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2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Empire › Alt Fails - Multitude

Alt fails---the neg fails to address gender norms that make the multitude impossible

Susanne Schultz Translated By Frederick Peters 6. Earth and Environmental Sciences - Academic & Research, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences,Manchester Environmental Research Institute, FSE Research Institutes, professor of evolutionary ecology and conservation at the university of Manchester. “Dissolved Boundaries and “Affective Labor”: On the Disappearance of Reproductive Labor and Feminist Critique in Empire.” Taylor & Francis. 8-1-2006. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10455750500505473 //NM

If one wants to do justice to this claim, one would have to push the organization of the boundary between paid and unpaid labor into the center of a critique of political economy*/and this in order to comprehend the very shifts in this boundary. The thesis of a dissolving boundary between production and reproduction treats this boundary as an historical relic, an object of anachronistic research agendas, and thus no longer a valid subject of study. In Hardt and Negri, the division between productive and reproductive work only appears in the form of the distinction 9 Hardt and Negri, op. cit., p. 364. 10 Frigga Haug, ‘‘Zur Theorie der Geschlechterverha¨ltnisse,’’ Argument, 243, 2001, pp. 761/787. 11Hardt and Negri, op. cit., p. 274. 80 SUSANNE SCHULTZ Downloaded by [Erciyes University] at 05:18 22 December 2014 between direct and indirect forms of capitalist exploitation.12 This may be read as a vague reference to longstanding debates about the role of household work in the generation of surplus value, debates which Hardt and Negri do not engage with explicitly. Certainly, the thesis on the dissolution of boundaries makes it impossible to critique the hierarchies that are produced in the process of dividing paid from unpaid work. This does not mean, however, that the division between productive and reproductive labor is not shifting. This becomes particularly clear when one considers hegemonic models of ‘‘‘female’’ wage labor, notably the attractive model of the ‘‘successful’’ professional woman in the fields of culture, finance or advertising. Empire correctly thematizes how qualifications acquired during so-called free time through cultural or political groups or through private relationships become valorized in the labor process. The division between work and leisure has become more mutable as a result of flexible working time. Certainly, the housewife model*/ the hegemonic model of femininity under Fordism*/no longer applies (and was never a reality for many women, in any case). In light of these displacements, one should not lose sight of the fact that these boundaries shift in significantly uneven ways. Women’s workforce participation faces extremely stable gender divisions of labor in the so-called sphere of reproductive work, notably in child and elderly care. One only has to recall that that a mere 1.5 percent of people who take official parental leave in Germany are men. In this sense, the convergence model of production and reproduction reflects less the reality of labor relations than an increasingly hegemonic image of female subjectivity, where reproductive labor disappears into the holes and gaps of the patchwork that is the neoliberal working day. The delegation of reproductive labor to underprivileged women, particularly migrant women, is certainly to be understood as a displacement of the boundaries between productive and reproductive labor as well. This case expresses everything but the dissolution of (unpaid) reproductive labor, however. One factor accounts for the extreme social and financial devaluation of this work. It is not seen as skilled and qualified labor, but rather as something that women and girls are ‘‘naturally’’ socialized to do. Also, reproductive labor remains structurally close to unpaid labor, with its extreme flexibility of hours and tasks as well as the mechanisms of emotional dependence and familial loyalty. This domestic worker model, which depends on high wage differentials, cannot be universalized. It is logically untenable for a domestic worker to pay yet another domestic to look after her own reproductive work. Finally, the thesis of a shrinking divide between production and reproduction appears absurd when one thinks of the neoliberal cutbacks to public services such as kindergartens and health care, which (re)privatize reproductive labor and force unpaid women to pick up the slack in the system. 12Ibid., p. 53. DISSOLVED BOUNDARIES AND ‘‘AFFECTIVE LABOR’’ 81 Downloaded by [Erciyes University] at 05:18 22 December 2014 How unpaid reproductive labor should be organized is no longer a question when its disappearance is quietly presupposed, as in Empire. Rather than speaking about a dissolution of the boundaries between production and reproduction, it would make more sense to analyze the restructuring of reproductive labor along the categories ‘‘race, class, gender’’ on an international level. This would be the only way to realize a materialist approach to the ‘‘production of life,’’ something Hardt and Negri promise but do not carry out. Because Empire offers no basis for a critique of the political economy of gender regimes, its claim to subvert dominant models of subjectivity must fail.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Empire › Alt Fails - Multitude

Alt fails--- materialization is impossible

Paul Thompson 5. Paul B. Thompson is a philosopher currently teaching at Michigan State University, where he holds the W.K. Kellogg Chair in Agricultural Food and Community Ethics. “Foundation and Empire: A critique of Hardt and Negri.” SAGE Journals. 7-1-2005. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/030981680508600105 //NM

Baffled by the ‘logic’ of one of Empire’s central arguments, Wolfe observes: ‘Thus one has to read Hardt and Negri’s question many times over, so flat out wrong are its assertions and assumptions, in order to judge whether they can possibly be serious’ (2001: 2). The task the authors set themselves was serious. But the big picture outlined in Empire, eclectically combining elements of Marxism, managerialism and postmodernism, remains unconvincing and often incomprehensible. The book is neither a robust guide to the realities and challenges of global governance, nor to the potential for Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on December 7, 2014 92 Capital & Class #86 social challenge and change. With respect to the latter, Wright argues that the recurrent problem of Negri and operaismo has been a penchant for all-embracing categories, and ‘the unrelenting preoccupation with the technical composition of labour power as a key explanation in the explanation of behaviour’ (2002: 226). This reached its peak with the socialised worker concept, which flattened differences instead of opening out contradictory dynamics and tendencies. There is much truth in this observation, but the problem runs deeper. Hardt and Negri largely ignore the real insights that can be generated from Marxist political economy, but reproduce what is, arguably, its weakest point—the gravedigger thesis. This search for an economic actor inside the hidden abode of production, who is then required to be a transcendent political subject with the responsibility of changing the whole society, creates an impossible practical and theoretical burden. Even within these terms, the multitude—‘all the subjugated and exploited’—is not a meaningful political subject. Instead of the difficult task of actually mobilising labour, we are presented with a picture of a multitude already formed and victorious. When faced with the reality that potential revolutionaries in various struggles did not recognise either themselves or others as part of an expanding chain of revolt, Hardt and Negri can only take refuge in the banal argument that this was a failure of communication (p. 54-5). Which leaves us, finally, with their own conclusion. For all the talk of postmodern republicanism, the underlying logic of Empire is an infantile vanguardism. The labour, whether immaterial or multitudinous, in whose name the book speaks is labour to which the communist militant, lauded in the postscript, imputes motives, labels struggles, allocates roles, and proclaims unity of purpose and outcome. Intellectual militants become the means of communication, except that what they are communicating is a fantasy that exists only in their own heads. This is absolutely consistent with the history of Negri and Italian workerism. For all its earlier insights, from its inception this current was distinctive for its view that what labour actually thought was secondary to its position as a particular category of labour (the mass worker, the social worker, immaterial labour, and so on). As Negri remarked of the social worker, ‘At the political and social level, this subject presents a complete materialization of consciousness within the structure of its own existence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Empire › Alt Fails - Multitude

Alt fails---the multitude doesn’t know what it’s fighting.

Carol A. L. Prager 2007. associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary. “Empire and Imperialism: A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.” Canadian Journal of political science. March 2007. https://sci-hub.hkvisa.net/ //NM

Michael Walzer, reflecting in a 2002 Dissent article ~vol. 49, Spring! upon the compelling issues in world politics, asked “Can there be a decent Left?” After reading Atilio A. Boron’s impassioned and derisive critique of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire ~Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000!, one wonders whether today there can be an empirically sophisticated, coherent Left. ~Negri, by the way, spent seventeen years in Italian prisons for his involvement with the Red Brigade and the murder of Italian politician Aldo Moro.! Boron, a professor of political theory at the University of Buenos Aires claims, no doubt rightly, that the last three decades, embracing the end of the Cold War, the impact of neo-liberal policies on the “periphery” and sweeping technological changes, have necessitated a reformulation of leftist thinking. The influential Empire, which advances a root-and-branch restructuring of socialist thought, though hugely popular among anti-globalization groups and already translated into over a dozen languages, is to Boron emphatically not it. While paying obeisance to Hardt and Negri’s “noble intentions and intellectual and political honesty” ~4–5!, the author proceeds to shred virtually all their main contentions. At least the general reader surmises as much, for Boron fails to provide an account of Empire adequate for those who are learning about Empire for the first time to judge. At the same time, summarizing the over 500-page and all-butunintelligible Empire is no mean task inasmuch as the book consists of an impenetrable mix of postmodern theory and systems analysis. What does seem clear, however, is that Empire—the forces of globalization, including the unobstructed flow of information, capital and labour—provides a complete contrast to imperialism because it has no centre and is not under anyone or anything’s control. Absent, too, are hierarchy and sovereign nation-states for it is Empire that is now sovereign. Opposing Empire is the “multitude,” which seems to include humanity, notably those who resist, from subsistence farmers to knowledge workers and jihadists, who are characterized simply as “being against.” Precisely against what, however, is unsatisfactorily explained. Dissidence in Empire is metaphorically depicted by the authors as a snake, undulating about Empire looking for opportunities to attack. It is small wonder to Boron that the authors are wrong-headed since their analyses are grounded in “French postmodern philosophy, Italian politics and US economic science” ~8! rather than the socialist canon of Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin. Boron considers the most egregious of Hardt and Negri’s mistakes to include the asserted end of imperialism, the disintegration of the state and the notion of independent multinational corporations. Premised on a Chomskyesque critique of US foreign policy, Boron insists that an American empire, together with the multinational corporations incorporated under its laws whose interests are American interests, continues to dominate the world and despoil vulnerable countries looting their natural resources, thereby refuting Hardt and Negri’s notion of the insignificance of states. Although Boron maintains that “the atrocious 9011 attacks,” which were “momentous and spectacular” ~6!, undermine Hardt and Negri’s thrust, he does not return to terrorism, but persists in the assumption that social injustice continues to be the world’s most pressing problem. No doubt Boron comes by his fury honestly. Latin America’s economic and political distress is as intractable as in any other part of the “periphery.” There is widespread economic suffering, civil insecurity and social disintegration. How many of these misfortunes can be laid at the door of neoliberal restructuring is, however, 280 Recensions / Reviews surely debatable. Some neoliberal reforms have misfired, causing hardship and dislocation, but more have been constructive. Much of Latin America’s misery can be laid at other doors, especially the weakness of democracy and other political institutions. Boron concedes that he not only wants to provide a theoretical context within which the world economic and political problematique can be analyzed, he also wants to facilitate political change. This admission does not inspire confidence in the unconverted; nor does the author’s reliance on pragmatic arguments. For example, Boron attacks Hardt and Negri’s conception of a deterritorialized space on the ground that “the classic distinction between centre and periphery...vanishes into thin air” ~11!. What is at issue here, however, is not how much of Boron’s preferred conceptual apparatus Hardt and Negri displace but what approach emerging realities will support, a matter that must be settled empirically. Flawed arguments along with the overwhelmingly polemical tone of this volume will be troublesome for those for whom understanding the world is more than enough. Unless readers already agree with Boron’s political orientation, they will remain unconvinced by his analysis. If the Left is to be revitalized, it will not, unfortunately, be at the hands of Boron, Negri or Hardt.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Empire › Alt Fails - Multitude

Alt fails---the multitude doesn’t assume religion in the real world

Ian K. McDaniel 2009. department Of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, Usa 9. . “Multitude against Empire: A sin of omission.” SAGE Journals. 8-18-2009. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/0191453709106241 //NM

Given the small population of American atheists as a percentage of the total population, the question that now concerns us is this: where are all these atheists who must constitute the suffering multitude? Assuming the highest estimate for the atheist population of each country, the top 10 atheist countries are Sweden, Vietnam, Denmark, Norway, Japan, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, South Korea and Germany. The atheist population in these nations ranges from a low of 49 per cent in Germany up to a high of 85 per cent in Sweden.14 At this point it is important to note that the majority of these nations, indeed many of the nations with significant atheist communities, reside within the European Union. If Hardt and Negri are correct, then these ‘atheist nations’ should have deplorable economic suffering among their populations and worse income inequality than the United States. Yet this is not the case. In fact, only Vietnam comes close to the USA in terms of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. All the others have a Gini coefficient below 0.34 and only Japan dips below 0.25, meaning that the income distributions of these nations are in the optimal ranges for growth and prosperity. It would seem that prosperity, not an increase in exploitation and suffering, leads to a decline of religion Let us now consider several nations with Gini coefficients that are more unequal than the United States; perhaps there we can find a preponderance of atheists to support Empire’s dismissal of religion. Mexico,Brazil and Argentina (indeed most of South America), South Africa, Namibia and Botswana all have Gini coefficients in excess of 0.50, yet only Argentina appears among the top 50 nations in terms of atheist populations (in the 45th position, a scant two spots behind the USA) with 8 per cent of the total population as atheists. The rest of these nations have less than 7 per cent of their total population as self-described atheists.15 Greater inequality and suffering on the part of the multitude 797 McDaniel: Multitude against Empire do not seem to result in a lack of faith within the multitude as Hardt and Negri imply. On the contrary, those countries that are experiencing greater inequality have higher proportions of religious persons than those with greater equality and prosperity. While individual religions act to unite portions of the multitude together under the banners of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc., at the same time, however, religion acts as a divisive force, separating Christians from Jews, Muslims from Christians, Hindus from Buddhists and so forth. Religions identify themselves so as to create a sense of unity, but this same labeling also creates a division among the multitude. By labeling themselves ‘Christian’, a third of the world’s population has at the same time labeled two-thirds of the world’s population as ‘Other’ (to use Hardt’s and Negri’s terminology); that is to say, other than us, i.e. non-Christian. So while it has the attractive power of unity and immobility to draw people to it in a time of crisis, change and uncertainty, religion also divides up the multitude along these lines of faith. This division not only makes seeking a unified community outside their religious affiliations difficult for most practitioners, the continuing notion of different faiths as inherently ‘other’ makes the seeking of such a unity undesirable for many religious persons. Herein lies the problem for Hardt and Negri: religion must be destroyed in order for the multitude to exist as a unified force capable of overcoming Empire; so long as the multitude remains divided along religious boundaries, the multitude will not be fully mobile, unified or, most importantly, capable of making the social demands necessary to overcome Empire. Bringing our current argument together at this point, we see that Hardt and Negri’s notion of the multitude as a unified force capable of standing in opposition to Empire requires an end to the various religious belief structures that separate and divide the multitude. At the same time, the economic forces that exist within Empire of exploitation and suffering among the multitude indicate an increase of religious belief and acceptance among the multitude. Simplifying the argument, to create multitude economically means to create more religious belief, but to create more religious belief means to deny the creation of a unified multitude. Within their discourse on the creation of Empire, Hardt and Negri ‘object to social contract theorists who pretend “that the subject can be understood pre-socially and outside the community”’ and yet they also claim that ‘no subjectivity is outside’.20 Religious beliefs, while perhaps not a major aspect of the European community at present, are very much a part of the global community. By omitting from their discourse the influence of religion on the multitude, Hardt and Negri have placed on 799 McDaniel: Multitude against Empire the ‘outside’ an important subjectivity of the multitude. It is this contradiction of their own construction in Empire that results in their contradictory notion of the creation of the multitude as a unified force capable of opposing the capitalist Empire.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap Good: AT Cap rejects workers’ rights

Capitalism compatible with worker’s rights – exit rights solve

Somin, 22, [Ilya, law professor at George Mason University, author of  and , “How Socialism Leads to More Domination of Workers than Free Markets,” Reason Foundation, 6/18/22, AG]

Such exit mechanisms are far from perfect. But they are vastly preferable to socialist alternatives. And, as Freiman also notes, much can be done to increase mobility and competition in existing capitalist systems, most notably breaking down barriers such as and , which make it harder for workers to seek out new opportunities. Finally, it's worth emphasizing that, if worker cooperatives are as wonderful as advocates claim, free market systems are entirely compatible with them. Nothing prevents people from setting up enterprises run by such collectives. Indeed, they have existed in "capitalist" societies for many decades now. If democratic cooperatives really do treat employees better than conventional bosses, that should give them important competitive advantages over the latter in attracting productive workers. They wouldn't have to pay as high wages to get the best people. And their happier workforces should be more productive, as a result, thereby increasing their competitive edge even more. The fact that cooperatives don't seem to be successful in most sectors of the economy is a sign they may not be as great as enthusiasts claim. Either they don't actually diminish domination of workers (perhaps for the reasons Freiman notes), or employees care more about things like pay and benefits than they do about non-domination. Some might even prefer a workplace where management is handled by the boss (or her specialized agents), because they find spending time on governance unpleasant and boring. As Oscar Wilde famously put it, "the trouble with socialism is that it takes up too many evenings." Regardless, the existence of "socialist" enterprises in capitalist societies further expands exit options for workers, and further diminishes the risk of domination by bosses. By contrast, a socialist society cannot readily accommodate conventional "capitalist" firms - at least not without ceasing to be socialist if the capitalist firms begin to outcompete their cooperative rivals. In sum, exit rights, not socialism are the best antidote to overbearing bosses. And if you are a non-domination theorist, they are also a far better solution to the problem of arbitrary power than is democratic governance.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap Good: Self-Correction – Worker’s Rights

Capitalism protects workers’ rights using economic incentives and minimizing abuse within working communities. Prefer comparative evidence to socialism.

Somin, 22, [Ilya, law professor at George Mason University, author of  and , “How Socialism Leads to More Domination of Workers than Free Markets,” Reason Foundation, 6/18/22, ocp]

One of the standard justifications for socialism is the claim that it will free workers from domination by their bosses. After the revolution comes, working people will no longer have to cater to the arbitrary whims of capitalists or their managerial lackeys. Anyone who has ever had to put up with a mean or incompetent boss can readily see the intuitive appeal of this idea. The intuition is backed by the ideas of (not all of them socialists), who emphasize the importance of freedom from the arbitrary control of others. Even if the victim of domination has a high material standard of living, they argue, she has still suffered a grave injustice. Thus, even the best-paid employees of capitalist firms still labor under the domination of the boss. Some non-dominationists add the point that this is true even if the boss's dictates are always reasonable and he never abuses his authority. The mere fact that he could wield arbitrary power over you if he wanted to, is enough to make you a victim of subordination. Socialism would, it is claimed, put an end to this grave injustice. In a recent at Bryan Caplan's "Bet on It" blog, political philosopher Christopher Freiman takes issue with the non-domination rationale for socialism. While it may free workers from the potential domination of bosses, it exposes them to worse abuses at the hands of fellow workers: [I]magine that Alice is living under capitalism and owns a restaurant. She has somewhat puritanical sensibilities and doesn't like the look of her employee Tate's new tattoo. However, she would suffer a significant material cost if she acted on her anti-tattoo bias and fired him—namely, the loss of a productive employee. So even though Alice doesn't like tattoos, she has an economic incentive to grit her teeth and keep Tate on board. Indeed, it's plausible for that if Alice does start making hiring and firing decisions on the basis of occupationally-irrelevant considerations like tattoos, she'll lose productive workers to competitors and see her business languish as a result. The system as a whole will punish arbitrariness even if a particular employer indulges in it. Now suppose Alice is living in a socialist society that's characterized by democratically-run, worker-controlled cooperatives. She still doesn't like tattoos and Tate—now her fellow worker-owner—still decides to get one. As an individual worker-owner in the cooperative, Alice can cast a vote to fire Tate. Notice that her material incentive to not indulge her anti-tattoo bias is much weaker in this scenario. Under capitalism, Alice's decision about Tate's employment is decisive—if she wants him fired, he's fired. Consequently, an arbitrary decision comes with a 100% chance of losing a high-productivity employee and taking money out of her own pocket. However, under socialism, even if Tate is productive and firing him would make Alice worse off economically, it may still be rational for her to vote to fire him to her distaste for tattoos. The vote, unlike the firing decision in the capitalist scenario, is not decisive—it comes with a much smaller chance of actually resulting in Tate's termination. Since there is a comparatively low chance that her vote to fire Tate will get him fired, the vote has a comparatively low material cost to Alice—making it more likely that she'll cast it. And the point holds for all of the other worker-owners, meaning this is a cooperative-wide problem. (It's true that Tate also gets a vote, but a single vote isn't much of a safeguard against domination.) While socialists claim that collectivization will liberate workers from the whims of their bosses, they tend to ignore how collectivization subjects workers to the whims of other workers. Indeed, worker-owners have stronger incentives than capitalist employers to make arbitrary decisions, so we should expect arbitrary decisions to be more prevalent under socialism than capitalism. Freiman's point can be extended in several ways. First, the dynamic he identifies becomes worse with increasing size. The larger the number of workers employed by any given enterprise, the smaller the significance of any given vote in the cooperative assembly, and the greater the voters' incentive to indulge various prejudices. At the same time, the larger the electorate, the less the chance that any potential victim of those prejudices will be able to exercise enough influence to change the outcome. In Chapter 1 of my book , I explain in greater detail how these dynamics ensure that democratic processes generally fail to solve the problem of domination, and may even exacerbate it. The danger of worker domination under socialism is exacerbated if the socialist system in question is one where enterprises are controlled not by their employees, but by the government - even a democratically elected one. In that event, the individual worker has even less chance of influencing the rules she must live under. And those rules apply not just to one enterprise - which dissatisfied employees can quit - but to every workplace throughout the economy. In that scenario, workers with minority preferences are likely to be far more thoroughly dominated than in almost any other. In the real world, of course, "democratic" socialism is , as has happened with every large-scale experiment in socialism throughout history. Workers throughout the nation then end up subject to the whims of a much smaller, and more centralized clique of bosses who - unlike capitalists - don't have to compete for labor. Dissenting workers are lucky if they only get fired or demoted, as opposed to executed or sent to the Gulag. As Freiman implies, the best safeguard against domination by bosses is the right of exit, combined with competition. If the boss makes arbitrary and unreasonable demands, she risks losing productive workers to her rivals. At the very least, she will have to pay good workers a higher salary to retain them. An employee who can say "no" to the boss by quitting has far more meaningful freedom from domination than one whose only recourse is, say, a 1 in 1000 chance of influencing the outcome of the next vote at the Workers Assembly. Such exit mechanisms are far from perfect. But they are vastly preferable to socialist alternatives. And, as Freiman also notes, much can be done to increase mobility and competition in existing capitalist systems, most notably breaking down barriers such as and , which make it harder for workers to seek out new opportunities. Finally, it's worth emphasizing that, if worker cooperatives are as wonderful as advocates claim, free market systems are entirely compatible with them. Nothing prevents people from setting up enterprises run by such collectives. Indeed, they have existed in "capitalist" societies for many decades now. If democratic cooperatives really do treat employees better than conventional bosses, that should give them important competitive advantages over the latter in attracting productive workers. They wouldn't have to pay as high wages to get the best people. And their happier workforces should be more productive, as a result, thereby increasing their competitive edge even more. The fact that cooperatives don't seem to be successful in most sectors of the economy is a sign they may not be as great as enthusiasts claim. Either they don't actually diminish domination of workers (perhaps for the reasons Freiman notes), or employees care more about things like pay and benefits than they do about non-domination. Some might even prefer a workplace where management is handled by the boss (or her specialized agents), because they find spending time on governance unpleasant and boring. As Oscar Wilde famously, "the trouble with socialism is that it takes up too many evenings." Regardless, the existence of "socialist" enterprises in capitalist societies further expands exit options for workers, and further diminishes the risk of domination by bosses. By contrast, a socialist society cannot readily accommodate conventional "capitalist" firms - at least not without ceasing to be socialist if the capitalist firms begin to outcompete their cooperative rivals. In sum, exit rights, not socialism are the best antidote to overbearing bosses. And if you are a non-domination theorist, they are also a far better solution to the problem of arbitrary power than is democratic governance.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Negative › 1nc – russia AI fails

Russia lags behind in AI, means they aren’t a threat

Polyakova ’18 (Alina,  President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as an adjunct professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), “Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare, Accessed 7/9/2022, brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/)

Speaking to Russian students on the first day of the school year in September 2017, Putin squarely positioned Russia in the technological arms race for artificial intelligence (AI). Putin’s comment (see above) signaled that, like China and the United States, Russia sees itself engaged in direct geopolitical competition with the world’s great powers, and AI is the currency that Russia is betting on. But, unlike the United States and China, Russia lags behind in research and development on AI and other emerging technologies. Russia’s economy makes up less than 2 percent of global GDP compared to 24 percent for the United States and 15 percent for China, which puts Russia on par with a country like Spain. Despite Putin’s focus on AI, the Russian government has not released a strategy, like China has, on how the country plans to lead in this area. The Russian government’s future investment in AI research is unknown, but reports estimate that it spends approximately $12.5 million a year on AI research, putting it far behind China’s plan to invest $150 billion through 2030. The U.S. Department of Defense alone spends $7.4 billion annually on unclassified research and development on AI and related fields. Russia’s public corruption, decline in rule-of-law, and increasingly oppressive government regulations have produced a poor business environment. As a consequence, the country trails the United States and China in terms of private investment, scientific research, and the number of AI start-ups. In 2018, no Russian city entered the top 20 global regional hubs for the AI sector, despite the much-hyped opening of the “Skolkovo Innovation Center” in 2010, which was designed to be Russia’s answer to Silicon Valley. Unlike Silicon Valley, Skolkovo did not spur the kind of private investments and innovation that the Kremlin had hoped for and has since fizzled out. Russia’s new venture, a “technopolis” named Era, which is set to open in the fall of 2018, now promises to be the new hub for emerging technologies, but it too is unlikely to spur Silicon Valley like innovation. It is telling that despite high-level presidential and administrative support, there is scant Russian language academic research on AI. It is not likely that the country’s stagnant and hydrocarbon-dependent economy will do much to improve the government’s ability to ramp up investment in emerging technologies. In the longer term, Russia’s demographic crisis (Russia is projected to lose 8 percent of its population by 2050, according the UN) will likely lead to shortages in highly skilled workers, many of whom have already left Russia for better pay and opportunities elsewhere. Western sanctions on key sectors of the Russian financial sector and defense industry, which Europe and the United States imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the United States has continued to ramp up since then, put extra pressure on the Russian economy. Taken together, the economic and demographic trends signal that in the AI race, Russia will be unable to match China on government investment or compete with the United States on private sector innovation. The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware of the country’s unfavorable position in the global AI competition, even if such an admission is unlikely to ever be made publicly. Strategically, such a wide gap between ambition and capacity means that Russia will need to invest its limited resources carefully. Currently, Moscow is pursuing investments in at least two directions: select conventional military and defense technologies where the Kremlin believes it can still hold comparative advantage over the West and high-impact, low-cost asymmetric warfare to correct the imbalance between Russia and the West in the conventional domain. The former—Russia’s development and use of AI-driven military technologies and weapons—has received significant attention. The latter—the implications of AI for asymmetric political warfare—remains unexplored. Yet, such nonconventional tools—cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, political influence, and illicit finance—have become a central tenet of Russia’s strategy toward the West and one with which Russia has been able to project power and influence beyond its immediate neighborhood. In particular, AI has the potential to hyperpower Russia’s use of disinformation—the intentional spread of false and misleading information for the purpose of influencing politics and societies. And unlike in the conventional military space, the United States and Europe are ill-equipped to respond to AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) in the information space.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Negative › 1nc – dod fails

DoD needs huge reforms before it could be effective

Konaev and Nurkin, 22 (Konaev Margarita and Tate Nurkin, Margarita Konaev is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Konaev’s research on international security, armed conflict, non-state actors and urban warfare in the Middle East, Russia, and Eurasia., Tate Nurkin is the founder of OTH Intelligence Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.Substantively, Mr. Nurkin’s research and analysis has a particularly strong focus on US-China competition, defense technology, the future of military capabilities, and the global defense industry and its market issues., 5-25-2022, accessed on 7-13-2022, Atlantic Council, "Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense", https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/#accelerating-dod)

Currently, there are no shared technical standards for what constitutes ethical or trustworthy AI systems, which can make it difficult for nontraditional AI vendors to set expectations and navigate the bureaucracy. The DoD is not directly responsible for setting standards. Rather, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) mission “to include advancing collaborative frameworks, standards, guidelines for AI, supporting the development of a risk mitigation framework for AI systems, and supporting the development of technical standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems.”7979. Pub. L. 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf. In July 2021, the NIST issued a request for information from stakeholders as it develops its AI Risk Management Framework, meant to help organizations “incorporate trustworthiness considerations into the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems.”8080. “Summary Analysis of Responses to the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF)—Request for Information (RFI),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 15, 2021, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/15/AI%20RMF_RFI%20Summary%20.pdf. Related to standards are the challenges linked to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation (TEVV). Testing and verification processes are meant to “help decision-makers and operators understand and manage the risks of developing, producing, operating, and sustaining AI-enabling systems,” and are essential for building trust in AI.8181 Michele A. Flournoy, Avril Haines, and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing: Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems,” WestExec, October 2020, 3–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf. The DoD’s current TEVV protocols and infrastructure are meant primarily for major defense acquisition programs like ships, airplanes, or tanks; it is linear, sequential, and, ultimately, finite once the program transitions to production and deployment. With AI systems, however, “development is never really finished, so neither is testing.”8282. Flournoy, Haines, and Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing,” 3. Adaptive, continuously learning emerging technologies like AI, therefore, require a more agile and iterative development-and-testing approach—one that, as the NSCAI recommended, “integrates testing as a continuous part of requirements specification, development, deployment, training, and maintenance and includes run-time monitoring of operational behavior.”8383. “Final ,” 384. The ethical code that guides the US military reflects a fundamental commitment to abiding with the laws of war at a time when authoritarian countries like China and Russia show little regard for human rights and humanitarian principles. Concurrently, the DoD’s rigorous approach to testing and assurance of new capabilities is designed to ensure that new weapons are used responsibly and appropriately, and to minimize the risk from accidents, misuse, and abuse of systems and capabilities that can have dangerous, or even catastrophic, effects. These values and principles that the United States shares with many of its allies and partners are a strategic asset in the competition against authoritarian countries as they field AI-enabled military systems. To cement the DoD’s advantage in this arena, we recommend the following steps. The DoD will not be able to fulfill its ambitions in AI and compete effectively with the Chinese model of sourcing technology innovation through military- civil fusion without close partnerships with a broad range of technology companies. This includes defense-industry leaders with long-standing ties to the Pentagon, technology giants at the forefront of global innovation, commercial technology players seeking to expand their government portfolio, and startups at the cutting edge of AI development. But, the DoD’s budget-planning, procurement, acquisition, contracting, and compliance processes will likely need to be fundamentally restructured to effectively engage with the entirety of this vibrant and diverse technology ecosystem. Systemic change is a slow, arduous process. But, delaying this transition risks the US military falling behind on exploiting the advantages AI promises to deliver, from operational speed to decision dominance. In the meantime, the following actions could help improve coordination with industry partners to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts. The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”88 Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training. Rather than building entirely new AI-enabled systems, in the short to medium term, the DoD will be integrating AI into a range of existing software and hardware systems—from cyberdefense architectures to fighter jets to C2. Progress toward implementing AI will, therefore, also depend upon streamlining collaboration between the startups and nontraditional AI vendors that the DoD has been courting for their innovative and cutting-edge technologies and the defense primes responsible for integrating new capabilities into legacy systems.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Negative › 1nc – regulations fail

It is impossible to fully and safely regulate complex AI

Gyulai and Ujlaki 21 (Attila, Centre for Social Sciences - Institute for Political Science / University of Public Service.  Anna, Centre for Social Sciences – Institute for Political Science / Corvinus University of Budapest, “The political AI: A realist’s account of AI regulation”, Információs Társadalom XXI, no. 2 (2021): 29–42,)

Recalling the realist viewpoint of the political sphere, it seems that the only attainable goal is a modus vivendi, which resonates with the idea that an inherent characteristic of the political world is balancing the possibilities of two extremes. History of politics supports this more pessimistic view: occasionally, eruptions of civil war and failed states still embody the brute reality of the Hobbesian state of nature, while the existence of authoritarian and totalitarian dictatures altogether with hybrid regimes are eternal reminders of the impossibility to limit power in a once-and-for-all manner. In light of this reality of the political world, new claims for the regulation of artificial intelligence, more specifically on weak AI, are less promising. Debates on the regulation of AI concentrate on the need to connect principles such as fairness, accountability, safety, sustainability, and social inclusion, among others, to AI governance (for a more exhaustive list, see Hagendorff 2020). Nevertheless, the most discussed issue is transparency, which is among the primary claims for several AI 38 ethics guidelines released by different institutions and companies in the past few years. The current boom in ethical guidelines for AI involves several criticisms concerning the effectiveness of such guidelines based on their potential to implement transparency and other claims effectively. This line of criticism can be divided into three types of argument. The first type challenges the AI guidelines on their extensive list of ethical claims based on their ineffectiveness. This type, which can be called ‘tick-box criticism,’ can be coupled with a proposal of some different approach, for example, virtue ethics (see Hagendorff 2020). The second type, which can be called ‘double standard criticism’, is more sceptical about the possibility of guiding AI and whether full transparency can be achieved at all. This criticism builds on the argument that it would be a double standard to call for higher transparency in AI compared to human decision tools and human reasoning (see Zerilli et al. 2019). The third type of criticism is more focused, what we call ‘specificity criticism’, and argues that current Artificial Intelligence Guidelines (AIGUs) are not specific to AI, but they are simply attempting to gain social control over technology. This criticism also demonstrates that transparency and explainability are claims that specifically concern AI because in such cases there is a possibility of the autonomy of AI. In that case, though, the double standard problem arises (see Héder 2020). These criticisms imply that there is a profoundly political characteristic of AI. On the one hand, there is a relative autonomy inherent in AI that can be understood in a broader sense. It is impossible to regulate in every detail, something that can develop by itself. On the other hand, concerning the expert systems of weak AI, the double standard criticism and specificity criticism correctly acknowledged that it would be an unfair expectation to regulate the decision-making of artificial intelligence in domains where human decision-making cannot be entirely regulated likewise. However, contrary to the double standard criticism, we do not base our argument on the similarity between the obscurity of artificial decision tools and human cognitive processes. Instead, we build our argument on the political characteristic of AI. Using AI as a tool is similar to political authorization: although accountability is the main virtue in politics, it would be unrealistic to expect legislative, executive, or judicial officials to act ‘perfectly’. We can only hope that they behave to the best of their knowledge, and while we usually hold them to account for significant breaches of their power, mostly, we authorize them because authorization is the only legitimate way to create order without slipping into a Hobbesian state of nature or a tyrannical regime.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – solvency – dod key

US needs dod ai leadership/ai in military

NSCAI 21 “final report” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence: Eric Schmidt (Chair) Safra Catz, Steve Chien, Mignon Clyburn, Chris Darby, Kenneth Ford, José-Marie Griffiths, Robert Work (Vice Chair), Eric Horvitz, Andrew Jassy, Gilman Louie, William Mark, Jason Matheny, Katharina McFarland, Andrew Moore https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf 

Even with the right artificial intelligence (AI)-ready technology foundations in place, the U.S. military will still be at a battlefield disadvantage if it fails to adopt the right concepts and operations to integrate AI technologies. Throughout history, the best adopters and integrators, rather than the best technologists, have reaped the military rewards of new technology.1 The Department of Defense (DoD) should not be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs, but should deliver it with leadership from the top, new operating concepts, relentless experimentation, and a system that rewards agility and risk. A new warfighting paradigm is emerging because of AI. Our competitors are making substantial investments to take advantage of it. This idea has been called “algorithmic” or “mosaic” warfare2; China’s theorists have called it “intelligentized” war.3 All of these terms capture, in various ways, how a new era of conflict will be dominated by AI and pit algorithms against algorithms. Advantage will be determined by the amount and quality of a military’s data, the algorithms it develops, the AI-enabled networks it connects, the AIenabled weapons it fields, and the AI-enabled operating concepts it embraces to create new ways of war. Today’s DoD is trying to execute an AI pivot, but without urgency. Despite pockets of imaginative reform and a few farsighted leaders, DoD remains locked in an Industrial Age mentality in which great-power conflict is seen as a contest of massed forces and monolithic platforms and systems. The emerging ubiquity of AI in the commercial realm and the speed of digital transformation punctuate the risk of not pivoting fast enough. The Department must act now to integrate AI into critical functions, existing systems, exercises, and wargames to become an AI-ready force by 2025. Simultaneously, DoD must develop more creative warfighting concepts that are paired with investments in future AI-enabled technologies to continuously out-innovate potential adversaries. If our forces are not equipped with AI-enabled systems guided by new concepts that exceed those of their adversaries, they will be outmatched and paralyzed by the complexity of battle.To compete, deter, and, if necessary, fight and win in future conflicts requires wholesale adjustments to operational concepts, technologies, organizational structures, and how we integrate allies and partners into operations. It will also require risk-based assessments of both the benefits and drawbacks of widespread integration of AI-enabled capabilities, to include future autonomous weapon systems. Lastly, it will require a willingness to engage in bilateral and multilateral dialogues with our allies and partners to urge them to make similar AI pivots to ensure future interoperability. CHAPTER 3 79 p How AI Will Change Warfare. AI-enabled warfare will not hinge on a single new weapon, technology, or operational concept; rather, it will center on the application and integration of AI-enabled technologies into every facet of warfighting. AI will transform the way war is conducted in every domain from undersea to outer space, as well as in cyberspace and along the electromagnetic spectrum. It will impact strategic decision-making, operational concepts and planning, tactical maneuvers in the field, and back-office support. In this new kind of warfare, traditional confines of the battlefield will be expanded through AI-enabled micro-targeting, disinformation, and cyber operations, as described in Chapter 1 of this report. AI will reshape many attributes of war, such as its speed, tempo, and scale; the relationships service members have with machines; the persistence with which the battlefield can be monitored; and the discrimination and precision with which targets can be attacked. There will be a premium on speed and accuracy in developing knowledge, acting, and reacting as the conflict unfolds. AI will make the process of finding and hitting targets of military value faster and more efficient. It will also increase accuracy of target identification and minimize collateral damage. Currently, this process generally involves passing data in a serial fashion from a sensor, through a series of humans, to a platform that can shoot at the target. AI will help automate some of the intermediate stages of the decision process. AI will also create opportunities for more advanced processes that would operate more akin to a web, fusing multiple sensors and platforms to manage complex data flows and transmitting actionable information to human operators and machines across all domains.4 In war, many of the military uses of AI will complement, rather than supplant, the role of humans. AI tools will improve the way service members perceive, understand, decide, adapt, and act in the course of their missions. However, new concepts for military operations will also need to account for the changing ways in which humans will be able to delegate increasingly complex tasks to AI-enabled systems. In the near term, this will be managed through the military’s principle of “mission command,” which stresses decentralized execution and disciplined initiative by subordinates who follow a commander’s intent. This human-centric approach to fighting should remain the standard for the foreseeable future. But as AI continues to advance into the cognitive and neuromorphic domain, and human-machine teaming becomes more sophisticated, the military will need to develop more imaginative concepts and organizational constructs that take full advantage of AI technologies without relinquishing the principles that undergird mission command. This list of how AI might transform warfighting principles and capabilities—as well as others like it—is by no means exhaustive. Innovation will lead to future capabilities that are unknowable at present and will only become clearer in time.  

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – solvency – risk assessment

Opening the “Black Box” of AI is key to creating proper regulations & risk assessment

Buiten 19 (Miriam, CERRE Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Law and Economics at the University of St.Gallen, Switzerland, “Towards Intelligent Regulation of AI, Published 4/29/2019, Accessed 7/15/2022, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-risk-regulation/article/towards-intelligent-regulation-of-artificial-intelligence/AF1AD1940B70DB88D2B24202EE933F1B, EA)

The concern of AI is that it presents new and unknown risks with which current laws may not be able to cope. We may thus need new rules to mitigate the risks of AI. One proposal is to introduce transparency requirements for AI.29 Such a transparency requirement would be difficult to implement in practice, if we are not sure what its scope is. The lack of a clearly defined scope would leave the industry uncertain whether its activities are covered by the regulation, and would leave the definition of AI to the courts. The definitions of AI discussed above are, however, context-sensitive and time-varying in character. Take the approach of defining AI in terms of a system’s autonomy. This raises the question of what it means for an application to act autonomously. Scherer uses the example of autonomous cars and automated financial advisers that can perform complex 24 Oxford Dictionaries, “Artificial Intelligence” accessed 22 October 2018. 25 P Stone et al, “Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence” (2016) accessed 20 September 2018. 26 C Reed, “How should we regulate artificial intelligence?” (2018) Phil Trans R Soc A 1. 27 R Calo, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 513, 529. 28 JM Balkin, “The Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45, 51. 29 See eg European Parliament, supra, note 11, and White House Report, supra, note 8. 2019 Towards Intelligent Regulation of Artificial Intelligence 45 https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2019.8 Published online by Cambridge University Press tasks “without active human control or even supervision”. 30 Let us consider the example of cars. Most would agree that a regular car is not autonomous, but some would say, like Scherer, that a self-driving car is. What about cars that have some autonomous-driving features, such as automatic distance keeping? Do they have sufficient autonomy to be considered AI, and should this distinction have any legal implications? If we were to require more transparency from AI, what would be the implications for producers of regular cars, partly autonomous and fully autonomous cars? Who would be subject to the requirement, and what would the requirement entail concretely? The problem, of course, would not be limited to cars, but to all systems that may be called AI. Considerable uncertainty would ensue on which systems and applications fall within the scope of such a rule. Using intelligence to define AI presents similar problems. Capabilities we consider intelligent today may not be seen as such in the future. The AI literature from the 1980s is illustrative, referring to a system’s ability to learn from experience as intelligent.31 Systems capable of playing chess, for instance, were seen as AI systems.32 Today, chess is considered as a relatively easy problem for a computer, given that the rules are known and the number of moves is finite. In 1996, IBM chess computer Deep Blue defeated the then world champion Gary Kasparov.33 In essence, while AI is sometimes defined as the capability of machines to perform tasks that require intelligence, our conception of what constitutes intelligent may change as machines acquire more capabilities. After all, how can the task require intelligence if a machine can do it?34 Even if we overcome the problem of varying definitions over time, intelligence may be viewed very differently depending on whom you ask. In 1982, John Searle essentially took the position that any technology that is understandable is not intelligent. Computers may seem to understand concepts but actually do not, as they attach no meaning or interpretation to any of it.35 On the other end of the spectrum are the views discussed above of intelligent behaviour as mimicking intelligent human behaviour, or being perceived as intelligent by humans.36 The range of applications that would be considered AI would vary greatly depending on which approach is taken. In some instances, features of AI such as autonomy or intelligence may help guide us in incorporating AI in our laws.37 When asking how laws should respond to AI, however, I propose to take a step back and demystify this concept. The narrative of AI as an inscrutable concept may reinforce the idea that AI is an uncontrollable force shaping our societies. In essence, part of the problem is that we cannot control what we do not 30 understand. I therefore propose to “open the black box” of AI and try to identify the risks and “unknowns”. This is not to say that AI does not present risks, or even that all of these risks are knowable now. In fact, the majority of the policy challenges regarding AI boil down to the need to mitigate risks that are unknown or difficult to control. It is clear that the question of how to address these risks deserves attention. A first step in doing so is to make these risks concrete, by considering the underlying computational systems. Notwithstanding AI being difficult to understand even for experts, it is a misconception that AI is completely unknowable. AI is a product of human invention, and humans continuously improve upon its underlying technology, algorithms. Algorithms are the basis of the wide array of AI applications, which may vary widely in their sophistication and purpose.38 Since the technology of algorithms is what AI applications have in common, I propose that we focus the policy debate on this technology, starting by better understanding the risks associated with algorithms. Understanding these risks may be possible without full comprehension of the technology, allowing us to grasp the risks and flaws that advanced automated systems present.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – solvency – digital authoritarianism

Lack of AI transparency undermines public trust

Putoni et al. 21 (Stefano, Behavioral scientist at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Director of the Psychology of AI Lab at the Erasmus Centre for Data Analytics, Rebecca Walker Reczek, Berry Chair of New Technologies in Marketing, Markus Giesler, Consumer researcher and Professor of Marketing at the Schulich School of Business, Simona Botti, PhD in philosophy, “Consumers and Artificial Intelligence: An Experiential Perspective”) Jan 2021 https://web-s-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=2&sid=fac31364-8601-4729-91f3-c78d18a8b3b0%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=147580050&db=bth acd

The listening capability enables AI systems to collect data about consumers and the environment in which they live. We conceptualize the resulting experience as "data capture," which includes the different ways in which data are transferred to the AI. Data can be intentionally provided by consumers, albeit with different degrees of understanding of the process: consumers share data when there is little or no uncertainty about how the data will be used and by whom, or consumers surrender data when this uncertainty is high ([147]). Data can also be obtained by AI from the "shadows" consumers leave behind when they engage in daily activities, as in the case of a shopper perusing a store equipped with facial recognition technology or of an iRobot Roomba creating a map of a residential space ([89]). The data capture experience provides benefits to consumers because it can make them feel as if they are served by the AI: the provision of personal data allows consumers access to customized services, information, and entertainment, often for free. For example, consumers who install the Google Photos app let Google capture their memories but in return get an AI-powered assistant that suggests context-sensitive actions when viewing photos. Access to customized services also implies that consumers can enjoy the outcome of decisions made by digital assistants, which effectively match personal preferences with available options without having to endure the cognitive and affective fatigue that decision making can entail ([ ]). Finally, access to customized services offers unprecedented opportunities for self-improvement. Consider one of the projects within Alphabet, in which data from smartphones, genomes, wearables, and ambient sensors are combined to drive personalized health care ([86]).Despite AI's ability to predict and satisfy preferences, consumers can feel exploited in data capture experiences, mainly because they do not understand AI's operating criteria. This can be attributed to several features of AI. First, the modalities of data acquisition are becoming increasingly intrusive and difficult to avoid. Second, even when consumers intentionally share information, they are not aware of how this information is aggregated over time and across contexts. Finally, data brokers are largely unregulated and often lack transparency and accountability ([59]). As a result, data capture experiences may threaten consumers' ownership of personal data and challenge personal control, that is, the feeling that events are determined by the self rather than by others or by external forces and can be stirred toward desired outcomes ([36]). We examine the consequences of this loss of control next from both a sociological and psychological perspective. In popular culture, lack of ownership over personal data has been frequently associated with a loss of personal control stemming from technology's threatening potential to enable monitoring of human behavior. Stories such as George Orwell's 1984 or Philip K. Dick's Minority Report envision systems of oppression in which, due to lack of privacy and constant surveillance, people can no longer control their destiny. This dystopian imagination is echoed in sociological scholarship that associates data capture with the rise of a capitalist marketplace in which private information becomes the central form of capital ([157]).Such dystopian concerns strike a resonant chord when considering Google's move in the early 2000s to transform consumer data from a by-product into an economic asset that formed the basis of a new type of commerce driven by the ability to colonize the consumer's private experience. This commerce contributes to a surveillance marketplace, in which data surplus is "fed into advanced manufacturing processes known as 'machine intelligence' and fabricated into prediction products that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later" ([157], p. 14, italics in the original). To illustrate the power of this commerce, targeted ads based on personality characteristics inferred from the analysis of Facebook likes in combination with online survey questions can increase conversion rates by about 50% ([102]). In 2018, Facebook's revenues from the sales of such tailored ads was close to $56 billion ([111]). From the perspective of this narrative, not only are technology companies continually required to find new ways to make monitoring and surveillance palatable to consumers by linking it to convenience, productivity, safety, or health and well-being ([10]), but they must also constantly push the boundaries of what private information consumers should share ([55]) through a complex landscape of notifications, reminders, and nudges intended to initiate behavioral change. Thus, as consumer behavior becomes increasingly retailored to the exigencies of behavioral futures, AI can transform consumers into subjects who are complicit in the commercial exploitation of their own private experience, thereby undermining personal control and promoting the concentration of knowledge and power in the hands of those who own their information. Data capture experiences are characterized by an underlying tension: consumers recognize that data capture allows AI to serve them through customization, but AI's inherent lack of transparency makes them feel exploited. These feelings of exploitation are fueled by actual and perceived loss of personal control, with important psychological consequences ([17]). The first of such consequences is negative affect, which can turn into demotivation and helplessness. Consider the case of Leila, a sex worker who shielded her identity on her Facebook account and reported being shocked to see some of her regular clients recommended by the "People You May Know" function. According to Leila, "the worst nightmare of sex workers is to have your real name out there, and Facebook connecting people like this is the harbinger of that nightmare." For Leila, like for domestic violence victims or political activists, privacy invasion is not only frightening, it may become a matter of life, death, or time in jail ([73]). As being in control is a basic need and a precondition of psychological welfare ([93]), the second consequence of loss of personal control may be moral outrage. Consider the case of a German consumer who requested his own data from Amazon and received transcripts of Alexa's interpretations of voice commands, even though he did not own any Alexa devices. The consumer relayed his story to a local magazine, which attempted to identify the consumer whose privacy had been compromised. The magazine staff involved in this experience described it as follows: "[we were able to] navigate around a complete stranger's private life without his knowledge, and the immoral, almost voyeuristic nature of what we were doing got our hair standing on end" ([24]). The third consequence of loss of personal control relevant to data capture experiences is psychological reactance, a state in which a person is motivated to restore control after a restriction ([21]), which causes more negative evaluations of and hostile behaviors toward the source of the restriction. In marketing, reactance can decrease the likelihood to repurchase and follow recommendations ([48]). Illustrating reactance in AI data capture experience is Danielle, a U.S. consumer who installed Echo devices throughout her home, believing Amazon's claims that they would not invade her privacy. When one of her Alexas recorded a private conversation and sent it to a random number in her address book, Danielle said "I felt invaded" and concluded, "I'm never plugging that device in again, because I can't trust it" ([76]). In summary, consumers may experience data capture as a form of exploitation: whereas technology companies, firms, and governmental agencies gain financial and political power, consumers lose ownership of their data and feel a loss of control over their lives. As we discuss next, managers should gain a better understanding of feelings of exploitation, as they prevent consumers from seeing the value firms can provide through data capture. This understanding starts at the organizational level and is then translated into decisions about experience design. A central programmatic task in addressing the issue of consumer exploitation in AI data capture experiences involves determining and enhancing the organization's level of awareness regarding the sociological and psychological costs raised in the previous sections. Companies should strive toward greater organizational sensitivity around consumer privacy and the current asymmetry in the level of control over personal data. For instance, they should use netnographic observation or sentiment analysis to listen empathetically and at scale to consumers who have experienced exploitation in AI data capture experiences. Furthermore, rather than accepting the surveillance society narrative at face value, firms can use these tools to understand when, how, and whether their own data capture experiences play into versus subvert this narrative. Likewise, companies should draw on insights by privacy scholars and activist movements to question their taken-for-granted beliefs. In doing so, for instance, companies could realize that their own view on privacy default settings might differ markedly from that of a vulnerable consumer group and adjust their processes accordingly ([101]).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – solvency – digital authoritarianism

NATO’s key to AI norms to counter digital authoritarianism

Margarita and Nurkin, 22 (Konaev Margarita and Tate Nurkin, Margarita Konaev is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Konaev’s research on international security, armed conflict, non-state actors and urban warfare in the Middle East, Russia, and Eurasia., Tate Nurkin is the founder of OTH Intelligence Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.Substantively, Mr. Nurkin’s research and analysis has a particularly strong focus on US-China competition, defense technology, the future of military capabilities, and the global defense industry and its market issues., 5-25-2022, accessed on 7-13-2022, Atlantic Council, "Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense", https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/#accelerating-dod)

Moreover, the DoD should also leverage the under secretary of defense for research and engineering’s (USDR&E) testing practices and priorities to ensure planned and deployed AI systems are hardened against adversary attacks, including data pollution and algorithm corruption.

The DoD should leverage allies and foreign partners to develop, deploy, and adopt trusted AI. Engagement of this nature is vital for coordination on common norms for AI development and use that contain and counter China and Russia’s authoritarian technology models. Pathways for expanding existing cooperation modes and building new partnerships can include the following.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – solvency – cooperation

International cooperation on clarity is key

Christie and Stanley-Lockman, 21 (Edward Hunter Christie and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Researcher, consultant, economist, EU affairs professional, former NATO official, public policy expert., ​Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Her research interests are in the areas of defence innovation, emerging technologies, defence industries, and military capability development. Previously she worked as a defence analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies., 10-25-2021, accessed on 7-13-2022, Nato Review, "NATO Review - An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO", https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/10/25/an-artificial-intelligence-strategy-for-nato/index.html)

Adopting AI in the defence and security context also calls for effective and responsible governance, in line with the common values and international commitments of Allied nations. To that end, Allied governments have committed to as a key component of NATO’s AI Strategy. These enduring principles are also foundational to the discussion and adoption of more detailed best practices and standards. Allies and NATO can leverage NATO’s consultative mechanisms and NATO’s specialised staff and facilities to work actively towards that goal. NATO’s own standardisation and certification efforts can also be bolstered by coherence with relevant international standard-setting bodies, including for civilian AI standards. In addition to best practices and standards, these principles can also be operationalised via other mechanisms including review methodologies, risk and impact assessments, and security certification requirements like threat analysis frameworks and audits, among others. Further, NATO’s cooperative activities provide the basis to test, evaluate, validate, and verify (TEVV) AI-enabled capabilities in various different contexts. More specifically, NATO’s experience not only in operations, but also in trials, exercises, and experimentation provide several avenues in which Allies and NATO can test principles against intended use cases. This is further reinforced by NATO’s scientific and technical communities, which have worked on issues such as trust, human-machine and machine-machine interactions, and human-systems integration, among many others. In addition to these existing activities, the implementation of the AI Strategy will also benefit from connections with NATO’s forthcoming Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). Allied Test Centres affiliated with DIANA could be used to fulfil the aims set out in the definitions of the principles. In the future, use of these Test Centres can help ensure that AI adoption and integration are tested for robustness and resilience. For example, to ensure that AI is Traceable, Reliable and Bias-mitigating, Test Centres could synthesise how AI systems perform in different simulated environments and on different testing data, or provide independent validation and verification to assess compliance with standards that focus on responsible engineering practices. Through the adoption of principles of responsible use, NATO and Allies are sending a deliberately public message to their domestic populations, to Allied forces, and to other states, reiterating the Alliance’s enduring values and commitments under international law. More than just an obligation, this democratic commitment is also a pre-condition for common policy bases among Allies – and for partnership with non-traditional innovators across the Alliance. Accelerating principled and interoperable adoption With the ethical aspects of adoption that the principles underscore, NATO has the chance to signal – and follow through on – responsibility at the core of its outreach efforts. This includes engagement with start-ups, innovative small and medium enterprises, and academic researchers that either have not considered working on defence and security solutions, or simply find the adoption pathways too slow or restrictive for their business models. In contrast to the development of traditional military platforms, AI integration entails fast refresh cycles and requires constant upgrading. This requires a change of mind-set for iterative, adaptive capability development, in contrast to sequential development cycles that take years to deliver small numbers of highly sophisticated platforms. With hostile state and non-state actors increasing their investments in Emerging and Disruptive Technologies including AI, this more flexible approach to adoption is all the more urgent. In this context, with its focus on TEVV and collaborative activities, the AI Strategy sets the framework for technological enablers to out-adapt competitors and adversaries. With more of a focus on agility and adaptation, NATO can make defence and security a more attractive sector for civilian innovators to partner with, while also allowing them to maintain other commercial opportunities. In doing so, efforts to bolster the transatlantic innovation ecosystem can also serve as a bulwark against undesirable foreign investment and technology transfers. NATO’s experience not only in operations, but also in trials, exercises, and experimentation provide several avenues in which Allies and NATO can test principles against intended use cases. This is further reinforced by NATO’s scientific and technical communities, which have worked on issues such as trust, human-machine and machine-machine interactions, and human-systems integration, among many others. Pictured: U.S. ground troops patrol while robots carry their equipment and drones serve as spotters. Illustration by U.S. Army This work requires coordination across the NATO Enterprise. Indeed, several stakeholders across the NATO Enterprise are already involved in the development of AI-related use cases, concepts, and programmes. With the AI Strategy, these activities can gain coherence to ensure the proper connections exist between all innovation stakeholders, including operational end-users. Moving Ahead To be sure, the implementation of accelerated, principled, and interoperable AI adoption depends not just on technology, but equally on the talented and empowered people who drive the technological state-of-the-art and integration forward. NATO has also dedicated attention to other AI inputs, notably through the development of a NATO Data Exploitation Framework Policy. With actions to treat data as a strategic asset, develop analytical tools, and store and manage data in the appropriate infrastructure, the Data Exploitation Framework Policy sets the conditions for the AI Strategy’s success. In addition to the interrelationships between data and AI, ensuring coherence between NATO’s efforts on AI and other Emerging and Disruptive Technologies such as autonomy, biotechnology, and quantum computing will be vital. As Allies and NATO seek to fulfil the aim of this AI Strategy, the linkages between responsible use, accelerated adoption, interoperability, and safeguarding against threats are critical. Indeed, these linkages will also apply to NATO’s follow-on work on other Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, including the development of principles of responsible use. More broadly, this entails further coherence between the work strands on these technologies, understanding that NATO’s future technological edge – and threats the Alliance will face – may depend on their convergence. As such, not only does the NATO AI Strategy apply to this foundational technology, but it also sets the stage for NATO’s and Allies’ ambitions with regards to other Emerging and Disruptive Technologies. For each of them, the future strategic advantage that comes with NATO innovation efforts will derive from the connections between ethical leadership, iterative adoption, and integration that prizes flexibility, interoperability, and trust.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – solvency – clarity

Lack of clarity and advancements in AI make Russian deterrence more difficult

O'Hanlon, 18 (Michael E. O'Hanlon, Michael E. O'Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy., 11-29-2018, accessed on 7-15-2022, Brookings, "The role of AI in future warfare", https://www.brookings.edu/research/ai-and-future-warfare/)

A hypothetical scenario in which Russia creates a pretext to slice off a piece of an eastern Baltic state, occupying it in purported “defense” of native Russian speakers there, could cause enormous problems if NATO chose to reverse the aggression. In that event, it could require a massive deployment of Operation Desert Storm-like proportions to liberate the territory while facing down any Russian reinforcements that might be sent. In a less successful case, Russia could interdict major elements of that attempted NATO deployment through some combination of cyberattacks, high-altitude nuclear bursts causing electromagnetic pulse, targeted missile or aerial strikes on ports and major ships, and perhaps even an “escalate to de-escalate” series of carefully chosen nuclear detonations against very specific targets on land or sea. While the latter concept of nuclear preemption is not formally part of Russian military doctrine, it could influence actual Russian military options today. Alternatively, the NATO deployment could succeed, only to face subsequent Russian nuclear strikes once evidence of NATO’s conventional superiority on the Baltic battlefields had presented Moscow with the Hobson’s choice of either escalating or losing. By 2040, some aspects of this kind of scenario could improve for American and NATO interests. The clarity and perhaps the scale of NATO’s security commitments to the Baltic states might have strengthened, reducing the chances of deterrence failure in the first place and improving the initial capacity for resistance to any Russian aggression. But on balance, technological innovation, including advancements in robotics and AI, makes it quite possible that things could also get worse.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – NATO key

NATO’s key for military AI

Gray and Ertan ND (Maggie Gray and Amy Ertan, Maggie Gray is a NATO CCDCOE Research Intern and student at Stanford University. her research focuses on cyber-enabled information warfare and the role of cybersecurity and technology in the military., Amy Ertan is a NATO CCDCOE Visiting Researcher and non-resident Cybersecurity Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, No Date, accessed on 7-13-2022, The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, "Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in the Military:An Overview of NATO Member States ‘Strategies and Deployment", https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy-in-the-military-an-overview-of-nato-member-states-strategies-and-deployment/)

AI and autonomous systems will play an increasingly large part in enabling future military activities. AI-enabled systems will make warfare faster and more effective by several metrics. ML will be especially influential, as militaries use it to improve a wide variety of systems, including autonomous vehicles, air and missile defence systems, ISR, and logistics support. NATO member states are, to varying extents, investing and exploring AI-enabled technology and autonomous military systems. There is an element of pressure to this, with significant evidence that Russia and China are already actively and aggressively developing these systems. The consequences of falling behind technologically could be catastrophic should AI-enabled systems live up to the current expectations of many. Military AI and autonomous systems should not be underestimated, and incremental implementations can be leveraged to great effect. Militaries around the world have begun integrating AI-enabled and autonomous systems into their militaries, especially in the categories discussed in this paper – autonomous vehicles, autonomous air and missile defence systems, data analytics, logistics, personnel management, and healthcare. Whenever possible, NATO should facilitate cooperation and information sharing between its members to ensure their military systems remain cutting-edge. It is important for NATO countries to work together to ensure that their military systems are interoperable and secure. When developing AI-enabled and autonomous systems, it is imperative that militaries consider security. AI systems are brittle, opaque, and reliant on good data, and any failure in an AI military system could have catastrophic consequences.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › solvency › 2ac – NATO key

NATO is specifically key to setting norms on AI

Ehlert 21 (Dr Ulf Ehlert, 12-16-2021, accessed on 7-9-2022, Nato Review, "NATO Review - Why our values should drive our technology choices", https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/12/16/why-our-values-should-drive-our-technology-choices/index.html)

We must strive to limit potential harm without unduly constraining the benefits a technology can bring. Therefore, our policies should set limits for the application of technologies (such as genetically optimised super-soldiers) rather than banning entire technology areas (in this case, biotechnology). We need to understand when policy changes are necessary and what those changes should be. Reflecting the diversity of interests, we need to institutionalise a broad stakeholder engagement that reaches out to all parties affected by a technology and influencing its evolution. Within this broadly applicable framing, NATO’s role is specific. As the international organisation committed to defence and security in the North Atlantic area, it convenes considerable political, military, economic, and technological power. Building in particular on its political and intellectual capital, the Alliance can credibly spearhead norm setting for technology applications in defence to comply with Western values. With its recently published AI Strategy, NATO fulfils its traditional role in an innovative way. This Strategy embraces principles of responsible use, which express the value-driven norms that NATO and its member nations will adhere to in the application of AI. By making these principles public, they set an example for other nations to consider and potentially adopt NATO’s principles. This is an effective approach towards proposing and gradually implementing an international norm, not unlike the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. At the same, NATO responds to the globally distributed innovation landscape. The NATO2030 initiative highlights the need to forge new coalitions with likeminded partners beyond the North-Atlantic region. This broad outreach should not only extend to governmental organisations, it should in general expand the types of partners to collaborate with (even within Allied nations), to include non-governmental organisations, the private sector, academia, and civil society.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › public trust › 2ac – clarity i/l

Gaining Public Trust through clear technical standards key to effective AI usage and implementation

Vincent 19 (Brandi, Defense Technology Correspondent at NextGov, Washington Bureau Desk Assistant at NBC News, Bachelors Degree at Northwestern State University, “Building the Public’s Trust in AI Key to Coming Guidance, White House Official Says”, 10/16/2019, https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2019/10/building-publics-trust-ai-key-coming-guidance-white-house-official-says/160652/)

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Assistant Director for Artificial Intelligence offered fresh details Wednesday into a memo being developed to help foster public trust and build agencies’ confidence in regulating artificial intelligence technologies.  “This is a memo directed to agencies that suggests regulatory and non-regulatory principles for how you oversee the use of AI in the private sector,” Lynne Parker, OSTP’s assistant director for artificial intelligence, said. “So these will establish some common principles [and] some predictability across agencies in terms of how they think about regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to the use of AI.” In February, President Trump issued an executive order to accelerate American advancements in AI. One of the key priorities of the order, Parker noted, is to “foster public trust and confidence in AI technologies and protect civil liberties, privacy, and American values in their application in order to fully realize the potential of AI technologies for the American people.”“The question is—how do you implement trust and confidence?” she asked.  Late last month, Federal Chief Technology Officer Michael Kratsios initially announced the memo. Implementing advanced technological solutions will require modern regulatory approaches, and Kratsios noted that it will be the first document that has “legal force” around how agencies should go about regulating AI tech. The memorandum is currently in the works through “close coordination” with the Office of Management and Budget’s Information and Regulatory Affairs office. The in-the-making memo marks one of the key efforts the administration is embarking on to address issues around worries the general public has around adopting AI. Parker said the memo’s crafters are taking a risk-based approach and thinking of AI not as a single monolithic concept, but more unique in terms of how it works for each specific application domain. She added that some application domains don’t need as many approaches as others, depending on whether they raise more concerns around deployment. Though Kratsios and Parker did not offer up a timeline, the assistant director of AI said once it’s crafted in draft format, the memo will be released for the public to weigh in. Parker noted that that element is critical as the team wholeheartedly aims to “get it right.” Once the input is taken into account, a final memo will be released. “After that, agencies will be directed to come up with their own plans for their own regulatory space, for how they want to ensure the appropriate regulatory and non-regulatory approaches for AI within the user application domains that they have oversight in,” she said. The order also calls for the establishment of AI technical standards, and efforts to limit the barriers around testing the technology and accelerating adoption. Technical standards enable interoperability across AI systems. Parker noted that putting them in place would support the measurement of the system’s performance, accuracy, robustness and trustworthiness. In support of the administration’s initiative, the National Institute of Standards and Technology recently instituted a plan for federal engagement to develop the necessary guidelines. “On the one hand, we say we want AI that’s trustworthy, but on the other hand, we have no way of knowing how to achieve it—because we don’t know the standard for trustworthiness,” Parker said. “So these technical standards are critically important.”Both the memo and the establishment of standards will support those deploying AI on the frontline in measuring bias and addressing concerns around it. Parker said the memo’s approach will allow agencies to consider use cases that present implications of bias.  She added proper tools must be developed to determine whether training data for machine-learning systems is appropriately representative for specific use cases.“We also have to make sure that we are comparing systems to the current state, and the current state is that people are making decisions, and often, people are biased,” Parker said. “So, we don’t want to hold AI systems to an unreasonable level of perfection when we know that the AI systems can do better than that current state.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › public trust › 2ac – clarity i/l

Transparency/clarity key to AI trust and acceptance- study proves

Shin 20 (Donghee,College of Communication and Media Sciences, Zayed University, “User Perceptions of Algorithmic Decisions in the Personalized AI System:Perceptual Evaluation of Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Explainability”) 14 Dec 2020

https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/08838151.2020.1843357 acd

The existence of trust is key to promoting technology acceptance (Shin, ) as it facilitates openness and transparency in adoption process. Findings in the work of Lee () imply that trust plays a mediating role in algorithm acceptance. In the news recommendation context, trust is considered a mediator of relationships between behavioral intentions and individual characteristics, and algorithm technology (Shin & Park, ). It can be reasonably considered trust can play a mediating role in the context of AI. For estimating indirect effects for FATE and trust, a non-parametric bootstrapping approach was employed. Bootsrapping is one of the crucial parts in structural equation modelling when it comes to test mediation effects. Mediation analyses assessed the indirect effect of explainability on the association of FAT and trust. Bootstrapping techniques can be used when examining mediation to gain confidence limits for specific indirect effects. Variance accounted for (VAF) is to evaluate the indirect effect and the value of greater than 80% is full mediation, while greater than 20% but less than 80% is partial mediation (per Hair et al., 2013). The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect via trust was obtained using bootstrapped resampling. Mediation is confirmed if such a confidence interval does not contain zero. The standardized indirect effect (Table 2) shows that exogenous latent constructs have partial mediation effects toward emotion through trust. The partial mediations observed in the test suggest that there are other potential mediators for trust or emotion.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff › clarity › 2ac – at: entaglement turn

No US entanglement

Beckley, 15 (Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, 4-1-2015, accessed on 7-15-2022, MIT press direct, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts", https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/39/4/7/12305/The-Myth-of-Entangling-Alliances-Reassessing-the)

American concerns about entangling alliances are as old as the Republic itself. During the post-World War II era, however, there have been only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement, and even these cases are questionable. The case in which alliance obligations had the largest impact on U.S. decision-making (the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis) entailed minimal military action, and the case that entailed the most military action (the Vietnam War) contained only a marginal role for alliance politics in U.S. decision-making. In the other three cases (the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo), both the effect of alliance obligations on U.S. policy and the costs suffered by U.S. forces were moderate. And beyond these cases, entanglement was virtually nonexistent in U.S. foreign policy. Against this limited evidence of entanglement are numerous cases in which alliances restrained the United States. Allies dissuaded the United States from escalating the Korean War and crises in Laos and Berlin, and struggled in vain to prevent the United States from entering or escalating other conflicts, the 2003 Iraq War being only the latest major example. Indeed, instances of alliance-induced restraint are evident even within the five cases of entanglement discussed above: in the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis, concerns about European alliances discouraged U.S. policymakers from bombing the Chinese mainland and publicly committing to defend Jinmen and Mazu; in the Vietnam War, allies impeded U.S. entry into the war and then repeatedly implored the United States to get out; and in Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. allies initially restrained the United States from lashing out violently and then provided all of the NATO ground forces and most of the postconflict peacekeepers for the eventual operations. There also are several cases in which the United States sidestepped inconvenient alliance commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or openly sided against an ally—and this list could probably be expanded by looking within other cases, including the five ostensible cases of entanglement. As explained earlier, the United States blatantly retracted a pledge to Taiwan to defend Jinmen and Mazu in 1955, refused to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, delegated ground operations and most of the postconflict peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo to allies, and waited for eight months and the receipt of private security assurances before responding militarily to China's provocative behavior near Taiwan in 1995–96. In sum, the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders' perceptions of the nation's core interests. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls “self-entrapment”—the tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention.188 Developing a disciplined defense policy therefore will require the emergence of prudent leadership, the development (or resurrection) of guidelines governing the use of force,189 the establishment of domestic institutional constraints on the president's authority to send U.S. forces into battle, or some combination of these.190 Scrapping alliances, by contrast, would simply unleash the United States to act on its interventionist impulses while leaving it isolated diplomatically and militarily.