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2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Biotechnology

Biotechnology only works to reaffirm the power of commodities over individuals- it’s use to implement control over other countries as the ideology of imperialism is instead presented as a question of science and objectivity

Jasanoff ’06 (Sheila Jasanoff, Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, has authored more than 130 articles and chapters, founded and directs the security technology and sciences Program at Harvard, served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science, holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège; 2006, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science”, JSTOR, DOA 6/25/22)//nm

Legibility Advertisements for agricultural biotechnology frequently show fields of grain laid out in neat parallel lines, illustrating both the fertility and the increased control that genetic modification can allegedly deliver. One could hardly find more compelling images of the “legibility” described by Scott. Intrusive weeds, barren patches, unruly growth have all been eliminated in favor of healthy, predictable, quantifiable yields— achieved through the precision of genetic control. However, just as the midcentury grand planners’ dreams of legibility were achieved at a cost, so legibility in modern GM agriculture demands unseen labors of standardization, and consequent elimination of ambiguity, to achieve its surface regularity. Four dimensions of standardization are worth noting: ontologies, epistemologies, socio-ecologies, and forms of life. All four maintain traditional relations of power between center and periphery, and all can be illustrated through the case of “golden rice,” the poster crop for a new generation of nutrient-enriched GM crops to feed the developing world.60 The name was given to a strain of rice bioengineered to produce beta-carotene, which colors the grain a pale gold; when ingested, it converts to vitamin A in the body and protects consumers against vitamin deficiency leading to possible blindness. For the products of GM agriculture to locate themselves securely in global markets, there has to be broad agreement on what these entities actually are. This ontological question may seem straightforward at first—proponents of golden rice, for instance, claim that it is nothing more than a more nutritious plant variety—but food crops straddle too many categorical boundaries for their identity in the political domain to be anything but hybrid. There are, to begin with, regulatory classifications. Should a crop engineered to produce ingredients of medicinal value be considered a food or a drug? Even if such issues can be settled by formal administrative definitions, the North-South debate surrounding GM crops shows how difficult it is to achieve ontological closure around a commodity that is at once a natural kind (a plant with specific genes and traits) and a social kind (a product of particular economic and political orderings, and a potential reorganizer of society).61 How one should know the properties of GM crops is similarly open to question. U.S. authorities have insisted that the only proper basis on which to evaluate the impacts of these novel entities is through science-based risk assessment. Yet, as the dispute between the United States and Europe at the WTO graphically illustrates, vast disagreements persist about the epistemological status of risk assessment. Is it a “science” at all, in the sense of being a well-demarcated, uncontroversial, paradigmatic (in a Kuhnian sense) method of representing the world; or is it instead a patently political and culturally constructed instrument for managing the uncertainties that inevitably accompany large projects of reconfiguring nature or society?62 To accept producers’ contention that crops such as golden rice are “safe,” one has to buy the former, not the latter, characterization. If, however, risk assessment is an expression of political culture by other means, then one should not be surprised if that form of analysis does not travel friction-free across political and cultural boundaries.63 GM crops are developed in the laboratory, usually in science-rich Western nations, tested in the field, and transported thence for commercial propagation in both naturally and socially variable environments. Monsanto, in this respect, is like the Kew Gardens of the nineteenth century: a metropolitan “center of calculation”64 from which standardized products flow out to take root in the world’s economic and political peripheries. Key to sustaining this mode of production is the assumption that socioecologies are as standard as the crops grown within them—put differently, that social and ecological circumstances at the periphery are not so radically different from those at the metropolitan center as to defeat the project of global technology transfer. Yet accidents occurring even within the boundaries of single nation-states show that transfers from the laboratory to the field can bring unpleasant surprises. For example, in one costly U.S. episode, ProdiGene, a GM corn variety containing an insulin precursor, trypsin,65 was planted in an unmarked field in rural Iowa. The manufacturer agreed with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which approved the field trials, that the field would be quarantined the following year so as to remove any volunteer plants.66 In fact, the fields were not properly isolated and an undetermined quantity of the GM crop was harvested along with about 500,000 bushels of soybeans during the following season. Similar failures resulting from unforeseen couplings of technology, environment, and human behavior are all the more probable when transfers occur across disparate cultures of farming and of hazard control. Expanding on this point, it has become clear that complex technological systems are forms of life, uniting human and nonhuman components in a common purposive framework, as much as they are targeted attempts to improve upon aspects of human life by physical or biological means. Thus, transportation systems do not only move people about from place to place. They remake social structures and self-understandings. A car culture, for example, gives rise to different visions, and valuations, of time, distance, autonomy, community, environmental quality, and the cost of life than a culture dependent chiefly on bicycles or public transportation does. Similarly, industrial agriculture is organized and managed on different principles from small family farms; the two systems of production rest on different economic, social, and technological infrastructures, and their impacts on human solidarity and on the environment are correspondingly divergent. Conventional risk assessment methods take little or no account of the social and ethical ramifications of technological systems, including the threats they pose to long-settled patterns of living. This blindness to technology’s disruption of established forms of life, underwritten by the allegedly scientific power of risk assessment, has fueled much of the criticism of agricultural biotechnology in the global South.67 Identity and Community Empires, no less than nation-states, engender and depend on feelings of belonging. Devices for producing imperial imagined communities have included, besides the grand, polarizing, ideological discourses of the cold war, mundane practices such as performing national celebrations,68 teaching a common language, training administrative and judicial élites, and building infrastructures for commerce and communication. Science and technology, we have seen, have long served as agents of imperial governmentality, helping to produce the mission consciousness and the associated forms of knowledge and skill that serve as instruments for extending power. Modern biotechnology, similarly, provides a discourse of development that continues colonial traditions, although the agents, recipients, and specific mechanisms of the development project have been partially reconfigured in modern times. The discovery of Africa as a site for biotechnological development, through the propagation of crops such as golden rice, offers perhaps the clearest illustration. In the rhetoric of development specialists, and the scientific and industrial institutions that serve them, Africa is represented through tropes of crisis and charity that render the continent’s condition as dire and the offers of scientific and technological solutions as salvationary.69 In one instructive example, Gordon Conway, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, and a colleague wrote an article in the prestigious journal Science on biotechnology’s capacity to help Africans. Though presented as scientific, the article merged the empiricist register of science with a narrative register that was little short of missionary. At the center of the discussion was a fictional African housewife, “Mrs. Namurunda,” who the authors said was not a real person but “a composite of situations existing in Africa.”70 The story begins with Mrs. Namurunda, a farmer and single mother, eking out a hard-scrabble existence on fields infested with every form of insect blight, under adverse conditions of drought and soil degradation. It ends with scientific biotechnology solving her problems, enabling her to turn a profit and secure a brighter, better educated, more enlightened future for her children. This script follows Foucault’s delineation of biopower with uncanny precision. An entire continent becomes a medicalized body, requiring urgent therapeutic intervention, both as a collective and for its individual members. The fictional person of Mrs. Namurunda, unveiled in the pages of one of the world’s leading scientific journals, becomes a symbol for Africa’s “composite” ailments. Advanced societies’ power to develop and deliver the requisite treatments offers them the right, indeed the obligation, to engage in a new mission civilisatrice—built on a biomedical ethic of cure rather than, as in earlier times, a religious model of grace. But, this time, eschewing the forceful, state-led constellations of power that undergirded colonial rule, the neoliberal state works through a lightly regulated global industry and a largely selfregulating scientific community. Their expansion into new territories carries the promise of better jobs and higher incomes back in the home country, thereby allowing the economically more powerful state to justify itself where votes are counted, in its own national community of citizens. The sick and incapacitated recipient, however, has little or no say in either the diagnosis or the treatment of the alleged pathology

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Biotechnology

The 1AC’s new biotech is merely a rearrangement of US domination—the drive for metaphysical innovations are justified by fears of the uncertain states which must be controlled by the technologically developed US empire

Jasanoff ’06 (Sheila Jasanoff, Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, has authored more than 130 articles and chapters, founded and directs the security technology and sciences Program at Harvard, served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science, holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège; 2006, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science”, JSTOR, DOA 6/25/22)//nm

PLANTS FOR THE PLANET: THE EMPIRES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY Apart from occasional radical social misfits such as the so-called Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski,43 few any longer question the vital role of science and technology in human development. Even opponents of particular technological projects—large dams,44 for example, or genetically modified (GM) foods45—rarely dismiss technology outright; rather they favor smaller, more transparent, or more locally governable technological systems. The question that preoccupies students of science and technology, then, is not whether, but how, to integrate innovation into people’s lives so as to make a positive difference. Years of research in the social psychology of risk perception46 and public understanding of science47 have established that popular fear or rejection of new technology often rests, at bottom, on an uneasiness about the ways in which technology is managed or, more accurately, governed. What do these observations imply for an industry with global ambitions, like agricultural biotechnology? How, more specifically, does biotechnology contribute to ways of political worldmaking beyond the nation-state, and what implications do the engagements between biotechnology and global politics have for democratic governance? In reaching for answers, it is useful to think of biotechnology operating politically in several different registers. It is, of course, most plainly a material technology: it makes new instruments for warding off harm and disorder, such as plants that resist insects, weeds, or drought, and it redesigns pieces of nature, such as genes, to perform new tasks in new environments. In this respect, biotechnology is, concurrently, a metaphysical device; it brings new entities into the world and through that process reorders our sense of rightness in both nature and society.48 At the same time, biotechnology is a discourse: to some, of progress and improvement, beneficence and utility; to others, of risk, invasiveness, and domination from afar. Proponents of agricultural biotechnology tell particular stories about a world in which plant genetic modification is possible, and these stories carry political and cultural weight. Lastly, biotechnology is an institution of governance; it shapes forms of social life by influencing how people choose to, or are able to, live with the products of bio-industry. Each of these registers, as we see below, has been activated in the global politics of biotechnology. The Resisting Multitude In May 2004, a scientific journal reported that German researchers were keeping secret the locations of some thirty sites planted with GM corn for fear that anti-GM activists would destroy the crops, as they previously had elsewhere in Germany.49 Failure to disclose these locations was contrary to the EU Directive 2001/18, which requires GM crop sites to be publicly registered. Noncompliance with European law in traditionally law-abiding Germany may have been newsworthy, but the threat to GM crops was anything but novel. From the late 1990s onward, attacks on field trial sites began evolving into a form of international protest that seemed to epitomize Hardt and Negri’s thesis about an emerging, assertive, global multitude: in Britain, hundreds of demonstrators dressed in decontamination suits uprooted GM plants in test fields in 1999; in India and Brazil, farmers’ unions organized similar protests; in France, José Bové, the charismatic head of the radical Confédération Paysanne (Peasant Confederation), became a folk hero by orchestrating the destruction of thousands of GM plants, as well as a partially built McDonald’s outlet, in 1999. His subsequent trial, fine, and terms of imprisonment left him and his supporters undaunted, indeed ready to resume battle as much as five years after their initial transgressions. Field trial sites were not the only theater of protest against GM agriculture. Antiglobalization activists early identified biotechnology as a symbol of the environmental, economic, and cultural homogenization they wished to resist. Demonstrations against Monsanto and GM corn (or maize), together with evocations of risks to nontarget species such as the monarch butterfly, were part of the repertoire of street protest during the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999. In this and similar episodes, representatives of a loosely networked global citizenry asserted their right to debate technological futures in terms other than those conventionally used by nation-states and their expert advisers: the formal discourses of law, molecular biology, economics, risk assessment, and bioethics. At stake was who had power to determine how much global harmonization there should be and which scientific, technological, and economic innovations should be allowed to diffuse throughout the world. Those opting for more local, bottom-up visions won a salient victory when Monsanto decided, under rising public pressure, to withdraw its plans to develop sterile seed technology, through use of the so-called Terminator gene;50 later, citing a drop in global demand, the company also announced that it would put on hold its plans to market genetically modified Roundup Ready wheat.51 Ideology and Enforcement Not everyone saw the antiglobalization movement as the promising vanguard of planetary resistance against an outmoded, corporate-dominated, neoliberal world order. Using the classical ordering machinery of science and the law, proponents of agricultural biotechnology sought to promote their visions of social and technological progress, stifling opposition and dissent. At the February 2000 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, Republican from Missouri, Monsanto’s home state, was openly dismissive of the Seattle protest. He represented it as a struggle between scientific expertise and the misguided, if exuberant, ignorance of youth: “The scientific debate is not being controlled by Ph.D.s but apparently by young people with a proclivity for street theater. . . . It’s coming to the point that scientists are going to have to get dressed up as corncobs to get the attention of the media.”52 At the same meeting, Madeleine Albright, President Clinton’s secretary of state, also cast the conflict as one between reason and unreason. “But science,” she said, “does not support the ‘Frankenfood’ fears of some, particularly outside the United States, that biotech foods or other products will harm human health.”53 Both speakers, from different political parties, enlisted science as their ally in defending biotechnology against its critics. This invocation of scientific authority in support of technological innovation is a marker of America’s commitment to a particular ideology of technoscientific progress.54 A look across the ocean at contemporaneous UK debates on biotechnology helps bring into relief the ideological dimensions of the American position. The term “Frankenfood” was widely used in the British tabloid press to reflect and, some said, reinforce public anxieties. But concerns were not restricted to the media and the ignorant public. The British scientific community had all along expressed greater uncertainty about the safety of GM crops than its American counterpart, particularly with respect to the environmental consequences of commercial use.55 These doubts led British experts to reject the official U.S. position that the process of genetic modification carries no special risks; all that matters for regulatory purposes is the end product. Scientific and public opinion in Britain united behind a more cautious approach, demanding more experimentation—for example, through farm-scale trials56— before authorizing the commercialization of GM crops. As doubts intensified, Tony Blair’s government decided on a highly unusual three-pronged review of the science, economics, and public acceptability of these products to reevaluate the case for their introduction.57 The immediate outcome of this process was a decision to approve the commercialization of only one variety of GM corn, at least to start. Thus, while American neoliberalism treated biotechnology as just another stream of products, adequately controlled by the market except for assessments of their safety to human health and the environment, Britain’s more cautious and communitarian political culture granted the public some say in deciding which products they wanted to allow into the market. Whereas consultative procedures such as Britain’s GM debate and referenda in countries such as Denmark and Switzerland sought to defuse public opposition, elsewhere legal sanctions were employed to beat down what biotechnology promoters saw as unacceptable acts of intransigence. Thus, demonstrators such as José Bové who destroyed GM crops were prosecuted for damaging property in several countries. At the international level, the United States brought a case against the EU at the WTO for imposing an allegedly illegal moratorium on the importation of GM crops and foods. Foundational to the U.S. case was the argument that there were no good scientific reasons for keeping these products off the European market, and that the moratorium therefore amounted to illegal protectionism.58 Intellectual property law, too, has been invoked in safeguarding the investments made by multinationals such as Monsanto in GM crops. Particularly interesting were the prosecutions brought against farmers in the United States and Canada who were found to be growing GM crops patented by Monsanto without a license. In the best known of these cases, a seventy-three-year-old Saskatchewan farmer named Percy Schmeiser was sued for growing genetically modified Roundup Ready canola, which he claimed had blown into his fields from neighboring farms. A 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld Monsanto’s patent infringement claim, saying that Schmeiser’s unlicensed use of seed containing Monsanto’s patented gene was sufficient to constitute infringement.59 In a Solomonic turn, though, the Court awarded no damages to Monsanto, on the ground that Schmeiser had not benefited economically from his unlawful act; equally, Schmeiser was not required to pay Monsanto’s court costs. The case warned GM crop producers that, under Canadian law, they would have a difficult time collecting damages for patent infringement; at the same time, they could be subject to potentially unlimited liability if their seeds accidentally contaminated, and thus damaged, the products of certified GM-free organic farms.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › AI

Data colonialism prevents the Global South rom accessing their own resources, deepening the economic and technical divide

Lmi ’20 ( Nima Elmi, head of government affairs at the World Economic Forum, November 11th 2020, “Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?” Foreign Policy, )

Technology transcends national borders, so it shouldn’t be surprising that, in 2020, private technology and telecommunication companies control more data on the average person than governments do. And it’s not just data ownership: Policymakers similarly fall behind in understanding the power of data. That’s a problem, particularly as social media platforms are able to influence political outcomes with few to no repercussions and geopolitics becomes a duopoly of technological trailblazers like the United States and China, with the rest of the world looking on as spectators—and reluctant participants. The coronavirus pandemic has moved many people’s lives online and demonstrated the revolutionary power of technology in driving economic growth despite physical stasis—whether in e-commerce, continuing employment for those able to work digitally, or virtual schooling. This dramatic shift wouldn’t have been possible without artificial intelligence (AI) embedded within now-essential services like Alexa, Siri, and Zoom. Artificial intelligence is usually talked about in sensationalist terms. But hyperbolic language can mask simple business truths: AI capabilities—understanding everything from shopping habits to future careers or propensity for criminality—will only ever be as good as the datasets that feed them and, without diverse data sets, the ability to innovate and enhance existing AI functionalities is limited. The de facto U.S.-China AI duopoly doesn’t accurately represent the cross-cutting, global consumer bases tech companies serve; for the game to go on, spectators need to pitch in—lest they lose their pastime. It is against this backdrop—a thirst for new data to keep the AI engine chugging—that colonialism has morphed into its latest form: data colonialism. Data colonialism is driven by the control of data as a proxy for the control of people and is quickly becoming the reality faced by many emerging economies today. Far from decolonized, these countries are subject to the whims of Big Tech’s unfettered rise; vulnerable peoples’ data is used to enhance companies’ innovations, entrench their economic and political might, and, in effect, occupy the daily lives of billions of people. Data extraction, monopolization, and monetization are data colonialism’s core tenets. Africa is ground zero for data colonialism. It is the continent with the largest number of countries; most cultural, linguistic and racial diversity; least connected nations; and its data protection regulations range from limited to nonexistent. Africa has always been a continent rich in natural resources, and, today, the diversity of the continent’s population renders it equally rich in data resources. But Big Tech’s exploitation of this diversity—heralded under the guise of internet-for-all initiatives—actually undermines the data sovereignty of African nations and impedes their ability to develop their own digital economies. That’s hardly a tide that lifts all boats. In 2017, data overtook oil to become the world’s most valuable commodity, but it remains hard to define. At its most basic level, data is us—humans—in digital form: how we look; the languages we speak; our viewing preferences, medical records, voices, learning habits, and music preferences. For AI, all data is valuable fodder—enhancing algorithms’ capabilities and generating revenue for the companies that collect it. When it comes to obtaining this data, the latest figures from the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development highlight just how vulnerable Africa is in comparison to its European counterparts. In Europe, 96 percent of countries currently have data protection laws in place—versus only 50 percent in Africa. Globally, only 43 percent of the U.N.’s designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have such laws; 33 out of the 47 LDCs are in Africa. As well as the unrivaled, diverse datasets that Africa offers tech companies, the continent’s relative absence of data protection policies—and a limited understanding of how valuable and influential data can be—is a central causal factor behind its vulnerability to data colonialism. There are myriad reasons for this vacuum in regulation on the continent, including a general lack of capacity, conflicting priorities, and political instability. Data colonialism is at times conflated with humanitarian efforts—after all, who can object to expanding digital access, which nearly all agree is crucial for economic growth? But corporations’ support for emerging economies may be a double-edged sword, as data extraction undermines African nations’ abilities to develop indigenous digital economies that can enhance their own capabilities. It’s farcical to assume corporations’ forays in Africa are chiefly compelled by goodwill: Corporations are ultimately accountable to their shareholders and driven by their bottom lines. That comes at a cost, of which Africa bears the brunt. Both Chinese and U.S. tech giants adopt a humanitarian framing in marketing digital infrastructure projects, but approach the ulterior motive of data extraction differently. Chinese corporations leverage political initiatives like Beijing’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative to secure contracts with African governments, whereby AI and other technology solutions are provided in exchange for access to local citizens’ data—like the deal between CloudWalk, a Chinese developer of facial recognition software, and the Zimbabwean government. Firms are relatively transparent about their goals, with little to no checks or accountability on how the information they receive will be used. Western corporations, by contrast, adopt a more covert approach, establishing digital hubs and offering free internet access. These include Google’s Internet Balloons and Facebook’s Undersea Cable, which encourage more Africans to get online, use their services, and, by convenient coincidence, relinquish their data in the process.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › AI

New harvesting of data in the global south perpetuates the old colonial structures

Adams and Alvarado ’22 (Kimberly Adams, correspondent with Marketplace Tech covering the intersection between politics and the economy, with a special focus on how federal policy affects the bottom line for businesses and individuals. Jesus Alvarado, Assistant Producer at Marketplace by APM, May 10th 2022, “Will the future of AI repeat past injustices?” Marketplace, https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/will-the-future-of-ai-repeat-past-injustices/)

Artificial intelligence has changed our world in major ways: autonomous vehicles, speech-recognition technology and algorithms that change what we see and hear on social media platforms. But the technology and the data fueling AI is often powered by low-paid workers in developing countries, including many nations in the Global South. Some academics describes this as AI colonialism, suggesting that what goes into artificial intelligence is repeating exploitative colonial history. I spoke with journalist Karen Hao, who recently published a series on AI colonialism in MIT Technology Review. The following is an edited transcript of our conversation. Karen Hao: With artificial intelligence, what we now have is these really wealthy companies that have become the empires of people’s data, of computational resources. And they are going to other communities that don’t have the same financial resources, computational resources, taking their data, their precious voices, or their faces, or their body movements and then turning that into software that powers, essentially, our internet. Kimberly Adams: You write about how deep-learning AI techniques rely on “ghost work.” Can you explain what that is? Hao: One of the more famous ghost work examples is content moderation. There are actually thousands and tens of thousands of people that are labeling videos and saying “this has violence, this has nudity, this has some other inappropriate content.” So that’s what ghost work is, it’s like this entire economy of people, primarily in the Global South, that do work to make sure people in the Global North have a clean, efficient internet experience. Adams: Is this a legacy of colonialism, or a new kind of colonialism? Hao: I think it’s both. There’s a sort of path dependence that we now have, where because of our global history there are certain populations that now are sort of predisposed to do certain kinds of work in this AI development pipeline. But then we’re also seeing this history be codified into artificial intelligence, because these AI algorithms, when they learn on data, what they’re really doing is they’re learning on historical data. It’s essentially bringing our past into the future with us. Adams: Your series focuses on the Global South. Can you give a few examples of how this is showing up there? Hao: In the first story, we go to South Africa, and we look at the surveillance industry there, specifically AI surveillance technologies, so technologies that are built on the extraction of people’s movements and people’s faces to then reidentify them, to track them. South Africa, obviously, has this really awful history of apartheid. But what is also happening is it’s now sort of perpetuating a digital apartheid of sorts, because the people that are able to buy these surveillance technologies — because South Africa has a very privatized surveillance industry — are the people that traditionally have wealth. And so it’s predominantly white people. And then the people who are surveilled, and don’t have the wealth to actually object to this kind of surveillance, are the people who didn’t have wealth before — they’re predominantly Black. So we look at stories like this all around the world, where different phenomenons are playing out, where both the local population is subjected to something because of the dispossession that they had globally with former colonizers suppressing their economic development, and therefore leaving them at the bottom of the food chain, and also potentially perpetuating the hierarchy within the countries as well, because of these dynamics that play out. Adams: How much awareness do you think there is of this dynamic among the general population? Hao: I don’t think there’s even an awareness among artificial intelligence researchers, to be honest. With this series, what I was trying to do was really expand the surface of the conversation: Why does AI not fundamentally work for everyone? And only by identifying really the root of the issue, can we then eradicate it and actually reimagine an AI that does work for everyone. Adams: Who would be the major players involved in shifting the balance, or perhaps that are already involved in perpetuating the system? Hao: I think, in shifting the balance, really everyone can be involved. But the heavyweight AI players that are the ones that entrench these systems currently — those are the big tech companies, and all of the companies that support them. The smaller tech companies as well, they’re all sort of engaged in this stuff: Instacart, Uber, Lyft, the entire ecosystem of companies that use any form of algorithms and automation to increase the efficiency and convenience for people in the Global North. They are definitely part and parcel of this broader colonial dynamic that’s happening. And so to shift it, it really requires not just people within these companies to actually push and pressure their leadership, it also requires civil society to push and pressure regulators to introduce regulation. It requires international coordination, too. In my second story, when I talk about Venezuela and the fact that a lot of Venezuelans are now being caught up in this ghost work labor, a researcher said to me: “It doesn’t really matter if Venezuelans rise up and try to resist this, because then the company is just going to move to the next poor population.” And so there has to be sort of an international consortium of, not just tech employees, regulators and civil society organizations all have to coordinate as well, to figure out what are the norms that we should be establishing internationally to make sure that these technologies are more humane.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › AI

The ontological condition of AI is INSEPERABLE from military domination—its autonomy establishes the basis for predicting and sustaining new warscapes

Shaw ’17 (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, DOA 6/24/22)//nm

Autonomous futures Autonomy – and AI more generally – is central to the future of US geopolitics. The Defense Science Board (2016: 3) writes that the ‘ongoing rapid transition of autonomy into warfighting capabilities is vital if the U.S. is to sustain military advantage’. Unlike automation, an autonomous system possesses adaptable intelligence. This enables it to be ‘goal-directed in unpredictable environments and situations’ (US Air Force, 2016: 30). Autonomous weapons are not entirely new: since the 1980s the US Navy has installed autonomous Phalanx CIWS Gatling Guns on many of its battleships. Nonetheless, the contemporary warscape is being transformed by ‘an emerging class of robotic weapons, including drones, mobile sea mines, automated turrets, remote-controlled machine guns, as well as weaponized computer programs’ (Bolton, 2015: 41). Several autonomous drones – the US Navy’s MQ-8 Fire Scout, the UK’s Taranis drones, and the Anglo-French Unmanned Combat Air System – promise to revolutionize air combat. Fearing this geopolitical pathway, 1000 leading scientists called for a ban on autonomous robotics in 2015, citing the existential risks to humanity. Similarly, Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic (2016) continue to demand the prohibition of what they term ‘killer robots’. The US military regularly produces roadmaps that imagine autonomous futures: from robots extracting causalities to swarms of drones overwhelming enemies. ‘Autonomy in unmanned systems will be critical to future conflicts that will be fought and won with technology’ (US Department of Defense, 2013: 67). Multiple reasons are given to justify the Pentagon’s quest for autonomy: future threats will be too complex for human reactions, autonomous robots can function if they lose radio contact, and using pilots to oversee multiple robots is more cost-effective. Finally, autonomous systems can analyze huge streams of real-time data ‘in ways that humans cannot by addressing volume, complexity, speed, and continuity’ (Defense Science Board, 2016: 47). Autonomy thus enables robots ‘to make and execute complex decisions’ (US Army, 2010: 65). Future pilots would direct swarms of intelligent drones with a geographic information system (GIS) program: on the loop but not in the loop. ‘The end result would be a revolution in the roles of humans in air warfare’ (US Air Force, 2009: 50). This standard of AI enables future drones to break with the restrictions of existing unmanned systems. ‘Future [unmanned aircraft] will evolve from being robots operated at a distance to independent robots, able to self-actualize to perform a given task’ (US Department of Defense, 2005: 52). This self-actualization enables the evolution from autonomous targeting to the more controversial step of autonomous attacking (US Department of Defense, 2007: 54). Yet, while the US military is a world leader in robotics today, it will face future ‘unknown unknowns’ from other militaries and non-state groups. For example, there is growing concern within the Pentagon that US soldiers are now vulnerable to (swarms of) terrorist drones on the battlefield. Accordingly, the drone-on-drone warfare of the future will produce highly contested airspaces, fueling a robot arms race of offensive and defensive systems. Autonomy, however, is more than just artificial intelligence: it is an ontological condition. Robots, like all technologies, materialize unique techno-geographies and techno-politics (Hecht, 2011). Rather than being slavish instruments of human minds, robots are geopolitical actors that disrupt and reinvent the worldly conditions of state power, installing ontological coordinates – predictable and unpredictable – for future military violence. The epistemological problem of if, or how, we go to war is inseparable from background material conditions. Drones, for example, continue to transform the ethics of targeted killing (see Walters, 2014). ‘Drones enable the (de)politicization of targets by abstracting human life into a techno-political entity that can be captured in clinical terms as data’ (Schwarz, 2016: 61). So, while robots do not straightforwardly determine military operations, they nonetheless recondition their field of possibilities. ‘Robots, then, may not only make it easier to start a war … they may actually change our military and political doctrines and activities’ (Coeckelbergh, 2011: 271). In short, robots always already possess a degree of ontological autonomy because they reconfigure the conditions of a more-than-human warscape.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › AI

The 1AC’s shift towards artificial intelligence is a tool of military domination that fuels an endless cycle of warfare

Shaw ’17 (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, DOA 6/24/22)//nm

The robotic revolution Robots have disrupted the social and economic spaces of human coexistence for decades. In 1961, General Motors installed the first industrial robotic arm – Unimate – on its assembly lines in New Jersey. Since then, robots have migrated from factories to the social spaces of everyday life. According to one report, there are over 8.4 million robots globally, with a market value in excess of $15 billion (Kadtke and Wells, 2014: 43). And with the exponential leaps in microprocessing power predicted by Moore’s Law, we now stand on the verge of a ‘Cambrian’ explosion of robotic life on planet earth. This has big consequences for the spaces of security and violence. On the ground, in the air, and underwater, military robots are eroding the human monopoly on violence. ‘Today, the world is approaching a robotics revolution in military affairs that may be on par with the introduction of gun-powder, levée en masse, and the advent of nuclear weapons’ (Sukman, 2015: 44). The coming decades will see US soldiers augmented, replaced, and wounded by artificial warriors, which ‘has the potential to change our basic core concepts of defense strategy’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 6). Yet the robotic revolution must be placed within a longer trajectory of capital-intensive warfare (see Edgerton, 1991). This liberal form of violence aims to use technological superiority to ‘solve’ the problem of ‘uncivilized’ states and actors (Mabee, 2016). Accordingly, the US military continues to project peace through capital, security through technics. In 2014, the USA accounted for just over half of global arms sales in a $70 billion annual industry (Theohary, 2015). Still, robots are disrupting the architectures of capital-intensive warfare. The future-oriented 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age sheds light on the US military’s production of robotic geopolitical futures. Co-authored by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work, it insists that ‘U.S. defense leaders should begin to prepare … for war in the Robotic Age’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 5). A similar report by the Pentagon-funded National Defense University explores how evolutions in synthetic life, robotics, and artificial intelligence will transform US dominance (Kadtke and Wells, 2014). At the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the US military had zero ground robots. By the end of 2008, there were 12,000, including iRobot’s PackBot, which was integral to counter–improvised explosive device (IED) missions. Aerial robots continue to disrupt the spaces, subjects, and geopolitics of US conflict (Shaw, 2016). Indeed, what Kate Kindervater (2016) calls ‘lethal surveillance’ has transformed US geopolitics. The Pentagon now stocks a fleet of well over 12,000 aerial drones (US Department of Defense, 2013). Controversially, medium-altitude Predator and Reaper drones have been deployed outside of ‘hot’ battlefields in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Shaw and Akhter, 2012). And on a smaller scale, the US Army is researching how to equip its soldiers with tiny pocket-sized drones for ‘over the hill’ surveillance, which could revolutionize infantry tactics. Within the USA, Predators and Reapers are routinely flown by US Customs and Border Patrol along the Mexico and Canadian borderlands. And back on the ground, $55 million has been spent on transferring 1000 military ground robots to police forces across 43 US states (Center for the Study of the Drone, 2016). On 7 July 2016, Dallas Police Department became the first to use an exploding robot to kill an armed suspect. A robot red-letter day. How, then, can we piece together these developments? Former secretary of defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Defense Innovation Initiative, also known as the ‘third offset strategy’, on 15 November 2014. Underpinned by robotics, cyber warfare, autonomy, 3D printing, electric weapons, miniaturization, and the internet of things, this strategy is designed to sustain US technological dominance in the 21st century. The ‘third offset’ follows precedents in the Cold War. To offset Soviet numerical advantages in the 1950s, the US military invested heavily in nuclear weapons. The second offset strategy of the 1970s was driven by stealth, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and network-centric systems. In both cases, technology was translated into US military dominance. Yet, unlike in the Cold War, the robotic revolution today is sweeping across multiple nations (and non-state actors), not just the US and Soviet militaryindustrial complexes. Thus, US empire confronts a robotizing warscape that is both global and unpredictable. US empire: Towards a proxy army of robots In the preface to the 2015 National Security Strategy, US President Barack Obama declared, ‘We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivalled in human history’ (White House, 2015). Rarely, however, is ‘empire’ used in official parlance. Yet, as Mabee (2004: 1360) suggests, ‘while “lonely superpower”, “unipolar”, and other monikers have been utilized, the US as empire seems to convey a richer understanding and a deeper resonance of America’s contemporary role’. But what exactly is empire? ‘Empires are usually states’, replies Zielonka (2012: 519), ‘but they are states of a peculiar nature.’ Can a statecentric understanding capture the global infrastructures of US military power? For Dalby (2005: 435), ‘If empire is to be of analytical use, it seems that none of the versions of it in circulation are quite adequate to grapple with nuances of the present.’ Accordingly, the concept of empire must connect the geographies of contemporary technics with past materializations. As Parker (2010: 128) concludes, ‘for all its differences from nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples, the geopolitics of empires is likely to be found in the present and in the future’. US history is inscribed by imperialism. For Munro (2014: 1567), ‘continuing to think of US history in imperial terms enables us to see how the present arrives already fundamentally shaped by past economic disparity, racial inequality, hetero-patriarchal oppression and a deep interrelation between the realms of foreign and domestic’. Accordingly, Heumann (2011) argues that the USA has always been an empire-state rather than a nation-state, inheriting the precedents of European empires. Practices of racial domination and expansionism underwrote US state formation and early capitalism, leaving a legacy of segregation. Fast forward to the 19th century, and the so-called Monroe Doctrine of 1823 articulated the belief that the USA was a guardian against European intervention in the ‘New World’. Under President Woodrow Wilson, this moral imperative was reworked into an idealistic vision for spreading democracy across the planet. The grim parade of US proxy wars and black ops during the Cold War – particularly in Latin America – entrenched the idea that the USA was the guardian of western civilization. Despite this history of foreign intervention, the USA has consistently escaped the label of empire (Johnson, 2004a). This did change during the ‘war on terror’, as the Bush administration adopted ‘a new ideological commitment to empire’ (Agnew, 2003: 883). Consider the now infamous boast of White House adviser Karl Rove: ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality’ (originally quoted in Suskind, 2004). Supporters of US empire ranged from liberal interventionists to neoconservative hawks. Under both visions, ‘the US state is thus seen as an imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states’ (Stokes, 2005: 219). Or, as Michael Ignatieff (2003) declared, ‘The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.’ Others find the idea of US empire implausible in an era of global capital (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 384). Empire is viewed instead as a deterritorialized form of capitalist world sovereignty. Yet globalization should not imply a flat and frictionless world of capital. The USA has long been the leader of an uneven world capitalism since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. Accordingly, ‘there is a geography of globalisation: one that rests on an imperial centre’ (Mabee, 2004: 1360). Thus, while capitalist logics are vital in explaining geopolitics, so too are the planetary materialities of US empire. Empires entrench their power through technics. No human sovereign is as awe-inspiring as the technical background that secures humanity across the planet. The question then becomes, how will US empire materialize – and maintain – its dominance in an age of global robotics, technological diffusion, and powerful non-state actors? If the third offset strategy is an indication, US empire will reconstitute by shifting to a permanent, robotic proxy war. Since World War II, the practice of total warfare between states has diminished and proxy wars have increased (Kaldor, 2012). One of the most infamous examples in US history was the CIAfunded Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s. More recently, the Pentagon spent billions on private military contractors in Iraq. But rather than outsource military power to human contractors, US military surrogates of the future could be replaced by robots: private military contractors without flesh, risk, or vulnerability (or healthcare costs). As Mumford (2013: 43) suggests, ‘developments in communications and information technology have the potential to nullify the twentieth-century belief in “boots on the ground” as a proxy-war necessity’. An army of robots can entrench US power without humans on the ground. And, just as importantly, these artificial warriors are profitable commodities (Shaw, 2017). A robotic US empire thus advances proxy warfare – and capitalism – to its most logical conclusion.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › AI

The AI industry is fueling neocolonialism, especially targeting the Global South

Hao 22 (Karen Hao, senior AI editor at MIT Technology Review, covering the field’s cutting-edge research and its impacts on society, April 19th 2022, “Artificial intelligence is creating a new colonial world order” Mit technology Review, ) – Cayden Mayer

The AI industry does not seek to capture land as the conquistadors of the Caribbean and Latin America did, but the same desire for profit drives it to expand its reach. The more users a company can acquire for its products, the more subjects it can have for its algorithms, and the more resources—data—it can harvest from their activities, their movements, and even their bodies. Neither does the industry still exploit labor through mass-scale slavery, which necessitated the propagation of racist beliefs that dehumanized entire populations. But it has developed new ways of exploiting cheap and precarious labor, often in the Global South, shaped by implicit ideas that such populations don’t need—or are less deserving of—livable wages and economic stability. MIT Technology Review's new AI Colonialism series digs into these and other parallels between AI development and the colonial past by examining communities that have been profoundly changed by the technology. In part one, we head to South Africa, where AI surveillance tools, built on the extraction of people’s behaviors and faces, are re-entrenching racial hierarchies and fueling a digital apartheid. In part two, we head to Venezuela, where AI data-labeling firms found cheap and desperate workers amid a devastating economic crisis, creating a new model of labor exploitation. The series also looks at ways to move away from these dynamics. In part three, we visit ride-hailing drivers in Indonesia who, by building power through community, are learning to resist algorithmic control and fragmentation. In part four, we end in Aotearoa, the Māori name for New Zealand, where an Indigenous couple are wresting back control of their community’s data to revitalize its language. Together, the stories reveal how AI is impoverishing the communities and countries that don’t have a say in its development—the same communities and countries already impoverished by former colonial empires. They also suggest how AI could be so much more—a way for the historically dispossessed to reassert their culture, their voice, and their right to determine their own future.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › AT: Democracy/HR Impact

Democracy is resilient, but it solves nothing.

Doorenspleet 19 Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243]

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8 . Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › AT: Diplomatic Cred Impact

Single instances of action do not change international perceptions of the US.

Fettweis 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › AT: Diplomatic Cred Impact

No diplomacy impact and too many alt causes

C. Richard Neu 13, senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, 2/8/13, “U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch,”

This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. “soft power” and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve American interests. The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP. The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999—by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade. And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policy—on the rise as a result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policy—typically foreshadows slower economic growth. Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S. fiscal policymaking. From the beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of GDP, to the end of 2012, the dollar lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have been because investors fear that the only way out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also given up a bit of its dominance as the preferred currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And the renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the “reference currency” for most of East Asia. (The good news is that in recent years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners, mostly at the expense of banks in London.) More troubling for the future is that private domestic investment—the fuel for future economic growth—shows a strong negative correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles dating back to the late 1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard. But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not taken. U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on contributions—political and financial—to major institutions and initiatives —International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world better. But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer lead? And what about unmet needs at home—healthcare costs, a foundering public education system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example? America's fiscal predicament is serious. The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for them. Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a number of years—increased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › Military Cooperation Good

Military-first should be the objective for all security assistance

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation,

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging—or compelling—State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › Military Cooperation Good

Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute,

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › AT: Militarization Impact

No link to militarization – plenty of checks.

Early ‘11 (Billy, Lt Col, USAF, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty, Air War College, 16 February 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf)

Conclusion Building the capacity of foreign military forces to counter terrorism and conduct stability operations is DOD’s strategy to promote the security of the United States.63 DOD’s direct authority to train and equip military partners promotes US national security, but it risks moving the United States toward a more militarized US foreign policy. Risks are mitigated because the State Department’s ability to implement US foreign policy remains strong through its close relationship with DOD and direct involvement in security assistance programs. Congress also remains engaged with yearly debate over the appropriate whole of government approach to promoting US security interests. Militarization of US foreign policy through security assistance exists but is managed through the continuous interaction and teamwork between DOD, the State Department, and Congress.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › Department of State Fails

State Department assistance fails

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation,

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › Department of State Fails

The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, *American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, **American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council Special Report No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › No Solvency

Diplomatic assistance causes political backlash---that wrecks solvency

Kralev ’20 (Nicholas, Executive Director @ the Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA), “Why Politicians Don’t Trust Diplomats,”

So politicians’ lack of trust in the Foreign Service is based on perceptions that are largely divorced from reality. Like most Americans, they know very little about our diplomats. In a challenge to such a conclusion, previous administrations have often pointed to entrusting a few senior Foreign Service officers, including William J. Burns and Thomas R. Pickering, with top State Department posts as an example of the respective president’s reliance on professionals. That may speak of these officers’ capabilities, but it doesn’t make up for sidelining or ignoring the service as an institution. At least Bush and Obama understood that having held a prominent position under an administration of the other party is also a part of a career diplomat’s job. For example, Bush appointed R. Nicholas Burns ambassador to NATO and later undersecretary of state, even though Burns had been State Department spokesman under Clinton. And Obama appointed Victoria Nuland an assistant secretary of state despite her earlier role as a close adviser to Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president. In contrast, Trump has retaliated against officers who held key positions during the Obama administration. Politicians’ decades-long distrust of the Foreign Service has significantly undermined the authority of the professionals and ultimately weakened U.S. diplomacy globally. The very real danger that there won’t be enough properly trained diplomats to restore America’s clout in the future worries us at the independent Washington International Diplomatic Academy. So much so that, although we were set up to offer short-term courses, we’ve decided to start a one-year post-graduate practical training program for people who aspire to become diplomats — the first such effort outside government. Our instructors, all former senior Foreign Service officers, have a lot to teach.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
AFF ANSWERS › Perm DCP

Security cooperation includes DOS activities.

Early ‘11 (Billy, Lt Col, USAF, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty, Air War College, 16 February 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf)-mikee

Security Cooperation The US military shapes the global security environment and safeguards US interests through military engagement with foreign militaries. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, threats to US security have shifted from a two-power major theater war to regional, ethnic, and religious conflicts. To counter these threats, the US military found it necessary to interact with foreign militaries using special operations forces which are best suited to handle these new relationsbuilding efforts.11 Therefore, in 1991 Congress granted DOD direct authority for special operations forces to train with foreign militaries.12 Seeing benefit from building these relationships, the US military continued to promote its engagement strategy which shifted towards working with new and emerging democracies. In 1998 DOD institutionalized planning for military engagements by requiring geographic combatant commanders to publish Theater Engagement Plans.13 Military engagement maintained a narrow, regional focus until former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld introduced Security Cooperation Guidance in 2003 to unify guidance and prioritize department efforts. Today’s DOD guidance reflects changes since 2005 requiring all combatant commanders to publish engagement plans and outlining a broad range of peacetime activities that fall under DOD security cooperation efforts. These include all DOD funded engagements with foreign militaries such as combined exercises, training, and education, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and information operations. Security cooperation also includes security assistance programs which fall under State Department funding and policy direction, namely Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET).14 After 9/11 security cooperation efforts grew rapidly mostly due to DOD activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but threats from global terrorism necessitated significant changes be made to US security assistance efforts.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Russia Alliance Impact Answers › Russia-China Good Turn

That causes extinction

Sharavin 1 [Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3]

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Russia Alliance Impact Answers › Russia-China Good Turn

China has an incentive to attack the Russia border

Sharavin 4 [Alexander, director of the Political and Military Analysis Institute, What the Papers Say, Jan 14]

Question: In your view, who poses the greatest danger to Russia? Alexander Sharavin: In the Defense Ministry's latest report, known as the White Book, our likely opponents are not named - they remain anonymous. However, we believe in being specific. And we name China first. At present, China appears to have good neighborly relations with Russia, and constantly declares that its intentions are friendly; but some of its actual actions prompt the thought that not everything is quite that simple. For example, the state borders issue hasn't been fully resolved - and such matters are always time-bombs. The Russian media pays a lot of attention to the territory dispute with Japan over four small islands, but it totally ignores China's pretensions, even though China aspires to claim much more territory - virtually all of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Or rather, official Beijing remains silent, but articles do appear in China's newspapers sometimes, and discontented voices are raised. It's hard to believe that anyone could permit themselves to speak out like that without authorization in totalitarian China. I repeat: there is no threat from China in the short term - Beijing's policies are entirely loyal in relation to us at present. But what might happen ten years from now? What guarantee is there that somebody won't try to play the territory card? Question: And we're selling Beijing modern fighter jets with extra engines. Alexander Sharavin: Yes, that's an alarming point. So it seems China is allowing for the possibility that the situation might change, and Russia might stop supplying spare parts for military hardware to its neighbor? And is it any coincidence that China's strongest military forces are concentrated along our borders, even if they're at a distance of 200 kilometers? Is that any distance at all, to them? And let's not forget that on our side of the border there are regions with depressed economies, with vast natural resources and small, ever-shrinking populations.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Russia Alliance Impact Answers › Russia-China Good Turn

Another sino-soviet border dispute causes nuclear war – US gets drawn in when Russia or china attack each other

Bolton 10 [Kerry R Bolton, "Sino-Soviet-US Relations and the 1969 Nuclear Threat", www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/17/sino-soviet-us-relations-and-the-1969-nuclear-threat/, DOA: 6/25/16]

The mainstream press has just come out with a Chinese expose that has informed an undoubtedly surprised world that in 1969 the USSR wished to settle its historical score with China and launch a nuclear attack. The USSR merely wanted an assurance of U.S. neutrality. Far from the USA welcoming this de-clawing of the growing dragon, it instead threatened that there would be retaliation from the U.S. against Russia. According to a report first carried in the Daily Telegraph, Chinese historian Liu Chenshan, writing in an officially sanctioned newspaper, stated that the threat “came in 1969 at the height of a bitter border dispute between Moscow and Beijing that left more than one thousand people dead on both sides.” [1] Liu quotes Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin as stating to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on October 15 that “Washington has drawn up ‘detailed plans’ for a nuclear war against the USSR if it attacked China.” The Telegraph writers also speculate that Liu is likely to have had access to official archives given the appearance of this as part of a series of six articles in an official news source. The Telegraph article continues: “The historian claims that Washington saw the USSR as a greater threat than China and wanted a strong China to counter-balance Soviet power…” They also conclude: “Mr Liu, the author, admits his version of history is likely to be contested by rival scholars.” However, this Chinese revelation is not “new” to informed observers. The Russian desire to settle with China, despite the cynically named Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance that had been signed between Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin in 1950 – which relegated China to colonial status rather than pave the way to super-power status[2] – came amidst the culmination of border disputes that had been ongoing since 1960.[3] The largest conflict had taken place on March 2, 1969, when Chinese troops ambushed Russian troops on the uninhabited Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, killing 32 Russians. The Soviets responded on the night of March 14 by shelling 20 kilometers into China. Approximately 60 Russians and 800 Chinese were killed in the conflict. So extensive was the Russian attack that Mao feared a Soviet invasion. It was then that the USSR intended to drive home their offensive with a nuclear attack. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, in their book Mao: The Unknown Story, allude to an article at the time published in a London newspaper “by a KGB-linked Russian journalist Victor Louis”, who had been Russian emissary to Taiwan, stating that the Kremlin was discussing bombing China’s nuclear test site, and planning to set up an “alterative leadership” for the Chinese Communist party.[4] Moreover it was U.S. President Richard Nixon’s aide John Haldeman who seems to have first broken the nuclear attack story in his memoirs in 1978.[5] He stated that for years the USSR had been trying to warn the USA not to allow China to become a nuclear power. This claim by Haldeman seems to directly contradict the claim by Liu that Nixon, when responding to the 1969 Soviet request for neutrality, did so not only because he regarded China as a means of containing Russia, but also because he was still “smarting from a Soviet refusal five years earlier to stage a joint attack on China’s nascent nuclear programme.”[6] If we place this all into context, I believe that the 1978 Haldeman version is more likely than that of Liu’s present contention. If the USA had asked for support from the USSR to bomb China’s nuclear programme in 1964, this was a year following Sino-Russian border conflicts amounting to 4000 dead. In 1960, there had been 400 clashes; in 1962, 5000.[7] The USSR would have no sentimental, comradely, ideological, diplomatic, or geo-political reasons to oppose such a US proposal and then change her mind five years later and make a similar suggestion to the USA. The relationship between China, the USA, and the USSR is quite contrary to how it is generally perceived. A more accurate scenario is that the USA backed Mao and the USSR backed Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin, prior to Mao’s assumption to power, regarded him as a Trotskyite. While Stalin had previously backed Mao as a counter to a Trotskyite coterie in China headed by Prof. Chen Tu-hsiu, Mao’s onetime mentor, by 1938,[8] Mao was being denounced in the USSR as a Trotskyite.[9] During World War II, while the USA was pushing Chiang to make an alliance with Mao against the Japanese, Stalin was counselling Chiang against this.[10] Gen. George Marshall warned Chiang in 1946 at a crucial time that if he persisted in pursuing the beleaguered Red Army into Northern Manchuria, U.S. aid would stop. This provided Mao with a base from which to recuperate and finally defeat Chiang. On the other hand, Stalin’s aid to Mao was granted according to Russian interests as distinct from communist fraternity, one particularly dramatic example of which was the demand for repayment in food that resulted in 10,000 peasants dying of starvation in Yenan.[11] This was a prelude to the debilitating Sino-Soviet Treaty that was to result in the “Great Famine” for the same reason.[12] Mao thought that he could make China a great power on Stalin’s coat tails. This was a grave error. While the USA attempted to court China, Mao went out of his way to act “Bolshie” towards the “Paper Tiger,” in a futile effort to court Stalin. Chang and Halliday write: “It was widely thought that it was the U.S. that refused to recognize Mao’s China. In fact, Mao went out of his way to make recognition impossible by engaging in overtly hostile acts.”[13] In 1979, the year for the renewal of the 1950 “friendship treaty” between Russia and China, Mao gestured as to what he by then thought the fraternal relationship by invading Russia’s ally Vietnam, which was particularly significant in that in 1978 the USSR had entered into a 25 year defence treaty with Vietnam.[14] Given the historically strained (at best) relationship between China and Russia, even at a time when they were supposed to be ideologically aligned, what are likely future scenarios on the world stage? There seems to be a preponderant view that the USA and China will increasingly become rivals due to economical and raw material factors. There is also a view that the USA and Russia will align against China. Again turning to an article in the Daily Telegraph, there is an interesting item from 2009. This refers to the Russian ethnic population decline in the Russian Far East, in comparison to the burgeoning Chinese population across the border, coupled with the tremendous mineral resources of the area. David Blair writes: The endless silver birch forests of the Russian Far East might appear so desolate and windswept that no one could possibly be interested in them. Yet the vast swath of territory between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok may become a new theatre of confrontation between Russia and China in the decades ahead. For now, the two giant neighbours have been thrust together by their shared suspicion of America and they cooperate as tactical allies, working in the United Nations Security Council to contain Washington’s power. But this affinity is based on little more than having the same rival. The empty lands of the Russian Far East, far closer to Beijing than Moscow, contain major sources of tension between the two powers.