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AFF ANSWERS › EU Weak
Lawrence and Cordy 20, *Christie Lawrence is a Director for Research and Analysis working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property. Prior, she worked at Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant. She holds a B.A. in Public Policy from Duke University and is a concurrent MPP/JD candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School. ** Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Koichiro Komiyama – Director, Global Coordination Division, JPCERT/CC, (Christie and Sean, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence)
The European Union’s Juncker 26 Commission (2014-2019) actively avoided regulating AI, causing the European Parliament to increase their efforts as a proactive voice in favor of stronger AI regulation. However, since the beginning of Ursula von der Leyen’s tenure, the Commission has initiated efforts to adopt stronger regulation for AI applications (i.e., differentiating regulation of AI based on defined “high-risk” and “low-risk” sectors”) and associated data spaces.27,28 These legislative proposals and their associated discussions are planned to be completed by the end of 2020. During the strategic planning and budgeting process of its R&D programs, the EU committed to providing at least EUR10.7 billion29 for AI-related research conducted between 2021 and 2027.30 Despite these financial and political efforts, the EU still remains technologically dependent on the US and China and suffers from a lack of capital and private funding, decentralized and uncoordinated AI expertise, severe brain drain (including to the US), and slow adoption of AI programming in its education and public sectors.
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AFF ANSWERS › EU Weak
De Maio ’21 (Giovanna was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December 2021, Brookings Institute, )
Yet NATO-EU cooperation remains somewhat limited because of political tensions between member states (which hinders intelligence sharing) as well as weak European military capabilities and inadequate defense spending. Over the past few years the EU has made important progress in this domain through the establishment of the European Defense Fund and several defense projects under the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. Yet, according to several studies in the field, the state of European defense appears insufficient to tackle more serious military threats or to enable the EU to take initiatives in its neighborhood independently from the United States. In its “Strategic Compass” to be published in March 2022, the EU is supposed to adopt a bolder approach to its defense capabilities. In parallel, in a new strategic concept to be released in June 2022, NATO is supposed to tackle security throughout a widened angle, looking at domains that are not strictly defense-related.
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AFF ANSWERS › NATO-EU Coop Fails
ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]
You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure? Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…” At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.
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AFF ANSWERS › NATO-EU Coop Fails
Soare 21, Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies”, German Marshall Fund, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies)
The Biden administration also provides a window of opportunity to progress and be ambitious in broadening and regularizing NATO-EU cooperation in the field of innovation and EDTs. While political dialogue among their leadership has been steadily increasing over the past five years, the EU and NATO have consulted on their respective EDTs agendas only twice. Furthermore, bureaucratic procedures and misalignments sometimes frustrate even staff-to-staff cooperation in this area. The EU and increasingly NATO are proliferating agencies that conduct work on innovation in EDTs, including in security and defense. This makes it challenging to achieve internal coherence of activities within one organization, let alone coordinating agendas between the two.
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AFF ANSWERS › NATO-EU Coop Fails
Raik and Järvenpää ’17 (Dr Kristi Raik is the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at ICDS since February 2018. She is also an Adjunct Professor at the University of Turku. Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, a former Finnish diplomat and a senior government official, joined International Centre for Defence and Security on 1 May 2013. As a Senior Research Fellow at ICDS, he focuses on the security of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region and on issues related to NATO, the EU and transatlantic cooperation, as well as on the security and development of Afghanistan. “A New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation How to Make the Best of a Marriage of Necessity,” International Centre for Defense and Security, May 2017, HL
In spite of the promising start that created a solid framework for cooperation, by the early 2010s the EU-NATO relationship had produced very limited tangible results and was mired in structural obstacles. The main impediments, especially at the operational level, were created by the standoff between Cyprus and Turkey over the unresolved conflict on Cyprus. Furthermore, there was a tendency on both sides to see the relationship between NATO and the CSDP in terms of competition – even as a zero-sum game – which obviously did not encourage cooperation.21 Since its accession to the EU in 2004, Cyprus has put brakes on Turkey’s accession negotiations and blocked its participation in EUled missions, membership of the EDA and generally a more active role in CSDP. At the same time, Turkey has been able to block the use of NATO capabilities and assets by the EU and has not allowed the participation of the Republic of Cyprus, which it does not recognise, at formal EU-NATO meetings. Hence, meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the PSC have been held rarely (the latest took place in September 2015) and with a narrow agenda.22 This deadlock practically turned the Berlin Plus arrangements into a dead letter and 21. Drozdiak 2010. It should also be said that the Americans were not at that point particularly helpful. 22. In the 18 months to August 2015, four PSC-NAC meetings were organised: one formal meeting on EUFOR Operation Althea, two informal meetings on Ukraine, and one informal meeting on the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. See Dakic 2015. prevented more ambitious strategic cooperation. Berlin Plus arrangements have been used only for two operations: Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which ended in September 2003, and EUFOR Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an operation deployed since 2004. While formal cooperation was limited, in practice a division of labour in crisis management took shape, roughly along the lines of soft/civilian and hard/military security. Although the CSDP was created to carry out both civilian and military crisis management tasks, the EU did not become the preferred instrument for more ambitious military operations. Member states limited the use of CSDP to softer, non-combat operations, whereas NATO took care of militarily more demanding environments and combat tasks. This division was evident in the two locations where both organisations had an operation running simultaneously: Kosovo and Afghanistan. Staff-level cooperation between the missions on the ground worked reasonably well, thanks to individual efforts to find flexible and creative ways to work around the formal obstacles.23 It was also a setback to the CSDP that EU Battlegroups were never deployed due to the lack of political will to actually use this new tool. One of the hurdles was the reluctance of member states to finance their deployment. As of today, discussions on improved usability and more effective financing of the Battlegroups continue, but the issue has been pushed down the list of priorities by new, more promising areas of defence cooperation, to be described below. Apart from the structural hurdles, the EU side was simply not very interested in close cooperation. The EU nurtured an ambition to be a different kind of international actor, described as a civilian, normative, ethical or soft power.24 This aspiration favoured taking a step back from NATO, characterised by many as a relic of the Cold War that was struggling to find a new purpose.25
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AFF ANSWERS › Perm
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
First, the EU could be a valuable partner for the U.S. and NATO in this theater given its growing economic and regulatory power, especially related to fair-trade practices and human rights protection. Second, NATO could help promote standards and interoperability (for example, through procurement coordination between NATO and the EU as described earlier). Increased interoperability not just through NATO but also EU forces could help to quickly mobilize forces in case of conflict, as well as serve as a deterrent regarding China. The EU could also offer support through its European Peace Facility, designed to provide assistance to partner countries to increase their security and defense capabilities.83 However, regardless of the type of assistance provided, without clear rules for standardization and convergent strategies for procurement and military strengthening, the two organizations (and their member states) risk competing with one another for strategic and market advantages.
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AFF ANSWERS › Perm
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Competition › A2: Perm DB
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
A weak European military European defense spending, specifically related to nations falling short of the NATO 2% of GDP target, has been a major issue in U.S.-EU relations. While Barack Obama’s administration exerted diplomatic pressure, Donald Trump’s engaged in open confrontation on this issue. Neither administration obtained significant results, however; and as Afghanistan has shown, Europe is still far too reliant on the military protection of the United States — an issue that weakens NATO’s posture. Over the past few years, the EU has strengthened both its legal and financial mechanisms to be more competitive on the security side. In December 2017, under articles 42.6 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council established a Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism to deepen cooperation between willing member states. These states have agreed to binding commitments on investment, planning and management to advance their defense capabilities in the service of both national and multinational operations (including those of NATO and the UN). PESCO currently has 46 projects in several domains, from training to maritime and land exercises to cyber and military mobility.33 Through the European Defense Fund, the EU also has allocated 7.9 billion euros (roughly $9 billion) for the 2021-2027 period to research innovative defense products and technologies through collaborate development projects.34 But while these initiatives represent a step toward better European coordination on defense issues, they are completely reliant on political will and inter-governmental coordination — as security is not a competence of the EU but an inalienable prerogative of its member states. In fact, many of the PESCO projects appear to be severely delayed.35 U.S. experts interviewed for this research also point out the bad shape of European defense and more broadly its dependence on the United States for even more reachable defense objectives. A report from the Center for American Progress mentions the example of France’s anti-terrorism operation in the Sahel, where the U.S. ended up supporting basic air-refueling and surveillance flights.36 A detailed study by the Clingendael Institute points out that if the EU wants to be a credible actor in crisis management, primarily in its neighborhood, then it should be able to operate crossspectrum in the air, land, sea, cyberspace, and space domains — which cannot be done without more serious investments in European defense.37 The case of Afghanistan — where Europeans decided to leave after the U.S. withdrawal despite the predictable consequences on migration and political instability — offers a concrete example of such shortcomings.38 As Brookings expert Michael E. O’Hanlon points out, Afghanistan operations did not require high-tech equipment or massive resources; but the fact that European countries involved in NATO operations in Afghanistan did not step up to preserve a military presence in a crucial theater for European security speaks to their unpreparedness in terms of stockpiles of equipment and inability to conduct such operations without the help of the United States.39 Germany’s defense capabilities are also emblematic: Despite having more fiscal leeway and being at the forefront of European technological innovation, Berlin has not invested in its military, which still lacks critical equipment such as body armor, night vision gear, and helicopter spare parts.40 In this regard, evidence suggests that integrating and strengthening European defense would undoubtedly offer more openings for specialization, boost resource allocation and more broadly improve readiness. Yet such opportunities are highly contingent on building trust between allies and increasing political will, which will inevitably take time and be achieved in different ways. Recently, some inter-governmental initiatives outside of the EU and NATO frameworks were taken to tackle these shortcomings. In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron launched the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) with the aim of deepening military cooperation between like-minded European governments sharing a strategic culture. Through intelligence sharing, scenario planning, joint planning and exercises, its 13 participants are working to strengthen their military cooperation so that they can offer rapid responses in case of a crisis. The E2I is particularly relevant because one of its members is the United Kingdom, which is not currently part of any PESCO projects. The U.K’s involvement signals the importance of the relationship and responsibilities that the it shares with European partners on security. While limited, the initiative is an example of how Europe and the U.K. can strengthen their security cooperation. As the U.K. has left the EU, stronger defense cooperation between the U.K. and the EU would also positively impact NATO through fostering synergies and interoperability. However, while relevant, these initiatives are insufficient for Europe to play a credible role as a security actor in its eastern and southern neighborhoods. And such weaknesses endanger the deterrence power of the NATO alliance against Russia and ultimately reduce the opportunities for the EU more broadly to defend its security interests.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Competition › A2: Perm DB
Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, )
The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. European digital autonomy The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › A2: No Money
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
As with the cyber domain, NATO and the EU could respond to outside pressure by increasing and improving procurement and technological cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered shortages and vulnerabilities in the supply chain, and the competition for rare earth material and high-technology products (such as microchips) has increased. Meanwhile, breakthrough technological achievements are opening new frontiers for competition in the security domain. First, European allies could better coordinate their defense spending within the framework of the European Union; the absence of an integrated defense structure inevitably leads to duplications and wasted resources. Moreover, the armed forces of different European countries may encounter difficulties in operating with one another, given that there are 138 defense systems in Europe (compared to only 30 in the United States).70 As stated in a European Commission report, the lack of cooperation in the European defense industry produces a loss of 25 billion to 100 billion euros per year, while 30% of the costs could be saved if a joint procurement was in place.71
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › A2: Hurts NATO
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
In the summer and early fall of 2021, two incidents cast doubt on the United States’ future commitment to European security. The first was the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan despite the objections of NATO allies. The second was United States’ negotiation of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal with Australia and the United Kingdom without informing France. (France had an agreement with the Australian government to build diesel-propelled submarines.)1 Europeans were furious. Charles Michel, president of the European Council, said, “What does it mean America is back? Is America back in America or somewhere else? We don’t know… We are observing a clear lack of transparency and loyalty.”2 European Commissioner Thierry Breton, who is French, spoke of “a growing feeling in Europe… that something is broken in our transatlantic relations” and called for a “pause and a reset.”3 These twin shocks created a new demand for what is intermittently called European strategic autonomy — the notion that the European Union should be more capable of acting on its own in pursuit of Europe’s interests. While France champions this idea, other European nations are more reluctant, especially those physically closer to Russia who see the United States as the key security provider. France argues that a greater role for the European Union is compatible with a continuing vital role for NATO in European security, but this begs the question of how the two organizations — NATO and the EU — relate to each other.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › A2: EU Fails
Belin ’19 — Célia; visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, domestic determinants of foreign policy, and the politics of travel under COVID. She holds a doctorate in political science (University Paris 2), a master's degree in international relations (University Paris 2), and a bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages/Business (University of Burgundy). April 2, 2019; “NATO matters, but the EU matters more”; Brookings; ; //CYang
Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later — and 16 new members later — the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans. Today, 28 European democracies, which used to compete among themselves and sometimes fight to their ultimate demise, now choose to pool sovereignty and have their interests communally discussed and collectively defended. The EU is a power multiplier: Every one of the 28 has a stronger individual voice because they stand together in the European Union. Small European countries, whose geography and demography would force them to cave to stronger neighbors, can now count on the solidarity of the group — as illustrated by the unwavering support for Ireland by the other 26 member states and the Brussels institutions in the Brexit negotiations. The neighbors of the European Union are no fools. Those who seek prosperity and stability hope to join the EU club. Those who reject the model set by the West and liberal democracies feel threatened by the European Union — it is the prospect of Ukraine moving into the EU’s orbit through an Association Agreement that triggered Russia’s hostility and ultimate aggression, not NATO. The power of attraction of the European Union, at least as much as the security guarantees of NATO, has helped stabilize Eastern Europe. Despite these realities, Americans often indulge in a scornful disregard for the EU. Recently, benign contempt has taken an ugly turn. Since taking office, President Trump and his administration have attacked the European Union and individual member states repeatedly, with near impunity. At first sight, American complaints appear to be centered on the issue of Europe’s trading power, which rivals that of the United States. For Donald Trump, the EU was created to “take advantage of” the United States and it is “worse than China.” Early in his mandate, the American president pushed for tariffs on steel and aluminum and threatened to go after automobiles, until a meeting with EU Commission President Juncker put a brake on the downward spiral. However, a deeper look reveals a fundamental ideological contention: The brand of nationalism and populism that defines this administration stands in direct contradiction with the very existence of a liberal, supra-national body such as the European Union. As laid out by the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Kiron Skinner in December 2018, the administration holds the view that “international institutions have steadily encroached on the rights of sovereign nations” and that “nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests” — an indictment of the EU’s very existence. The ideological clash is reminiscent of older times. Addressing a crowd in Warsaw in July 2017, President Trump likened the European Union to the Soviet Union, criticizing a similar “steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people,” an equivalency popular in conservative circles. Similarly, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested in a December 2018 speech in Brussels that EU bureaucrats were not really working for the interests of European citizens. By making no secret of his personal support for euroskeptic forces, Donald Trump has become an active political opponent of the European Union in its existing form. He celebrated the Brexit vote, expressed support for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen ahead of the French presidential elections, disparaged Angela Merkel repeatedly, and appeared to rejoice at the Yellow Vests protest movement. He criticized Theresa May for negotiating a “soft” Brexit, and even recommended to Emmanuel Macron that France leave the EU. The American president has nominated ambassadors famously critical of the EU, and his administration demoted the EU ambassador’s status without notification, before reversing under criticism. As Donald Trump torments both the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, all rush to NATO’s bedside, and few worry about the EU. Truthfully, Atlanticists love to love NATO. It stands for values, valor, unity, solidarity. NATO won the Cold War. Celebrating NATO is celebrating the military. It is much harder to love the EU, the bureaucracy, the politics, the regulations. The EU lacks democratic appeal, and its slow-moving decisionmaking process create many frustrations. Unlike in NATO, the United States sits on the sidelines, it does not control who enters, or who stays in. The EU is also an economic peer competitor, a tough trading partner, and a sovereign international actor, at times non-compliant with American demands. Yet, the prospect of an implosion of the European Union should be as unbearable and intolerable to an American audience as the dissolution of NATO — or more so, as no one wants to see the demons of nationalism back on the European continent, along with a global economic catastrophe. Benign neglect is counterproductive; but a policy openly hostile to the European Union is a grave mistake. In a world where the strongmen are striking back, Americans should not forget that the European Union stands with the United States when it matters most. The NATO summit in Washington this week should be the occasion to recall not only the utmost importance of the Atlantic alliance to trans-Atlantic security, but also the crucial contribution of the European Union to peace, unity, and ultimately security for Europe and beyond.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Disinformation
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
Leveraged EU advantages in the hybrid domain Although progress has been slow on the traditional military side, the European Union has proved to be a versatile asset for other aspects of security, specifically in the political and hybrid domains. Diplomatic and regulatory approaches are primary political tools to push back against autocracies. Despite its members having different strategic foreign policy priorities, the European Union has established a solid diplomatic posture in defense of European values and interests. For example, learning from its reaction to the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the EU was able to create a united front following Russia’s incursions in Ukraine in 2014 and has imposed sanctions still in place today — for example, in response to the annexation of Crimea, the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in eastern Ukraine, and more recently the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. On China, the European Union has acted consistently, based on its labeling of the country as both an economic competitor and a strategic rival. The EU has pursued commercial deals while also heavily regulating Chinese foreign direct investment in sensitive sectors of European interest. More meaningfully, the EU has repeatedly condemned China for its human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and has announced a ban on products made with forced labor.57 While NATO is reinventing itself in the face of pressing challenges like China and climate change,58 the EU has advanced in tackling cybersecurity, regulating and exploring new technologies and developing its Indo-Pacific strategy.59 The EU’s advantages over NATO in the diplomatic and economic domains, especially when it comes to crisis management and political pressure, should be taken into account in broader discussion of NATO-EU coordination. Sharpened cooperation on disinformation and cyber The countering of disinformation is one key area where the European Union offers added value to international security. Since 2014 — and particularly following the disinformation operations carried out by Russia-sponsored media during the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections in 2016 as well as the French presidential elections in 2017 — the EU has set up a solid structure to monitor, detect, and counter disinformation. The EU was the first to establish a dedicated task force, the EU StratCom, within the European External Action Service (EEAS) to combat disinformation in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Subsequently, the European Commission established ground rules for online platforms and the advertising and social media industries, including a Code of Practice on Disinformation and guidelines on accountability obligations.60 The EU also has set up important monitoring activities, such as the Digital Media Observatory and the COVID-19 monitoring and reporting program, to function as a European hub for fact-checkers. A crucial part of these efforts is included in the Action Plan Against Disinformation that sets up a Rapid Alert System to facilitate information sharing and a unified response across the European institutions.61 Compared to the EU, NATO’s approach to combatting disinformation is less robust and limited in scope. NATO has set up tracking and monitoring activities — which offer fact-checking findings and counternarratives, including in the Russian language — but it has mostly relied on its Public Diplomacy Division which only monitors NATO-related material. For example, during the first few months after the outbreak of COVID-19, the division set up a section on its website called “NATO-Russia: Setting the record straight”; the website addresses the top five myths circulated by Russian propaganda regarding NATO’s connection with and reaction to the spread of COVID-19.62 Also established by NATO — but operationally independent — the StratCom Center of Excellence (COE) in Riga, Latvia brings together civilian and military stakeholders to conduct research on the use of modern technologies and to develop virtual tools for analyses, research, and decisionmaking. Hence, the center has produced valuable material for NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. In addition, the StratCom COE has worked with the EEAS StratCom task force to train EU staff on how to respond to simulated disinformation attacks and responses. More recently, in 2019, the EU and NATO started exchanging information through the inclusion of NATO’s international staff in the EU Rapid Alert System, as well as through dialogues, staff and information exchanges and training exercises, including briefings between the EEAS StratCom and NATO Public Diplomacy Division.63 These are important efforts that highlight NATO and the EU’s openness to dialogue and mutual learning experiences. But they are nowhere near enough to keep up with the network of disinformation, where techniques are rapidly evolving and taking advantage of artificial intelligence. While China and Russia are reinforcing each other’s narratives through multiple channels, the effects of malign foreign influence in the disinformation domain are now being compounded by homegrown disinformation networks using the same pattern of exploiting people’s fear and vulnerability. Evidence of this occurring includes the spread of anti-vaccination propaganda as well as antidemocratic propaganda (which helped spur the assault on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021).64 Given the growing vulnerabilities in the trans-Atlantic space, NATO and the EU should join forces and expand their activity from countering disinformation to a preventing effort. The EU can add value in increasing the involvement of the private sector, and NATO can add value in using its intelligence capabilities in the counterterrorism domain to identify troll factories and disinformation sources. More broadly on cyber, despite advancements in their own jurisdictions, the paths of NATO and the EU have not crossed much yet. The two organizations have a different approach to cyber issues: While the EU aims to develop resilience against cyber threats, NATO has a broader and forward-looking approach that aims to prevent cyberattacks and to use cyber as an offensive tool to tackle threats and create deterrence.65 For example, the EU is seeking to strengthen its cyber posture through an EU Cybersecurity Strategy. The first piece of corresponding legislation, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (EU 2016/1148), established substantial cybersecurity standards that member states must adopt to protect critical sectors.66 Meanwhile, in its latest summit communiqué, NATO stated that “a decision as to when a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis,” thus highlighting the increased awareness of the security implication of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.67 Despite their different approaches, both NATO and the EU included cyber in their 2016 cooperation frameworks and started a series of joint exercises between the EU’s 2017 Parallel and Coordinated Exercise and NATO’s 2017 Crisis Management Exercise, as well as more recent exercises like those conducted through the CYBERSEC 2019 forum.68 However, while incredibly valuable, such exercises have not gone much beyond staffto-staff interactions and joint workshops. Understandably, cybersecurity cooperation implies a significant amount of intelligence sharing, which is ultimately impeded by a lack of trust stemming from political tensions and by the national security concerns of individual member states. In addition to establishing a more substantial channel for intelligence sharing to immediately warn allies about a cyberattack and prevent domino effects, other smaller steps could help increase cooperation and strengthen resilience in the trans-Atlantic space. For instance, the establishment of common standards related to threat and resilience capabilities could, in the event of a cyberattack, facilitate talks between allies and improve the interoperability of infrastructure. Within the United Nations, there are already two working groups trying to advance international legislation and standards covering the cybersecurity space.69 In line with these efforts, NATO and the EU could adopt similar standards that also help integrate and reinforce their complementary cybersecurity strategies. In particular, NATO could look at the existing EU regulatory framework and adopt similar strategies and resilience practices across the alliance, and the EU could benefit from NATO’s vast military experience and capabilities that are relevant to the cyber domain in order to bolster the security aspect of the EU’s cybersecurity strategy.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Interoperability
De Maio ’21 (Giovanna was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December 2021, Brookings Institute, )
So far, there is no similar dialogue platform between NATO and the EU — a fact that hinders inter-institutional cooperation in the procurement domain. In fact, if NATO and the EU develop different standards, it could lead to duplication and hinder logistical and strategic interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space. For this reason, it is especially important for NATO and the EU to establish deeper communication on procurement and the definition of common standards. Increasing connections and synergies between industrial clusters within the trans-Atlantic space, particularly for materials such as semiconductors and microchips, would decrease dependence on geopolitically risky supply chains. Moreover, developing common standards when it comes to procurement, data privacy, and weaponry components would facilitate technological exchanges as well as the interoperability of equipment (be it artificial intelligence or more traditional military supplies) across the NATO-EU space. Given the increasing importance of new technologies for economic development, industrial advancement, and innovation, the only alternative to a shared approach in the trans-Atlantic space would be increased competition among allies and reduced interoperability — which would inevitably create more advantages for competitors to exploit.
2022
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Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Deterrence
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATING IN EMERGING THEATERS As the pressure from China and Russia rises and amplifies the threats posed by traditional challenges, the EU and NATO’s partners have little to gain from division and a lack of coordination. The time has come to identify new and better ways to fill security gaps and effectively allocate resources to ensure readiness on a variety of fronts. Moreover, to enhance coordination, each organization should consider how to add value to the other organization in both the military and non-military domains. At least four dimensions of the current security debate are crucial to strengthening the NATO-EU partnership: increasing European military capability, improving military mobility and interoperability, sharpening cooperation in the cyber and disinformation space, and finding synergies in procurement through the securitization of technology and supply chains. A stronger European defense to strengthen NATO’s posture While the EU has made significant progress in countering hybrid warfare since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the same cannot be said with regard to developing more effective traditional deterrence capabilities. Such capabilities are increasingly necessary, not just because of Russia’s aggressive posture — expanding its area of operations beyond the post-Soviet space to Syria and Africa — but also because of the growing geopolitical and security alignment between Beijing and Moscow. Since 2014, cooperation between China and Russia has expanded beyond the domain of arm sales. The two countries have supported each other’s development of strategic weapons (such as for missile defense) and artificial intelligence, as well as each other’s political positions in the United Nations Security Council.41 Beijing and Moscow have deepened their interactions in Africa, where Russian Wagner Group mercenaries patrol Chinese facilities,42 and conducted military exercises including a shared air patrol in the Asia-Pacific region.43 They also have been seeking common ground on Afghanistan since the departure of U.S. troops.44 Such alignment is increasingly resembling a partnership that is reflected at the military level too. After the past year’s military drills in the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, and the Indo-Pacific, China and Russia recently conducted a joint military exercise called Zapad/Interaction-2021 in China’s northwestern region of Ningxia, where for the first time they used a joint command and control system and shared equipment — mimicking the way NATO forces work with each other.45 Meanwhile, the United States has begun to shift its security focus toward the IndoPacific region and South China Sea where Beijing is threatening Taiwan. Consequently, should a direct confrontation with China occur in the medium to long term, Russia could take advantage of the situation and potentially target Europe while U.S. forces and attentions are directed elsewhere. For this reason, it is crucial for European allies to have the military capabilities to push back against Russia with little support from the United States, at least in the initial phases. With more defense capabilities, European allies would also have the resources to respond to crises that arise in the Mediterranean region. After four years of strained trans-Atlantic relations — where the defense spending issue has intoxicated the broader debate on trans-Atlantic security — a stronger European defense would help Washington recognize the increased geopolitical cohesion and security concerns of the bloc. Unfortunately, as described earlier, such capability has yet to be achieved. A RAND Corporation wargaming simulation exercise assessed that in the case of a conventional attack by the Russian Federation, Moscow’s forces would be able to reach the outskirts of either the Estonian or Latvian capital in around 60 hours, and the NATO allies would not be able to defend these territories because of a (totally fillable) shortage of military capabilities.46 Similarly, a scenario analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that without the help of the United States, conventional forces from European NATO countries would not be able to push back against the hypothetical conquest of Lithuania and part of Poland by the Russian Federation.47 To ensure that they can successfully respond to a land attack from Russia, or a coordinated Russia-China operation, Europeans need to increase the quality and readiness of their defense apparatus. A policy brief by the NATO Defense College calls for multinational battlegroups in Poland and in the Baltics to increase their readiness in terms of support capabilities, such as artillery and air defense, and for European allies to fulfill their NATO 2018 Readiness commitment of providing several land combat brigades and maritime task groups.48 The authors also point out that to increase deterrence, European allies need sufficient and effective air and missile defense capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, as well as long-range conventional precision-strike weapons to limit Russia’s options for regional conventional attacks. All these analyses indicate that expanded capabilities on the European side are crucial for a stronger NATO posture. Political tensions around the branding of European strategic autonomy have unfortunately poisoned this debate and complicated a very simple issue: European forces must be able to take effective action with or without the United States in the theaters that are crucial for European security.
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Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Biotech
Giddings ’22 – Val, Senior fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, (“Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective”, 3/11/22, ) – sel
A WORLD OF BIOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES Mutual self-interest provides a strong basis for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology based on shared recognition of its vast potential to provide solutions to some of civilization’s most pressing problems. Thanks to explosive advances in our understanding of the many ways in which promiscuous nature has been manipulating DNA and RNA for the past billion years, it is widely anticipated that the 21st century will belong to biology.1 We are now at the point where our ability to innovate is constrained less by technical capability than by the limits of our imaginations. Multiple laboratories and companies on both sides of the Atlantic (and throughout the world) are pursuing promising applications, and experience confirms progress would be accelerated by cooperative approaches. But there are some considerable challenges, especially in agricultural and industrial contexts. The most important rate-limiting factor in our ability to harness biological innovations to the challenges of feeding the world, sustaining human and environmental health, and addressing climate change, is the burden imposed by ill-considered regulations. Unless this bottleneck can be unblocked, the enormous potential for transatlantic scientific cooperation will not yield the necessary fruits. DIVERGENT REGULATORY PATHS: PRECAUTION VS. OPENNESS TO INNOVATION Existing policies, legislation, and regulations do little or nothing to advance human or environmental safety.2 Born out of understandable caution at the dawn of recombinant DNA technologies, today their most obvious impact is to obstruct and discourage research, development, and deployment of innovative solutions to various challenges.3 This is so despite an abundant record of production and consumption of new biotech products with enviable records of improved safety, superior sustainability, and widespread beneficial economic impacts.4 The benefits are so substantial that a pattern has emerged of farmers breaking the law to acquire and plant improved seeds in countries where governments have lagged in allowing access.5 It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability, but only impede our ability to use the most innovative, precise, and safest tools to address our gravest challenges.6 In terms of regulatory policy and openness to biological innovations, the width of the Atlantic might be measured better in light years than miles or kilometers. As imperfect as regulations for the products of biotechnology are in North America, they are simply indefensible in Europe.7 The United States decided in 1986, after years of study and consultation, that no new laws were required to ensure the safety of crops and foods improved through biotechnology. This was based on the finding that they present no novel hazards, and foreseeable risks of their development and use fall into categories with which humans have considerable experience from millennia of conventional plant and animal breeding.8 The United States therefore decided to regulate these novel products under existing authorities administered by the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and Environmental Protection Agency.9 While implementation of this policy, the “Coordinated Framework,” has been far from perfect, it has been sufficiently predictable and science-based to enable an explosion of innovation, new product development, and commercial activity. Consequently, the United States has led the world to the present day wherein crops improved through biotechnology are now the global standard for quality seeds, delivering improved yields, safety, sustainability, and economic productivity around the world, with the lion’s share of benefits accruing on behalf of small farmers in developing countries.10 Europe took a different approach. It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability. The European Union decided to regulate seeds improved through biotechnology as a novel class governed under new regulations specifically focused on an arbitrary category known as “GMOs” (for “genetically modified organisms”). The conceit was that because they represented gene combinations produced by mechanisms supposedly “not found in nature” (but actually ubiquitous) they must present novel hazards, even though none has ever been identified. These putatively novel hazards, despite the lack of any concrete manifestations, allegedly required dedicated, specific, “precautionary” regulations. The resulting regulatory regime proved so burdensome it led to the general collapse of agricultural biotechnology in Europe, which had played a leading role in its discovery and invention. Permissions for field trials proved almost impossible to obtain, products could not be developed and brought to market, academic labs abandoned the field, and the industry relocated most of its assets and activities to the Americas. And Europe became the world’s largest importer of commodity foods improved through biotechnology, only recently surpassed by China. OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe.11 But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even “green” NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of science-based regulatory regimes in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and regulation that enables, rather than discourages the safe development of innovative products. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. We have robust models of proven approaches.12 Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone. As to national security risks, just as with other risks, novelty attributable to biotechnology is elusive. One can do very nasty things with conventional bioweapons, and they are easily magnified with recombinant DNA techniques. At the same time, defensive capacities are also buttressed by biotechnology, as demonstrated by the rapid development of mRNA vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. There has been some good work done in this area, but this topic is worth exploring at greater depth. The OECD has a track record of thoughtful analyses with such topics. One possibility would be to build on that foundation by establishing a joint OECD/NATO working group to serve as a forum.
2022
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – AI
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]
NATO and the EU address capability development in markedly different ways. NATO focuses more on procuring a given item from a given state to meet a specific need of the alliance, whereas the EU focuses more on filling capability gaps and encouraging member states to cooperate to develop new assets. In this regard, the EU appears to have a comparative advantage given the role of the European Defense Agency to go beyond specific operational requirements and its ability to consider long-term trends and ways member states can cooperate on the development of new capabilities. In particular, the EU defense procurement benefits from strong support from EU-led research and development programs, as well as from considerable financial resources from the European Defense Fund. As European defense capabilities advance, there will be overlap between the EU Capability Development Priorities and the NATO Defense Planning Process; this gives the EU and NATO an opportunity to foster greater cooperation and build up a more efficient and competitive trans-atlantic defense.73 A recent study from the French Institute of International Relations identifies areas where defense requirements could be harmonized and where the EU and NATO could work on joint research projects: from cyberdefense, air superiority, logistics, and medical support capabilities to science and technology, arms control, and intelligence.74 A more synchronized approach in these areas — that would also entail a joint assessment of member state performances — will undoubtedly reinforce both NATO- and EU-led operations as well as deterrence. Such an approach to procurement could prove particularly helpful given the rising threats coming from vulnerabilities in the global supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled Western countries’ strong dependency on Chinese supplies, both in the medical and technological fields (though the supply issues around personal protective equipment were addressed relatively rapidly).75 A recent study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies identifies 103 categories of electronics, chemical, mineral/metal, and pharmaceutical products in which the EU is critically dependent on imports from China.76 At the same time, as economies worldwide have started to recover from the pandemic and embark on ambitious investment plans to boost innovation in their national industries, the demand for semiconductors — crucial for building microchips, which are essential in any modern technology — has increased and become one of the central issues of the U.S.-China competition. This issue is further complicated by geopolitical concerns; a large proportion of semiconductor manufacturing occurs in Taiwan.77 The U.S. and the EU have recently begun initiatives to increase the domestic production of microchips. In June, the U.S. Senate passed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, which allocates $52 billion toward the effort.78 And the EU followed suit with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen committing to a similar amount.79 The U.S. and EU discussed the issue during their inaugural Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in September 2021.80 These discussions represent a first step toward breaking the ice on trans-Atlantic cooperation, particularly related to developing new technologies that are vital for enhancing geopolitical and economic security. But the main takeaways are that the U.S. and the EU are facing the same challenges and that the EU has increased its geopolitical ambition and range of interests. So far, there is no similar dialogue platform between NATO and the EU — a fact that hinders inter-institutional cooperation in the procurement domain. In fact, if NATO and the EU develop different standards, it could lead to duplication and hinder logistical and strategic interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space. For this reason, it is especially important for NATO and the EU to establish deeper communication on procurement and the definition of common standards. Increasing connections and synergies between industrial clusters within the trans-Atlantic space, particularly for materials such as semiconductors and microchips, would decrease dependence on geopolitically risky supply chains. Moreover, developing common standards when it comes to procurement, data privacy, and weaponry components would facilitate technological exchanges as well as the interoperability of equipment (be it artificial intelligence or more traditional military supplies) across the NATO-EU space. Given the increasing importance of new technologies for economic development, industrial advancement, and innovation, the only alternative to a shared approach in the trans-Atlantic space would be increased competition among allies and reduced interoperability — which would inevitably create more advantages for competitors to exploit.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Cyber
Shea 19 (Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, “EU-NATO COOPERATION A SECURE VISION FOR EUROPE,” Spring 2019, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/dp_2018_web.pdf)//JRD
To strengthen inter-organisational cyber security and cyber defence cooperation, the EU and NATO should solve the political blockage, develop joint action plans to be implemented by member states and do away with technical issues such as the lack of formal agreements between institutions. The work done at staff-to-staff level must now be replicated at the national level by launching and investing in joint activities and projects that will increase member states’ capabilities. While top representatives spoke of ‘prioritising strengthened cooperation’ at the 2016 and 2018 NATO summits, more should be done to generate investments from the capitals. The following policy proposals aim to designate a number of joint activities with an aim to create more substantial cooperation among the member states of both organisations. A strong political support and prioritisation is necessary also from the key capitals. First and foremost, an EU-NATO working group on cyber security and defence issues must be established. These topics must also be regular agenda items in other joint working and high political level meetings, such as the EUNATO capability development group and the NAC-PSC meetings. This new working group should discuss policy themes where closer cooperation can create synergy (synchronising crisis response mechanisms, speeding political decision-making, developing joint response options to cyberattacks, etc). Joint working groups at the subject matter expert level should explore possibilities to develop joint research and innovation programmes and coordinate national and union-level activities in the area of emerging technologies (including 5G and artificial intelligence). Joint education and training courses should be created with the first step of opening all existing courses to each other’s officials and member states. The EU must be granted observer status at the Steering Committee of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), as suggested by the Allied Command Transformation. Formal cooperation – including technical arrangements for information sharing – must also be established with ENISA and other relevant EU bodies (such as the Cybersecurity Research and Competence Centre and EU-CERT) in order to facilitate participating in each other’s exercises. Closer cooperation between research and competence centres is needed to jointly develop doctrine and concepts, and launch common research projects in areas such as cyber activities in the grey space, supply chain security, military dependencies on civilian critical infrastructure (such as energy, transport and finance), including how do develop common methodology to assess inter-dependencies. The NATO Cyber Defence Pledge could also be applied to non-NATO EU countries and possibly in third countries. The resiliency requirements and cyber security standards of the EU and NATO should be complementary and ensure the minimum common level of protection in all countries. Information sharing between the organisations has been improved but more should be done to create joint threat assessments and intelligence sharing for attribution of cyberattacks. The EU and NATO should continue synchronising their hybrid threats playbooks with a view to creating joint responses. They must also synchronise cyber defence capabilities development roadmaps and experiences on improving civilmilitary information sharing. One way forward is through joint EU-NATO joint exercises, be they technical, crisis management or table-top style. The table-top exercises at the subject matter expert and ambassadors, foreign and defence ministers level should explore the application of EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox and joint response options. More joint action is also needed to promote the application of international law, confidence building measures, and state responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Both organisations should create common cyber capability building programmes, including joint trust funds, for the third countries. In the area of cyber defence, the EU and NATO should explore options on how to use the sovereign effects of the NATO Cyberspace Operations Centre with a view to support future EU missions and operations. PESCO’s recent ‘Cyber Rapid Response Team’ initiative – comprised of nine participating EU member states – could be deployed to assist non-EU NATO countries and third countries to prevent, detect and respond to cyber incidents.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Cyber
Deschaux-Dutard ’21 – Delphine, Associate Professor in Political Science at the University Grenoble Alpes, France. She is also a researcher at CESICE and Vice-Dean for International Relations at the Faculty of law at the same institution., (“Is NATO ready for cyber war?”, pp.1-3, 8/30/21, ) – sel
In a more and more connected world cyberspace has become the fifth battlespace. The latest Pegasus case, refereeing to a spying hardware which affected many European heads of states and government in the Summer of 2021, shows how much cyber threats are now part of the international security arena. NATO has tackled the cyber topic for over a decade. NATO’s awareness towards cyber threats started raising in the late 1990s, following cyberattacks by Serbian hackers against NATO Supreme Command’s (SHAPE) website during the air bombing campaign on Serbian positions in the frame of the Kosovo war. The cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and in the context of the conflict in Georgia in 2008 urged the Alliance to take this new threats seriously. NATO is today the most advanced international organisation regarding cyber defence. With a cyber command structure set up in 2008, its 2010 Strategic Concept has enabled it to lay the foundations of its vision for cyber defence. Indeed NATO frames cyber threats as a direct challenge for transatlantic and national security as stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The Alliance approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence in 2008 (revised in 2011 and 2014) and established a Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) in 2008 and even a Cybersecurity Operations Centre within NATO Command Structure in 2018. The Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 in Lisbon fully acknowledges cyber defence capabilities as a necessity for the Alliance. NATO also created tools to prevent cyber-attacks and cyber offensive capabilities with a central objective: to defend the Alliance’s own communications and information systems and to arouse its member states’ awareness on the need to protect critical infrastructures implied in contemporary military operations. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, the organisation crossed a new important threshold by recognizing cyber defence as part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defence and therefore included cyber threats as relevant article V material. This concretely means that NATO could trigger the article V of the Washington Treaty in case of a massive cyber attack with lethal implications against one of its members. Yet such a case would raise the difficult question of the attribution of the cyberattack. Such an attribution to a specific state or state-sponsored hacker would necessitate a consensus among the member states within the North Atlantic Council, which would probably make it difficult as it tackles diplomatic strings and strategic priorities which keep diverging among the EU member states. Indeed attribution continues to be a competence of member states until now, and not of NATO as such. Since 2014 NATO regularly reaffirms the importance of cyber defence as one of the core tasks of the Alliance, as it has been done during the Alliance’s summit in Brussels in June 2021: NATO endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy supporting the three main priorities of the Alliance (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security). The member states also agreed to commit to making use of the full range of capabilities to actively deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats at all times. Aside from these policy aspects, NATO also develops a wide range of tools and capabilities in the area of cyber defence, with the aim of being able to provide assistance to its member states in case of cyber-attack. It should also be acknowledged that NATO owns its information and computer networks used in NATO military missions, whereas in the case the EU for instance, the EU depends on the members states ICT infrastructures for CSDP missions. NATO set up a specific agency dedicated to cyber defence in 2012 at its SHAPE headquarters: the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), which hosts since 2016 a Cyber Security Operations Center (CyOC) dealing with around 500 cyber incidents each month and responsible for the cyber defence of NATO’s information and computer infrastructures in the world and on military theatres (like in Afghanistan until August 2021 for instance). This Cyber Operation Center should be fully operational in 2023. In addition to these tools the Alliance created a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, which is a research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, research and development. The main task of the Centre is to provide expertise on cyber defence, and organise cyber exercises involving both NATO Allies and partners. These tools are completed with NATO’s smart defence initiatives entailing cyber defence aspects and aiming at bringing member states to cooperate to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or alone. The Alliance develops yearly exercises under the label Cyber Coalition. The development of NATO cyber capabilities over the last 15 years clearly shows that NATO started developing its own cyber defence culture. The organization therefore issued a Cyber Defense Pledge at the Warsaw summit in 2019 to facilitate cyber cooperation among its member states. As a follow up, France decided to host the first international conference in Paris in 2018 gathering the 29 NATO member states and the Secretary General of the Alliance to urge its allies to keep developing strategic thinking on cyber issues. Last but not least, NATO also develops an important cooperation with the EU on cyber defence. Both organizations have enhanced their cooperation in cyber defence since their joint declaration at the Alliance summit in Warsaw in 2016. They regularly organize common training and exercises and develop information sharing in order to raise mutual. Cooperation is even more needed in a context of limited financial resources: some experts suggest using the Berlin Plus agreements in cyber defence. The EU and NATO have also concluded a technical agreement between their response teams for cyber incidents (NCIRC and CERT-EU) in February 2016 to intensify their cooperation on cyber defence. This agreement has been enforced to discuss cyber threats in the context of 2019 European elections for instance. NATO also started a partnership with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP). More precisely the Alliance develops links with computer firms such as Microsoft, Atos, Thales, Cisco or Apple. The panorama of NATO’s cyberdefence assets shows therefore that the Alliance takes cyber threats seriously and dedicates resources and reflection to the topic. Even though NATO could not decide itself to trigger article V against a cyber aggressor, its member states have the common framework enabling them to act, should they manifest the political will to do so.
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EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Cyber
Lete 19 [Bruno Lété currently serves as a transatlantic fellow, security and defense at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels. He provides analysis and advice on trends in geopolitics and on international security and defense policy. “THE EU AND NATO: the Essential Partners”. 2019. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://drive.google.com/file/d/18Um8tOva0YQLiUGAjjzkkuUnIIXx-TGZ/view?usp=sharing. Accessed 6-22-2022; MJ]
The EU and NATO are targeted by the same cyber threat vectors that undermine all levels of society in member states, threatening civil, political, econom- ic and military security. The vast increase in the number of cyberattacks and the emergence of cyberspace as a new battlefield has motivated the EU and NATO to launch initiatives to strengthen their cyber resilience, and to increase their mutual consultations and coordination in the cyber domain. While the recent progress in EU- NATO cyber relations is commendable, this chapter nevertheless argues that the EU and NATO will eventually need to evolve from today’s coordinated approach to a more ambitious and integrated joint model of cooperation if they are to respond adequately to the security threats that shape today’s digital age. The first part of this chapter out- lines the history of EU-NATO cooperation in cyberspace. The second part highlights the present-day challenges that prevent a more ambitious EU-NATO cooperation agenda. The third part formulates concrete recommendations on how to move from a coordi- nated approach to a joint model for EU-NATO cooperation in cyberspace. EU and NATO responses to cyber insecurity Cybersecurity and defence have long been part of the EU and NATO calculus but it is only gradually that the issue moved to the top of their policy agendas.! The first game-changer for Europe came in 2007, when a series of coordinated cyberattacks on Estonia forced both institutions to think more seriously about this type of threat. With the aftermath of Estonia in mind, in 2008 NATO developed its very first Cyber Defence Policy. Five years later, in 2013, the EU followed suit by adopting its first ~ Cybersecurity Strategy. Another wake-up call for Europe came with the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. Russia’s an- | nexation of Crimea and semi-clandestine military actions in Donbass lent new urgency ~ to cyber defence and readiness because Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine also - included sophisticated cyberattacks.? Since then, cybersecurity has loomed increasing- ly large in NATO and EU priorities and both institutions’ initiatives in the cyber domain ~ have increased exponentially. NATO endorsed an enhanced cyber defence policy and action plan in 2011, and it decided to operationalise cyberspace as a domain of defence policy and planning in 2016. That same year all Allies also made a Cyber Defence Pledge to enhance their cyber resilience as a matter of priority. At its last Brussels Summit in July 2018, the Alliance - also announced the creation of a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO’s strengthened Command Structure. The EU for its part made the fight against cyber- crime one of the three pillars of the European Agenda on Security, and recognised cy- bersecurity as a priority for the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign - and Security Policy. The same year the EU Directive on the Security of Network and ~ Information Systems introduced important legal measures to boost the overall lev- : el of cybersecurity in the EU. In addition, in 2017 Brussels adopted a ‘Cybersecurity - ~ Package’ including the revised Cybersecurity Strategy and the introduction of a Cyber : ~ Diplomacy Toolbox.> In November 2018 the EU also updated its 2014 Cyber Defence Policy Framework to strengthen European strategic autonomy in cyberspace. Finally, ' in May 2019, member states adopted a list of ‘EU cyber sanctions’ targeting individuals ~ or groups that engage in cyberattacks against the bloc. In this climate of urgency, the EU and NATO have started to see each other as com- plementary partners in the endeavour to build up their cyber resilience. In order to foster operational-level information sharing, NATO and the EU signed a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence in February 2016 between NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). The most significant step was made with the signing of two EU-NATO Joint Declarations, in July 2016 and in July 2018, that create a concrete framework for coop- eration in the sphere of security and defence. With regard to cyber, the implementation plan of the EU-NATO Joint Declarations recognises four areas of cooperation: integra- tion of cyber defence into missions and operations; training and education; exercises; and standards. A common set of new proposals was added in 2017 to foster exchange between staffs’ relevant good practices concerning the cyber aspects and implications of crisis management and response, as well as operational aspects of cyber defence, with a view to improving understanding and synergies between the EU and NATO.* Since neither organisation possesses the full range of capabilities to tackle contem- porary security challenges, there is a serious incentive for the EU and NATO to cooperate in times of crisis. And in the field of cybersecurity and defence the past few years have indeed brought significant change. The EU and NATO share many of the same priorities in cyberspace, their policies are largely identical — based on the principles of resilience, deterrence and defence — and their tools are becoming increasingly complementary. Active interaction in the field of cyber has significantly improved with exchanges be- tween staffs on concepts and doctrines, information on training and education courses, ad-hoc exchanges on threat assessments, cross-briefings, including on the cyber as- pects of crisis management and regular meetings, and featuring an annual high-level EU-NATO staff-to-staff dialogue.® Another concrete achievement is the fact that since 2017 the EU and NATO flagship crisis management exercises — respectively called EU PACE and NATO CMX - are being coordinated and held in parallel with options for mu- tual participation of EU and NATO staffs. Coordinating EU PACE and NATO CMX reflects the overall desire to develop more interaction between both organisations.