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2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

Independently, lack of AI coordination wrecks overall cohesion and interoperability.

Gilli ‘20 [Andrea Gilli December 2020 “’NATO-Mation’: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” NATO Defense College Research Paper No.15 pp. 25-28 ] -os-

Building on the previous discussion of AI as a GPT, it appears that the challenge for NATO is subtle, multifaceted and significant. First, in an age of accelerating technological change and growing domain applicability, catching up with industry leaders and innovators becomes more and more difficult for those that lag behind.73 This means that waiting is not a solution – even though acting prematurely, in a realm of great uncertainty, is inherently difficult and risky.74 Second, governments cannot expect that individuals, firms and organizations will be able to embrace and successfully exploit the new wave of technological transformation alone, without advice, support, direction, vision or investments in infrastructure. Third, while some countries will have an advantage, others will find the transition more difficult. Regardless of this, technological transitions do not occur in a vacuum, as they require the alignment of incentives among a multiplicity of actors, organizations and institutions, as well as the provision of complementary services and goods for the new technologies to flourish and be adopted.75 Fourth, and more important for NATO, without coordinating and cooperating on their investments in the necessary complementary assets, goods and services, Allies could find themselves having to face additional hurdles. What types of problem could emerge? Technology-generated efficiency gains in production lead to lower prices. However, lower prices lead to increases in demand – because the relative price of substitute goods (rivals) increases.76 Over the past decade, AI – and, in particular, ML – has made a particular activity, prediction, cheaper: it is reasonable to forecast that this trend will continue in the future.77 As AI becomes cheaper, however, the demand for AI-related services will increase, thus leading to more demand for related necessities like AI specialists, AI infrastructure (and 5G networks) and AI components (processors). This in turn might well lead to scarcity and higher prices, thus pitching actors against one another – not unlike the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, when individual self-interested actions led to collectively bad outcomes.78 In the context of a military alliance, the problem goes much deeper, as it can generate a beggar-thy-neighbour effect with allies competing for the same scarce resources.79 Moreover, without consultation and cooperation, Allies could end up developing different technological solutions, with the risk of undermining compatibility and interoperability. Similarly, they could end up prioritizing some problems over others, with the risk of developing multiple, different and redundant solutions while neglecting other points in need of attention.80 However, through intra-alliance coordination and cooperation, as well as dialogue and consultation, secondary market mechanisms and other approaches, NATO could provide an important contribution to identify and address this type of problems.81

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

Losing the AI race causes global nuclear war – multiple scenarios for Russia and China conflicts that escalate.

Kroenig & Gopalaswamy ‘18 (Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Bharath Gopalaswamy is the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin; “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 12 2018,

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

NATO is losing its technological edge – action now key to ensure future deterrence and warfighting tactics against adversaries

Jankowski ‘21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 83-84. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications,

Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) seem simultaneously trendy, powerful, and mysterious. They are often perceived as carrying the potential to revolutionize governmental structures, economies, and life as one knows it. At the same time, scholars and policymakers emphasize that “these technologies may also promote international instability: for instance, by leading to a swift redistribution of wealth around the world; a rapid diffusion of military capabilities or by heightening the risks of military escalation and conflict.”1 For past decades, NATO and its Allies have enjoyed a technological edge, which has underpinned their collective military security – an advantage resulting from their collective economic, industrial, and academic strengths. NATO’s technological edge has always been an essential enabler of its ability to deter and defend against actual and potential adversaries. In October 2019, NATO Defence Ministers expressed concern that this advantage can no longer be taken for granted. In fact, NATO was in danger of losing its technological edge due to a combination of factors, among them a growing determination from peer competitors, especially Russia and China, to drive the future of advanced technologies, including military applications. Availability and knowledge of EDTs, enhanced by rising defence budgets, have provided NATO’s adversaries with capabilities to challenge the Alliance politically, militarily, and technologically. Allowing adversaries to gain competitive advantage in the EDTs area would impede NATO’s ability to win on the battlefield, challenge strategic stability, and change the fundamentals of deterrence. For NATO, EDTs are primarily of interest through their influence on current and future defence capabilities, as well as on deterrence and defence posture. It is clear that EDTs will affect many of the foundations of deterrence strategy. Indeed, new military technologies will play a crucial role in future warfighting and building forces that can decisively operate across domains. At the same time, deeply strategic and practical understanding of the significance of EDTs and their diffusion, as well as extending thinking concerning how science, technology, and international social relations interact to shape and facilitate management of the changing global security landscape, is a pressing need for NATO in the upcoming decade.2

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Competition Advantage

The AI race is on, but the US is failing behind to China – it will determine global balance of power both economically and militarily.

Franke ’21 (Ulrike Esther, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. "Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI" – ECFR/367 2, January, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Artificial-divide-How-Europe-and-America-could-clash-over-AI.pdf)

A Europe-US front on AI against China International competition on technology, such as 5G, has recently attracted significant attention. At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, for example, tech was an important topic – yet the discussion was not really about tech, but about power, as the rivalry over who builds 5G telecommunications infrastructure turned into a US-Chinese competition. This was despite the fact that the leading 5G providers are European and Chinese. There is a growing realisation that the adoption of AI-enabled systems may have geopolitical consequences and eventually affect the global balance of power. In particular, AI may give one actor considerable power over others, be it in the form of an economic boost or an AI-enabled military advantage, or through control over crucial technology components and standards. In the US, there is growing concern over the possibility that China might become too strong an AI actor. The competition over global leadership between the US and China is intensifying, with technology in general, and AI in particular, as battlefields. The US fears that AI may give China a competitive edge. Therefore, countering China’s AI ambitions – as embodied in its attempts to dominate international technology standards bodies, for example – has become an important motive for the US to seek international cooperation. In this context, Joe Biden has proposed an “alliance of liberal democracies” to present an economic and political alternative to China. Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI – ECFR/367 7 European policymakers have been less vocal about the geopolitical consequences of AI. So far, the debate in Europe has primarily revolved around AI’s economic and social effects. Of the 21 strategies on AI either published or drafted by EU member states, very few touch on the geopolitical implications of AI. The notable exception to this is France, whose national AI strategy was clearly drafted with a geopolitical mindset. It warns that France and Europe need to “avoid becoming just ‘digital colonies’ of the Chinese and American giants”. The strategy’s inclusion of “American giants” is telling and important. It shows that, from a European point of view, the US is the primary ‘other’ that Europe measures itself against on technology – at least for now. This is despite the fact that, in recent years, Chinese acquisitions of European high-tech firms have caused significant concern.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › 1AC › 1ac – Inherency

NATO established an AI strategic initiative but has yet to implement it – coordination, funding, and demonstration projects are still needed.

Soare ’21 (Simona, Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis, “Algorithmic power, NATO and artificial intelligence,” MILITARY BALANCE, 19th November 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence)

NATO has formally approved its first Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy as it seeks a leading position in the adoption of AI for defence, but it may face some critical hurdles ahead in implementing the strategy, according to Simona Soare. NATO defence ministers have formally adopted the Alliance’s first artificial intelligence (AI) strategy. The document lays out six ‘baseline’ principles for ‘responsible’ military use of AI – lawfulness, responsibility and accountability, explainability and traceability, reliability, governability, and bias mitigation. It also provides an insight into key implementation challenges. The strategy is meant to provide a ‘common policy basis’ to support the adoption of AI systems in order to achieve the Alliance’s three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The strategy is also designed to challenge established Alliance processes for procurement, technology development and wider engagement with the private sector and academia. Only a summary of the strategy has been made public. However, it reveals four critical obstacles to implementation that NATO will face: reconciling the objectives of member nations; securing sufficient political and financial support; bridging any disconnect between the Alliance’s policy and operational units; and managing the transnational bureaucracy that will implement the strategy. Hard questions As well as being a consensus-building policy document, the strategy attempts to position NATO as the leader of AI adoption in defence. It reiterates the allies’ commitment to transatlantic cooperation on the development and use of AI in security and defence, an important element of which is ensuring inter-operability and standardisation. There are still hard questions, however, about how NATO will coordinate different national approaches to managing the development and application of AI in defence, combined with restrictions on technology use, access, sharing and transfer. For countries like the United States, it is a priority that allies agree practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems and the necessary data-sharing, a challenge that should not be underestimated. Some allies, meanwhile, are not satisfied with the granularity of the six principles of responsible use, while others consider that overemphasising the normative approach risks ceding technological advantage to peer competitors. Similar tensions are playing out in the European Union. The EU’s proposal for an AI act is more restrictive for high-risk, high-impact applications of AI, though its impact on defence will be indirect, as it do does not apply to the military domain. In the defence realm, the European Defence Agency’s Artificial Intelligence Action Plan for Defence shares more similarities with the NATO strategy. While the plan is not public, it reportedly includes a list of use cases for military applications of AI which member states may consider for collaborative development and principles of responsible development and use. Another question that remains to be answered is the extent of NATO’s ambition to adopt AI. The strategy is meant to be implemented in a phased approach, partly to build political support for AI military projects. Initial ambitions seem modest, reportedly focusing on mission planning and support; smart maintenance and logistics for NATO capabilities; data fusion and analysis; cyber defence; and optimisation of back-office processes. As political acceptance grows and following periodic reviews of the strategy’s implementation, the goal is to also include more complex operational applications. Finally, the AI strategy runs parallel to NATO’s Military Strategy, a military-led process launched in 2019, and its Warfighting Capstone Concept, which examines alliance requirements in future operating environments. However, the AI strategy is a stand-alone document. To avoid creating narrow implementation tracks, meaningful early engagement between NATO’s policy and military communities would be beneficial to cut across any disconnect between threat-based assessments of the impact of AI on military capabilities and politically driven processes for the development and use of AI. Avoiding friction The executive summary of NATO’s AI strategy does not reflect any alignment of the roles and resources of the different NATO and national innovation bodies. It is unclear from the summary how the NATO Innovation Unit, Allied Command Transformation, the Science and Technology Organization and the NATO Communications and Information Agency will coordinate to implement the strategy. The Alliance aims to exploit AI developments in the commercial sector by adopting an open innovation model and deliberately moving away from its present procurement model. However, this will require an effort to map out the relationship between old structures, such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, and new engagement channels with the private sector, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and others created by the AI strategy. While NATO has adopted the AI strategy, there is no dedicated line of funding for it. Finance will depend on a combination of common budget funding and off-budget mechanisms such as the NATO Innovation Fund. Besides the uncertainty over the availability of funding, some Alliance agencies are concerned that their budgets could be cut and redistributed towards the implementation of the AI strategy. The allies have set a USD1 billion target for the NATO Innovation Fund. However, whether this amount is sustainably generated and distributed over the long term, and by what means, is more important for encouraging innovation than the announced figure. The promise of AI for military applications has been clear for some time; less obvious is the route to deliver on it. For all the implementation challenges it faces, the Alliance’s AI strategy represents a step in the right direction.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 2nc - hypersonics

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” doctrine makes the risk of using hypersonics even more likely

Brookes 22 (Peter Brookes - Senior Research Fellow, Center for National Defense. “Threat Assessment Grim on Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Heritage Founation. February 8, 2022. ”)

Beijing is expanding and diversifying its nuclear capabilities on an unprecedented scale. The commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, called it “breathtaking.” Discovery of the construction of nearly 250 new land-based ICBM silos in the summer of 2021 undermines the idea that China is still adhering to its long-standing “minimum deterrent” nuclear force. The silo expansion could mean China could soon rival the U.S.’ land-based ICBM force. China has also sent its nuclear strike force to sea on submarines and is developing a strategic bomber leg as part of what will soon be a nuclear triad. Beijing is also developing unique ways to deliver its nukes. Last year, China stunned many by testing a fractional orbital bombardment system, which circumnavigated the globe before releasing a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle at a target. That increase in Beijing’s nuclear numbers and capabilities raises the specter of parity or near-parity with the U.S.—or even superiority. That’s a chilling thought in an era of great power competition and the level of strategic distrust that exists between Washington and Beijing. Besides modernizing its nuclear force, Russia is also diversifying it, testing and deploying a number of novel nuclear weapons. Those nontraditional nuclear-capable weapons systems include an ICBM, three hypersonic weapons, a long-range nuclear-powered underwater torpedo, and an unlimited-range nuclear-powered cruise missile. Add to that a concern about Russia’s doctrine for its nonstrategic (i.e., low-yield) nuclear weapons, aka battlefield or tactical nukes. Moscow’s “escalate to deescalate” doctrine contemplates using a tactical nuke in a conventional conflict with NATO to end resistance to its aggression by crossing the nuclear threshold. Considering Russia’s belligerence in Europe, those small nukes are a big problem for NATO. Weapons of mass destruction also include chemical and biological weapons—and their recent use is deeply troubling. Indeed, Israel reportedly struck targets in Syria that might be involved in the production of chemical weapons. The Damascus regime has already used chemical weapons against civilians in Syria’s civil war—and could use them in a conflict with Israel. Also, don’t forget Russia’s use of a nerve agent against political opponents Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny or North Korea’s use of VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim’s half-brother. While we’ve not seen a biological weapon used, the COVID-19 pandemic painfully reminds us of the potential power of a purposely unleashed biological pathogen. No one likes to think about these horrific weapons, especially in the hands of troubling regimes, but unfortunately, due to their destructive power, we’re going to have to in 2022. 

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 2nc - hypersonics

Russia claiming they possess hypersonic nuclear weapons increases the chance of nuclear war

Boyd 22 (Iain Boyd; Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; and Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences at University of Colorado Boulder; “Hypersonic weapons raise risk of nuclear war”; Asia Times; 4/16/22; DOA: 6/24/22; ) // bh

Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. In the case of the US, if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the US would consider this a first-strike attack and respond by unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia. The hypersonic speed of these weapons [means] increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced. It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the US and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons. What is hypersonic? Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher. Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the first US crewed flight around the Earth, his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity. ICBMs are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. Hypersonic missiles are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles but are able to vary their trajectories. U.S. Government Accounting Office Three types of hypersonic missiles There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces used to attack Ukraine, the Kinzhal, is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980. The type of hypersonic missile Russia has used in Ukraine, the Kinzhal aero-ballistic missile, is essentially a ballistic missile launched from aircraft. It is not as advanced as other types of hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the US are developing. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP/The Conversation A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way. Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s Dongfeng-17, Russia’s Avangard and the US Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike system. US officials have expressed concern that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the US system. A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a scramjet to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places. Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the US. The US reportedly conducted a test flight of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020. Difficult to defend against The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The US is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and close cooperation with key allies. This approach is likely to be very expensive and take many years to implement. With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 2nc – Russian escalation

Finland and Sweden NATO alliance leads to Russian response in the form of nukes

Moscow Times 22, (The Moscow Times, Independent News from Russia, May 16, 2022 “Sweden, Finland Joining NATO Doesn’t Threaten Russia But May ‘Trigger’ Response – Putin”, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/16/could-russia-use-the-nuclear-option-a77693)

Sweden and Finland’s anticipated bid for NATO membership “doesn’t pose a threat” to Russia but may “trigger a response,” President Vladimir Putin said at a summit of former Soviet allies on Monday. The two Nordic countries have made historic steps toward joining the U.S.-led military bloc in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, citing the need to guarantee their security from feared Russian aggression. Speaking at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Moscow, Putin said that while Russia “doesn’t have problems” with either country, the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure across their territory may “trigger a response.” “What kind [of response] it will be, we will decide depending on threats that are created against us,” Putin warned. Putin noted that NATO’s “expansionist politics” which led the alliance “to overstep its intended geographic boundaries” warrants the Kremlin to keep a close watch on the situation. NATO’s role was also highlighted in the collective statement issued by the CSTO. “Realizing our responsibility for ensuring lasting peace in the Eurasian region, we emphasize the importance of de-escalating tensions in the continent and reaffirm our readiness for practical cooperation with NATO,” the statement says. Russia sent troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24 after its demands for NATO and the United States to permanently bar Ukraine from joining the alliance and to halt NATO expansion in what Moscow sees as its sphere of influence were refused.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 2nc – Russian escalation

Finland and Sweden joining NATO guarantees Russian escalation

Turak 22, (Natasha Turak Correspondent, CNBC, APR 14, 2022, “Russia threatens new nuclear deployments if Sweden, Finland join NATO”, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/14/russia-threatens-new-nuclear-deployments-if-sweden-finland-join-nato.html)

Russia says a nuclear-free Baltic region would no longer be possible if Finland and Sweden become NATO members, alluding to additional nuclear deployments in Europe. “If Sweden and Finland join NATO, the length of the alliance’s land borders with the Russian Federation will more than double. Naturally, these borders will have to be strengthened,” Dmitry Medvedev, former president and deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, wrote on his official Telegram channel Thursday. Russia will have to “seriously strengthen the grouping of land forces and air defense, deploy significant naval forces in the waters of the Gulf of Finland. In this case, it will no longer be possible to talk about any nuclear-free status of the Baltic - the balance must be restored,” he said. Finland’s position on NATO is a direct result of Ukraine war, says NATO chief The comments come a day after Finland and Sweden said their decision on whether to apply for NATO membership would come within a matter of weeks. The countries’ leaders said their security assessments had dramatically changed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February. The Baltics — the northeastern European countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — are members of the EU and NATO. Sweden and Finland are members of the EU, but not NATO, and the latter shares an 830-mile border with Russia. If Finland and Sweden did join NATO, this would give Moscow “more officially registered opponents,” Medvedev added. He claimed that NATO was planning to admit the two Nordic states with “minimal bureaucratic procedures.” Russia’s response should be taken with “no emotion, with a cold head,” he added. Moscow sees neighboring Finland’s potential inclusion in NATO as a threat to its national security, as the U.S. could deploy advanced military equipment in Finland if it joined the alliance. ‘Nothing new’ Lithuania, which borders the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, brushed off Medvedev’s comments on Thursday. It’s “nothing new,” Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte said. The country’s defense minister, Arvydas Anusauskas, added that Russia already has nuclear weapons in the Baltic region. How NATO is defending Eastern Europe “The current Russian threats look quite strange, when we know that, even without the present security situation, they keep the weapon 100 km from Lithuania’s border,” Anusauskas was quoted by Lithuania’s BNS wire as saying. “Nuclear weapons have always been kept in Kaliningrad ... the international community, the countries in the region, are perfectly aware of this. ... They use it as a threat,” he added. Kaliningrad, which is slightly larger than Connecticut, borders the Baltic Sea on its west and is sandwiched between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a U-turn in Finnish public opinion on becoming a member of the 30-country military alliance, which it has refrained from joining since World War II in a bid to maintain neutrality. Moscow has in the past warned of severe consequences and instability in the Nordics if Finland were to join. If Finland joined the alliance, Sweden would likely follow suit. Finland and Sweden, as well as Ukraine, are already “Enhanced Opportunity Partners” of NATO, the closest form of partnership with the alliance, and partake in military exercises with NATO states. Rather than urging the countries to pursue membership, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly said it is for Finland and Sweden to decide their own path. He has also said, “the door remains open” for the alliance to welcome new members. UK commander on NATO’s presence in the Baltic region amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine But Russia has long warned against any enlargement of NATO, reportedly accusing the alliance of being “a tool geared towards confrontation.” Ahead of its invasion of Ukraine, it demanded that the organization, which was created in 1949 in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, return to its pre-1997 borders — something the U.S. and NATO refused. Fourteen countries have joined the collective defense alliance since 1997, accounting for nearly half of its members. These countries include much of Central and Eastern Europe, and the first NATO members to border Russia and its exclave territory of Kaliningrad: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Moscow blames Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership, among other things, for triggering the invasion, saying it threatened Russia’s security. NATO leaders have reiterated that they will not send troops into Ukraine to help in the fight against Russia, primarily because the country is not a member of the alliance. NATO has to prevent the war from escalating beyond Ukraine: Secretary-general ″The persistent attempts by NATO to draw those countries into the orbit of its interests and opportunistic policies haven’t gone unnoticed by Russia,” Russian’s Foreign Ministry said in December 2021. “It’s quite obvious that Finland and Sweden joining NATO … would have serious military and political consequences that would require an adequate response from the Russian side,” ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said at the time. Risks abound Finland’s and Sweden’s leaders say they are aware of the risk of escalation. “We also need to be very frank about consequences and risks. There are both short-term and more long-term risks. These risks are there both if we apply and if we do not apply,” Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said during a news conference Wednesday. The leaders of Finland and Sweden have both said a decision on whether to apply for NATO membership can be expected sooner rather than later. The leaders of Finland and Sweden have both said a decision on whether to apply for NATO membership can be expected sooner rather than later. AAStill, looking at the devastation wrought on Ukraine in a matter of weeks, Marin pointed to the significance of being a fully fledged NATO member, rather than just a partner, which is its current status. “The difference between being a partner and being a member is very clear and will remain so,” Marin said. “There is no other way to have security guarantees than under NATO’s deterrence and common defense as guaranteed by NATO’s Article 5.” The alliance’s Article 5 embodies the principle of collective defense. In short, Article 5 means that an attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against all the allies.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 2nc – disinformation in Turkey

Russian disinformation in Turkey seeks to undermine NATO

Castello 18 (Katherine, defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, where her primary research areas include national and international security issues. Her background includes research on Turkish history, foreign policy, and popular culture, “Russia’s Use of Media and Information Operations in Turkey,” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE278.html)-AT

Russian media have sought to undermine Turkey's political and security cooperation with the United States and Europe by exacerbating mutual skepticism and highlighting policy differences. In Turkey, Russian media have also contributed to anti-American discourse and have reinforced and informed the Turkish government's own propaganda pursuits. This analysis assesses how Russia has used media and information operations to pursue its foreign policy goals related to Turkey. It examines Russian media responses to three significant events in Turkey: (1) Turkey's November 2015 shootdown of a Russian military aircraft, (2) the July 2016 Turkish coup attempt, and (3) the December 2016 assassination of the Russian ambassador. Russian media efforts following these events exemplify the propaganda strategies of amplification of genuine uncertainty, creation of opportunistic fabrications, and use of multiple contradictory narratives. These strategies have supported Russian foreign policy objectives, which include undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and fomenting mutual suspicion between Turkey and its Western allies; enlisting Ankara's support and impeding its opposition to Russian actions in Eurasia and the Middle East; and influencing Turkish internal political developments to make Turkey a more compliant partner. The U.S. government, NATO, and independent media watch groups should take steps to monitor Russian media efforts in Turkey and outside coverage of Turkey. In addition, the U.S. government, other governments, and media watch groups should continue to monitor Turkish government efforts to stifle independent media in the country and to create a propaganda arm that may emulate well-honed Russian practices.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 1nc - turn

Hypersonic missiles trigger arms race

Schwartz 21, (Mattathias Schwartz, senior correspondent at Insider, 6 Dec 2021 “Hypersonic missiles could start World War III — but that’s not the biggest threat they pose”, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-russia-have-deployed-hypersonic-missiles-2021-12)

It's April 2023. China is massing troops at the Taiwan Strait. Party leaders claim they're conducting a peaceful military exercise. But the National Security Agency has intercepted phone calls and texts from President Xi Jinping's inner circle that indicate an invasion is imminent. As a show of US resolve, President Joe Biden orders the USS Ronald Reagan, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier based in Japan, to a position just off Taiwan. It's a tense standoff. But neither Biden nor Xi wants a war. The two leaders schedule a virtual summit, in the hope that they can negotiate a peaceful resolution. Then, an hour before their call, Donald Trump — who's been named speaker of the House by the newly elected GOP majority — logs on to @SpeakerTrump and tweets: "I hereby declare WAR on China under Article One of the Constitution! Sorry, Xi! This is what happens when you don't return calls from America's REAL PRESIDENT. You have 24 hours to PERSONALLY guarantee Taiwan's freedom. -DJT" Almost immediately, Beijing's secure phone lines light up with reassurances from officials at the White House. Trump's declaration, they say, is nothing but political grandstanding. But Xi decides to treat the insult as an act of war. Two hours after Trump's tweet, the predawn sky above the Strait is broken open by a flash, followed by a series of sonic booms. In a fraction of a second, 20 dart-shaped projectiles rip through the Reagan's armored steel skin, traveling at upward of 5,000 mph. What's left of the carrier becomes a smoking inferno, flecked with radioactive chunks of uranium from the carrier's nuclear reactor. The impact destroys its complement of 90 fixed-wing jets and kills most of the 6,000 troops on board. What is this mysterious superweapon that just touched off World War III? In this imaginary scenario, the Reagan was sunk by a very real weapon: the DF-ZF, a hypersonic missile that can travel five times the speed of sound, striking targets from a distance of 3,400 miles. After being launched high into the atmosphere via a medium- or long-range ballistic rocket, the DF-ZF's arrowhead-shaped "glide vehicle" maneuvers on its own through the air before nosediving onto its target. You don't have to wait until 2023 to see the DF-ZF in the field. China has already included it in military parades and deployed it with active-duty units. While ballistic missiles travel in soaring, predictable parabolic arcs, like punted footballs, hypersonic missiles are more like speedy hockey pucks that keep low and change direction in an instant. The high velocity means more damage; the maneuverability and lower altitude make them harder to track and intercept. But for the Pentagon, the scariest thing about hypersonic weapons is that China and Russia have already deployed them in the field, while the United States is still developing them. Over the summer the Financial Times, citing anonymous Pentagon insiders, reported that China had fired a ballistic missile that released a hypersonic missile, which in turn jettisoned another projectile, possibly designed to foil a missile-defense system. In the grim humor of the arms-control world, this mysterious threefold weapon was dubbed the "turducken" missile. Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, likened the Chinese test to a "Sputnik moment" — a shocking public display of just how far America has fallen behind. There are reasons to be skeptical of Milley's assessment. Almost everything we know about hypersonic missiles comes to us from the nationalistic leaders of China and Russia, who like to exaggerate their strength for propaganda purposes, or the Pentagon, which has a long track record of exaggerating outside threats while seeking to bolster its funding. In an age when the US military is attempting to transition from the global war on terror to so-called great-power competition with China and Russia, hypersonics has become an appropriations buzzword. The Pentagon asked for $3.8 billion for its hypersonics programs in 2022, up from $2.6 billion in 2020. The military has a growing hypersonics bureaucracy that includes a hypersonics "war room," the Joint Hypersonics Transition Office, and a principal director for hypersonics. "The pursuit of a new technology can be as much about its marketability to congressional appropriators as it is about capabilities," says Cameron Tracy, a Stanford-affiliated scholar who has questioned the military benefit of hypersonics. "If you're the Department of Defense, your choice is between talking about a 50-year-old ballistic missile versus a hypersonic missile, where no one is really sure what it can do, and it sounds really cool. In that situation, you are incentivized to make it look as though we're behind." Resurrecting the logic of the Cold War For a while, the United States led the world in hypersonic-missile development. In 2003, George W. Bush asked the Pentagon to come up with a "Conventional Prompt Global Strike" — the ability to strike any target, anywhere, within minutes, even in places like Afghanistan that were far from US bases and nuclear submarines. By 2009, after a few years of research and testing, the Defense Science Board, which advises the Pentagon, came up with five "representative scenarios" for situations in which a hypersonic weapon might be used. Three involved terrorists or a "rogue state," like North Korea. Only one — an attempt to take out a US satellite — involved conflict with Russia or China. After that, funding for hypersonics dried up. The technology seemed to be a solution in search of a problem. There were certainly times when the US needed to hit distant targets fast, but old-fashioned subsonic Tomahawk missiles, or teams of Navy SEALs, could do the job just fine. But as China and Russia began making headway on their own programs, the rationale behind US hypersonics shifted. Before, hypersonic weapons were being developed for a specific mission. Now, the military argued, we needed them solely for the sake of keeping up with China and Russia. Michael Griffin, then the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, proclaimed that it was "among my very highest priorities" to develop hypersonic missiles to "hold China and Russia at risk in a corresponding manner." Griffin was dusting off the circular logic of the Cold War: We had to win the arms race because there was an arms race. China has been parading its new hypersonic weapons, including these DF-17 ballistic rockets that are equipped to deploy DF-ZF missiles at five times the speed of sound. It's worth remembering that during the Cold War, the Pentagon consistently overestimated the strength of Soviet forces, first with the bomber gap and then with the missile gap. In both cases, the US military got spooked by fragmentary intelligence and successful tests like Sputnik and succeeded in convincing itself that it was falling behind. In 1959, for instance, military sources warned respected Washington reporters that the Soviet Union was on the verge of having 100 intercontinental nuclear missiles, versus 30 in the American arsenal. In fact, by the end of 1960, the Soviets had deployed only two long-range nukes. The military's claims that it was losing the arms race were really justifications for accelerating it. Military insiders insist that this time, the threat is real. "In my previous job, I was cleared into everything," Mark J. Lewis, who oversaw DARPA as the Pentagon's acting deputy undersecretary for research and engineering, told me. "I can tell you definitively that the Chinese really are ahead." (Lewis now works at the National Defense Industrial Association, a non-profit trade group that represents military contractors.) China is said to have the capacity to hitch a hypersonic missile to a medium-range DF-17 ballistic rocket or a long-range DF-41, with or without a nuclear warhead. Russia has the long-range Avangard, another ballistic missile with a glide vehicle attached, and two hypersonic cruise missiles: the ship-launched Zircon (still under development) and the air-launched Kinzhal (already in the field). The most important question is: So what? Does it really matter whether China and Russia have hypersonic missiles that we don't? The United States still rules the world in the two military technologies that matter most: nuclear weapons and airpower. You might have heard, for instance, that China is seeking to triple its nuclear arsenal, to 1,000 warheads, by the end of this decade. It sounds scary — until you consider that the US already has nearly 4,000 warheads. In 2022, the United States plans to devote $768 billion to military spending. China is expected to spend less than half that amount; Russia less than a tenth. It's true that a hypersonic missile could take out an aircraft carrier, which poses a serious tactical problem. But that vulnerability alone does little to alter America's vast military superiority. The United States trembling at the prospect of a few hypersonic missiles is a bit like a teenage bully whining about a kindergartener with a spitball. More game adjuster than game changer The question of whether hypersonic technology poses some kind of new and disruptive threat hinges on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction — the idea that no country will ever use its stockpile of nuclear weapons because every country is unwilling to suffer the nuclear consequences. The doctrine has worked, so far, because no great power has the ability to knock out its rivals' nuclear arsenals fast enough to prevent them from being deployed. And while the US leads the world in missile defense, it's still a long way from being able to stop a massive nuclear attack by Russia or China, which further reduces the likelihood that anyone will ever use such weapons. Ironically, the US lead in missile defense is one reason that China and Russia have bet so heavily on long-range hypersonic missiles, which have the ability to carry a nuclear warhead. If the US defense system ever reaches the point at which it can stop every ballistic nuke, hypersonic missiles could offer an alternative. "They want a hedge," explains Tracy, the critic of hypersonics. But there is one crucial difference between the two technologies. Nuclear bombs were immediately recognized as a revolution in warfare. The significance of hypersonic weapons, by contrast, is still hotly debated. Skeptics argue that they don't accomplish much that isn't already possible using other weapons. Low-altitude ballistic missiles launched from submarines can deliver speed; MaRV-equipped missiles can deliver maneuverability. Tracy, along with David Wright of MIT, argue that hypersonic weapons will underperform their ballistic peers because of their lower trajectories, which create more friction with the atmosphere and heats up the missiles. Their findings have been contested by hypersonics boosters, who have access to the results of classified tests being conducted in 26 hypersonic wind tunnels scattered across the US. But whoever is right, the mere existence of a debate over the efficacy of hypersonic weapons suggests that comparisons to Sputnik and the Manhattan Project are a stretch. There is one area, at least, where hypersonic weapons could live up to their billing as a true revolution in warfare. For smaller, regional powers that can't match Russia or China's advantage in long-range ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons offer a relatively inexpensive on-ramp to war. India, France, and Japan have active hypersonics programs; Israel, South Korea, and Iran are said to have done basic research. Because there hasn't been much of a rush to curb the development of hypersonics through treaties and nonproliferation agreements, and because smaller countries lack the kind of special hotlines and de-escalation protocols that Russia and the US developed during decades of Cold War brinkmanship, it's not hard to imagine how the new technology could accelerate and intensify local conflicts. After all, our most recent brush with nuclear war didn't involve the US, China, or Russia. It was a fight between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir, in 1999. As the conflict escalated, Pakistan was said to be preparing to deploy nuclear weapons — until American intelligence found out and confronted it within hours of the discovery. But as hypersonic know-how continues to spread, through science and espionage, the window for breaking up a fight could get much shorter. In early December, India announced its first successful test-fire of the hypersonic BrahMos II cruise missile, which travels almost three times as fast as its supersonic predecessor. That means Pakistan would have less than 10 minutes to decide whether an incoming BrahMos II was carrying a nuclear warhead and, if so, how to respond. It may not matter so much if the US is "behind" in the race to develop a flashy but redundant class of weaponry. But the spread of hair-trigger missiles — conventional weapons that are unregulated by nuclear-arms treaties — is something worth worrying about.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 1nc - turn

Russia will use hypersonic missiles if Sweden and Finland join NATO

Faulconbridge 22, (Guy Faulconbridge, Author for Reuters, April 14, 2022, “Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO”, )

One of Russian President Vladimir Putin's closest allies warned NATO on Thursday that if Sweden and Finland joined the U.S.-led military alliance then Russia would deploy nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles in a European exclave. Finland, which shares a 1,300-km (810-mile) border with Russia, and Sweden are considering joining the NATO alliance. Finland will decide in the next few weeks, Prime Minister Sanna Marin said on Wednesday. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, said that should Sweden and Finland join NATO then Russia would have to strengthen its land, naval and air forces in the Baltic Sea. Medvedev also explicitly raised the nuclear threat by saying that there could be no more talk of a "nuclear free" Baltic - where Russia has its Kaliningrad exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. "There can be no more talk of any nuclear–free status for the Baltic - the balance must be restored," said Medvedev, who was Russian president from 2008 to 2012. Medvedev said he hoped Finland and Sweden would see sense. If not, he said, they would have to live with nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles close to home.

2022 CNDI Negative
Offense › Sweden/Finland Turn › 1nc - turn

Russia is pushing disinformation campaigns in Finland and Sweden – prevents them from joining NATO

Dragonfly 22, (Dragonfly's Security Intelligence & Analysis Service, 12 Apr 2022 “Finland / Sweden | Russian disinformation and cyber campaigns very likely”, )

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have prompted a near total shift in their foreign policies; we now assess that both are likely to apply to join NATO in the coming months. Disinformation campaigns in particular would fit with what is a tried-and-tested but rarely successful approach by Russia to divide society and polarise debates over contentious issues that threaten its national security. To reflect this, we have raised our cyber threat exposure levels for Finland and Sweden from high to severe. This does not mean that we anticipate the likelihood of a disruptive cyber incident on critical infrastructure in either country is elevated at present. But that in our assessment, the three indicators below are likely to increasingly play out in the coming months: Finland and Sweden have a high degree of diplomatic or military tensions with another country that has advanced offensive cyber capabilities (Russia). The Finnish and Swedish authorities have warned of the potential for offensive cyber and information operations in the coming months. There are early signs that Russia is engaged in active disinformation campaigns in Finland and Sweden. Accelerated accession plans Russia has repeatedly warned Finland and Sweden against joining NATO, threatening retaliation if they do. Russia already seems to be engaging in hostile activity against Finland. The Finnish government said that while the Ukrainian president was giving an online speech to its MPs on 8 April, DDoS attacks forced several government websites and services offline. The Finnish authorities have not attributed this to Russia or the groups it co-opts, but it did say that a Russian state aircraft was ‘suspected’ to have breached its airspace at the same time. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has incentivised Finland and Sweden to pursue NATO membership. Finland tabled a white paper on its ‘security environment’ in parliament yesterday, 13 April. And more than half of MPs would support a proposal to join NATO, according to local press reports. The Finnish prime minister yesterday said that a decision would be made ‘in weeks’. And the former prime minister has said the government could apply to NATO in May, ahead of the bloc’s summit in Madrid on 29-30 June. More surprising has been Sweden’s openness to NATO accession. According to sources in the governing party cited in the usually-reliable Svenska Dagbladet this week, the Swedish government plans to submit an application to join NATO in June, and accession appears to now have cross-party support. The Swedish prime minister had said on 8 March that a NATO bid ‘would further destabilise the security of this particular region of Europe’. While it is not clear what has prompted this apparent turn-around, the invasion of Ukraine has probably made Finland and Sweden now see being inside NATO as safer than outside of it. Divisive campaigns As part of attempts to influence and polarise debates on NATO accession, Russia is very likely to push disinformation campaigns and divisive messaging in Finland and Sweden in the coming months. The Swedish security police said last month that Russia’s goal is to keep it out of NATO, and that it tries to ‘influence decisions…and behaviours…in Sweden through misleading information’. Supo, the Finnish intelligence service, has assessed that Russian disinformation tactics could include the following: Claims of abuse or harassment of people with a ‘Russian background’ in Finland Blackmail of politicians Deep fake videos of ‘real people’ All of the above are tried-and-tested tactics by Russia, particularly in the Baltics. And there is clear precedent of Russia pursuing disinformation tactics in Finland and Sweden related to NATO. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs in 2017 said that the circulation of fake news, false documents and disinformation by Russia around that time was intended to influence public opinion and decision making in Sweden and to hinder the Swedish government’s ability to gain public support for its policies. The institute added that Russia’s goal was to ‘preserve the geo-strategic status quo’ by minimising NATO’s role in the Baltics and keeping Sweden out of the alliance. Pro-Russia media outlets and social media bots are highly likely to be the main source of divisive messaging and disinformation in Finland and Sweden in the coming months. Based on Russia’s past disinformation campaigns, probable narratives include the killing or raping of civilians by NATO member-state troops, corruption within the alliance and that NATO expansion is a threat to Russia. For the Kremlin, it seemingly views disinformation campaigns as a way to exacerbate societal divisions and destabilise its adversaries. Such campaigns are likely to be evident ahead of a general election in Sweden in September. Disinformation campaigns by Russia are unlikely to destabilise Finland or Sweden, such as by prompting unrest due to divisive messaging, let alone derail any NATO accession. Alleged Russian disinformation campaigns in the Baltics for example have failed at distorting public opinion on issues such as Russian language rights. And Russia seems to be losing the battle to reverse public support for NATO membership in Finland and Sweden; opinion polls cited in the press have suggested that 68% of Finns now support NATO membership, more than double the proportion prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Cyber campaigns Despite increasing Russian hostility towards Finland and Sweden, we doubt that Russian state-sponsored cyber groups are currently intent on disrupting critical systems in either country. Instead, they are likely to increase the scale of cyber activity in Finland and Sweden for intelligence collection, particularly around NATO accession, and launch technically unsophisticated attacks such as barrages of DDoS (as occurred on 8 April). The Finnish authorities have said Russia is ‘likely’ to expand its cyber and information ‘from Ukraine to the West’ and increase such operations against Finland in the coming months. There is a reasonable chance that hacktivist and criminal cyber groups supporting Russia will increasingly seek to target businesses in Finland and Sweden in the coming months. Several prominent malware and ransomware groups have intensified their attacks, mainly on Ukrainian networks, since the invasion of the country on 24 February. And while we have not seen such groups explicitly threaten Finnish or Swedish firms, some have expressed outright hostility towards the West. The potentially-high financial rewards for targeting firms in Finland and Sweden probably make them attractive for cyber extortion groups.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Solvency › 2nc – AI can’t solve

AI technology isn’t neutral – makes it unreliable to identify harmful information

Kelley 22 (Alexandra Kelley; JUNE 17, 2022; Alexandra Kelley reports on emerging technology for Nextgov. Her most recent post was covering breaking news for The Hill where she focused on a variety of quantitative subjects, including Big Tech and the economy, in addition to covering the coronavirus pandemic since late 2019. She graduated from Kenyon College in 2017, “The Federal Trade Commission sent a report to Congress detailing limitations artificial intelligence has in regulating disinformation and harmful online content.” )

The Federal Trade Commission issued a warning regarding the government’s use of artificial intelligence technology to fight disinformation, deepfakes, crime and other online concerns, citing the technology’s inherent limitations with bias and discrimination.Detailed in a report sent to Congress, officials at the FTC said that AI technology cannot play a neutral role in mitigating social problems online, specifically noting that using it in this capacity could give way to illegal data extraction from online users and conduct improper surveillance. “Our report emphasizes that nobody should treat AI as the solution to the spread of harmful online content,” said Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Samuel Levine. “Combatting online harm requires a broad societal effort, not an overly optimistic belief that new technology—which can be both helpful and dangerous—will take these problems off our hands.”The report specifically highlights the broadly rudimentary level this technology is at, mainly with the datasets AI algorithms run on not being representative enough to successfully identify harmful content. AI software developers’ biases are also likely to influence the technology’s decision-making, a longstanding issue within the AI industry. FTC authors also added that most AI programs cannot gauge context, further rendering it unreliable in distinguishing harmful content. “The key conclusion of this report is thus that governments, platforms and others must exercise great caution in either mandating the use of, or over-relying on, these tools even for the important purpose of reducing harms,” the report reads. “Although outside of our scope, this conclusion implies that, if AI is not the answer and if the scale makes meaningful human oversight infeasible, we must look at other ways, regulatory or otherwise, to address the spread of these harms. Another critical observation the FTC arrived at is that human intervention is still needed to regulate the AI features that may inadvertently target and censor the wrong content. Transparency surrounding how the technology is built, mainly within its algorithmic development, is also highly recommended. The report also noted that platforms and websites which host the circulation of harmful content should work to slow the spread of illegal topics or misinformation on their end. The FTC recommends instilling tools like downvoting, labeling or other targeting operations that aren’t necessarily AI-run censorship. “Dealing effectively with online harms requires substantial changes in business models and practices, along with cultural shifts in how people use or abuse online services,” the report concluded. “These changes involve significant time and effort across society and can include, among other things, technological innovation, transparent and accountable use of that technology, meaningful human oversight, global collaboration, digital literacy and appropriate regulation. AI is no magical shortcut.” The report stems from a 2021 law that asked the FTC to review how AI might be used to fight disinformation and digital crime. FTC Commissioners voted to send the report to Congress upon finalization in a 4-1 decision.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Solvency › 2nc – AI can’t solve

AI systems fail to accurately identify disinformation attacks – conflicting algorithm labels are too complicated

Wooley 20 (Samuel Wooley; January 8, 2020; an assistant professor at Moody School of Communication at the University of Texas-Austin, “We’re fighting fake news AI bots by using more AI. That’s a mistake,” )

When I was at the Oxford Internet Institute, meanwhile, we looked into how and whether Twitter bots were used during the Brexit debate. We found that while many were used to spread messages about the Leave campaign, the vast majority of the automated accounts were very simple. They were made to alter online conversation with bots that had been built simply to boost likes and follows, to spread links, to game trends, or to troll opposition. It was gamed by small groups of human users who understood the magic of memes and virality, of seeding conspiracies online and watching them grow. Conversations were blocked by basic bot-generated spam and noise, purposefully attached to particular hashtags in order to demobilize online conversations. Links to news articles that showed a politician in a particular light were hyped by fake or proxy accounts made to post and repost the same junk over and over and over. These campaigns were wielded quite bluntly: these bots were not designed to be functionally conversational. They did not harness AI. There will also need to be policies for handling situations in which an AI system makes exactly the wrong decision. Because of the limited data available in the early stages of a rapid disinformation attack, the need to quickly make a determination might lead an algorithm to invert truth and falsity and conclude that the disinformation is accurate and that the attempts to debunk it are themselves a disinformation attack. This is a less far-fetched outcome than it might initially appear to be. Algorithms, like the people who design them, can be influenced by a confirmation bias effect, leading to a boost in confidence in a wrong conclusion by selectively giving greater weight to inputs bolstering that conclusion. Particularly given the short time scales of rapid disinformation attacks, this could lead an algorithm to quickly converge on an incorrect conclusion that would need human intervention to identify and invert. For most topics and events, there simply won’t be the resources to supply staffing dedicated to individually monitoring each of the essentially limitless list of situations in which disinformation might arise. Attempts to use AI to identify disinformation will likely need to confront noisy data for the simple reason that intentional deception is involved. Most people who post an image of a car to the internet wouldn’t choose to label it “bicycle” just to throw off machine learning algorithms. But disinformation attacks will be associated with a set of conflicting claims about whether online statements are true. Returning to the Election Day example from above, in response to a tweet falsely stating that a polling location is closed, someone who has actually just voted at that location might reply with a tweet stating that the initial tweet is false and that the polling location was in fact open. That reply is, in effect, a label. An account controlled by the attackers might also reply to the initial tweet by asserting that it is true. That reply is also a label, though one that directly contradicts the reply from the real voter. Over short time scales, it would be exceedingly difficult for an algorithm—or a human—to know which label to trust. Responding quickly to disinformation thus requires addressing the twin hurdles of limited data and unreliable—and in some cases, intentionally wrong—labels of that data. This is especially true given that companies such as Facebook and Twitter operate globally; there are literally billions of accounts in nearly two hundred countries that could potentially be employed to disseminate disinformation. As a result, for the vast majority of instances of disinformation, human intervention at the social media companies will of necessity occur only after a problem is flagged either algorithmically or through manual reporting channels. Public policy will play a central role in both the human and technological aspects of the response to rapid disinformation attacks. At the technology level, policies will need to be embedded into the algorithms in relation to questions such as: What confidence level that a rapid disinformation attack is occurring should trigger notification to human managers that an activity of concern has been identified? Over what time scales should the AI system make that evaluation, and should that time scale depend on the nature and/or extent of the disinformation? For example, suspected disinformation regarding violence should clearly receive a higher priority for immediate resolution than disinformation associated with conflicting online characterizations of what a politician said at a recent campaign speech. Other questions that can drive policies to be embedded in AI disinformation detection systems include: Under what circumstances should an AI system preemptively shut down accounts suspected of originating a rapid disinformation attack? What types of autonomous actions, if any, should be taken to address posts from legitimate accounts that unwittingly contribute to propagating disinformation? Policy considerations will be an important driver for the human response as well. When an AI system identifies a potential rapid disinformation attack, managers at social media companies will need a set of guidelines for how to proceed. Policies can also guide the extent to which people at social media companies should arrange in advance to be “on call” to watch for rapid disinformation attacks. It is clear that for a short duration, high stakes events like a national election, social media companies will need to have people standing by ready to step in and address disinformation. For events in that category, the question is not whether disinformation will be present, but rather how much of it there will be, and how sophisticated the attacks will be.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Solvency › 1nc – AI can’t solve

The aff can’t solve - AI solutions cannot quickly identify disinformation attacks

Villasenor 20 (John Villasenor; November 23, 2020; a nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies and the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings. He is also a professor of electrical engineering, law, public policy, and management at UCLA, as well as co-director of the UCLA Institute for Technology, Law, and Policy. Villasenor’s work considers the technology, policy, and legal issues arising from key technology trends including the growth of artificial intelligence, the increasing complexity and interdependence of today’s networks and systems, and continued advances in computing and communications., “How to deal with AI-enabled disinformation,” )

One hurdle to any learning algorithm, whether supervised or unsupervised, is access to a sufficiently large set of training data. Information suitable for use as training data regarding a particular issue or question can take significant time to accumulate on social media. To be useful in AI systems for detecting disinformation, the data would in many (though not all) instances require at least some degree of manual coding at the outset. Such an approach works if the topic at issue is one—such as false claims regarding medical cures—for which the time over which it is important to continue to combat the disinformation is much longer than the time it would take to build and use a large set of training data. But it is far less effective for situations when disinformation defenses need to be deployed very quickly, and in which there will typically be a smaller amount of data that can be used as a basis for the algorithm to learn. Another issue, both in rapid and in less time-constrained attempts to identify disinformation, is the accuracy of the data labels on which an AI algorithm is relying during the learning process. “Noisy” data—data in which the labels are not necessarily accurate—is a well-known problem in machine learning. To take a simple example unrelated to disinformation attacks, consider a machine learning algorithm that is attempting to learn to automatically distinguish images of cars from images of bicycles. To do this, the algorithm might scour the internet and find millions of images that are labeled “car” and millions of other images labeled “bicycle.” In most cases, those labels will be correct. But in some instances, the labels will be incorrect; an image labeled “car” might show a truck, a bicycle, or content completely unrelated to vehicles. The higher the fraction of incorrect labels, the more difficult and slower it will be for the algorithm to learn to accurately distinguish between cars and bicycles. Working with noisy data is an active area of research, and there are emerging approaches that can help mitigate—though not completely eliminate—the loss in accuracy that results when a machine learning algorithm learns based data in which there a is substantive fraction of labeling inaccuracies.[8] Attempts to use AI to identify disinformation will likely need to confront noisy data for the simple reason that intentional deception is involved. Most people who post an image of a car to the internet wouldn’t choose to label it “bicycle” just to throw off machine learning algorithms. But disinformation attacks will be associated with a set of conflicting claims about whether online statements are true. Returning to the Election Day example from above, in response to a tweet falsely stating that a polling location is closed, someone who has actually just voted at that location might reply with a tweet stating that the initial tweet is false and that the polling location was in fact open. That reply is, in effect, a label. An account controlled by the attackers might also reply to the initial tweet by asserting that it is true. That reply is also a label, though one that directly contradicts the reply from the real voter. Over short time scales, it would be exceedingly difficult for an algorithm—or a human—to know which label to trust. Responding quickly to disinformation thus requires addressing the twin hurdles of limited data and unreliable—and in some cases, intentionally wrong—labels of that data. Responding quickly to disinformation thus requires addressing the twin hurdles of limited data and unreliable—and in some cases, intentionally wrong—labels of that data.” Researchers have recognized these issues and are developing new approaches that do not rely on a large set of pre-existing training data. In April 2020, a team of researchers from Microsoft and Arizona State University posted a pre-publication version of a paper[9] describing new results on techniques for quickly detecting fake news.[10] In the paper the authors note that traditional approaches to detecting fake news “rely on large amounts of labeled instances to train supervised models. Such large labeled training data is difficult to obtain in the early phase of fake news detection.”[11] To address this, the authors introduce a method that requires only a “small amount of manually-annotated clean data,”[12] which can be used to rapidly and automatically label a larger set of data based on posts and comments on news articles by social media users. User credibility is one of the factors considered in forming the labels. According to the authors, this approach “outperforms state-of-the-art baselines for early detection of fake news.”[13] Frameworks like this can not only help solve the problem of limited data, but could potentially also help mitigate labeling accuracy issues. As the above examples help to convey, one common theme in research addressing disinformation is the importance of measuring the credibility of online sources. Approaches to establish and then leverage credibility will be critical to quickly identifying truth in the presence of a well-constructed rapid disinformation attack. For instance, in the Election Day scenario, it would be advantageous to give high credibility weight to the social media accounts of local television and news stations and the reporters who work at those stations. That way, as soon as those stations are able to identify that the claims of closed polling places are false and disseminate that fact on social media, the AI system can calibrate truth and falsity and move to the next step of addressing the posts known to contain disinformation.[14] It is also important to recognize the limits of what AI can be expected to accomplish. Earlier this year, Samuel Woolley of UT Austin published an excerpt of his book “The Reality Game” in MIT Technology Review. In it, Woolley noted that “There simply is no easy fix to the problem of computational propaganda on social media.”[15] It would be unreasonable to expect any AI solution that will be available in the near future would be able to quickly and unambiguously identify a rapid disinformation attack. However, AI will certainly be able to provide insight into the dynamics of emerging disinformation attacks, pinpoint at least some of the social media accounts at the source, and compute confidence levels regarding the likely truth or falsity of a claim making the rounds on social media. After that, the response will need to be overseen by humans making decisions based on a combination of the AI outputs and guidance from policy frameworks.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Inherency › 2nc – Squo solves

The Rapid Alert System is currently in effect, progress reports are promising

Rankovic, ’19 (Didi Rankovic is an experienced online journalist, editor, and translator, with a career spanning over ten years writing for major a English-language website in Serbia, and previously working as translator for international organizations and peacekeepers in the Balkans. Rankovic is passionate about free and open source tech and is a head contributor for Reclaim The Net, focusing on lead stories., “The EU’s Rapid Alert System that shares info about “fake news” between member states is now in action”, Reclaim The Net, March 30, 2019, https://reclaimthenet.org/the-eus-rapid-alert-system-fake-news/)

The European Union (EU) is scrambling to establish tighter control of online information ahead of the elections in May for the European Parliament (EP). This effort requires cooperation from Big Tech and advertisers – who must keep “fake news” at bay, or risk EU regulation – and cooperation with partners such as NATO and G7. The Rapid Alert System, late last year, whose declared goal is to allow EU member-states to “share information on ongoing foreign disinformation campaigns with one another, and coordinate responses,” has now come into effect. Specifically, the foreign information threat the EU is looking to shield itself from is Russia, and “pro-Kremlin” disinformation. After the 2016 US presidential elections, Hillary Clinton’s campaign and supporters never accepted her defeat as the choice of American voters – but rather the result of American voters being manipulated by Russia. Russia continues to deny these accusations, but ever since the big US election upset that saw Donald Trump become president, there have been attempts, to various degrees successful, to pin the outcome of every election and referendum in the western world that didn’t quite go the establishment’s way on Russia’s malign influence. This includes Brexit, the UK’s vote to leave the EU. Addressing the European Data Protection and Privacy Conference, EU Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society Mariya Gabriel has now offered some into the way the new system is set up and meant to function. Gabriel mentioned that US tech and social media giants and advertisers have signed up to the . Under the code, these companies are expected to cut off revenue streams to suspected offenders, remove their accounts, promote news from sources viewed favorably, and ensure more transparency when it comes to political advertising. “In view of the European Parliament elections, Google and Facebook are providing training to candidates, political parties and campaigners on how to manage their online presence and on how to protect their campaigns,” Gabriel revealed during her keynote speech. But that’s not all – since late 2018, Twitter, Facebook, and Google have been reporting to the EU on a monthly basis on the progress they made in implementing this voluntary, and self-regulatory, code. The last such “progress report” showed promise, the EU official said – but warned that “we are not yet there.” And while these companies have all implemented “a tool to monitor political ads” – not everyone is moving fast enough to remove unwanted accounts. YouTube, for example, reported removing 600,000 in February alone – but the commissioner admitted the EU is not sure if their offense was of political or commercial nature. Facebook is yet to report its latest figures – while Twitter reported “nothing” – said Gabriel. The European Commission has also enlisted help from “independent and researchers to detect and expose disinformation campaigns across social networks,” Gabriel said. On the member-states’ side, “election cooperation networks” have been put in place to swiftly detect “potential threats,” she explained. In the context of the initiative, the commissioner made special emphasis on data protection and privacy, linking the issue with political disinformation campaigns. Advertisers, ISPs, insurers and others collecting and misusing personal data in order to sell “shoes and cars” is one thing – but what if the same techniques are used by (bad) governments and those with vested political interest? Gabriel differentiated between “legitimate” political processing of online users’ data, and that which brings with it “serious risks” to privacy and trust in the democratic process. According to Gabriel, EU citizens are given protection in both scenarios by the GDPR and the e-Privacy Regulation. The GDPR stands for “General Data Protection Regulation” – a piece of legislation in place since 2018 that is seen as having good intent to give users more protection and control over their own data, but has also . However, Gabriel praised it as having become a global standard in just under a year, and spoke strongly in favor of a “transparent, fair and lawful” manner of data collection and processing. It’s hard to assess how effective the EU’s move to introduce these measures can and will be, but it seems unlikely to backfire as a political initiative. If the EP elections produce a status-quo, the EU could blame Russia for trying, while giving itself a pat on the back for a job well done in blocking Moscow’s interference. In the reverse scenario, the EU could blame Russia for succeeding – and push for even more regulation, more self-regulation from tech companies, and more money paid by EU member-states towards the budget of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – the implementer of the Rapid Alert System.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Inherency › 2nc – Squo solves

NATO utilizes a strategy of communication and clarity to counter misinformation now

NATO, 20 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization informational website, “NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19”, NATO, Last updated: 17 Jul. 2020 14:12, )

NATO Engages NATO’s communications are based on real actions and facts. NATO and Allied armed forces have played a key role in supporting civilian efforts to fight COVID-19, with some 350 flights delivering hundreds of tons of critical supplies, the construction of almost 100 field hospitals, and almost half a million troops across the Alliance securing borders, transporting patients and helping with testing. To ensure NATO is prepared for a possible second wave of COVID-19, Allies have agreed a new plan, a new stockpile of medical equipment, and a new fund for the quick acquisition of medical supplies. Many Allies have already offered to donate to the stockpile and contribute to the fund. This is a clear sign of Alliance unity and solidarity. The practical support provided by NATO Allies to other Allies, as well as partners, has underpinned NATO’s communications on COVID-19. NATO views fact-based, credible communications as the best way of countering disinformation. This is based on the Alliance’s core values of democracy, freedom of speech and the rule of law. Engaging the public and building resilience over the medium to long term is the most effective way to inoculate people against disinformation. NATO will continue to expose disinformation through a wide range of media engagements including statements, rebuttals and corrections, and briefings to inform a wide variety of audiences about disinformation and propaganda, as it has since before the pandemic. To meet the challenges of the current crisis, NATO has: Intensified digital communications on the pandemic response across all platforms. Ongoing COVID-19 related information and news stories can be found at . To shape the policy debate, NATO has turned public diplomacy face to face events into online engagements. Communications in Russian have been enhanced. This include articles, translations of factsheets, such as Russia’s 5 myths about NATO and COVID-19 , and videos on our Russian language YouTube channel. To reach a broader audience, NATO routinely translates content into a range of languages. NATO supports the work of independent NGOs, think tanks, academics, fact-checking organisations and other civil society initiatives to promote debate and to build resilience. A pluralistic, independent media sector also plays an important role in countering disinformation and conveying factual information to the public. NATO engages with media to provide timely information on its response to COVID-19 to a potential audience of hundreds of millions of people. NATO has conducted briefings to media in multiple countries, including Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine and the Western Balkans region, focusing on disinformation and NATO’s contribution to the fight against COVID-19. Coordination: Working with partners Coordination with partners and international institutions underpins both the Understand and Engage strands of NATO’s response to disinformation. It is particularly important when dealing with a rapidly evolving crisis such as COVID-19. To identify, analyse and counter disinformation, NATO works with the European Union through the European External Action Service and the European Commission, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the United Nations and its Verified campaign and the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center. NATO’s active public diplomacy outreach and cooperation with partners globally strengthens our collective ability to address the challenge of disinformation.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Inherency › 2nc – Squo solves

NATO checks cyber disinformation now

NATO 20 (NATO; 17 Jul. 2020, “NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19,” )

NATO has demonstrated that it can sustain its operations, missions and activities, and maintain readiness despite the pandemic. The Alliance is now preparing for a possible second wave of COVID-19 with an operation plan, a stockpile of medical supplies and funding, while also strengthening the resilience of our societies. That is because international organisations such as NATO, as well as NATO Allies and partners, have faced a proliferation of disinformation, propaganda and misinformation during the pandemic. NATO views disinformation as the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead. Disinformation seeks to deepen divisions within and between Allied nations, and to undermine people’s confidence in elected governments. The Alliance has been dealing with these challenges since its inception and has been actively countering a significant increase in disinformation and propaganda since Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Ukraine, in 2014. NATO has intensified efforts to counter disinformation, following clear direction from Allied Heads of State and Government in the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, which stated: “We face hybrid challenges, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities.” In 2019, in their London Declaration, Allied Heads of State and Government said that NATO is “strengthening [its] ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies.” NATO is responding in a unified manner, working in close cooperation with Allies and partners. NATO acts in a measured and responsible way, countering disinformation with fact-based, credible public communications. NATO publicly refutes false claims, debunks the main disinformation narratives aimed at the Alliance and coordinates to share information, insight and best practice. NATO also works with the European Union, the United Nations, the G7 and civil society to counter disinformation. A free and independent media is the best response to disinformation and propaganda, with journalists free to ask tough questions and check their sources. COVID-19 has focused the attention of many to the ongoing challenge of disinformation, propaganda and misinformation and the potential harm it can inflict. In a pandemic, facts and clear communications can save lives. They are essential to maintain public safety and uphold NATO’s shared values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. By working together, NATO Allies and partners are making our societies more resilient and our people safer. NATO’s approach to countering disinformation involves a twin-track model, focused on the ‘Understand’ and ‘Engage’ functions. The Understand function encompasses Information Environment Assessments, which regularly track, monitor and analyse information relevant to NATO’s mission. This enables NATO to evaluate the effectiveness of its communications. The Engage function embeds these insights, enabling NATO to tailor its strategic communications where it will most effectively counter disinformation. NATO’s communications are fact-based, timely, transparent and coordinated. This allows NATO to have an impact in a contested information space. Coordination with Allies and partners is the cornerstone of all NATO’s work both to understand the information environment and to engage audiences. This is particularly important when dealing with a fast-moving crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. It is crucial for NATO that nations, other international organisations, such as the EU, as well as civil society and the private sector, work together to build resilience in our societies.

2022 CNDI Negative
Solvency Answers › Inherency › 1nc – Squo solves

NATO already has multiple means of countering disinformation, including set processes and widescale strategies to ensure response

Robbins ’20 (Joseph Robbins (PhD, Texas Tech University) is the political science department head at Valdosta State University. His research examines Post-Communist party system development and, more recently, the consequences of terrorist attacks; his research has been published in journals such as Armed Forces & Society; Comparative Politics; Comparative Political Studies; Conflict, Security, and Development; Electoral Studies; Global Policy; the Journal of East European and Asian Studies; the Journal of Peace Research; Legislative Studies Quarterly; Party Politics; and Terrorism & Political Violence), “Countering Russian Disinformation”, from “The Diversity of Russia’s Military Power,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020) ,

Recognizing this threat, in 2018 the European Council endorsed a plan to counter Russian cyber threats, which included the creation of the Rapid Alert System.139 It serves as a clearinghouse of sorts for member states to share information and concerns regarding suspected disinformation campaigns and to discuss “best practices” in responding to these malicious campaigns. The RAS then shares authoritative accounts in response to false or misleading messaging that can be disseminated by the EU member states, civil society groups, and social media companies. This mechanism has been used against Covid-19 disinformation campaigns that have spread harmful information regarding the pandemic and dangerous or unproven remedies to the disease.140 As a multilateral, multilevel organization, the RAS has great potential to help counter Russian disinformation campaigns but it has been hampered by inconsistent participation by members, uneven real-time responses to threats, and concerns over ideologically motivated responses.141 NATO has also been targeted by Russian disinformation, as the Kremlin looks to sow discord and fuel animus toward the organization amid the Covid-19 pandemic.142 False stories were spread regarding NATO’s intent to withdraw troops from Lithuania, Canadian troops allegedly exposing Latvia to the virus, and a Polish military official reportedly criticizing U.S. military forces. These stories aim to undermine NATO’s legitimacy and support as well as weaken individual member states. Back in 2008, Estonia led a NATO effort to create the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) following Russia’s 2007 massive cyberattack on the Baltic nation. The CCDCOE consists of 28 member states, including the Czech Republic and Estonia, and supports a comprehensive strategy to counter cyber threats. The CCDCOE supports its mission through interdisciplinary methods to study, train, and organize exercises to fortify cyber defense. Its Locked Shields exercise is one such example of how it promotes cyber defense across teams to ensure that experts and decisionmakers are working together on these threats.143 These efforts extend beyond disinformation alone but can contribute to ongoing efforts to curtail this influence. NATO has employed other efforts to counter disinformation. In addition to CCDCOE’s work, STRATCOM aims to raise awareness of information operations and refute misleading or false claims. Its analytical reports summarize tactics, messaging, and targets of Russian disinformation.144 The organization mobilized in earnest in the wake of the Crimean annexation and since 2014 has expanded its efforts to help NATO members identify false or misleading narratives, recognize networked or coordinated Russian media activity, and increase audience resilience when targeted by the Kremlin.145 STRATCOM’s coordinated efforts are vitally important to enhance the collective security of its member states and to counter disinformation efforts levied against NATO as a whole Conclusion This article underscores a few effective methods to counter disinformation operations at both the national and international levels. Estonia’s use of real-time volunteer forces along with the Czech Republic’s BIS and think tanks are useful in naming and shaming Russia’s digital active measures. Meanwhile, Estonia’s use of government-sanctioned programming can help shape the broadcast conversation, thus countering channels like RT, which further harmful narratives. The NATO and EU responses to Russia’s ongoing efforts to sow discord offer some useful suggestions for moving forward. These organizations have created task forces and organizations that, collectively, reveal a holistic framework that can help uncover subversive efforts, coordinate a cogent response, and promote multilateral collaboration. With additional buy-in from EU and NATO members, these efforts will evolve and strengthen the response to disinformation operations.