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2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › Cooperate Despite Tension

NATO can overcome disagreements and cooperate

David Yost, March 2010, Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229789395_NATO's_evolving_purposes_and_the_next_Strategic_Concept, "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept," International Affairs 86(2):489 - 522 (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Is there a conflict between the Alliance's original and enduring purpose of collective defence and its post-Cold War crisis management functions? This is an ill-framed debate, because the home base must be secure in order to support expeditionary power projection. The allies have, moreover, moved away from a static, reactive, and territorial concept of collective defence towards a more ‘proactive’ and ‘anticipatory’ approach. Some experts have even referred to a ‘deterritorialization’ of collective defence. Other issues also illustrate the changing dimensions of collective defence—missile defence, cyber warfare, space operations, the risk of state-sponsored terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency. Despite disagreements on how to pursue shared goals, the allies may yet demonstrate that they have the vision and political will to meet the new challenges. The question of the Alliance's ‘level of ambition’ in capabilities is inseparable from that of its agreed purposes and burden-sharing to achieve them.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › Tensions Amplify Solvency

Aff – all the dispute you locate increase plan’s solvency

David Ryan, 5-30-2022, University College Cork https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10309905/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiii-39-hanhimaki%C2%A0-pax-transatlantica%C2%A0, "H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-39 on Hanhimaki. Pax Transatlantica: America and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Though Hanhimäki’s work is intentionally focused on the sphere within the north and west, one has to question the identity of the shared values. After all, with NATO out of area operations, one needs to further consider the basis of the liberal values. The extent to which these values drove decisions and methods in Iraq and Afghanistan needs further consideration. Though not a part of Hanhimäki’s argument, one might consider the centrality of these values in the wars in Vietnam and in the earlier period of European colonialism. During the Cold War, with the transitions from colonialism to decolonisation, there was much for the western powers to disagree upon, but also a lot to question the basis of ‘liberalism’ in their international interactions. This was also, of course, the very period in which NATO was formed and grew.[30] In his From Plato to NATO, David Gress emphasises the cracks rather than the paint which covered the disagreements. But even in the “grand narrative” the emphasis on liberal, pluralist democracy and an uncertain commitment to the market economy, “… suffered from the weakness of liberalism: the illusion of newness, economic reductionism, and an inability to choose between the negative and positive ideas of liberty – the idea that saw liberty and freedom from coercion versus the idea of liberty as self-realization.” [31] Some of the dominant European powers could not look too far into their pasts to maintain any sense of a prevalent liberalism; in that sense, but only at the level of meta-narrative, the United States with its formal ideologies offered a new conceptual identity, centred on the narrowly defined purpose of NATO.[32] Moreover, the Cold War West, from which NATO emerged, “… could not contain any substantive definitions of liberty or democracy for no such substantive definitions could command general agreement.” These values were read in different ways, even within the same conceptual West. Gress concludes, “to enroll such contradictory ideas in a common front required that the distinctions be ignored or elided.”[33] Hanhimäki emphasises that the robust disagreements that are present add strength to the vitality of the West and NATO.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › Tensions Amplify Solvency

These tensions AMPLIFY solvency instead of reducing it

Daniel S. Hamilton, 5-30-2022, , Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10309905/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiii-39-hanhimaki%C2%A0-pax-transatlantica%C2%A0, "H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-39 on Hanhimaki. Pax Transatlantica: America and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

In this clear and compelling volume, Jussi Hanhimäki takes on the “paradox” he sees at the heart of the transatlantic relationship: a “great success story that is always at the brink of catastrophe” (7). Hanhimäki goes beyond doom-and-gloom headlines by placing recent transatlantic disputes within the deeply embedded political, economic, and security ties that hold the transatlantic community together even in times of crisis.

Hanhimäki does not dismiss very real differences that have often shaped US-European relations. He shows, however, that such tensions have never led to a transatlantic crack-up, in part because they remind policymakers and opinion leaders of the tremendous stakes each side of the North Atlantic has developed in a densely interwoven alliance of prosperous democracies. “If anything,” he concludes, such disagreements are “the creative lifeblood of the transatlantic relationship” (21).

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Regional Flanks

East flank focus undermines NATO effectiveness

Heather A. Conley, 7-17-2020, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-nato-can-avoid-strategic-decoupling-eastern-mediterranean, "How NATO Can Avoid a Strategic Decoupling in the Eastern Mediterranean," Center for Strategic and International Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

NATO has always struggled to articulate and deploy forces to protect and defend its southern flank and has devoted too little strategic attention to the Mediterranean over the last few years while powers such as Russia have consistently reinforced their military presence. With a dramatic increase in conflict as well as migration challenges, NATO and the European Union need to be an effective and unified presence in the Mediterranean despite disagreements with Turkey. The European Union relies on NATO intelligence and other support to execute many of its missions, so a diminished NATO also diminishes the European Union.

Absent more focus on the Mediterranean, Ankara and Southern European NATO members may conclude that the alliance has become, de facto, exclusively focused on its eastern flank. These members may see to protect and pursue their own interests in the region as well, modeling Turkey’s behavior of ad hoc arrangements, new regional alignments, and reversible bilateral understandings, thus creating even greater regional instability.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Spending Gaps

Not all NATO countries spend the same amounts

Alex Lazar, 7-27-2016, "Five Reasons Why NATO Nations Don't Always Pay Their Fair Share," NBC News, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

Currently, only the United States, Greece, Great Britain, Estonia and Poland have spent an average of 2 percent of GDP on their own defenses. The United States by far spends the most, with the average being 3.61 percent of GDP. The other countries spend around 1.5 percent or less, with Luxembourg coming in last at merely 0.44 percent of GDP. Iceland spends nothing on defense, but has no armed forces. Why do some NATO countries spend less of a percentage of GDP on defense than others? In short, they can’t afford it. Michael Corgan, an associate professor of international relations at Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, argues that health and retirement benefits promised to Europe’s aging population, combined with high taxes, would make it very difficult for such countries to spend much more on defense without enacting policies that would be difficult for their citizens to swallow. “Virtually no democratically elected government could survive either situation,” Corgan told NBC News. The U.S., on the other hand, already spends a lot more on defense. Heather Conley, the senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says that increased U.S. defense spending over the past decade has greatly increased that spending gap, while noting that the U.S. military has become increasingly focused on the Middle East and Asia, and less so in Europe. With Russia taking provocative actions in the region, such as in Crimea, however, many European countries are now facing the consequences.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Spending Gaps

NATO’s spending goals don’t translate to defensive capabilities

Anthony H. Cordesman (Emeritus Chair, Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State), 6-26-2019, "NATO: Going From the 2% Non-Solution to Meaningful Planning," Center for Strategic and International Studies, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-3-2022)

As the Secretary General’s Annual Report for 2018 makes clear, NATO has many productive initiatives underway that focus on its real security needs, and that will help deter Russia and deal with the key issues in its military readiness and force planning. In fact, some 90% of the Secretary General’s report focuses on such issues. At the same time, NATO does not issue any net assessments of the balance between NATO and Russia and its capability to deter and fight. It does not openly address any of the many national problems and issues in current force structure nation-by-nation strength and readiness, and it has no coherent force and modernization plans for the future. Setting the Wrong Goals and Claiming Pointless Progress Instead, far too much of NATO’s public profile is focused on goals that are not only meaningless, but actively counterproductive. These goals set percentage of GDP and total defense spending levels that focus on arbitrary levels of spending with no ties to military needs or effectiveness. As the Secretary General’s report notes (p. 34), At the 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO leaders endorsed a Defense Investment Pledge. The pledge called for all Allies that did not already meet the NATO-agreed guideline of spending 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense to stop cuts to defense budgets, gradually increase spending, and aim to move towards spending 2% of GDP on defense within a decade. Allies also agreed, in that same time-frame, to move towards spending at least 20% of annual defense expenditure on major new equipment, including related research and development. What passes for progress reporting is progress in meeting the percentage objectives regardless of whether this is the right priority for a given country or if it will strengthen the Alliance. The Secretary General’s annual report summarizes such progress as follows: At the Brussels Summit in July, NATO leaders agreed there is a new sense of urgency to invest 2% of GDP on defense and to have credible national plans on how to meet this goal. NATO Allies will continue to invest in developing, acquiring and maintaining the capabilities the Alliance needs to defend its nearly one billion citizens. The Alliance attaches great importance to ongoing efforts to ensure fair burden-sharing in all three elements of the Defense Investment Pledge: defense expenditure; investments in capabilities; and contributions to NATO’s operations, missions and activities. In 2018, the United States accounted for half of the Allies' combined GDP and almost 70% of combined defense expenditures. At the same time, European Allies and Canada are continuing to spend more on defense. In 2018, seven Allies reached the 2% defense spending guideline, up from three in 2014. In real terms, defense spending among European Allies and Canada increased by almost 4% from 2017 to 2018. Furthermore, in the period from 2016 to 2018, they have contributed an additional cumulative spending of over USD 41 billion. Allies also made progress on the commitment to invest 20% or more of defense expenditure in major new capabilities. In 2018, 25 Allies spent more in real terms on major equipment than they did in 2017. The number of Allies meeting the NATO agreed 20% guideline rose to 16 in 2018. As Figure One shows, these goals focus the alliance on the wrong objectives in ways that encourage pointless burdening sharing debates over the wrong objectives, and divide it in ways that serve no functional purpose. Ignoring the Threat and Russia’s Level of Spending The NATO percentage goals also ignore a key underlying reality in the relative level of effort by NATO and Russia: Its one major potential threat. This is to some extent the natural result of the lack of any public or transparent effort to tie NATO military efforts to some net assessment of the extent to which Russia is a threat, show NATO’s relative capability by key sub-region and mission, and assesses how well each member is doing in reinforcing NATO’s deterrent and defense capabilities. As Figures Two and Three show, however, setting such percentage goals ignores a more fundamental reality. It assumes that NATO’s weaknesses are dominated by its level of spending and not by its lack of cohesive, coordinated effort to use its resources effectively. If one uses the Secretary General’s report for NATO data, and the IISS Military Balance for Russian expenditures – spending data which U.S. experts agree are roughly the same as U.S. intelligence estimates – these two Figures show that one gets the following results:

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Spending Gaps

NATO spending is insufficient to address issues

Max Bergmann and Sierra Cicarelli, 1-13-2021, "NATO’s Financing Gap," Center for American Progress, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-3-2022)

In 2014, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, NATO leaders met in Wales for a critical summit. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially following 9/11, the alliance had shifted its focus from its traditional mission of defending Europe to operations abroad. Meanwhile, NATO members significantly reduced defense spending, downsized their forces, and underinvested in modernizing their forces following the Cold War. However, Russian aggression against Ukraine shook the alliance; NATO leaders agreed in Wales that defending Europe would be a top priority and committed to spending at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2024.1 This pledge was seen as a massive step forward for the alliance, as it would serve to address a growing gap in its capabilities. Since the summit, some progress has been made in strengthening the alliance. NATO members have increased defense spending, deployed forces in Central and Eastern Europe, and begun investing in needed capabilities. In 2019, almost all NATO allies increased their defense spending, with nine countries hitting the 2 percent goal.2 Most allies have put plans in place to substantially increase defense spending by 2024.3 The alliance is stronger and better prepared to deter Russia than it was six years ago, despite the divisive approach of President Donald Trump, but significant gaps remain. Marginal spending increases by various NATO members were inherently fragmented and often yielded few new major capabilities or failed to address some of NATO’s serious shortfalls. Meanwhile, many member states still have yet to adequately invest in their forces, leading to very low states of readiness and operational strain. Lack of progress toward the 2 percent benchmark has also caused major diplomatic tension within the alliance between the countries meeting their commitments and those that are not.4 Now, with the COVID-19 crisis hammering the balance sheets of all NATO members, the prospect for European defense spending looks bleak.5 It seems unlikely that there will be significant new investment to address some of NATO’s critical capability gaps. Indeed, the European Union—which had planned to increase funding to upgrade the dual-use infrastructure critical to moving NATO forces—has reduced its planned allocations in its recent budget.6 NATO members seeking to keep their economies alive are unlikely to prioritize defense. This is a serious problem for the alliance, and NATO needs to think more creatively about how to support continued alliance investment in the wake of the massive economic contraction caused by COVID-19. Simply demanding that countries spend more on defense, which was not very effective prepandemic, will certainly not work now. What has become apparent is that NATO’s default focus on individual nation-state spending commitments was doing little to address alliancewide issues. Collectively, European NATO members spend as much on defense as Russia, yet the disaggregated and loosely coordinated spending by individual states means that the alliance’s combat strength is well short of what it could be and has left critical gaps in its capabilities.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey-EU

EU-Turkey tensions undermine solvency

Heather A. Conley, 7-17-2020, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-nato-can-avoid-strategic-decoupling-eastern-mediterranean, "How NATO Can Avoid a Strategic Decoupling in the Eastern Mediterranean," Center for Strategic and International Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Second, these tensions reveal troubling divergences between Turkey and the European Union. From the EU perspective, Ankara’s aggressive pursuit of energy interests, disregard for the rule of law within Turkey (which should concern NATO as well), and use of migrants to pressure the European Union and destabilize the European neighborhood are at odds with EU values and interests. In the case of Cyprus, the European Union cannot be an unbiased actor. It supports its member state Cyprus and its ability to advance its economic interests within its EEZ according to international law, as the European Union would with any country elsewhere in the world. And while Turkey is free to pursue its national interests at the expense of collective European interests, its actions move it away from a more constructive partnership or strengthened economic ties with the European Union. And a more problematic EU-Turkey relationship further complicates conflict resolution efforts in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey-France

France-Turkey tensions undermine cooperation

Arab News, 7-7-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1701071/middle-east, "Tensions between Turkey, France pose threat to NATO alliance, warn experts," (TheoMSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Paris’ recent decision to suspend its involvement in the NATO Sea Guardian maritime security operation in the eastern Mediterranean following an incident between a French frigate and Turkish vessels, has highlighted the organization’s difficulties in maintaining order and harmony among its members.

Months of escalating dispute between France and Turkey came to a head on June 10, when Paris claimed that its La Fayette-class Frigate Courbet was targeted three times by Turkish Navy fire control radars while it was trying to approach a Tanzanian-flagged civilian cargo ship suspected of trafficking arms to Libya.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey-France

France & Turkey

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 4-12-2019, , former NATO Secretary-General (2009-2014):

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/what-security-minds-think-about-natos-past-and-future/, "What security minds think about NATO's past and future," euractiv (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

“The Transatlantic Alliance still needs NATO. The US’ allies are its greatest global competitive advantage, and Europe cannot reproduce the strength of NATO. In an increasingly dangerous world, we cannot go it alone.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey-France

France-Turkey tensions undermine NATO effectiveness

Heather A. Conley, 7-17-2020, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-nato-can-avoid-strategic-decoupling-eastern-mediterranean, "How NATO Can Avoid a Strategic Decoupling in the Eastern Mediterranean," Center for Strategic and International Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Since an extraordinary naval standoff occurred between French and Turkish warships in the Eastern Mediterranean in early June, Paris and Ankara have been trading increasingly sharp verbal blows over their respective actions in implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya. While this may appear to be just another moment of friction between NATO allies, particularly with Turkey, it is not. This incident represents a more deep-seated strategic dilemma for NATO as well as an increasingly stark divide between the European Union and Turkey.

This strategic dilemma is rooted in Turkey’s new regional foreign and security policy, based in part on its “Blue Homeland” doctrine. The implementation of this doctrine has caused a series of serious incidents that have been observed by Turkey’s allies but fleetingly, if rarely, addressed. Encountering little resistance, Turkey believes its actions to be largely accepted (as some are, such as limiting Russian influence). But the totality of Turkey’s policies and actions have now reached a point of dangerous escalation, which could substantially challenge the coherence of NATO’s collective defense posture in the Mediterranean and weaken its political cohesion. Turkey’s actions threaten to hinder vital NATO-EU cooperation in the region as well.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey–Doctrine

Turkey won’t abide by NATO norms – no solvency

Arab News, 7-7-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1701071/middle-east, "Tensions between Turkey, France pose threat to NATO alliance, warn experts," (TheoMSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

“Turkey’s government has begun to violate international norms by breaking an arms embargo on the Libyan conflict and invading northern Syria, backing extremist groups, and bombing northern Iraq.

“Ankara has tried to strong-arm NATO into supporting it through threats to hold up a Baltic defense plan and also through threatening and insulting other NATO members.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey-Sanctions

Turkey sanctions gut solvency

Arab News, 7-7-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1701071/middle-east, "Tensions between Turkey, France pose threat to NATO alliance, warn experts," (TheoMSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system has also angered some NATO members over concerns it could undermine Western defense systems and led to Turkey’s expulsion from the alliance’s F-35 stealth fighter jet program.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Turkey-Sanctions

Turkey is eroding NATO cohesion and security and disagreements inevitable

FederigaBrindi, IanBond, Heather Conley ( foreign policy directors from Center for European Reform) “Is Turkey Damaging NATO” last modified Jan 24, 2018 (ESIEVER/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

Yes, it is. In Afrin, Turkish forces have launched a ground offensive against U.S.-backed Syrian-Kurdish militia. In other words, Turkey is indirectly attacking its main NATO ally. It is doing so with Russian support, as Moscow controls the skies in the area—the last act in the rapprochement between the two countries since the 2015 crisis. Western powers have timidly pleaded with Ankara to show restraint. At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council called by France, ambassadors met behind closed doors. They did not publicly condemn Turkey for its actions. Nor there has been enough condemnation by Western allies of the repeated human rights violations by Turkey over the last few years.Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has essentially been given the all-clear to do what he wants, knowing that Ankara’s NATO allies (not to mention the EU) will look the other way. The problem with such irresponsible behavior is that it is not only damaging NATO, it is undermining the whole Western community—and its values system. The respect of fundamental rights is what the West has used to justify the last two decades of wars;the damage is soon going to be irreparable. Turkey is causing an increasing amount of damage to NATO. Ankara has reason for concern about U.S. support for the Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria, given the YPG’s link to the PKK terrorist group inside Turkey; but allied security will not benefit from Turkey attacking one of the only forces in Syria that can consistently fight and win against the so-called Islamic State. Only Bashar al Assad and IS would gain from the defeat of the YPG. And if Turkey’s action in Syria is at least explicable, what was Erdoğan thinking when he decided to buy a long-range air defense system from Russia rather than from a NATO ally? The alliance will end up with a significant gap in coverage on its south-eastern flank. But Turkey’s drift away from democracy and the rule of law damages the alliance more fundamentally than any individual action. After more than a decade of rating Turkey as “partly free,” Freedom House downgraded the country to “not free” this year. During the Cold War, NATO held its nose and tolerated authoritarian regimes in allied countries (including Turkey). These days, shared democratic values glue NATO together. Turkey’s behavior puts that unity at risk. Turkey’s recent brinkmanship policies have definitely damaged the cohesion of NATO and the current Afrin incursion has the potential to widen the gap. However unwise Turkey’s latest move might be, it does not come as a surprise. It is not enough that the United States recognized Turkey’s legitimate security concerns along the northern Syrian border only after the Afrin offensive. Make no mistake: there are many things that Turkey is to blame for—including, in large part, for not peacefully resolving the Kurdish question. A solution might have allowed Turkey to agree to some sort of face-saving agreement with the Kurdish YPG in Syria. But if there is one thing that Washington and Ankara have in common, it’s a miscalculated Syria policy—and the current situation is the direct outcome of that. Both the United States and Turkey now face a larger question: are their long-term goals in Syria attainable? For the Turks, the incursion not only creates security risks at home (PKK terror attacks in major Turkish cities had stopped since 2016, but may very well return); it also risks serving Moscow’s agenda to drive a wedge into NATO. President Erdoğan’s agenda may be fuelled by strong survival instincts and paranoia, but even outside his circles suspicion against NATO runs deep. It does not take much to make the case for alternative alliances. Turkey has reached a point where the government might be willing to risk damaging NATO for what it sees as preserving Turkey’s sovereignty, even if this may come at a high price.Any NATO member that purposefully diminishes its democratic principles and institutions damages the alliance. Every NATO member is a signatory to the alliance’s founding document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, and its preamble states that all members are “… determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Although we associate NATO solely with its military operations, NATO is a political-military alliance with democratic principles at its core. Turkey has so greatly diminished its democracy over the past several years that an independent U.S. organization, Freedom House, has recently declared the country “not free.” Unfortunately, Turkey is not a NATO outlier in this regard but is part of a growing trend. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are also actively diminishing judicial independence, institutional transparency, and the ability to express political opposition; the very essence of democracy. These countries also damage the credibility of this crucial political alliance.

But as a critical NATO member, Turkey’s military interventions in the Middle East—whether it is the shooting down of a Russian military aircraft or repeated unilateral military interventions in Iraq and Syria—increasingly place Turkey’s national security at risk, which places NATO at risk of becoming involved in the broader regional conflict. Thus, Turkey inflicts ongoing damage to NATO politically and militarily.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Ukraine Policy

NATO tensions raised over Russia-Ukriane

Anurag Roushan, 04/7/2022, political writer for Republicworld.com, NATO Countries Divided Over Maintaining Relations With Russia Amid Ukraine War: Reporthttps://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/nato-countries-divided-over-maintaining-relations-with-russia-amid-ukraine-war-report-articleshow.htm, (MDOCK/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

As the war in Eastern Europe continues to escalate, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are divided into two camps on the issue of relations with Russia. While Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia push for a complete split with Russia, Germany, France, and Turkey intend to keep in touch with Russian officials regardless of the situation in Ukraine and the alleged war crimes committed by Russian troops, The New York Times reported quoting Western officials.

The NATO foreign ministers' meeting this week, to discuss ways to assist Ukraine in prosecuting Russia, agreed on one main point - the war is far from over - and despite their withdrawal from areas around Kyiv, Russian troops are making gradual progress in Ukraine's east, the report added. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that Moscow has no intention of abandoning its ambitions in Ukraine. He also stated that there is currently a large movement of Russian troops away from Kyiv to reorganise, rearm, and resupply and they are shifting their focus to the eastern region. "We expect a renewed Russian drive in eastern and southern Ukraine in the coming weeks, with the goal of capturing the entire Donbass and establishing a land bridge to occupied Crimea. This is a crucial phase of the conflict," the NATO chief added. Ukraine shares draft security guarantee with NATO & non-NATO nations amid war with RussiaAs per The New York Times report, NATO is committed to providing all kinds of help to Ukraine and around two-thirds of the alliance's members have already provided lethal weaponry, including the Czech Republic's supply of Soviet-era tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The Czech Republic became the first NATO member to send tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) to Ukraine. According to reports, this was the first such shipment of heavy weapons to the besieged ex-Soviet country since the Russian invasion began on February 24. 91% of Ukrainians want to join EU as support for NATO membership continues to declineMeanwhile, European Union diplomats failed to approve a new sanctions package against Russia which was proposed by the European Commission on Wednesday, April 6. Reportedly, the sanctions package could not get approval owing to disagreements over the coal embargo. However, the bloc has withdrawn Russia's "most-favoured-nation" trade status, which allows EU countries to impose punitive levies on Russian trade and commerce.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Ukraine Policy

Ukraine splits path of NATO

Steven Erlanger and Michael Crowley, April 6 2022, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times and diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau, NATO Nations See Differing Paths as Ukraine War Enters Uncertain Stage,https://www.nytimes.com/2 022/04/06/world/europe/nato-ukraine-russia.html, (MDOCK/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Faced with the prospect that the war in Ukraine will be long and grinding, NATO countries are divided on how best to manage the next stage of the conflict and the uncertain period that promises to follow. Central European members like Poland and the Baltic states want a total break with Moscow and an effort to bring Russia to its knees, two senior Western officials said. They worry that anything that Russia can present as a victory will do serious damage to European security. But other nations believe that Russia cannot be easily subdued and that the war’s outcome is likely to be messy — more exhausting cease-fire than resounding victory. Countries like France, Germany and Turkey want to keep contacts with Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, regardless of the allegations of war crimes committed by his troops, the officials said. NATO foreign ministers, meeting this week to discuss how to help Ukraine prosecute the war, do agree on one major point: The war is far from over and — as badly as Russia’s forces have performed and despite their retreat from areas around Kyiv, the capital — they are making slow and brutal progress in Ukraine’s east. “Moscow is not giving up its ambitions in Ukraine,” Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general, said this week. “We now see a significant movement of troops away from Kyiv, to regroup, rearm and resupply. And they shift their focus to the east.” That will take several weeks, officials believe, as Russian troops move back into Belarus to be resupplied and reorganized, and then must make their way with their equipment through Russia toward eastern Ukraine. Image The site where one woman’s body was found, very close to where six civilians from the village had been buried in a mass grave in a forest in Motyzhyn, Ukraine, on Tuesday.Credit...Daniel Berehulak for The New York Times “In the coming weeks, we expect a further Russian push in the eastern and southern Ukraine to try to take the entire Donbas and to create a land bridge to occupied Crimea,” Mr. Stoltenberg said. “This is a crucial phase of the war.” In response to the scenes of corpses in Bucha, the United States and the European Union are preparing more sanctions against Russia, but without much expectation that they will hasten the end of the war. But at the NATO meetings, the talk will be of weapons and matériel, not sanctions. There is a general agreement that Russia is no longer a strategic partner of the alliance, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no longer bound by the troop limits of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and that its military posture must be sharply enhanced to deter a confrontational Russia, so long as Mr. Putin and his allies retain power there.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Ukraine Policy

Biden confirms NATO tension over Ukraine

Patrick Wintour 1/20/2022, diplomatic editor for The Guardian, “Biden lays bare Nato divide over Russia aggression against Ukraine”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/20/biden-lays-bare-nato-divisions-over-russia-aggression-in-ukraine, (MDOCK/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Joe Biden confirmed at his press conference on Wednesday what has been apparent for weeks – Nato remains divided over how to respond to Russian aggression against Ukraine. His admission of a split was overshadowed by his passing remark that a minor incursion would be treated differently to a full-scale invasion. The White House afterwards clarified that a minor incursion meant cyber-attacks, as opposed to a movement of Russian troops into Ukraine sovereign territory. None of this is academic since Biden said he thought Vladimir Putin would risk an invasion, however much Nato tried to change the Russian president’s calculus with threats. The greatest tension over the correct response is between the US and Germany, hence the visit of the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to Berlin on Thursday before a meeting with Russian officials in Geneva. Some of the differences are manageable. Neither of the two main sides of the German coalition are willing to sell arms to Ukraine, saying it is longstanding German policy, based on its war experience, not to send weapons into a conflict zone. The current vice-chancellor, Robert Habeck, caused a storm last year when he suggested, against that policy, that the Greens might provide defensive arms, but he beat a fast retreat. By contrast the US, the UK and Turkey do supply arms. Critics point out that the underlying morality guiding Germany’s approach to arms exports is opaque. According to government figures released on Monday, sales to Egypt boosted Germany’s arms exports to record levels in 2021. Preliminary figures from the Economic Affairs and Climate Action Ministry showed Germany exported arms worth €9.35bn (£7.79bn/$10.65bn) last year – 61% up on 2020. This leaves open the question of why it is acceptable to sell arms to a repressive regime, such as Egypt, but not to a country seeking to avoid repression, such as Ukraine. On the issue of energy dependency, the tensions are deeper. A compromise reached last summer between the US and Angela Merkel, reaffirmed this week by her successor as chancellor, Olaf Scholz, implies that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline built to carry gas from Russia to Germany will be affected if an invasion happens. In the absence of an invasion, the Greens and the Social Democrats (SPD) have for now parked their differences by waiting to see if the pipeline receives regulatory approval in Germany and the EU. The SPD want it to go ahead and the Greens do not, but the German approach – not just in the SDP, the home of detente – may be shifting. A letter from more than 73 eastern Europe security experts in Die Zeit urged Germany to end its three-decade policy of standing by in the face of Russian aggression. Solely in deference to Germany, Biden has worked hard with Democratic senators to prevent them backing sanctions now, but the issue is still live in US politics, and patience with Germany among Republicans is thin. Separately there has been a dispute about whether Russia can be detached from SWIFT, the international payments system. Some of this is a technical dispute about the legality and effectiveness of the action, and voices do not all go one way. Katarina Barley, a vice-president of the European parliament and member of Germany’s Social Democrats, for instance, is a supporter. But the fact that the EU does not want to meet formally to discuss sanctions in advance suggests it wants to avoid a row. The risks of fracture stretch beyond individual punishments to the wider principle of the extent to which the EU should be running an independent Russia policy. The Americans have undoubtedly made strenuous efforts to involve European capitals. But on Wednesday the French president, Emmanuel Macron, once again raised the principle of not just an independent EU security policy, but explicitly an independent European policy towards Russia – something he has proposed before, to little effect in Moscow. His proposal blindsided the European commission and led to frantic reassuring calls to the Americans. This is a familiar French refrain, but if the US finds it dispiriting, it should review the wisdom of going behind France’s back to sign the Aukus nuclear submarine deal to confront China in September, leaving France humiliated. In diplomacy, loyalty has to be earned, not just demanded.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Sweden/Finland

Finland and Sweden membership threatens the health of the entire alliance – NATO cannot agree with a plan that perpetuates the risk of going nuclear

Jonas Gratzer June 29th, 2022 (The US. Is Welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO. That’s a Mistake; ; Daniel L. Davis is a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the Army who was deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “. Cutby:neigh)

When meet in Madrid this week, one of the featured agenda items is Finland and Sweden’s request to officially join the alliance. The NATO leadership has welcomed their ascension, with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg saying the two countries’ “membership in NATO would increase our shared security.” Though originally signaled it objected to the idea, it lifted its opposition after a breakthrough on Tuesday that clears the way for the Nordic states. While enlarging NATO might seem like a wise thing to do in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it doesn’t take much sober analysis to conclude that adding yet more NATO members is likely to have the opposite effect of what the secretary general hopes. Instead of lowering the chances of war, the membership of Finland and Sweden would increase the risk of future conflict for the entire alliance; adding two more triggers for Article 5 — the provision in the NATO charter that stipulates that an attack on one is an attack on all — would add to the risk of war for the entire alliance. That would be an unwise course in any case, but it’s particularly ill-advised given that it would make Finland and Sweden more vulnerable, as well. Russia poses no realistic threat to Sweden or Finland. Since World War II, Russia hasn’t exhibited the slightest interest in territorial acquisition in either country, and in fact, during the Cold War. In contrast, Russia was consistently and emphatically clear that it regarded any NATO expansion along its border in either Ukraine or Georgia as an existential threat that it would use force to prevent — and in fact has done so twice ( and ). Thus Georgia and Ukraine had reason to fear a Russian attack. Finland and Sweden don’t. Extending NATO membership to these two countries wouldn’t only burden the U.S., which would be expected to go to war on behalf of these two Nordic states if they are attacked. It would saddle Helsinki and Stockholm with troubles, as well. Up to now, if a war ever broke out between NATO and Russia, both Finland and Sweden would have been protected by their neutral status. If membership were extended to both, that protection would be gone. If the two became NATO members and the alliance went to war with Russia in the future, both countries would be thrust almost immediately into an armed conflict whether they wanted to be or not — and even if their national interests weren’t otherwise threatened. Given their status as NATO members, the Kremlin would almost certainly attack airfields and ports in both countries to prevent other allies from using their facilities to stage attacks against Russia. But there is an even more fundamental reason to oppose expanding the alliance at present: It isn’t needed. Russia has exposed itself as being in conventional military power, and it is now clear, beyond any question, that Russian ground forces don’t even possess the capacity to invade the NATO alliance. It isn’t entirely clear that Moscow will be able to capture the entirety of , in the single country of Ukraine, directly on its border. Russia is constrained in its ability to project power beyond its country by in its logistics system. It is very difficult to get supplies beyond more than 180 miles away and virtually impossible beyond that without dedicated rail links. It is understandable that people who live near Russia would be afraid that one day Russia might invade them as it invaded Ukraine, and that, no doubt, led Sweden and Finland to make a sudden U-turn on their long-held preferences for neutrality. But an unemotional evaluation of their neighborhood shows their fears are misplaced. Sweden and Finland are at no clearer risk of an attack from Moscow than they have been for the past 70 years. Though the U.S. has also recently shown itself , the accession of Sweden and, especially, Finland could hardly be said to further the American national interest. Finland shares a roughly 800-mile border with Russia that NATO would be committed to defend, and this defense — or the stationing of NATO military infrastructure in Finland — would risk antagonizing Russia. Washington should at least be clear that if Finland becomes a NATO member, it expects that the Europeans would be tasked with defending Finland’s border, as the U.S. itself is already for the defense of wealthy and capable European countries. None of this is to say that Russia doesn’t pose a danger to Europe, however. It does. But the nature of the threat isn’t conventional military power; it’s the massive that could nearly wipe out the U.S. and Europe in an . Author Harry Kazianis participated in a 2019 U.S. government exercise in which NATO and Russia eventually came to nuclear blows during a Ukraine war scenario — and the study predicted that at least would be killed in the ensuing exchange (no matter who fired the first shot). significantly threaten NATO in its current composition, and Finland and Sweden are under no apparent threat from Moscow if they remain outside the alliance — while the risk of nuclear escalation if they join could destroy our country and theirs. The U.S. has a great incentive to resist the knee-jerk emotional desire to expand NATO at this time. The risk to our national security is great, while the benefit is nonexistent.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Sweden/Finland

Sweden and Finland’s power disrupts current balances within NATO – this damages alliance consensus and prevents the plan’s passage

Zachary Selden May 31, 2022 (Will Finland and Sweden Joining NATO Deepen the Alliance’s Problems?, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/will-finland-and-sweden-joining-nato-deepen-the-alliances-problems/Zachary Selden was the deputy secretary general for policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly from 2008 to 2011 and the director of the Defence and Security Committee at the same institution from 2003 to 2007. He is currently an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida) (NEIGH/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Clearly Sweden and Finland have decided that it is time to rock the boat. The fact that two non-aligned states in close proximity to Russia want to join NATO now has strategic implications, but — contrary to what most argue — enlarging the alliance to bring in these two states will change it much more than previous enlargements did. were pitched as part of integrating the Central and Eastern European states into Western institutions, particularly the European Union, more than explicit protection against Russia. Sweden and Finland, however, are joining NATO solely for the American security commitment in the face of Russian aggression. This is likely to exacerbate tensions in the alliance between those members focused on building European strategic autonomy, particularly France, and those more concerned with maintaining a strong transatlantic security relationship heavily dependent on American military power. If Sweden and Finland were confident in the European Union’s ability to achieve meaningful strategic autonomy backed by military power, there would be no need to join NATO. Further, Sweden and Finland bring more financial and military assets to the table than the states in previous rounds of enlargement and will use that to shape NATO in their interests as much as possible. This is likely to lead to a greater NATO air and naval presence in the Baltic, as well as more of a NATO focus on the Arctic. On both points, Sweden and Finland will sit closer to the British position, which has particular political significance in the post-Brexit environment. Not All NATO Enlargements Are the Same Sweden and Finland are joining now because of their heightened following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What is not as obvious, perhaps, is that fear of Russian military action was not the main factor that drove many Central and Eastern European states to apply for NATO membership in the previous rounds of enlargement. since the end of the Cold War at the request of aspirant states. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were brought into NATO. In 2004 the alliance formally approved the entry of countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), as well as Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, and Montenegro and North Macedonia followed in 2017 and 2020. In all of these cases, accession was preceded by a lengthy process to bring each aspirant member up to certain standards. The question was not just military compatibility and capability, but also the strength and depth of democratic institutions. Each aspirant member went through a lengthy process, in which progress was continually assessed in areas such as building an independent judiciary, establishing transparent election processes, and constructing a market-based economy. Much of this does not relate directly to the needs of a military alliance, but that only underscores that NATO is a political-military alliance. Many of the demands of the accession process dovetailed closely with the reforms undertaken by each of these countries in their quest for E.U. membership, which was precisely the point for most of these states. In the 2000s, E.U. membership was seen by many of these countries as the more significant prize and fulfilling the criteria for NATO membership was a means toward that end. Meeting the milestones set down in the Membership Action Plan was a way to establish progress toward completing the European Union’s , a much more voluminous package of reforms that must be voted into law by each applicant to the European Union. NATO membership was seen as a significant step forward on the path to E.U. membership, and the two were often discussed as part of a package leading to “.” Security from Russian actions and territorial integrity were clearly priorities for the Baltic states, but most of the countries that have joined NATO over the past 20 years do not share a border with Russia and were into the European Union than any threat that Russia posed to them. It is worth remembering that when the “big bang” enlargement of NATO occurred in 2004, NATO and Russia had recently upgraded the relationship to form the , Russia had a , and President Vladimir Putin was still widely viewed . In short, most of the states that joined NATO between 1999 and 2020 lacked the financial and military resources to be significant contributors to the alliance’s military capabilities, and they were more concerned about integration into a broadly conceived West than their security from Russia military action. They had limited capability and incentive to use their political capital to shift the alliance in any significant manner — just being a member of the club fulfilled most of their goals. Finland and Sweden have little in common with the states that have joined NATO since the end of the Cold War. They are joining now solely to get a security guarantee backed by American military power. They are not new democracies seeking incorporation into European structures — rather they are highly developed market economies and longstanding members of the European Union. Their militaries and defense industrial bases are . As non-aligned states, they maintained their military capability after the end of the Cold War to a . Those factors will affect their direct and indirect contributions to NATO and give them far more influence than the states that joined in previous enlargements. They bring significant financial and military resources to the table and likely will use that as leverage in NATO policy discussions. Finland’s and Sweden’s Interests and Influence by direct financial contributions by the members and, far more importantly, by indirect contributions in terms of military personnel and equipment tasked by national authorities for NATO operations. As for (which are ), Finland and Sweden are likely to pay approximately 1.2 percent and 2.2 percent respectively, based on the formula that divides the costs among the members based on GDP. That may not be much compared to the U.S. share (16 percent), but it puts Sweden and Finland in the same category as Denmark. The real influence of Finland and Sweden, however, will come from their indirect contributions. Finland and Sweden are quite distinct in some ways (Finland, for example, ), but both are better prepared than most NATO members to defend their territory as well as to deploy forces as part of missions out of the region. In fact, both were significant contributors to NATO missions prior to applying for membership, . In sum, they are not likely to remain in the background in North Atlantic Council meetings, where the ambassadors from each member state meet to discuss NATO policy. NATO is an alliance of theoretically equal states operating by consensus, but those states with the capability to sustain significant forces as part of NATO missions have a weight in the room that those who cannot do so simply lack. How might this change NATO? First, there is likely to be a push for much more NATO focus on . This is not new, and NATO has devoted particular attention to the region through ground troop deployments and exercises in . However, the alliance’s activities in this region are likely to become much more focused on maritime and aerial operations. While the small Baltic states rely on other NATO members for their air defense, Sweden and Finland have substantial and sophisticated air forces. Both countries are widely viewed as in terms of their ability to sustain an air campaign. With the addition of Sweden and Finland, the Baltic Sea effectively becomes a NATO lake. As such, the alliance’s military activities in and around the Baltic Sea will likely become deeply integrated with the territories and armed forces of Sweden and Finland, to include basing. Sweden and Finland will also likely drive as a zone of competition with Russia. NATO has a longstanding interest in the “high North,” but competing concerns have generally relegated this to the back shelf in terms of NATO priorities. Yet, a wide range of military and non-military concerns revolve around the Arctic for all the countries involved, and it will not escape Sweden and Finland’s notice that, with their accession, every country on the Arctic Council will also be a NATO member except Russia. The Arctic will likely become much more of a central issue for NATO, and this may exacerbate some tensions in the alliance. France, for example, is generally a proponent of a more Mediterranean focus for the alliance. NATO is obviously capable of doing both, but the balance shifts toward a northerly geographic focus with the addition of two more Arctic states. Sweden and Finland’s geographic interests will align more closely with those of the United Kingdom than those of France. In the post-Brexit environment, this will likely heighten tensions in the alliance between those who favor a strong transatlantic relationship and those who seek to raise the prominence of the European Union as a security actor under the rubric of “ .” France is a longstanding leader on this issue and President Emmanuel Macron has recently used France’s term as the rotating president of the Council of the European Union to push for . By applying for NATO membership now, Sweden and Finland are signaling where they stand in that debate. Once again, their motivation for joining NATO now is to pull themselves into a formal security relationship with the United States. Keep in mind that both are E.U. members and that the European Union has a mutual defense clause as part of the . If ensuring Sweden and Finland’s security were seen in Helsinki and Stockholm as a goal that could be met through the European Union and greater European security autonomy, there would be no need to join NATO. Both clearly want to be part of a security arrangement backed by American power. As a recent makes clear, Sweden sees the United States as the only power capable of guaranteeing European security, not the European Union or its members based on their collective military capability. This is clearly at odds with France’s drive for greater European security autonomy. Every NATO enlargement changes the alliance, but adding Sweden and Finland will be more transformative than previous rounds. Sweden and Finland bring significant capabilities and resources to the table that will be a welcome addition to the alliance. But these capabilities give them influence that can be expected to further shift NATO’s focus to the Baltic and Arctic regions. At the same time, Sweden and Finland’s accession may heighten longstanding tensions in the alliance, particularly with France. It will require a deft diplomatic hand to balance priorities and maintain alliance solidarity in what promises to be a challenging period in the transatlantic relationship and European security.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › Russia Divides NATO

Russia disrupts solvency by pitting NATO members against each other

Todd HelmusJanuary 2018 (Researcher at RAND Corporation), “Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe,” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324480070_Russian_Social_Media_Influence_Understanding_Russian_Propaganda_in_Eastern_Europe (BGS-MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

The literature review presented in this chapter provides context for Russian propaganda operations on social media, which are intertwined with Kremlin information operations via more-traditional media and other soft power elements.1 In the former Soviet states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, the Kremlin aims to leverage shared elements of the post-Soviet experience in order to drive wedges between ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations and their host governments. Farther abroad, the Kremlin attempts to achieve policy paralysis by sowing confusion, stoking fears, and eroding trust in Western and democratic institutions.