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2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › China Internal

China co-op calls are lies–– DOD requests and Diverging Incentives prove

Allen 22 (Gregory Allen, 5-20-22, Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, ) Roho

One Key Challenge for Diplomacy on AI: China’s Military Does Not Want to Talk May 20, 2022 Over the past 10 years, artificial intelligence (AI) technology has become increasingly critical to scientific breakthroughs and technology innovation across an ever-widening set of fields, and warfare is no exception. In pursuit of new sources of competitive advantage, militaries around the world are working to accelerate the integration of AI technology into their capabilities and operations. However, the rise of military AI has brought with it fears of a new AI arms race and a potential new source of unintended conflict escalation. In the May/June 2022 issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren Kahn, and Laura Resnick Samotin write: The United States, then, faces dueling risks from AI. If it moves too slowly, Washington could be overtaken by its competitors, jeopardizing national security. But if it moves too fast, it may compromise on safety and build AI systems that breed deadly accidents. Although the former is a larger risk than the latter, it is critical that the United States take safety concerns seriously. Such fears are not entirely unfounded. Machine learning, the technology paradigm at the heart of the modern AI revolution, brings with it not only opportunities for radically improved performance, but also new failure modes. When it comes to traditional software, the U.S. military has decades of institutional muscle memory related to preventing technical accidents, but building machine learning systems that are reliable enough to be trusted in safety-critical or use-of-force applications is a newer challenge. To its credit, the Department of Defense (DOD) has devoted significant resources and attention to the problem: partnering with industry to make commercial AI test and evaluation capabilities more widely available, announcing AI ethics principles and releasing new guidelines and governance processes to ensure their robust implementation, updating longstanding DOD system safety standards to pay extra attention to machine learning failure modes, and funding a host of AI reliability and trustworthiness research efforts through organizations like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). However, even if the United States were somehow to successfully eliminate the risk of AI accidents in its own military systems—a bold and incredibly challenging goal, to be sure—it still would not have solved risks to the United States from technical failures in Russian and Chinese military AI systems. What if a Chinese AI-enabled early warning system erroneously announces that U.S. forces are launching a surprise attack? The resulting Chinese strike—wrongly believed to be a counterattack—could be the opening salvo of a new war. In recognition of this risk, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence recommended in its March 2021 final report that the DOD engage in diplomacy with the Chinese military to “discuss AI’s impact on crisis stability.” More recently, Ryan Fedasiuk wrote in last month’s Foreign Policy that “it is more important than ever that the United States and China take steps to mitigate existential threats posed by AI accidents.” It is not only Americans who have written about the need for a diplomatic dialogue on this subject. In 2020, Zhou Bo, a senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), wrote an op-ed in the New York Times in which he argued, As China’s military strength continues to grow, and it closes the gap with the United States, both sides will almost certainly need to put more rules in place, not only in areas like antipiracy or disaster relief—where the two countries already have been cooperating—but also regarding space exploration, cyberspace and artificial intelligence. Other Chinese officials—including Fu Ying, the vice chair of the China’s National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee—have published similar calls for U.S.-China diplomacy on AI risk reduction. Even the Global Times, a newspaper owned and published by the Chinese Communist Party, ran an English-language article in November 2021 with the headline “China urges regulating military use of AI, first time in UN history, showing global responsibility.” Clearly China believes that calls for diplomacy on military AI are good for its global reputation. Substantive diplomacy on this topic is worth pursuing and, if successful, could meaningfully contribute to reducing the risk of a future U.S.-China conflict. With such loud public support in prominent Chinese venues, one might think that the U.S. military need only ask in order to begin a dialogue on AI risk reduction with the Chinese military. Alas, during my tenure as the Director of Strategy and Policy at the DOD Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, the DOD did just that, twice. Both times the Chinese military refused to allow the topic on the agenda. Though the fact of the DOD’s request for a dialogue and China’s refusal is unclassified—nearly everything that the United States says to China in formal channels is—the U.S. government has not yet publicly acknowledged this fact. It is time for this telling detail to come to light. China’s refusal was not the first time that China’s diplomatic strategy on military AI included a gap between words and actions. China’s 2016 and 2018 position papers to the United Nations discussions on lethal autonomous weapons have supported a ban on the usage of such weapons, but not their development. If that is the case, it begs the question why are Chinese weapons companies—including ones controlled and owned by the Chinese military— building and exporting internationally AI-enabled weapons that openly advertise lethal autonomous capabilities. And it is important that such risk reduction dialogues occur bilaterally between the DOD and the PLA, not just via the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ public proclamations at the United Nations. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a direct analogue of the U.S. State Department, which complicates its ability to authoritatively speak on behalf of the PLA. In the Chinese system, the Chinese military is a part of the Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese government, which controls the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though both organizations ultimately have the same leader—Xi Jinping is both the president of the People’s Republic of China and chairman of the Chinese Communist Party—experience has shown that there is no substitute for direct DOD-PLA dialogue on military issues. It is frustrating that China’s public calls for diplomatic dialogue and the cooperative development of new norms on military AI—which have continued even after the PLA’s multiple refusals to have such a dialogue—have attracted praise from those who are evidently not aware of the gap between public rhetoric and private reality. For example, Michael Woolridge, an AI researcher at Oxford University, highlighted China’s public diplomacy on military AI in his recent book as encouraging evidence that China was seriously considering the concerns being raised by both AI researchers and Chinese international relations scholars. The truth, unfortunately, is that—despite the United States’ efforts at transparency and requests for dialogue—the United States knows very little about how seriously the Chinese military considers ethics in its use of AI, how robust Chinese test and evaluation processes are, and what governance structures and procedures exist to reduce the risk of military AI accidents.That secrecy in and of itself is a source of risk to international peace and security. But, then again, what incentive does China have to substantively engage? The United States is already providing a great deal of transparency around its own risk reduction efforts, and China is already garnering many reputational benefits from calling for dialogue without any of the costs of substantively participating. Perhaps neither the U.S. government nor the Chinese scholarly community can succeed in persuading the PLA that it is in everyone’s best interest for this dialogue to occur. At the very least, however, it should be clear to the international community that China is the one refusing to talk.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › China Internal

AI gives China an opportunity to leap ahead in the global power race

Kania ‘19 (Elsa B Kania, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, “Chinese Military Innovation in the AI Revolution,” The RUSI Journal, 164:5-6, 26-34, November 29 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2019.1693803)-amc

Chinese leaders recognise the AI revolution is a unique moment in which the PLA has the potential to leapfrog the US in terms of military power. Notably, Lieutenant General Liu Guozhi (刘国治), director of the CMC Science and Technology Commission has argued, ‘this is a rare strategic opportunity for our nation to achieve innovation surpassing and to achieve a powerful military, and it is also a rare strategic opportunity for us to achieve turning sharply to surpass (弯道 超车)’.63 In the process, the PLA will be inherently challenging – and often targeting – the US military. Indeed, the recent history of China’s military modernisation has been deeply influenced by the PLA’s concentration on the US military as both a model and a powerful potential adversary (强 敌). This approach to military science was aptly captured by an authoritative commentary in PLA Daily that urged to: Keep an eye on future opponents, adhere to using the enemy as the teacher, using the enemy as a guide, and using the enemy as a target ... We must develop technologies and tactics that can break the battle systems of powerful adversaries and counter the high- end combat platforms of powerful adversaries.64 If successful, the PLA could succeed in realising its aspirations of becoming a world-class military, changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Interoperability Key

Threats to interoperability now – Building AI capacity with European countries is key to prevent digital divide

Soare 20 [Simona R. Soare, Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations., “DIGITAL DIVIDE? Transatlantic defence cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 3, March 2020,

There is a growing transatlantic digital gap, including on AI,21 that feeds into broader concerns around transatlantic military interoperability. Europe is already behind in the global technological competition on AI, including in R&D and technology adoption. The EU, the world’s second-largest economy, only attracts 8% of global private equity AI investment, most of which goes to the United Kingdom,22 now outside the Union. In a demonstration of the flattening effects of AI, a post-Brexit EU might attract as little AI private funding as Israel – approximately 4% of the global total. Diffusion of digital technologies in Europe remains slow and AI is mostly a niche market for European companies. The European Commission’s pledge to spend €20 billion a year for the next decade to support AI R&D, together with national European pledges, will help narrow the AI investment gap with the US and China. It may not close the gap, but it will undoubtedly make Europeans more competitive. European states are also increasing their defence spending, which means more funding will be redirected towards R&D and emerging and disruptive technologies. Nevertheless, Europe is lagging significantly behind the US and China on defence AI R&D. Of course, European defence R&D has traditionally been lower than the US and the transatlantic technology gap is an enduring feature of the relationship. At €44.5 billion, European defence investment is not negligible, but defence research is still decreasing, begging the question whether this state of affairs is sustainable. The fact that 90% of European defence AI R&D comes from 7 out of 27 countries highlights the intra-European technological divide between the AI haves and have-nots. While national AI efforts and limited bilateral cooperation may help narrow the investment and technological gaps between Washington and leading European AI champions, it will not close a structural security vulnerability for the Union and for the transatlantic partnership, with negative impact on interoperability.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Interoperability Key

AI interoperability is key to maintaining effective US military alliances

Imbrie et al. ‘20 (Andrew Imbrie, Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Ryan Fedasiuk, Research Analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Catherine Aiken, Director of Data Science and Research at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Tarun Chhabra, nonresident fellow with the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; February 2022; “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI”; CSET; )-amc

Interoperability is a critical lubricant for U.S. alliances. To operate effectively, allies need to plan, train, and exercise together. Joint operational concepts, com- mon doctrine, and compatible military capabilities and systems are required to communicate effectively and achieve shared objectives.66 As countries integrate AI into military systems, the United States and its allies must ensure that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure. The United States and its allies could start with common standards for inter- pretability, safety, and security of AI systems, including AI-enabled, safety-critical systems.67 For AI-enabled military systems expected to perform a given function, the United States and its allies should agree on common benchmarks for accuracy and performance based on the same training and testing data. The CSET survey sug- gests that allies and partners desire such benchmarks, with a majority of surveyed officials expressing the need for international coordination and management of AI military applications, specifically autonomous weapons systems and unmanned vehicles for submarine detection. A German representative stated that collaboration with the United States would be enhanced by an AI strategy that includes a focus on AI-related defense and security threats.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › NATO Losing

Emerging tech and threats guarantee innovation will be the make or break for NATO stability and future effectiveness.

Kallenborn 22 (Zachary Kallenborn is an author and analyst who specializes in WMD terrorism, unmanned systems, drone swarms, and homeland security. Zachary is a Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a Research Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an officially proclaimed U.S. Army "Mad Scientist," and a Senior Consultant at ABS Group.) “Can a Focus on Innovation Save NATO?” June 23, 2022 ZX

NATO is rewriting its core strategic concept for the first time since 2010. As NATO bureaucrats in Brussels scribble away, NATO is beset with a plethora of security challenges. Technologies like (AI) and unmanned systems raise open questions about how militaries will organize and fight in 2032. At the same time, militaries have recognized the growing dependency on known technologies in space and cyberspace. Climate change is raising the frequency and magnitude of natural hazards like hurricanes and wildfires while strengthening migration flows and general instability. China is rising in the East, using its growing economic and military might to bolster its influence in the region. And, of course, Russia has . The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows clearly the inevitability of change in global security. In only a few short days after the invasion, Germany a new 100 billion euro fund to modernize its military, expressed new interest in joining NATO, and former Japanese prime minister called for a nuclear weapons sharing agreement. Nations throughout the world have clearly recognized the threat the Russian invasion poses to the broader international order, which is predicated on the assumption states should not invade other states. Of course, the war is not yet over, and the geopolitical dust may settle in new, unexpected ways. The NATO strategic concept should define and enhance NATO’s role as an innovation foundry. As a confederated alliance, NATO has a major strategic advantage in granting member states the freedom to innovate and diverge in how they make crucial defense and security decisions. Smaller states with fewer resources need to find more effective and efficient ways to use them. But the concepts, policies, doctrines, and strategies the smaller states develop may help inform the practices of larger member states. This allows the inherent risk of innovation to be diffused throughout the alliance. Plus, NATO dominates the world in academic excellence. In the U.S. News and World Reports' best college rankings, a non-NATO member doesn’t show up until twenty-fifth place. That college, the University of Melbourne in Australia, also happens to be located in a . Excellent universities mean excellent research, excellent teaching, and sharper minds. That means improved technology, innovative ideas, and military leaders equipped to think critically about emerging challenges. Better applying such brilliance to defense innovation can only help the alliance take on the broad, dynamic challenges it faces. Geopolitically, Russian aggression is growing, China is on the rise, and the alliance’s future in the Middle East is uncertain. Russia has invaded Ukraine, adding another military intervention to its since 1991. Russian also played a role in the 2016 election of former President Donald Trump, the decision for the United Kingdom to exit the European Union, and the weakening of European Union member states writ large. At the same time, Washington is quite worried about the rise of China as a competitor for global leadership and an opponent in a potential fight over an independent Taiwan. Understandably so: Chinese defense spending hit in 2019 without needing to prepare for a two-front war. Chinese calls for control over Taiwan seem to have grown louder and stronger, too. The U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan leave NATO’s future role in the Middle East unclear. Geopolitical competition is also taking place in new domains. In the past few years, NATO has wisely identified cyberspace and space as critical domains of competition. Today’s militaries are deeply dependent on both domains. Complex computing systems support today’s advanced weapon systems and platforms, and those systems can create significant . Cyberspace also allows adversaries to strike, disrupt, and even destroy critical infrastructure assets in a member state without putting a single boot on the ground. On the space front, the notes that space-based positioning, navigation, and timing are “integral to enabling the Joint Force” to carry out objectives in the National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy. Cyberspace and space are also interrelated themselves, as depend on cyber technology. Cyber and space dependence is particularly acute when it comes to new technologies like artificial intelligence, , and drone swarms. NATO has identified eight emerging disruptive : big data, artificial intelligence, autonomy, quantum technologies, space technologies, hypersonics, biotechnology and human enhancement, and novel materials and manufacturing. Advancements in robotics and artificial intelligence are leading to more sophisticated unmanned systems, usable in the air, on the land, at sea, and perhaps at once. threatens traditional encryption methods, while threatens traditional stealth. Additive manufacturing allows new means of producing defense equipment, while nanotechnologies allow new types of materials with novel properties. What’s more, these technologies may interact in complex and unforeseen ways. How might artificial intelligence lead to improved bio- or nano-technologies? If quantum radar weakens the advantages of stealth, does that make cheap massed drones more valuable? Even if prove to be in the short-term, technology is always growing. The evangelists may yet prove right. Three core tasks have traditionally defined NATO’s activities: collective defense, collective security, and crisis management. NATO should add a fourth: collective resilience through innovation. The aim of the new core task would be to prioritize NATO’s capacity to innovate and learn, and in so doing, bind states more tightly together as an alliance. This task would aim to expand and strengthen existing NATO efforts like the to ensure innovation remains a key part of the alliance, not just until 2030, but until 2100. What’s more, it offers specific paths to realize the commitments NATO members made in the 2021 to strengthen NATO as an organizing framework, enhance resilience, foster technological cooperation, and strengthen NATO capacity building. The starting point for innovation is expanding research and development collaboration. NATO recently started a Defense Innovation Fund and a Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). The forty-seven test centers and nine accelerators under DIANA need to be integrated as a permanent feature of the alliance as a whole, which means codifying how the accelerator sets priorities, how research results are disseminated, and how research findings support other NATO activities. NATO should also go beyond the accelerator to encourage and enable the creation of more bilateral and multilateral research agreements and general memorandums of understanding on research cooperation. But that’s just the start. NATO should launch a “War Game 2030 Initiative” to identify, experiment with, and evaluate new concepts for employing technologies and considering the ways adversaries might employ them. NATO could hold alliance-wide competitions to assess different answers to common defense questions such as: what combination of unmanned and manned systems are most effective in amphibious assault missions? Winners would earn points of military pride for their country and contribute to the alliance in ways beyond simple metrics. In addition, NATO should explore new ways to conduct war games, especially through the use of synthetic environments. NATO might partner with non-traditional stakeholders like video game designers and eSports leagues to draw on their experience in making realistic, dynamic war gaming environments. NATO has thirty members. That’s a lot of opportunities for cooperation. In fact, there are 435 possibilities for bilateral cooperation, with possibilities including everything from Albanian ties with Belgium to joint United Kingdom and American cooperation. NATO should establish a NATO diplomatic corps to help identify opportunities for interstate collaboration and support collective NATO diplomatic goals. NATO diplomats could be stationed at each NATO member state, critical non-NATO partners and rivals, and international organizations like the European Union. NATO diplomats could also help advance common NATO positions around emerging international like the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and calls to ban autonomous weapons. This would differ from existing defense attaches and inter-state diplomacy in that NATO diplomats would represent collective NATO interests, not just national interests.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › NATO Losing

NATO action urgent – they need to defend their tech edge

Jankowski 21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 96-99. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ

NATO’s approach to EDTs should be based on three key objectives: Retain the technological edge Maintain the core values of the Alliance Ensure that no potential adversary gains a strategic, asymmetric advantage over NATO that could undermine the deterrence and defence posture The potential EDTs implications for NATO’s deterrence and defence remain of primary importance. Indeed, EDTs will provide a greater range of tools for adversaries to challenge and find weaknesses in NATO’s posture. At the same time, ease of commercial access to EDTs raises the prospect of new – increasingly confident – state and non-state actors to contest NATO, particularly with increased challenges of attribution. Table 2 presents an overview of the EDTs impact on NATO’s posture, including both challenges and opportunities. **Table 2 omitted** Moreover, based on the four broad inter-related trends presented earlier in this study, one can identify the most critical implications for NATO’s deterrence and defence. First, the maturation of the precision-strike regime appears to favour the denial of most domains relative to the ability to gain control over them. The dominant force elements of the Allied armed forces can be held at risk with precision-guided missiles for a fraction of those platforms’ costs. Yet, Allies could exploit cross-domain precision weapons to deny an opponent the ability to project power intra-regionally. By developing the “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities, frontline states – including on NATO’s eastern flank – could considerably strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence. In this context, one should note that trends in precision-strike warfare call into question NATO’s preference for expeditionary defence whereby forces are dispatched reactively to reinforce frontline states. Second, disrupting an adversary’s battle network should be treated as a major warfighting mission. In doing so, the Allied armed forces will need to reduce their vulnerabilities to network attacks while improving their abilities to operate in environments where radio-frequency interference will be a likely condition. Moreover, the security of Allied military supply chains – especially with regards to semiconductor production and 5G networks – will demand greater attention as a consequence of the competition between battle networks. Finally, the struggle between opposing battle networks will hinge on the contests for control of space and cyberspace – both crucial for military surveillance, warning, battle management, and communications. Third, the contestation of space and cyberspace will require new missions for protecting assets and holding hostile systems at risk within those domains. Allies will also observe a growing use of space to deny operations in other domains. This will entail closer space cooperation between Allies in order to enhance strategic solidarity and complicate efforts by an aggressor to target the space capabilities. Fourth, the supplanting of human forces by highly autonomous machines could offer NATO a path to significantly reduce the cost of training forces to the point where they are able to achieve “first battle competence.” Autonomous systems may also offer Allies affordable means of regaining forward combat power in conflicts on the periphery of great power rivals through more distributed, swarming, and expandable forces. Table 3 offers an overview of the military implications on NATO of selected EDTs.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › NATO Losing

NATO is falling behind in the AI race – standardization is needed now

Wodecki 5/4 (Ben Wodecki is Ben Wodecki is assistant editor at AIBusiness.com, “NATO at risk of losing AI innovation race to Russia, China,” AI Business, 5/4/2022, )-MP

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should standardize and regulate AI to keep up with rivals, according to findings published by the U.S. think tank, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). CEPA’s comments came as it published a series of AI-related recommendations for NATO amid growing geopolitical tensions with the likes of Russia, China and North Korea. Its recommendations include AI standardization, encouraging and improving AI literacy and spurring private sector innovation. Such undertakings would allow NATO allies to better scale and deploy AI – and keep pace with rivals. “These new capabilities will revolutionize NATO’s military and strategic affairs, thus strengthening NATO’s ability to fulfill its essential core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security,” CEPA’s Nicholas Nelson and Nico Luzum wrote. The pair cited AI projects being undertaken by adversaries, including China’s attempts to develop purported mind-controllable drones and AI assistants for fighter pilots. But NATO allies have their own capabilities – including U.S.-developed autonomous tanks and British-made systems that provide ground troops with information on the surrounding terrain. The think tank’s study suggests that at present, NATO is leading the AI race – but risks losing its competitive advantage to peer competitors “competitors if allies fail to leverage the private sector, coordinate implementation and engage with the public.” CEPA suggests that NATO allies should accelerate AI adoption and actively encourage private sector innovation. “Ultimately, we hope that these recommendations enable NATO allies to better innovate, scale, deploy, and integrate AI and autonomy-based technologies to form agile, system-wide solutions.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › AI Race Now

AI development is coming and inevitable. Only effective management and regulation can prevent widespread collapse of deterrence postures.

Diwakar 21 (Amar Diwakar is an independent writer and researcher. He has written for Al Jazeera English, The Boston Globe, In These Times, and other publications.) 17 JUN 2021 “The future of war and deterrence in an age of autonomous weapons” ZX

Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems will significantly alter the future battlefield and challenge strategists to come up with new models of deterrence. Innovation in the field of emerging technologies – broadly encompassing developments such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, drones, quantum computing, 3D printing, biotech – is evolving at breakneck speed with the potential to have far-reaching consequences on everything from governance and commerce to geopolitics. When it comes to warfare, many of these critical technologies possess the power to completely upend the terms of human conflict and alter future battlefields. “AI and robotics will smash the status quo that exists in the world today,” geopolitical futurist Abishur Prakash told TRT World, adding that new technologies will “reduce the gap between advanced military powers and the rest of the world”. With traditional concepts of state power gradually intertwined with national expertise and investment in AI, a is already underway, with the US and China at the forefront. As wider adoption accelerates, conventional notions around deterrence are set to come into question too. What happens to deterrence and escalation when decisions can be made at machine speeds and are carried out by forces that do not risk human lives? “We will need to rethink the central tenets of deterrence. AI and autonomous systems challenge the way that nuclear and non-nuclear operations are conducted, as well as the way these systems can be held vulnerable to attack,” says Mikhail Sebastian, a London-based political risk analyst specialising in cybersecurity and digital diplomacy. “At the same time, they offer a new suite of options for deterring nuclear attacks.” Prakash warns we’ve now reached a point of no return. “We are exiting the era where the most damaging behaviour could be deterred. Now, as technology gives nations and organisations new capabilities, governments are faced with threats they cannot stop or limit,” he says. “They can only be managed.” Autonomous battlefields If there is one military technology proven to be a gamechanger thus far, it’s drones. After gunpowder and nuclear weapons, many have referred to automated killer robots as the “”. Late last year amid the pandemic, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia amounted to a showcase for autonomous weapons – and provides a glimpse of the battlefield of the future. Azerbaijan deployed a range of drones, purchased from Israel and Turkey, to rout the otherwise conventionally superior Armenian army in a short space of time. Azeri forces used to Israeli-made ‘Harop’ loitering munitions, designed to hover high above the battlefield while waiting to be assigned a target to crash their explosive payload into, earning them the moniker “”. Azerbaijan spent years investing in loitering munitions and accumulated a stock of over 200, while Armenia had only one domestically made model with a limited range. Being the first war won by autonomous weapons, an from national armies acquiring unmanned aerial systems followed shortly after. In the US, a new from the National Security Commission on AI discusses how autonomous technologies are enabling a new paradigm in warfighting and urges massive amounts of investment in the field. Countries are intensely to build or purchase cutting-edge drone systems: China and Russia intend to pursue the development of autonomous weapons and are investing heavily in R&D. The UK’s new defence strategy puts AI front and centre, as does Israel. And a much more transformative drone technology could be just on the horizon. Advances in Li-ion batteries have given rise to cheaply made miniature quadcopters. Multiple air forces are now beginning to test networked that can overwhelm radar systems. Sebastian points out that while on its own a single unmanned and autonomous unit is no match for a fighter jet, when algorithmically linked together a fleet of thousands can conceivably overwhelm larger platforms. “Once refined, low-cost autonomous drones coordinating their actions at machine speed provide a unique coercive tool that undermines high-cost legacy weapon systems, while potentially augmenting the feasibility of an offensive attack,” he told TRT World. Possibly the scariest development are autonomous quadcopters equipped with computer vision technology that can recognise and kill a specific target, or so-called . “As opposed to other military drone applications, assassin drones don’t have to be confined to the battlefield. They can lurk as an omnipresent threat outside of wartime,” says Sebastian. Until now, deterrence has primarily involved humans attempting to affect the decision calculus and perceptions of other humans. But what happens when decision-making processes are no longer fully under human control? ‘How does one deter an event that has not happened yet?’ What sets the new technology arms race apart from the past is AI’s dual-use. During the Cold War, the development of nuclear weapons was driven by governments and the defence industry. Beyond power generation, there wasn’t much commercial use for nuclear technology. But that model doesn’t apply anymore. “The creeping ubiquity of AI means developments in technologies cannot be contained, and they are bound to bleed across the civilian and military realms,” Sebastian notes. In an published last year James Johnson, an assistant professor in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University, argued the dual-use and diffused nature of AI compared to nuclear technology will make arms control efforts problematic. “When nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities and war-faring are blurred, strategic competition and arms racing are more likely to emerge, complicating arms control efforts,” he wrote. “In short, legacy arms control frameworks, norms, and even the notion of strategic stability itself will increasingly struggle to assimilate and respond to these fluid and interconnected trends.” Johnson underscores what is now referred to as the nascent “fifth wave” of modern deterrence (the “fourth wave” followed the Cold War and continues to the present, coinciding with multipolarity, asymmetric threats and non-state actors) is defined by a conceptual break by including non-human agents into deterrence. It then follows that asymmetric AI capabilities will inform deterrence strategies. To fight autonomous weapons, you need those same weapons – driving actors to adopt these technologies to shore up their defence against autonomous attacks. The mix of human and artificial agents could affect escalation between actors in the process. In a , researchers emphasise how widespread AI and autonomous systems could make inadvertent escalation more likely because of “how quickly decisions may be made and actions taken if more is being done at machine, rather than human, speeds.” Two conflicting sides might equally find it necessary to use autonomous capabilities early to gain a coercive and military advantage to prevent an opponent from gaining the upper hand, raising the possibility of first-strike instability. These dynamics could have fateful consequences for how wars begin. “Because of the speed of autonomous systems having to be countered by other autonomous systems, we could find ourselves in a situation where these systems react to each other in a way that’s not predictable,” Sebastian says. ”Before you know it, a rapid escalation leads to a military conflict that wasn’t desirable in the first place.” Prakash, who is the author of , believes governments are going to have to rethink deterrence in an era when AI is making military decisions. “Deterrence has so far revolved around stopping a nation or actor from doing something today. But as nations use technology to predict future events on the world stage – or what I call ‘’ – a new challenge emerges,” he says.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Inherency › AI Not Developed Yet

More NATO AI Projected needed.

Sanur Sharma May 30, 2022 [ Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.; NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis; EurasiaReview]

The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability. The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process. NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems. Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29 NATO will also have to focus on the vulnerabilities and intrusion issues with the AI-enabled systems and will need to set up dedicated centres for AI development and testing in order to maintain a test-safety regime for systems-of-systems employed using AI. The challenges related to AI use in wars and geopolitical conflicts need to be addressed to generate confidence in the use of such systems. Additionally, testing mechanisms and accuracy standards need to be implemented for system components. Policymakers need to address the operational risks and ethical considerations of employing AI in military systems. In future, AI will act as an enabler to out-adapt competitors and adversaries. The current AI strategy of NATO needs to address the vulnerabilities in AI systems and related measures for effectively using autonomous weapon systems and military governance of AI. The NATO accelerator has been devised to address, prioritise, and promote interoperability in transatlantic cooperation to drive the strategic innovation process. The key drivers for Innovation in AI and other EDTs will be the establishment of the NATO-Civil-Military Technology capability that will include various actors from the military, civil, state and private sectors as a part of the EDT innovation ecosystem. Another critical factor is the broadening of the NATO–EU cooperation through a joint taskforce on defence innovation and EDTs to regularise and provide strategic capabilities on ethical and adoption challenges of EDTs like AI and ML. Furthermore, NATO needs to protect the use of AI from manipulation and disruption and align it with its stated principle of “Responsible use of AI”. NATO needs to work on AI adoption challenges centred on innovation and arms control. It can look towards bringing in guiding principles on use of AI-driven lethal autonomous weapon systems. It is expected that in the next 2–3 years, AI’s use will be confined to the field of military logistics, reconnaissance, mission planning and support, predictive maintenance of a military facility, data fusion and analysis, cyber defence and optimisation of processes. In the long run, NATO could employ AI for more complex military applications as it generates greater political support for offensive AI military projects.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Inherency › AT: SQ Solves

NATO 2021 guidelines are a good starting point but agency, funding, and sufficient infrastructure are required to guide AI towards ethical development.

Christie and Ertan 22 (Edward Hunter Christie is the owner and founder of AI Policy Consulting. He served as a NATO official from 2014 to 2020, ending his tenure in the role of Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit. Amy Ertan is a cybersecurity fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard Kennedy School), researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and doctoral candidate at the Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London.) “NATO and Artificial Intelligence” 14 Jun 2022 // ZX

The practical adoption of AI presents certain challenges for Allied defence institutions. Christie (2021) identifies four areas to consider: iterative development, access to human capital, access to data, and engagement with civilian-oriented technology institutions through supportive innovation mechanisms. Iterative development refers to the fact that software development in general, and AI development in particular, requires highly iterative and dynamic work processes that are generally referred to as Agile development. From a project management perspective, traditional development generally follows a Waterfall model, a linear process where each step is completed before moving on to the next step. Agile development, by contrast, allows for development steps to be revisited and adjusted multiple times in a more dynamic manner, with much shorter development and testing timelines. The need to adopt Agile development approaches is well understood in key parts of the NATO Enterprise, notably Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), and in many national defence institutions. What is less clear is what types of reforms need to be enacted at higher organisational levels. Access to data refers to a range of organisational and normative challenges to ensure that Allied defence institutions can leverage the data they have as effectively as possible. To address these challenges, a NATO Data Exploitation Policy was developed, based on detailed consultations with internal NATO Enterprise stakeholders and with representatives of Allied governments. The Policy is based on the recognition of the need for a comprehensive life-cycle approach to data resources (including collection, documentation, storage, exploitation, retention, and disposal) and for the further development of relevant enabling factors for each lifecycle stage. NATO’s emerging data policy efforts also include the formulation of guiding principles that partly mirror the principles of responsible use that should hold for AI, with the addition of specific considerations that relate to data ownership and management. To the extent that the NATO Enterprise carries out its own data exploitation and AI development efforts, the relevant NATO staffs will need the relevant structures, resources, and staff to do so, in a manner that mirrors what occurs in national defence institutions. Additional considerations are necessary to ensure that the NATO Enterprise can play a full role as a facilitator for common multinational and Alliance-wide efforts. A particularly salient issue in that context is the collaborative training of Machine Learning algorithms. While individual Allies may choose in many cases to remain the sole owners and custodians of the real-world military data they collect, there is a good case for seeking economies of scale and scope through collaborative data exploitation and algorithm training efforts. Intuitively, one may expect this to imply a need to pool datasets from multiple institutions under the custodianship of a single entity, for example a NATO body. This need not necessarily be the case, thanks to the existence of technical solutions that allow for the collaborative development of Machine Learning algorithms based on sharing successive trained instances of algorithms without actual data pooling. However, significant practical work will be necessary to ensure that the Alliance is able to pursue both types of effort – informally, data sharing versus model sharing – in efficient and seamless ways. Allied governments should also consider increasing public funding levels for research & development in AI and related technologies, as well as enhancing collaborative public-private financing mechanisms to support technological innovation at various stages of maturity. To support these goals, two major initiatives championed by NATO’s Innovation Unit were approved by Allies in 2021, namely the creation of a Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the launch of a NATO Innovation Fund (NATO, 2021c). The versatility and adaptability of AI technologies pose specific challenges in terms of governance. A large volume of analysis and commentary has already been devoted to ethical considerations, leading to the adoption by many organisations of a range of principles. In the course of 2021, NATO developed and negotiated its first-ever AI Strategy. The final text as approved by Allies was formally agreed by Allied Defence Ministers in October 2021. A summary of the Strategy was released to the public, consistent with the stated aim of the Alliance “to lead by example and encourage the development and use of AI in a responsible manner” (NATO, 2021). The Strategy and its summary contain a set of Principles of Responsible Use which were closely modelled on the DoD principles and other existing national principles. The NATO Principles constitute a political commitment that applies to both the Alliance and the NATO Enterprise (the expression “Allies and NATO” is used in the text), in other words it is also a commitment by each national government regarding its national activities, regardless of whether they are intended for NATO activities or for national or other multinational activities outside of the NATO context. As in the DoD case, the NATO principles “apply across all types of AI applications” (NATO, 2021). An additional issue on the scope of application which is clearer in the NATO case is that the principles apply to “the AI applications they [Allies and NATO] develop and consider for deployment” (NATO, 2021). By implication, AI applications that are not intended for deployment could deviate from the principles. The underlying reasoning for this caveat is to allow for experimental applications or systems that entail deviations from principles that are necessary, for example for the development of countermeasures against actual or hypothetical adversarial capabilities that do not conform to the principles or for enhancing understanding of the technical characteristics necessary to ensure compliance with all principles. A process of learning-by-doing will be necessary across Allied defence institutions and relevant NATO bodies in order to operationalise NATO’s Principles of Responsible Use. Over time and based on experience in the implementation of the principles, Allies and NATO should be able to formulate with greater precision how the principles are to be applied, potentially leading to new NATO military-technical standards, to reliance on emerging civilian technical standards where that is more efficient, and to new or updated certification processes. In that context, the development of relevant review methodologies and of risk and impact assessment frameworks, and relevant updates to security certification requirements will be important (Stanley-Lockman and Christie, 2021). NATO’s cooperative structures and consultation mechanisms will provide a basis for the testing, evaluation, validation and verification (TEVV) of AI-enabled capabilities against intended use cases and the NATO Principles of Responsible Use. Ongoing applied research within the NATO Science & Technology Organisation’s networks on matters such as human-machine teaming, and machine-machine and humans ystems integration, among others, will provide essential contributions (Stanley-Lockman and Christie, 2021). Existing and emerging national and NATO test centres, most likely including those foreseen under NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), will be instrumental in the operationalisation of the Principles of Responsible Use by providing facilities, personnel, and procedures for relevant TEVV and certification activities. This would include a range of simulation and modelling activities, in addition to physical testing as appropriate. Focusing on the technical characteristics to be ensured during the design and development phases, it is important to note that AI applications pose challenges in terms of testing and validation. A simple mechanical device can be subject to relatively simple testing protocols to ensure its safety, and such testing protocols, while informed by practical uses, can be standardised to a high degree. AI applications, on the other hand, are too versatile, changeable, and context-dependent to allow for an ex-ante formulation of all possibly relevant technical tests. Instead, the way forward is to design and apply adequate “methodological standards” on the processes inherent to the design and development of AI algorithms, rather than on each trained instantiation of every AI algorithm. Allies and NATO have laid important policy foundations for the military use of AI. A particularly visible development is the adoption, by the United States in 2020 and by the entire NATO Alliance in 2021, of principles of responsible development and use. This is only the beginning of a long process of technological transformation, adoption, and adaptation. Multiple challenges have been identified that need to be addressed in order to adopt AI and leverage data as a strategic resource. Looking across the range of organisational, institutional, human resources, and investment challenges, one evident general conclusion is that Allied governments will need to mobilise new and greater financial resources and hire new staff and train existing staff if they wish to adopt and adapt as required. At the same time, relevant policy adaptation should accompany this process, on the one hand to directly support technology adoption, and on the other hand to ensure good governance and responsible use. The latter topic is generally the most analysed and discussed in policy communities, both inside and outside government. In this chapter, we wished to stress that this most popular topic has already moved beyond the general discussion phase and is now in need of technical layers of additional work to ensure that recently adopted principles are implemented in practice.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Inherency › AT: SQ Solves

NATO is key for ensuring a western AI advantage BUT requires further guidelines and investment since its 2021 declaration.

Christie and Ertan 22 (Edward Hunter Christie is the owner and founder of AI Policy Consulting. He served as a NATO official from 2014 to 2020, ending his tenure in the role of Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit. Amy Ertan is a cybersecurity fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard Kennedy School), researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and doctoral candidate at the Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London.) “NATO and Artificial Intelligence” 14 Jun 2022 // ZX

NATO is a military alliance of democratic states in the North Atlantic region. Its first essential core task, unchanged since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, is collectively to deter and if necessary defend against armed attacks against any one of its members in the North Atlantic region, in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. To ensure this primary task, Allied governments coordinate their defence policies to ensure a chosen degree of collective military interoperability, capability, and readiness. This is pursued through activities such as the definition and implementation of common military-technical standards, of commonly agreed military capability targets, and of common capability development activities and projects. At the organisational level, NATO has a permanent common military command structure which enables it, among other tasks, to uphold readiness, to organise exercises, and to lead collective military operations following relevant political decisions. NATO also pursues two additional core tasks in addition to collective defence, namely crisis management and cooperative security1, which leverage NATO’s nature and purpose as a military alliance. NATO’s purpose and structures imply a centrality of military considerations in how it approaches any new security challenge. NATO decisions are taken by consensus among Allied governments, through a multi-layered hierarchy of committees. The most senior committee, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), is a civilian committee. The NAC meets regularly at the level of Ambassadors, four times a year at the Ministerial level (twice Defence Ministers, twice Foreign Ministers), and on average every two years at the level of Heads of State and Government. In practice, NATO’s activities include consultations among Allied governments on matters of common interest, ranging from broad strategic discussions on international security developments to detailed decision-making on particular activities, projects, standards, targets, or policies. Warfare has always been shaped by technology. Artificial intelligence has already demonstrated the potential to enhance military capabilities and to create new military capabilities. From intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to inclusion in unmanned systems, or across logistics and support functions, there are a number of consequences of AI inclusion across military domains that warrant attention and activity from NATO as an Alliance and as an organization. As noted by the STO, AI “has the potential for revolutionary impact on NATO operations and capabilities”, describing AI as a “fulcrum around which big data will be turned into actionable knowledge, and, ultimately, a NATO decision advantage” (2020, p.14). The STO further notes that “integration of AI into combat models & simulation, enterprise systems, decision support systems, cyber defence systems and autonomous vehicles will allow for rapid and more effective human-machine decision making” (2020, p.15). The formulation of AI policies for the area of defence is a recent but fast-moving area of work. At the time of writing, the United States and France were the only Allies with published national AI defence strategies (US Department of Defense, 2018; French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 2019), with the UK announcing their intention to release a defence-focused AI strategy, see UK Ministry of Defence (2021: p.42), likely before the end of 2021. At NATO, the International Staff produced two policy White Papers for the consideration of Allied governments in the course of 2020, one on Artificial Intelligence, the other on Autonomous Technologies more specifically. In October 2021, NATO Defence Ministers approved NATO’s first-ever AI Strategy, as well as a related Data Exploitation Policy (NATO, 2021a). These policy documents will be discussed in sections 4 and 5 below, with a main focus on the AI Strategy. Iterative development refers to the fact that software development in general, and AI development in particular, requires highly iterative and dynamic work processes that are generally referred to as Agile development. From a project management perspective, traditional development generally follows a Waterfall model, a linear process where each step is completed before moving on to the next step. Agile development, by contrast, allows for development steps to be revisited and adjusted multiple times in a more dynamic manner, with much shorter development and testing timelines. The need to adopt Agile development approaches is well understood in key parts of the NATO Enterprise, notably Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), and in many national defence institutions. What is less clear is what types of reforms need to be enacted at higher organisational levels. Access to data refers to a range of organisational and normative challenges to ensure that Allied defence institutions can leverage the data they have as effectively as possible. To address these challenges, a NATO Data Exploitation Policy was developed, based on detailed consultations with internal NATO Enterprise stakeholders and with representatives of Allied governments. The Policy is based on the recognition of the need for a comprehensive life-cycle approach to data resources (including collection, documentation, storage, exploitation, retention, and disposal) and for the further development of relevant enabling factors for each lifecycle stage. NATO’s emerging data policy efforts also include the formulation of guiding principles that partly mirror the principles of responsible use that should hold for AI, with the addition of specific considerations that relate to data ownership and management. To the extent that the NATO Enterprise carries out its own data exploitation and AI development efforts, the relevant NATO staffs will need the relevant structures, resources, and staff to do so, in a manner that mirrors what occurs in national defence institutions. Additional considerations are necessary to ensure that the NATO Enterprise can play a full role as a facilitator for common multinational and Alliance-wide efforts. A particularly salient issue in that context is the collaborative training of Machine Learning algorithms. While individual Allies may choose in many cases to remain the sole owners and custodians of the real-world military data they collect, there is a good case for seeking economies of scale and scope through collaborative data exploitation and algorithm training efforts. Intuitively, one may expect this to imply a need to pool datasets from multiple institutions under the custodianship of a single entity, for example a NATO body. This need not necessarily be the case, thanks to the existence of technical solutions that allow for the collaborative development of Machine Learning algorithms based on sharing successive trained instances of algorithms without actual data pooling. However, significant practical work will be necessary to ensure that the Alliance is able to pursue both types of effort – informally, data sharing versus model sharing – in efficient and seamless ways

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Solvency

NATO is key – focusing on non-controversial security cooperation sets a model for broader cooperation – US leadership is also key.

Franke ’21, (Ulrike Esther Franke, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI,” ECRF, January 2021, )

AI can enable applications in fields as diverse as health, robotics, defence, and agriculture. Where should the focus of potential transatlantic cooperation lie? If Europe and the US agree to focus on AI ethics, then they should seek to develop common rules and guidelines that both sides can enforce in their jurisdictions. However, if they agree that their shared goal is to slow down other actors’ – particularly China’s – AI advances, they will need to engage in more targeted forms of cooperation. US researchers have proposed several specific initiatives for international cooperation, such as coordinating investment screening procedures, and establishing common export controls on supply chain components, to ensure China remains dependent on imports of AI chips. This would be in addition to the long line of measures already introduced by the US Department of Commerce. These include requirements for Chinese company Huawei to apply for licences to purchase semiconductors, a measure that aims to exert economic pressure and disrupt Chinese technology supply chains. As noted, agreeing on shared goals and supporting measures will present some challenges. Beyond the specific themes of ethical AI and slowing Chinese progress in AI, however, there are other areas for transatlantic AI cooperation. Investing in these potentially less controversial areas may help create new platforms and lay important groundwork for greater cooperation. For example, the transatlantic allies should facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices on AI, and invest in mutually beneficial research, such as privacy-preserving machine learning. Defence might also be a promising area for transatlantic cooperation, given the close military ties between the US and Europe through NATO. Military experts are raising concerns over how the introduction of AI onto the battlefield may hinder interoperability between allied forces, so defence could be a good realm in which to strengthen cooperation. Militaries on both sides of the Atlantic are already investing in AI-enabled capabilities. In military affairs, as in the civilian realm, AI has a variety of uses. Military AI applications include autonomous vehicles and weapons; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics (for example, the predictive maintenance of military systems such as vehicles and weapons); forecasting; and training (such as that in virtual reality simulations). Some of these military capabilities – namely, lethal autonomous weapon systems, or “killer robots” – are among the most controversial uses of AI. The US and its European allies have adopted different positions on this issue in international debates such as those at the United Nations in Geneva, where lethal autonomous weapons have been under discussion since 2014. Transatlantic cooperation on lethal autonomous weapons, or other combat-related capabilities, does not, therefore, look promising. However, military AI includes many non-controversial uses, such as ‘sustainment’, which encompasses logistics as well as support activities such as financial management, personnel services, and health care. AI helps make these services more efficient and cost-effective; for example, predictive maintenance helps in monitoring a system, such as an aircraft, and can do things such as use various sensory inputs and data analysis to predict when parts of a system will need to be replaced. Equally, AI can help improve logistics’ efficiency by, for instance, ensuring that supplies are delivered in appropriate quantities and at the right time. Transatlantic cooperation in this field is uncontroversial, but extremely useful – especially when carried out within NATO, as this could help bring allies closer together, establish joint procedures, and thereby ensure interoperability. Which forum is best for fostering transatlantic AI cooperation? The US and most of its European allies already work together in a multitude of settings, with NATO foremost among them. Other international organisations and meetings – such as the G7, the G20, and the Five Eyes – bring together the US and some Europeans, as well as other actors. In addition, several new alliances and partnerships focused on technology or AI have been proposed or were already established over the last year: Europe and the US will need to choose the appropriate forum for AI cooperation based on its area of focus. Transatlantic cooperation on military AI might be best located within NATO. Members of the alliance have a long history of working together, and NATO already has dedicated units whose task is to ensure that all allies can cooperate and transform together. Given that military interoperability is vital to its functioning, NATO has no alternative but to address this issue, independent of other forums’ work. It would be advisable for NATO, and possibly the EU and its member states, to join the newly established, US-led AI partnership for defence. The current situation – in which the partnership includes only a few European countries and some of the United States’ other like-minded partners – is not constructive from a European viewpoint: Europeans should strive for Europe-wide harmonisation, not the creation of further differences. For cooperation on other areas of AI, such as sharing data or supporting research, other forums, including ad hoc alliances aimed at specific outcomes, may be the way forward. From a European standpoint, however, it would be advisable to try to include the EU as much as possible, so that European positions are not watered down or member states divided among themselves. CONCLUSION This paper has discussed the rationale for transatlantic cooperation on AI. It has shown that both Europe and the US have reasons for wanting to cooperate with each other. But substantial hurdles may prevent the transatlantic partners from cooperating in a significant way. However, they can still look to ramp up their cooperation. And non-combat military AI, in particular, may be low-hanging fruit for AI cooperation within NATO. Europeans should reach out to their American allies, so that a new, third phase of Europe’s policy efforts in this AI spring can indeed become a phase of international – and particularly transatlantic – cooperation.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Solvency

Security cooperation for AI logistics and sustainment projects solves – it improves alliance interoperability, military readiness, and leads to quick innovation. US leadership, within NATO, counters adversaries and locks in a democratic AI model.

Konaev & Chahal ’21 (Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf)

Focusing on AI-enabled Military Logistics and Sustainment In military affairs, logistics is tasked with managing the global supply chain for the armed services, including “the transfer of personnel and materiel from one location to another, as well as the maintenance of that materiel.”27 Sustainment is a broader term, encompassing logistics as well as financial management, personnel services, and health services which together provide the support necessary to maintain operations until the mission is accomplished.28 The two functions are closely intertwined. NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, for instance, offers a comprehensive definition of logistics that also entails elements of sustainment, encompassing the aspects of military operations that deal with “design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support.”29 Logistics and sustainment are essential to military effectiveness, readiness, survivability, and endurance, and in many ways, constitute the lifeblood of military power.30 The Department of Defense, in turn, sees great promise in leveraging AI/machine learning (ML) technologies for military logistics and sustainment to better maintain equipment, reduce operational costs, and improve readiness. The Department of Defense’s AI strategy, for example, includes efforts related to AI-enabled logistics and sustainment, such as “implementing predictive maintenance and supply, and streamlining business processes,” as part of its strategic approach to “delivering AI-enabled capabilities that address key missions.”31 Joint Logistics, in turn, is one of the JAIC’s key mission initiatives, dedicated to “improving fleet readiness through AI-driven diagnostics, training, process improvements, demand forecasting, and supply chain optimization.”32 The discussion below outlines the technological, political, and strategic imperatives and opportunities for multinational collaboration on AI-enabled military logistics and sustainment. Naturally, the principal mission of militaries is national defense and the force (including logistics and sustainment functions) must be prepared for combat at any time. Modern militaries, however, are massive organizations that employ hundreds of thousands of people, if not more. The Department of Defense, for example, employs 2.91 million people, and less than half of them, or 1.3 million, are active duty personnel.33 And unlike military functions such as fires or movement and maneuver of forces and equipment, many of the tasks related to military logistics and other financial, personnel, and health services are administered in noncombat settings. While we discuss how the United States and its allies can work together on AI for military logistics and sustainment in both combat and noncombat settings, there is no doubt that the environment in question matters a great deal. From data to computational power to available talent, as well as considerations like privacy, safety, and security, implementing AI for military logistics and sustainment functions performed in controlled environments similar to commercial settings is a different endeavor from deploying AIenabled logistics and sustainment functions in contested and hostile environments. We take these differences into account where relevant, and acknowledge that even under the best of circumstances, there are still significant challenges for both the adoption of AI applications and multinational collaboration in this area. Technologically attainable While not without its challenges, military logistics and sustainment tasks, especially those performed in noncombat settings, present a technologically attainable area for multinational collaboration in AI. Although much of the innovation in AI is occurring in the commercial sector, adopting and adapting commercial AI applications for military purposes is often impossible. Current AI technologies, and especially ML-based systems, tend to perform well in stable environments but struggle with uncertain and novel situations, and remain particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. These vulnerabilities present an unacceptable level of risk in highstakes military settings, where the environment is uncertain and adversarial by definition. The consequences of mistakes and even system failure, however, are less severe when it comes to some military logistics and sustainment tasks which are administered and managed in noncombat settings, and constitute what some have called enterprise AI applications. Advances in AI for logistics in commercial aviation, maritime shipping, and transportation sectors are therefore more applicable to certain military logistics and sustainment tasks performed in noncombat settings than for specialized military equipment like autonomous ground combat vehicles or armed drones. In particular, there may be opportunities to adopt and adapt commercial applications for the intelligent automation of tasks such as scheduling equipment maintenance and repairs, updating and issuing licenses, supply tracking and forecasting, and other processes that control the flow of logistics throughout the military organization.34 To reiterate, these are much more than cost cutting and efficiency increasing measures; improvements in these areas enable military readiness and effectiveness in combat.35 In addition to these opportunities to leverage AI-enabled technologies and tools available in the commercial sector in support of military logistics, there are also fewer barriers to inhouse innovation within defense organizations. Many of the AI applications relevant to logistics and sustainment can be developed and used in relatively well-controlled and benign environments in settings akin to commercial civilian enterprises. Under such conditions, resources like data and infrastructure, including storage, ETL pipelines, communication bandwidth, and compute can be made available to train ML models for various AI applications.36 Notably, the 2016 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy raised a similar point regarding logistics planning and execution as “a particularly good candidate for testing and experimentation (T&E) … because the behavior of logistic software can be evaluated against crisply known metrics.”37 Considering both the potential for leveraging developments from the private sector and lower barriers to in-house innovation, collaboration on AI for logistics and sustainment could also involve allies with more limited military-industrial capacities. Based on its fact-finding mission to Singapore, NATO’s Science and Technology Committee observed that “small and medium-sized Allies with smart scientists and engineers can play an outsized role in AI development and adoption.”38 This is a significant advantage, arguably unique to AI technologies, and especially timely considering that even the relatively wealthy U.S. allies are facing cuts to their defense budgets due to the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, collaboration that includes input from small and medium-sized allies can strengthen interoperability, contribute to allied burden sharing, and buttress the long-term viability of U.S.-led defense partnerships. This is not to say that adopting and developing, let alone collaborating on AI-enabled logistics will be an easy task for the U.S. military and allied defense organizations. The ML and deep learning algorithms behind commercial AI-enabled logistics are generally not optimized for military needs.39 And if the experience of the Department of Defense is any indication, there are multiple challenges with regards to the data needed to power AI applications—from lack of data to problems with traceability, access, and interoperability of data collected by different systems.40 Moreover, data security and privacy concerns as well as different legal frameworks for how personal data is collected, handled, processed, and stored remain a critical barrier to international collaboration. Lack of clarity surrounding how to implement the exemptions for research incorporated into the General Data Protection Regulation, for example, has stalled collaboration between the U.S. National Institutes of Health and some European counterparts.41 These and other technical barriers and privacy-related concerns are indeed significant. But developments in privacy-preserving ML techniques, including homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation, and federated learning offer opportunities for allies to share and pool data without compromising the privacy of individual users and organizations whose data is being used.42 The United States can also work with allies to develop technical standards and protocols for harmonizing data collection, formatting, storage, and archiving to ensure data security and integrity.43 Overall, the U.S. military and allied defense organizations will face nonnegligible technical barriers whether adapting commercial AI technologies or building AI-enabled systems and tools in-house. From a comparative standpoint, however, military logistics and sustainment applications that fall under the broader category of enterprise AI applications present “low hanging fruit” for the U.S. military (and presumably for other technologically advanced militaries).44 Moreover, international collaboration on AI-enabled military logistics and sustainment is likely more within reach than collaboration on AI integrated into weapons systems or applications that feed on sensitive data collected by proprietary weapons and sensor systems.45 Politically feasible With key U.S. allies like the United Kingdom, Germany, France, South Korea and Japan already pursuing efforts to leverage AI for military logistics and sustainment, collaboration in this area seems politically feasible. The integration of AI into weapons systems has raised ethical concerns and opposition in some communities across the United States and in allied countries. Yet by focusing collaboration on AI applications for military logistics and sustainment functions, the United States and its allies could potentially sidestep the contentious “killer robots” debate. Collaborative efforts to develop and apply AI tools to areas such as defense supply chain management, personnel management, and equipment maintenance can improve existing processes and functions, save costs and increase efficiencies in defense organizations. Multinational collaboration around this set of goals and applications is less likely to galvanize widespread grassroots opposition than programs on AI-enabled drones or autonomous ground combat vehicles. Moreover, some of the United States’ closest allies are already investing in AI and ML technologies for logistics and sustainment. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Autonomy Programme, for example, identifies defense resupply and logistics challenges through the Defense and Security Accelerator as one of its key activities.46 In 2019, MOD also allocated £66 million (about $83 million) to accelerate robotic projects for the British Army, including autonomous logistics vehicles supporting resupply missions in conflict zones.47 Notably, the UK’s Defense Science and Technology Laboratory and the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s Ground Vehicle Systems Center have been working together since 2016 on the Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply project, prototyping semiautonomous logistics convoys, along with ground and aerial autonomous resupply systems, and demonstrating the interoperability of the two nations’ armies with autonomous driving technology.48 France’s military AI strategy also views “logistics and operational readiness” as one of the priority areas for the defense ministry, including a focus on predictive maintenance. 49 Notably, the strategy states that “mission performance and assisted maintenance applications, especially for cooperation with countries that have the same systems” as France pose no significant problems in terms of sharing classified data. And in addition to its key European partners, France is also open to collaboration with the United States given the similar approach to AI development. 50 Along similar lines, the German Army identifies AI for personnel and material management, including predictive maintenance, as one of the main areas for action on AI development.51 Japan and South Korea are also increasingly investing in military applications of AI, including for logistics and sustainment. South Korea’s National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence lists national defense as a key area for AI applications, including using AI to “quickly analyze and process large-scale defense data and develop and support common services such as medical care, logistics, and administration.”52 Meanwhile, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) has identified “logistical support technologies” in its medium- to long-term defense technology outlook back in 2016. More recently, ATLA has been working with private sector partners on research and development projects applying AI for defense logistics and “streamlining system maintenance work.”53 Efforts to advance collaboration on AI-enabled military logistics and sustainment will likely face some resistance. The aforementioned challenges related to data privacy are not merely technical in nature, but deeply political as well. Some European policymakers are pushing toward data sovereignty and less dependency on U.S. technology. Others are doubting whether the United States is willing to advance meaningful regulations over digital technologies and safeguards for data privacy.54 The question of a forum for collaboration remains a politically sensitive topic as well, even more so now in the aftermath of Brexit. 55 These challenges notwithstanding, the United States and its allies have shared interests and common policy objectives in ensuring the safe and responsible use of AI in alignment with democratic norms and principles. And with allies like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, South Korea, and Japan already promoting initiatives to leverage AI for military logistics and sustainment, this seems like a politically pragmatic area for collaboration. Strategically critical The strategic environment in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region heightens the importance of coordinating national and multinational logistics, while collaboration on AI-enabled logistics can provide an operational advantage in multinational operations. The U.S. military is a global force that must remain ahead of competitors and adversaries and be prepared for a broad range of contingencies and missions. Yet in multinational operations, the gap in military and technological capabilities between the United States and its allies and partners, and more specifically, significant discrepancies in allies’ logistic capabilities, can negatively impact survivability, interoperability, cohesion, and ultimately, mission success. Thus, for the United States and its allies, collaboration on logistics and sustainment in general, and on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment in particular, is important for several operational and strategic reasons. Operationally speaking, logistic support during multinational military operations differs from unilateral operations. Nations have different national and military objectives, cultures, capabilities, and approaches to logistic support and functions. These differences impact how the United States military organizes, prepares, and eventually executes logistic support during multinational operations.56 Moreover, in multinational operations, nations share a collective responsibility for logistics in support of the mission. Thus, the logistic capabilities of each allied nation affect not only their ability to support their own forces but the operational-level support capabilities of the coalition as a whole.57 On a strategic level, the global threat landscape and U.S. security posture in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region elevate the significance of joint, streamlined logistics and comparable military endurance capabilities between the United States and its allies. In Europe, on NATO’s eastern flank, the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, (as well as potentially Lithuania) could be overrun by Russia’s superior military forces in a matter of days.58 Thus, in the event of a major conflict in the Baltic states, NATO would have to move thousands of troops and heavy military equipment from across Europe as well as from the United States very rapidly and efficiently to counter Russian aggression. Sound logistics—from the coordination and transfer of military cargo ships and private merchant vessels to the surge and movement of military equipment and supplies along Europe’s roads, rivers, and incompatible rail infrastructure—would prove essential to success. 59 Preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia and strengthening the U.S.-led security architecture in the western Pacific is high on the list of U.S. strategic interests. Yet the U.S. military has no local shore bases from which to project power in the region, and its dependence on more distant bases in Guam, Japan, and South Korea, presents significant operational limitations. Moreover, U.S. air bases, aircraft carriers, surface vessels, ports, airfields, and logistics systems—those already in the region and those surge forces moving into the theater in the event of a crisis or a conflict—are currently vulnerable to Chinese air and missile attacks and cyberattacks.60 U.S. national security experts are well aware of these challenges and recognize the need to work with allies to protect shared security interests in these strategically important regions. For instance, the NSCAI’s interim report recommends assisting NATO in its adoption of AI and negotiating formal AI cooperation agreements with allies and partners like Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam.61 Moreover, the report explicitly recommends that U.S. alliances, primarily NATO, “explore pilot projects in low-risk areas such as for enterprise AI applications (logistics and sustainment) to derive lessons that would support broader application of AI systems for alliance efforts.”62 Along similar lines, in their assessment of U.S. competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, the Center for a New American Security recommends integrating logistics and sustainment considerations into the U.S. military strategy and operational concept development for China in order to ensure that the United States is able to project and sustain combat power in the Indo-Pacific region. 63 These efforts, however, could be strengthened by paying closer attention to the role AI/ML technologies could have in enabling more responsive logistics systems as well as in building the capacity of key partners in the region. Certainly, when it comes to international collaboration in general, or collaborative AI projects related to military logistics and sustainment more specifically, disagreements and complications are inevitable. The past four years have seen more friction between NATO member states as well as between the United States and NATO. Rebuilding U.S. alliances is high on the Biden administration’s agenda. But restoring trust and good collaborative relationships takes time, effort, and resources. Moreover, NATO member states have very different military and technological capabilities which makes it difficult to implement alliance-wide initiatives. And while confronting China’s assertiveness is a top priority for the United States, many of the United States’ European and Asia-Pacific allies have economic and technological relationships with China. Their objectives vis-à-vis China on questions of geopolitics and technology are not necessarily aligned with those of the United States. Nevertheless, the strategic and operational arguments in favor of working together on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment are quite powerful. Coordination on AI embedded in logistic systems can make for more efficient and streamlined movement of personnel and equipment, enable interoperability between systems and forces, and expedite the provision of medical services. Such improvements directly contribute to the readiness and endurance of allied military forces and their ability to deter and defeat adversaries if conflict erupts.

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Democracy solves extinction

Carla Zoe Cremer & Luke Kemp 21, The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" //pipk

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour. We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)45,115. Decision-making procedures are not either democratic or non- democratic, but instead lie on a spectrum. They can be more or less democratic, inclusive, and diverse. We posit three reasons for why we should democratise research and decision-making in existential risk: the nature of collective decision-making about human futures, the superiority of democratic reason, and democratic fail-safe mechanisms. Avoiding human extinction, or crafting a desirable long-term future, is a communal project. Scholars of existential risk who take an interest in the future of Homo sapiens are choosing to consider the species in its entirety. If certain views are excluded, the arguments for doing so must be compelling. Democracy will improve our judgments in both the governance and the study of existential risks. Asking how our actions today influence the long-term future is one of the most difficult intellectual tasks to unravel, and if there is a right path, democratic procedures will have the best shot at finding it. Hong and Page116,117 demonstrate both theoretically and computationally that a diverse group of problem-solving agents will show greater accuracy than a less diverse group, even if the individual members of the diverse group were each less accurate. Accuracy gains from diversity trump gains from improving individual accuracy. Landemore115, builds on this work to advance a probabilistic argument that inclusive democracies will, in expectation, make epistemically superior choices to oligarchies or even the wise few. This is supported by promising results in inclusive, deliberative democratic experiments from around the world 118. In the long run, democracies should commit fewer mistakes than alternative decision-making procedures. If this is true, it should improve the accuracy of research efforts and decision-making. We are more likely to make accurate predictions about the mechanisms of extinction, probable futures, and risk prevention if the field invites cognitive diversity, builds flat institutional structures, and avoids conflicts of interest. Thereare many ways to consider the interests of the many. Democratic assemblies could allow global citizens to deliberate about the futures they prefer, citizens could be surveyed, and the field of ERS itself could be diversified. At the moment, the field is, as many academic disciplines are, unrepresentative of humanity at large and variably homogenous in respect to income, class, ideology, age, ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, and professional background. The latter issue is particularly true of existential risk, which, despite being an inherently interdisciplinary endeavour, is at the highest levels dominated by analytic moral philosophers. We need to be vigilant to what perspectives are not represented in the study of existential risk. An awareness of bias will go some way towards mitigating its negative effects. To get close to replicating the cognitive diversity found among humans, we must begin by inviting different thinkers with different values and beliefs into the field. Democracies can limit harms. Any approach to mitigating existential threats could create response risks, and the TUA seems particularly vulnerable to this. Despite good intentions and curiosity-driven research, it could justify violence, dangerous technological developments, or drastically constrain freedom in favour of (perceived) security. If we hope to explore ideas but minimise harms, democracies can be used to moderate the measures taken in response to harmful ideas. It seems, for example, vanishingly unlikely that a diverse group of thinkers or even ordinary citizens would entertain the idea of sacrificing 1 billion living, breathing beings for an infinitesimal improvement in reaching an intergalactic techno-utopia. In contrast, the TUA could recommend this trade-off. The democratic constraint of extreme measures may simply be a form of collective selfinterest. Voters are unlikely to tolerate global catastrophic risks (GCRs), which incur the death of a sizeable portion of the electorate, if they know they themselves could be affected. We expect that scholars who do not support sacrificing current lives in the name of abstract calculations, but would still like to explore the use of expected value theory in existential risk, will be in support of democratic fail-safe mechanisms. Empirically, this fail-safe mechanism seems to work. Even deeply imperfect democracies, like the ones we inhabit now, often avert detrimental outcomes. Democracies prevent famines 119 (although not malnutrition)120. They make war — a significant driver of GCRs — less likely 121. The inclusion of diverse preferences in democracies, such as those achieved through women’s suffrage, further decreases the likelihood of violent conflict 122. Citizens often show a significant risk aversion in comparison to their government. While surveys are notoriously difficult to collect and interpret, existing data suggest that the public has little support for nuclear weapons use 123–125, but strong support for action against climate catastrophe 126–128. We can further show that when citizens deliberately engage with the subject at hand, their concern and readiness for action often increases 118. For example, citizen assemblies on climate change have recommended widespread policy-changes across sectors, amendments to incentive structures and laws against ecocide to reach emissions targets 129. Indeed, many lament that when it comes to genetically modified organisms and nuclear power, citizens are far too riskaverse130 . The problem is not that the public is riddled with cognitive biases that make them unconcerned about global catastrophes. Democratic debate cannot be an afterthought. Navigating humanity through crises will involve many value-laden decisions under deep uncertainty. Democratic procedures can deal with such hard choices. Greater cognitive diversity should be represented amongst scholars of ERS. Recommendations on policies that would reduce risk should be passed through deliberative assemblies and await the approval of a wider pool of ordinary citizens, as they will be the ones who will bear this risk. A homogenous group of experts attempting to directly influence powerful decision-makers is not a fair or safe way of traversing the precipice.

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Chinese dominance of AI spread authoritarianism globally – subjects billions to state-sponsored violence.

Anderson ‘20 (Ross Andersen is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees the science, technology, and health sections. He joined The Atlantic in 2015. He was previously the deputy editor of Aeon, and before that, he was the science editor of the Los Angeles Review of Books. In addition to his work as an editor, Andersen is known for his award-winning feature essays, which straddle philosophy, technology, science, history, and the arts.) “THE PANOPTICON IS ALREADY HERE” September 2020 // ZX

The lobby’s most prominent poster depicted Xi Jinping in a crisp black suit. China’s current president and the general secretary of its Communist Party has taken a keen interest in the institute. Its work is part of a grand AI strategy that Xi has laid out in a series of speeches akin to those John F. Kennedy used to train America’s techno-scientific sights on the moon. Xi has said that he wants China, by year’s end, to be competitive with the world’s AI leaders, a benchmark the country has arguably already reached. And he wants China to achieve AI supremacy by 2030. Xi’s pronouncements on AI have a sinister edge. Artificial intelligence has applications in nearly every human domain, from the instant translation of spoken language to early viral-outbreak detection. But Xi also wants to use AI’s awesome analytical powers to push China to the cutting edge of surveillance. He wants to build an all-seeing digital system of social control, patrolled by precog algorithms that identify potential dissenters in real time. China’s government has a history of using major historical events to introduce and embed surveillance measures. In the run-up to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, Chinese security services achieved a new level of control over the country’s internet. During China’s coronavirus outbreak, Xi’s government leaned hard on private companies in possession of sensitive personal data. Any emergency data-sharing arrangements made behind closed doors during the pandemic could become permanent. China already has hundreds of millions of surveillance cameras in place. Xi’s government hopes to soon achieve full video coverage of key public areas. Much of the footage collected by China’s cameras is parsed by algorithms for security threats of one kind or another. In the near future, every person who enters a public space could be identified, instantly, by AI matching them to an ocean of personal data, including their every text communication, and their body’s one-of-a-kind protein-construction schema. In time, algorithms will be able to string together data points from a broad range of sources—travel records, friends and associates, reading habits, purchases—to predict political resistance before it happens. China’s government could soon achieve an unprecedented political stranglehold on more than 1 billion people. Early in the coronavirus outbreak, China’s citizens were subjected to a form of risk scoring. An algorithm assigned people a color code—green, yellow, or red—that determined their ability to take transit or enter buildings in China’s megacities. In a sophisticated digital system of social control, codes like these could be used to score a person’s perceived political pliancy as well. A crude version of such a system is already in operation in China’s northwestern territory of Xinjiang, where more than 1 million Muslim Uighurs have been imprisoned, the largest internment of an ethnic-religious minority since the fall of the Third Reich. Once Xi perfects this system in Xinjiang, no technological limitations will prevent him from extending AI surveillance across China. He could also export it beyond the country’s borders, entrenching the power of a whole generation of autocrats.China has recently embarked on a number of ambitious infrastructure projects abroad—megacity construction, high-speed rail networks, not to mention the country’s much-vaunted Belt and Road Initiative. But these won’t reshape history like China’s digital infrastructure, which could shift the balance of power between the individual and the state worldwide. American policy makers from across the political spectrum are concerned about this scenario. Michael Kratsios, the former Peter Thiel acolyte whom Donald Trump picked to be the U.S. government’s chief technology officer, told me that technological leadership from democratic nations has “never been more imperative” and that “if we want to make sure that Western values are baked into the technologies of the future, we need to make sure we’re leading in those technologies.” Despite China’s considerable strides, industry analysts expect America to retain its current AI lead for another decade at least. But this is cold comfort: China is already developing powerful new surveillance tools, and exporting them to dozens of the world’s actual and would-be autocracies. Over the next few years, those technologies will be refined and integrated into all-encompassing surveillance systems that dictators can plug and play. The emergence of an AI-powered authoritarian bloc led by China could warp the geopolitics of this century. It could prevent billions of people, across large swaths of the globe, from ever securing any measure of political freedom. And whatever the pretensions of American policy makers, only China’s citizens can stop it. I’d come to Beijing to look for some sign that they might. Xi has appropriated the phrase sharp eyes, with all its historical resonances, as his chosen name for the AI-powered surveillance cameras that will soon span China. With AI, Xi can build history’s most oppressive authoritarian apparatus, without the manpower Mao needed to keep information about dissent flowing to a single, centralized node. In China’s most prominent AI start-ups—SenseTime, CloudWalk, Megvii, Hikvision, iFlytek, Meiya Pico—Xi has found willing commercial partners. And in Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, he has found his test population. By 2009, China’s Uighurs had become weary after decades of discrimination and land confiscation. They launched mass protests and a smattering of suicide attacks against Chinese police. In 2014, Xi cracked down, directing Xinjiang’s provincial government to destroy mosques and reduce Uighur neighborhoods to rubble. More than 1 million Uighurs were disappeared into concentration camps. Many were tortured and made to perform slave labor. Uighurs who were spared the camps now make up the most intensely surveilled population on Earth. Not all of the surveillance is digital. The Chinese government has moved thousands of Han Chinese “big brothers and sisters” into homes in Xinjiang’s ancient Silk Road cities, to monitor Uighurs’ forced assimilation to mainstream Chinese culture. They eat meals with the family, and some “big brothers” sleep in the same bed as the wives of detained Uighur men. Until recently, it was difficult to imagine how China could integrate all of these data into a single surveillance system, but no longer. In 2018, a cybersecurity activist hacked into a facial-recognition system that appeared to be connected to the government and was synthesizing a surprising combination of data streams. The system was capable of detecting Uighurs by their ethnic features, and it could tell whether people’s eyes or mouth were open, whether they were smiling, whether they had a beard, and whether they were wearing sunglasses. It logged the date, time, and serial numbers—all traceable to individual users—of Wi-Fi-enabled phones that passed within its reach. It was hosted by Alibaba and made reference to City Brain, an AI-powered software platform that China’s government has tasked the company with building. City Brain is, as the name suggests, a kind of automated nerve center, capable of synthesizing data streams from a multitude of sensors distributed throughout an urban environment. Many of its proposed uses are benign technocratic functions. Its algorithms could, for instance, count people and cars, to help with red-light timing and subway-line planning. Data from sensor-laden trash cans could make waste pickup more timely and efficient. In the early aughts, the Chinese telecom titan ZTE sold Ethiopia a wireless network with built-in backdoor access for the government. In a later crackdown, dissidents were rounded up for brutal interrogations, during which they were played audio from recent phone calls they’d made. Today, Kenya, Uganda, and Mauritius are outfitting major cities with Chinese-made surveillance networks. In Egypt, Chinese developers are looking to finance the construction of a new capital. It’s slated to run on a “smart city” platform similar to City Brain, although a vendor has not yet been named. In southern Africa, Zambia has agreed to buy more than $1 billion in telecom equipment from China, including internet-monitoring technology. China’s Hikvision, the world’s largest manufacturer of AI-enabled surveillance cameras, has an office in Johannesburg. Having set up beachheads in Asia, Europe, and Africa, China’s AI companies are now pushing into Latin America, a region the Chinese government describes as a “core economic interest.” China financed Ecuador’s $240 million purchase of a surveillance-camera system. Bolivia, too, has bought surveillance equipment with help from a loan from Beijing. Venezuela recently debuted a new national ID-card system that logs citizens’ political affiliations in a database built by ZTE. In a grim irony, for years Chinese companies hawked many of these surveillance products at a security expo in Xinjiang, the home province of the Uighurs. The country is now the world’s leading seller of AI-powered surveillance equipment. In Malaysia, the government is working with Yitu, a Chinese AI start-up, to bring facial-recognition technology to Kuala Lumpur’s police as a complement to Alibaba’s City Brain platform. Chinese companies also bid to outfit every one of Singapore’s 110,000 lampposts with facial-recognition cameras.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Cooperation Advantage

Plan ensures that a democratic AI model is credible – cooperation spills over to challenge the China’s authoritarianism.

Imbrie et al. ‘20 (Andrew Imbrie, Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Ryan Fedasiuk, Research Analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Catherine Aiken, Director of Data Science and Research at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Tarun Chhabra, nonresident fellow with the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; February 2022; “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI”; CSET;

The United States has a vested interest in setting the rules of the road for artificial intelligence. Western countries have already taken the lead in developing principles governing the application of artificial intelligence. China has produced its own set of principles and engages actively in international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), to establish standards for mobile network technologies and the future governance of AI. By assuming leadership in AI, the United States and its allies face risks and opportunities. The risks are twofold. On the one hand, standard setting could become a casualty of geopolitical competition as leading countries precipitate a race to the bottom. On the other hand, China already asserts its principles and standards through a variety of multilateral fora. The opportunity is that the United States and its allies can act now to set global standards for AI reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal democratic values, while addressing critical questions surrounding the rollout of 5G, facial recognition for surveillance, automated cyber exploitation and defense, and autonomous weapons systems. A Japanese official responding to the CSET survey noted that the United States and its allies should adopt a citizen-centric AI strategy. Such citizen-centric strategies would seek to develop and deploy AI for the benefit of democratic societies, including strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens within rules-based market economies; greater access to education, precision medicine, energy efficiency, and more inclusive social service provision. The United States should lead a multilateral effort with allies and partners to set international rules of conduct for AI. This effort should build on and extend the OECD Principles on AI and the International Organization for Standardization working group initiatives on standards for data and AI safety and security. The United States and its allies could establish a standing platform to coordinate policies on standard-setting in multilateral fora. This is likely an area for productive dialogue, as partners are eager to coordinate policies and share best practices around norms and standards. In fact, all surveyed officials were extremely or very interested in this avenue for international collaboration. Longer term, the United States and its allies should explore the conditions for a common AI market, including standards for testing, verification, and validation of AI technologies, as well as common practices for certifying companies that support liberal democratic values and privacy.87 This common market would create incentives for other countries to abide by these principles in the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. As one EU representative observed, if the West could offer a viable way of doing AI that respects privacy and fundamental rights, developing (and democratic) countries would be more inclined to follow the Western model. Optimal Partners: Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Singapore, and Japan Center for Security and Emerging Technology 33 Multilateral Fora: EU, OECD, International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission Joint Technical Committee 1 Sub Committee 42 – Artificial Intelligence, WTO, 3GPP, NATO-EU joint initiative on standards for emerging technologies Criteria for Partnership: To lead the global discussion on AI safety and ethics, the United States will need to build a coalition of like-minded, influential countries from which it can listen and learn and with whom it can shape norms and standards. Ideal partners will be countries that host active and engaged civil societies, who have historically aligned with liberal democratic values and U.S. policy priorities, and who most actively collaborate internationally to develop AI norms and standards. Allies that more frequently use information and communication technologies, issue governance documents about AI, and host robust public sector discussions about AI and image recognition are optimal partners for shaping global norms, standards, and best practices around these technologies. For one measure of technology use, we included the World Economic Forum’s Government Usage of ICT index, as well as a count of national AI governance documents provided by Nesta.88 We also measured commitment to a democratic way of AI by canvassing national AI strategies for mentions of “principles,” “norms,” “standards,” and “safety.” To measure international clout and diplomatic capacity, we captured the number of diplomatic posts each country operates worldwide, as well as their ranks on the Soft Power 30 Index.89 Finally, we recorded countries’ demonstrated willingness to ban technology imports from Huawei Technologies as a proxy for their willingness to work with the United States.90 Other considerations and caveats: The United States will need to expand cooperation beyond the aforementioned countries to promote liberal democratic norms and standards for AI. Sweden and New Zealand were among the top-scoring countries for this initiative. As the world’s largest democracy, India is also an important partner in this effort. Policymakers will need to weigh additional considerations: countries that generate a high quantity of policy documents about AI may not make for optimal partners if these documents do not align with U.S. values and policy priorities. What’s more, many national guidelines mention or touch on AI but are not directly related to AI, and data is not widely available for non-Anglophone countries. Initiative 10: Establish a multilateral digital infrastructure network. One of the chief attractions of Chinese-supplied consumer technologies (5G, cell phones, computers, digital wallets) is that they are less expensive than Western equivalents, and market access is often a condition for Chinese companies investing in developing countries. For example, some allies and partners are reluctant to ban Huawei for fear of losing access to the Chinese market and investments. Even among partners, the appeal of cost effectiveness sometimes outweighs considerations of privacy and security. The CSET survey found that cost effectiveness matters more than privacy for international agreements around software contracts. Yet privacy matters more among partners for international agreements around data storage and sharing. Surveyed officials were split in terms of the relative importance of privacy and cost for international agreements around novel applications and hardware investment. Germany, Australia, and the EU tended to favor privacy in all cases, while Colombia and the Czech Republic tended to favor cost effectiveness when considering international collaboration. To promote a rules-based global trading order, the United States should not mimic China’s model of state-driven, top-down national development strategies that trade investment for market access. Instead, the United States should form a multilateral consortium to coordinate the extension of credit to European mobile telecommunications networks and invest in next-generation networks.91 The United States and its allies should also launch a multilateral digital infrastructure network. This network could be modeled on USAID’s Higher Education Solutions Network, a partnership between USAID and development labs at seven major universities, and the EU’s Digital4Development policy, an initiative that harnesses information and communications technologies to promote sustainable development.92 A multilateral digital infrastructure network would enable the United States and its allies to partner with developing countries to build digital capacity in support of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The right approach would ensure that digital systems in emerging markets are open, secure, resilient, and interoperable, while empowering developing countries to protect data privacy, meet their domestic needs, and access high-performance computing and mobile internet technologies. Liberal democratic governments have established frameworks and standards for good governance tied to development lending and giving. Democratic countries should include AI in these frameworks along with capacity building to ensure that developing countries can make sovereign and democratically accountable decisions about the deployment of AI. Many developing countries are growth markets and present opportunities to shape AI governance consistent with liberal democratic principles. As part of this effort, the United States and its allies should integrate federated learning techniques and data privacy into digital capacity building efforts with developing countries. By creating an accelerator fund for privacy-preserving 36 Center for Security and Emerging Technology machine learning technologies, the United States and its allies could promote an alternative model of development that puts data protection and privacy at the absolute center. Optimal Partners: Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Canada Multilateral Fora: IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, and Digital Nations (The Digital 9) Criteria for Partnership: The best partners for investing in global digital infrastructure are countries that lead in foreign aid and consider technology to be a staple of development and governance. We measured outflows of official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) from each country. We considered three indices of governments’ commitment to technology and global development: the UN e-Government Development Index, the Digital Evolution Index, and “technology” scores on the Commitment to Development Index.93 We also included a measure from our survey: expressed concern around China’s investments in the developing world. Other considerations and caveats: Other high-scoring countries included South Korea and Sweden for their commitments to digital development. It is also important to consider the optimal destinations for digital infrastructure support. Ideal recipients would be countries at risk of becoming dependent on Chinese technology and monetary assistance, for whom price is a prohibitory factor in buying from companies based in the United States and allied countries. As of this writing, China’s Belt and Road Initiative encompasses more than 60 countries.94 Conclusion How can the United States collaborate with allies and partners to shape the trajectory of artificial intelligence in ways that will promote liberal democratic values and protect against efforts to wield AI for authoritarian ends? This question is both important and urgent. It is important because America’s broad network of alliances and security partnerships is a singular asset in defending liberal values. It is urgent because China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI and the export of censorship and surveillance technologies to countries across the globe.1 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion and stifle dissent.2 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. All democratic nations must work together to uphold basic principles, set international rules of the road, and articulate a positive vision for the future in the age of AI. Within the United States, and certainly within allied countries, debate persists over the threat of digital authoritarianism and how to counter it. While U.S. allies will likely vary in their strategic orientations toward China and Russia, there is a growing consensus on the need to showcase a democratic way of AI. These debates will take shape in a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains. In this context, the right U.S. approach would leverage its network of allies and partners to safeguard democracy and liberal values. An alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. The United States and its allies should play to their strengths. This positive agenda begins with shaping the ecosystems for the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. The most effective approach would capitalize on advances in AI and machine learning to foster sustainable and inclusive economic growth, improve service delivery, and promote transparent and accountable governance. The United States and its allies should pursue a vision of the future in which AI enables strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens within rules-based market economies; cleaner, safer, and more efficient transportation; precision medical diagnosis; greater access to education; and more effective disaster response.

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AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Cooperation Advantage

Uncertainty over AI military application puts NATO at the center of the broader debate over democracy and emerging technology – cooperation now sets international norms.

Gilli ’20 (Andrea is Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. In the past, Andrea has been visiting and post-doctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University, “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artifical Intelligence,” , 6/25/22)-lf

NATO has an interest, and a moral obligation, to promote the adoption of its values in the realm of AI. Democratic values inform the Alliance’s goals, thus giving meaning to its material capabilities – including its military power. At the same time, the integration of AI into the fields of security and defence poses unique moral, ethical, legal, and safety-related questions.85 It is thus imperative that the Alliance actively considers and operationalizes AI ethics, regardless of the degree and scope of AI integration within NATO and its Allies. The common principles and values pronounced in the Atlantic Treaty represent the foundations on which NATO was built. Such principles and values – democracy, freedom, rule of law, individual rights, free markets – are the bond underlying the transatlantic community, which in fact predates the Atlantic Alliance.86 Norms and values can strongly shape the international system.87 Given the intense international competition in the technological, military, economic, and normative domains, embedding democratic values into AI is as much a strategic imperative for the Alliance as it is a functional one.88 In addition to signaling to domestic populations that NATO and its Allies follow through on their commitments to uphold values as the basis of the political and military Alliance, incorporating AI ethics into the “NATO-mation” agenda also serves as a bulwark against the incursion of unwelcome illiberal values in the course of future technological development.89 It is worth noting that NATO’s role in the AI ethics sphere differs from that of many other organizations, such as national governments and the European Union, because NATO is not a regulatory body. NATO complies with existing laws and regulations, including the Laws of War, which nations and the international community created. This means that regulatory and normative questions such as the development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems will not be determined at NATO level. Nevertheless, there is still room for NATO to play a clear role. Indeed, given doubts and worries about the adoption of AI for military purposes, NATO can help generate more public support and engagement by clearly defining ethical boundaries and moral guidelines. The uses of AI in military operations – ranging from logistics to maintenance, from recruitment to retainment, from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to medical tests and medical evacuation, and more90 – go beyond the discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems that have dominated European debate about AI in military affairs. Accordingly, the range of ethical questions relevant to NATO extend beyond focusing on the tip of the spear. Seemingly mundane uses of AI, such as in human resources or decision support, can still pose distinct ethical questions the Alliance should be prepared to handle. Addressing security risks,91 minimizing bias in systems,92 developing trust,93 and respecting privacy are fundamental tasks for the Alliance to ensure the future effectiveness of AI, whether in battle or in other functions. The age of intelligent machines requires the Alliance to reiterate its commitment to values as new moral and ethical questions emerge, because algorithms do not have a conscience, personal preferences or moral agency. These statistical machines have no understanding of good and bad, or fair and unjust.94 All an algorithm can do is achieve its human-defined reward function, not provide any context or information on whether the right question is being asked.95 Instead of giving moral agency to algorithms, humans and organizations can view AI as a “moral entity”. This means that we humans are dutybound to adhere to our moral code of conduct when interacting with the systems, rather than shirking human responsibility to computers.96 At the organizational level, this means that the design, development and deployment of AI should be “ethically aligned” with the Alliance’s values and goals.97 This is important because AI is data-intensive, unpredictable and brittle.98 While a system may work well in the context in which it was trained, it may break in an unfamiliar setting. The reliance on BD in the current second wave of ML also creates fallibilities,99 given that the algorithms can scale up harm if the data over- or under-represents certain groups.100 For neural networks in particular, it may be impossible to explain or interpret results. Some refer to this as the “black-box” problem, meaning that the outcomes of these complex AI systems are opaque to humans that either want to reproduce the good, or prevent the bad from recurring. While traditional software can be debugged to solve a performance issue, the lack of linear causality between a programmer’s inputs and the AI system’s outputs means that it is difficult to track bias and reliability. Creating organizational processes to minimize these concerns across the AI lifecycle is critical to responsible use of the technology. Considering AI ethics also means developing trust in systems. Organizations developing AI applications should think deeply about user expectations related to transparency and disclosure. Ultimately, these norms will change the distinction between human, AI-assisted and AI interactions.101 “Calibrating” trust is especially important for AI-assisted decision making,102 a concept whose value will only increase given the emphasis on human-machine teaming in Allied militaries.103 In many cases, the unethical or unacceptable outcomes of AI systems pertain not to moral dilemmas, but to the reliability and robustness of the systems at hand. As such, building trust is fundamentally tied to building safe and secure systems.104 The problem of bias in AI illustrates the overlap between AI safety and AI ethics: bias is morally problematic, because it can unfairly harm or systematically discriminate against specific groups105 – and it can also be seen as a failure mode that reduces the reliability of a given algorithm in a given context.106 For NATO, this relates to the safety of enterprise tools and weapons systems alike. In deployments, these safety measures would be critical to ensure that AI-enabled weapons systems are used in a manner consistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. As explained in greater detail below, this may also feed into the eventual standardization process. While addressing these and other ethical issues is not impossible, it is also not immediate, especially among different actors who, understandably, may hold variegated views or priorities. Several courses of action are possible: Appoint an Ethics Board. The Atlantic Alliance could benefit from establishing an Ethics Board of experts, along the lines of the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI or the AI Ethics Committee in the French Ministry of Armed Forces. The aim should be to start an internal discussion about the applications of AI in the military domain, and the board should be empowered to monitor the progressive implementation of ethically aligned processes, principles, and standards over the medium-to-long term so as to avoid “ethics washing”.107 The board could be made of specific personalities, or also represent ethics boards already set up by individual Allies. It is important, however, that a board of this kind remains in place for the medium term: the upcoming integration of AI at entry-level will lead to new applications, and thus to wider adoption within the Alliance; for this reason, an ethics board would be increasingly called on to support trust-building measures, as well as integration of ethics into the front end of development. Similarly, it would play an important support role in providing the necessary governance for technical, moral, legal and ethical questions as the adoption of AI intensifies.108 Lead and shape with ethical principles. The proposed Ethics Board could start its work from scratch, defining a new set of guiding ethical principles for NATO and its Allies, or it could take a pragmatic approach and borrow from the important work already done by several institutions, including the OECD and the European Union.109 As recalled above, work has already been done by international organizations such as the European Union and the OECD, national governments, such as the US Department of Defense and the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, private companies like Google and IBM, as well as non-governmental institutions like the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineering.110 Having clear and simple ethical principles is important, both internally, as actors at different levels need to be able to make choices, and externally, as NATO and its Allies may want not only to signal their ethical and moral commitments to their own citizenries, including developers and civil society, but also to shape the international environment. The priority is to ensure that NATO Allies adopt clear ethical guidelines which reflect their values – such as democratic representation, civilian control of the armed forces, individual responsibility, the centrality of human life, and compliance with the Laws of War – and that such values inform international norms, practices, agreements and possible future treaties. Leading in this realm means moulding the future security environment, in particular by embedding democratic values into this pervasive technology.111 What ethical principles should NATO adopt when it comes to AI? This will be up to the Ethics Board, if established, or to other authorities. As recalled, there is, however, a general agreement on some principles:112 • Human centricity: AI must be based on fundamental human rights and be aimed at improving the human condition; • Safety and security: AI must be adopted and deployed in a risk management framework that accounts for and minimizes threats; • Explainability and transparency: algorithms are generally opaque. For this reason it is important that their underlying logic can be understood, and that algorithms are written in a clear way; • Responsibility and accountability: the deployment of AI must ensure that responsibility for actions can be identified, especially in the event of error, meaning that individuals or organizations can be accountable even when responsibility is distributed across many stakeholders; • Reliability: the development of AI must ensure that it is reliable, and thus does not operate unpredictably or, especially, pose unanticipated threats; • Fairness and inclusion: algorithms must be designed to improve the human condition and thus reduce bias and discrimination, not exacerbate them; and • Privacy and data governance: the privacy and sensitivity of data – with regard to individuals, equipment, processes or organizations – must be preserved and protected. Implementation and execution. The transition from principles to action is critical in any activity. Ethics is no exception, and while issuing comprehensive principles is difficult in any organisation, ensuring their implementation is an even greater challenge so as to strike the fine line between ethics washing and ethics “bashing”.113 Indeed, governance is an important factor in ensuring that technology is used responsibly and in line with the Alliance’s desired outcomes.114 In this respect, NATO may have a relevant role in supporting its Allies. A dedicated organization, such as an Artificial Intelligence Integration & Implementation-Enabling Centre (next chapter), could prove particularly useful, not least because it could help Allies share concerns, considerations, solutions and best practices as well as support them with ad hoc training activities.115 Similarly, aligned principles may eventually be translated into standards – and related measures such as benchmarks and annotations – an aspect which will be discussed towards the end of this Research Paper.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

Nuclear deterrence solves existential threats

Chilton 18—USAF, Retired Former commander, US Strategic Command [General Kevin P. Chilton, Spring 2018, “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, ] AMarb

Some argue the US nuclear deterrent should be eliminated because its existence represents Cold War think. If nuclear deterrence is Cold War think, then one might posit machine guns are World War I think and main battle tanks are World War II think and conclude the US does not need those anymore for the defense of the nation. In fact, nuclear deterrence is not Cold War think. The reality is nuclear deterrence underpins the national security of the United States and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It remains relevant and necessary today to deter the existential threats to our nation posed by both Russia and China and by lesser but certainly horrific threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. It also helps to deter nonnuclear attacks that could have catastrophic consequences, such as attacks involving biological weapons. The term Cold War think is a pejorative typically proffered by those who have never thought seriously about, let alone studied, deterrence theory or by those who have run out of ways to defend their position. It is generally the last throwaway line of argument from an uninformed antinuclear ideologue. “No One Would Ever Use a Nuclear Weapon against the United States” Those who would use this argument seem willing to risk the very existence of the nation on the basis of their speculation and without forethought. However, this is not a wager military planners should ever risk. The US military must ensure national survival through deterrence provided by a safe, secure, capable, reliable, flexible, and vigilant nuclear posture. It is our duty to assume the worst and then take steps to ensure it never happens. Additionally, we must deter attacks on our friends, allies, and fielded US military forces deployed abroad. This will become more challenging as Russia, China, and North Korea appear to include the possible employment of nuclear weapons in their planning; indeed, Russia and North Korea openly discuss nuclear weapons as instruments to be used in future conventional conflicts with the US and NATO.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

Independently, AI enhances nuclear deterrence by improving military operations – it lifts the fog of war and improves decision making.

Nurkin and Konaev, 2022 - senior fellows at the Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council [Tate and Margarita, 5-25-2022, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense” Atlantic Council ARD]

AI embodies a significant opportunity for defense policymakers. The ability of AI to process and fuse information, and to distill data into insights that augment decision-making, can lift the “fog of war” in a chaotic, contested environment in which speed is king. AI can also unlock the possibility of new types of attritable and single-use uncrewed systems that can enhance deterrence.2 It can help safeguard the lives of US service members, for example, by powering the navigation software that guides autonomous resupply trucks in conflict zones.3 While humans remain in charge of making the final decision on targeting, AI algorithms are increasingly playing a role in helping intelligence professionals identify and track malicious actors, with the aim of “shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”4 AI development and integration are also imperative due to the broader geostrategic context in which the United States operates—particularly the strategic competition with China.5 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) budget for AI seems to match that of the US military, and the PLA is developing AI technology for a similarly broad set of applications and capabilities, including training and simulation, swarming autonomous systems, and information operations—among many others—all of which could abrogate the US military-technological advantage.6 As US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted in July 2021, “China’s leaders have made clear they intend to be globally dominant in AI by the year 2030. Beijing already talks about using AI for a range of missions, from surveillance to cyberattacks to autonomous weapons.”7 The United States cannot afford to fall behind China or other competitors.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

NATO cohesion checks numerous existential crises.

Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” ]

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.