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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA, reunderlined by JMP]
On this note, the French conception of controlled AI goes a step further and ties auditability to the core value of sovereignty in French strategic culture.54 This is because the relationship between auditability and control stems from geopolitical concerns. The strategy states, “France cannot resign itself to being dependent on technologies over which it has no control. […] Preserving digital sovereignty therefore also involves controlling the algorithms and their configuration, and the governance of data.”55 This need for control comes from a desire to exert independence from the “stranglehold on AI exerted by China and the United States,” including by strengthening European cooperation.56 While the geopolitical aspects and prospects of France to assert this independence are beyond the scope of this study, it is notable that they trickle into the French approach to trace the provenance of models and data. In particular, weapons are “critical applications” that will need to be auditable.57 If enforced, this means that questions about data rights and legal authorities to transfer data (including from foreign suppliers) could render AI “uncontrolled” per the French definition. Here, protectionism straddles the line of ethics and adoption, with digital sovereignty as a potential factor that determines acceptability of both. This can also be seen in the imperative to maintain “freedom of action.”58
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Trabucco, 2020 - Research Assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen [Lena, May 10 “AI Partnership for Defense is a Step in the Right Direction – But Will Face Challenges” http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/ Acc 4/17/22 TA, reunderlined by JMP]
Which brings me to the third challenge. The AI partnership symposium did not offer a coherent strategy for the partnership beyond advancing core values the participating nations find important to the AI pipeline. Peter Singer, New America Foundation fellow and strategist, noted that the US has not yet offered a coherent strategy to contrast its “near peers.” In one article, Singer said, “China has a fairly clear and robust vision of this [AI and its applications] and it is actively exporting that vision. There is absolutely no way the US can compete without offering a different and compelling vision and one that involves our friends and allies.” On the one hand, the absence of an overarching strategy gives the DoD and the AI partnership latitude to address inevitable issues that will arise. Secretary Esper noted in his address that this kind of partnership is the first of its kind and needs time to operate in the face of unforeseen challenges. But to accomplish the goal as the preferred security partner in AI, the partnership will need to substantiate its agreement with a vision more concrete than just ethical values. The AI partnership accomplishes getting some allies on board, but does not clarify what vision is driving the newfound partnership. At some point, this will need to change. In essence, the AI partnership is a necessary and welcome development in the US AI strategy, but significant legal and policy challenges are on the horizon. The three outlined here – legal interoperability, trans-Atlantic cooperation, and an uncertain coherent strategy – are certainly not exhaustive. But they represent a span of legal and policy issues the partnership are sure to encounter as it moves forward.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA] reunderlined by //AB
On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA] reunderlined by //AB
Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations Full US-EU collaboration faces five distinct, but interconnected obstacles (see Figure 1 below). At the highest level, the United States and European Union have some diverging geopolitical interests (section A) illustrated by: America’s increasing isolationism, the European Union’s rebalancing to become a third power, the European Union’s resistance to adversarial discourse about China, and domestic political demands to focus resources on COVID-19 responses. Flowing out of the geopolitical landscape and political interests are three overarching considerations that are bolstered by differing beliefs about the role and size of government and can fuel US-EU disagreements around AI. These US national interests and EU common priorities are (section B): AI’s impact on national security and economic interests, as well as the ethics and values that guide AI’s development and use. Finally, aspects of the AI operating environment (sections C, D, and E), such as regulation and governance (including standards and operationalizing principles), funding, data spaces, hardware, and computing resources, provide tactical areas for disagreement or misalignment.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 1nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Gilli, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College [Andrea, NDC Research Paper No.15 – December ““NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1514 Acc 4/21/22 TA, reunderlined by JMP]
Defence procurement is particularly complex, given the range of strict requirements and specifications with which contractors have to comply.251 This is why traditional weapons manufacturers generally have an advantage when it comes to approaching defence buyers.252 AI, however, will entail a paradigm shift because the capabilities will continuously evolve. For AI-enabled autonomous systems in particular, as mentioned above, decision-making is “non-deterministic” and depends on the “dynamic environment” in which the system operates.253 This means that “traditional development and procurement approaches, based on full-path regression, are unfit”.254 This means that R&D also continues in the product deployment phase, as data and algorithms keep providing information and feedback that have to be integrated in order to achieve initial operational capabilities. Current “waterfall” procurement paradigms are set up so that engineers test prototypes according to defined specifications, and then subsequently move to production.255 With machine learning, the specifications will keep evolving as algorithms are fed new data.256 By extension, this means that testing cannot be treated as a singular phase prior to production and development. For NATO Allies, a more iterative procurement paradigm that does not depend on the sequential “waterfall” entails unique challenges. The integration of enterprise AI requires specific technical, legal, and organizational capabilities. This is linked to human-capital challenges in requirements, procurement and operations communities, as organizations leveraging AI “need their own people who know how to structure the problem, handle the data, and stay aware of evolving opportunities”.257 The development of AI-centred major weapon systems similarly calls for reform, or at least a remarkable adaptation, of defence procurement.258 Significant political, organizational and human capital will have to be invested. This is an additional reason why a centre such as the proposed A3IC could support the transition, through best practices, lessons learned and similar initiatives.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 1nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Each member state can have different equipment, policies, and tactics
reluctant to share sensitive operational and intelligence information
different languages and military cultures
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › U.S. Must Consider Turkey Concerns to Rebuild Relations
Hess, 22 – a Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (June 22, 22; Maximillian Hess; “Why the West should make peace with Erdogan now”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/, AI)
For Erdogan’s drift away from the West and closer relations with Moscow to be reversed, it is important to understand what motivated it. Today, the West is paying a price for failing to listen to his concerns. The drift initially began in 2011, as the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Erdogan was ebullient, as the uprisings offered the prospect of bringing Islamists similar to himself to power across the region. He felt betrayed when then-U.S. President Barack Obama failed to uphold his redlines in Syria and abandoned then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and publicly backed by Erdogan, when the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in a coup. “Turkey has learned the hard way that the U.S. is unwilling to invest in the region,” Muhammet Kocak, an international relations specialist based in Ankara, told me. Similarly, “Turkey’s security concerns have not been perceived as a particularly relevant issue in the NATO agenda,” said Elizabete Aunina, a doctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam focused on Turkish security policy.
But what accelerated Erdogan’s drift away from the West—and shift to Moscow—was his sense of betrayal after the 2016 failed Turkish coup, which he publicly accused the United States of fostering. He also felt abandoned by his NATO allies when Washington withdrew its Patriot missile defense systems from Turkey and when NATO barely even reacted after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter aircraft intruding on its airspace, the first such incident involving NATO and Russian or Soviet airpower in 60 years. Since then, Erdogan felt that Moscow offered a better route to improving his regional and domestic position.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › U.S. & NATO Diplomacy key to Turkey Support
Stavridis, 22 – former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO (June 20, 22; James Stavridis; “NATO must bring Finland, Sweden, and Turkey together”; , AI)
This is a deeply meaningful moment for NATO. The secretary-general or deputy secretary-general should consider undertaking shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Helsinki and Stockholm. Senior military leaders must help their political counterparts see the operational value of bringing the two Nordic nations into the alliance. NATO’s supreme allied commander, the highly regarded US Air Force General Tod Wolters, should be quietly and respectfully making the case in Ankara for this accession.
Finally, as the most powerful member of NATO, the US, has a special responsibility to finding a path to untying this Gordian knot. Simply cutting through it by force won’t solve the underlying tensions which have been exacerbated by the EU’s long rejection of Turkish membership. There may be incentives the US can offer Turkey, ranging from military purchases to economic support for refugees they host from Syria.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › 2nc AT: No Spillover
Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis
NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38
While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › 2nc Delay Bad
Auerswald 22 – Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College [David Auerswald, May 17, 2022, “How the US Senate could slow down Sweden and Finland’s NATO future” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-senate-could-slow-down-sweden-and-finlands-nato-future/ Acc 6/21/22 ER]
With the announcements that Finland and Sweden will apply for NATO membership, attention now turns to the existing members of the Alliance. Adding new members requires amending NATO’s founding treaty, which then needs to be ratified by each of its thirty members. Proponents within the Alliance—to say nothing of the two aspirant countries—will want that process to happen as fast as possible. The longer it drags on, the more opportunities exist for Russia to derail the expansion process by manipulating public opinion, engaging in petro-coercion, or increasing its military threats.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › 2nc Link – Consultation
Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, , accessed 6/23/22, NB]
Although Allies will always have some different interests, they can use consultations to limit their negative, political impact. They can also adjust consultation mechanisms to changing strategic realities, further limiting the risk of tensions and increasing the probability of a common, coordinated response. The Allies should thus agree a set of principles to guide their consultations in the coming decade. These might include:
• Consultations must not be merely notifications or briefings about decisions already taken. They must entail frank discussions and the chance to influence an Ally’s actions.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › 2nc Link – Consultation
Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, , accessed 6/23/22, NB]
NATO has been able to adapt to profound changes in international relations largely due to its consultation mechanisms. During the Cold War, consultation enabled NATO to adjust its strategy to the Allies’ changing perceptions of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, consultations facilitated NATO’s adjustment to new threats that required out-of- area interventions and engagement in the fight against terrorism. Today, the Alliance is again trying to adjust to a new reality. With US policy in NATO likely to be determined by the rise of China, the Allies will have to consult to come up with a coherent approach to reconcile US global and European regional security interests.
NATO was created as a collective defence organisation soon after World War II to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union. The Alliance’s military credibility was guaranteed by the economic, political and military potential of the US and supported by American military presence in Europe. In case of military attack, the Allies could invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to trigger a collective military response. The credibility of this mutual security guarantee has been strengthened by consultation mechanisms. Article 4 of the Washington Treaty gives Allies the right to call for consultations if their “territorial integrity, political independence or security ... is threatened.”1 Rather than rely on ad hoc consultations during crisis, NATO created the North Atlantic Council—its main decision making body, which meets at least weekly at the level of permanent representatives (ambassadors) and regularly at higher political levels (foreign ministers, ministers of defence and heads of state and government). Over the years, NATO has developed habits, norms and institutional mechanisms that enable almost continuous consultations on the whole range of issues affecting their security. These have facilitated the development of a common strategy and necessary capabilities to support it, and limited tensions among member states with sometimes differing national interests, strengthening the Alliance’s political cohesion. As NATO decisions are made by consensus, the consultation agenda also has to be approved by all Allies. Informal discussion among various groups of states and the weekly informal lunch of all representatives can help to build a consensus on what should be discussed during formal meetings, perhaps leading to politically binding decisions
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › 2nc Link – Game Theory
Dr. Ping-Kuei Chen 16, Doctor of Philosophy in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, "Holding Hands While Parting Ways: Examining Alliance Treaty Renegotiation", Doctoral Dissertation, 2016, https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/18546/Chen_umd_0117E_17257.pdf?sequence=1
During bargaining, alliance members interact and communicate their demands for future security cooperation. Allies not only try to determine a set of mutually acceptable solutions, but also evaluate whether the alliance is worth preserving. In the attempt to find a solution to their differences, members may encounter difficulties during negotiation, since their interests are unlikely to overlap completely.
Morrow (1994) suggests that two problems may hinder coordination in alliance politics. First, a distributional problem occurs when members have different preferences among all available solutions. The other problem is informational problem. Allies may conceal available options from each other in order to advance their own interests. These two problems intertwine. As Morrow argues, “Distributional interests prevent the honest sharing of information.” This dictum applies to intra-alliance bargaining because, even in a security alliance, members are not fully aware of each other’s intentions. Members sometimes have an incentive to misrepresent or hide their true intent in terms of maximizing their own security benefit, and so may withhold information regarding their security interests or falling short of their commitments in order to achieve unexpressed policy goals.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Top Level Links / Internal Links › Emerging Tech Link
Cook and Dowd, 22 (5/13/22, Cynthia R. Cook directs the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Defense-Industrial Initiatives She formerly spent 25 years at the RAND Corporation, where she worked on and oversaw a wide range of acquisition studies for components across the U.S. Department of Defense. Anna M. Dowd is a senior international security and defense policy expert, an adjunct at the RAND Corporation, and co-founder of the Digital Innovation Engine. From 2014 to 2020, she served as principal officer and head of industry relations at the NATO Communications and Information Agency. Prior to joining NATO, she was a fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and served as senior policy officer at the European Defense Agency and senior analyst at the Polish Ministry of Defense. “How to Get NATO Forces the Technology They Need.” ) //AB
In a Feb. 26 Twitter post, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation, asked the SpaceX chief executive, Elon Musk, to provide Ukraine with Starlink terminals to enable satellite-based communications. In less than 48 hours, Starlink user kits arrived in Ukraine, immediately improving the command-and-control ability of Ukraine’s military.
For those of us who study the NATO acquisition process, it is almost impossible to imagine the alliance identifying a requirement and adopting a solution so quickly, no matter how urgent the circumstances. Among the many challenges would be the alliance’s elaborate, consensus-based governing structure, as well as the divergent interests and funding mechanisms among the 30 member states. This is why, in 2016, the International Board of Auditors concluded that NATO struggles to provide commanders with required capabilities on time and estimated that common-funded capabilities required an average of 16 years from development to delivery.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Uniqueness › AT: Congress Won’t Support NATO Expansion
DESIDERIO 22 – congressional reporter [ANDREW, 05/19/2022, “Senate on track to approve NATO bids of Finland and Sweden” , Acc 6/21/22 ER]
“[Sweden and Finland are] in a gray zone right now, and they are rightfully concerned,” said Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), who chairs the Senate’s NATO Observer Group, in a brief interview. “It’s not that we expect any encroachment of their borders, but there are other things like hybrid warfare that they’re concerned with. Us being there is reassuring to them.”
Even before Russia’s stepped-up aggression in Eastern Europe, there was broad consensus in Washington that NATO is the most successful defensive alliance in history. That Finland and Sweden decided to apply for membership in the 30-member group after decades of neutrality underscores what the West views as the necessity of conveying a united front against threats to the liberal order.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Uniqueness › AT: Congress Won’t Support NATO Expansion
DESIDERIO 22 – congressional reporter [ANDREW, 05/19/2022, “Senate on track to approve NATO bids of Finland and Sweden” , Acc 6/21/22 ER]
GOP senators who opposed new Ukraine aid are eager to push back on Russian aggression in another way: supporting Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO.
Senators in both parties are already taking steps to fast-track a defense treaty for the two countries’ memberships in the alliance, as the U.S. and its allies look to strengthen their posture against Russia and send a message of unity to Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, both bids are on a glide path to the required two-thirds Senate approval.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Uniqueness › AT: Turkey Won’t Every Support
Turak, 22 -- CNBC correspondent (5/17/22, Natasha ‘The stakes here are now massive’: Turkey is threatening to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. ) //AB
“The stakes here are now massive,” Timothy Ash, emerging markets strategist at Bluebay Asset Management, said in a note Tuesday. “It feels like a major crisis is looming in Turkey-Western relations over Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid.”
“Other NATO members will be furious with Turkey given the now clear and present danger to Europe presented by Putin in Ukraine,” Ash added. “Turkey will be seen an an unreliable partner. This will leave even more bad blood/faith between the two sides — gone will be any remnants of a Turkish EU accession bid.”
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Uniqueness › 2nc Uniqueness – NATO Expansion
Blinken and Stoltenberg, 22 – US Secretary of State and the NATO Secretary General State [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; ; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]
SECRETARY GENERAL STOLTENBERG: On Finland and Sweden, I and my staff, we are in close contact of course with Turkey, an important NATO Ally. And the two countries that have applied for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, we have met with them and I’m going to convene the meeting in a few days with senior officials and then follow up to ensure that we make progress on the applications of Finland and Sweden to join NATO. My intention is to have this in place before the NATO summit. At the same time, I know that to make progress we need 30 Allies to agree.
Finland and Sweden has made – have made it clear that they are ready to sit down and to address the concerns expressed by Turkey. And all NATO Allies are of course ready to sit down and address those concerns, including the threats posed to Turkey by PKK. And this is terrorist threats, which of course is something we are taking very seriously. We know that no other NATO Ally has suffered more terrorist attacks than Turkey. And Turkey is an important Ally, not least because of its strategic geographic location bordering Iraq and Syria. They have been important in our fight against ISIS, and also Black Sea country, close to Russia.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Uniqueness › 2nc Uniqueness – NATO Expansion
Samuels, 22 (05/18/22 11:56 AM ET, Brett, “Biden says he will press Congress, allies on NATO membership for Sweden, Finland,” https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3492842-biden-says-he-will-press-congress-allies-on-nato-membership-for-sweden-finland/, JMP)
President Biden on Monday voiced his support for Finland and Sweden applying to join the NATO alliance and said he would work with Congress and other member nations to “quickly” approve their membership.
“Sweden and Finland have made the important decision to seek NATO membership after thorough and inclusive democratic processes in each country,” Biden said in a statement.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Uniqueness › 2nc NATO Unity Now
Blinken and Stoltenberg, 22 – US Secretary of State and the NATO Secretary General [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; ; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]
And let me just also, if I could, before I turn it over to Jens, I do want to say one thing about the question that you addressed to the Secretary General. Here again, at every stage of this Russian aggression – before the aggression, when it started, and in the months since – at virtually every stage we have heard doubts expressed about what the Alliance would do, what countries would do in terms of support for Ukraine, and whether that was actually going to happen. We have demonstrated that it would, and that it has; concerns and doubts about whether we could really deliver on what we said we would do – massive consequences for Russia’s aggression with unprecedented sanctions. Well, we’ve delivered on that. And I would suggest that there are always going to be stories about differences in any particular moment.
But when it comes to the strategic direction that we have taken together as Allies, as partners, both within Europe and beyond, this, at least in my experience, has been unprecedented in its solidarity in the common determination both to support Ukraine with security assistance, economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, to put extraordinary pressure on Russia to cease its aggression, and to shore up the defenses of our Alliance.