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2022 CNDI Topicality
NATO

Aff must fiat proposal. Normal means is that the proposal goes to the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council.

Michel 2006 Leo. "NATO Decisionmaking: How the “Consensus Rule” Works." Croatian International Relations Review 12, no. 42/43 (2006): 7-14.

Although international security affairs cognoscenti often refer to the NATO consensus rule, the North Atlantic Treaty does not specify how collective decisions are to be made, with one exception: the Article 10 provision that "unanimous agreement" is necessary to invite a state to join the Alliance. Absent any explicit voting procedure, NATO has developed a set of customary practices. Most decisions are based on draft proposals circulated to all Allies by the Secretary General, who chairs the North Atlantic Council (NAC), or by the chairperson of one of the hundreds of NATO committees and working groups.' These draft proposals may be initiated by the Secretary General, the IS, or individual Allies. Written proposals generally are preceded by consultations in a variety of forums, including bilateral or multilateral discussions in allied capitals, Allied missions at NATO Headquarters, the NAC, and committees and working groups established by the NAC. Such consultations are useful indeed, in some cases they are critical-to identify possible concerns or objections among Allies and to craft mutually acceptable solutions. When a written decision or statement of position is deemed necessary, it frequently occurs that some or all of the Permanent Representatives (Perm Reps) cannot provide their respective national positions at the conclusion of a specific AC or committee meeting. In such cases, the Secretary General or relevant committee chairperson may opt to circulate the draft proposal under a silence procedure.' If no Ally "breaks silence"-that is, notifies the IS in writing of its objection before the deadline set by the Secretary General or committee chairperson-the proposal is considered approved. However, if one or more Ally breaks silence, the proposal is normally referred back to the relevant body for further work to reach consensus. As a rule, NATO does not publicly identify which countries break silence, although national positions may be leaked to the press (sometimes by the country breaking silence) if the issue is contentious. Moreover, as there is no formal voting procedure, there is no formal abstention procedure, either.

2022 CNDI Topicality
NATO

Must be North Atlantic Council

NATO handbook 2006 [https://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006/Part2.pdf]

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of permanent representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving foreign ministers, defence ministers or heads of state and government, but it has the same authority and powers of decisionmaking, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance’s policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of NATO. The Council is the only body within the Alliance which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Many committees and planning groups have since been created to support the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters. The Council thus provides a unique forum for wide-ranging consultation between member governments on all issues affecting their security and is the most important decision-making body in NATO. All member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views round the Council table. Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by common consent. All member governments are party to the policies formulated in the Council or under its authority and share in the consensus on which decisions are based.

2022 CNDI Topicality
NATO

NATO is a consensus based alliance – individual countries belong to NATO, but are not NATO itself.

Masters 2022 [Jonathan, “What is NATO” via Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-nato#chapter-title-0-4]

Headquartered in Brussels, NATO is a consensus-based alliance in which decisions must be unanimous. However, individual states or subgroups of allies can initiate action outside NATO’s auspices. For instance, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom began policing a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone in Libya in early 2011 and, within days, transferred command of the operation to NATO once  had been allayed. Member states are not required to participate in every NATO operation; Germany and Poland declined to contribute directly to the campaign in Libya.

NATO’s military structure comprises two strategic commands: the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located near Mons, Belgium, and the Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia. The supreme allied commander Europe oversees all NATO military operations and is always a U.S. flag or general officer; U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters currently holds this position. Although the alliance has an integrated command, most forces remain under their respective national authorities until NATO operations commence.

2022 CNDI Topicality
Security Cooperation

1NC - Training and Interoperability are not topical under security cooperation

Bowne ’18 [Andrew 2018 Military Law Review, “Defending the New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against the Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147]

Despite bipartisan criticism of the perceived lack of funding from other NATO members, the United States still recognizes that its leadership in the Alliance is vital to its own national security. 78 There are clear benefits to combined defense in terms of national security, foreign relations, and the economy, 79 placing U.S. funding of NATO at the intersection of foreign and domestic policy. While the President has constitutional authority in defense, as the Commander-in-Chief, and to enter into agreements with foreign states, 80 Congress can affect both defense and foreign affairs through its power of the purse. 81 Accordingly, this section analyzes the reflection of U.S. foreign and defense policies through Congressional authorizations and appropriations that affect the implementation of Operation Atlantic Resolve's lines of operation, particularly in increasing interoperability and improving the defense capacity of the Baltic States. 82

A. Congress's Role in Funding NATO Operations

2022 CNDI Topicality
Security Cooperation

Isn’t security assistance – different agencies in the USFG.

CRS 2016 [“DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues” 23 August 2016 https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160823_R44602_e41f79489b9b3f8686a73d6ff65b2dcb9b696ba2.pdf]

"Security assistance" and "security cooperation" are two terms that refer to U.S. activities to train, equip, and otherwise assist foreign partners. The term security assistance is a generic term used throughout the U.S. government to describe assistance provided to foreign military and security forces, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. However, DOD uses the term security assistance to refer specifically to assistance provided under Title 22 authority, funded with monies appropriated to the State Department and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), an agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy.3

DOD defines "security cooperation" as a broad set of activities undertaken by DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Included in the definition are DOD interactions with both foreign defense and foreign nonmilitary security establishments. Security cooperation includes all DOD-administered security assistance programs that (1) build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.4 According to DOD, security assistance is a subset of DOD's security cooperation portfolio.

2022 CNDI Topicality
Security Cooperation

Building capacity means developing capabilities, integrating developed military capabilities, employing capabilities, and maintainence.

https://www.dsca.mil/50th-anniversary/institutional-capacity-building

 (ICB) programs, overseen by DSCA, encompass Security Cooperation activities that directly support U.S. ally and partner nation efforts to improve security sector governance and core management competencies necessary to effectively and responsibly achieve shared security objectives. Understanding an ally or partner’s institutional capacity is critical to the development of a full-spectrum approach to Security Cooperation.  A Full-Spectrum approach assists allies and partners by ensuring they have all that is necessary and sufficient to successfully perform a security role in support of shared objectives. ICB assists allies and partners in examining and addressing broader, systemic factors essential to delivering what is needed (e.g., money, things, people, ideas, decisions) to:

Understand requirements, develop forces, and purchase or obtain the articles and services as required to develop, employ, and sustain required capabilities;

2022 CNDI Topicality
Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is security assistance, combined exercises, international arms cooperation, and information sharing

***SC = security cooperation, PN = Partner Nation

Scott 2017 [Kevin D., “Security Cooperation” 23 May 2017 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff”

SC encompasses all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable PNs to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › NATO Good › Prevents Russian Expansion --- 2AC

NATO division is good for Russia.

Emily Stewart 19 [Staff writer Vox. “Trump has reportedly discussed withdrawing from NATO. That would be great for Russia.” January 15, 2019. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/15/18183759/trump-pull-out-of-nato-nyt-mattis]

Trump’s antipathy toward NATO is a good thing for Russia, whether he ultimately withdraws from the agreement (which would require a one-year notification period and likely see pushback from Congress) or not. Moscow benefits from divides between the US and Europe, and Putin has been trying to undermine ties between the two for years.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › NATO Good › Prevents Russian Expansion --- 2AC

American power in Europe protects it from Russian encroachment and eastern European nuclear proliferation.

Hal Brands 3-13 [Hal Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US foreign policy and defense strategy. Concurrently, Dr. Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. Dr. Brands has previously worked as special assistant to the secretary of defense for strategic planning and lead writer for the National Defense Strategy Commission. “Putin’s Biggest Lie: Blaming NATO for His War”. March 13, 2022. https://www.aei.org/op-eds/putins-biggest-lie-blaming-nato-for-his-war/]

The argument isn’t wholly wrong. Putin’s wars are indeed meant, in part, to push Western influence back from Russia’s frontiers. But the idea that NATO expansion is the root of today’s problems is morally and geopolitically bizarre.

Far from being a historic blunder, NATO expansion was one of the great American successes of the post-Cold War era. Far from being the act of a domineering superpower, it was part of a long tradition of vulnerable states begging to join America’s liberal empire. And far from posing a mortal threat to Moscow, NATO enlargement actually provided Russia with far greater security than it could have provided itself.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › NATO Good › Impact

Collapse of NATO causes increased Russia aggression and terrorism, economic collapse, and more.

Hans Binnendijk 19 [Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as senior director for defense policy on the Clinton administration’s National Security Council. “5 consequences of a life without NATO”. March 19, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/]

The most catastrophic impact of NATO’s retirement would be the risk of Russian aggression and miscalculation. Without a clear commitment to defend allied territory backed up by an American nuclear deterrent, President Vladimir Putin will certainly see opportunities to seize land he believes is Russian. He has already done this in Georgia and Ukraine. Had they not joined NATO, the Baltic states would probably already be occupied by Russian troops. Certainly Putin would also see an opportunity to seize more of Ukraine without the “shadow” of NATO to protect it.

History teaches us that major wars start when aggressive leaders miscalculate. German leader Adolf Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, believing that after then-British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement, England would be unlikely to respond. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 after the United States appeared to remove Seoul from its defensive perimeter. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, believing the United States had signaled that it would not respond.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt › Turn – Gender Essentialism

Feminist international relations impose the idea of “gender” being based upon the “heteronormative binary”.

Chamindra Weerawardhana 2017 – Political analyst, PhD in Comparative Politics at Queen's University Belfast, Research in conflict management in deeply divided societies with a special focus on Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. “Profoundly Decolonizing?: Reflections on a Transfeminist Perspective of International Relations”.

The field of feminist security studies highlights how “security” is interrelated to issues of gender and sex in many important ways (Wibben and Stern 2014; Hudson 2011, 586; see also Sjoberg 2009; Sjoberg and Martin 2010). Although feminist security studies strongly challenges the dominant, repressive, and invariably patriarchal ways in which national security, international security coalitions, foreign policy priorities, and defence mechanisms are conceived, it is a considerably “restrictive” field. Publications in journals such as Politics and Gender demonstrate that the near-totality of contributors are cis, white, able-bodied women in Western academia. Feminist security studies focuses invariably on the gender binary, thereby limiting its brand of feminism to cis (and largely white) able-bodied women. It is a field that seldom accommodates a diversity of perspectives or includes voices of women of color, Indigenous women, or Trans and queer feminist scholars and activists. This approach to feminist security studies perpetuates a cycle of exclusion and exceptionalism, adjudicating on who gets to articulate what in the field, and who gets academic credence as a “feminist.” Concluding an article on feminist security studies, Hudson (2011, 589) calls upon fellow academics in that research area to avoid inflicting unto others what has been done unto them in the past in the form of exclusionary practices and in defining the boundaries of feminist security studies to say who is in and who is out. In terms of theorizing, critical voices on the potential of feminist security studies to engage with and destabilize gendered power relations are receiving increasing scholarly attention (see, e.g., Åhäll 2016). Yet even such critical voices take a considerably cisgender feminist turn, with subjective and restrictive interpretations of what is implied by “feminist.” In Practice: The Gender Binary as the Status Quo in International Politics The consequences of mostly whitefeminist theorizing of international relations and security studies can be observed in the agendas and targets of supranational organizations, regional bodies, and powerful governments. The UN’s gender policies and strategic goals, as well as those of powerful governments, are structured in a way that perpetuates gender-related conservatisms and norms, which, to borrow from Ahmed (2016, 23), are also heteronorms. The UN’s concept of gender mainstreaming involves ensuring that the goal of gender equality is made central to all activities—policy development, research, advocacy, legislation, resource allocation, planning, implementation, and monitoring of programs and projects (UN Women, n.d.). Many scholars of feminist IR have explored challenges and inconsistencies in the way in which gender mainstreaming is perceived by the UN and other supranational bodies (see, e.g., Youngs 2008; Daly 2005; Rees, 2005; Walby 2005; Perrons, 2005; Beveridge and Nott 2002; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; True 2003, 2009, 2010). Gender mainstreaming, as it is practiced by the international community, persistently interprets “gender” around the “heteronormative binary” (see Zalewski 2010, 21–22) and consequently regularly ignores interfaces between race, sex, gender, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and power (25; see also Jauhola 2010). Today, UN bodies have begun to pay increased attention to Transgender issues through their emphasis on sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC), especially in collaboration with platforms such as the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Association (ILGA). However, the overall ethos of such engagements continues to be somewhat inconsistent, in that they fail to acknowledge the salient reality that anti- Trans discrimination—if not discrimination against gender identities that do not fall within the binary—is inherently linked to misogyny, patriarchal oppression, and inequities that are at the heart of gender-related oppression, which especially take their toll on underprivileged cis women of color in the Global South, Indigenous peoples across the world, and also women from ethnic minorities in the West.10 In a similar vein, the UN’s women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda is also essentially founded not only upon a narrow and restrictive understanding of gender(s) fixed on the gender binary, but also on the basis of stereotyping (cisgender) women as the vulnerable “other.” Even when discussing women affected by armed conflict, WPS resolutions locate the (cisgender) male soldier as the ultimate referent (Jansson and Eduards 2016, 12). A fast-growing body of work examines the rationale and problems of implementing WPS resolutions (Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Farr 2011; Barnes 2011; Harrington 2011; Reeves 2012; Adrian-Paul 2012). Scholars of feminist security studies have also critically engaged with the WPS agenda (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Schnabel and Tabyshalieva 2012; Boyd 2014). Critics highlight that Resolution 1325 does not confront the structural roots of gender inequalities, including entrenched understandings of patriarchy, masculinity, and militarized power (Barnes 2011). Resolution 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions (including Resolution 2122 of 2013) largely perceive women through a prism of wartime victimhood (see, e.g., Meger 2016). This logic locates the cis male soldier as the agent of preventing violence against women, and, as scholars have repeatedly pointed out, legitimizes military activity once sexual violence against women is addressed. In sum, the UN’s conception of gender equates cis women and cisnormative femininity with peace and is entrenched in cisnormative gender stereotypes (Shepherd 2008). This reading of women in contexts of armed conflict fails to identify patriarchy as the primary cause of violence against women, which prevents UN resolutions from consistently addressing the exclusion of women and gender-plural people from conflict management initiatives. It also prevents supranational bodies (and governments) from focusing on a logic of addressing the visceral excesses of patriarchal attitudes and developing a consistent logic of women’s empowerment, especially in post-war contexts in the Global South. The problems inherent in the WPS agenda and gender mainstreaming primarily stem from the fact that the very authority that drafts these policy guidelines is also one that is largely spearheaded by influential states with power acquired through centuries of colonization, and by white settler-controlled authorities that are squarely responsible for the human, socioeconomic, cultural, and linguistic genocide of First Peoples, especially women and gender-plural peoples of Turtle Island and elsewhere. Since its inception, the UN has proved to be incapable of addressing atrocities committed by these powers upon non-white peoples. Western superpowers have carte blanche on the international sphere, often justifying their military aggressions and violence in foreign lands on the basis of protectionist discourses along (cis)gender faultlines, such as the often-repeated “objective” of protecting “women and children,” echoing a discourse of masculinist protectionism built upon a patriarchal and hence patronizing understanding of democratic citizenship and world politics. In the face of such discourses, the UN has been conspicuously silent and partaking in the agendas of Western powers. This calls into question the UN’s capability, in its present form, of addressing the challenges facing women/gender minorities in contexts of armed conflict and natural disaster. An effective strategy must be grounded in the recognition of a broader understanding of gender beyond the binary, and a decolonizing logic of empowering cis and Trans women and all other gender-plural people. Most importantly, such an approach must profoundly challenge the logics of warfare as articulated by powerful states and ensure that women and gender-plural people occupy frontline roles in all aspects of conflict management and resolution initiatives. It is in articulating a policy perspective of this nature, with decolonizing, equity, justice, and empowerment at the center, that a Transfeminist approach to IR will gain prime significance. As outlined below, key ideas in Transfeminism, when applied to IR, provide a promising avenue to develop a strongly intersectional, feminist, Global South(s)-focused and decolonizing twenty-first-century perspective on world politics.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt › Turn – Gender Essentialism

Traditional feminist understandings habitually entrench wester notions of gender

Underwood 16— B.A. International Studies, The Ohio State University (Jasmine, “FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND “EPISTEMIC BLANK SPOTS”: ENTRENCHING HEGEMONY?,” Wright State University Graduate School, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=wright1484344418762762&disposition=inline)

The basic task of dismantling and decentering the current theoretical paradigms of mainstream IR by challenging its “western” origins served as the foundation to call into question the supposed objectivity of knowledge developed within the boundaries of this discipline (Sign Systems, and Knowledge). This ultimately leads to deconstruction of the masculinities, and consequently, the femininities derived from mainstream IR, which challenges the universalism of its principles. These principles are the basis under which knowledge is disseminated within the field and they dominate the ways in which we think about the world. Thus, to deconstruct and challenge these principles then “problematizes” all of the concepts and practices derived from them. When considering how feminist IR challenged and problematized development, this served as the basis for the building tasks of practices and politics. While international relations and the international system advocate for development as benevolent, in practice, this concept has been enacted (at times) with various self-interested outcomes by those in positions of power. Tickner pointedly referred to development as a “western project” and other theorists critiqued the western frame of development models and practices. Furthermore, if one thinks about the politics of development, this concept is complexly used to withhold social goods such as foreign aid or development assistance. The buildings tasks of relationships, identities, and connections are closely intertwined and dependent upon each other, especially in feminist IR. The literature also challenged, developed, and weaved together the various aspects of identity of women around the world. Challenging the views of women in the developing world also involved challenging how women in the developed world view their own status and position. Take, for example, the concepts of complicity and insider/outsider identities. The feminist IR literature strongly asserted that through actions such as underpaid household labor or unfair labor practices used to produce 57 globally-shipped goods (e.g. buying items produced in sweatshops) women have participated in aspects of patriarchy that disadvantage others. Another example is “femocrats” or women in power who condone—or even advocate—certain policies that are steeped in hegemonic masculinity, such as war. These are women that have upheld certain aspects of patriarchy because it is beneficial to maintaining their own power. Thus, it forces women in the developed world to think about their relationship and connection to their counterparts in developing countries, particularly in ways that do not create them as abstract figures. If these women are oppressed, if they are “third world”; if they are disadvantaged, then, those in the “first world” are not disconnected from their position. This oppression did not—and does not—happen by coincidence. Women in the First World/developed countries/Global North bear some responsibility, whether implicitly or explicitly, in maintaining the disadvantaged social status of those outside the west. Furthermore, an interesting aspect of this analysis of feminist IR literature was not in how these pieces talked about women in developing countries or the “Third World,” but in how these women weren’t spoken about. Not in terms of making them invisible, but in not attempting to describe them; not attempting to speak for them, but straying away from one-dimensional or homogenized views of their lives. It seemed that the goal was simply to “trouble” the existing images and ways in which we think about these women and their lives. The task was not necessarily to describe, but instead, to deconstruct. Perhaps, this was a method to counter existing, problematic narratives, but without co-opting the stories of marginalized women for scholarly purposes. The previously identified themes and categories will be carried forward to the second part of the discourse analysis on policy literature. The purpose of the next chapter is to see if any of 58 these objects in feminist IR literature have influenced and/or appear in the discourse of international women’s development policy. Summary When looking at the overall discourse of feminist IR literature, the not only stresses the idea of adding women to IR, but which women are added and whose voices are heard. This is disruptive to the discipline because of its agendered assumptions. The texts repeatedly and purposefully situate gender and international relations within a western context, to serve as a reminder that the international system has a specific sociocultural frame. This creates situated identities within this frame that may have been imposed upon individuals, particularly women in the “Third World”/ “Developing” world/ “Global South.” By giving examples of women’s agency, particularly in reference to women’s movements and civil society, it serves to uncover and build an image of these women separate from “western” created concepts. Often, images of marginalized individuals are depicted in relation to those in power, highlighting the (hierarchical) differences. Telling a plurality of stories decenters the singular frame in which one can see the world. Despite these attempts at disruption, the use of dichotomies shows the power of language and that one can only exist so far “outside the system” (even when aware of its pitfalls). This “discursive slippage” is a result of unconscious, habitual, and inherited language (Hooper, 2001; Runyan & Peterson, 2010). The continued use of western-imposed, hierarchical dichotomies means that uncovering new ways to view international relations requires new language to speak about international relations. Otherwise, feminist IR will disrupt discourse in one context, while entrenching it in another.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Alt › Fails – Policy Key

Alt fails – privileges abstraction and distances theory from practice – materiality is not reducible to discourse.

Hudson 15

Heidi, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, “(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” POLITICS & GENDER, 11 (2) (2015)

While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour —or even a dead end—if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women’s lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression. In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space. After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, “security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways” (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically—with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization. Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes —performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn’t we first make the bodies from “other worlds,” rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), “language” remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke’s claim that “embodied security is . . . fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language” (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013). There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called “new materialisms” on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Impacts › A2 Extinction

Gender is not the root cause of violence or ontological and cant explain the case -- violence is constructed by many axes of oppression

Olena Hankivsky 12, Professor in the School of Public Policy, Simon Fraser University, June 2012, Women’s health, men’s health, and gender and health: Implications of intersectionality, Social Science & Medicine, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0277953612000408

Using an intersectionality framework, researchers have noted the explanatory limitations of single axis designs centered on sex and gender. Cole (2009) has warned that analyses that focus on gender are problematic because they often “implicitly assume a host of other social statuses that usually go unnamed in American culture: middle-class standing, heterosexuality, able-bodiedness and White race” (p. 173). Others have explicated similar limitations. For example, studies in the field of violence (Bent-Goodley, 2007; Craig-Taylor, 2008; Crenshaw, 1995; Nixon & Humphreys, 2010; Sandelowski, Barroso, & Voils, 2009) show that violence against women is not only a matter of gendered power relationships but is co-constructed with racial and class stratification, heterosexism, ageism, and other systems of oppression, some of which may be more salient within such interactions. Research on cardiovascular disease (CVD) (Brister, Hamdulay, Verma, Maganti, & Buchanan, 2007; King, LeBlanc, Carr, & Quan, 2007; King, LeBlanc, Sanguins, & Mather, 2006) shows that focussing on sex and gender often obscures the fact that CVD is disproportionately experienced by racial ethnic and low-income groups whose lives are shaped by intersecting processes of differentiation along the lines of age, sex, ethnic group affiliation, socioeconomic class, and geography. Finally, HIV/AIDS research (Dworkin, 2005; Elford, Anderson, Bukutu, & Ibrahim, 2006; Jackson & Reimer, 2008; Meyer, Costenbader, Zule, Otiashvili, & Kirtadze, 2010; Young & Meyer, 2005) demonstrates that gender and sexuality cannot be separated from other axes including race, class, age, religious affiliation, and immigration status and the structural economic, political, and social processes that shape them. For example, in her analysis of surveillance categories for HIV, Dworkin (2005) argues that pushing beyond a singular sex/gender system to explore the simultaneity of race, class, and shifting gender relations is vital to the future of the HIV epidemic and in particular, for making visible bisexual and lesbian transmission risks. Emerging research thus demonstrates that there are many groups which “do not necessarily identify gender oppression as the primary frame through which they understand their lives” (Nixon & Humphreys, 2010, p. 150). In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, this is especially apparent with growing immigrant populations whose health is primarily affected by dislocation, isolation, loss of identity, culture, and meaningful employment and Aboriginal/Indigenous populations whose health and well-being is largely determined by unresolved colonial injustices and ongoing experiences of racism and poverty (Alfred, 2005; Waldrum, Herring, & Young, 2006). Further, the emphasis on gender (and sex) often leads to a focus on differences between women and men. This helps to explain why so much data continues to be collected, organized, and presented solely around sex and gender differences even when similarities between women and men are demonstrated (e.g. Hyde, 2005; Petersen, 2009), differences among women and among men are often as significant if not more than between women and men (Crawshaw & Smith, 2009; Varcoe, Hankivsky, & Morrow, 2007), and men are sometimes subordinate to some women and some women exercise power over some men (Pease, 2006). Nevertheless, numerous reviews of sex based and gender differences continue to be produced (Gochfeld, 2010; Read & Gorman, 2010). Moreover, even in some frameworks that seek to include considerations of both sex and gender, as in the sex and gender based analysis (SGBA) tool developed in Canada (e.g. Clow et al., 2009), proposed guides construct lines of interrogation that prioritize examinations of similarities and differences between women and men. As Clow et al. (2009) state, “SGBA reminds us to ask questions about similarities and differences among women and men, such as: Do women and men have the same susceptibility to lung disease from smoking? Are women at the same risk as men of contracting HIV/AIDS through heterosexual intercourse? Are the symptoms of heart disease the same in women and men?.” (p. 1). Within this type of construct, differences that are shaped and formed by factors outside of sex and gender are treated as secondary in importance, if at all.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Perms › Perm Do Both – Critical Friend

Perm do both—the aff acts as a critical friend to NATO which is key to nuanced understandings that change institutions and avoid co-optation

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Introduction.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 5-6. LJS

Much to the benefit of the feminist IR, there are numerous critical engagements and conversations between feminists on approaches to the study of security, war and the institutions that wage them. Sylvester (2013) and Duncanson (2013) acknowledge a tension between what can be broadly described as an ‘anti-militarist’ feminism and what Sylvester calls ‘new’ feminist war studies that seek to centralise the accounts of women as agents within institutions of war (2013: 49) (see also Lobasz and Sjoberg, 2011: 574). Sylvester notes unease between women who self-identify as feminists but depart from common advocacy of peaceful conflict resolution, or a strident anti-militarism. Similarly, Duncanson (2013) identifies a tension between feminists who view militaries as useful in the pursuit of peace (Olsson and Tryggestad, 2001; Kaldor, 2012; Kronsell, 2012) and those who are much more sceptical about the role and place of militaries and militarism (Whitworth, 2004); between those whom she calls ‘feminist sceptics of military intervention’ and ‘feminist sceptics’ (Duncanson, 2013: 2). This tension becomes acute when considering sites of feminist research and the role of feminist researcher: as Sylvester (2013: 39) notes: ‘Gender and war is a very fraught coupling and the men and women who join the institution of war or work within it can put observers in a conundrum: to support them, take no position, look the other way?’ What Sylvester is commenting on is the notion that by centralising institutions of war and the individuals that choose to work within them as a site of feminist analysis, this somehow promotes, reinforces and legitimates those structures. Yet, Kronsell (2005, 2006, 2012) highlights how solely focusing on women at the ‘margins’ of International Relations, on those ‘outside of hegemonic institutions’ such as the military, tends to underestimate the significance of the transformative work of those women who work ‘inside’ such organisations (Kronsell, 2005: 289). In advancing a ‘revitalised’ standpoint theory, Kronsell (2005: 289) also argues that a reluctance to engage with women within hegemonic institutions perpetuates certain assumptions about them: Women within such institutions have been perceived as either co-opted or too few to be representative of women’s knowledge or standpoint. Standpoint theory’s tendency to emphasise knowledge generated by women only in particular ‘women’s spaces’ has led to the implication that an occasional woman with power is either a male in disguise or a mere token. It is not our intention to promote, reinforce or legitimate NATO as an international actor through this book. But it is our intent to offer a feminist critique of its gendered institutional norms, practices and structures by centralising the experience of those women who have worked and continue to work within it. We see our role as ‘critical friends’. In introducing this concept of a ‘critical friend’ we build on the work of Rech et al. (2015: 56). They contend that the study of the military, of militarism, and of processes of militarisation, should not be undertaken solely for its own sake, but should also be guided by the possibility of engagement with the forces and institutions responsible, and should not be bashful about doing so. This is because such institutions are ultimately accountable to the civilian world, and understanding how they function is necessary to critique them (rather than dismiss them) (Enloe, 1993; Rech et al., 2015: 56). Being a ‘critical friend’ means rejecting problem-solving approaches which ‘takes the world as it finds it’ and aims ‘to makes these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 128–9). Rather, it means adopting a critical approach which calls these institutions into question and accounts for the possibility of their change. In so doing it opens up the possibility for research to be normatively guided (Cox, 1981: 129–30). Being a ‘critical friend’ to military institutions therefore entails engaging in complex and nuanced arguments and situating these in broader political considerations and in more nuanced ways than simplistic ‘pro-military’ or ‘anti-military’ positions are able to accommodate (Rech et al., 2015: 56). It means a commitment to praxis, which necessities engagement. Military institutions are often secretive, complex and contradictory, this means critical agendas can be vulnerable to co-option (as we discuss in Chapter 4). Researchers as ‘critical friends’ therefore need to engage in an ongoing process of reflexivity from the outset of any project.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Perms › Perm Do Both – WPS

Perm do both—NATO’s Women Peace, Security agenda proves traditional policy analysis and feminist analysis are not mutually exclusive—WPS can be expanded into cybersecurity

Mhajne, K.C, and Whetstone 21

Anwar, Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Head Faculty Fellow for the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Social Justice at Stonehill College; Luna, Postdoctoral Researcher on Women Peace and Security (WPS) - Research Network, Center for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University; Crystal, Assistant Professor at Sam Houston State University's Political Science Department. “A call for feminist analysis in cybersecurity: highlighting the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Centre for Women, Peace, and Security. 9/17/2021. LJS

So far, cybersecurity, defined as “the preservation – through policy, technology, and education – of the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information and its underlying infrastructure to enhance the security of persons both online and offline,” has been a key focus for policymakers and defense institutions. Weaponising a civilian space has enormous implications for human rights, especially for women who are already disadvantaged in conflict settings. While national security matters, we suggest that cybersecurity needs to take human rights seriously by centering people’s empowerment and well-being. We see a need to extend the WPS agenda, including 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs), to the cyber realm to achieve sustainable peace. The WPS agenda promotes human security by encouraging the participation of women in peace and security governance. We envision 1325 as protecting women, girls, trans, queer, and other sexual and gender minorities from online GBV and ensuring equal access to cybersecurity both in terms of access to cyber technologies and participating in cybersecurity governance. The WPS agenda could be used in cyberspace to: • Ensure women from diverse backgrounds are in decision-making positions in cybersecurity governance and expanding the number of women in cybersecurity across the board, as well as women’s equal access to cyber technologies. As Brown and Pytlak explain, participation in cyber is critical to representation. Without women’s full and equal participation, their perspectives are unlikely to be represented within cyber policy or their perspective taken seriously in cyber policy.• Provide for the application of a feminist intersectional approach regarding cyberspace to understand how women, girls, and diverse gendered categories experience cyberspace differently. Cyberspace is not equal, and a one-size-fits-all policy does not work for everyone, particularly, women and girls in conflict-affected contexts, who might face unique challenges while using the cyber realm due to weak cyber laws. • Launch gender-disaggregated data collection on cyber-space tools and resources countries and businesses in the private sector (Facebook, Twitter, Tok-tok) are creating and utilising to make cyberspace safer by protecting the data privacy and security of marginalised groups, including women and girls as well as trans, queer, nonbinary and other sexual and gender minorities face in cybersphere. • Promote training for cybersecurity professionals, scholars and policymakers on gender-specific issues in cybersecurity and recognise that achieving sustainable peace requires achieving a safe cyberspace. We build on recent work by Feminist IR scholars who have made a case for using 1325 and the WPS agenda beyond conflict settings. For instance, Laura Shepherd argues that since no country is violence-free or full of gender equality, there is a need to apply 1325 beyond war and postwar contexts. Similarly, in this piece, we try to expand the scope of application for the WPS agenda to include cyberspace in all contexts, with a focus on conflict-affected countries. To do so, more feminist analysis is needed to help us understand how complex social identities in the cyber realm shape users’ experiences and their interaction with power structures. Feminist analysis can shed light on how gender and other inequalities operate in cyberspace and impact human rights and uniquely impact women and other marginalised groups living in conflict-affected countries. We see the WPS agenda as a starting point for scholarly and policy-focused feminist cyber engagement.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Links › A2 No Policy W/O Activism

NATO’s adoption of WPS was independent of activists—top-down politics solve

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 49-50. LJS

The eight WPS resolutions, which make-up the WPS agenda, each have their own strengths and weaknesses, but it is clear that the greater engagement there was with the NGO Working Group, the better the outcomes in terms of aligning with feminist goals. The continued feminist engagement with the resolutions is evidenced in the strengthening of the feminist content in the WPS resolutions. The adoption of the WPS resolutions has had a number of positive effects, including challenging the Security Council’s conservative approach to gender (Otto, 2010: 98). The WPS agenda embodied in the resolutions has created a ‘snowball effect’ on institutional activity backed by the power of the Security Council (Otto, 2010: 103). Many parts of the UN structure have become involved in the implementation of the WPS agenda, for example, the InterAgency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) established a task force on WPS to coordinate the mainstreaming of WPS into the UN bureaucracy (Otto, 2010: 103). The WPS agenda has utility for a range of actors and settings beyond that envisaged by those who supported the passage of UNSCR 1325 through the Security Council. For example, McLeod’s (2012: 137) research on Women in Black in Serbia finds that after learning about UNSCR 1325, the group conceived ways in which the Resolution could be used strategically to support their existing goals. Prior to their engagement with the WPS agenda in 2005, Women in Black did not articulate ‘security’ as one of their core values. The use of ‘mainstream’ language on security to express feminist goals therefore became a strategy to achieve their pre-existing objectives. In understanding WPS as a ‘travelling concept’ we see how it has moved from transnational feminism to formal acceptance by the UN Security Council, to national and local engagement by grassroots civil society actors. NATO’s adoption of the WPS agenda adds an additional dimension to this journey. NATO did not engage with the WPS as a response to pressure from feminist civil society nor did it formally consult civil society until the 2014 iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy. Despite the initial NATO/EAPC Policy on WPS adopted in 2007 calling for civil society consultation, this did not occur formally until seven years later. Rather, NATO’s initial engagement was the result of state-level advocacy of the issue which framed WPS as part of NATO’s existing concern with the status of women in the military, as a tool to increase operational effectiveness and also to engage partner states. This journey served to remove WPS from a direct link to feminist advocacy. This leaves open the possibility that NATO’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 has shaped the WPS agenda itself. This is something we consider further in Chapter 5 where we discuss how the concept of a ‘gender perspective’, initially articulated in UNSCR 1325, has travelled to and been embraced by NATO.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Links › Reforms Good

Legal reforms challenge essentialist notions of gender

Williams, 13 (Dr. Juliet A., associate professor in the Department of Gender Studies at UCLA, "Girls can be anything...but boys will be boys: discourses of sex difference in education reform debates," Nevada Law Journal, Vol. 13, 5-17-13, scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=nlj)

*In this context the “gender essentialists” that Williams is talking about are those who think that masculine behavior is innately tied to their biological sex. Meaning that she is arguing we need to challenge notions that boys are and will always be aggressive, etc. She is also talking about sex stereotyping in the context of promoting single gender education environments*

Law has an important role to play in opening up space to contest gender essentialism. One way this may happen is through rigorous application of the still-evolving anti-stereotyping principle in constitutional equal protection analysis. The determination of whether a classification constitutes stereotyping generally has been understood to pivot on the question of whether an overbroad generalization is at play. As a result, the judicial account of sex difference has been characterized as a form of “sexual realism.”67 As Katherine Franke argues, in constitutional jurisprudence, “the wrong of sex discrimination is premised upon a right of sexual differentiation, that is, a fundamental belief in the truth of biological sexual difference.”68 From this perspective, “[d]iscrimination occurs when false or stereotypical differences are mistaken for real differences.”69 More recently, however, legal scholar Cary Franklin has demonstrated that the anti-stereotyping principle is being applied even in cases in which a biological sex difference is recognized. 70 Reflecting on the significance of the 1996 decision U.S. v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court found the male-only admission policy at a state-supported military college unconstitutional, Franklin finds growing judicial support for the view that “equal protection law should be particularly alert to the possibility of sex stereotyping in contexts where ‘real’ differences are involved, because these are the contexts in which sex classifications have most often been used to perpetuate sex-based inequality.”71 In other words, the anti-stereotyping principle is now invoked to engage the question of the social meaning attributed to sex differences by a classification. In so doing, anti-stereotyping analysis thrusts the social construction of masculinity to the fore, a development that creates critical leverage for future challenges to essentialist pedagogies in court. The evidence rallied to support sex segregation must be carefully reviewed to ensure that sex stereotyping does not take the place of meaningful education reforms.72 Responding to legal challenges, proponents of “gender-friendly” educational initiatives portray their detractors as feminist ideologues unwilling to accept the simple facts of nature. But rhetorical warfare is no substitute for a fair and impartial review of existing evidence. Indeed, an important legacy of feminist legal reforms of the past several decades has been a progressive strengthening of the anti-stereotyping principle in sex-discrimination law.73 The vigorous application of a robust anti-stereotyping principle in law has played a critical role in defeating essentialist justifications for policies that promote the subordination of girls and women.74 But in the case of boys and men, essentialist discourses are proving more resilient. No doubt law once again has a central role to play in challenging essentialist policies that insist we accommodate rather than interrogate the basis for masculine behavior. VI. GIRLS CAN BE ANYTHING . . . BUT BOYS WILL BE BOYS After two decades of concerted gender advocacy in the United States, girls’ advocates and boys’ advocates are sharply divided when it comes to questions of gender difference. Building on legal reforms of the 1970s that were designed to curtail sex discrimination and gender bias in the classroom, advocates for girls traditionally have emphasized the need to challenge social attitudes and practices that stand in the way of girls’ success. Where at one time the dominant social view of girls emphasized inherent limitations, there is now a flourishing discourse of possibility and “the sky’s the limit” thinking about girls.75 The same cannot be said in the case of gender advocacy for boys, where essentialist claims have risen to the forefront. Indeed, among boys’ advocates, there is a growing demand to adjust educational environments and expectations to accommodate boys’ innate capacities and interests. What emerges, then, is a divergent discourse about kids, one which simultaneously proclaims that girls can do anything but boys will be boys.76 In this way, contemporary gender discourse in education suggests a striking shift in what anthropologist Sherry Ortner has called the “underlying logic of cultural thinking” about sex and gender.77 In a now classic essay, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?, Ortner declared “the secondary status of woman” to be “one of the true universals” of human societies.78 Ortner attributes this “stubborn” fact to the universal association of woman with nature and man with culture, an attribution derived from “woman’s greater bodily involvement” with reproduction.79 But the message emerging from boys’ advocates today suggests a significant reversal in the familiar terms of gender discourse. In contemporary education reform debates, it is in discussions of girls that we most often encounter a transcendent rhetoric of possibility. In contrast, we are much more likely to be warned of the damaging effects of pushing boys beyond biologically-determined cognitive and emotional limits. One should not presume, however, that this shift indicates a reversal in the gender hierarchy, for the appropriation of an essentialist discourse by boys’ advocates may in fact serve to reinforce male privilege. Today, appeals to nature function as an implicit rejoinder to the suggestion that boys’ troubles emanate in practices of gender socialization that reward aggression and discourage the expression of emotional vulnerability in boys and men. Indeed, in the education-reform debates, the assertion of boys’ fixed and immutable nature has emerged as a powerful tool to subvert interrogation of masculinity. From this perspective, among the most important items of unfinished business for feminism today is a more serious reckoning with the effects of essentialized masculinity.80

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Links › Women Participation Good

Women are participating in political processes around the world – that engagement is critical to combat instability

UN Women, 17 – (UN Women, September 14, 2017, "Editorial spotlight: International Day of Democracy 2017," ) // kt

Democracy, sustainable peace and conflict prevention cannot be achieved if women—half of the population—are left behind. This year's International Day of Democracy (15 September) theme, “Democracy and Conflict Prevention”, calls for “strong leadership to support democracy, strengthen civil society, empower women and uphold the rule of law”. [infographic omitted] See infographic on women in leadership » Democracy goes hand in hand with women’s rights Despite women’s leadership and their right to participate in democracy, there is still a wide-underrepresentation of women in politics and decision-making around the world, with women accounting for only 23.4 per cent of parliamentarians around the world and less than one-third of women holding senior and middle-management positions. Laws affecting women’s rights and women’s bodies are being made in Parliaments dominated by men. Women should have an active voice in policies that affect them, and their leadership is indispensable for preventing conflicts and building resilient societies. UN Women is working with countries to end discriminatory laws, policies and attitudes that are holding women and girls back. Women leading political progress Despite slow progress, across the world women are working hard to change the political landscape. In the African continent this year, hundreds of women are running for office. Coumba Diaw grew up hearing women couldn’t run for elections. Today, she is the only women Mayor in the Louga region of Senegal. Read more » “I understand the issues in my electoral district— we don’t have many teachers; the roads are damaged and our healthcare system is poor. I know how to convince my constituents that working together, we can derive better solutions when I am elected to represent them.” In October 2017, Liberians will head to the polls to vote, as President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s first elected female Head of State, completes her second and final term tenure this year. Thirty-seven-year Christine Juah Settor Dennis is running for a parliamentary seat. Read more » “I am going door to door, campaigning to urge women and youth to vote for me. Our time is now or never.” In Kenya, women ran for county elections, and UN Women and partners worked to change the attitudes of the traditional leaders. When Abdia Gole, 33, first announced her decision to run for political office, people in her community ridiculed her. The Council of Elders, who are the traditional leaders of the community and have the ultimate say in such matters, also disapproved Gole’s intentions. Read more » The new Tunisian Constitution for the first time includes a clause guaranteeing women’s rights, an unprecedented milestone for gender equality. Among the people who brought this Constitution to life was women’s rights activist Mehrezia Maïza Labidi. “I chaired a majority of the plenary sessions on Tunisia’s new constitution. It was my first time in politics, and I ended up writing a constitution!” “Women in politics are still women,” says Ms. Labidi . “We can laugh and be joyful and still be in politics. We do not want to be like men, we want to be ourselves and still engage effectively in politics.” Read more » In Europe and Central Asia, women have been scaling-up their political participation from the local to the national level. “I hope that [women] will be part of decision-making, fight for more policies for women’s economic and social empowerment, and not remain mere numbers in the new Parliament!” In the recently concluded national elections, Albania reached a new milestone with 28 per cent of women parliamentarians. Albanian Member of Parliament Albana Vokshi has been elected for the third consecutive time, and is a strong advocate for women shaping policies and decisions. Read more» Nuriya Temirbek kyzy, a 40-year-old mother of three from Naryn, in central Kyrgyzstan, used to be a housewife. Although she worked all day, taking care of her family, she had less decision-making power since she didn’t earn an income. Today, she has been elected as a member of the Ak-jara village local council, where she actively advocates for women’s rights. Read more » In Asia and the Pacific, women are breaking gender stereotypes and making democracies stronger. Barbara Garma Soares, from Suku Sau, is one of 21 women elected Xefe Suku (Village Chief) in local elections in Timor-Leste. Photo credit: UN Women/Corinne Roberts “It’s vital to shift community opinion, to show people that women are not just wives and mothers, but capable leaders at all levels.” In Timor-Leste, despite never having a woman lead their community as Village Chief before, the villagers of Suku Sau were won over by Barbara Garma Soares. Read more » A woman in Nepal speaks up at an event contesting local polls. Photo: UN Women “I am contesting the upcoming election with my headscarf on, duly following the advice of my mother-in-law. But I have offered my full support to my daughter-in-law to contest the polls without the scarf” In Nepal, women contested for leadership roles to put an end to socio-economic and cultural discrimination against women. Read more » In Latin America, women’s leadership and political participation is combating machismo and building peace. Lucía del Socorro Basante “I was scared to become a candidate, despite all my years of experience as a lawyer. The fear that male councillors will raise their voices, the fear of not being capable, of being in men’s territory. More is demanded of us [as women]” Colombia has made headlines in the last year for the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, slowly putting an end to more than half a century of conflict and instability. But achieving gender equality is central to sustainable peace. Lucía del Socorro’s story tells us how she overcame the societal barriers impairing women running for office.