the report, adding that U.S. President Donald Trump has also “failed to stand up for democracy in the region.” In response, Zoltán Kovács, Hungary’s secretary of state for international communication and relations, said on that Freedom House “was once known as the bipartisan human rights organization. With their [George] Soros funding they’ve declined, becoming the fist of the party that is the Soros network. Anyone who doesn’t conform to their liberal view, gets downgraded.” The report also has serious concerns about the Balkans. “Years of … strongman tactics employed by Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia and Milo Đukanović in Montenegro have tipped those countries over the edge,” it says. “For the first time since 2003, they are no longer categorized as democracies.” The assessment comes on the day of an , which was supposed to be held in Croatia but will now take place over videolink. The Freedom House report says foreign influence has been a destabilizing factor. “In addition to Russia’s continued malign influence, China has been advancing an ambitious foreign policy in practically all of the region’s 29 countries,” the authors say. “Xi Jinping’s regime is not so much spreading its own one-party model as it is spreading its influence … taking advantage of institutional weaknesses, and wedging itself into corrupt political and economic structures.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Impact – China

China uses an autocratic Hungary to expand its sphere of influence to challenge NATO in Europe.

FrançOis Venne, 1-6-2022, François Venne is a Title VIII Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Venne holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy degree from The Fletcher School at Tufts University (as of May 2021) where he concentrated in International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution and Political Systems and Theories. He is also a proud College of the Holy Cross alumnus having earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies and French, with a minor in Religious Studies.  China in Hungary: Real Threat or False Alarm?, CEPA, jkap

In April 2021, Hungary blocked an EU (European Union) statement condemning China for its authoritarian Hong Kong security law, its latest in a series of efforts shielding the Chinese regime from criticism.1 The backlash from the EU and its largest member, Germany, was fierce. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called Hungary’s move an “absolutely incomprehensible” action that prevented the EU from speaking with “one voice” over China.2 “This is not the first time that Hungary has broken away from [the EU’s] unity when it comes to the issue of China,” Maas said.2 Nor will it likely be the last. Since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán came to power in 2010 and Hungary joined the 16+1 Initiative in 2012 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has become an important factor in Hungary-EU relations. Western claims that Hungary was or is becoming a Chinese “puppet”3 or “Trojan horse”4 that could damage the EU’s unity from within have become commonplace; they are often fueled by incidents such as the blocked EU statement and Orbán’s insistence on treating China as a partner and ally rather than as a competitor and rival. Hungary’s technological dealings with China also actively concern the US; Hungary’s use of China’s Huawei tech despite US pressure has especially been a source of tension between the two governments. In short, Budapest’s relations with Beijing, especially with regard to the BRI, have heightened tensions with the US, the EU, and within Hungary itself. Ultimately, how the transatlantic alliance finds itself challenged by the Sino-Hungarian relationship informs how the US and EU choose to respond. This report therefore seeks to answer the following questions: In what ways does Hungary’s political-economic relationship with China impact the transatlantic alliance as it seeks to counter China? How can and should the US respond to these concerns, if at all? To address these questions, the remainder of this report proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Hungary’s relationship with the EU and the US. Section 3 explains how the Hungary-China relationship concerns the transatlantic alliance. Section 4 explains the nature of and dispels myths about Hungary’s relationship with China and describes the driving force behind the relationship. Section 5 discusses policy options and proposes a set of policy solutions. Section 5 concludes. With the end of the Cold War and Hungary’s acceptance into NATO and the EU in 1999 and 2004 respectively, Hungary became a welcomed and involved member of the transatlantic community. Since Orbán came to power in 2010, however, Hungary’s relationships with the EU and the US have been tense, with China becoming a particular irritant in recent years. The Hungary-EU relationship has proved politically tense but economically strong over the past decade, with both Hungarian domestic politics and foreign policy toward undemocratic states such as China playing an important role. Since 2010, EU member Hungary has touted itself domestically as an “illiberal democracy”6 and a one-party state at the heart of Europe, distancing itself from its “traditional [European] democratic allies,”7 and drawing closer to other, non-European regimes such as China, Russia, and Turkey.8 Claiming it has systematically failed to comply with EU norms, policies, and expectations such as protecting the rule of law and standing for democracy,9 the EU has criticized Hungary for behaving like a “rogue state”7 within Europe. Hungary has flatly denied all accusations of wrongdoing, calling the EU a “liberal empire”7 and claiming it abuses its power, targets the state, and unjustly meddles in its domestic affairs. Driven by Orbán, Hungary’s conflict with the EU has become especially acute. Elected in 2010, Orbán has gradually “align[ed] the judicial, executive and legislative branches”11 in favor of his national-conservative, right-wing Fidesz party, effectively turning Hungary into a one-party state.In September 2018, the tension between Hungary and the EU worsened when the European Parliament voted to trigger Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union, an action that could ultimately threaten Hungary’s EU funding and voting rights.6 This past year, they have further clashed or diverged on several foreign policy issues, with China most recently taking center stage. For instance, as internal strife began in Belarus following the (still) disputed results of the August 2021 presidential election, Orbán’s Hungary, which shares Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian tendencies,12 called simply for dialogue with Belarus as the rest of the EU called for diplomatic or economic coercion.13 Later, in November 2020, Hungary blocked the EU budget including a COVID-19 relief package, objecting to a provision that would make funds contingent upon a country’s respect for democratic norms.14 Most recently, Hungary blocked or refused to sign several EU statements criticizing China for its actions related to Hong Kong and the South China Sea, and atrocities against the Uyghurs. This political tension has not led to economic friction, let alone a decoupling of their economies. Indeed, despite Hungary’s Opening to the East Strategy of cultivating economic links with China through 16+1 and BRI, Hungary-EU economic ties remain significant. For instance, Hungary continues to receive over €4bn ($4.6bn) from the EU per year, while contributing less than €1bn ($1.16bn) to the EU budget,16 making it the fourth-largest net recipient of EU funding.17 The EU also is Hungary’s largest economic partner, with 82% of its exports going to EU member states and 75% of its imports coming from within the EU.16 Eight of its 10 top importers and nine of its 10 top exporters are EU members (the UK is its tenth importer, Russia is its ninth exporter, and China is its third exporter).18 Germany, its top trading partner both for imports (25.3%) and exports (27.7%),18 is particularly important to Hungary, leading to a largely positive relationship that Hungary has come to depend on.19 Berlin therefore holds a level of economic and political leverage over Budapest that few, if any, other countries share.20 The US-Hungary relationship has also weathered some tension over the past decade, some related to domestic Hungarian affairs and others to China (see Figure 2). As Hungary trended toward authoritarianism, the US, led by President Barack Obama — a self-described champion of democracy, liberalism, and the rule of law — gave Orbán the cold shoulder, effectively cutting off high-level contacts.21 With Hungary’s interest in political recognition secondary to its desire for national security that the US — and not the EU — could offer through NATO, such lack of American appreciation, though problematic, would not generate outright anti-Americanism. Additionally, Orbán said in 2016 that “economic relations… [remained] good” during this period.22 This tame response reflects Hungary’s inherent dependence on the US and a respect for its power. Under President Donald Trump, relations saw an immediate reset. Orbán “welcomed” Trump’s 2016 presidential victory8 and Trump equally welcomed Orbán, inviting him to the White House in May 2019 to “lavish praise” on the prime minister.23 Orbán’s Hungary and Trump’s America shared an embrace of nationalism, “authoritarian populist"24 governance, and skepticism of Western alliances, but they did have tense moments. For instance, the US considered Hungary a “growing liability” for the transatlantic alliance and reportedly considered sanctioning Orbán’s close associates in 2019.25 One significant “liability” is Hungary’s continued use of China’s Huawei 5G technology,26 despite US warnings that Huawei is a national security risk and should be shunned.5 Orbán’s government even allowed Huawei to establish an R&D center in Budapest in 2020 This tech-driven tension that originated during the Trump era remains a growing issue and one of the Biden administration’s primary challenges as it seeks to strengthen its leadership and improve its competitiveness in the CEE region. CHALLENGES POSED TO THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE BY HUNGARY-CHINA RELATIONS. The Sino-Hungarian relationship has raised the transatlantic alarm and ultimately creates the following primary challenges: First, it emboldens Orbán and exacerbates ideological and policy divisions within the EU, making a united EU and joint US-EU response to China more difficult. Second, BRI and the relationship lays bare the US’s inability to establish a strong economic presence in the CEE region to compete with China. Additionally, the relationship, especially Hungary’s use of Huawei, puts into relief the US’s lack of technology leadership on infrastructure and telecommunications networks development in Europe. Responding to these challenges requires strategies at the US and transatlantic levels. The West must be careful not to misjudge the nature and degree of the threat the Sino-Hungarian relationship poses or misunderstand what drives the relationship, lest it overreact politically and worsen the situation. UNDERSTANDING HUNGARY-CHINA RELATIONS To properly address the challenges posed by Hungary-China relations, the transatlantic alliance must understand several points. First, contrary to the perception created by the Hungarian and Chinese governments, the relationship offers limited economic benefits for Hungary, which therefore remains largely dependent upon the EU and the US. Second, Orbán himself is the main driving force behind Hungary’s pro-China policy; his personal cost-benefit analysis of working with China comes before Hungary’s more generally. Third and last, there is a minimal threat to the transatlantic alliance of a Chinese “Trojan horse” in Hungary controlling foreign policy. THE PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY OF HUNGARY'S GAINS Seeking to ease its economic dependence on the West following the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary adopted an “Opening to the East Strategy” to cultivate ties with China; the 16+1 initiative and BRI were therefore welcome opportunities. From the start of 16+1 and BRI, the Hungarian and Chinese governments have pointed to developments that suggest Hungary gains substantially from the relationship and that their ties are “prosperous,” in the words of Xinhua, a Chinese state-run news agency.28 For instance, the governments note that China is now Hungary’s greatest trade partner outside of the EU, with annual trade worth approximately $9 bn.29 Since 2013, Hungary has been one the largest recipients of the billions of dollars China has poured into infrastructure projects in CEE.30 It boasts the highest level of cumulative Chinese FDI from 2000 to 2020 of all the EU’s CEE countries, ($3.1 bn), 23% more than second-place Poland (see Figure 3).31 Hungary also reports that last year China invested almost $6 bn in the country (see Figure 4), more than most other CEE members.32 Hungary and China have also signed a deal to build the Belgrade-to-Budapest railway.33 Furthermore, the Chinese and Hungarian governments have frequently held talks at 16+1 summits and BRI forums, and established a “comprehensive strategic partnership,”34 setting the stage for further cooperation. At first glance, these developments give the impression that Hungary has seen large gains and has strengthened its ties with China — and thereby has also decreased its dependence on the EU. The reality, however, is a different story. Few, if any, experts find that Hungary has gained economically from its relations with China in a way that substantially threatens the EU. Most, in fact, find the opposite.35 Hungary’s post-2010 gains have been modest, exaggerated, or underwhelming at best, and completely lacking at worst. First, the Opening to the East policy has failed to deliver, with Hungary increasing its trade dependence on China from 2009 to 2014 by less than 0.5%36 and keeping its trade dependence on the EU at over 75%. Second, Hungary’s $3.2 bn cumulative completed Chinese FDI is minimal compared with the rest of Europe; Germany and the UK have received more than 9 times that amount (see Figure 3), reflecting China’s priorities and preference for ties with Western Europe over Hungary. Third, Hungary received only $4.07 bn in Chinese investment last year — not $5.95 bn or $5.36 bn, as the Hungarian and Chinese governments respectively claimed. Indeed, both governments inflated their figures to create the illusion that China was more invested and involved in Hungary than it actually was (see Figure 4).36 Fourth, the Belgrade-to-Budapest railway offers little, if any, economic benefit to Hungary; some estimates suggest it could take between 130 and 2,400 years (!) before Hungary makes a profit from it.37 Fifth, from 2010 to 2019, Hungary-China export and import levels decreased — not increased — by 16% and 14% respectively.38 The reality is clear: The cost-benefit analysis shows that Hungary, as opposed to Orbán himself, gains little from its relationship with China. Rationally speaking, abandoning the EU and the US in favor of China is not in Hungary’s economic or political interests.

ORBAN's 'ONE MAN SHOW' If Hungary does not economically profit from its relationship with China, what drives the relationship and why does Hungary push to work with China? The answer: Orbán. As an authoritarian leader, one of Orbán’s main goals, especially approaching this year’s elections, is to maintain his support and legitimize his illiberal regime, sometimes even at a cost to his country. Following this logic, the prime minister cultivates a relationship with China for several key reasons: Orbán seeks to maintain a set of strong illiberal “friends,” such as Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and China, that legitimize his regime. In other words, in cultivating economic partnerships with countries like China, Orbán seeks to ensure that he has economic and political alternatives if he should sever Hungary’s relationship with the EU and the US. Once Orbán realized the Chinese government would ultimately not be Hungary’s economic savior, he began to leverage Beijing for political gain in his battles with Brussels. By threatening to turn toward China, Orbán seeks to create the impression that he has a strong hand. In politics, perception often trumps reality. Orbán’s inner circle directly gains from his relationship with China. For example, Opus Global, a company controlled by Orbán’s oligarch friend Lőrinc Mészáros, “won” the contract to build Hungary’s section of the Budapest-to-Belgrade railway. The $2.1 bn deal could earn Mészáros a princely sum.39 Ultimately, Hungary’s China policy is “not a national strategy, but a one-man show,” says Tamás Matura, an expert on central and eastern Europe’s relations with China.40 The relationship is a function of Orbán himself. The opposition parties and candidates do not share the prime minister’s regard for China, especially since the controversy around the creation of China’s Fudan University campus in Budapest showed that being anti-China can poll well. If Orbán were to lose to the United Opposition in Hungary’s 2022 parliamentary elections, the country would likely do an about-face on its China policy.40 THE TROJAN HORSE FALSE ALARM Ever since Hungary-China relations intensified in the early 2010s, journalists and news organizations have peddled the idea that Hungary is China’s “Trojan horse” in Europe,41 implying that China has influence in and control over Hungary and thereby poses a threat to the EU. Some scholars argue that China invests in CEE countries such as Hungary to achieve political objectives such as a pro-China EU policy42 and that China strategically invests in countries that offer a potentially high political reward.43 If indeed true, Hungary would therefore become a threat to be addressed aggressively and rapidly by the West. Admittedly, China possesses indirect influence over Hungarian foreign policy through the prime minister: The more Chinese investment benefits Orbán personally, more he will encourage the government to adopt pro-China stances and partnerships such as the Belgrade-to-Budapest railway. Indeed, even without Chinese pressure to engage, Orbán seeks to cultivate ties and reap his own benefits from Chinese investments in Hungary, whether or not his country does.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Impact – Cohesion/Russia

Poor relations with Hungary and Poland undermine unity in the alliance and pose a threat to NATO’s response to Russia

Jonathan Katz and Torrey Taussig, 7-10-2018, (Torrey Taussig was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center.) "An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/, accessed 7-22-2022,[ONHS HC]

The overriding concern of this week’s NATO Summit will be cohesion, with the security alliance facing crises of disunity on multiple fronts. In the West, President Donald Trump repeatedly calls into question NATO’s strategic value and berates America’s closest allies. Already, he has sent to the leaders of several NATO member-states demanding they do more to pay their own way. In the East, an aggressive Russia has used conventional and nonconventional weapons to invade sovereign states and undermine European and American security. In continental Europe, migrant and refugee flows not seen since World War II are roiling internal politics within frontline and destination states. There is also significant democratic backsliding among NATO member states. The cast of illiberal characters—who are leading the charge in the wrong direction—includes the recently reelected and empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party in Poland, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party. Each has proven more than willing to repress free media, dismantle checks and balances, demonize political opposition, clamp down on civil society, and diminish the rule of law. America’s democratic system and norms under President Trump are also under duress; as a result, Freedom House on the basis of weakening political rights and civil liberties. Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will exacerbate already tense divisions in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them.Russia is already benefiting from and effectively leveraging its relationships with Hungary and Turkey to exacerbate discord within Europe and NATO. Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin see one another as allies in their and Orbán has courted Russian and political support as he builds an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Russian propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungarian media. A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that Russian state-owned media content “by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hungary.” The report cited Orbán as the EU and NATO’s most supportive leader of Putin’s worldview and leadership. Acting as the Russian “camel’s nose under the tent,” Orbán is thwarting Ukraine and NATO’s partnership efforts by blocking the Ukraine-NATO Commission from meeting at the upcoming summit. In Turkey, Erdoğan has rattled the NATO alliance by pursuing a deal to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia. In addition to hurting NATO’s ability to cooperate on security, the system is also with NATO’s defenses. Through arms and energy deals, Putin uses Turkey as a wedge to divide NATO. Similarly, Erdoğan might see his deals with Putin as a way to free Turkey from Western leverage, particularly as on his brand of authoritarian politics by cutting EU pre-accession funds. After winning the recent twin parliamentary and presidential elections, an emboldened Erdoğan will likely become an even more problematic partner for NATO. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies. Other illiberal and populist governments, including Italy’s new anti-establishment government, could follow suit in enhancing their partnerships with Russia, creating future intelligence-sharing and cohesion problems for the alliance. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies, including electoral process and open information spaces. There is a between democratic governance and security gains. Liberal democracies have historically been less likely to experience intra- and interstate conflict, generate refugees, and harbor violent extremists. They are also better at maintaining transparent institutions, civilian control of the military and intelligence services, and working together on confidence-building measures, all of which are core features of NATO’s ability to collectively defend its members. On the other hand, corruption and insecurity grow under politicized institutions and poor rule of law. This hurts NATO’s renewed efforts to combat terrorism, as military and security communities have long acknowledged the connection between corruption and the existence of criminal networks, traffickers, and terrorists within state borders. Corruption also opens space for Russian kleptocratic networks close to Putin to operate and gain influence. For example, in 2014 Orbán awarded Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear company, the sole contract to build two nuclear plants in Hungary from Moscow. The Hungarian parliament, dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz Party, then passed a rushed vote to keep data from the nuclear deal confidential for 30 years in the name of “national security.” The deal diminished transparent economic competition within the European Union and solidified Hungary and Russia’s energy ties. Distrust among allies hurts alliance interoperability. The PiS Party’s assault on independent media and the Constitutional Court, including efforts last week to summarily force out , have isolated Poland from France and Germany, diminishing trust among the European nations. This could make it increasingly difficult for Washington to gain consensus on joint decisions, communications, and operations. If NATO is dedicated to building resiliency along Russia’s periphery by placing multi-national battalions in Poland, then it should not ignore the accountable institutions that would strengthen this joint effort.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Impact – Russia

Hungary is the main conduit to Russian influence, only the counterplan can solve.

James Kirchick, 1-7-2019, "Is Hungary becoming a rogue state in the center of Europe?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/is-hungary-becoming-a-rogue-state-in-the-center-of-europe/,

Most of the international criticism directed at Hungary over the past nine years has focused on domestic indicators such as the rule of law, separation of powers and press freedom. Prime Minister Viktor Orban has been remarkably blunt about his designs for Hungary, citing China, Russia and Turkey as models. After an election in April widely deemed free but not fair, he sounded a triumphal note, declaring that “the era of liberal democracy is over.” Since Orban won reelection, however, his behavior has called into question not only his democratic bona fides, but also his basic trustworthiness as an ally of the United States and member of the democratic Western world. Increasingly, Hungary is behaving like a rogue state. Consider the actions that Orban and his Fidesz Party government have taken in the past few weeks. Last month, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, the Hungarian envoy did his best to sabotage any improvement in relations between the Western alliance and Ukraine. As its excuse the Budapest government is using a recent language-law reform in Ukraine that allegedly threatens the Hungarian-speaking minority. By exploiting such a frivolous issue to obstruct NATO support for Ukraine—whose land Russia seized in the first armed territorial annexation on the European continent since World War II—Hungary is doing Moscow’s bidding.

Nor is this the first time that the Hungarians have done so. In late November, Hungary denied a U.S. request to extradite a pair of Russian arms dealers who had attempted to sell antiaircraft missiles to Mexican drug cartels. Instead of handing over the father-and-son weapons traffickers to a fellow NATO ally, Orban’s government allowed the men safe passage back to Russia. Though Hungary formally supports European Union sanctions on Russia, Orban has been the most vociferous internal critic of the measures, frequently calling for them to be dropped. At a time when Europe has shunned Russian President Vladimir Putin for his aggression against Ukraine and manifold other abuses, the Russian leader has made multiple, friendly visits to the Hungarian capital, where Orbán has embraced him. Today Hungary is considered by some in the intelligence world to be the main conduit for Russian influence-peddling within the Western alliance. “There is tremendous concern that Russia is basically using Hungary as an intel forward operating base in NATO and the EU,” a former official at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest told Politico in 2017. Orban shares with Putin a dark predilection ostensibly proscribed by membership in Western institutions such as the E.U. and NATO: revanchism. A century after Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory as a result of World War I, inflaming nationalist sentiment among the Hungarian diaspora living in the region remains a priority for the Hungarian right. Last summer, at the same political festival in Romania where, four years earlier, he had hailed the onset of the “illiberal state,” Orban delivered a disturbingly irredentist speech to the local Hungarian community. Repeatedly referring to the Romanian territory on which he stood by its Hungarian name, “Székely Land,” he attacked the Romanian government for allegedly saying that “Székely Land doesn’t exist” and insisted that “Székely Land will still exist when the whole of Europe has already submitted to Islam.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Impact – Russia

Absent US intervention, Hungary and Poland will threaten to escalate conflict with Russia

Daniel Hegedus, Opinion Contributor, 5-12-2021, (Daniel Hegedüs is visiting fellow for Central Europe at GMF. He writes and speaks extensively on populism and democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, and the European and foreign affairs of the Visegrad countries. He is frequently quoted in outlets such as AFP, the Financial Times, the New York Times, Euractiv, EU Observer and Der Spiegel. He has studied political science, history, and European law at the Eötvös Loránd University Budapest and Humboldt University in Berlin.) "Why the US should meddle in Europe to stop autocratizing NATO allies," Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/552402-why-the-us-should-meddle-in-europe-to-stop-autocratizing-nato/, accessed 7-22-2022,[ONHS HC]

While the Biden administration has elevated the fight against authoritarian trends and corruption to a foreign policy priority, the U.S. now faces a tough challenge to its democracy agenda: the authoritarian developments among its European NATO allies, particularly Hungary and Poland. Both countries experienced the sharpest decline in democratic quality in the Western world since the recent incumbents, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in Hungary and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, came to power in 2010 and 2015, respectively. The fact that neither of the world’s two leading democracy-measuring institutions — and — considers Hungary to be any sort of democracy anymore should raise alarm about the true authoritarian nature of illiberal projects among U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe. If Washington turns a blind eye to the authoritarian developments in its own self-described, value-based alliance system, the U.S. risks running into the accusation of double standards, which may significantly weaken its democracy agenda. However, the autocratization of Hungary and Poland poses more challenges for the U.S. than just its credibility when it comes to democracy and rule of law. Besides Turkey, Hungary is the only NATO member state that fails to comply, not only with democratic values that the current administration promotes, but also with the foreign policy priorities and interests of the U.S. regarding China and Russia. In stark contrast to Budapest, Poland’s commitment to NATO has been unshakeable because of the existential stemming from Russia. Warsaw also has been ready in the past to comply with Washington’s main expectations regarding China, in order to keep the U.S. engaged as a security provider on . However, since the Biden administration took office, Poland appears to be distancing itself from Washington’s China policy by seeking a more intense and balanced relationship with Beijing and labeling U.S.-China strategic competition as a “bilateral issue.” Warsaw may believe it has the upper hand in U.S.-Poland bilateral relations if it rests on the assumption that the U.S. won’t reduce its security engagement on the Eastern Flank without undermining its own strategic approach to NATO. According to the Polish perception, the Biden administration cannot credibly threaten Poland with weakening security cooperation if the PiS government further proceeds with its authoritarian agenda. How can Washington then address the autocratization of its Central European NATO allies, Hungary and Poland, and their rapprochement with Beijing? While U.S. influence over Hungary might be limited, Washington still does have significant leverage over Poland because of Warsaw’s substantial interest in security cooperation. Washington should be ready to play out the security card to put pressure on Warsaw. First, it should calibrate its diplomatic and policy moves in a way that drives a wedge between Poland and Hungary. This could allow European Union institutions to address authoritarian developments in both countries, but primarily in Hungary, more effectively. How can such a strategy be realized? U.S. diplomacy should clearly communicate with Poland that Warsaw’s strategic alliance with Budapest poses a heavy burden on any further deepening of the security cooperation.Washington also should use the security cooperation card on the Polish domestic stage to weaken the vanguards of authoritarian politics in the Polish government coalition and strengthen moderate forces. It should communicate the message on all available channels that the policies of Justice Minister pose severe obstacles to deeper transatlantic relations, while Deputy Prime Minister should be backed in parallel. Furthermore, as a strong contrast to former approach to the European Union, should recognize — and use — EU institutions as potential vehicles for amplifying U.S. interests. In this spirit, the U.S. should elevate the question of autocratizing EU member states to the highest levels of the transatlantic dialogue and create a discourse of reciprocity with regard to the democracy homework that both the U.S. and the EU have to do on the home front. The U.S. recently started working on strengthening democracy at home after Trump’s four-year onslaught on democratic institutions, but the EU largely has failed to do so for a decade. Since the European Union expressed its high expectations for a renewal and reinforcement of U.S. democracy, Washington should not shy away from communicating the same message to EU institutions and key European governments, including Germany. Germany lately has evolved into a key autocracy-enabler within the EU, so Berlin’s policy toward Budapest and Warsaw also should be put on the U.S.-German bilateral relations agenda.To provide the appropriate impetus for U.S.-EU dialogue on authoritarian developments in Europe, and to push EU institutions toward a more activist approach, Washington could consider moves that may ridicule EU passivity, especially towards Hungary. In similar fashion, as it happened recently with former Slovak general prosecutor , the Biden administration should trigger sanction mechanisms against key stakeholders of political corruption in Hungary — potentially including general prosecutor ; the regime’s top oligarch, ; or Orbán’s son-in-law, . That would put pressure on the EU to act and could help to push forward the application of the EU’s rule of law conditionality regulation, which is actually suspended. With an eye on the upcoming 2022 elections in Hungary, the U.S. should emphasize the question of electoral integrity both in its dialogue with the EU and within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe () and should act proactively to put in place a robust international electoral monitoring mission under an OSCE flag. On a bilateral level, the U.S. should renew its commitment to supporting democracy in central and eastern Europe, making financial resources available for the support of critical civil society and free media, and calibrating priorities in a way that will allow for grants to have real impact on the ground. If Washington would like to preserve the credibility of its democracy agenda, it must address the autocratization of its Central European allies in a convincing way. However, it can only succeed if the Biden administration is ready to meddle in European politics in unprecedented ways.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Impact – Democracy

Democratic backsliding in Hungary sends global signal, only the CP reverses failed western response.

Daniel HegedüS 22, 5-10-2022, visiting fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, He researches populism and democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, he has studied political science, history, and European law at the Eötvös Loránd University Budapest and Humboldt University in Berlin, US, EU Face Higher Hurdles Now for Action Against Orbán’s Tightening Grip in Hungary, https://www.justsecurity.org/81438/us-eu-face-higher-hurdles-now-for-action-against-orbans-tightening-grip-in-hungary/, HKeef

Even if overshadowed by the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Orbán’s recent landslide victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections was an important turning point for the Western world’s democratic credibility.

The implications of Orbán winning a fourth consecutive term as prime minister and a fresh constitutional supermajority for his Fidesz party, even in the face of a united opposition this time, will be far-reaching. Hungary’s Western partners must draw the right lessons from a historical juncture that has further cemented Hungary’s path of autocratization, alongside similarly disturbing trends in the region in Poland.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Conditions Solve Democracy

Democracy in Hungary is in shambles and future is not bright- must act now.

Julianne Cullen 22, 4-20-2022, [Democratic Erosion is a multi-university consortium that helps students and faculty evaluate threats to democracy both at home and abroad through the lens of theory, history, and social science.] "Viktor Orban’s Hungary: A Democracy Backsliding," Democratic Erosion,

With the end of the Cold War and fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the political systems of eastern Europe began to undergo massive change. As countries transitioned away from the communist regimes of the past, many nations opted to lay foundations for democracy. Hungary was one of those countries and embodied a young, stable democracy for three decades. However, in the time since 2010, Hungary’s democratic state has weakened substantially. A prime factor in the Hungarian democracy’s backsliding is the actions of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his right-wing party, Fidesz. Orbán and Fidesz represent autocratic leadership with stark nationalist attitudes, and a demonstrated dedication to anti-immigration policies. Alongside that, the two entities have dismantled core democratic institutions and have produced unfree and unfair elections. The tactics deployed by Orbán and Fidesz are exceedingly worrisome, not only for Hungarian freedom but for the dangerous example they set for the other young democracies of the world. 

Orbán’s lack of political forbearance in the abuse of Hungary’s constitution has greatly contributed to Hungarian democracy’s decline. Forbearance is commonly recognized as self-restraint in the exercise of power. Orbán has rewritten several components of the constitution in recent years, allowing him to secure more power for himself and his party. Upon the widespread firing of civil servants, Orbán installed members of his own party to aid in blurring the lines between state government and Fidesz. Another corrosive action has been the expansion of Hungary’s constitutional courts, the body responsible for overseeing the fairness/constitutionality of parliamentary acts. Orbán  with Fidesz loyalists who then neglected to call out his authoritarian ways. He also gerrymandered parliamentary districts to break up the anti-Fidesz vote amongst the electorate. None of Orbán’s constitutional actions are illegal, but they all are extremely corrosive to democracy. A central component of a strong democracy is a respect for democracy itself. Forbearance is a respect for democracy, and Orbán’s lack of forbearance has proven detrimental to Hungary’s democratic future.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Conditions Solve Democracy

Hungarian nationalism, militarism, and relations with revisionist countries growing- NATO must act now

Bergmann and Ciccarelli 20, 8-17-2020, [The Center for American Progress is an independent, nonpartisan policy institute.] "Why Hungary’s Democratic Backsliding Should Prompt NATO To Act," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/hungarys-democratic-backsliding-prompt-nato-act/

On June 6, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Órban visited a small town on the Hungarian-Slovak border to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The agreement, signed in the wake of World War I, dramatically shrunk Hungary’s territory from its Austro-Hungarian empire borders, resulting in Hungary ceding two-thirds of its territory and leaving sizable populations of ethnic Hungarians outside of the new boundaries. In , which was imbued with nationalist resentment, Órban described every Hungarian child inside and outside of the country’s borders as a “guard post” to protect national identity. Additionally, he boasted about the speed at which Hungary has increased defense spending and built “a new army,” proclaiming, “We haven’t been this strong in a hundred years.”

Órban’s deliberately provocative and threatening speech was not a nationalist dog whistle intended only for the Hungarian public. Rather, it directly suggested that a significant amount of territory belonging to Hungary’s neighbors to the east—Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine—should be considered Hungarian.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › Conditions Solve Democracy

Conditioning the benefits Hungary and Poland receive from the US and NATO is key to maintaining democratic values within the alliance

Cordelia Buchanan, 2-4-2021, "What Can We Do About Poland and Hungary?," (Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek was a Title VIII Fellow in the Transatlantic Leadership program at CEPA. Buchanan Ponczek graduated from the University of Oxford with an MPhil (dist.) in Russian and East European Studies and was awarded the Michael Kaser Prize for the best political economy thesis. Previously, she earned her BA (magna cum laude) in Political Science at Miami University, with a focus on Russian kleptocracy and petroleum transit in the Caspian Sea region. At CEPA, she will research the domestic drivers of Polish and Hungarian foreign policy.) CEPA, https://cepa.org/what-can-we-do-about-poland-and-hungary/, accessed 7-22-2022,[ONHS HC]

Governments in Poland and Hungary — U.S. allies and members of NATO and the European Union — continue to pursue policies that are fundamentally at odds with healthy democratic development and that marginalize some of their most vulnerable communities. Outsiders have lumped the phenomena in Poland and Hungary together, but that glosses over some important differences between the two countries and possible approaches to their situations. In Hungary, changes to electoral law and deteriorating economic and political institutions put the country in a precarious place, compounded by the government’s cooperation with other nondemocratic regimes. Poland has maintained its strategic alignment with the United States and economic integrity, but its domestic politics and social policies are worrisome. Both governments were democratically elected and earned a legitimate mandate to rule from their populations. Both governments also assert that external actors should keep out of their domestic affairs. Nevertheless, as an ally and active promoter of democracy in the region, the United States must find a way to head off decline. Through diplomatic pressure, the incoming administration should strongly advocate minority rights and support regional civil society. With other partners, such as the EU and NATO, the United States should establish democratic expectations and make it clear to the Polish and Hungarian governments that accountable governance through rule of law and democratic norms is the key to stability and partnership. INTRODUCTION In 2020, covid-19 swept through the globe, causing a public health and economic crisis. To offset the economic fallout, the European Union set up a recovery fund. There was a hitch: the European Commission would hand out money from the fund only to members that demonstrated respect for the rule of law, a condition that EU leaders had for years been seeking to link to other funding disbursements. This stipulation targeted primarily Poland and Hungary, which then blocked approval of the EU budget and recovery fund. Refusing to back down, the EU threatened to cut Hungary and Poland out of the covid fund if the gridlock was not resolved. The commission was not alone: Majorities in all European countries, including Poland and Hungary, support the principle of tying EU funds to respect for the rule of law. In the resulting compromise, the EU Parliament passed the rule of law conditionality, but the EU Commission had to make several concessions on language, scope, and enforcement. This flurry of political developments is the culmination of years of accusations that governments in Poland and Hungary are pursuing domestic policies at odds with their democratic mandate, resulting in a great deal of head-scratching about how outside parties should respond. Earlier in 2020, Freedom House downgraded the most democracies ever in its 25 years of compiling the Nations in Transit report. Poland and Hungary stood out as the worst examples of democratic decline. Critics have accused Hungary’s Fidesz-led government, which came to leadership in 2010 under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, of consolidating power by undermining independent media and the judiciary, changing election laws, and facilitating corruption. In Poland, the Law and Justice-led coalition (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, styled “PiS”) has drawn criticism throughout its five years in power, especially for its changes to the judiciary, which the EU and other critics say undermine the rule of law and violate the principles of EU membership. The PiS and Fidesz governments defend their policies as necessary. Domestically, both parties’ focus on economic development and social spending have won them a mandate to rule, especially from rural voters. The charge that democracy in Poland and Hungary is deteriorating is serious and has prompted calls for intervention. As a bilateral ally, NATO member, and promoter of democracy in the region, the United States has an important role to play in addressing challenges to the rule of law and its consequences for democracy. This paper argues that Poland and Hungary are pursuing policies that erode the rule of law and democratic norms. It also argues there are key differences between the two countries, all of which put Hungary on a more worrying trajectory. The United States should maintain its role as an active promoter of democracy in the region and continue to advocate minority rights, support civil society, and stress to the Polish and Hungarian governments that accountable governance through rule of law and democratic norms is the key to stability and partnership. To do this, the United States should lead with diplomacy and set the conditions that will safeguard its relationships in central and eastern Europe, a region that still matters for the United States’ strategic interests. In this report, Section 1 will explain the spectrum of concepts and definitions applied to the domestic situations in Poland and Hungary. Section 2 provides an account of each country’s recent domestic developments. Section 3 gives broader context for attacks on the rule of law and backsliding. Section 4 notes differences between Poland and Hungary. Section 5 offers a discussion on policy options, makes recommendations, and concludes. SECTION 1. TERMS Experts debate what to call the situation in Poland and Hungary, and its causes. Some call it backsliding. Others call it a “playbook of autocracy” or “autocrat's playbook.” Still, others consider it a mere hiccup not indicative of a lasting deviation from the countries’ prior trajectories: All democracies have occasional problems, and Poland and Hungary are not swerving off democratic course. Even the concept of democracy is complex and encompasses a spectrum of systems. Populism and backsliding are separate phenomena that feed off each other. Populism enables a party or political formation’s path to power; backsliding is the way that power is wielded and maintained through twisting proper governing mechanisms. Populist rhetoric provides a narrative of why for the ruling party — why the country is in danger; why the party is the only hope for salvation and ought to be voted into power; why governing mechanisms need to be altered. Backsliding is how those ruling parties stay in power. It is the sum of measures taken to ensure that the power structures are still secure in favor of the ruling party even if the electorate has a change of heart or stops believing the narrative. Related to this, one prevailing explanation for populism’s success is a divided and/or weakened opposition. The opposition’s weakness could in turn be due to the lack of a compelling platform, infighting, or the power of the majority party’s simplistic narrative (especially if it taps into aspects of the electorate’s identity). The rise of populism and concerns over the deterioration of democratic institutions are not unique to Hungary and Poland. Other EU members, and indeed countries around the world, are experiencing these problems to some degree. Ironically, growing illiberalism elsewhere helps the Polish and Hungarian governments claim that the “West” and “Western media” are singling them out — a convenient narrative. SECTION 2. COUNTRY SPECIFICS People wearing protective face masks attend a voting during the presidential election at a polling station in Warsaw, Poland June 28, 2020. Slawomir Kaminski/Agencja Gazeta/via REUTERS Although criticism has intensified in recent years, concerns over the domestic politics of Hungary and Poland date back to the early 2000s and 2010s. Then, onlookers cited Poland as the worse offender. Now, Hungary has taken the lead, with Poland’s government allegedly mimicking the Hungarian government’s methods to keep a grip on power. A summary of developments in the two countries over the past decade shows similarities, but also some striking differences that ought to be noted in assessments and subsequent policy responses. Sketching out events in each country also helps avoid the tendency to draw overly simplistic caricatures. While some comparison can yield valuable insights, if we rely too much on this approach, we risk overlooking some of the nuances specific to each country. <Section 2.1-2.3 5.1 and 3.2 excluded for irrelevance and length> POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Considering the above, U.S. should adopt a cautious and considered approach in addressing concerns over perceived backsliding in Hungary and Poland. The PiS and Fidesz governments were elected democratically, and they represent a sizable number of Polish and Hungarian citizens. Some recent developments in both countries are undoubtedly problematic, but to call foul on the legitimacy of their governments is unwarranted: It’s important to not treat them like fully authoritarian regimes. Advocates of softer measures would steer away from material threats in favor of more political finesse, vocal diplomatic pressure, and institutional weight. The actions of Poland and Hungary come nowhere close to those of countries that have economic or targeted personal sanctions leveled against them, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The United States must maintain influence to address key U.S. interests in the region, allowing strategic objectives to drive its diplomatic priorities while keeping its focus on engaging in areas it can influence. U.S. policymakers can do this by adopting a tandem of internal and external measures. 5.2.1. INTERNAL The United States should establish formal tools to measure the impact of its regional stance on rule of law and threats to democracy. So far, U.S. policymakers have reacted to crises or developments in Poland and Hungary on an ad hoc basis. They have relied on external meters to diagnose the problem and have rushed to do damage control (or not). Instead, the United States should establish its own benchmarks or metrics to gauge whether developments in Poland and Hungary (and any ally facing rule-of-law issues) are impeding strategic objectives, alongside a plan to reassess the U.S. response when Poland and Hungary take measures in line with U.S. goals. Such measurements and procedures would offer stability, consistency, and transparency to regional partners and clarify the U.S. role in encouraging democratic practices and safeguarding strategic goals in Poland and Hungary. The United States should take a harder line toward Hungary’s and Poland’s transgressions, imposing consequences for violations of the rule of law. The incoming administration should make it clear that high-level visits, bilateral cooperation, economic support, and other benefits will depend on meaningful changes in Polish and Hungarian behavior and policy. At the same time, the United States must reassure Poland and Hungary that despite domestic woes, it would defend them against an external threat. In official and unofficial meetings, the United States should press Poland and Hungary on actions that threaten the rule of law or democratic norms, especially laws that restrict the rights of minorities or limit freedom of the press. The United States should encourage greater social freedoms where possible, modeling adherence to the rule of law, political decency, and democratic pluralism at home. The United States should not condition its military aid or weapons sales — vital to U.S. interests in the region — on successful domestic political reforms or EU dialogue. But a loosely connected approach could create an incentive potent enough for the governments in Warsaw and Budapest to sit up and take note. For example, the United States could privately insist on serious, good-faith efforts to revisit certain domestic developments, particularly in the judiciary, civil society, and media, as part of returning to the shared values under which Poland and Hungary came to benefit from a U.S. troop presence along NATO’s eastern border. The United States should support a vigorous and well-funded civil society in the region. The United States has made an enormous difference in central and eastern Europe not with military might or arms sales, but through diplomacy and support for the organizations and people who create democracy. It should return to these people-to-people methods with funding, training, and teaching and learning opportunities for Polish and Hungarian NGOs and civil society, including English- and regional-language NGOs, which inform an ever-wider audience. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden addresses to media after meeting Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski in Warsaw March 18, 2014. 5.2.2. EXTERNAL There are compelling reasons to push for a regional approach to democratic development. An aggressive diplomatic push to bring local actors into a regional dialogue could help realize democratic objectives. The United States must work with allies and partners to keep Hungary and Poland from further degrading the rule of law and to encourage the governments in Warsaw and Budapest to cooperate in addressing shared democratic concerns. The United States can use its considerable influence to push for a structured dialogue within NATO — alone or with support from other members — that explores democratic norms and the safeguarding of democracy. Indeed, a U.S. troop presence in the eastern flank offers more leverage to shape security and political outcomes. Even a “failed” discussion could offer a framework for future talks and, later, arrangements. If dialogue proves difficult, the United States could focus the conversations on responding to shared security threats, such as Russian revanchism or the effects of Chinese economic power. In parallel, the United States could use diplomatic power to support a regional EU-based discussion track. Piggybacking off the NATO discussion, the United States could facilitate a regional dialogue on issues of rule of law and democratic norms. Such conversations would not require any new institution or official bi- or multilateral declarations. Like the NATO conversations, these dialogues would be open-minded and flexible, and focused on getting many interests and players at the table. Some conversations would be best held with U.S. support but with no U.S. representation — to ensure that EU countries feel they are properly representing their regional interests. Other conversations could include envoys from Washington. Still others might include players outside the region, such as Russia and China. Currently, the more the elites in Brussels push, the more the Polish and Hungarian administrations decry an external EU “threat” in order to legitimize their power grabs, but adding the United States as a broker alongside the EU to facilitate these conversations might wear down Poland and Hungary’s rhetoric. Dialing back the heat, even a bit, among Poland, Hungary, and the EU would be conducive to creating structures for future progress. In addition to this, the United States and other regional partners should use Poland and Hungary’s desire for power and prestige within international organizations to leverage for reform. Both countries would need to feel they had something to gain by behaving in line with the norms of those institutions and that they have a legitimate opportunity to wield influence within such organizations. More broadly, the United States needs to be more consistent in its policy toward the transatlantic space. This means not fracturing the EU or threatening the integrity of the alliance. Lack of predictable U.S. policy in central and eastern Europe, and indeed the EU, breeds uncertainty among allies and partners, which encourages them to act in ways counter to U.S. policy objectives, including hedging. This is particularly true in Hungary, which has cultivated close relationships with the governments in Beijing and maintained a close relationship with Putin’s Russia. The United States can expect Orbán to continue to deepen ties with China and Russia, which is strategically smart, but it should use diplomatic ties to remind Orbán of Hungary’s enduring and important relationship with the United States. Hungary may seek diplomatic alternatives in Russia or trade and investment in China, but these are not truly credible alternatives to security and intelligence partnerships with the United States. At the same time, the United States should consider not getting too close to the government in Budapest, whose continued threats to the rule of law will likely undermine its long-term stability and which could increasingly turn to Russia and China for aid. This move away from Budapest might give the government in Warsaw pause, as it sees itself as promoting Western values, in tandem with the United States, in its foreign policy. Both Russia and China have incentives to maintain or exacerbate the current divide between central and eastern Europe on the one hand and the European Union and United States on the other. China poses a lesser threat than Russia to the de facto territorial integrity of countries like Poland and Hungary, but China throws its weight and money around in ways that could further erode democratic norms. At the same time, when considering its relationship with Poland and Hungary, the United States should avoid over-emphasizing its geopolitical competition with China and Russia. At this point, Poland is firmly in the “Western” camp. But countries like Poland and Hungary are encouraged by the economic opportunities China provides, and they should not be forced to choose between the United States and “others.” The United States should be mindful of Russian and Chinese activity in the region but should avoid treating it as moves in a zero-sum game. China and Russia still have largely transactional relationships with Hungary: Russian activity continues to focus on projection of power, and China is focused on sowing economic accord through investment, but the government in Beijing has not seemed eager to dive into domestic politics outside of the political pressure necessary to ensure its own ends. Finally, because the United States is facing some of the same domestic issues as Poland and Hungary, it has an opportunity to speak to the two CEE countries peer-to-peer. Common experience could be a starting point for recommitting to values underlying a healthy democracy. President Biden’s remark at an October 2020 town hall lumping Poland and Hungary in with Belarus as “totalitarian” is not conducive to a constructive dialogue. Indeed, Biden’s victory has gotten a frosty greeting in Poland and Hungary (as opposed to other Western countries), as the two countries anticipate the shift in strategy from the incoming U.S. government. But the Biden Administration could echo the dialogue of healing and return to civility — which it has used domestically — in addressing such topics on the transatlantic space and bi-lateral ties. 5.3 CONCLUSION A more constructive approach to Poland and Hungary is essential for sustainable democratic development and U.S. interests in the CEE region. A successful strategy will require resilient diplomacy backed by rhetoric that reinforces stability rather than provoking confrontation. With this in mind, the United States should not shrink away from calling out its allies on their more egregious policies that harm the region’s most vulnerable communities. The focus must be on keeping Poland and Hungary from decline while encouraging cooperation on shared goals. As a part of this, the United States should bring in the EU and NATO members to uphold democratic norms. Managing the transatlantic relationship — of which Hungary and Poland are a vital part — is a long-term project that can only succeed through pluralism, open dialogue, and a shared set of values and objectives.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF Answers › Nuclear Deterrence Good

Effective Nuclear deterrence reduces the risk for both Nuclear and Conventional conflict between Nuclear Powers.

Bertolin 13 Giorgio Bertolin has a post-graduate diploma in economics from the university of Bristol and is the head of ClimatePartnerItalia To What Extent is Nuclear Deterrence Important in the Post-Cold War World? https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/04/to-what-extent-is-nuclear-deterrence-important-in-the-post-cold-war-world/

The eventuality of a nuclear attack has always represented one of the most dangerous threats to the safety of a country, inasmuch the precision and lethality of nuclear devices permit an adversary to cripple in an extremely short period of time the command, control and communication (C3) structure of the attacked state, in what is called a “decapitation strike” (Walton, 2010: 215). The only effective deterrent for such an attack remains the threat of another nuclear strike, in what is called a “second-strike capability”. Anyway, today’s nuclear threats are extremely different from the ones that lead to the establishment of the classic balance of terror during the Cold War. In a 2008 report, the US Secretary of Defense indicates as the current most urgent causes for concern terrorism and nuclear proliferation (US Secretary of Defense, 2008: 9). The two phenomena are closely linked, since the two most likely scenarios of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons – acquisition of HEU (highly enriched uranium) with or without the assistance of a government and theft or transfer of a completed weapon – require the existence of a nuclear arsenal in a sympathising or unreliable country (Gallucci, 2006: 53). As previously said, the main strategy developed to deal with the threat of a nuclear attack conducted by a non-state actor is expanded deterrence; anyhow, this measure must be implemented by steps to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, that is, the growth in the number of actors armed with nuclear weapons. In fact, the enlargement of the nuclear club has increased the likelihood of a nuclear strike taking place: since a single weapon is sufficient to conduct such an attack, it can be deduced that, while vertical proliferation (the growth in the number of warheads within a country) does not make the eventuality of such an attack more likely, horizontal proliferation does. Nuclear deterrence has traditionally been associated with the neorealist view that a world with more nuclear actors, and ideally a world composed only by nuclear actors, is the prerequisite to a lasting peace founded on the fear of nuclear war (Berkowitz, 1985: 115). However, this model does not consider the current relevance of non-state actors and so-called rogue states and their asymmetrical relationship with the traditional players. One of the most serious challenges to nuclear deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age is, in fact, represented by the issue of its applicability to actors with a different behaviour than the Cold War-era US and USSR (Walton, 2010: 214). These new actors may not conform to a model of rational behaviour, the latter being a fundamental prerequisite for deterrence to work. Hence, the major contemporary challenge for nuclear deterrence is to find ways to adapt itself to actors that may be non-rational: this means forcing them to assume a rational behaviour. The reduction of the “nuclear threshold” referred to in the US Nuclear Posture Review can be read in the light of these facts not as an introduction of flexible response strategies in nuclear policy, but as an action consistent with the need for improved deterrence schemes. Being credibility far more influential than capability as a variable that decides the effectiveness of a nuclear deterrent (Lowther, 2009: 32), the aggressive policy of nuclear pre-emption which is discussed in the above said document and in the US National Military Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006: 18) can be seen as a way to make the prospect of nuclear attack more real in the minds of the potential enemies of the US. Since the nuclear taboo does not apply to terrorist organisations or rogue states ruled by irrational leaders, the only way to counter them is acting as if its validity was lost also for the traditional actors (in this case, the US). The matter is different with regard to the relationships within the circle of the established nuclear powers. In this case, nuclear deterrence is based on the schemes of the Cold War, as the policies of Russia and the US show. In fact, the current expenditure for nuclear weapons, despite significant cuts, is still extremely high, as previously mentioned. China has a considerably inferior arsenal compared to that of the two former superpowers, sufficient only to assure a policy of “minimal deterrence” (Lieber and Press, 2006: 8). The concept of minimal nuclear deterrence could be the most suitable to today’s security issues regarding the relations among declared nuclear armed states, and there are sectors of the public opinion lobbying for an even greater reduction in the nuclear stockpiles of the US: among the others, this position is supported by the Federation of the American Scientists (Kristensen et al., 2009: 21). Anyway, at the moment the official strategy of the US is oriented differently, and the same can be said for Russia. While at the beginning of the First Nuclear Age the US relied on nuclear weapons to counterbalance Soviet conventional forces, today the situation has reversed, and Russia keeps an apparently anachronistic large storage of nuclear weapons to cope with the drastic reductions which took place after the Cold War in its non-nuclear offensive capabilities. NATO has stated in its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review that the current amount of its strategic nuclear weapons is dependent on the reciprocal level of these weapons on the Russian soil, so it is very unlikely that there will be drastic reductions, similar to those that occurred at the end of the Cold War, by the US and its allies in the foreseeable future. Nuclear Deterrence of Non-nuclear Attack The role of nuclear deterrence in averting the threat of a conventional attack is currently proving to be alive especially with regard to non-traditional nuclear actors, that is, non-declared nuclear powers, states outside the NPT and states that have violated the terms of the NPT. Countries in this category have not been attacked militarily in recent times, and there is some evidence that their nuclear capabilities could have played a major role in defending them. It is the case of North Korea, a part of Bush’s “axis of evil”: her policy towards the development of WMD programs was far more aggressive than that of Iraq (on her current and past programs: NTI, 2012), but she has not suffered any attack by the US nor by any of their local allies. It can be argued that it was her very progress in the development of WMDs, and especially of nuclear weapons, that permitted her to avoid an external aggression. Given the sensitivity of the American public opinion toward the number of casualties during recent conflicts, it is easy to understand that a retaliatory strike conducted by an actor facing foreign invasion is considered as an unacceptable condition by the US. On the other side, the threat of a nuclear attack should be questioned the survival of the state apparatus must be considered seriously: in fact, the price to pay to break the nuclear taboo is high, but certainly lower than that of regime capitulation: so, these actors gain in credibility what they lack in capability. Nuclear deterrence has a role also in averting conventional attacks in a regional context. The conflict between India and Pakistan exemplifies this point: in fact, despite the existence of sources of tension between the two countries, these actors have not engaged in major open hostilities since their development of a nuclear arsenal. The fear of nuclear escalation may be the explanation for the restraint of these governments in an area like Kashmir, where since the acquisition of nuclear weapons both sides have only supported a low-intensity conflict (Joeck, 1997: 36). In any case, nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear attack seems inconsistent with regard to the traditional nuclear actors. In fact, these have continued to experience major conventional conflicts (it is, for example, the case of Russia with Georgia). It is possible that the threat of a nuclear retaliation lacks credibility when only the aggressor is armed with nuclear weapons – as the behaviour of many nuclear powers in time of war may lead to think – but this would be hardly true in the case of a WMD attack. In this respect, the biggest innovations are those developed by the US within its strategy to combat global terrorism. The same policy of expanded deterrence which has been discussed above is applied also to non-nuclear threats, in particular with regard to the scenario of a terrorist use of WMDs (Huntley, 2006: 49-50). In the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington has confirmed its willingness to pursue a policy aimed at “dissuading, deterring and defeating those who seek to harm the US directly […] especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction” (US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006: 9). Nuclear deterrence is the most likely way to counter terrorism to be used in the future, since pre-emptive war lacks popular support and has been recognised to be an excessively expensive strategy. As Trager and Zagorcheva argue, nuclear deterrence may prove to be an effective method to counter the threat posed by non-state actors, as long as terrorists’ political aims will be influenceable by states (2005/2006: 88). Conclusion Nuclear deterrence is still relevant in dealing with contemporary security issues. Although different strategies concerning the use of nuclear weapons have been proposed in recent times, their application would be extremely controversial, and for this reason is very unlikely. Nuclear deterrence is still an important part of the official strategy of the US to fight traditional threats, and has been adapted to meet also today’s new security concerns. The other nuclear armed states, the traditional as well as the non-traditional ones, have shown their willingness to maintain the nuclear taboo, pursuing in most cases a minimal deterrence policy. The threat of a nuclear strike can deter both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, the contemporary security scenario requires an evolution of deterrence rather than a discharge of the concept as a whole. In fact, nuclear weapons are still among the most powerful and intimidating weapons with which states can arm themselves, and the stability of a system based on deterrence still remains attractive, although since the end of the Cold War maintaining this system has become far more complicated. However, nuclear deterrence alone cannot be the answer to every security issue in the contemporary world, and its application needs to be strengthened by other strategies. The main role it held during the First Nuclear Age is lost, but its relevance, although resized, is not.