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2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - Moral Justification

Reduce civilian casualties and unintended engagements

Hiebert, 22 (Kyle Hiebert, Researcher and analyst based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor, 1-27-2022, accessed on 6-27-2022, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So", .) (NB)

Rapid advances in autonomous weapons technologies and an increasingly tense global order have brought added urgency to the debate over the merits and risks of their use. Proponents include Robert Work, a former US deputy secretary of defence under the Obama and Trump administrations, who has argued the United States has a “moral imperative” to pursue autonomous weapons. The chief benefit of LAWS, Work and others say, is that their adoption would make warfare more humane by reducing civilian casualties and accidents through decreasing “target misidentification” that results in what the US Department of Defense labels “unintended engagements.”

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - Moral Justification

LAWS are morally acceptable

Etzioni and Etzioni, 17 (Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, PhD, PhD in AI, May 2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, Army University Press, "Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems", .) (NB)

Moral justifications. Several military experts and roboticists have argued that autonomous weapons systems should not only be regarded as morally acceptable but also that they would in fact be ethically preferable to human fighters. For example, roboticist Ronald C. Arkin believes autonomous robots in the future will be able to act more “humanely” on the battlefield for a number of reasons, including that they do not need to be programmed with a self-preservation instinct, potentially eliminating the need for a “shoot-first, ask questions later” attitude.21 The judgments of autonomous weapons systems will not be clouded by emotions such as fear or hysteria, and the systems will be able to process much more incoming sensory information than humans without discarding or distorting it to fit preconceived notions. Finally, per Arkin, in teams comprised of human and robot soldiers, the robots could be more relied upon to report ethical infractions they observed than would a team of humans who might close ranks.22 Lt. Col. Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army, asserts there might be ethical advantages to removing humans from high-stress combat zones in favor of robots. He points to neuroscience research that suggests the neural circuits responsible for conscious self-control can shut down when overloaded with stress, leading to sexual assaults and other crimes that soldiers would otherwise be less likely to commit. However, Pryer sets aside the question of whether or not waging war via robots is ethical in the abstract. Instead, he suggests that because it sparks so much moral outrage among the populations from whom the United States most needs support, robot warfare has serious strategic disadvantages, and it fuels the cycle of perpetual warfare.23

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – Humans Worse - Turn

LAWS have more accuracy on the battlefield; lack the restrictions of human-driven military forces

Hiebert, 22 (Kyle Hiebert, Researcher and analyst based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor, 1-27-2022, accessed on 6-27-2022, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So", https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/#:~:text=Put%20plainly%3A%20Autonomous%20weapons%20systems,centre%20thousands%20of%20miles%20away.)

Put plainly: Autonomous weapons systems may be able to assess a target’s legitimacy and make decisions faster, and with more accuracy and objectivity than fallible human actors could, either on a chaotic battlefield or through the pixelated screen of a remote-control centre thousands of miles away. The outcome would be a more efficient use of lethal force that limits collateral damage and saves innocent lives through a reduction in human error and increased precision of munitions use. Machines also cannot feel stress, fatigue, vindictiveness or hate. If widely adopted, killer robots could, in theory, lessen the opportunistic sexual violence, looting and vengeful razing of property and farmland that often occurs in war — especially in ethnically driven conflicts. These atrocities tend to create deep-seated traumas and smouldering intergenerational resentments that linger well after the shooting stops, destabilizing societies over the long term and inviting more conflict in the future.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – Humans Worse - Turn

LAWS are faster than humans; can strike even in hard circumstances

Etzioni and Etzioni, 17 (Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, PhD, PhD in AI, May 2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, Army University Press, "Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems", .) (NB)

3 In addition, the long-term savings that could be achieved through fielding an army of military robots have been highlighted. In a 2013 article published in The Fiscal Times, David Francis cites Department of Defense figures showing that “each soldier in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon roughly $850,000 per year.”4 Some estimate the cost per year to be even higher. Conversely, according to Francis, “the TALON robot—a small rover that can be outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000.”5 According to Defense News, Gen. Robert Cone, former commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, suggested at the 2014 Army Aviation Symposium that by relying more on “support robots,” the Army eventually could reduce the size of a brigade from four thousand to three thousand soldiers without a concomitant reduction in effectiveness.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – Humans Worse - Turn

LAWS are faster than humans; can strike even in unprecedented circumstances

Etzioni and Etzioni, 17 (Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, PhD, PhD in AI, May 2017, accessed on 6-27-2022, Army University Press, "Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems", .) (NB)

An example of a dull mission is long-duration sorties. An example of a dirty mission is one that exposes humans to potentially harmful radiological material. An example of a dangerous mission is explosive ordnance disposal. Maj. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, U.S. Army, adds, “[lethal autonomous robots] have the unique potential to operate at a tempo faster than humans can possibly achieve and to lethally strike even when communications links have been severed.”3 In addition, the long-term savings that could be achieved through fielding an army of military robots have been highlighted. In a 2013 article published in The Fiscal Times, David Francis cites Department of Defense figures showing that “each soldier in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon roughly $850,000 per year.”

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – Accuracy

Facial recognition software, which is used to identify targets, is already accurate and getting better

William Crumpler (Research Assistant, Technology Policy Program) “How Accurate are Facial Recognition Systems – and Why Does It Matter?” April 14, 2020 https://www.csis.org/blogs/technology-policy-blog/how-accurate-are-facial-recognition-systems-%E2%80%93-and-why-does-it-matter#:~:text=In%20ideal%20conditions%2C%20facial%20recognition,Recognition%20Vendor%20Test%20(FRVT).

Facial recognition has improved dramatically in only a few years. As of April 2020, the best face identification algorithm has an error rate of just 0.08% compared to 4.1% for the leading algorithm in 2014, according to tests by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).[1] As of 2018, NIST found that more than 30 algorithms had achieved accuracies surpassing the best performance achieved in 2014. These improvements must be taken into account when considering the best way to regulate the technology. Government action should be calculated to address the risks that come from where the technology is going, not where it is currently. Further accuracy gains will continue to reduce risks related to misidentification, and expand the benefits that can come from proper use. However, as performance improvements create incentives for more widespread deployment, the need to assure proper governance of the technology will only become more pressing.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – Accuracy

The technology used in LAWS is getting more accurate by the day. The affirmative is trying to reject a lifesaving technology based on flawed analysis

Hess 2020. Eric Hess is Senior Director of Product Management for Face Recognition & Security Solutions at SAFR from RealNetworks. “Top Five Misconceptions about Face Recognition” April 28, 2020. <https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/92242-top-five-misconceptions-about-face-recognition> Accessed 6/30/20. ARJH

Providers and operators of any emerging technology must be held to high standards to ensure the technology is developed and deployed in a manner consistent with human and consumer rights. Face recognition is a powerful tool, but not a substitute for human surveillance operators making deliberate and actionable decisions based on corroborating evidence. Its job is to present data in real time that can be used to help security staff of potential issues or investigate incidents post-event. Yes, some facial recognition algorithms do currently show unacceptable levels of racial bias, however, the technology is far too valuable to be banned outright. Why continue to advocate use of face recognition when results aren’t always perfect? Some facial recognition systems exhibit lower levels of bias than others: A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) study found that Asian and African-American faces had false-positive match rates 10 to 100 times higher than white faces across many tested algorithms. While these levels of bias are clearly unacceptable, the study also identified several algorithms that were “important exceptions.” These algorithms had fairly consistent results across racial groups with accuracy variances as low as 0.19%. This shows that facial recognition systems don’t inherently have high rates of bias and can be improved. Rather than ban this technology outright, facial recognition providers should be held accountable for reducing bias in their algorithms. A labeling system — akin to nutrition labels on foods — based on results from an independent evaluator such as NIST could provide transparency. Systems that don’t meet minimum consistency requirements across race, age, and gender should not be considered by purchasing committees. Using face recognition can reduce bias in real-world situations: The core function of face recognition — attempting to identify a face based on a knowledge bank of known faces — is something humans do all the time. Take an eyewitness to a crime, a police officer looking for a suspect based on a surveillance image, or a store clerk watching for shoplifters. Each has inherent bias informed by past interactions, the media, and amplified by the cross-race effect. All people have inherent bias — the bias found in facial recognition algorithms stems from bias in the humans developing them. There is no way to completely eradicate bias in humans or algorithms, but facial recognition technology is already as good as, or better than, humans at finding correct matches when comparing images of faces. It can also do so exponentially faster. Facial recognition algorithms are getting better: It’s much easier to train an AI model to reduce bias and eliminate the cross-race effect than it is to eradicate bias in every security guard, law enforcement officer, and witness to a crime. Face recognition has come a long way since it was first developed, and the technology continues to improve with regards to accuracy across skin tone and gender. Bias thresholds could evolve over time as the technology improves to ensure false-match rates continue to drop for all users as the technology becomes more widespread. A complete ban on face recognition would prevent this continual improvement of a technology that could be an equalizer. Accurate, low bias systems leveraged by humans who are educated on how they work — and how to account for their limitations — have the potential to dramatically reduce bias across a range of security, law enforcement, and criminal justice use cases.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - LAWS Safe Now

Status quo solves – regulations on the use of weapons stops escalation

Congressional Research Service “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” November 17, 2021 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150

Role of human operator. DODD 3000.09 requires that all systems, including LAWS, be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” As noted in an August 2018 U.S. government white paper, “‘appropriate’ is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, one-size-fits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every context. What is ‘appropriate’ can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon system.” Furthermore, “human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but rather broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. This includes a human determination that the weapon will be used “with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.” To aid this determination, DODD 3000.09 requires that “[a]dequate training, [tactics, techniques, and procedures], and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system’s autonomy in realistic operational conditions.” The directive also requires that the weapon’s human-machine interface be “readily understandable to trained operators” so they can make informed decisions regarding the weapon’s use. Weapons review process. DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they Function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized parties. Any changes to the system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would require the system to go through testing and evaluation again to ensure that it has retained its safety features and ability to operate as intended. Senior-level review. In addition to the standard weapons review process, a secondary senior-level review is required for LAWS and certain types of semi-autonomous and human-supervised autonomous weapons that deliver lethal effects. This review requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to approve the system “before formal development and again before fielding in accordance with the guidelines” listed in Enclosure 3 of the directive. In the event of “urgent military operational need,” this senior-level review may be waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense “with the exception of the requirement for a legal review.” DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide senior leaders through this review process; however, as the United States is not currently developing LAWS, no weapon system has gone through the senior-level review process to date.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - LAWS Safe Now

High bar to deploy LAWS and current policies stop their development – the affirmative is fearmongering about what types of weapons are used

Gregory C. Allen (director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.) “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread” June 06, 2022 https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread

In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undersecretary of defense for policy; and the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence. Getting the signatures of the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officer and two undersecretaries in a formal senior review is no easy task. Perhaps the strongest proof of the rigor required to surpass such a hurdle is the fact that no DOD organization has even tried.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency - LAWS Inevitable

LAWS are inevitable; in many ways, they’re already here

Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", ) (NB)

Systems with some degree of autonomy have been implemented on the battlefield. 18Notable examples include missile defense systems such as Israel's Iron Dome, which uses radar to identify, track, and shoot down incoming missiles, rockets, mortars, and drones, 19and sentry robots used by South Korea in the Demilitarized Zone, which use heat and motion sensors to identify people and can shoot machine gun rounds or [*157] grenade launchers if granted approval by a human operator. 20As of now, "[t]here are no autonomous weapons systems [("AWS")] in use today that directly attack human targets without human authorization." 21However, future developments in AI could enable systems to use image, facial and behavior recognition to independently identify targets and make lethal decisions in real time. 22Some military experts predict that these types of fully autonomous weapons systems could be created in the coming decades. 23The U.S. Air Force anticipates "by 2030 machine capabilities will have increased to the point that humans will have become the weakest component in a wide array of systems and processes."

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – Fights over Definitions

Plan is ineffective; no clear definition of what LAWS are – aff is unable to solve

Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", ) (NB)

There is no universally accepted definition of what qualifies as LAWS. There is even a fundamental debate over whether LAWS should be defined as (1) the broader category of autonomous technology systems, some of which may be legally problematic, or as (2) the problematic subset of a broader category of systems with some autonomous functions. 12As an [*156] example, the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") defines an autonomous weapon system as "[a]ny weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions." 13A weapon system that is able to "select (i.e. search for or, detect, identify, or track) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage, or destroy) targets without human intervention." 14The United States Department of Defense formulates its definition for LAWS slightly differently, defining it as "weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." 15The degree of autonomy in a system exists on a spectrum that is commonly simplified for clarification into three categories based on the degree of human involvement in the system. 16These categories are: (a) Human in-the-Loop Weapons: robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command; (b) Human- on-the-Loop Weapons: robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots' actions; and (c) Human- out-of-the-Loop Weapons: robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – No Modeling/Fails

Can’t ban; LAWS meet the International Humanitarian Law threshold and therefore are fair game

Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", ) (NB)

When developing new military technology, States must evaluate whether the technology can be operated in compliance with core[International Humanitarian Law] IHL principles. Under Article 36 of Geneva Convention Protocol I ("Protocol I"), in order to develop, acquire, or adopt a new "weapon, means or method of warfare," the State must first conduct a review to determine whether the technology would violate IHL in "some or all circumstances." 25The weapons review obligation of Article 36 has likely not reached the status of customary international law. 26Indeed, only a few States currently utilize systematic approaches to weapons review. 27 [*158] However, States are still bound by the underlying IHL obligations of weapons law and targeting law, even if they do not conduct a formal review prior to implementation. 28 The first step is to review whether the weapon is already prohibited or restricted by existing treaty or customary law. 29Next, the state must evaluate whether the weapon can be used in accordance with the core IHL obligations. 30The State is not required to evaluate all possible misuses of the weapon, but rather the evaluation should relate to the "normal or expected use" of the weapon. 31Finally, if no existing treaty or customary law would prevent the weapon's use, the State should evaluate whether its use would violate the 'Martens Clause'. 32The Martens Clause is a catch-all provision that is intended to provide baseline level protections to civilians, requiring States to act from the "principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience," even in the absence of positive treaty law. 33According to the ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, the purpose of the Martens Clause is to "prevent[] the assumption that anything which is not explicitly prohibited by the relevant treaties is therefore permitted" and to protect the core principles of IHL "regardless of subsequent developments of types of situation or technology." 34Many have argued that the Martens Clause is particularly important in ensuring adequate protection of civilians when weapons technology has developed faster than IHL can adapt to the technology. 35 In order for a new weapons technology to be compliant with IHL during its Article 36 review, the weapon must meet the obligations of "weapons law" and "targeting law". 36Weapons law [*159] evaluates whether a weapon is per se unlawful. 37Targeting law evaluates whether the weapon can be operated within a military environment in a lawful manner. 38These core IHL obligations are codified in Protocol I and have also been recognized as customary international law. 39 The first obligation of "weapons law" is that a weapon cannot be "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." 40To be legal, the weapon must have the capacity to target legitimate military objectives and must not create disproportionate harm to civilians and other noncombatants in at least some battlefield contexts. 41Examples of weapons that fail to meet this standard under customary IHL include incendiary weapons, cluster bombs, and biological weapons. 42The second "weapons law" obligation is that the weapon cannot cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 43The purpose is to prevent inhumane or needless injuries to combatants. 44The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has previously defined "unnecessary suffering" as "a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives." 45Historical examples of weapons that violate this obligation include lasers used to blind soldiers and "dum-dum" bullets (bullets that expand on impact causing large and painful wounds) -- as these weapons caused extreme suffering without progressing any legitimate military purpose. After a weapon is found not to be per se illegal under "weapons law", "targeting law" evaluates whether the weapon can be lawfully operated in a specific battlefield context. 47Two key principles of "targeting law" are (1) distinction and (2) proportionality. 48The requirement that actors distinguish between combatants 49and civilians, and between military and civilian objects, is a "cardinal" principle of IHL. 50The goal of distinction does not demand perfect results but instead requires that actors make decisions using reasonable judgment given the military context in which they are operating. 51Changes to the character of warfare, such as the increased presence of non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, have made it increasingly difficult for military actors to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in real-time combat operations. 52 Next, the principle of proportionality requires that actors balance the extent and risk of collateral harm against the military advantage of the operation or action. 53This is a highly context-specific assessment and has led international courts, military manuals, and others to adopt a "reasonable military commander" standard. 54For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described its standard for proportionality as follows: "In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably wellinformed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian [*161] casualties to result from the attack." 55Gross failures to account for the collateral damage of military operations can amount to a war crime. 56A weapon is not IHL compliant if it does not allow an operator to use their judgment when making targeting decisions within the given battlefield context. 57New weapons technology such as LAWS can only be lawfully used if the State can assure through an Article 36 review that the technology can adhere to IHL obligations within the battlefield context in which it is being used. LAWS technology raises a number of complex issues, ranging from the technical feasibility of IHL compliance, to legal and ethical questions over whether non-human intelligence should be allowed to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield, to the significant public policy implications of wars conducted by robots. 58The novelty of LAWS technology and these complex legal, moral, and practical considerations has resulted in a highly unsettled and contentious international legal status for LAWS development and use. 59 LAWS are not likely to be per se illegal under "weapons law" due to being indiscriminate in their impact or causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 60The evaluation of these factors is based on the nature of the weapon in the uses for which it is designed. 61 LAWS are not likely to be per se illegal [*162] under weapons law because, in theory, the systems can be designed to discriminate and not cause unnecessary suffering. 62LAWS are able to be designed with the ability to strike specific targets. 63This ability to control the impact of the weapon is an important point of distinction as compared to other weapons previously deemed indiscriminate, such as cluster bombs, chemical weapons, incendiary weapons, and anti-personnel landmines. 64And if LAWS use conventional forms of lethal force (e.g. standard bullets or explosives), the presence of autonomous functionality would not likely affect considerations of whether the weapon causes "unnecessary suffering" or "superfluous injury". 65The more significant legal questions are whether LAWS can be designed to comply with IHL "targeting law" and the degree of human involvement that is legally necessary. 66 In order for LAWS to be compliant with IHL "targeting law," "they must be able to reliably and predictably distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, as well as make rapid judgments on the proportionality of an attack against its potential collateral harms. 67First, there is a question as to whether computer algorithms will be able to gauge the complex, context-dependent, and humanistic clues that soldiers must use to distinguish combatants and non-combatants in the modern battlefield where combatants often attempt to conceal their identities. 68Second, even if such a distinction is technically [*163] feasible, there is a question as to whether these systems can reliably make sound decisions given the vast array and often rapidly changing nature of battlefield contexts. 69For example, one potential risk to the system's reliability is the introduction of bias to decision-making originating in the data sets used to train the AI system. 70Even if both of these technical feasibility questions can be adequately addressed, there is a further question as to whether lethal decision-making inherently requires human involvement under IHL. 71And if there is such a requirement, what degree of human involvement is sufficient to meet IHL obligations must also be determined.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › Solvency › Solvency – No Modeling/Fails

International coalition fails – LAWS use inevitable.

Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/

Other risks are that autonomous weapons technology could fall into the hands of insurgent groups and terrorists. At the peak of its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State was launching drone strikes daily. Despotic regimes may impulsively unleash autonomous weapons on their own populations to quell a civilian uprising. Killer robots’ neural networks could also be susceptible to being hacked by an adversary and turned against their owners. Yet, just as the debate intensifies, a realistic assessment of the state of the killer robots being developed confirms what the Swiss ambassador to the CCW feared — technological progress is far outpacing deliberations over containment. But even if it weren’t, amid a splintering international order, plenty of nation-states are readily violating humanitarian laws and treaties anyway, while others are seeking new ways to gain a strategic edge in an increasingly hostile, multipolar geopolitical environment.

2022 SDI Negative
Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative › ***Case Answers*** › Inherency

LAWS are more efficient and make war more humane. They also reduce civilian casualties which solve terror recruitment

Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/

More Just War — or Just More War? Rapid advances in autonomous weapons technologies and an increasingly tense global order have brought added urgency to the debate over the merits and risks of their use. Proponents include Robert Work, a former US deputy secretary of defence under the Obama and Trump administrations, who has argued the United States has a “moral imperative” to pursue autonomous weapons. The chief benefit of LAWS, Work and others say, is that their adoption would make warfare more humane by reducing civilian casualties and accidents through decreasing “target misidentification” that results in what the US Department of Defense labels “unintended engagements.” Put plainly: Autonomous weapons systems may be able to assess a target’s legitimacy and make decisions faster, and with more accuracy and objectivity than fallible human actors could, either on a chaotic battlefield or through the pixelated screen of a remote-control centre thousands of miles away. The outcome would be a more efficient use of lethal force that limits collateral damage and saves innocent lives through a reduction in human error and increased precision of munitions use. Machines also cannot feel stress, fatigue, vindictiveness or hate. If widely adopted, killer robots could, in theory, lessen the opportunistic sexual violence, looting and vengeful razing of property and farmland that often occurs in war — especially in ethnically driven conflicts. These atrocities tend to create deep-seated traumas and smouldering intergenerational resentments that linger well after the shooting stops, destabilizing societies over the long term and inviting more conflict in the future.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › CP – Regulations

Regulations and norms are the best option – bans won’t solve and are a dangerous illusion of control.

König, H. The illusion of control in germline-engineering policy. Nat Biotechnol 35, 502–506 (2017).

The arrival and rapid adoption of the clustered, regularly interspaced, short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)–CRISPR-associated protein 9 (Cas9) system1 has sparked ethical and societal controversy around genome editing of the human germline. Here, I point out the fallacy that such technologies and their applications can be globally prohibited on the basis of universal ethics and bans—the so-called 'illusion of control'. A look at previous technological developments suggests instead that differentiated and multi-faceted approaches that take into account the broadest range of possible ethical and social issues would be preferable for the oversight of CRISPR–Cas9 germline engineering. Such an approach would not only be more effective but also ensure that society has the greatest chance of capitalizing on potential opportunities of the technology. To date, the CRISPR–Cas9 technique has been used to edit the genomes of (non-viable) one-celled human embryos2,3. The first of these genome-editing studies published in the spring of 2015 prompted debate from within the field and by national academies about not only safety issues (such as off-target effects) but also ethical-moral questions. As a result, calls and statements have been released urging researchers to cease performing CRISPR–Cas9 experiments on human germ cells in a clinical context until safety issues have been resolved and the ethical and social implications of directed germline modifications broadly discussed among diverse societal groups and the public4,5,6. In February 2017 a report by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine concluded that clinical trials might be permitted and outlined criteria for a strict regulatory framework. These include the restriction to preventing a serious disease, credible pre-clinical and/or clinical data on risks and potential health benefits, or long-term, multigenerational follow-up (that still respects personal autonomy)7. Furthermore, several groups have suggested the need to develop norms and harmonize regulations **internationally or globally5,6. Among the numerous ethical and social challenges of genome editing and its potential applications, a key unresolved issue relates to the notion that certain technologies or applications can be prohibited globally. The notion of banning technologies or applications worldwide has come to the fore as calls have grown for regulating germline editing in humans. The central assumption underlying this notion is that technologies can be prohibited—continuously or until they are 'safe enough'—and, moreover, that this can be done globally. Considering reproductive technology as a whole, history provides several examples of procedures that prompted controversy due to ethical (including safety) or moral concerns once they became technically feasible. These include the use of assisted-reproduction techniques (ARTs), such as in vitro fertilization (IVF), intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). As time has passed, these technologies have become more and more widely adopted and accepted across the globe. Today, they have come into use, even in countries where they were initially prohibited for considerable time periods (e.g., Costa Rica, which only ***effectively lifted its ban on IVF in 2016; and Germany, which only granted conditional permission for PGD in 2011). In 2015, the United Kingdom approved therapeutic approaches that involve three-parent mitochondrial genome replacement (MGR) in egg cells or one-cell embryos, which thus entail inheritable changes to the human germline. Furthermore, in the Ukraine, MGR has been applied to treat infertility, with a first baby girl reported to have been born early this year8. Similarly, US fertility researchers recently announced that they had conducted MGR in Mexico to prevent mitochondrial disease in a boy born last April9. An expert panel recently convened by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that clinical investigations of MGR are ethically permissible, though only under strict conditions, for example, if restricted solely to male embryos, which cannot pass on mitochondrial DNA to later generations10. Yet, by the time this article went to press, MGR therapy was still effectively banned in the United States owing to an FDA decision in 2001 (http://bit.ly/2q2898X) because of concerns over safety issues such as negative effects from mitochondrial heteroplasmy and mitochondrial–nuclear mismatches. The decision was made in response to ART applied in several fertility clinics that involved the transfer of egg cytoplasm (including mitochondria)11. The decision indicates that the use in therapy of human cells “involving the transfer of genetic material by means other than the union of gamete nuclei” requires application to the FDA for permission. Even the idea that technologies can be banned or prohibited until they are proven by research to be 'safe enough'—at least in the context of reproduction and/or therapies—appears to be disputable. What safe enough means may in practice be as much a question of perception involving different values and interests (and weighing perceived benefits against perceived risks) as it is one of available 'strictly scientific' evidence or numbers (should they be available at all before first clinical applications). An example may be the decisions for the first ART via ICSI by four couples after 3–13 years of unsuccessful trials with traditional ART methods, even though only data from rabbits were available12. An ambiguous state of global union Imposing legal regulations that might prohibit the use of ART technology globally also appears non-feasible, at least when ethical or moral arguments stand in the way of new medical opportunities. Even with respect to human somatic cell nuclear transfer—and despite a seemingly broad international scientific consensus against reproductive cloning due to its low efficiency and the unacceptable potential health issues associated with cloned offspring—no binding global convention has been agreed upon. What's more, the resulting non-binding United Nations (UN; New York) “Declaration on Human Cloning” remains ambiguous by calling to “prohibit all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human life”13. The ambiguity in the UN declaration arises from its failure to define or interpret the forms of cloning that are incompatible with human dignity or what human life and human dignity should mean. The reason this ambiguity exists was because UN negotiations had to address the issue that dignity and life have different meanings in different cultures and religions globally14. In line with this, regulations vary in different countries or regions of the world, ranging from prohibition of all forms of cloning, to selectively permitting therapeutic cloning, to no official regulations at all (Table 1). Furthermore, the Council of Europe's (Strasbourg, France) legally binding “Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,” which prohibits in its protocol on cloning the creation of “a human being genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead,” has not been signed or ratified by various member states, although it explicitly leaves the interpretation of “human being” to national policies to allow therapeutic cloning where it is accepted15. That (reproductive) cloning appears not to have been performed anywhere so far, including in countries where there is no legal ban, may encourage supporters of such international declarations or conventions. However, it can hardly provide evidence that they were instrumental in—or even contributed to—this outcome, especially given the huge technical hurdles that reproductive cloning faces16. Illusion of (universal) control The idea that biological technologies, like CRISPR–Cas9, or their applications can be (continuously) prohibited, and that this can be done globally thus appears to be reminiscent of the 'illusion of control' in psychology—a phenomenon in which people's beliefs in the control are greater than can be actually justified. For instance, people act as if they have control in situations that are actually determined by chance17. Similarly, when people envision that they will obtain a certain result that they then achieve, they frequently overestimate their influence in bringing about the result18. It is very unlikely that a global ban across jurisdictions is feasible. Indeed, current regulations related to germline interventions vary considerably across the globe19,20. They encompass bans—based on law or less-enforceable governmental or research council guidelines—that prohibit both research and clinical or reproductive applications; or that prohibit clinical or reproductive application only; or that remain sufficiently unclear to raise doubts as to whether they cover human germline gene modification at all (Table 1). In the United States, no federal law describes an outright ban on human germline interventions and work on human embryos, and in some states researchers could do research on embryos with private funding (as was the case with MGR experiments in Oregon in 2012; ref. 21). Yet, there are regulatory means in place that in fact prevent human germline modifications in publicly funded research and in clinical settings. Thus, the US National Institutes of Health does not fund “any use of gene-editing technologies in human embryos” and its Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) will not entertain or review proposals for human germline alterations22. Furthermore, the FDA has regulatory authority over cell and gene therapy applying to any (not only publicly funded) research and clinical trials in the United States, and the agency has never approved a proposal to modify the germline. In addition, a renewable provision (that has been extended twice into 2017) of the US Congress's Fiscal Year 2016 omnibus spending bill prevents the FDA from using the budget to evaluate or permit trials with human embryos “intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification”23 (see also ref. 24). The bill may thus also affect the FDA's capability to review MGR therapy approaches (see above). When it comes to developing regulations on whether or under which conditions germline modifications should be permitted, entrenched moral stances and views on ethics will always be confronted by, and weighed against, the hopes and needs of affected people and their families and caregivers. These may include a desire for people to have their 'own' (genetically related) children not suffering the same disease (e.g., deafness or cystic fibrosis) as both parents do, or new fertility treatments that may be (felt to be) needed due to economic or cultural factors. Naturally, the result of the confrontation between societal ethics and individual hopes—be it a strict ban on all forms of human germline interventions or more differentiated regulations—will strongly depend on the prevalent ethical and moral stances of the societies in which those individuals are found. And these societal ethical or moral stances will differ across the globe. As in the case of cloning, moral stances with respect to the compatibility with human dignity may also be a key issue with respect to germline modification. The UN Declaration on Human Cloning includes statements on human genetic engineering. But as for its language about reproductive cloning, it remains vague and ambiguous with respect to genetic modification and human dignity, calling for the adoption of “measures necessary to prohibit the application of genetic engineering techniques that may be contrary to human dignity”13. Notions of global bans, and maybe even of globally harmonized regulations, on germline interventions—at least of ones that would not be too vague or ambiguous—may thus in fact include features related to the 'illusion-of-control'. Alternatives to illusions Features like exaggerated belief in control or in the causal role of one's own intentions, or unrealistic optimism are elements of normal human thought. They can promote motivation, persistence or the ability to care for others25. However, when it comes to the development or choice of policies, it may be worth considering that these phenomena could also have a downside: they may entail less 'realistic' and thus less-efficient policies. Thus, policies may be followed that strive to universally, and maybe continuously, ban or prohibit technologies or their application—irrespective of their purpose—on a national level or even globally. But on the basis of the evidence, there is in fact little or no empirical support that such strategies work. In addition, they may obscure and distract from alternative policy approaches, focusing on processes that we could better or more realistically control. Such processes could be case-by-case evaluations, dealing with specific applications in which we use knowledge and the technologies in question, such as CRISPR–Cas9 genome editing. Developing and delineating tests and standards (including clinical ones) for techniques or therapeutic tools used in the specific context of these applications may be important elements of such evaluations. Furthermore, focusing on concrete applications and conditions should facilitate interpretations and definitions (including legal ones) related to applications and ethical boundaries20. In contrast to global regulations or bans based on efforts to 'globalize' ethics that universally disapprove germline applications of genome editing, alternative, more realistic policies would support more case-oriented approaches. Such policies may in fact benefit from experiences coming from diverse governance schemes or authorities. These may involve state, regional and national regulations, multiple monitoring bodies (both public and private), but also formal and informal bilateral or multilateral interactions and the engagement of stakeholders on various levels. Stakeholders should include not only researchers and ethicists, but also companies and investors, non-governmental organizations, groups of concerned citizens or families who would be involved in deciding, for instance, on (experimental) approaches. The difficulty of deciding who should be included in such consultations should not be underestimated. For example, it may be important to engage in the policy development processes of not only do-it-yourself biology and biohacker communities as well as biohacker spaces, but also funding sources, such as crowd-funding platforms or investor-supported 'hackubators', even though human germline applications of CRISPR–Cas may not (yet) appear as a goal for these groups26. Involving them and their efforts on codes of ethics may be beneficial, not least of all because any bans or guidelines on institutional research or research funding may hardly provide guidance and oversight on such non-institutional activities27. These more 'polycentric' patterns of approaches and stakeholders may promote key elements linked to polycentric governance in other contexts, like diverse experimental efforts, enhanced collaboration or mutual monitoring and trust28. These elements could be important to facilitate bilateral and multilateral exchange between nations, and gain scientific data and knowledge on safety issues by carefully crafted and monitored laboratory and clinical experimental approaches. But they may also prove beneficial to the development of democratically meaningful deliberation processes. These would need to go beyond the type of expert-dominated summits or one-time public consultations with largely expert-driven agendas (that resulted from calls, including for global action, and statements by various groups4,5,6 so far). Furthermore, these processes would need to contribute to understanding risks by continuously revisiting earlier choices and questions, and thus improve policies over time—based on experiences (about hardly predictable interactions between society and technology) from different conditions and involving a wide variety of perspectives29. Such deliberation processes may reduce the danger of missing potentially important ethical, social or political implications, and further strengthen mutual trust. 'Illusion-of-control'-like notions of universal ethics and bans on germline applications may thus favor one-dimensional thinking and illusionary policies, harboring the danger of leaving aside potentially more realistic and efficient policy alternatives. The latter type of 'polycentric' approach should be better capable of exploring the opportunities of genome-editing techniques, foster collaboration between countries and enhance the chances to grasp the broad range of possible ethical and social issues that would have to be taken into account by efficient and trust-building policies. They may also require governments, non-profits, investors and corporate managers to invest more effort to understand and experiment with conditions that both foster and ethically guide innovation. Ensuring that these differentiated and polycentric policymaking strategies take into account the realities of 'manyness' (i.e., societal differences in values and interests across the globe) would mean tailoring regulations around specific conditions rather than rejecting applications of technologies as a whole. Such an approach to regulations would not only allow space for experimental efforts that generate important scientific data (e.g., on safety issues), but also reduce incentives for researchers to move to countries with more lax standards or less stringent oversight. At the same time as they allow research to progress, they would also allow meaningful democratic deliberation processes on futures with genome-editing applications that people may, or may not, want.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › Links – Business Confidence / Innovation

The aff bioterror solvency card concedes that a ban would disrupt innovation

1AC Barry Pavel and Vikram Venkatram , 21, (Barry Pavel, Barry Pavel is the senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Barry Pavel was a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the Officer of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for almost eighteen years. From October 2008 to July 2010, he served as the special assistant to the President and senior director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, serving both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Prior to this, Pavel was the chief of staff and principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities. From October 1993 to November 2006, Pavel also led or contributed to a broad range of defense strategy and planning initiatives for both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. In this capacity, Pavel supported post-9/11 deterrence policy (including deterrence of terrorist networks and regional nuclear powers); strategies for reducing ungoverned areas; and a long-range planning construct that accounts for trends and “strategic shocks” that could significantly change Department of Defense’s role in national security. Vikram Venkatram is a Young Global Professional in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Forward Defense at the Atlantic Council. He is a recent graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where he studied Science, Technology, and International Affairs with a minor in Biology. He is also currently a second-year graduate student in Georgetown’s Security Studies Program. Originally from San Jose, California, his main interests lie in biosecurity issues, ranging from pandemic preparedness to emerging biotechnology to environmental security to bioethics., 9-7-2021, Atlantic Council, Facing the future of bioterrorism, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/, 7-1-2022) SCade

Given the broad scope and scale of this growing threat, the United States should take a series of actions to mitigate the risks, without unduly stunting the growth of the biotechnology field. To date, bioterrorist attacks have been low-risk, high-impact events. While they have been extremely rare, their frequency will only increase as will their ramifications. However, overregulating the spread of biotechnological tools could stunt innovation and the profound potential of this increasingly important sector. Furthermore, existing methods of preventing bioterrorism may no longer be effective. The government could previously monitor the purchase of expensive and dangerous biotechnology tools and the laboratories that owned them in large quantities. This is no longer possible to the same degree when such tools are increasingly cheap, widespread, and usable in a garage. The FBI is currently attempting to address this risk by building relationships with the iGEM community and with life scientists so that they can report suspicious behavior. These efforts should continue, but are wildly insufficient, since some bioterrorists may have minimal contact with the larger community of biologists and biology hobbyists. The release of a bioweapon by a terrorist, if left unchecked, could spread throughout the globe, just as a naturally occurring pandemic would. Thus, one major step that the United States should take is to establish improved responses to disease outbreaks, particularly learning from COVID-19. This should include building a larger stockpile of PPE and establishing a set of clear step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of an attack. Building resilience in this fashion will not prevent bioterrorism, but it will mitigate its effects, and may slightly disincentivize utilizing bioweapons to cause terror. Beyond this, the United States should secure its laboratories and the data within, as terrorists could leverage that knowledge to build bioweapons. For example, new technology allows pathogens to be synthesized from the data describing their genetic sequences. In a recent controversial study, scientists published a methodology that would allow horsepox virus, a virus very similar to one that causes smallpox, to be synthesized. This research was conducted with a noble goal: understanding how the horsepox virus could be used as a potential treatment for cancer. However, it had significant dual-use implications. Research like this should not be banned outright, but the United States should establish norms to evaluate whether it is worth the risk before such research is conducted, and then ensure that it is conducted and the results published in the most secure ways. Replicability is an important part of science, but the general public should not be able to replicate the most dangerous experiments. Where building resilience would reduce the impact of a bioterror incident, restricting access to dual-use methodologies will reduce the likelihood of one occurring in the first place. Finally, enforcing domestic standards is not enough. Pathogens spread across borders, and the spillover effects of even a targeted bioterrorist attack could kill many unintended victims. Thus, the United States must work with other countries to protect against the bioterrorist threat, monitor the emergence of new viruses and bacteria that could be leveraged for a bioweapon, limit access to the most dangerous pathogens (and data associated with those), and build global response networks in the event of an attack. Importantly, this collaboration should emphasize working with allies, but should also include adversaries: if China or Russia remain unregulated, an attack within their borders would still affect the United States and its allies. Emerging biotechnology will result in new medicines and medical techniques, a greater understanding of how pathogens function and spread (and thus a better understanding of how to combat them), a healthier populace, innovative new capabilities that could transform daily life, and greater engagement with the biological sciences. While ensuring that these benefits are maintained, the United States and its allies and partners must take logical steps to protect themselves from the worst-case scenarios. The risk of bioterrorism is growing, and the United States must be prepared to face the future.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › Links – Business Confidence / Innovation

Germline editing is the biggest medical innovation in decades

Abinaya & Viswanathan 21 Abinaya, Ravichandran Vijaya, and Pragasam Viswanathan. “Biotechnology-Based Therapeutics.” Translational Biotechnology, 2021, pp. 27–52, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128219720000198, 10.1016/b978-0-12-821972-0.00019-8. Accessed 30 June 2022. //DRE

Within the last decade, biotechnology had a spontaneous growth spurt in developing numerous ground-breaking techniques for diagnosis, prevention, and curing various life-threatening diseases. Innovative methodologies, such as recombinant DNA technology, gene therapy, DNA vaccines, stem cell therapy, RNA-based therapeutics, and drug discovery, have significantly contributed to improving medical science. The biomaterials for tissue engineering, the genome editing for gene therapy, the development of nano-based drugs and novel antibiotics, stem cells therapy for regenerative medicine, the advancement in monoclonal antibodies production, and the highly modified vectors for drug delivery systems made possible to treat human diseases which are even untreatable. This chapter discusses the newly developed biotechnology principles, methods, and products, that aid in healthcare, pertaining to the field of biotechnology. In upcoming days, this stable and steady growth of biotechnology will revolutionize the field of medical and health science.

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › Links – Business Confidence / Innovation

Gene editing is k2 innovation

Claire O’Connell, 11-14-2019, Claire O'Connell is a contributor to The Irish Times who writes about health, science and innovation "Why gene editing is decade’s most significant innovation", Irish Times, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/innovation/why-gene-editing-is-decade-s-most-significant-innovation-1.4080666, 6-28-2022, //ms

gene editing (like the other innovations) has been in the works for a while, the last seven years have seen major developments in our ability to specifically edit DNA in living cells. It is not without controversy. Recent claims that human embryos in China had been genetically edited and had resulted in twin babies prompted widespread condemnation from scientists, as well as discussions about safety and ethics and calls for effective regulation. But as a technology, the ability to alter a gene in a living cell offers many potential benefits, including treating inherited diseases, understanding what specific genes do, generating more resilient crops and even detecting species in the environment. "The field is amazing," says Jane Farrar, a professor of genetics at Trinity College Dublin. "I have had some very late nights updating my lecture slides for undergraduates, because so much in gene technology is happening so quickly." Gene editing – which directly changes the “letters” of the genome – is becoming more of a feature of gene therapy, notes Farrar, but it is the new kid on the block. “The ability to edit specific genes in living cells is relatively new,” she says. “That means many forms of gene therapy that have by now reached the clinic or are under late-stage development don’t use these new gene-editing techniques. They deliver the gene into the cell, rather than correcting or editing the DNA,” she notes. Farrar was one of the pioneers of gene therapy research in Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s, when the patient-led charity Fighting Blindness supported work to find the genetic changes linked to inherited forms of vision loss. “The eye is really an ideal place for gene therapy,” she explains. “It is accessible, it can tolerate the viruses used to deliver genes and you have a natural control – if you put the gene therapy in one eye you can compare it to the other over time.” Rare eye disease Farrar, Prof Pete Humphries and colleagues identified gene changes involved in a rare eye disease called retinitis pigmentosa, and developed a system to "rescue" the gene function by suppressing the mutant gene and delivering a new gene into the cell. The technology was acquired by Spark Therapeutics in 2016. In 2017, the FDA in the USA approved a different Spark therapy, Luxturna, which replaces the function of gene changes associated with progressive sight loss. It was the first gene therapy of its kind to be approved in the US. “In general, there’s a huge amount of commercial interest in new gene therapies,” says Farrar. “Plenty more are in the works, not just for inherited eye diseases but also for rare diseases that affect how cells break down cellular components to recycle them, conditions that damage the mitochondria [which act as “batteries” in cells] and spinal and central nervous system disorders, among others.” She believes that gene editing will become more common in gene therapy approaches in the coming years, particularly as we work out how to do it safely and effectively. “With gene editing, there is the potential risk of ‘off-targets’, where editing a target gene could bring about unintentional changes in the genome or cell function, so some researchers are looking for ‘safe harbours’ in DNA,” she explains. “These are stretches of DNA where in principle you could add different genes targeting different disorders, while avoiding negative off-target effects.” The availability of gene editing in recent years also means that scientists can now use it as a research tool to target specific stretches of DNA relatively easily, according to Prof Breandan Kennedy, a senior lecturer at University College Dublin. Probably the best known gene-editing technology is CRISPR-Cas9, which was made commercially available in 2012. A little like having a sat-nav and a scissors, CRISPR-Cas systems allows you target a specific sequence of DNA “letters” in a living cell, then cut the sequence at that point. ‘Very powerful’ “By doing this, we can inactivate a specific gene, and this gives us a lot of information about what that gene normally does,” says Kennedy, whose work at UCD school of biomolecular and biomedical science uses gene editing technology on microscopic worms, zebrafish and human cells in the lab. “By inactivating specific genes, which we can do much more quickly and easily now with CRISPR-Cas systems, our group has been able to identify genes that are important for vision, for eye development and for blood vessels in the eye to grow and work properly. We are also using the approach to validate in the lab whether particular DNA change in patients are involved in inherited eye disease. Ten years ago if you said such a technology would be widespread, people would have laughed, but now labs around the world can do this. It’s very powerful.” Plant science, too, is reaping the rewards of being able to target specific stretches of DNA in living cells. "What is possible now is what was impossible five years ago," says Dr Ewen Mullins, head of the crop science department at Teagasc, Oak Park. “The holy grail for plant breeding is to be able to control the activity of a single gene, or several linked genes, and now gene editing allows us to do that,” he says. “And crucially, we are not necessarily adding a gene in from another species. With CRISPR-Cas systems, we can edit the genes already in the plant.” This could help to make crop plants more resilient in the face of droughts, fluctuating temperatures and agents of disease, notes Mullins: “These are becoming issues for farmers in Ireland and other parts of the world now, and in the face of climate change we need to reduce those susceptibilities where we can into the future.” Identifying species Gene-editing technology can even help us to identify what species are living in a particular environment, as Dr Anne Parle-McDermott from Dublin City University is finding out. "We are looking at the different species of salmon that live in rivers and aquaculture, but we are doing that by analysing the DNA they shed, also known as environmental or e-DNA," she explains. "We can take a sample of water, then we add CRISPR to find unique stretches of DNA that tell us about the species it came from. The associated Cas protein then cuts a reporter DNA and we can detect that cutting activity, so we know that stretch of DNA is present in the sample. It gives us a whole new way of knowing what DNA is present in the environment." Dr Ciaran Seoighe, deputy director general at Science Foundation Ireland, is impressed that gene technology won the reader vote for the innovation of the decade. "CRISPR-Cas9 is a case of a discovery turned into an innovation," he says. "Decades ago, researchers were discovering that bacteria had this system of being able to find and cut DNA in viruses and so stop them attacking, and the innovation was to take that and use it to specifically edit genes ourselves. It was a case of finding something interesting and then doing something different with it. Now it provides a tool for researchers to work on more personalised approaches to medicine." Farrar is also impressed by the winning vote. “I think the readers are very insightful,” she says. “Gene technology has matured in the last decade, and thanks to gene-editing technology we can also now get far more understanding about disease. This is really a story of fundamental biology enabling a new technology. Without that curiosity, we might not have these exciting innovations now.”

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › Links – Business Confidence / Innovation

Restrictions on germline genetic editing would crush business confidence – venture capitalist are hugely invested.

Brian Gormley, 3-10-2022, Brian Gormley is a Special Writer covering life sciences for Dow Jones VentureWire. He joined Dow Jones in 2004."Venture Investment in Crispr Gene Editing Spurs Innovation, Hunt for IP," WSJ,

Increasing venture-capital investment in gene-editing technology is fueling a rush to secure intellectual property in a sector that promises to spur advances across several areas of biotechnology.Technology known as Crispr enables researchers to make precise changes, or edits, to the genetic code, which could lead to therapies for genetic diseases, cancer and other conditions. Because of its broad commercial potential, the gene-editing technology has been surrounded by intellectual-property disputes for several years.In one such dispute, U.S. patent authorities ruled that the Broad Institute, a partnership including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, was first to invent a method of editing plant and animal cells using the enzyme Cas9, a type of molecular scissors that can cut DNA.The dispute pitted Broad against the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Vienna and Emmanuelle Charpentier, who shared the 2020 Nobel Prize in Chemistry with Berkeley professor Jennifer Doudna for their Crispr-Cas9 research.The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office decision affects companies that use Cas9, favoring those with ties to the Broad, including Editas Medicine Inc., and going against drugmakers such as Intellia Therapeutics Inc. that have licenses from the University of California and its partners.Intellia last week said it had filed patent applications for its own Crispr-Cas9 innovations and that it doesn't expect the ruling to affect its ability to develop future Crispr-based medicines.Several Crispr-based startups raising venture capital recently are using enzymes other than Cas9 to enable new applications for gene editing, avoid existing patents, and generate new intellectual property. Last week's ruling will spur even more Crispr innovation, said Katherine Ann Rubino, chair of the life-sciences practice group for law firm Caldwell Intellectual Property Law.Globally, venture capitalists invested $1.08 billion in 31 Crispr startup financings last year, compared with $172.9 million in 18 such deals in 2020, according to market tracker PitchBook Data Inc. Part of the appeal is the efficiency, specificity and simplicity of Crispr gene editing, said Ursheet Parikh, a partner with venture firm Mayfield. 

2022 SDI Negative
*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative › Off case › Links – Politics

Democrats don’t support a full ban on genetic engineering

Andrew Joseph, 6-5-2019, (Andrew Joseph is a general assignment reporter at STAT. Prior to joining STAT at its founding in 2015, he worked for the San Antonio Express-News and the San Francisco Chronicle. He was part of the STAT team that was named a Pulitzer Prize finalist for their reporting on the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic. Andrew graduated from Dartmouth College and has covered everything from crime to health policy.) "Congress Revives Ban on Altering the DNA of Human Embryos Used for Pregnancies", Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/congress-revives-ban-on-altering-the-dna-of-human-embryos-used-for-pregnancies/ lilw-msdi2022

A House committee on Tuesday restored to pending legislation a ban on altering the genomes of human embryos intended for pregnancies, despite calls from some scientists to lift the ban and allow the Food and Drug Administration to review applications for new technologies. Lifting the prohibition could have opened the door to clinical trials of babies being made with genetic material from three people or with genomes that had been changed in ways that would be passed on to future generations. The ban has been attached to bills that fund the Food and Drug Administration in the form of an amendment, or rider, since December 2015. But last month, a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee dropped the ban from the legislation. At a hearing Tuesday, supporters of the ban framed it as a necessary barrier to prevent experiments like the one announced last year in which a Chinese scientist created the world’s first gene-edited babies with the technology CRISPR. The work drew worldwide condemnation for skirting ethical and regulatory guidelines and for using scientific tools that were not yet ready to be used in people. “The ethics hadn’t caught up with the science, and… the science has not caught up with the science,” said Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.), who introduced the rider in 2015 and again at Tuesday’s hearing. He said that for now, genetically editing embryos had “too many unknowns, too many unintended consequences.” The rider blocks the Food and Drug Administration from considering clinical trial applications “in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification.” Scientists and ethicists who advocated for dropping it argued that doing so would simply allow the FDA to review research requests, as it does any other innovative therapy. Some Democratic lawmakers who had appeared supportive of dropping the ban earlier — and who had criticized the inclusion of the ban in 2015 without debate — said they felt it was time for Congress to debate the underlying ethical and scientific issues. But they said that should be done separately from the appropriations process. The chairwoman of the committee, Democrat Nita Lowey of New York, said she “reluctantly supported” returning the ban to the bill. She acknowledged that editing embryonic DNA had some potential risks, but added that it could cure and prevent genetic disease. “We have a moral obligation to allow advances in science so that fewer parents have to watch a child die,” she said. Some scientists had called on Congress to modify the legislation to allow so-called three-parent embryos but maintain the ban on the direct editing of embryonic DNA. The three-parent technology, more precisely called mitochondrial replacement therapy, or MRT, has the potential to prevent severe diseases that result from abnormal mitochondria, energy-producing cellular structures. It involves transferring the nucleus of an unfertilized egg with defective mitochondria into one with healthy mitochondria and then fertilizing it via IVF. Because mitochondria have a small bit of their own DNA, the resulting embryo has genes from three people. The technology is being studied in some countries, including Britain, as a way to halt the inheritance of genetic diseases that stem from the DNA in the mitochondria. Rep. Sanford Bishop Jr. (D-Ga.), who chaired the subcommittee that approved the bill without the ban last month, said he wanted Congress to discuss allowing MRT, “but today is not that time, and this appropriations committee markup is not that place.” He supported adding the ban back to the bill. The committee approved the amendment to reinsert the ban on a voice vote, but one Democrat who voted against it was Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida. She carries a variant of the BRCA2 gene that raises her risk of certain cancers (she was diagnosed with breast cancer in 2007) and said her children would have to get tested to see if they carried the mutation. “If we ever have an opportunity when they have children or when they decide to have a family, to have research advanced to a point where you could have their genetic material, when combined with their partner, altered so that that mutation could be cut off in our family tree and that risk of death and massive health care implications could be eliminated, that’s incredibly important,” she said.