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2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Colonial

The transition to AI including further drives the Global South into economic dependency upon colonial powers

Arun 19 (Chinmayi, Affiliate at Harvard at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society & Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, 07-20-19, “AI and the Global South: Designing for Other Worlds” Draft Chapter for the Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403010, pp. 2-3)-qcl

There is an increasing awareness that we should be thinking more about the impact of AI on the Global South. The broad concern is clear enough: if privileged white men are designing the technology and the business models for AI 9 , how will they design for the South? The answer is that they will design in a manner that is at best an uneasy fit, and at worst amplifies existing systemic harm and oppression to horrifying proportions. As ‘Global South’ advocates furrow their brows about AI, they may be thinking of web-based AI designed by people who live in worlds that rarely see power cuts or internet shutdowns and then deployed to the rural hinterlands of countries with poor internet connectivity and only a few hours of electricity a day. They may worry about the resources diverted from education and health-care budgets to technology-centric solutions from the companies that are building these systems. They may be concerned about the surveillance of Southern children through AI for Education, built by people whose own children go to private school and have restricted access to screens. In authoritarian countries, they may lose sleep over AI that uses facial recognition, drones and other forms of surveillance to oppress vulnerable populations. They may worry about the loss of jobs and the impact on economies as AI replaces low-skilled workers. These concerns are not without foundation. Ideas of the past like one laptop per child10 have resulted in spectacular failure despite the bright-eyed optimism and laudable intentions with which they were created. Technology designed out of context may fail to take local resources, social norms and cultural context into account. 'One day delivery’ can mean very different things in Boston and Hyderabad even if the system designed for both cities is the same. Facebook can be fairly harmless in most countries and find itself weaponised in a country with Myanmar’s sociopolitical context, to contribute to genocide.11 It can take effort for Google Maps to be able to account for the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.12 Technology policy frameworks can impact whole countries, as we might have learned from the debate on drug patents and public health in developing world. There are so many ways in which Artificial Intelligence can wreak havoc in Southern countries and affect the human rights of Southern populations. In the absence of local regulation in Southern countries, AI may be deployed in its experimental stages such that the people of these countries bear the risk of harm that may ensue. At a larger scale, AI may impact the economies of these countries by affecting their role in the global economy: several developing countries that benefited from their role in the Internet-driven global economy may gradually find the low skilled outsourced services they offer replaced by automation. The ‘call-centres’ of Bangalore, and employment and business they generate, can be undone as automation makes human intervention unnecessary. Automated cars may result in the cab drivers of New York - famously from all over the world - finding themselves out of work with a redundant skill. We need to begin our journey towards including the South as a priority, and we need to do go beyond the mere use of the phrase in policy documents or speeches. For this, we have to understand the many things we specifically worry about when we speak of the Global South. Who is being left out and endangered?

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Colonial

The transition to AI including further drives the Global South into economic dependency upon colonial powers

Arun 19 (Chinmayi, Affiliate at Harvard at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society & Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, 07-20-19, “AI and the Global South: Designing for Other Worlds” Draft Chapter for the Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403010, pp. 2-3)-qcl

There is an increasing awareness that we should be thinking more about the impact of AI on the Global South. The broad concern is clear enough: if privileged white men are designing the technology and the business models for AI 9 , how will they design for the South? The answer is that they will design in a manner that is at best an uneasy fit, and at worst amplifies existing systemic harm and oppression to horrifying proportions. As ‘Global South’ advocates furrow their brows about AI, they may be thinking of web-based AI designed by people who live in worlds that rarely see power cuts or internet shutdowns and then deployed to the rural hinterlands of countries with poor internet connectivity and only a few hours of electricity a day. They may worry about the resources diverted from education and health-care budgets to technology-centric solutions from the companies that are building these systems. They may be concerned about the surveillance of Southern children through AI for Education, built by people whose own children go to private school and have restricted access to screens. In authoritarian countries, they may lose sleep over AI that uses facial recognition, drones and other forms of surveillance to oppress vulnerable populations. They may worry about the loss of jobs and the impact on economies as AI replaces low-skilled workers. These concerns are not without foundation. Ideas of the past like one laptop per child10 have resulted in spectacular failure despite the bright-eyed optimism and laudable intentions with which they were created. Technology designed out of context may fail to take local resources, social norms and cultural context into account. 'One day delivery’ can mean very different things in Boston and Hyderabad even if the system designed for both cities is the same. Facebook can be fairly harmless in most countries and find itself weaponised in a country with Myanmar’s sociopolitical context, to contribute to genocide.11 It can take effort for Google Maps to be able to account for the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.12 Technology policy frameworks can impact whole countries, as we might have learned from the debate on drug patents and public health in developing world. There are so many ways in which Artificial Intelligence can wreak havoc in Southern countries and affect the human rights of Southern populations. In the absence of local regulation in Southern countries, AI may be deployed in its experimental stages such that the people of these countries bear the risk of harm that may ensue. At a larger scale, AI may impact the economies of these countries by affecting their role in the global economy: several developing countries that benefited from their role in the Internet-driven global economy may gradually find the low skilled outsourced services they offer replaced by automation. The ‘call-centres’ of Bangalore, and employment and business they generate, can be undone as automation makes human intervention unnecessary. Automated cars may result in the cab drivers of New York - famously from all over the world - finding themselves out of work with a redundant skill. We need to begin our journey towards including the South as a priority, and we need to do go beyond the mere use of the phrase in policy documents or speeches. For this, we have to understand the many things we specifically worry about when we speak of the Global South. Who is being left out and endangered?

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Colonial

AI impacts result on our society – decolonialization is a solution to challenge fairness and settled assumption

Muhammed 18 (Shakir, scientist and engineer in the fields of statistical machine learning and artificial intelligence, 10-11-2018, accessed on 6-24-2022, The Spectator, "Decolonising Artificial Intelligence", http://blog.shakirm.com/2018/10/decolonising-artificial-intelligence/)-qcl

AI will result in objects of culture, and its use will have impacts on the way our societies work (it already has). And this is why we should consider decolonisation seriously. But we are already engaged in these issues, under different headings and, importantly, in relation to their underlying technical questions. This brings the utility of decolonisation as a tool into question. The famous paper by Tuck and Yang entitled 'decolonisation is not a metaphor'[note]Tuck E, Yang KW. . Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society. 2012 Sep 8;1(1).[/note] enters: 'Decolonisation brings about repatriation of indigenous land and life; it is not a metaphor for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. E. Tuck and K. Wang, Decolonization is not a Metaphor, 2012. This is an important clarification. The key message they leave us with, is that it is problematic to use decolonisation as a placeholder for all the ways we wish to engage with social justice. It leads to a loss of meaning. Too often is decolonisation used for political symbolism. Too often are claims for decolonisation used to raise opposition, without genuine concerns. Too often is decolonisation used to signal an enemy. Our science will not be advanced through a world-view based on empty symbolism and opposition: together we can move beyond the too-easy narrative of them-vs-us, coloniser-vs-colonised, metropole-vs-south, west-vs-rest. More worryingly, decolonisation increasingly seems to be used as a replacement for Transformation. The cannot be paid by allowing ourselves to be distracted by the language of decolonisation and delaying the work of deep social, institutional and personal responsibility for change. We can learn from the questions that decolonisation raises and the strategies it suggests. But we can also maintain our focus on the important questions of social justice. I will continue to demand for a simpler language. Let us say what we mean and want, to aim to be understood, to be more precise. And we can do this by keeping the challenges we identify and their scientific and technical basis in close proximity. There is a reason for concern! What else can we see when read in the [note]Kai Fu Lee, , New York Times June 2017[/note] about one future path for our countries: "Unless they wish to plunge their people into poverty, they will be forced to negotiate with whichever country supplies most of their A.I. software — China or the United States — to essentially become that country’s economic dependent." Kai Fu Lee, , June 2017 We immediately recognise the colonial nature of this possible future. When Ian Hogarth writes of [note]Ian Hogarth, , June 2018[/note], we recall the hubris and implications of the nations that sought Empire. We are not oblivious to the fact that a form of [note], Model View Culture, June 2016[/note] and its ownership is possible (if not underway). We do recognise a forming [note], June 2014[/note] that expands as censorship increases and online freedoms are curtailed. This is where decolonisation plays its role. The solutions that have been tried in the restoration of land and life in the post-colonial age, can be ours to learn from and reuse. The basis of this solution is in self-ownership and its protection. Fortunately, as a field we have the basis of such protections already. We can continue to strengthen open-source software, open-data, and open-access science— publishing more, not less; we can further support accessible machine learning frameworks, and accessible scientific communication; and we can continue to find solutions to the challenges of fairness, privacy, safety, verification, and governance. And we can go further, by always challenging our settled assumptions and world-views as we expand the frontiers of our knowledge. The only AI that empowers and works for the benefit of humanity is a truly global AI. Making global AI truly global will not be easy. We have heard the call.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Colonial

Data Colonialism Link – proliferation of AI technology thwarts the Global South into a new stage of coloniality, one in which Northern tech companies control economic and national sovereignty via a monopoly on data

Varon & Peña 21 (Joana, Executive Directress and Creative Chaos Catalyst at Coding Right, Paz Latin American Institute of Terraforming, “Artificial intelligence and consent: A feminist anticolonial critique”, Econstor, Institute for Internet and Society, Berlin, Vol. 10, Iss. 4, https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.4.1602 , pp. 15-17)-qcl

Indian digital anthropologist Payal Arora states (2019) that there is a tendency of states to experiment with people in economic vulnerability, as the damages that can be done are considered less important and it is more difficult for them to access justice for reparations. This extractivist logic focused on the most vulnerable prevails in AI systems developed for social welfare. They replicate what Couldry and Mejias (2018) call the "new state of capitalism" where the production and extraction of personal data naturalise the colonial appropriation of life in general. To achieve this, the authors consider that a series of ideological processes operate where, on the one hand, personal data is treated as raw material, naturally disposable for the expropriation of capital and, on the other, where corporations are considered the only ones capable of processing and, therefore, appropriate the data. Renata Ávila (2020) goes even further and points out how countries where most ‘big tech’ companies come from (the US and China, particularly) tend to benefit within a global system from the digitisation of poor and middle-income countries in what appears to be a new form of colonialism. Therefore, there is a multilayer of extractivism: at the level of individual countries, dominant elites processing, classifying and taking decisions about data of the poor, and at the global level, rich countries presenting themselves, and their companies, as the providers of “solutions”, benefiting from the profits of data colonialism. For this extractivist and data colonialist practices to prevail, there is a chain of subject focused consent from citizens to governments and from local governments to ‘big tech’. Once again, consent is being instrumentalised to enable for data processing even beyond data owner clear awareness of future usages and consequences. In the mentioned cases about Chile and Colombia, for example, there are private bidding processes. Moreover, in the case of the Colombian SISBEN, the state's bidding contract is part of a strategy to consolidate a data analysis market in Colombia, so that the Colombian company selected would provide a service to the state, while receiving training from MIT experts and access to a sufficiently massive database to experiment (López, 2020). In Latin America, IBM, Microsoft, NEC, Cisco, Google are commonly involved in AI projects developed by the public sector from the region. Every project feeds databases and provides intelligence for machine learning systems of these companies, which can use these less regulated environments, where enforcement of privacy rights is weak, as laboratories to test and improve their systems, normally unaccountable to possible harmful consequences. Who will own the knowledge and set the epistemologies of the categories running these AI systems? Very likely, the digital welfare hype in Latin America is feeding a circle in which a foreign agent, unaware of the context and with lived experience far different from the local culture will always be bringing what is commonly called “an innovative solution” to a problem, treated as something external and punctual, though most of those problems are historical, structural and actually caused or fed into by the actions of these very same corporations. With the inputs from these experiments, very commonly, these companies are also the vectors for spreading experiments from one country to another. For example, this is the case of Plataforma Tecnológica de Intervención Social (Technological Platform for Social Intervention), a machine learning experiment to predict teenage pregnancy and school dropouts, which was conducted by Microsoft, in partnership with the municipality of Salta, Argentina. “Intelligent algorithms allow us to identify characteristics in people that could end up with these problems and warn the government to work on their prevention,” said a Microsoft Azure representative in an interview for a company publication (News Center Microsoft Latinoamérica, 2018, n.p.). The system was heavily criticised due to statistical errors, sensitivities of reporting unwanted pregnancies, using data inadequate to make reliable predictions, but even further, for being used as a tool for discrimination of the poor and deviate the agenda of effective public policies to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive rights (Peña & Varon, 2019). Despite this, the programme is now being exported to other municipalities in Argentina, such as La Rioja, Tierra del Fuego, as well as to Colombia and Brazil (Peña & Varon, 2020).

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Military Application (general)

Military AI applications risk accuracy and information errors that threaten human dignity and civilian lives

Schmid et al ’22 (Schmid, S-- human-computer interaction cscw crisis informatics

., Riebe, T-- is a research associate and doctoral student at the Chair of Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC) in the Department of Computer Science at the TU Darmstadt.

., & Reuter, C.-- Christian Reuter is Full Professor at Technical University of Darmstadt. His chair Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC) in the Department of Computer Science with secondary appointment in the Department of History and Social Sciences combines computer science with peace and security research

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Military Application (general)

AI military application is riddled with error—brings error for miscalc and requires human oversight.

Atherson ’22 (Kelsey Atherton is a military technology journalist based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His reporting has appeared in Popular Science, Breaking Defense, and The New York Times, “Understand the Errors Introduced by Military AI Application,” )- lf

On March 22, 2003, two days into the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American troops fired a Patriot interceptor missile at what they assumed was an Iraqi anti-radiation missile designed to destroy air-defense systems. Acting on the recommendation of their computer-powered weapon, the Americans fired in self-defense, thinking they were shooting down a missile coming to destroy their outpost. What the Patriot missile system had identified as an incoming missile, was in fact a UK Tornado fighter jet, and when the Patriot struck the aircraft, it killed two crew on board instantly. The deaths were the first losses suffered by the Royal Air Force in the war and the tragic result of friendly fire. A subsequent RAF Board of Inquiry investigation concluded that the shoot-down was the result of a combination of factors: how the Patriot missile classified targets, rules for firing the missiles, autonomous operation of Patriot missile batteries, and several other technical and procedural factors, like the Tornado not broadcasting its “friend or foe” identifier at the time of the friendly fire. The destruction of Tornado ZG710, the report concluded, represented a tragic error enabled by the missile’s computer routines. The shoot-down of the Tornado happened nearly 20 years ago, but it offers an insight into how AI-enabled systems or automated tools on the battlefield will affect the kinds of errors that happen in war. Today, human decisionmaking is shifting toward machines. With this shift comes the potential to reduce human error, but also to introduce new and novel types of mistakes. Where humans might have once misidentified a civilian as a combatant, computers are expected to step in and provide more accurate judgment. Across a range of military functions, from the movement of autonomous planes and cars to identifying tanks on a battlefield, computers are expected to provide quick, accurate decisions. But the embrace of AI in military applications also comes with immense risk. New systems introduce the possibility of new types of error, and understanding how autonomous machines will fail is important when crafting policy for buying and overseeing this new generation of autonomous weapons. What went wrong in 2003 The Patriot missile began development in the 1960s, when the U.S. Army sought a means to reliably shoot down enemy airplanes. Later, the missile would gain the ability to also intercept other missiles, and as the roles assigned to the missile expanded, its autonomous capabilities increased. Patriot missile batteries use a phased array radar to detect and identify targets. This information is then fed into a computer control station to manage how the missiles are launched in response. Once fired, the missiles fly toward an identified intercept point calculated before firing, directions that can be altered by sending updated sensor readings over radio signal to the fired missile. As it approaches for impact, the missile’s own radar tracks the target. Raytheon, which manufactures the Patriot, has described the system as having “automated operations” with “man-in-the-loop (human) override” capabilities—technology that allows the weapon to quickly engage targets with the necessary speed to carry out its missile defense mission. Automation is a compelling feature for an anti-air and, especially, for an anti-missile system. The calculations involved in shooting down aircraft and missiles are hard and require immediate translation of sensor information. Both interceptors and targets are traveling exceptionally fast. It’s the kind of task in which the involvement of a human introduces lag, slows down the process, and makes it less likely a missile is going to successfully shoot down an incoming projectile or aircraft. But human operators also serve an essential role: preventing accidental, incorrect shootdowns. And this requires a balance between human and machine decisionmaking that is difficult to achieve. When the Pentagon investigated the causes of the Tornado shootdown, as well as two other incidents of friendly fire involving Patriot systems, the missile system’s automated functions were identified as contributing factors in misidentifying friend as foe. U.S. Patriot batteries deployed to Iraq under the assumption that they would face heavy missile attacks, which would require the batteries to operate with a relative degree of autonomy in order to respond with sufficient speed. As a 2005 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Patriot system’s performance observed, operating autonomously required U.S. forces to trust that the automated features of the system were functioning properly. So when the assumptions underlying the decision to allow the Patriot system to autonomously identify and sometimes fire on targets no longer applied, the soldiers operating the system were not in a position to question what the weapon’s sensors were telling them. Had U.S. and coalition forces faced heavy missile attacks in the war, automating such defenses would have made more sense. Instead, U.S. and allied forces quickly established air superiority, enough to drastically shift the balance of what was in the sky. Instead of facing large amounts of incoming missiles, Patriot batteries were observing large numbers of allied planes operating in the sky above them and sometimes struggling to identify friend from foe. According to the Defense Science Board’s task force, the first 30 days of combat in Iraq saw nine ballistic missile attacks that Patriot batteries might have been expected to counter, compared to 41,000 aircraft sorties, amounting to a “4,000-to-1 friendly-to-enemy ratio.” Picking out the correct targets against the background of a large number of potential false positives proved highly challenging. In the case of the Tornado shootdown, automation—and the speed with which automated action was taken—was likely sufficient on its own to cause the tragedy, but it might have been prevented if other systems hadn’t failed. As the UK Ministry of Defence concluded in its report examining the incident, the battery culpable for the shootdown was without its communications suite, which was still in transit from the United States. Contact with battalion headquarters occurred through a radio relay with another battery equipped with voice and data links to headquarters. “The lack of communications equipment meant that the Patriot crew did not have access to the widest possible ‘picture’ of the airspace around them to build situational awareness,” the report found. Another system that failed and that might have prevented the shootdown was the identification-as-friend-or-foe system, a safety measure designed to avoid such deadly mistakes. That kind of information, transmitted securely and immediately, could have prevented an automated system from shooting down the jet. If the information was communicated to the human crew operating the Patriot battery, it would have been a signal to call off the attack. Tragically, the IFF transponder or the Patriot battery’s ability to receive such a signal failed. While it is tempting to focus on the automated features of the Patriot system when examining the shootdown—or autonomous and semi-autonomous systems more broadly—it is important to consider such weapons as part of broader systems. As policymakers consider how to evaluate the deployment of increasingly autonomous weapons and military systems, the complexity of such systems, the ways in which they might fail, and how human operators oversee them are key issues to consider. Failures in communication, identification, and fire-control can occur at different points of a chain of events, and it can be difficult to predict how failures will interact with one another and produce a potentially lethal outcome. The Defense Science Board’s examination of the Patriot concluded that future conflicts will likely be “more stressing” and involve “simultaneous missile and air defense engagements.” In such a scenario, “a protocol that allows more operator oversight and control of major system actions will be needed,” the task force argued. Lessons learned since Finding the right mix of trust between an autonomous machine and the human relying on it is a delicate balance, especially given the inevitability of error. Seventeen years after the Tornado shootdown, the automated features of the Patriot missile remain in place, but the way in which they are used has shifted. Air threats, such as aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles can now only be engaged in manual mode “to reduce the risk of fratricide,” as the U.S. Army’s manual for air and missile defense outlines. In manual mode, automated systems still detect and track targets, but it’s a human who makes the call about when and if to fire. But “for ballistic missiles and anti-radiation missiles,” like the kind the Patriot in Iraq assumed the Tornado was, “the operator has a choice of engaging in the automatic or manual mode,” though the manual notes that these “engagements are typically conducted in the automatic mode.” Defense researchers caution that human beings are not well-suited to monitoring autonomous systems in this way. “Problems can arise when the automated control system has been developed because it presumably can do the job better than a human operator, but the operator is left in to ‘monitor’ that the automated system is performing correctly and intervene when it is not,” the engineering psychologist John Hawley, who was involved in the U.S. Army’s efforts to study the 2003 friendly fire incidents, wrote in a 2017 report. “Humans are very poor at meeting the monitoring and intervention demands imposed by supervisory control.” This dynamic played out in the other fatal friendly fire incident involving a Patriot missile battery during the Iraq War, when a U.S. Navy F/A-18 aircraft was misidentified as a ballistic missile and shot down, killing the pilot. According to a 2019 Center for Naval Analyses report, the Patriot recommended that the operator fire missiles in response to what it had identified as an enemy projectile, and the operator approved the recommendation to fire “without independent scrutiny of the information available to him.” This difficulty faced by Patriot missile batteries in correctly identifying potential targets illustrates one of the most serious challenges facing autonomous weapons—getting accurate training data. As militaries move toward greater autonomy in a wide range of systems, they are increasingly reliant on machine learning technology that uses large data sets to make predictions about how a machine should operate. The challenge of acquiring accurate data sets autonomous systems up for inevitable failure. “Conflict environments are harsh, dynamic and adversarial, and there will always be more variability in the real-world data of the battlefield than in the limited sample of data on which autonomous systems are built and verified,” as Arthur Holland Michel, and associate researcher in the Security and Technology Programme at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, wrote in a report last year addressing data issues in military autonomous weapons. A lack of reliable data or an inability to produce datasets that replicate combat conditions will make it more likely that autonomous weapons fail to make accurate identifications. Aware of the potential for error, one way to adopt autonomous systems while addressing the risk to civilians and servicemembers is to shift toward a posture in which risk is borne primarily by the machine. The 2003 shootdowns involved Patriot missiles acting in self-defense and misidentifying their enemy. By accepting greater risk to autonomous systems—that they might be destroyed or disabled—autonomous systems can avoid the risk of friendly fire or civilian casualties by “using tactical patience, or allowing the platform to move in closer to get a more accurate determination of whether a threat actually exists,” as Larry Lewis, the author of the 2019 CNA report, argues. Rather than quickly firing in self-defense, this view argues for patience and sacrificing a measure of speed in favor of accuracy. More broadly, Lewis recommends a risk management approach to using AI. While the specific nature of every given error is hard to anticipate, the range of bad and undesired outcomes can fall in similar categories of error or outcome. Planning for AI incorporated into weapons, sensors, and information displays could include an awareness of error, and present that information in a useful way without adding to the cognitive load of the person using the machine. Artificial Intelligence has already moved beyond the speculative to tangible, real-world applications. It already informs the targeting decisions of military weapons, and will increasingly shape how people in combat use machines and tools. Adapting to this future, as the Pentagon and other military establishments seem intent to do, means planning for error, accidents, and novel harm, the way militaries have already adapted to such error in human hands. The Pentagon has taken some steps to address these risks. In February 2020, the Department of Defense released a set of principles AI ethics drafted by the Defense Innovation Board.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Machine learning

Reinforced Learners (RL) rewards function logic mirrors classic utilitarian framing

Heather M. Roff , 19 July 2022, Senior Research Analyst, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Associate Research Fellow, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge - Maren Lien

While RL is premised on a feedback loop, where an agent tries a particular action or behavior to reach a (preselected/identified) goal and receives a reward signal from the environment providing information about whether it is acting correctly, the environment does not fundamentally change. The environment may produce varying signals to the agent, but the environment as such, does not ontologically change, and so this is not a co-constituting ontology. The feedback loop only goes in one direction, not two. Thus, for the RL agent, a goal remains something external or exogenous to it, and the agent directs its actions towards it. It cannot modify or change its goal. This is important because as AIs become more powerful, the model for learning may need to change. RL agents may be able to reshape not only their environments, but rewards as well. An example may be helpful here. An agent playing chess receives various signals from its environment (such as another agent’s move on the board). The signal tells the agent which actions are not only permissible to take, but which actions may preferable or best to take, given the available knowledge about the game of chess at the time, with the goal of winning the game. This is a feedback loop. However, it is not a co-constituting agent-structure problem. The agent playing chess cannot, once its adversary moves to e5, claim that the board itself changed and now is a 9x9 matrix. The board is the structure; the agents move within it. The conceptual terrain is important here to understanding how the logic of reinforcement learning and the billiard ball model of learning work to produce a particular kind of utility maximizing agent: a hedonistic act utilitarian. While one may object, and claim that the RL utility maximizing agent is a different kind of “utilitarian” than that of the moral philosophers, this is in fact, not wholly true. One is merely the mathematical representation of the logic of the other, and indeed implicitly carries in certain assumptions about broader normative aims. For example, as Sutton and Barto (1998) explain with regards to reinforcement learning, Rewards are in a sense primary, whereas values, as predictions of rewards, are secondary. Without rewards there could be no values, and the only purpose of estimating values is to achieve more reward. Nevertheless, it is values with which we are more concerned when making and evaluating decisions. Action choices are made based on value judgments. 7 Here, a value judgment is a judgment about what sorts of behaviors or actions contain “worth”. But what “worth” entails, is actually about what is “good” all things considered for the decision or task at hand. 8 It is, therefore a teleological or goal-directed action. Moreover, if one desires to avoid circularity, then one cannot define “good” or “value” in terms of itself, so one must find some other thing to use as a signal or content for the “good.” In the RL scheme, the signal is the reward function, and this is used to estimate or “judge” which actions or states will yield the long term best act/choice/decision; that is, what will most likely yield the “value” function. Yet if we grant that this conceptualization of RL as true, then we must also grant that it maps — almost identically — to the logic of the moral theory of utilitarianism as well. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory that argues that normative properties are determined by some sort of end state (or goal). In easy terms, the best consequences — here operationalized as the most utility — determine the morally right act. Utility can be defined in any number of ways, as I will explain in the next section, however it is most often associated with an aggregate welfare account, usually seen in shorthand as “the greatest good for the greatest number.” One ought to immediately see that RL is very much like utilitarianism because both the RL agent and the utilitarian moral agent seek to determine some present action by a judgment about maximizing the value — or good — of some future state/goal/consequence. Additionally, utilitarianism also seeks coherence and avoiding circularity. Thus, one cannot define the good in terms of itself, but must instead define it in some other (nonmoral) term. Classically, this is done through a reward signal (pleasure or pain).9

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Machine learning

Machine learning techniques create better AI – reward hacking, epistemological limitations, and distributions problems

Heather M. Roff , 19 July 2022, Senior Research Analyst, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Associate Research Fellow, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge - Maren Lien

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial.1 This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be “good” for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create “beneficial AI” in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits ‘benefit’ is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity, (at least for the majority of reasons cited against utilitarianism over the past three hundred years). Indeed, as I will attempt to show here, much of the philosophical insights about the deficiencies of utilitarianism apply directly to many of the currently cited concrete problems in AI safety, such as specifying the wrong objective function, avoiding negative externalities, reward hacking, distribution problems, epistemological limitations, and distributional shift2 . The paper is organized into four sections. The first section lays out how RL could be seen as an implementation of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Section two discusses the various kinds of utilitarianism, as well as many of its well-cited criticisms, particularly how most of its forms ultimately collapse back into a brute act utilitarian evaluation. Moreover, this section argues that the two ways that utilitarianism is often described, as either an evaluative theory of right or as a decision-procedure for individual action, is the same description of how machine learning researchers are approaching the problem of creating beneficial AI. This presents us with a useful intervention point, both within policy but also within research communities to assess whether this is a solvable problem for AI. The third section argues that many of the problems noted in classic arguments about utilitarianism manifest themselves in concrete AI research safety problems, especially in reward hacking. Finally, section four argues that it may be useful for AI researchers to look towards philosophers to see how they have previously attempted to solve such problems. In particular, it may be more simple to look to various constraints on an AI’s action, or as Mackie notes as “device[s] for countering such specific evils” that may result.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Development

Effect of AI development on countries in the Global South

Lee 17 (Kai-Fu Lee Taiwanese computer scientist, businessman, and writer, 6-24-2017, accessed on 6-24-2022, The New York Times, "Opinion | The Real Threat of Artificial Intelligence", https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligence-economic-inequality.html)-qcl

BEIJING — What worries you about the coming world of artificial intelligence? Too often the answer to this question resembles the plot of a sci-fi thriller. People worry that developments in A.I. will bring about the “singularity” — that point in history when A.I. surpasses human intelligence, leading to an unimaginable revolution in human affairs. Or they wonder whether instead of our controlling artificial intelligence, it will control us, turning us, in effect, into cyborgs. These are interesting issues to contemplate, but they are not pressing. They concern situations that may not arise for hundreds of years, if ever. At the moment, there is no known path from our best A.I. tools (like the Google computer program that recently beat the world’s best player of the game of Go) to “general” A.I. — self-aware computer programs that can engage in common-sense reasoning, attain knowledge in multiple domains, feel, express and understand emotions and so on. This doesn’t mean we have nothing to worry about. On the contrary, the A.I. products that now exist are improving faster than most people realize and promise to radically transform our world, not always for the better. They are only tools, not a competing form of intelligence. But they will reshape what work means and how wealth is created, leading to unprecedented economic inequalities and even altering the global balance of power. It is imperative that we turn our attention to these imminent challenges. What is artificial intelligence today? Roughly speaking, it’s technology that takes in huge amounts of information from a specific domain (say, loan repayment histories) and uses it to make a decision in a specific case (whether to give an individual a loan) in the service of a specified goal (maximizing profits for the lender). Think of a spreadsheet on steroids, trained on big data. These tools can outperform human beings at a given task. This kind of A.I. is spreading to thousands of domains (not just loans), and as it does, it will eliminate many jobs. Bank tellers, customer service representatives, telemarketers, stock and bond traders, even paralegals and radiologists will gradually be replaced by such software. Over time this technology will come to control semiautonomous and autonomous hardware like self-driving cars and robots, displacing factory workers, construction workers, drivers, delivery workers and many others. Unlike the Industrial Revolution and the computer revolution, the A.I. revolution is not taking certain jobs (artisans, personal assistants who use paper and typewriters) and replacing them with other jobs (assembly-line workers, personal assistants conversant with computers). Instead, it is poised to bring about a wide-scale decimation of jobs — mostly lower-paying jobs, but some higher-paying ones, too. This transformation will result in enormous profits for the companies that develop A.I., as well as for the companies that adopt it. Imagine how much money a company like Uber would make if it used only robot drivers. Imagine the profits if Apple could manufacture its products without human labor. Imagine the gains to a loan company that could issue 30 million loans a year with virtually no human involvement. (As it happens, my venture capital firm has invested in just such a loan company.) We are thus facing two developments that do not sit easily together: enormous wealth concentrated in relatively few hands and enormous numbers of people out of work. What is to be done? Part of the answer will involve educating or retraining people in tasks A.I. tools aren’t good at. Artificial intelligence is poorly suited for jobs involving creativity, planning and “cross-domain” thinking — for example, the work of a trial lawyer. But these skills are typically required by high-paying jobs that may be hard to retrain displaced workers to do. More promising are lower-paying jobs involving the “people skills” that A.I. lacks: social workers, bartenders, concierges — professions requiring nuanced human interaction. But here, too, there is a problem: How many bartenders does a society really need? The solution to the problem of mass unemployment, I suspect, will involve “service jobs of love.” These are jobs that A.I. cannot do, that society needs and that give people a sense of purpose. Examples include accompanying an older person to visit a doctor, mentoring at an orphanage and serving as a sponsor at Alcoholics Anonymous — or, potentially soon, Virtual Reality Anonymous (for those addicted to their parallel lives in computer-generated simulations). The volunteer service jobs of today, in other words, may turn into the real jobs of the future. Other volunteer jobs may be higher-paying and professional, such as compassionate medical service providers who serve as the “human interface” for A.I. programs that diagnose cancer. In all cases, people will be able to choose to work fewer hours than they do now. Who will pay for these jobs? Here is where the enormous wealth concentrated in relatively few hands comes in. It strikes me as unavoidable that large chunks of the money created by A.I. will have to be transferred to those whose jobs have been displaced. This seems feasible only through Keynesian policies of increased government spending, presumably raised through taxation on wealthy companies. As for what form that social welfare would take, I would argue for a conditional universal basic income: welfare offered to those who have a financial need, on the condition they either show an effort to receive training that would make them employable or commit to a certain number of hours of “service of love” voluntarism. To fund this, tax rates will have to be high. The government will not only have to subsidize most people’s lives and work; it will also have to compensate for the loss of individual tax revenue previously collected from employed individuals. This leads to the final and perhaps most consequential challenge of A.I. The Keynesian approach I have sketched out may be feasible in the United States and China, which will have enough successful A.I. businesses to fund welfare initiatives via taxes. But what about other countries? They face two insurmountable problems. First, most of the money being made from artificial intelligence will go to the United States and China. A.I. is an industry in which strength begets strength: The more data you have, the better your product; the better your product, the more data you can collect; the more data you can collect, the more talent you can attract; the more talent you can attract, the better your product. It’s a virtuous circle, and the United States and China have already amassed the talent, market share and data to set it in motion. For example, the Chinese speech-recognition company iFlytek and several Chinese face-recognition companies such as Megvii and SenseTime have become industry leaders, as measured by market capitalization. The United States is spearheading the development of autonomous vehicles, led by companies like Google, Tesla and Uber. As for the consumer internet market, seven American or Chinese companies — Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent — are making extensive use of A.I. and expanding operations to other countries, essentially owning those A.I. markets. It seems American businesses will dominate in developed markets and some developing markets, while Chinese companies will win in most developing markets. The other challenge for many countries that are not China or the United States is that their populations are increasing, especially in the developing world. While a large, growing population can be an economic asset (as in China and India in recent decades), in the age of A.I. it will be an economic liability because it will comprise mostly displaced workers, not productive ones. So if most countries will not be able to tax ultra-profitable A.I. companies to subsidize their workers, what options will they have? I foresee only one: Unless they wish to plunge their people into poverty, they will be forced to negotiate with whichever country supplies most of their A.I. software — China or the United States — to essentially become that country’s economic dependent, taking in welfare subsidies in exchange for letting the “parent” nation’s A.I. companies continue to profit from the dependent country’s users. Such economic arrangements would reshape today’s geopolitical alliances. One way or another, we are going to have to start thinking about how to minimize the looming A.I.-fueled gap between the haves and the have-nots, both within and between nations. Or to put the matter more optimistically: A.I. is presenting us with an opportunity to rethink economic inequality on a global scale. These challenges are too far-ranging in their effects for any nation to isolate itself from the rest of the world.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Development

AI development causes environmental collapse and labor exploitation – while AI itself is already environmentally harmful through infrastructure networks that require unethical mining operations and endless pollution regimes – it also causes a rebound effect in which its proliferation multiplies its own impacts since its increased capabilities are utilized by businesses that are environmentally harmful

Hagendorf 21 (Thilo, AI researcher at the University of Tübingen. 11-25-21, “Blind Spots in AI Ethics,” Orcid, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00122-8)-qcl

Ecosystem services do not only have an unprecedented monetary value for humans [164], but they are the very reason for the possibility of human life on earth. Over-exploitation of ecosystems harms future generations [165], poor and already underprivileged people [166], animals [167], and many more. Whereas the building industry, agroindustry, or transport industry seem to be main drivers of ecosystem destruction and climate change, the information and communication industry also play a tangential role. This holds AI and Ethics 1 3 especially true for the AI field. The term “AI” bears a linguistic similarity to the term “cloud”. The notion of cloud computing suggests that it lacks materiality, that it is invisible and placeless, that data are “stored in the troposphere” [168], where in fact, big data is anything but transcendent or amorphous. It is grounded in fragile physical infrastructures, cables, hardware, routers, server buildings, power grids, cooling systems, satellites, etc., all of whom require natural resources. A similar situation unfolds with AI. The term “artificial intelligence” again suggests something immaterial, a mental quality that has seemingly no physical implications. This could not be farther from the truth. To appreciate this, one must switch from a data level, where the real material complexities of AI systems are far out of sight, to an infrastructural level and to the complete supply chain. Here, and frst of all, it becomes visible that the cloud and AI systems are intrinsically intertwined. The cloud builds the necessary condition of AI, and the material implications of the cloud cling onto AI, too. These implications are far-reaching and manifest themselves in global networks of cable infrastructures, labor division, logistics, distribution, and manifold externalities. These networks comprise lithium, tin, cobalt and other mines that deliver essential minerals for electronic components or batteries that are part of every digital mobile device, smelters and refiners that produce acidic, radioactive, and otherwise harmful waste products, storage systems and warehouses for logistics and transportation operations, energy and water hungry data centers, afliated cooling systems, diesel powered generators for backup purposes in cases of blackouts, data annotation factories, collection operations for toxic electronic waste consisting of technical devices with a lifespan of a few years, and many more [2, 169]. All these mining, shipping, manufacturing, and garbage incineration operations are heavily destructive, have a high burden on ecosystems, and come at the cost of human lives, child labor, wildlife populations, natural habitats, toxins in the ground, water, and air, public health, political instability and tensions and low wage labor markets. The material conditions that allow AI usage, especially rare earth elements or “confict minerals”, are also triggers for military operations, violence, murder, and migration that surround the already brutal and slavery-like industry of mining [170]. AI systems are not just demanding in terms of material resources, they also require a lot of energy. Electronic machines, in contrast to combustion engines, can in principle be used sustainably by consuming electricity from renewable energy sources. In practice, however, in many countries, only small proportions of electricity are renewable [171]. Accordingly, powering the computational resources that are required to collect large amounts of training data and to train, test, and apply large AI models comes with a signifcant carbon footprint [172]. Strubell et al. [173] conducted a life cycle assessment of several large AI models and found out that they can emit around three hundred thousand kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent. The reason for this lies in the many ways machine learning methods go along with a “bigger is better” approach which prioritizes accuracy over efciency [174] with costly trial and error processes which span from practitioners intuitively setting up model parameters all to neural architecture search and other tuning and automated optimization processes. Ultimately, the information and communication industry, which incorporates the AI feld, has a carbon footprint that is bigger than that of the aviation industry [175]. But while there is fight shame, there is no such remorse for AI use, although some AI ethics researchers have tentatively started to develop a critical perspective on the role that AI has in contributing to climate change [174, 176, 177]. Much of this is dependent on where training servers are located, which energy grid is used, how long models are trained, and what hardware accelerators are in use [178]. However, even under perfect conditions where only renewable energy sources are used, it seems likely that AI remains a polluting technology in many industry sectors due to the business purposes it is utilized for. On one hand, AI technologies are heralded as technical solutions to the climate crisis by helping to develop lowemission infrastructures, operate smart grids, help foster sustainable consumption and production, etc. [21, 179]. On the other hand, AI technologies are used to buttress industries and business models that are environmentally harmful—let alone rebound efects in industries that are deemed to be sustainable [180]. In this regard, the tip of the iceberg is the collaboration between the largest AI companies and the fossil fuel industry [181, 182] which does not only comprise the optimization of oil and gas extraction, but goes so far as to actively support climate change deniers [183].

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Development

AI and Co-development is a strategy to address CDSs, they are tools for social development – failure of paternalism, technological solutionism, and predatory inclusion

Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” pp. 669-671 pp. 671)-qcl

Much of the current policy discourse surrounding AI in developing countries is in economic and social development where advanced technologies are propounded as solutions for complex developmental scenarios, represented by the growing areas of AI for Good and AI for the Sustainable Development Goals (AI4SDGs) (Vinuesa et al. 2020; Floridi et al. 2018; Tomasev et al. ˇ 2020). In this discourse, Green (2019) proposes that “good isn’t good enough”, and that there is a need to expand the currently limited and vague definitions within the computer sciences of what “social good” means. To do so, we can draw from existing analysis of ICT for Development, which are often based on historical analysis and decolonial critique (Irani et al. 2010; Toyama 2015). These critiques highlight concerns of dependency, dispossession or ethics dumping and shirking, as discussed earlier (Schroeder et al. 2018). Such critiques take renewed form as AI is put forward as a needed tool for social development. Where a root cause of failure of developmental projects lies in default attitudes of paternalism, technological solutionism and predatory inclusion, e.g. “surveillance humanitarianism” (Latonero 2019; Vinuesa et al. 2020), decolonial thinking shifts our view towards systems that instead promote active and engaged political community. This implies a shift towards the design and deployment of AI systems that is driven by the the agency, self-confidence and self-ownership of the communities they work for, e.g. adopting co-development strategies for algorithmic interventions alongside the communities they are deployed in (Katell et al. 2020). Co-development is one potential strategy within a varied toolkit supporting the socio-political, economic, linguistic and cultural relevance of AI systems to different communities, as well as shifting power asymmetries. A decolonial view offers us tools with which to engage a reflexive evaluation and continuous examination of issues of cultural encounter, and a drive to question the philosophical basis of development (Kiros 1992). With a self-reflexive practice, initiatives that seek to use AI technologies for social impact can develop the appropriate safeguards and regulations that avoid further entrenching exploitation and harm, and can conceptualise long-term impacts of algorithmic interventions with historical continuities in mind.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Governance

The aff’s AI governance policy is coloniality that locks the global south into an imbalanced power relation to colonial powers

Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” pp. 669-671)-qcl

Power imbalances within the global AI governance discourse encompass issues of data inequality and data infrastructure sovereignty, but also extend beyond this. We must contend with questions of who any AI regulatory norms and standards are protecting, who is empowered to project these norms and the risks posed by a minority continuing to benefit from the centralisation of power and capital through mechanisms of dispossession (Thatcher et al. 2016; Harvey 2004). As Jasanoff and Hurlbut (2018) remind us, we must be mindful of “who sits at the table, what questions and concerns are sidelined and what power asymmetries are shaping the terms of debate”. A review of the global landscape of AI ethics guidelines (Jobin et al. 2019) pointed out the “under-representation of geographic areas such as Africa, South and Central America and Central Asia” in the AI ethics debate. The review observes a power imbalance wherein “more economically developed countries are shaping this debate more than others, which raises concerns about neglecting local knowledge, cultural pluralism and the demands of global fairness”. A similar dynamic is found when we examine the proliferation of national policies on AI in countries across the world (Dutton 2018). In some views, this is a manifestation of a new type of geopolitics amongst “AI superpowers” (Lee 2018), and a rise of “AI nationalism”, where nations wrangle to spread a preferred view of policy, applied approaches and technical services (Hogarth 2018; Edgerton 2007b). We are quickly led to one possible scene of coloniality by Lee (2017): “Unless they [developing countries] wish to plunge their people into poverty, they will be forced to negotiate with whichever country supplies most of their AI software—China or the United States—to essentially become that country’s economic dependent”. It can be argued that the agency of developing countries is in these ways undermined, where they “cannot act unilaterally to forge their own rules”and cannot expect prompt protection of their interests (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Such concerns were demonstrated at the 2019 G20 summit, where a number of developing countries including India, Indonesia and South Africa refused to sign the Osaka Track, an international declaration on data flows (Kanth 2019), because the interests, concerns and priorities of these countries were not seen to be represented in the document. The undermining of interests and agency of developing countries is also a relevant issue vis a vis the OECD AI Principles (OECD ` 2019). As these guidelines are adopted and enforced by partner countries around the world, we see analogous concerns surfacing around exclusionary path dependencies and first-mover advantages (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Additionally, AI governance guidelines risk being replicated across jurisdictions in a way that may be incompatible with the needs, goals and constraints of developing countries, despite best efforts (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). There are clear hierarchies of power within these cases of policy development, which can be analysed using the aforementioned metropole-periphery model. It is 670 S. Mohamed et al. metropoles (be it government or industry) who are empowered to impose normative values and standards, and may do so at the “risk of forestalling alternative visions” (Greene et al. 2019). A metropole-periphery model draws attention to the need to represent values, interests, concerns and priorities of resource-constrained countries in AI governance processes, as well as the historic dynamics that prevent this. Decolonial theory offers AI policy makers a framework to interrogate imbalances of power in AI policy discourse, understand structural dependencies of developing countries, question ownership of critical data infrastructures and assess power imbalances in product design/development/deployment of computational technologies (Irani et al. 2010) as well as the unequal distribution of risks and economic benefits

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Data Privacy

US digital authoritarian strategy reinforces economic imbalances between countries and magnifies inequality in the poorest countries – punitive approaches to multinational service providers generate millions in digital service taxes Klyman 22

Kevin Klyman researches US-China relations and has written data protection policies adopted by the World Health Organization. “Biden’s Campaign for “Digital Democracy” Is Really a Giveaway to Big Tech”, Jacobin. 6/26/22. --JrH

Another dangerous aspect of the United States’ digital strategy is its punitive approach toward countries that levy taxes on multinationals that provide digital services. Digital services taxes are often cited as a core component of digital authoritarianism in , since they weaken foreign firms and allow the Kremlin to nurture more pliable domestic providers of digital services. China, by contrast, has  for such taxes, as it has already driven out most major foreign tech companies through internet censorship and invasive data-sharing requirements. Digital services taxes can have downsides, of course. If they do not narrowly target foreign firms, such taxes can  the domestic technology ecosystem. Taxes that target firms’ transactions instead of their profits are likely to  for consumers, making it more expensive to go online. But they have benefits too. Digital services taxes secure significant revenue for countries with limited tax bases. Malaysia  $126 million from its digital services tax in just one year, equal to 1.5 percent of its  tax revenue. Smaller economies have been just as successful: Kenya  $45 million and Ecuador  $20 million in the first year of their digital services taxes. Over time, these taxes  up to 3 percent of a country’s tax revenue simply by levying fees on a few multinationals. Logan Wort, the African Tax Administration Forum’s executive secretary, told Jacobin that this fundraising potential demonstrates “the importance of countries taking such approaches to enhance their tax bases.”These revenues are especially important in the context of the global economic crisis wrought by the pandemic, which has  governments in the Global South to  their budgets. Without digital services taxes, governments around the world would be  to default on their loans from the International Monetary Fund, increasing the risk that creditors will force governments to cut costs by eliminating basic services. The United States has launched a full-scale assault on digital services taxes. In June 2021, the Biden administration  a 25 percent tariff on a wide range of goods from India, Turkey, Spain, and Britain in response to their digital services taxes. US trade representative Katherine Tai said that the government would not enforce the tariffs for six months, allowing trade negotiations to continue while the threat of harsh economic reprisal loomed. In October 2021, the  celebrated Treasury secretary Janet Yellen’s “groundbreaking” negotiation of a global minimum tax for corporations. The agreement, which sets the minimum tax rate on corporations at 15 percent  than the international community’s original goal of 25 percent, has a gaping loophole: it  all 140 signatories to repeal their digital services taxes and not introduce similar taxes in the future. Many of the world’s poorest countries refused to sign the deal, since they wanted to retain or implement digital services taxes to expand their tax bases. This has  that the United States will impose steep tariffs on “half of Africa.” In an interview with Jacobin, Wort warned that such a move would have “broader economic impacts on countries with economic ties to the US” and that countries that have not signed the agreement face “significant risk and continued loss of revenue” if they wait to adopt digital services taxes. The United States is ‘waging war’ on countries that impose nontariff barriers to digital trade — even democratic ones. Though these coercive tactics are a  for Big Tech, they have little tangible payoff for the United States. The US International Trade Commission that eliminating all global digital trade barriers would boost US GDP by just 0.1 percent. Nevertheless, the United States is “” on countries that impose nontariff barriers to digital trade — even democratic ones. Samantha Power, the head of US Agency for International Development, announced at Biden’s Summit for Democracy that her agency would an additional $20 million on this variety of lobbying. “We’ll use these funds to help partner nations align their rules governing the use of technology with democratic principles and respect for human rights,” she said. In April, the Biden administration codified its corporatist stance at the State Department’s signing ceremony for the Declaration for the Future of the Internet. The declaration, which was signed by sixty other countries, discourages countries from data localization,  they “realize the benefits of data free flows [sic].” A leaked  of the initiative’s aims clarifies that the Biden administration hopes to counter the “alternative vision of the Internet as a tool of State control promoted by authoritarian powers such as China and Russia.”

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Data Privacy

US assault on data protection/privacy bolsters techno hegemony and reflects a larger project of public/private collusion to deny fundamental human right of privacy to millions – turns democracy promotion

Klyman 22

Kevin Klyman researches US-China relations and has written data protection policies adopted by the World Health Organization. “Biden’s Campaign for “Digital Democracy” Is Really a Giveaway to Big Tech”, Jacobin. 6/26/22. --JrH

Freedom to Assemble Our Computer Overlords The next pillar of America’s “pro-democracy” digital strategy is to weaken other countries’ data protection and privacy laws. The in some circles of “the ” is that data protection can exacerbate authoritarianism because dictators use such laws to ensure that the “government is the main arbiter and moderator of data.” The US International Trade Commission — a federal agency tasked with adjudicating international trade disputes — staunchly strong data protection laws, suggesting they tend “to cause substantial damage to consumer trust in the Internet; to erode business opportunities for data-related innovations, for example, in the areas of analytics and Big Data; and to raise costs for businesses complying with multiple divergent standards.” US technology giants wholeheartedly agree that private companies, not governments, should be the main arbiters and moderators of data. Big Tech companies have accordingly become the leading opponents of robust data protection and privacy laws across the world. Leaked Facebook documents revealed that it was able privacy legislation in Malaysia by promising the government it would increase investment. In Kenya, Google and IBM are at the of undercutting Kenya’s data protection law by lobbying for looser restrictions on the transfer of personal data. In Europe, where the EU is harsher penalties for algorithmic harm, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft are the continent’s . “America’s ‘more democratic’ alternative to allowing countries to manage their own data is to coerce them into allowing US multinationals to host their citizens’ personal data in the US.” Companies have brazenly violated the law to establish monopolies overseas. In 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission Microsoft $25 million for bribing the governments of Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Turkey to use Microsoft’s services. A Microsoft whistleblower subsequently in March 2022 that the company pays $200 million annually in bribes and kickbacks to secure favorable government contracts in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Qatar. Although the terms of Microsoft’s government contracts are not public, it is likely that Microsoft’s contracts contain few privacy provisions as they “cement its monopoly on the continent,” in the whistleblower’s words. Sambuli, the Ford Global Fellow, told Jacobin, “What’s happening behind the scenes is what we don’t know. We don’t know what those companies have negotiated. We don’t know which parts of us have been sold.” Despite Big Tech’s protestations, data protection and privacy laws are usually motivated by their clear-cut benefits, not tyrannical ploys for government supervision. Privacy is a  human right.  of the world’s poorest countries have no data protection or privacy legislation, leaving their citizens at risk of having their personal information stolen or  to third parties. Before the  of South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act in 2020, the personal information of 30 million South Africans was hacked, a figure representing more than  the country. Data protection laws boost countries’ economies as well, helping  legal ambiguity and reassuring companies that, if they expand in a country, their data will be safe and they will not face arbitrary litigation. But even more importantly, data privacy ensures that people feel safe enough to organize and express their political beliefs. In other words, it is fundamental to democracy — exposing the absurdity of the United States’ opposition in the name of democracy promotion.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Techno Dominance

Aff’s Techno hypocrisy obscures violence and economic exploitation that undergirds US global tech hegemony – sale of facial recognition tech, satellite primacy and strongarm data agreements policies

Klyman 22

Kevin Klyman researches US-China relations and has written data protection policies adopted by the World Health Organization. “Biden’s Campaign for “Digital Democracy” Is Really a Giveaway to Big Tech”, Jacobin. 6/26/22. --JrH

US policymakers portray China’s technology strategy as uniquely dangerous and despotic, but what they truly fear is that China threatens to displace the United States as the global leader in advanced technologies. Take digital infrastructure as an example. Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden’s national security advisor, has  that China is pursuing “global domination” by building out internet infrastructure in Eurasia and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative. However, the United States is a far more dominant player in global technology infrastructure. The US government and American firms  three thousand satellites, 60 percent of the global total,  the Global Positioning System (GPS), a constellation of thirty satellites that provides location services to billions of devices. US companies design  of all semiconductors, the microelectronics necessary for smartphones and computers. And Google’s Android operating system  72 percent of the world’s mobile phones — Apple’s iOS accounts for the remaining 28 percent — allowing Google to  personal information from 2.5 billion people round-the-clock. Nanjira Sambuli, one of East Africa’s leading technology policy analysts and a Ford Global Fellow, said in an interview with Jacobin, “For the average user, the interaction they have with Chinese tech is phones. But the phones run Android.” When they bother to acknowledge the reality of US global tech hegemony at all, believers in American exceptionalism contend that even if US-based companies monopolize essential infrastructure and engage in mass surveillance, their actions are qualitatively different from those of Chinese firms, as they are less integrated with the state. In reality, US tech companies are intimately connected with the government. Big Tech receives billions of dollars in corporate welfare each year in the form of  and . The Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security paybillions to tech companies in exchange for cloud computing services, secure databases, and augmented reality systems. Besides monetary support, the revolving door between Big Tech and the federal government is , with tech-backed nominees  key regulatory positions. Munira Lokhandwala, director of tech and training at the anti-corruption group Little Sis, told Jacobin, “Virtually every US government department has multiple multiyear contracts with Big Tech.” According to Lokhandwala, “Some agencies are wholly reliant on tech companies. As a government employee, there’s often no way to do your work without outsourcing some of it to one of the five major tech companies.” Chinese firms are rightly  for  surveillance technology abroad to autocratic governments such as Uganda, Zambia, and Kazakhstan. Similarly, US companies  be condemned for  facial recognition technology to Saudi Arabia, , , and the United Arab Emirates, helping these totalitarian states crack down on dissidents. In 2020, Belarus  equipment provided by the American company Sandvine to block millions of websites and censor news and social media in the midst of mass protests following Alexander Lukashenko’s  reelection. After several outlets reported its involvement, Sandvine quietly  its partnership with the Belarusian government, though it  similar partnerships in Jordan and Russia. Francisco Partners, which owns Sandvine, was later “ 2020’s top money maker” among tech-focused private equity firms.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › 1nc Governance

The alternative is decolonial AI – Critical Technical Practice centers decoloniality to produce ethical research strategies, safety, diversity initiatives and activism and disrupt colonial Sociotechnical discourses that enframe AI research & development

Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” pp. 669-671 pp. 671)-qcl

The basis of decolonial AI rests in a self-reflexive approach to developing and deploying AI that recognises power imbalances and its implicit value systems. It is exactly this type of framework that was developed by Agre (1997), who described a shift towards a Critical Technical Practice of AI (CTP). Critical technical practices take a middle ground between the technical work of developing new AI algorithms and the reflexive work of criticism that uncovers hidden assumptions and alternative ways of working. CTP has been widely influential, having found an important place in human-computer interactions (HCI) and design (Dourish et al. 2004; Sengers et al. 2006). By infusing CTP with decoloniality, we can place a productive pressure on our technical work, moving beyond good-conscience design and impact assessments that are undertaken as secondary tasks, to a way of working that continuously generates provocative questions and assessments of the politically situated nature of AI. The role of practice in this view is broad by necessity. Recent research, in both AI and Science and Technology Studies (STS), highlights the limitations of purely technological approaches to addressing the ethical and social externalities of AI. Yet, technical approaches can meaningfully contribute when they appropriately reflect the values and needs of relevant stakeholders and impacted groups (Selbst et al. 2019). This context-aware technical development that CTP speaks to—which seeks to consider the interplay between social, cultural and technical elements—is often referred to as heterogeneous engineering (Law and et al. 1987). As a result, a heterogeneous-critical practice must encompass multiple approaches for action: in research, organising, testing, policy and activism. We explore five topics constituting such a practice: algorithmic fairness, AI safety, equity and diversity, policy-making, and AI as a decolonising tool. Fairness Research in algorithmic fairness (Nissenbaum 2001; Dwork et al. 2012; Barocas and Selbst 2016) has recognised that efforts to generate a fair classifier can still lead to discriminatory or unethical outcomes for marginalised groups, depending on the underlying dynamics of power; because a “true” definition of fairness is often a function of political and social factors. Quijano (2000) again speaks to us, posing questions of who is protected by mainstream notions of fairness, and to understand the exclusion of certain groups as “continuities and legacies of colonialism embedded in modern structures of power, control, and hegemony”. Such questions speak to a critical practice whose recent efforts, in response, have proposed fairness metrics that attempt to use causality (Chiappa and Isaac 2019; Mitchell et al. 2018; Nabi and Shpitser 2018; Madras et al. 2019) or interactivity (Canetti et al. 2019; Jung et al. 2019) to integrate more contextual awareness of human conceptions of fairness. Safety The area of technical AI safety (Amodei et al. 2016; Raji and Dobbe 2020) is concerned with the design of AI systems that are safe and appropriately align with human values. The philosophical question of value alignment arises, identifying the ways in which the implicit values learnt by AI systems can instead be aligned with those of their human users. A specification problem emerges when there is a mismatch between the ideal specification (what we want an AI system to do) and the revealed specification (what the AI system actually does). This again raises questions that were posed in the opening of whose values and goals are represented, and who is empowered to articulate and embed these values—introducing discussions of utilitarian, Kantian and volitional views on behaviour, and on the prevention and avoidance of undesirable and unintended consequences (Gabriel 2020). Of importance here, is the need to integrate discussions of social safety alongside questions of technical safety. Diversity With a critical lens, efforts towards greater equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI) in the fields of science and technology are transformed from the prevailing Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical 673 discourse that focuses on the business case of building more effective teams or as being a moral imperative (Rock and Grant 2016), into diversity as a critical practice through which issues of homogenisation, power, values and cultural colonialism are directly confronted. Such diversity changes the way teams and organisations think at a fundamental level, allowing for more intersectional approaches to problem-solving to be taken (D’Ignazio and Klein 2020). Policy There is growing traction in AI governance in developing countries to encourage localised AI development, such as the initiatives by UNESCO, UN Global Pulse’s AI policy support in Uganda and Ghana (ITU 2019) and Sierra Leone’s National Innovation & Digital Strategy (DSTI 2019), or in structuring protective mechanisms against exploitative or extractive data practices (Gray and Suri 2019). Although there are clear benefits to such initiatives, international organisations supporting these efforts are still positioned within metropoles, maintaining the need for self-reflexive practices and considerations of wider political economy (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Resistance The technologies of resistance have often emerged as a consequence of opposition to coloniality, built by self-organising communities to “bypass dynamics and control of the state and corporations” (Steiner 1994; Milan 2013). A renewed critical practice can also ask the question of whether AI can itself be used as a decolonising tool, e.g. by exposing systematic biases and sites of redress. For example, Chen et al. (2019) instantiate this idea of using AI to assess systemic biases in order to reduce disparities in medical care, by studying mortality and 30-day psychiatric readmission with respect to race, gender, and insurance payer type as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Furthermore, although AI systems are confined to a specific sociotechnical framing, we believe that they can be used as a decolonising tool while avoiding a techno-solutionism trap. When AI systems can be adapted to locally specific situations in original ways, they can take a renewed role as “creole technologies” that find positive and distinctive use at scale, and outside their initially conceived usage (Edgerton 2007a).

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › 1nc Governance

The aff’s AI governance policy is coloniality that locks the global south into an imbalanced power relation to colonial powers

Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” pp. 669-671)-qcl

Power imbalances within the global AI governance discourse encompass issues of data inequality and data infrastructure sovereignty, but also extend beyond this. We must contend with questions of who any AI regulatory norms and standards are protecting, who is empowered to project these norms and the risks posed by a minority continuing to benefit from the centralisation of power and capital through mechanisms of dispossession (Thatcher et al. 2016; Harvey 2004). As Jasanoff and Hurlbut (2018) remind us, we must be mindful of “who sits at the table, what questions and concerns are sidelined and what power asymmetries are shaping the terms of debate”. A review of the global landscape of AI ethics guidelines (Jobin et al. 2019) pointed out the “under-representation of geographic areas such as Africa, South and Central America and Central Asia” in the AI ethics debate. The review observes a power imbalance wherein “more economically developed countries are shaping this debate more than others, which raises concerns about neglecting local knowledge, cultural pluralism and the demands of global fairness”. A similar dynamic is found when we examine the proliferation of national policies on AI in countries across the world (Dutton 2018). In some views, this is a manifestation of a new type of geopolitics amongst “AI superpowers” (Lee 2018), and a rise of “AI nationalism”, where nations wrangle to spread a preferred view of policy, applied approaches and technical services (Hogarth 2018; Edgerton 2007b). We are quickly led to one possible scene of coloniality by Lee (2017): “Unless they [developing countries] wish to plunge their people into poverty, they will be forced to negotiate with whichever country supplies most of their AI software—China or the United States—to essentially become that country’s economic dependent”. It can be argued that the agency of developing countries is in these ways undermined, where they “cannot act unilaterally to forge their own rules”and cannot expect prompt protection of their interests (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Such concerns were demonstrated at the 2019 G20 summit, where a number of developing countries including India, Indonesia and South Africa refused to sign the Osaka Track, an international declaration on data flows (Kanth 2019), because the interests, concerns and priorities of these countries were not seen to be represented in the document. The undermining of interests and agency of developing countries is also a relevant issue vis a vis the OECD AI Principles (OECD ` 2019). As these guidelines are adopted and enforced by partner countries around the world, we see analogous concerns surfacing around exclusionary path dependencies and first-mover advantages (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Additionally, AI governance guidelines risk being replicated across jurisdictions in a way that may be incompatible with the needs, goals and constraints of developing countries, despite best efforts (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). There are clear hierarchies of power within these cases of policy development, which can be analysed using the aforementioned metropole-periphery model. It is 670 S. Mohamed et al. metropoles (be it government or industry) who are empowered to impose normative values and standards, and may do so at the “risk of forestalling alternative visions” (Greene et al. 2019). A metropole-periphery model draws attention to the need to represent values, interests, concerns and priorities of resource-constrained countries in AI governance processes, as well as the historic dynamics that prevent this. Decolonial theory offers AI policy makers a framework to interrogate imbalances of power in AI policy discourse, understand structural dependencies of developing countries, question ownership of critical data infrastructures and assess power imbalances in product design/development/deployment of computational technologies (Irani et al. 2010) as well as the unequal distribution of risks and economic benefits.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › 1nc Digital Democracy

Alternative is democratic digital collective – solves surveillance capitalism, cultivates communal and accessible response to sociotechno exploitation

Martell 21

Professor Luke Martell has been a Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Reader, and Professor of Political Sociology at Sussex. He was Head of the Department of Sociology, Chair of the Social and Political Thought Graduate programme, and President of the University and College Union branch. He is now a part-time Teaching Fellow in the Sociology Department. He teaches modules on 'The Death of Socialism?' and 'Alternative Societies'. His book 'Alternative Societies: For a Pluralist Socialism' will be published by Bristol University Press in 2023. “”, 8/11/21. https://www.ideology-theory-practice.org/blog/surveillance-capitalism-and-digital-alternatives --JrH

So, to recap and clarify key points. Oligopoly and the harvesting and selling of our digital lives has become a norm and a new economic sector of capitalism. State responses, to very different degrees, have been to resist monopolization and ensure modest privacy protections or awareness. Individual responses and those of some organizations have been to use software that blocks tracking and aims to maintain privacy and anonymity. But positive as these methods are, they are in part defensive, limited in what they can achieve against high-level attempts at intrusion, and some of these individualise action. Alongside such state and individual processes, we need a more pro-active and collective approach. This includes stronger regulation and breaking up and taking tech into collective ownership. In the sphere of alternatives, it means expanding and strengthening a parallel sphere, decentralised and federated. And alternatives require putting control in the hands of those affected, so collective democracy with inclusive participation. Then oligopolies are challenged and there is a link between those affected and those in control. But alternatives must be made accessible and more easily understandable to the non-techy and beyond the expert, and do not just have to be an alternative but can be a prefigurative basis for spreading to the way the digital and tech world is more widely. This involves supplementing liberal individual privacy and rights approaches, often defensive within the status quo, with collective democracy and control approaches, more proactive and constructive of alternatives. If there is an erosion of capitalism out of such an approach so there will be also to profit incentives in surveillance capitalism. With an extension of collective control not-for-profit, then motivations for surveillance and data capture are reduced. But this must be done through inclusive democratic control (by workers, users and the community) as much as possible rather than the traditional state, as the latter has its own reasons for surveillance. It should be supplemented by a pluralist, decentralised, federated, digital world to counter oligopoly and power. Democratisation that is inclusive globally is also suited to dealing with differences and divides digitally, e.g. by class or across the Global North and Global South. Taken together this approach implies pluralist democratic socialism as well as liberalism, rather than capitalism or the authoritarian state.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › 1nc Digital Democracy

Surveillance capitalism weaponizes digital technology to control communities and turns democracy promotion – US/Big tech partnership reproduces economic inequality, human rights violation and environmental degradation

Hynes 21

Mike Hynes, PhD, is  lecturer in Political Science and Sociology at the National University of Ireland Galway, specializing in environmental sociology, Mobilities and sustainability research. (2021). "Digital Democracy: The Winners and Losers", The Social, Cultural and Environmental Costs of Hyper-Connectivity: Sleeping Through the Revolution, Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 137-153.  --JrH

The digital ICT revolution promised much for democratic politics in the twenty-first century but so far has delivered little but disruption. The dawn of the internet age was to bring a decisive shift towards the citizen and information was to become free and limitless, and enlightenment and empowerment would follow. But while digital technologies provide us with the opportunity to accumulate quantities of information that one time may not have been possible, big tech and the state remains much better equipped than any private citizen to take full advantage of this opportunity. In many ways, digital technology has been weaponised against the very system it was purported to support and defend and the citizens it was meant to engage, protect and enlighten. Authoritarian regimes across the world have seized upon the opportunities provided by such technology to increase surveillance and control of their people while simultaneously spreading misinformation and confusion, undermining many of the established Western liberal democracies. It would be rather naïve to think that democratic governments are not also regularly using similar digital surveillance technique under various guises and security apparatuses. And all the while big tech is the real big winner. The pioneers of surveillance capitalism Google were emboldened and benefitted from historical events when a national security apparatus, galvanised by the attacks of 11 September 2001, saw the emergent capabilities and the promise of some certainty in how Google’s storage and use of huge stocks of personal data could be used to shadow and predict the behaviour of individuals.Zuboff believes that the concepts underpinning surveillance capitalism are facilitating the overthrow of the people’s sovereignty and is a prominent force in the perilous drift towards democratic deconsolidation that now threatens Western liberal democracies themselves. And this is a common complaint in the twenty-first century; democracy itself has lost control of corporate power in the form of big tech companies, who use whatever means possible to hoard vast wealth and influence while fuelling inequality, damaging the planet and avoid paying their fair share of taxes.Today’s big tech behemoths exist in a political culture that has grown accustomed and accommodating to their every need, and Runciman argues, in the United States, this was further cemented by the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United case of 2010 to grant corporations the same rights to free speech as individual citizens. The ideals and very notion of liberal democracy are now under constant pressure from many angles, and the traditional hierarchy of power is also under increasing danger. The power of modern corporate power, in the form of big tech, has grown exponentially over the past decade to the point where it now has the wherewithal to undermine how democracy itself operates and not be overly worried about the consequences. A major imperative now for every citizen and democratic nation must be to reassess the inequitable influence of big tech corporate power and the internet, particularly as it relates to our personal data, and to question: who owns and controls such power, and what right do they have to use and misuse our personal data to undermine our key democratic institutions? Democracy must be seen to represent the wishes of the people rather than viewed as a system of corporate tyranny.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › 1nc Digital Democracy

US democracy promotion is imperialist, hypocritical and bolsters authoritarian surveillance

Klyman 22

Kevin Klyman researches US-China relations and has written data protection policies adopted by the World Health Organization. “Biden’s Campaign for “Digital Democracy” Is Really a Giveaway to Big Tech”, Jacobin. 6/26/22. --JrH

American democracy promotion has been a calamity, to put it lightly. This century alone, the United States has helped violently overthrow the governments of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Haiti, Bolivia, and Honduras, leaving and tens of millions more , all in the name of democracy. The irony is potent: at home, the United States responded to 2020’s mass protests against police brutality with yet more police brutality, and 2021 began with an attempted coup galvanized by the outgoing president and his political party. Despite the wreckage and the hypocrisy, democracy promotion remains a centerpiece of US foreign policy, and is mobilized as a justification for American goals, whatever they may be. With respect to technology, US policymakers have called for the promotion of “digital democracy” and opposition to “digital authoritarianism” emanating from China. The narrative of democracy triumphing over high-tech dictatorship obscures America’s real goal, which is to prevent Beijing from displacing Washington as the leader in global surveillance and the owner of much of the world’s internet infrastructure. US technology strategy has the same underlying motivation as many other policies that ostensibly aim to promote democracy: opening up markets so that American firms can sell their products abroad. What the tech industry and policymakers have dubbed “digital democracy” is just a recapitulation of US imperialism with respect to the pursuit of global technology dominance. Promoting digital democracy is dangerous for three reasons. First, the United States and other electoral democracies engage in indiscriminate mass surveillance around the world. Second, the US government foists technology policies on poor countries that largely benefit Big Tech. Third, the narrative that innovative American companies are more righteous than their illiberal Chinese counterparts manufactures consent for US-backed surveillance. Voting for the Panopticon “Digital democracy” is by nature defined against digital authoritarianism. The Brookings Institution — which from Google, Facebook, and Amazon — digital authoritarianism as “the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations.” This raises the question: What about when democracies use the same tactics? The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation — a think tank by Apple, Microsoft, and Uber — that democracies, unlike authoritarian states, would never abuse technology: “Authoritarian nations will use technology for authoritarian purposes. Democratic nations will use them for legitimate and civil-liberty-protecting purposes.” This kind of black-and-white thinking creates a self-reinforcing logic: when democratic states and their tech companies engage in surveillance, we can assume that it is for the cause of freedom, but when authoritarian states do it, it is for the purpose of social control. Was the NSA on Angela Merkel’s phone calls a triumph of representative government? Are YouTube’s efforts to Palestinian activists justified by the will of the majority? Is Facebook facilitating genocide in Myanmar and “what democracy looks like”? Apparently so. In truth, spying on people and stealing their data is abhorrent regardless of the nature of the government performing or sanctioning that surveillance. Regrettably, surveillance capitalism has become a in the global economy. Across the world’s democracies, republics, oligarchies, monarchies, theocracies, and dictatorships, accumulating data for profit has become the modus operandi of many companies. US technology strategy has the same underlying motivation as other policies that ostensibly aim to promote democracy: opening up markets so that American firms can sell their products abroad.