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2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Russia Deterrence DA

They’ll target U.S. critical infrastructure---only by advancing cyber mechanisms can Russia be deterred

Aldanova ’22 [Dina; May 30; Master’s Candidate at Georgetown University’s Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies Program; National Interest, “Will Russia Launch a New Cyber Attack on America?,” /ceng

International cooperation to this degree is not an asset that Russia benefits from. With the support of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence’s research and development projects, expertise, and training, U.S. retaliation to a potential Russian cyber attack could be not only detrimental but even more profound as a multilateral response. Based on all this, the fear of retaliation could indeed prevent Putin from engaging in offensive cyber operations against the United States. Finally, Putin has lost the upper hand in launching an attack by surprise. For instance, Russia invaded Georgia during the Olympics Games in Beijing in 2008, and Ukraine during the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014. When Putin waged war on Ukraine in 2022—incidentally, immediately following the Beijing Winter Olympic Games—the West anticipated it. Putin invaded Ukraine anyway. He is unlikely to act recklessly in this way again, considering the failures the Russian military has experienced since the invasion. Furthermore, knowing that the United States and European allies have shielded up, Putin has no incentive to strike. Nevertheless, would Putin wait for a more favorable moment? Or scale back a potential attack, for instance, by meddling in the U.S. midterm elections in November? It would be misleading, however, to underestimate Russian cyber capabilities or Putin’s mind games and lose vigilance. In 2020, despite denying its involvement, Russia evidently hacked U.S. software company SolarWinds. By installing malware into the company’s updated Orion software program, the attack affected thousands of customers, a hundred companies such as Microsoft and Intel, and some federal agencies like the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Cyber experts acclaimed the code used as phenomenal. More astonishingly, if not for a performance assessment and proper investigation, the attack could have easily gone unnoticed. For over six months, Moscow tracked emails and other traffic of sensitive information. Could there already be a similar malware in U.S. networks? Now, on the brink of a new Cold War, the United States must keep its guard up on cybersecurity. Although there are significant factors that challenge the probability of an imminent Russian cyber-retaliation, the United States should not disregard the potential for malicious activity in the near future. It needs to keep a sober view and not act hastily. Setting priorities for the long run, the United States needs to continue advancing cyber mechanisms that detect sensitive activity like the Solar Winds hack, and invest more in training and education about cyber hygiene for government agencies, private companies, and the public. It should not neglect to regularly test offline backups, run software updates, report incidents, use multifactor authentication, block unusable domain IP addresses, and assess third-party risks. Although Putin’s intentions are far from clear, his decision to pursue a cyberattack on the United States’ critical infrastructure that would instantly shut down electricity or disrupt clean water supply, the offense might come unexpectedly, and soon. Cornered with sanctions and burdened by the bitterness of defeat, Putin might act furiously. The United States and Western allies need to be vigilant and maintain strong lines of communication about any malicious activity. With a strong multilateral front in the West, Russia will have fewer incentives to engage in cyber warfare.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Russia Deterrence DA

Russian reliance on cyberwarfare escalates now---NATO is next

Cattler ’22 [David and Daniel Black; April 6; Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security at NATO; Principal Analyst in the Cyber Threat Analysis Branch at NATO; Foreign Affairs, “The Myth of the Missing Cyberwar: Russia’s Hacking Succeeded in Ukraine—And Poses a Threat Elsewhere, Too,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/myth-missing-cyberwar/ceng

After Russia invaded Ukraine, many observers initially expected cyberattacks to steal the limelight as a major instrument in Russia’s arsenal. But after a month of fighting, a host of prominent scholars and analysts of cyberconflict have reached the opposite conclusion. Russia’s activities in cyberspace, they claim, have been paltry or even nonexistent. They have dismissed the role of cyber-operations, variously proposing that digital preparations for the invasion in Ukraine never occurred, were haphazard or lacked any real impact, or were mere continuations of Russia’s long-term cyber-activity against Ukraine that fell below the threshold of outright war. This is a dangerous misdiagnosis. All available evidence indicates that Russia has employed a coordinated cyber-campaign intended to provide its forces with an early advantage during its war in Ukraine. The apparent disconnect between these observed incidents, on the one hand, and the public analysis that Russian cyber-operations have been minimal, on the other, is jarring. Preconceived notions of the role of cyberattacks on the battlefield have made it hard for analysts to see cyber-operations in Ukraine for what they are and for the role they play within Russia’s military campaign. Leaning on these preconceptions will only lead to future policy and intelligence failures. Cyberspace is still a nascent domain of operations, and events in Ukraine will have outsized implications not just for any appreciation of Russian cyberpower but for an understanding of the nature of cyberconflict itself. OPENING SALVO The belief that cyber-operations have played no role in Ukraine does not stem from a lack of real-world impact. To the contrary, the magnitude of Moscow’s pre-kinetic destructive cyber-operations was unprecedented. On the day the invasion began, Russian cyber-units successfully deployed more destructive malware—including against conventional military targets such as civilian communications infrastructure and military command and control centers—than the rest of the world’s cyberpowers combined typically use in a given year. The cumulative effects of these attacks were striking. In the hours prior to invasion, Russia hit a range of important targets in Ukraine, rendering the computer systems of multiple government, military, and critical infrastructure sectors inoperable. Forensic analysis by Microsoft, the cybersecurity company Symantec, and the Slovak firm ESET has found that these attacks affected numerous government agencies, military institutions, civil emergency services, and a range of other critical infrastructure sectors such as defense industrial base manufacturers, information technology services, and energy companies directly relevant to Ukraine’s military capacity. Cyber-enabled sabotage also knocked offline the satellite Internet provider KA-SAT, which Ukraine’s military, intelligence, and police units depend on. Victor Zhora, the deputy chief of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection, has characterized the satellite outage as “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of war.” U.S. defensive cyberspace operations prevented further Russian attacks from disrupting the railway networks that were being used to transport military supplies and help millions of Ukrainian citizens evacuate. Russia continues to draw from its wartime arsenal of cybertools, deploying additional destructive malware on a weekly basis. Cities under siege from Russian shelling, including Kharkiv and Kyiv, have experienced cyber-enabled disruptions to Internet services. Ukraine’s national cyber-authorities continue to expose intrusion attempts by Russian and Belarussian cyber-units. All of this has occurred against the backdrop of a series of website defacements, denial-of-service attacks, and other destabilizing cyber-operations intended to produce chaos and further exhaust Ukraine’s cyberdefenses. If observers see this cyber-offensive as a series of isolated events, its scale and strategic significance get lost in the conventional violence unfolding in Ukraine. But a full accounting of the cyber-operations reveals the proactive and persistent use of cyberattacks to support Russian military objectives. The misperception that Russia has been restrained or ineffective in the prosecution of its cyberwar on Ukraine likely stems from the fact that Russia’s cyber-operations have not had the standalone, debilitating effects that assessments before the war imagined they would have. But those assessments pose an unrealistic test of strategic value. No single domain of operations has an independent, decisive effect on the course of war. Nevertheless, the lack of overwhelming “shock and awe” in cyberspace has led to the flawed presumption that Russia’s cyber-units are incapable, and even worse, that cyber-operations have offered Russia no strategic value in its invasion of Ukraine. THUNDER RUN Analysts should assess the use of cyberpower in its proper context. Evaluating Russia’s cyber-operations in Ukraine is impossible without accounting for the multiple tactical and strategic errors that have bedeviled other aspects of Moscow’s military campaign. Russian planners expected a swift victory in Ukraine, but their strategy failed for multiple reasons: inadequate coordination and preparation, the underestimation of the strength and resilience of Ukraine’s military, and various intelligence lapses. Russia’s missteps and struggles have almost certainly hurt its ability to fully employ its cyber-program in support of its conventional forces. But even with those limitations, Russian cyber-units successfully attacked a range of targets in accordance with Russia’s war plans. Russian cyberattacks on government and military command and control centers, logistics, emergency services, and other critical services such as border control stations were entirely consistent with a so-called thunder run strategy intended to stoke chaos, confusion, and uncertainty, and ultimately avoid a costly and protracted war in Ukraine. Indeed, Russian cyber-units have demonstrated their ability to succeed without a great deal of advance warning and direction, and despite the overarching difficulties hampering Russia’s military effort. The reason for this relative success lies in the unique nature of competition and conflict in cyberspace. Unlike troop buildups or other forms of military mobilization that are infrequent and highly visible, cyber-operations are the result of operational cycles that occur covertly and continuously through peacetime and wartime. The targeting of sensitive networks during peacetime lets attackers lay the groundwork for malware intended for wartime use. The methods attackers use to establish initial footholds for espionage activities are indistinguishable from those that precede cyberattacks. For cyber-units, war does not fundamentally change the way they prepare or start to fight. Russia’s cyberattacks prior to the invasion suggest methodical preparations, with the attackers likely gaining access to Ukrainian networks months ago. This stands in stark contrast to the evident lack of preparation across Moscow’s other military instruments, including on the ground, in the air, and in its frequently used influence operations through media and social media. Russian cyber-units did not need direct military orders to prepare for the invasion or to generate new capabilities for the war. The operational realities of cyberspace required them to be ready well in advance. Russian cyber-units will probably continue to be in a state of permanent readiness and capable of supporting tactical and strategic objectives on short notice, either in Ukraine or beyond, as the war persists. The emerging consensus that claims Russian cyber-operations were ineffective misses the bigger picture. Russia’s strategy failed to capitalize on the full capabilities and numerous operational successes of its cyber-units. For instance, Russian cyber-units have not yet shut down electricity or Internet connectivity on a massive scale in Ukraine. That does not mean Russia is incapable of such attacks, as some observers have suggested, but that it envisioned a swift victory and did not see the need for such widespread, indiscriminate disruptions. In all likelihood, Russian military units were reliant on Ukrainian civil infrastructure for their planned seizure of Kyiv and could not risk blowback to their own operations. Russia is almost certainly capable of cyberattacks of greater scale and consequence than events in Ukraine would have one believe. Moscow has significantly improved its ability to conduct comprehensive cyber-operations in recent years and has actively invested in its cyber-capabilities, developing new and harder-to-detect variants of its more advanced malware and operational infrastructure. NO RESTRAINT The war in Ukraine is not over. Russia has been forced to change its operational approach, and Western intelligence points to Moscow shifting toward a strategy of attrition. With the likelihood that the conflict will become a protracted war, Russia will probably not exercise restraint in its use of additional disruptive and destructive cyber-actions. Russian President Vladimir Putin is most likely to double down on early cyber-successes and seek to further disrupt and undermine government, military, and civilian infrastructure, as well as defense industrial base enterprises. Russia’s recent attempts to strike the same targets it hit on the day of the invasion with additional destructive malware indicate this new phase of the conflict is well underway. Although less visible than cyberattacks, cyber-enabled espionage—the theft of sensitive information, in this case from Ukrainian networks—is also likely to play a grisly role in the Russian offensive. Russia’s Federal Security Service has allegedly used personal information stolen from Ukrainian federal databases to draw up kill lists of people who could lead a Ukrainian resistance movement in the event of a Russian victory. And as the war carries on, Russia may be increasingly tempted to tap into the latent strategic potential of hacking collectives aligned with the Kremlin that specialize in ransomware and can unleash chaos at a moment’s notice. Western policymakers should also be prepared for cyber-operations to spread beyond the confines of Ukraine. Several Russian cyber-operations since the invasion have already had spillover effects into NATO countries, affecting critical sectors and civilian Internet connectivity across Europe. Russia knowingly accepted the risk that its cyberattacks would cause collateral damage and has a history of similar reckless behavior. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment released in March judged that “Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure … in United States as well as in allied and partner countries.” Active Russian preparations for future cyber-operations indicate that this not an idle threat. Cyber-operations have been Russia’s biggest military success to date in the war in Ukraine. They will continue to provide Moscow a flexible tool capable of hitting a range of targets in Ukraine and beyond. Disregarding their unprecedented use will only leave policymakers and analysts unprepared for what’s next. A clear-eyed view of the role cyberwarfare has played so far in Ukraine and a better understanding of its place in modern warfare are imperatives for NATO’s collective security and for managing the risks of escalation looming in cyberspace.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Off- Case Position Answers › Military Readiness

The United States does not currently have LAWS in their inventory. This proves they aren’t key to U.S. military protections

Congressional Research Service “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” November 17, 2021 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150

Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without manual human control of the system. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate. Contrary to a number of news reports, U.S. policy does not prohibit the development or employment of LAWS. Although the United States does not currently have LAWS in its inventory, some senior military and defense leaders have stated that the United States may be compelled to develop LAWS in the future if U.S. competitors choose to do so. At the same time, a growing number of states and nongovernmental organizations are appealing to the international community for regulation of or a ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Off- Case Position Answers › T - LAWS

The complexity of the system is irrelevant – lethal autonomous weapons systems are defined based on whether humans are in the loop in the decisions making process

Congressional Research Service “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” November 17, 2021 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150

U.S. Policy Definitions. There is no agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is used in international fora. However, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 (the directive), which establishes U.S. policy on autonomy in weapons systems, provides definitions for different categories of autonomous weapon systems for the purposes of the U.S. military. These definitions are principally grounded in the role of the human operator with regard to target selection and engagement decisions, rather than in the technological sophistication of the weapon system. DODD 3000.09 defines LAWS as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” This concept of autonomy is also known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with humansupervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.” Semiautonomous weapons include so-called “fire and forget” weapons, such as certain types of guided missiles, that deliver effects to human-identified targets using autonomous functions.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Off- Case Position Answers › T - LAWS

Definition of LAWS/How LAWS Work

Future of Life Institute “AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS: WHAT ARE THEY, AND WHY DO THEY MATTER?” Summer 2021 https://futureoflife.org/2021/11/30/an-introduction-to-the-issue-of-lethal-autonomous-weapons/

What are lethal autonomous weapons? Slaughterbots, also called “lethal autonomous weapons systems” or “killer robots”, are weapons systems that use artificial intelligence (AI) to identify, select, and kill human targets without human intervention. Whereas in the case of unmanned military drones the decision to take life is made remotely by a human operator, in the case of lethal autonomous weapons the decision is made by algorithms alone. Slaughterbots are pre-programmed to kill a specific “target profile.” The weapon is then deployed into an environment where its AI searches for that “target profile” using sensor data, such as facial recognition. When the weapon encounters someone the algorithm perceives to match its target profile, it fires and kills.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Off- Case Position Answers › A2 Business Confidence/Economy Disadvantage

No link and turn – AI developments like the plan don’t pay off. The plan actually saves money and helps the economy by ending development before the industry crashes

John Horgan (Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology) Will Artificial Intelligence Ever Live Up to Its Hype? December 04, 2020 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-artificial-intelligence-ever-live-up-to-its-hype/

There are also signs that investments in AI are not paying off. Technology analyst Jeffrey Funk recently examined 40 start-up companies developing AI for health care, manufacturing, energy, finance, cybersecurity, transportation and other industries. Many of them were not “nearly as valuable to society as all the hype would suggest,” Funk reports in IEEE Spectrum. Advances in AI “are unlikely to be nearly as disruptive—for companies, for workers, or for the economy as a whole—as many observers have been arguing.” Science reports that “core progress in AI has stalled in some fields,” such as information retrieval and product recommendation. A study of algorithms used to improve the performance of neural networks found “no clear evidence of performance improvements over a 10-year period.” The longstanding goal of “general” artificial intelligence, possessing the broad knowledge and learning capacity to solve a variety of real-world problems, as humans do, remains elusive. “We have machines that learn in a very narrow way,” Yoshua Bengio, a pioneer in the AI approach called deep learning, recently complained in WIRED. “They need much more data to learn a task than human examples of intelligence, and they still make stupid mistakes.” Writing in The Gradient, an online magazine devoted to tech, AI entrepreneur and writer Gary Marcus accuses AI leaders as well as the media of exaggerating the field’s progress. AI-based autonomous cars, fake news detectors, diagnostic programs and chatbots have all been oversold, Marcus contends. He warns that “if and when the public, governments, and investment community recognize that they have been sold an unrealistic picture of AI’s strengths and weaknesses that doesn't match reality, a new AI winter may commence.”

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Off- Case Position Answers › Politics

Plan is bipartisan

Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/

National Interests Undermine Collective Action While Turkey may have been the first to allegedly deploy live killer robots, their wide-ranging use is likely to be driven by Beijing, Moscow and Washington. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin both openly loathe the Western-oriented human rights doctrines that underpin calls to ban killer robots. And despite America’s domestic division and dysfunction, its political class still has a bipartisan desire for the United States to remain the world’s global military hegemon. With a GDP just slightly larger than that of the state of Florida, Russia’s inability to compete in a great power competition economically renders it reliant on exploiting asymmetric power imbalances wherever possible, including through furthering its AI capability for military and espionage purposes. Autonomous weapons could be well-suited to secure the resource-rich but inhospitable terrain of the Arctic, a region where the Kremlin is actively trying to assert Russia’s primacy. The country is also the world’s second-largest arms exporter behind the United States, accounting for one-fifth of global arms sales since 2016 — a key source of government revenue and foreign influence. Its recent anti-satellite weapons test underscores the Kremlin’s willingness to explore controversial weapons technologies too, even in the face of international condemnation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Other Solvency Mechanisms › CCW ban

Solvency mech

Michael T. Klare (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association) “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war

Out of this process, some clear strategies for limiting these systems have emerged. The first and most unequivocal would be the adoption under the CCW of a legally binding international ban on the development, deployment, or use of fully autonomous weapons systems. Such a ban could come in the form a new CCW protocol, a tool used to address weapon types not envisioned in the original treaty, as has happened with a 1995 ban on blinding laser weapons and a 1996 measure restricting the use of mines, booby traps, and other such devices.13 Two dozen states, backed by civil society groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have called for negotiating an additional CCW protocol banning fully autonomous weapons systems altogether. Proponents of such a measure say it is the only way to avoid inevitable violations of international humanitarian law and that a total ban would help prevent the unintended escalation of conflict. Opponents argue that autonomous weapons systems can be made intelligent enough to overcome concerns regarding international humanitarian law, so no barriers should be placed on their continued development. As deliberations by CCW member states are governed by consensus, a few states with advanced robotic projects, notably Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have so far blocked consideration of such a protocol. Another proposal, advanced by representatives of France and Germany at the experts’ meetings, is the adoption of a political declaration affirming the principle of human control over weapons of war accompanied by a nonbinding code of conduct. Such a measure, possibly in the form of a UN General Assembly resolution, would require human responsibility over fully autonomous weapons systems at all times to ensure compliance with the laws of war and international humanitarian law and would entail certain assurances to this end. The code could establish accountability for states committing any misdeeds with fully autonomous weapons systems in battle and require that these weapons retain human oversight to disable the device if it malfunctions. States could be required to subject proposed robotic systems to predeployment testing, in a thoroughly transparent fashion, to ensure they were compliant with these constraints.14 Those who favor a legally binding ban under the CCW claim this alternative would fail to halt the arms race in fully autonomous weapons systems and would allow some states to field weapons with dangerous and unpredictable capabilities. Others say a total ban may not be achievable and argue that a nonbinding measure of this sort is the best option available.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Other Solvency Mechanisms › Code of Conduct

Solvency mech

Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/

Finding the Middle Ground: Responsible Use. Even in the event that a ban on killer robots could be reached and somehow enforced, the algorithms used by autonomous weapons systems to identify, select and surveil targets are already streamlining and enhancing the use of lethal force by human actors. Banning hardware without including the underlying software would arguably be a half measure at best. But governments are badly struggling with how to regulate AI — and expanding the scope of the proposed ban would add enormous complexity to an already stalled process. Instead, establishing acceptable norms around their use — what one US official has called a non-binding code of conduct — in advance of broad adoption may represent an alternative means to harness the potential positives of LAWS while avoiding the most-feared outcomes. These norms could be based primarily on a shared commitment to avoid so-called unintended consequences. According to Robert Work, the former US defence official, LAWS should be totally excluded from systems that can independently launch pre-emptive or retaliatory attacks, especially those involving nuclear weapons. A code of conduct could include an expectation as well to keep autonomous weapons technology out of the hands of non-state actors. Numerous countries party to the CCW also believe that there are grounds to extend established international human rights law, such as the Geneva Convention, to cover autonomous weapons systems, by applying the law to the human authority that ordered their use. Some proponents of LAWS agree. These are imperfect solutions — but they may prevent dystopian sci-fi fantasies from becoming reality. One way or another, killer robots are coming.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Other Solvency Mechanisms › Regulation

Regulation Mech

Frank Sauer (Senior Research Fellow, Bundeswehr University Munich) “Autonomy in weapons systems: playing catch up with technology” September 29, 2021 https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/09/29/autonomous-weapons-systems-technology/

Hence the challenge of regulation is not met by trying to categorically separate ‘LAWS’ from ‘non-LAWS’. Instead, the challenge is met by developing a new norm in order to adjust human-machine-interaction on the battlefield: Who or what – human or machine – is supposed to perform which function on the targeting cycle where and when? Finding context-dependent and differentiated answers to this question will yield the desired regulation on how autonomous weapons technologies are applied in a manner that is ethically acceptable, compliant with IHL and prudent in terms of the preservation of international security and stability. Luckily, considerable headway has been made this year, also due to the recent papers circulated by the Belgian chair of the GGE, which underlined that the issue under discussion is best characterized by asking what the circumstances of autonomous target selection and engagement are within a framework of human command and control. Convergence is slowly but surely not only taking place in terms of conceptualization, resulting in much less ‘talking past each other’ at the CCW. It is also observable regarding the structure of a possible regulation which, potentially, could take shape in the fully fleshed-out ‘normative and operational framework’. A two-pronged approach combining prohibitions and regulations is taking shape: First, there are specific applications of autonomy in the critical functions of weapons systems that are not acceptable to many members of the international community and should thus be prohibited. Here, the ICRC as well as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and a recently formed group of ten States at the CCW especially highlight the targeting of human beings. In addition, the ICRC as well as many States Parties suggest that uncontrollable autonomous weapon systems should be ruled out as well due to their potentially unforeseeable or indiscriminate effects on the battlefield. Second, when applying force against target profiles other than those intended to represent humans, such as various military objects, autonomy in the critical functions is acceptable, but it requires certain limits and constraints, that is, positive obligations to curb ethical risks, safeguard IHL compliance and address security and safety concerns. Those limits and constraints can be temporal, spatial and, generally speaking, be subsumed under the notion that human control – no matter if eventually characterized as ‘meaningful’, ‘substantial’ or ‘effective’ – must be preserved by design and in use of a weapons system, even and especially when it, at times, performs its critical functions autonomously. The 2021 CCW RevCon and beyond Arguably, a soft ‘proto norm’ on weapon autonomy has emerged and socially taken hold already. After all, in 2021, virtually no one is able to contemplate and discuss autonomy in a weapon’s critical functions without being pointed to the serious concerns involved, the open letters published by the scientific community, the ongoing UN debates, emerging domestic legislations, large bodies of scholarly works in moral philosophy, international law, political science, and so on and so forth. In other words, the debate overall, including the UN deliberations on weapon autonomy in Geneva, has come a long way. The conversation at the CCW in particular has gotten more productive and constructive recently, with convergence increasing. That said, especially the regulatory structure sketched above is far from being universally accepted; nor is the notion that the next step should be codifying it as a legally binding instrument. The most recent GGE meeting in August demonstrated that at least a handful of States Parties are clearly having none of it, this way signaling their intent to prevent the consensus body from making headway. At the same time, pressure on the CCW keeps increasing. In light of the upcoming RevCon, States Parties need to produce tangible results. If they fail to do so, the volume of calls for moving the process into another forum will most certainly increase. Then, the CCW would – once again – have served as only an incubator. New, binding international law is needed. While weapon autonomy presents welcome opportunities in the optimization of defenses against munitions – protecting soldiers’ lives – leaving it unchecked and unregulated will make the world a more unsafe, uncertain, unstable, and inhumane place. Technology will not wait. It is time for UN diplomacy to catch up.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Other Solvency Mechanisms › Establish an International Framework for use

NATO regulations key to global regulation of LAWS – lack of regulation causes misuse

Brian Michelson (Center for European Policy Analysis) “Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards” February 23, 2021 https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/

Lethal autonomous weapon systems will come to dominate warfare in the coming years. NATO needs to harmonize its approach to their development and use, or risk being left behind. The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, “big data,” social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills. While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations’ ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. These systems will inevitably grow more capable, and more necessary, in the coming decade. Technological gaps are inevitable considering the disparities in GDP and military budgets. The United States accounts for over 70 percent of NATO’s overall military spending, while the next three largest contributors (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) provide approximately half of the remaining 30 percent. And with most NATO nations continuing to fund their militaries at under the 2 percent GDP goal, technological gaps will continue to grow. For perspective, the 2021 United States Department of Defense research and development budget is approximately equal to the entire defense outlay of France and Germany combined. With such a large differential, what can be done to help enable effective investments in autonomous weapons by smaller nations? Even more specifically, how can smaller nations provide capabilities that can integrate into, and contribute to the alliance? To better invest limited funds, now is the time to look at a NATO standard for lethal autonomous weapons and their ethical use. While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › NATO Cohesion – Warming Impact

Adaptation fails

JRC 16 (Joint Research Centre is the European Commission's science and knowledge service which employs scientists to carry out research in order to provide independent scientific advice and support to EU policy. August 11, 2016 https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/08/160811101332.htm)

Global change will strike the oldest and most complex ecosystems of the world hardest, regardless of their past stability. This alarming finding is reported in a JRC-led article published in Nature Communications. The authors hypothesized that invasive species, the warming climate and environmental degradation have altered natural habitats so deeply that species adaptation to historical conditions may not be helpful under these new circumstances. Interestingly, the authors found independent support for this hypothesis from both computer simulations and real-world data. Starting from a single ancestor digital organism, the authors let artificial life communities evolve for hundreds of thousands of generations under different, stable environmental settings. These simulated communities included both free-living and 'parasite' digital organisms that helped researchers investigate how biodiversity and ecological networks develop over time, under different environmental conditions. Over several generations, both hosts and parasites diversified, and their interactions became more complex. The authors then investigated how these communities would respond to different scenarios of biodiversity loss. They found that when species become extinct in a sequence consistent with their degree of adaptation to the 'natural' environmental conditions within which they had evolved, their extinction has only a limited effect on the overall diversity of the community. Any deviation from this pattern however, may trigger extinction cascades, eventually leading to the collapse of the entire network. The tendency of consuming species to rely and specialise (develop in a way most suited to the environment) on dependable resources has enabled the evolution of complex systems. This basic mechanism may have doomed many species to extinction -- the authors demonstrate it by comparing the results of their artificial life simulations with several empirical host-parasite networks of different animal groups. Resources that had been largely available in the past are now becoming increasingly scarce, putting at risk the species that rely on them.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › NATO Cohesion Advantage › NATO Cohesion – Warming Impact

Not inevitable – cuts now have an IMMEDIATE effect

Desjardins 13 (Cléa, member of Concordia university Media Relations Department, academic writer, citing Damon Matthews; associate professor of the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment at Concordia University, PhD, Member of the Global Environmental and Climate Change Center, “Global Warming: Irreversible but Not Inevitable,” http://www.concordia.ca/now/what-we-do/research/20130402/global-warming-irreversible-but-not-inevitable.php)

Carbon dioxide emission cuts will immediately affect the rate of future global warming Concordia and MIT researchers show Montreal, April 2, 2013 – There is a persistent misconception among both scientists and the public that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions. This misconception has led policy makers to argue that CO2 emission cuts implemented now will not affect the climate system for many decades. This erroneous line of argument makes the climate problem seem more intractable than it actually is, say Concordia University’s Damon Matthews and MIT’s Susan Solomon in a recent Science article. The researchers show that immediate decreases in CO2 emissions would in fact result in an immediate decrease in the rate of climate warming. Explains Matthews, professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, “If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented – not in several decades." “The potential for a quick climate response to prompt cuts in CO2 emissions opens up the possibility that the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as the political decisions themselves.” In their paper, Matthews and Solomon, Ellen Swallow Richards professor of Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate Science, show that the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at reducing CO2 emissions, and the resulting future emissions that we produce. This means that there are critical implications for the equity of carbon emission choices currently being discussed internationally. Total emissions from developing countries may soon exceed those from developed nations. But developed countries are expected to maintain a far higher per-capita contribution to present and possible future warming. “This disparity clarifies the urgency for low-carbon technology investment and diffusion to enable developing countries to continue to develop,” says Matthews. “Emission cuts made now will have an immediate effect on the rate of global warming,” he asserts. “I see more hope for averting difficult-to-avoid negative impacts by accelerating advances in technology development and diffusion, than for averting climate system changes that are already inevitable. Given the enormous scope and complexity of the climate mitigation challenge, clarifying these points of hope is critical to motivate change.”

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › War Escalation Advantage › War Escalation – Great Power War Impact

Yes it’s nuclear and escalates—multiple warrants and empirics provide a strong basis for our predictions

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring_13/lieber.pdf]

A second set of arguments stems from the problem of nuclear escalation and the future of the US nuclear arsenal. Our main claim is that deterring nuclear conflict will be much more difficult in the coming decades than many analysts realize. As nuclear weapons proliferate, it becomes increasingly likely that the United States will find itself in conventional conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Those adversaries understand the consequences of losing a war to the United States—prison or death typically awaits enemy leaders. 7 Coercive nuclear escalation as a means of creating stalemate and remaining in power is one of the only trump cards available to countries fighting the United States. Some analysts might scoff at the notion that a rational leader would use nuclear weapons against a superpower like the United States. But that retort conflates the logic of peacetime deterrence with the logic of war, and it ignores history. During peacetime, almost any course of action is better than starting a nuclear war against a superpower. But during war—when that superpower’s planes are bombing command and leadership sites, and when its tanks are seizing territory—the greatest danger may be to refrain from escalation and let the war run its course. Leaders of weaker states—those unlikely to prevail on the conventional battlefield—face life-and-death pressures to compel a stalemate. And nuclear weapons provide a better means of coercive escalation than virtually any other. The notion of countries escalating conflict to avoid conventional defeat may sound far-fetched, but it is well grounded in history. When nuclear-armed states face overwhelming conventional threats—or worry about the possibility of catastrophic conventional defeat—they often adopt coercive escalatory doctrines to deter war or stalemate a conflict that erupts. Pakistan openly intends to use nuclear weapons to counter an overwhelming conventional Indian invasion. Russia claims it needs theater nuclear weapons to counter NATO’s conventional advantages. Israel expects to win its conventional wars but retains the capability for nuclear escalation to prevent conquest in case its conventional forces suffer a catastrophic defeat. The discussion of coercive nuclear escalation should sound familiar to Western analysts, as it was NATO’s strategy for three decades. From the mid 1960s until the end of the Cold War, NATO planned to deter war, and stalemate it if necessary, through coercive nuclear escalation. NATO understood that—by the mid 1960s—it could no longer win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, but it still based its national security strategy on coercive escalation because it believed Warsaw Pact conventional forces were overwhelming. In short, the escalatory dynamics that existed during the Cold War exist today—and they are just as powerful. States still face the same critical national security problem they faced during the Cold War and throughout history: namely, how to prevent stronger countries from conquering them. The high-stakes poker game of international politics has not ended; the players and the cards dealt have merely changed. Those who were weak during the Cold War are now strong, and another set of militarily “weak” countries—such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and even China and Russia—now clutch or seek nuclear weapons to defend themselves from overwhelming military might, just as NATO once did. What can the United States do to mitigate the problem of escalation? Ideally, it should avoid wars against nuclear-armed enemies. But that option may not be possible given current US foreign policy and alliances. War may erupt on the Korean Peninsula, ensnaring the United States in a battle against a desperate nuclear-armed foe. In the future, Washington may fight a nuclear-armed Iran over sea lanes in the Persian Gulf. And the United States could someday be dragged into war by a clash between Chinese and Japanese naval forces near disputed islands. Alternatively, the United States could seek to develop conventional war plans designed to wage limited war without triggering enemy escalation. Development of alternative plans is sensible, but history shows that wars are difficult to contain, and modern conventional warfare is inherently escalatory. A third option to mitigate these dangers is to retain, and improve, US nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities. Fielding powerful counterforce weapons may help deter adversary escalation during war— by convincing enemy leaders to choose a “golden parachute” rather than escalation—and would give US leaders better response options if deterrence failed. In particular, the United States should retain and develop nuclear weapons that bring together three key characteristics of counterforce: high accuracy, flexible yield, and prompt delivery. To be clear, sharpening US counterforce capabilities is not a “solution” to the problem of adversary nuclear weapons. Although, ceteris paribus, it would be better to have excellent counterforce capabilities than to lack them, given enough time and motivation, many countries could greatly increase the survivability of their forces. But given the plausible prospect that the United States will find itself waging war against nuclear-armed states, and given the powerful incentives of US adversaries to brandish or use nuclear weapons, it would be reckless to proceed without a full suite of modern nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › War Escalation Advantage › War Escalation – Great Power War Impact

War still likely --- the world is more dangerous now than during the Cold War.

Paul Miller, 12/20/2011. Assistant professor of international security studies at the National Defense University, former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council and political analyst in the U.S. intelligence community, specializing in South Asia. “,” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/19/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_iv.

In my posts, I argued that the world today is more dangerous than it was during the Cold War because the threat from Russia and China is still present, on top of which we face new threats from new nuclear autocracies hostile to the United States, including North Korea, soon Iran, and possibly Pakistan. In addition to the old-fashioned state-centric threats of hostile nuclear powers, the United States now faces a whole new category of threats that simply did not exist during the Cold War: the threats that come when state failure meets globalization, when non-state actors can operate with impunity outside the write of any law but act with global reach because of new technology. These are the threats that are the current fads of IR and security studies: pirates, organized crime, drug cartels, human traffickers, WikiLeaks, hackers, the global Islamist "pansurgency," and, yes, terrorists. (Throw in pandemic disease and ecological disaster and you get all the research funding you want.) There is nothing new about the existence of many of these actors, of course. Pirates and terrorists have existed for centuries. However, their ability to present an immediate and large-scale threat to the United States is new, or at least greater than during the Cold War. Travel and communication is easier and weapons technology is more lethal, state failure is more widespread (giving them more space to operate with impunity), while U.S. and allied border, port, and infrastructure security has not kept up. I earlier argued that the faddish, new-fangled theories about non-state actors were overstated. They are, but that doesn't mean they're completely wrong. Osama bin Laden and Julian Assange clearly did massive and irrevocable harm to the United States in ways literally inconceivable for a non-state actor during the Cold War; the same may be true of the drug gangs in Mexico today. Coupled with the United States' almost complete lack of homeland security, and there is a very real possibility of large-scale, massive, direct harm to the U.S. homeland from a globalized non-state actor. The preeminent threat of this type is, of course, the global campaign by violent Islamist militants and terrorists to eject the "west" from "Muslim lands," overthrow secular governments and replace them with Islamic regimes, and establish the supremacy of their brand of Islam across the world. (I agree here with David Kilcullen's of the conflict as a global insurgency). Violent Islamist movements have done most of their direct damage to people and states across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. But those attacks certainly don't make the world safer for the United States, nor would their victory in, for example, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. And the movement has, of course, directly attacked the United States and our European allies. Note that violent Islamist groups-whether al Qaida or Hamas or Hezbollah or al Shabaab or Lashkar-e Taiba-typically flourish in and around weak and failing states. The only thing comparable to the global proliferation of Islamist insurgencies and terrorist movements over the last two decades was the Soviet Union's sponsorship of communist insurgencies around the world during the Cold War. But the Islamist insurgencies are likely to be more resilient, harder to defeat, and more dangerous because they are decentralized, because their ideology is not linked to the fate of one particular regime, because globalization has made it easier for them to operate on a global scale, and because of the higher risk that Islamists will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction since they are not accountable to a deterable sponsoring power. Even setting the threat from violent Islamism aside, a host of other non-state actors threaten the world order and make American leadership more costly. In fact, the aggregate effect of state failure multiplied across scores of states across the world is so great that "failed states may eventually present a systemic risk to the liberal world order, of which the United States is the principal architect //// and beneficiary," as I argue in the . State failure and the rise of non-state actors-a problem non-existent during the cold war-is a threat to American national security. Conclusion Essentially, the United States thus faces two great families of threats today: first, the nuclear-armed authoritarian powers, of which there are at least twice as many as there were during the Cold War; second, the aggregate consequences of state failure and the rise of non-state actors in much of the world, which is a wholly new development since the Cold War. On both counts, the world is more dangerous than it was before 1989. Essentially take the Cold War, add in several more players with nukes, and then throw in radicalized Islam, rampant state failure, and the global economic recession, and you have today. I recognize that the world doesn't feel as dangerous as it did during the Cold War. During the Cold War we all knew about the threat and lived with a constant awareness-usually shoved to the back of ours minds to preserve our sanity-that we might die an instantaneous firey death at any moment. We no longer feel that way. Our feelings are wrong. The Cold War engaged our emotions more because it was simple, easily understood, and, as an ideological contest, demanded we take sides and laid claim to our loyalties. Today's environment is more complex and many-sided and so it is harder to feel the threat the same way we used to. Nonetheless, the danger is real.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › War Escalation Advantage › War Escalation – Great Power War Impact

Yes great power war---rising geopolitical rivalries.

Brands & Feaver 2017—Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins // Peter Feaver is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke and the director of the American Grand Strategy Program and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies [“Stress-Testing American Grand Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 6, December/January, p. 104-105]

This assumption is now being tested, however, as the spectre of greatpower war revives. Russia and China – two key powers that were never fully reconciled to the post-Cold War order – are now pushing back against that order more assertively than ever before. Russian President Vladimir Putin has used force to halt the feared spread of Western influence and institutions into the former Soviet space. He has also used Russia’s revived military power to intimidate US allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, and to harass US and NATO forces in international waters and airspace. China, as noted previously, is likewise using military and paramilitary forces to coerce US allies, to adjust maritime boundaries by force and to exert pressure on neighbours from Japan to Vietnam.

Both Moscow and Beijing, moreover, are developing warfighting capabilities and strategies designed to deny Washington access to their ‘nearabroads’, and to prevail in a limited military conflict with the United States and its allies. As one US Navy official has noted, Chinese forces have been training for a ‘short sharp war’ with Japan – and presumably, by extension, with America as well.34 For its part, Moscow has regularly staged major military exercises along NATO’s eastern flank, and has re-emphasised nuclear weapons in its rhetoric and planning.35 In other words, neither Russia nor China is acting – or talking – like it believes that great-power war is obsolete. And neither, for that matter, is the United States, as the Pentagon invests in a Third Offset Strategy meant to re-establish American military dominance vis-à-vis great-power rivals.36

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › War Escalation Advantage › War Escalation – Conflict Multiplier

Plan key to maintaining ethical norms and accountability to war crimes

Michael T. Klare (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association) “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” March 2019 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war

This poses obvious challenges because virtually all human ethical and religious systems view the taking of a human life, whether in warfare or not, as a supremely moral act requiring some valid justification. Humans, however imperfect, are expected to abide by this principle, and most societies punish those who fail to do so. Faced with the horrors of war, humans have sought to limit the conduct of belligerents in wartime, aiming to prevent cruel and excessive violence. Beginning with the Hague Convention of 1898 and in subsequent agreements forged in Geneva after World War I, international jurists have devised a range of rules, collectively, the laws of war, proscribing certain behaviors in armed conflict, such as the use of poisonous gas. Following World War II and revelations of the Holocaust, diplomats adopted additional protocols to the Hague and Geneva conventions intended to better define the obligations of belligerents in sparing civilians from the ravages of war, measures generally known as international humanitarian law. So long as humans remain in control of weapons, in theory they can be held accountable under the laws of war and international humanitarian law for any violations committed when using those devices. What happens when a machine makes the decision to take a life and questions arise over the legitimacy of that action? Who is accountable for any crimes found to occur, and how can a chain of responsibility be determined? These questions arise with particular significance regarding two key aspects of international humanitarian law, the requirement for distinction and proportionality in the use of force against hostile groups interspersed with civilian communities. Distinction requires warring parties to discriminate between military and civilian objects and personnel during the course of combat and spare the latter from harm to the greatest extent possible. Proportionality requires militaries to apply no more force than needed to achieve the intended objective, while sparing civilian personnel and property from unnecessary collateral damage.11

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › War Escalation Advantage › War Escalation – Conflict Multiplier

The plan only ends fully autonomous systems – affirmative can still engage in necessary warfighting capabilities

USNI News “Report to Congress on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” November 19, 2021 https://news.usni.org/2021/11/19/report-to-congress-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-3

DODD 3000.09 defines LAWS as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” This concept of autonomy is also known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.” Semi-autonomous weapons include so-called “fire and forget” weapons, such as certain types of guided missiles, that deliver effects to human-identified targets using autonomous functions.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › War Escalation Advantage › War Escalation – Conflict Multiplier

LAWS are a threat multiplier; everything is worse in the world of LAWS availability

Future of Life Institute “AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS: WHAT ARE THEY, AND WHY DO THEY MATTER?” Summer 2021 https://futureoflife.org/2021/11/30/an-introduction-to-the-issue-of-lethal-autonomous-weapons/

What’s the problem? Weapons that use algorithms to kill, rather than human judgement are immoral and a grave threat to national and global security. Immoral: Algorithms are incapable of comprehending the value of human life, and so should never be empowered to decide who lives and who dies. Indeed, the United Nations Secretary General António Guterres agrees that “machines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.” Threat to Security: Algorithmic decision-making allows weapons to follow the trajectory of software: faster, cheaper, and at greater scale. This will be highly destabilising on both national and international levels because it introduces the threats of proliferation, rapid escalation, unpredictability, and even the potential for weapons of mass destruction.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative › Democracy Advantage › Democracy Advantage – Impact

Democratic collapse is an existential threat --- controls every impact

Kasparov 17 (Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf)

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of terror, war, refugees, and military intervention that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.