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2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Cyber

Increased EU-NATO cooperation over cybersecurity is vital and likely to happen- recent developments prove.

Lété and Pernik ’17 (Bruno Lété currently serves as a senior fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels. He provides analysis and advice on trends in geopolitics and on international affairs. He focuses primarily on NATO, transatlantic defense cooperation, developments in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, and cybersecurity. Piret Pernik is a researcher at NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “EU–NATO Cybersecurity and Defense Cooperation: From Common Threats to Common Solutions,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, No. 28, December 2017, HL

Cybersecurity and defense have long been part of EU and NATO calculus but have only recently moved to the top of their agendas. The game first changed for Europe in 2007, when cyber-attacks in Estonia forced both institutions to think more seriously about this type of threat. As a result NATO developed in 2008 its very first Cyber Defense Policy.1 Five years later, the EU followed suit by adopting its first Cybersecurity Strategy. The 2014 crisis in Ukraine was Europe’s next big shock. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and semiclandestine military actions returned new urgency to European defense and deterrence, but also to cyberdefense and readiness as Russia’s hybrid aggressions against Ukraine included cyber-attacks.3 Since then, NATO and the EU have intensified their initiatives in the cyber sphere. NATO endorsed an enhanced cyber defense policy and action plan in 2011, and it decided to operationalize cyberspace as a domain of defense policy and planning in 2016. That same year all Allies also made a Cyber Defense Pledge to enhance their cyber resilience as a matter of priority.4 The EU for its part made the fight against cybercrime one of the three pillars of the European Agenda on Security, and recognized cybersecurity as one of the priorities for the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. In 2017 the EU adopted a “Cybersecurity Package” including the revised Cybersecurity Strategy.5 In this climate of urgency the EU and NATO have started to see each other as complementary partners to build up their cyber resilience. In order to foster operational level information sharing, NATO and the EU signed a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense in February 2016 between NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability and the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team. The most significant step was made with the signing of the EU–NATO Joint Declaration of July 2016 that creates a concrete framework for cooperation in security and defense. With regard to cyber, the implementation plan of the EU–NATO Joint Declaration recognizes four areas of cooperation: integration of cyber defense into missions and operations; training and education; exercises; and standards. EU–NATO cooperation in times of crisis is increasingly becoming a must. And in the field of cybersecurity and defense the past years have indeed been pivotal.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Generic

EU-NATO summits allow the EU to take the lead on emerging tech.

Soare 21, Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies”, German Marshall Fund, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies)

As the allies meet with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell at this month’s NATO summit, the two organizations need a more ambition agenda for cooperation. In particular, the EU and NATO need to consider a joint task force on fostering defense innovation and EDTs, with renewable two-year mandates. This instrument would provide political impetus for closer cooperation on EDTs, it would give coherence, regularity, and structure to the efforts of the two sides, and ensure commonality of purpose and synergy of output. In addition, allies could consider meeting regularly in EU-NATO digital summit formats. The EU could take the lead in this regard given its considerable financial capacity for investing in EDTs and its regulatory powers. EU-NATO digital summits would allow the transatlantic partners to regularly review progress, provide strategic guidance on legal, ethical and adoption challenges related to innovation and EDTs, and enhance their tech diplomacy by inviting like-minded global partners to attend.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Generic

A balance between bolstering EU autonomy and multilateral cooperation is possible---they’re compliments.

Puglierin ‘21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, )

However, the next four years of the Biden presidency should not be wasted on meta-debates. They present a window of opportunity for both sides of the Atlantic. It is up to the Europeans to prove that the European quest for greater strategic sovereignty can at the same time be positive for the transatlantic partnership and that a strong and self-reliant Europe is in America’s interest. And it is up to the Americans to show that they are interested in real partnership on greater eye-level, instead of curating vassals. The starting conditions are good: President Biden wants to repair the shattered relationship with the Europeans and make the transatlantic partnership the cornerstone of a unified Western approach toward great power competition. The recent US request to join a PESCO project on military mobility as a third country represents an initial test case – and a big opportunity - for a constructive future EU-US cooperation. For the Europeans, this also means that they must contribute greater added value to the transatlantic partnership through measures that simultaneously strengthen their own strategic sovereignty. First of all, this would be the development and procurement of more effective European capabilities, including high-end spectrum capabilities and strategic enablers. Very few PESCO initiatives currently address these capability gaps. Even if the issue of transatlantic industrial cooperation will remain difficult – Biden will be tough when it comes to buying and selling American – a basic willingness to support credible efforts to strengthen European defence capabilities is there. But the EU will need to demonstrate that its efforts go beyond subsidizing European defence industries and lead to a tangible boost in Europe’s operational equipment that would be available also within a NATO framework. Second, the EU needs to take some military load off the United States. They should assume greater regional responsibility in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood and also increase their operational readiness for operations abroad. Third, Europeans should spell out what the European pillar of NATO is supposed to be and how it relates to CSDP. Cooperation between the EU and NATO has made much progress in recent years, but there is clearly still unused potential. Capability development and defence planning could be even better coordinated and further aligned. The ongoing Strategic Compass process should be closely linked to the NATO review process, especially in the areas of countering cyber and hybrid threats as well as fighting terrorism and disinformation campaigns, cooperation between the two institutions should be strengthened. The EU needs to reemphasise its effort to strengthen European military mobility and provide adequate funding.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Generic

EU has a comparative advantage in all emerging tech.

De Maio ’21 (Giovanna was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December 2021, Brookings Institute, )

In this regard, the EU appears to have a comparative advantage given the role of the European Defense Agency to go beyond specific operational requirements and its ability to consider long-term trends and ways member states can cooperate on the development of new capabilities. In particular, the EU defense procurement benefits from strong support from EU-led research and development programs, as well as from considerable financial resources from the European Defense Fund. As European defense capabilities advance, there will be overlap between the EU Capability Development Priorities and the NATO Defense Planning Process; this gives the EU and NATO an opportunity to foster greater cooperation and build up a more efficient and competitive trans-atlantic defense.73 A recent study from the French Institute of International Relations identifies areas where defense requirements could be harmonized and where the EU and NATO could work on joint research projects: from cyberdefense, air superiority, logistics, and medical support capabilities to science and technology, arms control, and intelligence.74 A more synchronized approach in these areas — that would also entail a joint assessment of member state performances — will undoubtedly reinforce both NATO- and EU-led operations as well as deterrence.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › Solvency › S – Generic

NATO and EU cooperation can successfully build long-term defence against Russia and China without relying on the US – the CP ensures lasting European autonomy.

Simón ’19 [Luis Simón is a Director of the Research Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy and a Research Professor in International Security at the Brussels School of Governance. “EU-NATO Cooperation In An Era Of Great-Power Competition”. 11-26-2019. GMFUS. ; MJen]

Over the past two decades, discussions on EU-NATO relations have been closely associated with crisis-management operations and transnational threats. But that is yesterday’s world. The return of great-power competition is eliciting a shift in European security and transatlantic relations toward deterrence and defense. As such the conceptual framework that has so far underpinned debates on EU-NATO relations has been, by and large, rendered obsolete. The return of great-power competition and growing uncertainty about the United States' commitment to Europe have led to renewed calls to turn the EU into an autonomous pole in global politics. Some even toy with the notion of European equidistance in a global context that is increasingly defined by Sino-American competition. At the same time, the EU’s need to give its global role security and a transatlantic anchor underlines the potential of a more structured EU-NATO dialogue. Great-power competition also has important implications for capability development. A key challenge is to ensure that the EU’s new defense initiatives help reinforce NATO’s ongoing efforts in deterrence and defense. One way to do that would be to give the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy the authority to bring together the industrial and politico-strategic aspects of the union’s defense policy and thus act as an effective bridge between the EU and NATO. The last three years have witnessed a steady flow of self-congratulatory remarks about unprecedented progress in the relationship between the European Union and NATO. Their joint statements in 2016 and 2018 provided a compass for greater cooperation between them. But it is important to put this in perspective and ensure that the relationship keeps apace with a rapidly changing— and worsening—geostrategic environment. Discussions on EU-NATO cooperation remain stuck on a 1990s wavelength, taking crisis management and transnational challenges as their key referents. As NATO leaders meet in London and the EU undergoes a leadership transition, they should revamp their dialogue around the increasingly important theme of great-power competition. Crisis-Management Cooperation Ever since the EU stepped into the realm of security and defense in 1999, discussions on EU-NATO relations have been intimately linked with the notion of European strategic autonomy. See, for example, Jolyon Howorth, European integration and defense: the ultimate challenge? European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2000. Whereas European countries tend to see the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as a useful means to curb over-reliance on the United States in security matters, the latter has traditionally perceived the EU’s ventures in this domain as both an opportunity and a challenge. This equivocal attitude on the part of NATO’s leading member has also reflected on the EU-NATO relationship, which has always displayed a mix of competition and cooperation. From the outset, the United States warned that any attempt by Europeans to pursue security cooperation in the EU framework should avoid duplicating existing NATO structures, discriminating against non-EU NATO members, or decoupling the EU from the transatlantic security architecture. Yet, it also recognized that there was a growing political demand for European strategic autonomy. More importantly, perhaps, this demand came at a time when the United States was adopting a less direct and engaged approach to European security affairs, as it sought to shift its attention to other regions. For this shift to be successful, Europeans would have to do more in the security sphere. European integration and defense. From a U.S. viewpoint, there was a way to square the European security circle: CSDP would be welcome as long as it helped overcome Europe’s strategic introspection and generate the capabilities needed for expeditionary operations while being firmly embedded in the NATO framework. Key EU member states like the United Kingdom and Germany were sympathetic to this vision. Thus, a sort of balance emerged, with the EU explicitly acknowledging NATO’s monopoly in collective defense and confining its venture into security policy to the realm of external crisis management, and more particularly to those contingencies where NATO as a whole was not engaged. This arrangement would still work for those countries, like France, eager to underscore the EU’s autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. The absence of great-power competitors and the salience of transnational challenges meant that collective defense and deterrence were not really on Europe’s politico-strategic radar. In this vein, the 2003 European Security Strategy noted that “ large-scale aggression against any Member States” had become “improbable” and that Europe was facing “new threats” such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts in the European periphery, “failed states,” or organized crime. The focus was not so much on high-end warfare against peer-adversaries, but rather on external crisis management in militarily semi-permissive environments. When it comes to external crisis management, the EU and NATO have been cooperating and competing at the same time. On the one hand, the 2002 Berlin Plus agreements granted the EU access to NATO assets for the planning and conduct of such operations, while efforts to coordinate capability-development processes in the EU and NATO outlined the complementarity between them. On the other hand, the EU’s efforts to set up its own command arrangements as well as to launch operations in Africa—often at France’s behest—underlined the principle of political and operational autonomy from NATO and the United States. Enter Great-Power Competition For almost two decades, the concept of European strategic autonomy and discussions on the EU-NATO relationship were closely associated with external crisis-management operations—but that is yesterday’s world. Neither the EU nor NATO have given up on this field, which remains particularly relevant in Europe’s extended southern neighborhood. However, the return of great-power competition is eliciting a conceptual shift in U.S. and European thinking, away from crisis management and transnational threats and toward deterrence and defense. The return of great-power competition is increasingly recognized in NATO and EU circles. For the alliance, Russia’s annexation of Crimea marked a turning point. The 2014 and 2016 NATO summits in Wales and Warsaw ushered in rebalancing to the core business of deterrence and defense in a context of Russian revisionism, even as crisis management would still remain part of NATO’s remit. More recently, the question of how to deal with China has also found its way into NATO debates, partly as a result of repeated U.S. references to the country as a “long-term strategic competitor” and “the greatest threat to the West,” but also partly spurred by European worries about Beijing’s recent military exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic seas, and its military modernization. Against this backdrop, NATO launched an internal strategic reflection on China earlier this year. For its part, the EU already referred to Russia as a strategic challenge in its 2016 global strategy, and it has more recently defined China as a systemic rival. In his confirmation hearing, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell alluded to the existence of an increasingly competitive world and argued that the EU should learn to “use the language of power.” This theme resonates with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for a more “geopolitical Commission.”‘A commission to stand up for Europe’s interests’, A New Framework for EU-NATO Relations? The shift from a world dominated by transnational security challenges to one increasingly defined by great-power competition will have a pervasive impact on discussions on EU-NATO relations. Over the last three years, the Trump administration has expressed disdain for the multilateral, rules-based order Europeans hold so dear, and instead emphasized great-power competition with China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. While the EU is also concerned about Russian revisionism and China’s rise, Trump’s repeated swipes at it have also provided much political impetus in support of greater European political and strategic autonomy. There seems to be growing political support in EU circles around the need to reject a binary choice between the United States and China, and instead, invest in the development of the union as an autonomous pole in great-power politics. Yet, the existence of deeply rooted shared values within the West, the United States’ ongoing role in European security, and the fact that many European countries (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) have a closer political allegiance to Washington than Brussels underscores the limits to the notion of EU strategic autonomy and geopolitical equidistance between the United States and China. Great-power competition bears important implications for capability development. It is one thing for European countries to be operationally autonomous in the context of relatively modest out-of-area operations conducted against non-peer adversaries and another for them to deter or defend themselves against a great power such as Russia. The EU—and more particularly the European Defence Agency—has in recent years insisted that its work on capability cannot be restricted to crisis management and must incorporate capabilities required for defense and deterrence, regardless of whether they will be used directly by the EU itself or simply to boost the capabilities of its member states. This principle is meant to inform three key EU initiatives: the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The CDP identifies those capabilities that the EU should collectively prioritize on the basis of evolving strategic and technological trends, thus providing a reference for CARD, which surveys existing defense capabilities and identifies opportunities for cooperation, and PESCO, which provides a framework to develop key 4 capabilities collaboratively. Yet, while the EU has the potential to develop the capabilities needed for defense and deterrence (nuclear weapons excepted), its current efforts (including through PESCO) are still primarily focused on the lower end of the military spectrum. The conceptual leap from crisis management to full-spectrum defense capabilities in EU circles opens up opportunities for cooperation with NATO in this field, not least given the renewed importance that European armed forces attach to deterrence, which NATO excels at and has much more experience in than the EU. This underscores the relevance of the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), “a framework to harmonize national and NATO defense planning activities to enable Allies to provide the necessary forces and capabilities in the most effective way.” Notably, the CDP is meant to take into consideration NDPP requirements. Likewise, CARD aspires to develop in coherence with the NDPP wherever requirements overlap while acknowledging the different nature of the two organizations. In that same vein, the 25 EU member states that signed on to PESCO declared that it is complementary with NATO and insisted that the alliance “will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defense for its members.”Yet it remains unclear to what extent the CDP, PESCO, and CARD will actually feed into the NDPP process or provide an alternative framework. The key political challenge for the three EU initiatives is to make themselves relevant in the context of the newly launched European Defense Fund (EDF), which puts their relationship with NATO and the NDPP on the back burner. This leads to a critical sticking point in the EU-NATO relationship. In 2017, the European Commission launched the EDF as a vehicle to provide financial incentives to member states to advance toward a more efficient and competitive European defense-industrial base. In 2020, the European Defense Industrial Development Program will devote around €500 million to collaborative defense capability endeavors and some €90 million are already being invested in defense research projects. In 2021-2027, the EDF will invest €13 billion (about €1.8 billion per year). The United States has raised concerns about the difficulties for third-party participation in the EDF (as in PESCO), arguing that such barriers could undermine the integrity of the transatlantic defense market. The broader question, however, is to what extent the European Commission’s efforts on the defense-industrial front are grounded in a common political-strategic vision about the future of European defense. This is problematic within the EU framework, not least as the failure to give the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy a pivotal role in the EDF decision-making progress will only serve to aggravate the decoupling between the industrial aspects of European defense and the politico-strategic ones. Some measures have been adopted to ensure some interface between the two, such as placing the European Defense Agency at the center of the CDP, CARD, and PESCO processes, allowing it to act as a transmission belt to ensure that the EU’s industrial and technological priorities are capability-based, and thus strategy-based. Yet, as long as the European Commission remains in control of allocating the EDF’s money, there is no guarantee that funding decisions will be made on the basis of strategic considerations. The problem of an industrial-strategic gap in European defense transcends intra-EU bureaucratic rivalries, and even the EU itself. To the extent that the key challenge is great-power competition and deterrence, the real decoupling between the industrial and strategic aspects of European defense is the one between the EU and NATO. Since the growing importance of deterrence and defense underline NATO’s centrality to European security, strengthening the connection between the EDF, the CDP, and the NDP is critical to redressing the existing gap between the technological-industrial and strategic aspects of European defense.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › 1NCs › 1nc – NB

The CP sets the framework for broader EU-NATO cooperation – the spills over into cooperation over a laundry list of impacts. Outweighs and turns case.

Drozdiak ’15 [William Drozdiak was a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at The Brookings Institution, and is a senior advisor for Europe with McLarty Associates, an international strategic consultancy firm based in Washington. “Why can’t NATO and the EU just get along?”. 9-28-2015. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/28/why-cant-nato-and-the-eu-just-get-along/. Accessed 6-23-2022; MJen]

For anybody who spends time in Brussels, one of the more baffling mysteries in the self-styled “capital of Europe” is the lack of communication between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Even though these vital Western institutions are located just a few miles from each other, there is a striking absence of policy coordination between them. This, at a time when the European continent is confronting multiple crises whose solutions will require ingenuity, innovative thinking, and smarter use of resources. HAPPIER TOGETHER The need for closer collaboration between the EU and NATO makes sense for several reasons. There is now greater overlap in membership than ever before—22 out of 28 NATO countries also belong to the EU. European allies are worried about an American retreat and want to see a reinvigorated U.S. commitment to their security. In fortifying ties between the two organizations, Europe could be reassured by an abiding American involvement on their continent. And deeper bonds between NATO and the EU could have tangible political benefits, perhaps even to help persuade Britain to stay in the EU. For the United States, this kind of initiative could revitalize the transatlantic alliance as the foundation of our political, security, and economic relations with the rest of the world. It could also demonstrate that the community of Western democracies still remains our front line in defending common values and interests in the 21st century. A new approach to Western security cooperation—starting by creating a joint policy planning council linking the EU and NATO—should extend beyond military thinking and pursue more imaginative responses to current threats. Those include hybrid warfare by Russia, surging waves of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East, pandemic disease, climate change, and economic instability on Europe’s periphery. Future security challenges will demand more pluralistic policy responses that could be best accomplished by combining NATO and EU assets and capabilities. In the fight against terrorism, NATO could work directly with the EU to connect national criminal databases and use the EU’s special powers to seize financial assets of suspected criminals. The EU and NATO should also collaborate to avoid conflict with Russia over the control of energy resources and shipping lanes through the Arctic region. The melting polar icecap will transform global shipping routes by shaving thousands of nautical miles and up to seven days of travel time off current itineraries through the Suez and Panama canals. For those reasons alone, it is imperative for the West to prevent Russian domination in the Arctic. Other regional challenges will require closer NATO and EU cooperation. The United Nations predicts the world will need 70 percent more food to feed a global population of 9.6 billion by 2050; some experts say at least three dozen countries could be desperately short of crops or fresh water within the next 10 years. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that by 2020, between 75 and 250 million Africans could face starvation or drought—which could trigger new wars that might require EU and NATO intervention.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › 1NCs › 1nc – Cybersecurity

The CP creates an effective European cybersecurity network – solves the aff

Lete ’19 [Bruno Lété currently serves as a transatlantic fellow, security and defense at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels. He provides analysis and advice on trends in geopolitics and on international security and defense policy. “THE EU AND NATO: the Essential Partners”. 2019. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://drive.google.com/file/d/18Um8tOva0YQLiUGAjjzkkuUnIIXx-TGZ/view?usp=sharing. Accessed 6-22-2022; MJen]

~ Evolving to a joint model The priority for the EU and NATO is to now find agreement on how to mitigate cyber- security threats which are becoming more frequent and more sophisticated. EU-NATO : cooperation is essential to allow European and transatlantic governments to become better at preventing, detecting, and deterring cyberattacks, as well as to hold those that engage in malicious cyber activities accountable. As such, both organisations must continue to seek new ways of cooperation that deepen and broaden their engagement. The following recommendations are achievable, some immediately and others in the long term. But given the scale of the threat, it is necessary to think ambitiously. Create an EU-NATO cyber threat information hub Joint structures that combine EU and NATO resources or expertise are nothing new. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki is a good example of how, with the necessary good will, the EU and NATO can work together un- der the same roof. The creation of an EU-NATO Cyber Threat Information Hub could be another step in this vein. The mission of such a hub would simply be to improve information sharing by building relations and networks between the EU, NATO, mem- ber states and partners. It could do so first of all by advising technical and operation- al level Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for information exchange between the EU and NATO entities, and identifying how to enable secure lines of communication to share confidential cyber intelligence. In addition, it could assist the EU and NATO in defining what type of information needs to be shared, who needs to receive it, when the information needs to be shared, and making sure the information is released in a timely and appropriate manner. In this regard, the hub could make active recommendations concerning the growing role of automated information sharing in identifying rele- vant information more quickly, but also in automating threat mitigation in real time. Automated sharing of security and threat information could also help the EU and NATO to standardise their threat intelligence. The hub could identify adequate informa- tion-sharing platforms or information-storage clouds that can withstand increasingly complex attacks, based on open industry specifications. Such platforms bring several benefits. They enable rapid communication and peer-based sharing, they reduce cost, and increase the speed of cyber defences by substituting manual responses for auto- mated processes. In this regard, the hub could make active proposals on how to use the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the European Defence Fund (EDF) to develop this type of technological capacity. The recent proposal of eight EU member states to develop a ‘Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform’ under PESCO encourages more thinking in this direction. The success of EU- NATO cooperation in preventing, detecting and deterring cyberattacks will ultimately be defined by the ability of the two organisations to share information more effectively. Cautious steps in this direction have already been taken; for instance the EU was grant- ed access to the NATO Malware Information Sharing Platform. But both organisations will need to continue to explore bold initiatives if they are to address today’s informa- tion-sharing gap. Establish an EU-NATO Taskforce for cyber crisis response coordination To efficiently synchronise their cyber crisis response mechanisms the EU and NATO : will need to create additional capacity. The existing structures that allow the EU and - NATO to come together are still limited, ranging from formal and informal meetings ~ between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), exchanges at ministerial meetings, cross briefings to respective Committees and i - Councils, and informal staff-to-staff interaction, for instance between the European External Action Service and NATO’s International Staff. These interactions are valu- : able, but they do not represent a solid basis for guaranteeing an efficient and smooth | ~ collective response in the event of a real cyber crisis. A roadmap for collective response is therefore needed. An immediate way to achieve this would be to create a structure — like a joint taskforce — that brings together the EU Cyber Crisis Response Framework ~ and NATO’s Crisis Response System. This taskforce would be convened when a ma- jor cyber incident strikes multiple EU member states and NATO Allies or EU/NATO institutions. To prepare this taskforce for operational duties, in a first stage, its task would be | to map the full spectrum of EU and NATO competencies for cyber defence, to clari- fy responsibilities at national and supranational levels for issues like attribution and countermeasures, and based on this information to create a common template of cyber crisis management phases. Once such a common template is created, in a second stage,% ~ the taskforce could then be convened to respond to cyber incidents. This taskforce! could also be useful in many other ways. For instance, it could make recommenda ~ tions on how to synchronise joint strategic communication among EU and NATO in- stitutions, or make proposals on how to use EU PESCO and NATO structures to supporti countries before, during and after crises. It could also look at creating linkages betweeni the EU ‘Cyber Rapid Response Teams’ currently being developed under PESCO and the! existing NATO Rapid Reaction Team to Fight Cyber Attacks. Finally the taskforce couldi also make suggestions on how to include NATO into the EU Commission ‘Blueprint toi respond to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises’. The EU and NATO have a§ wide array of crisis management tools at their disposal, but they are disconnected. An% ambitious, but much needed step, would now be to align those different instruments and to create an EU-NATO ‘playbook’ on how to react to cyber incidents and crises. Develop EU-NATO triggers for a collective response to cyberattacks Talking openly about active and reactive responses in cyberspace is no longer taboo fori EU or NATO member states. And the policy instruments to conduct an offensive strategy or to sanction adversaries are steadily increasing. NATO for instance has already ~ recognised that a serious cyberattack on a member state could be a potential triggeri for Article 5. At its November 2017 defence ministerial the Alliance also agreed to cre ate a Cyber Operations Centre that will facilitate the integration of cyber capabilities with conventional military capabilities. The EU for its part created in 2017 its Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities. In May 2019, EU countries also agreed that individuals and groups conducting cyberattacks from outside the bloc may be hit with potential sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes. These measures have boosted the EU’s and NATO’s individual capacity to hit back at cyber adversaries. But there is today no template on how to synchronise these different EU and NATO tools, nor is there agreement on the conditions that would trig- ger the collective use of these tools. In other words, the circumstances in which the EU and NATO would work together to adopt a responsive or offensive posture are still éambiguous. While NATO and the EU have to an extent consciously embraced ambigu- éity for its strategic value, the absence of a clearer definition of an offensive posture, : and of the circumstances, degree, and manner in which counter-measures can or should be taken if member states perceive a cyber threat or suffer a cyberattack, make 1t more difficult for the EU and NATO to respond collectively. The conditions to use Ethe EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox or the trigger for NATO to launch an offensive cyber : campaign may be clear if a member state faces a large-scale, devastating cyber cri- ésis. However, most cyberattacks fall below the threshold of being perceived as a clear act of aggression. Formulating a proportionate response in this grey zone constitutes the biggest problem. Russian ‘active measures’ in Europe are for instance clearly de- ésigned to exploit these grey zones, and the Kremlin has acquired some sophistication i in avoiding red lines that would trigger a common response from EU or NATO member Estates. Russia is also not the only potential adversary capable of similar tactics. There is thus an acute need to define when and how the EU and NATO must respond against i day-to-day cyber intrusions. The development of a set of EU-NATO basic principles, or (non-binding) guidelines that would trigger a joint response would be a good first step. The Tallinn Manual® published by the NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence could offer inspiration on how the EU and NATO can define these principles while respecting the application of international law. Currently the EU and NATO need to assess each individual cyber threat or cyberattack on a case-by-case basis without the support of standard measurement tools and indicators that can help them formulate a swift and proportionate response. This considerably slows down the decision-making process. However, if the EU and NATO were to dispose of a set of pre-agreed principles, it would significantly improve their joint reactiveness and resilience. Intensify joint cyber exercises, foster a culture of mutual trust Exercising, training and learning together is key to better understand each other’s institutional processes, to develop common responses, and to cultivate a culture of trust. In their history, the EU and NATO have found it difficult to adopt such a mind- ~ set. They held only one joint crisis management exercise in 2003, which prioritised politico-military priorities and did not include cyber assets. The EU and NATO also planned, but failed, to implement more exercises in 2007, 2010, and 2014. The Joint ~ Declarations of 2016 and 2018 have nevertheless turned the tide and today both organi- sations exercise, train and learn together more than ever before. But the rapprochement is in many cases still cautious. A key example are the EU and NATO ‘coordinated and parallel’ crisis management exercises — EU PACE and NATO CMX. Synchronising EU and NATO flagship exercises is a commendable step to develop more interaction but : working in parallel is still a very different concept than a ‘joint exercise’. De facto, EU | PACE and NATO CMX remain independent initiatives, they constitute only one signif- icant occasion per year where the EU and NATO exercise together, and they are not conducted at the same moment in time which represents an important disconnect with a joint crisis response in reality. A more realistic approach to creating a fully-fledged - EU-NATO joint exercise is perhaps to think small-scale. A useful angle in this respect would be to have EU-NATO staffs exercise how to align specific technical cyber inci- i dent information (from computer security incident response teams — CSIRTs) with ~ military intelligence threat assessments. Moreover, exercises must also go hand-in- ~ hand with joint training and education opportunities. The EU and NATO have already opened up their cyber courses to each other’s staffs. As a next step, they could further explore how to integrate NATO cyber defence courses with the recently launched EU - Cyber Education, Training and Exercise platform - an initiative from the European Security and Defence College to harmonise and standardise cyber defence education for - EU member states. Coherent training and joint exercises will be key to create a mutual ~ culture of trust and understanding. Create a common Cyber Trust Fund for partner countries Today the EU and NATO work individually with their partner nations on cybersecuri- ty and defence programmes. But EU and NATO programmes could become more effi- cient if both institutions coordinate their assistance in order to create more synergy and avoid duplication. The EU and NATO could coordinate their assistance for partners around issues like technical cyber capabilities, information networks, and standards. A coordinated approach would also enable partners to more efficiently share with the EU and NATO their firsthand information, expertise, and experience. To complement or bundle the efforts of various EU or NATO assistance providers, an independent Cyber Trust Fund, supported by the EU and NATO, could be created. Access to the Trust Fund could be granted to EU Associated Countries or partner countries of the NATO Euro- Atlantic Partnership, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Global Partnerships. The management of EU-NATO donations and screening of project proposals could be managed by an independent private law foundation — for instance based on the model of the European Endowment for Democracy. The Trust Fund could address an important gap by focusing on the buildup of local and grassroot cyber skills and enable various stakeholders in partner nations to attend EU or NATO cyber courses, seminars, training sessions and conferences, or to organise similar types of activities in their homeland. The Trust Fund could adopt new approaches towards the develop- ment of local skills (government, corporate or civil society), for instance by requiring local partners to be involved in the project, and avoid situations where European or American contractors simply export their technology or knowhow to the partner na- tions. In this light, the Trust Fund could only support projects proposed by the partner nations, rather than copying the EU and NATO approach of pre-defining specifics for trust fund projects. The EU and NATO have worked together on financial assistance programmes in the past, such as the regular EU contributions to NATO trust funds for the disposal of unexploded ordnances, and anticorruption initiatives. In this light, the development of an independent EU-NATO Cyber Trust fund may not be such a far- fetched idea after all. Shape global norms around state behaviour in cyberspace To sustain global peace and security, much capacity to prevent irresponsible state be- haviour already exists in traditional domains such as nuclear, chemical or biological warfare. But the legal tools to stop governments across the world from engaging in malicious cyber activities are still limited. The lack of international agreement on rules regulating state behaviour in cyberspace or triggers for ‘digital self-defence’ com- plicates efforts to manage cross-border cyberthreats. As such, the EU and NATO, as two rather like-minded bodies with overlapping memberships, have the opportunity to shape their own common vision for responsible nation state behaviour in cyber- space and project it to the world stage. Today, the most significant platform to clarify the application of legal frameworks in cyberspace probably remains the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, which deals with disarmament and international security. In this context the EU and NATO should have a common dialogue on how they can assist the work done by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security (UNGGE) — a UN platform designed to debate the applicability of internation- al law in cyberspace. EU-NATO cooperation could also be used to advance ideas about transparency and accountability in cyberspace in other international platforms, from the G20 to the OECD or OSCE.” The current volatile geopolitical relations on cyber- ~ security between major powers such as Russia, China, the US or the EU, means that | finding global compromise around the rules of state behaviour in cyberspace remains : very much an open question. The EU and NATO have an opportunity here to lead the way and use their combined political weight to promote their ideas on this issue on the global stage. Adapting together The accelerating change of the digital age, and the challenges it brings, is placing new pressures on the traditional structures of intergovernmental organisations like the EU or NATO. It also highlights how these traditional structures can find it difficult to co- : ordinate with each other, even if the political will to do so is there. However, both the EU and NATO will continue to face threats emerging from cyberspace. For a long time, : ~ both found themselves ill-adapted to deal with this new reality, but change is on the horizon. And common responses are slowly but surely being developed to assert EU and NATO credibility in cyberspace in the eyes of their members, partners — and, in- deed, adversaries. Clearly, bold initiatives are needed. The EU and NATO must transit : from an agenda that strengthens their coordination, exchange and consultation mech- anisms, to initiatives that improve their joint force-multiplying functions, their cyber | ~ capabilities, their communication and decision-making structures in cyber exercises, crises and conflicts, and their interoperability with partners in cyberspace. EU-NATO : cooperation in cyberspace has taken its first small steps, but it will take a bigger leap ~ forward to adapt to a digital age that is constantly, and rapidly, evolving.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
EU-NATO Cooperation CP › 1NCs › 1nc – Generic

The CP solves coordination, capacity building, data sharing, and development on emerging tech issues – EU-NATO coop reinforces existing programs to create better security.

De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. ; MJen]

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS In a world marked by COVID-19, deeper social divisions, more vulnerable supply chains, and increased competition in the international arena, the roles of NATO and the EU and their ability to tackle global challenges are constantly being questioned. Moreover, with the proliferation of ad hoc coalitions to tackle specific challenges, the two organizations are constantly fighting for relevance and space to operate. In this context, as this paper has shown, both NATO and the EU have more to gain through joining forces rather than competing with one another. In light of the arguments developed so far, some broad policy recommendations appear relevant: 1. NATO and EU member states should leverage their policy fora to discuss joint initiatives and better employ their assets — NATO’s military capabilities and logistical systems and the EU’s capacity building and financial assistance. This would enable a more coordinated approach to crises based on a division of labor agreed to on a case-by-case basis. Learning from past experiences, the two organizations should work to avoid another “Afghanistan scenario” in areas like the Sahel region. 2. NATO and the EU should increase information sharing and establish protocols in crucial sectors from anti-terrorism cooperation to cybersecurity. The periodic joint exercises performed so far are important steps toward building confidence and fostering regular updates and the sharing of best practices. Yet insufficient information sharing and the lack of protocols in case of a crisis hinder the utility of the exercises conducted. While this recommendation ultimately depends on political will, some smaller channels could be created to streamline limited but vital information, especially in the event of a cyberattack. 3. Regarding disinformation, NATO should take advantage of the EU’s apparatus and support it with its own solid structure for intelligence gathering — instead of having NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division duplicate the work of the EU StratCom task force. Alternatively, because countering disinformation is not the main job of the division, NATO could create a separate disinformation unit to work closely with the EU’s task force. Coordinating efforts to tackle different outlets of disinformation could help reduce the overall burden. In both scenarios, the two organizations should not just seek to counter disinformation but also prevent it as much as possible. 4. NATO and the EU should increase their dialogue on regulations and impediments to military mobility and interoperability. NATO’s deeper expertise on strategic airlifting and military operations could help the EU improve regulations to facilitate military mobility. More broadly, NATO should leverage EU regulatory power in conjunction with its objectives when it comes to capacity building as well as in countering China’s multifaceted influence. 5. To reinforce NATO’s posture in Europe and elsewhere, the EU should boost its military capability (as member states’ militaries contribute to NATO’s single set of forces). Enhanced military capabilities would also enable the EU to intervene independently from the United States in theaters that are no longer security priorities for Washington. European countries will need to assess their defense spending for greater efficiency and assess the advantages of a more integrated procurement system. While doing so, Europeans should consider mechanisms to enable the U.S. defense industry to participate; this could minimize the economic losses, foster technological development and cooperation on a trans-Atlantic level, and reduce dependence on geopolitically risky supplies. 6. NATO and the EU should foster cooperation in procurement and capability development to increase interoperability, including through the establishment of similar standards. This would enhance military mobility and interoperability across Europe and other theaters like the Indo-Pacific, where the engagement of the U.S. and Europe is growing.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Feminist IR › No solvency

Recent literature published about Fem IR is fundamentally flawed by ignoring significant events. This means that the alternative cannot solve the affirmative.

Crilley ‘18 (Rhys Crilley, any qualifications, “International relations in the age of post-truth politics,” March 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rhys-Crilley-2/publication/323645901_International_relations_in_the_age_of_%27post-truth%27_politics/links/5c7d09df299bf1268d36ba2f/International-relations-in-the-age-of-post-truth-politics.pdf)

Undoubtedly, many of these things have played a role in creating the conditions of possibility for the ‘post-truth’ present. Yet while interesting, these authors’ analyses are rendered problematic by their definition of ‘post-truth’ as something novel and contemporary. This is not to say that the authors present ahistorical accounts of recent events. Rather, it is to suggest that the understanding of ‘posttruth’ politics itself—collectively deemed to be the victory of emotion over reason in contemporary politics and society—is flawed. This is because there has been no sudden shift towards people making decisions and voting with their hearts rather than their heads. Emotions have always been important in politics, economics and society. Feminists, critical theorists and others outside the mainstream of academic inquiry have argued so for decades.1 What is new is the recognition, both within the study of these respective fields and within wider public discourse, that emotions matter. And it is not that emotions matter at the expense of rationality. Seeing them in opposition to one another is to construct a false dichotomy that ignores the ways in which emotions are pervasive and interlinked with rationality.2 Subsequently, what marks the ‘post-truth’ age is not an actual shift in politics from an age of reason to an age of emotion, but an analytical one whereby the likes of d’Ancona, Ball and Davis—and the popular psychology, economic thinking and political studies that they draw on—have begun to realize that emotions matter. The point is underlined by their engagement with psychology. The dynamics of confirmation bias, the prioritization of an in-group at the expense of an out-group and the notion that humans are more convinced by narratives than by statistics, are important. They are, however, not new. In the social sciences, and indeed in International Relations (IR), many critical theorists, feminists, post-colonial theorists and post-structuralists have highlighted the importance of these phenomena throughout history. While integrating the insights of multiple disciplines into accounts of the political present is important, it also has to be recognized that those insights can help explain the past. Claims about psychology suddenly helping us understand an epochal shift from a world of truth to one of ‘post-truth’ are therefore to be approached with caution. They do not tell us about the specifics of the modern-day moment, but instead they illuminate general tendencies of human psychology. This is not to say that human psychology is universal across time and space, but it is to point out that what is lacking in the authors’ accounts of psychology as a cause of ‘post-truth’ politics is a sense of what exactly, if anything, has recently changed in how people think about politics. If, as Davis asserts, ‘we are willing accomplices to bullshit peddlers’ (p. 158), one is left wondering how, exactly, this is a novel development that has led to a shift towards ‘post-truth’ politics. Ultimately, these concerns create further limitations within these works. The first is an avoidance of contextual specifics when talking about a condition of ‘post-truth’ politics instead of engaging with the complexities of events such as Brexit and the election of Trump. The second is the proclamation that we, collectively, are to blame for buying into ‘post-truth’ politics, rather than fully interrogating how political actors are at fault for strategically lying and playing on people’s prejudices. As a consequence, the authors pay scant attention to the role of racism, sexism and xenophobia in ‘post-truth’ politics. Although the suggestions that the new age of ‘post-truth’ politics has been ushered in because of our psychology is unconvincing, the sections of these books that do engage with the historical and contextual specifics leading up to the events they are concerned with are much better. This is where Ostrovsky’s work is strongest. The invention of Russia is a detailed history of the evolution of Russian media after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, and how television has come to be a key tool for the Kremlin. As such, it provides insights into Putin’s approach to television and media coverage, and more specifically into how he has used the media as a scapegoat in the wake of national disasters, such as the sinking of the Kursk submarine. Then, Putin proclaimed to relatives of the dead submariners: ‘Television? They are lying! They are lying! They are lying!’ (p. 299). Ostrovsky also documents how television and the media have come to be interwoven with Russian military activities, labelling the Russian–Georgian conflict of 2008 as ‘Russia’s first fully televised war’ (p. 321). Although the addition of a new preface does attempt to bring the original 2015 book up to date with the current climate of ‘the new Cold War’, the book only touches on certain issues that are worthy of more attention. Ostrovsky suggests that Putin emerged as Russia’s president as a result of the public’s loss of trust in and disillusionment with the pro-western elite in the wake of the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the NATO bombing of Belgrade. He compares these with recent events in the UK and the US, noting that Russia’s turn to Putin was ‘a manifestation of the frustration and distrust of many people with their own establishment’ (p. xviii). This observation is important because it serves to place specific events in context and highlights the role that they, and politics more broadly, have played in causing the emergence of a so-called ‘post-truth’ condition. Ball’s work is at its strongest when discussing how the current media ecology has led to the rise of Trump and Britain’s vote to leave the European Union. He deftly highlights how traditional media business models are failing, and draws attention to how PR companies, tech companies and major news sites all play a role in creating a broken media environment whereby almost everyone profits from ‘outright fake news or articles of very dubious quality’ (p. 212). This culture of sensationalism and a focus on gaining clicks and views, alongside the public’s dissatisfaction with mainstream media reports reflecting the status quo, are indeed important contextual factors that have contributed to Brexit and Trump (Posttruth: how bullshit conquered the world, p. 225). In a similar vein, Davis is right to point to the rise of marketing, PR, spin and disinformation in leading to the events of 2016. Yet there is a tension between his suggestions that there have been ‘genuine changes in the way public discourse was conducted’ (p. xiii) and his claims that a deep-seated culture of bullshit (that is hard to change) led to the ruptures of 2016. Oddly, for a book that draws heavily on insights from different academic fields, the chapter on ‘culture and norms’ does not engage with cultural studies or the study of culture. D’Ancona points out how trust in politicians and the establishment has been undermined by crisis after crisis in prominent public institutions. He suggests that bank bailouts after the financial crisis of 2008, the MPs’ expenses scandal, child sex scandals at the BBC and the phone hacking scandal at the News of the World have led to ‘an age of institutional fragility’ (p. 41) where people no longer trust political, economic and social institutions. These events no doubt played a role in determining how people felt towards, and ultimately bought into, the anti-establishment narratives of the Trump and Brexit movements, and they warrant more discussion than is present in d’Ancona’s book. This is because, like Davis, d’Ancona also struggles when it comes to discussing culture. However, this is not because he ignores theorists of it, but because he dedicates a whole chapter to blaming them for causing the ‘post-truth’ politics of today. The notion that post-modern and post-structural philosophers ‘paved the way for post-truth’ (Post-truth: the new war on truth and how to fight back, p. 96) has become a rather tedious refrain. This argument is based on a caricature of post-structural thought and fails to reflect on the fundamental fact that the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and Jean Baudrillard are not advocating for politi- cians to lie and play fast and loose with the truth. Rather, what these post-structuralists, and the critical scholars of IR that they influence, are interested in is how truths are mobilized. For example, when Baudrillard was writing about the Gulf War, he was not encouraging politicians and the military to provide a sanitized view of conflict to the media. He was critiquing how such a sanitized media representation of the war led to western audiences failing to fully comprehend the violence taking place in Iraq.3 As such, Baudrillard was challenging politicians’, militaries’ and the media’s deployment of untruths, and was essentially critiquing the ‘post-truth’ view of the Gulf War. In fact, one of the key takeaways from Baudrillard and other post-structural philosophers is that we should always be sceptical of claims made by politicians, the media and businesses—a point that is remarkably similar to d’Ancona’s suggestion that in order to combat ‘post-truth’ politics ‘we must all become editors: sifting, checking, assessing what we read’ (p. 113). Furthermore, the critical ethos presented by post-structuralists, as well as their associated methodological tools of deconstruction and genealogy, can be used to address and challenge the issues most apparent in ‘post-truth’ politics—the lies, xenophobia and misogyny.4 These books also suffer in their tendency to suggest that a collective ‘we’ are to blame for the ‘post-truth’ politics of Brexit and Trump. This argument leads the authors to focus on human psychology and blames us, the public, for the current ills of political discourse. As Davis argues: ‘we live in a post-truth age because significant numbers of gullible people are taken in by fake news and false narratives that are put about by those who play to our disposition to believe’ (p. 125). Indeed, Britain’s vote to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump would not have happened if people didn’t turn out and vote for them. However, such a view that people did so because they are ‘gullible’ or psychologically disposed to believe bullshit falls short not only because it is perhaps borderline insulting, but also because it lets those who strategically stretched the truth off the hook. Each author does suggest that the events of Brexit and Trump happened because of their respective campaigns and the narratives they strategically deployed—whether that be claims about the UK’s National Health Service spending painted on the side of a big red bus or Trump’s promise to ‘drain the swamp’. However, what would benefit these works is a deeper engagement with the strategies, actions and narratives of these campaigns and how they created the effects they did. It is high time that people stopped suggesting that ‘post-truth’ politics and ‘fake news’ can be explained by broad generalizations about psychology and our propensity to believe lies. Instead, the focus should be on the role of actors who intentionally deceive for political purposes, and the people who have actually been influenced by them. This brings us to the authors’ recommendations about countering ‘post-truth’ politics. Ball provides a detailed range of sensible suggestions for politicians, the media, and for readers and voters. By far his most convincing recommendations concern the media. He argues that media literacy needs to be taught in schools and that politicians should work to bring targeted social media advertising into the public eye. D’Ancona’s claim that tech companies should ‘acknowledge their responsibility as the world’s most powerful distributors of information’ (p. 117), and act on this, is also important. In comparison, Davis’s recommendations seem rather broad, and in suggesting that the media ‘should do its job with the usual rigour and set out the facts as it always would’ (p. 289) he not only provides a rosetinted view of the media (one wonders if he has ever seen a copy of the Daily Mail or watched Fox News), but he also fails to reflect on the role that the media have played in the Brexit and Trump campaigns. Trump simultaneously used the media to great effect in garnering coverage of his campaign while also latching on to people’s anger that the mainstream media failed to reflect their views and life experiences. Herein lie the implications of these works for scholars and practitioners of global politics. The most serious of these include a need to engage with the everyday lived experiences of people, pay greater attention to the role of racism, sexism and xenophobia in global politics and interrogate the role of the media in our analyses—and how this is being transformed by developments of digital technology. For d’Ancona, Ball and Davis, people’s motivations for being antiestablishment are often obscured by generalizable claims about psychology. D’Ancona does highlight how real events such as the financial crisis have led to people losing trust in politicians and public institutions, but more could be said about the importance of Iraq, propaganda and anti-establishment sentiment. One recent study found that in the US, one of the clearest indicators of a community’s support for Trump was the number of people from that community who had died fighting for the US in the ‘war on terror’.5 Studies like this make clear that actual politics—such as the propaganda, decisions and actions of past governments—are implicated in the rise of populist movements. IR as a discipline must place greater focus on understanding the everyday lived experiences of people, and take these as a serious source of inquiry. Such an approach would help to make sense of the actual reasons behind people’s support for Brexit and Trump beyond the generalizations drawn from pop psychology presented in these books. In addition, these books engage only in a limited way with blatantly important societal ills such as racism, sexism and xenophobia and their role in both Brexit and the election of Trump. Research has demonstrated that the most consistent evidence for support of populist movements is cultural values, and that antiimmigrant sentiment as well as right-wing cultural beliefs explain why people support the populism of Trump and Brexit.6 But the authors of these works on ‘post-truth’ barely recognize this, let alone address what can be done about it. Others have been much more attentive to the role that racism and misogyny have played in movements such as the alt-right,7 and it is imperative that scholars of IR pay greater attention to the insights of scholars working in the areas of postcolonial and feminist theory. Not only do they help understand how and why racism and sexism serve political interests in the way that they do, but they have also spent decades grappling with many of the issues which seem to be suddenly so important. The starkest omission from these books on ‘post-truth’ politics is any engagement with gender. This is rather unforgivable in any work that discusses the election of Donald Trump who, of course, ran against the first female US presidential candidate nominated by a major party, Hillary Clinton. Neither d’Ancona, nor Ball nor Davis explores in detail how sexism and misogyny were at the heart of Trump’s rhetoric and how he was still elected despite being caught on tape bragging about sexual assault. Scholars of IR should avoid being so gender-blind, and would be wise to place gender at the heart of their analysis of Trump, Brexit and other populist ‘post-truth’ phenomena. Indeed, if emotion is at the heart of the ‘post-truth’ condition, as d’Ancona, Ball and Davis all suggest, they would do well to remember that ‘feminist scholarship has a very long history with “the emotional”’8 , and is therefore a valuable source of insight. Finally, these works on ‘post-truth’ politics all demonstrate that IR needs to take the media and popular culture seriously. There are well-developed literatures on political communication and on popular culture and world politics, which are perhaps no longer on the margins of IR scholarship. As Ostrovsky makes clear, Trump and Putin have many differences, yet ‘both men are, in their own way, a product of the media rather than of traditional politics, and both are TV personalities’ (p. xviii). This highlights the importance of recognizing how politics is mediatized: a process whereby politicians and institutions increasingly adopt media logics. Furthermore, since the mid-2000s, social media platforms, algorithms and targeted advertising have reconfigured power, legitimacy and authority in global politics and, in the wake of 2016, it is clear that they need to be integrated into our studies. On the whole, the works reviewed here are worth reading. While certain claims—such as the main argument that we have transitioned from an age of reason to an age of emotion—rest on shaky foundations, they are important as they provide an insight into how journalists themselves think about the current ills that face their industry and the world they write about. The books struggle to articulate both what is novel about the current ‘post-truth’ moment, and what caused it. D’Ancona’s, Ball’s and Davis’s works would benefit from a more sustained engagement with the contextual histories of the events they purport to cover—as Ostrovsky does. However, Ostrovsky also could benefit from a further interrogation of the political present in Russia and elsewhere. Perhaps it is too harsh to expect these journalistic works to reflect a level of critical engagement one might hope to find in academic inquiry, yet what they lack—such as a sustained discussion of sexism and gender, particularly in the context of Trump’s election victory—is jarring. That said, these books do highlight several important issues IR scholars should take up for further research. Davis and d’Ancona are optimistic about addressing the problems of contemporary politics, suggesting that ‘the truth will out’ (Posttruth: the new war on truth and how to fight back, p. 149) and that ‘good sense normally prevails in the end’ (Post-truth: why we have reached peak bullshit and what we can do about it, p. 302). Such platitudes are misplaced in the face of populism informed by racism and sexism. If, as some suggest, IR and security studies are facing a crisis of ethics, we would be wise to place the ethical imperative of our work on challenging the underlying global social and political ills that make the victories of xenophobes and misogynists possible.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Politics › Non Unique

Cybersecurity passage in the squo thumps and is bipartisan popular

Lauver ‘22 (Madeline Lauver, Security magazine in 2021 as its Assistant Editor, “US passes bills to foreground national cybersecurity,” Magazine, issue, 06/23/22, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/97873-us-passes-bills-to-foreground-national-cybersecurity)-KN

President Biden signed into law the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act of 2021, which establishes a federal rotational cyber workforce program for the federal cyber workforce; and the State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 2021, which requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to increase collaboration with state, local, tribal and territorial governments on cybersecurity issues. The Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act of 2021 creates a rotating program for cybersecurity and information technology (IT) positions across federal agencies.

"By signing two new bipartisan bills into law, the Biden Administration emphasizes that cybersecurity is a main-stage issue and deserves air time in our crowded political landscape," said Justin Fier, VP of Tactical Risk and Response at Darktrace."These bills mark substantial progress, but no legislation is without faults. While the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act will grant federal cyber professionals valuable transferable skills and diversify their career paths, it also adds to an industry already suffering peak burnout. Hopefully, the focus on interagency collaboration will benefit understaffed cyber departments amidst a globally limited workforce."

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Diplomacy CP

Non Unique – The DoS already has engagement

Sanger ‘22 (David E. Sanger, Davide E. Sanger is a White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer. In a 38-year reporting career for The New York Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His newest book, “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age,’’ and an HBO documentary by the same title, examine the emergence of cyberconflict and its role in changing the nature of global power, “U.S. Sends Top Security Official to Help NATO Brace for Russian Cyberattacks,” New York Times, Feb 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/us/politics/russia-ukraine-cybersecurity-nato.html)

The White House dispatched its top cybersecurity official to NATO on Tuesday in what it described as a mission to prepare allies to deter, and perhaps disrupt, Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine, and to brace for the possibility that sanctions on Moscow could lead to a wave of retaliatory cyberattacks on Europe and the United States. The visit by the official, Anne Neuberger, the deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, underscored recent intelligence assessments that an invasion of Ukraine would almost certainly be preceded by renewed cyberattacks on Ukraine’s electric grid, its communications systems and its government ministries. All of those systems have been Russian targets in the past six years. Ukraine has often been President Vladimir V. Putin’s testing ground for Russia’s arsenal of cyberweapons. “We have been warning for weeks and months, both publicly and privately, that cyberattacks could be part of a broad-based Russian effort to destabilize and further invade Ukraine,” the White House said in a statement announcing Ms. Neuberger’s arrival at NATO headquarters in Brussels. After speaking with the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s main policy body, she will go on to Poland, where she will meet with Baltic officials responsible for cyberdefense. Ms. Neuberger will tell NATO members that over the last few years they have witnessed a lot of cyberskirmishes, but no cyberwar. She will say, according to a White House statement, “that the kinds of disruptive or destructive cyberactions possible during a conflict are different in scope, kind and sophistication from the types of incidents we have seen during peacetime.” In January, hackers brought down dozens of government websites in Ukraine, and Microsoft warned that it had detected a dangerous form of malware in government and private computer networks in the country. The U.S. government has been quietly sending teams into Ukraine in recent weeks to help shore up the country’s defenses, and it is preparing to do the same with NATO countries on the alliance’s eastern flank. But those experts are reporting back to Washington that there is relatively little they can do to fundamentally harden Ukraine’s networks in a few weeks. Ukraine poses some unique cyberdefense challenges. The electric grid is still connected to Russia’s own electric supply network, a huge vulnerability that Ukrainian officials vowed to fix after attacks that turned out the lights in 2015 and 2016. Those incidents were later blamed on Russian hackers, though it was never clear if they were working at the government’s behest. Ukraine is scheduled to conduct some long-planned experiments in coming weeks that involve disconnecting from Russian electric supply networks and linking to other European power grids. But the effort is preliminary, and American officials doubt it will be of much help in any near-term confrontation with Russia. There are also concerns about how easy it would be to shutter the Ukrainian internet and communications throughout the country. A blog post this week from the Atlantic Council noted that by slicing a single undersea cable in the Kerch Strait that was installed in 2014 by Russia’s state-owned telecommunications company, Russia could disrupt much of Ukraine’s internet traffic — but at the cost of also cutting off Crimea and other Russian-speaking territory. “It could create panic in the rest of Ukraine and limit the international community’s visibility into further Russian actions,” wrote Justin Sherman, a fellow at the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Such an action would echo a move taken by Russia when it annexed Crimea nearly eight years ago and would be “well in line with the Kremlin’s willingness to accept some costs to invade and forcibly exert control over Ukraine.” Many of these scenarios have been mapped out by United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, and they have been part of war game exercises overseen by the White House. Ms. Neuberger’s trip is largely focused on how to coordinate a NATO response should Russia again attack parts of the power grid in Ukraine or take out communications in an effort to destabilize the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Diplomacy CP

Diplomatic solution doesn’t work

Snider ‘22 (Ted Snider, a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com, “Is the US hindering much-needed diplomatic efforts?,” report, issue, 04/09/22, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/09/is-the-us-hindering-much-needed-diplomatic-efforts/)-KN

Years prior to the war, when diplomatic avenues were open to prevent war, the United States already seemed to be setting up roadblocks.

In 2014, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was faced with the choice of economic alliance with the European Union or with Russia. In a country that was nearly evenly split, the choice of either partner was divisive and dangerous. But there was a way out of the dilemma: compromise was possible. Ukraine doesn’t have to choose, Putin offered. Both Russia and the EU could work economically with Ukraine.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

US Presence in China not as large as though

Van Jackson, 10-26-2021,( senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington,)"America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End," Foreign Policy, --MV

In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, detailed the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But absent from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was any meaningful statement about political economy—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are as bland as the rhetoric itself. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s military-first Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a heavily militarized agenda. Consequently, the United States is misallocating its attention and influence relative to what would actually benefit the region most. Economic policy, not defense policy, is the only way to address the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: The United States has no economic strategy for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints. First, Washington must obviously prioritize economic statecraft and stop thinking with its missiles. It is clear from the way U.S. leaders talk about their country’s role in Asia that trade, aid, finance, and development are not as privileged in their minds as the Pentagon; economic equality outside U.S. borders does not even appear to register as a problem needing attention. If that does not change, the United States will continue to place itself on the wrong side of trends—including defense spending, naval expansion, nuclear modernization, and missile proliferation—that are turning the region into a powder keg, which serves no one except the defense industry. Second, Washington needs an economic policy for Asia—one that tries to do actual good for the region instead of furthering only abstract U.S. interests. And there is much the United States can do to do right by Asia. For instance, U.S. officials could use the United States’ privileged position in the global economy to negotiate various forms of debt relief on behalf of low- and middle-income countries in the region that have been hit particularly hard by the pandemic, such as the Philippines and Malaysia. (The United States did this for Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion.) Washington could also grant these countries preferential trade access, which would be a boon to Asia’s export-dependent economies.

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2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

US already focused on measures against Chinese AI

Amy Hudson, 7-13-2021,( news editor of Air Force Magazine) "DOD's Artificial Intelligence Efforts Gain Momentum as US, Allies, and Partners Look to Counter China," Air Force Magazine, --MV

The Defense Department’s push to operationalize artificial intelligence, which leaders say will change the way the military conducts war but not the laws of war, is gaining momentum. More than 600 AI efforts are in progress across the department, “significantly more than just a year ago,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III told a live audience at The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s Global Emerging Technology Summit in Washington, D.C., on July 13. AI is “one of the top technology priorities” in the department’s $112 billion research, development, test, and evaluation budget request for 2021—the largest RDT&E request ever, he added. “In today’s department, innovation cannot be an afterthought. It is the ballgame,” Austin said. “As President Biden has noted, we’re going to see more technological change in the next 10 years than we saw in the last 50. And we know that some of our competitors think that they see an opening, but we’re determined … to develop and dominate the products and technologies of the future.” All the conference speakers, which included senior members of Congress and the U.S. national security team as well as leaders from India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, NATO, and the European Union, agreed that China is the pacing threat. China already has stated it intends to be globally dominant in AI by 2030. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, opened the full-day conference with a stark warning: “China has reared a generation of innovative technologists, and let’s not underestimate the enormous skills and talents of the Chinese people,” he said. “In many areas, we’re now seeing Chinese competitors launch both products and new technologies in advance of all Western competitors.” Warner said China is expanding its global influence by offering other authoritarian regimes a chance to monitor dissidents. “China, I believe, is hoping to control the next generation of technological innovation and digital infrastructure and hopes to impose its values on those developments,” Warner said. “All of this again, I think, puts into question principles of transparency, accountability, sovereignty, [and] free, fair, and reciprocal relations.” That’s why the Defense Department is focused on responsible artificial intelligence, which Austin said is the culmination of “cutting-edge technology” and “timeless values.” He emphasized that the U.S. will not choose between the two. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan agreed, saying the U.S. and its allies and partners need to “muster the will, the energy, and the resources to alter the course of the digital revolution.” He outlined three waves to this revolution. The first was based on the premise that technology would favor democracy and human rights, while the second was the authoritarian counter to that revolution. “So, the question before us today is whether we have the will and determination to usher in that third wave of this digital revolution—whether we can reboot and ensure that critical and emerging technologies work for, not against, our democracies and our security,” Sullivan said. “I believe that third wave is within our reach, if across party lines, across the public and private sectors, and across borders to allies and partners, we invest in our enduring advantages, we promote our shared values, we protect our technological ecosystem, and we mobilize and organize the rules of the road for the 21st century with our partners and allies.” Austin said the Defense Department is “working with other like-minded friends to advance global norms grounded in our shared values,” noting DOD leaders meet several times a year with representatives from 15 allied and partner nations on the topic. He said he expects that number to “mushroom, going forward.” Austin said artificial intelligence is a “transformative technology” that will require new processes, policies, and procedures. Last year, DOD adopted ethical principles for AI development and use and in June it announced the creation of the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, which “helps us get promising tech across the so-called ‘Valley of Death’ and into new prototypes, capabilities, and concepts,” Austin said. The Department also recently launched a new AI and data acceleration initiative aimed at harnessing data at scale and speed. “We’re going to compete to win, but we’re going to do it the right way. We’re not going to cut corners on safety, security, or ethics … We don’t believe for a minute that we have to sacrifice one for the other,” Austin said.

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2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

US already focused on China – Hot topic at 2022 NATO Summit

Stuart Lau,, 6-26-2022, "The G7 conundrum: How hard should you push China in a crisis?," POLITICO, --MV

For China, the main concerns about western countries' pronouncements in the days ahead focus on what's brewing at next week's NATO summit, rather than any tough talk at the G7. For the first time ever, NATO will consider China to be a challenge in its upcoming 10-year blueprint, the Strategic Concept, to be adopted next week. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the 30 leaders in the military bloc will "address China and the consequences for our security" at the Madrid summit. "I expect that allies will state that China poses some challenges to our values, to our interests or to our security. And this, of course, has an impact also on how NATO should react in a more competitive world," Stoltenberg told POLITICO this week. In a last-minute appeal to head off that kind of designation, Wang Lutong, head of European affairs at China's Foreign Ministry, wrote that China "is not an adversary to NATO and should not be regarded as one. China poses no challenge, and its rise is for delivering better lives to the Chinese people, and has brought economic opportunities to the world, including NATO members." China's close alliance with Russia during the Ukraine war is, however, already posing big questions about how rich Western nations should deal with the broader G20 format, in which high-income nations engage with a broader group representing the wider global economy, including China, Russia, Mexico and Indonesia. Russia's presence has raised the prospect that some Western nations could boycott to avoid being in the same room as Putin. But a senior EU official said that the a widening divide between the G7 nations and developing economies made the G20 all the more important. “The G20 takes on all the more relevance as a bridge to constituents who may not have an identical world view,” the senior official said. "The worst thing we could do is break that format. ... Diplomacy is not about having just cozy chats with your like-minded friends.”

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2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

Not unique and only risk of link turn - China is using cognitive warfare now on Taiwan

Huang ‘21, "China Using ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Against Taiwan, Observers Say," VOA, , 1-17-2021 --AL

A Taipei think tank and observers in Taiwan say China is trying to influence residents with “cognitive warfare,” hoping to reverse opposition to Beijing’s desired takeover of Taiwan so it can be accomplished without having to go to war. Taiwanese attitudes have been drifting away from the mainland, especially among the younger generation, whose members see themselves “born independent” with no ties to China. China’s effort, these analysts say, includes tactics ranging from military intimidation and propaganda to misinformation spread by its army of online trolls in a bid to manipulate public opinion. They say the complexity and frequency of the effort puts Taiwan on a constant defensive. “Its ultimate goal is to control what’s between the ears. That is, your brain or how you think, which [Beijing] hopes leads to a change of behavior,” Tzeng Yi-suo, director of the cybersecurity division at the government-funded Institute of National Defense and Security Research in Taipei, told VOA. Cognitive warfare is a fairly new term, but the concept has been around for decades. China has never stopped trying to deter the island’s separatists, according to Tzeng, who wrote about the Chinese efforts last month in the institute’s annual report on China’s political and military development. Liberal democracies such as Taiwan, that ensure the free flow of information, are vulnerable to cognitive attacks by China, while China’s tightly controlled media and internet environment makes it difficult for democracies to counterattack, according to Tzeng. China’s campaign has intensified since the outbreak of COVID-19, using official means such as flying military jets over Taiwan, and unofficial channels such as news outlets, social media and hackers to spread misinformation. The effort is aimed at dissuading Taiwan from pursuing actions contrary to Beijing’s interests, the report said. China has used these tactics to attack Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, undermine support for democracy and fuel Taiwan’s social tensions and political divide, it said. The South China Situation Probing Initiative, for example, a project run by Najing University in China, has disseminated information about Chinese military activities in the region through its Twitter account, but some of the posts have been found to be false, apparently aimed at intimidating Taiwan's public and weakening Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party government’s resolve, according to the report. Tzeng said China’s efforts didn't work in Taiwan’s presidential election last January, when Tsai won a landslide victory. The island’s growing anti-China sentiments – seem further strengthened by disapproval of China’s brutal suppression of pro-democracy Hong Kong protests. China “set out to [actively] promote the island’s reunification with the mainland, its identity as ethnic Chinese or favorable views toward the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]. But now all it can hope for is to curb Taiwan’s [growing] pro-independence sentiments” – a trend Beijing has found it difficult to contain, he said. Tzeng added that he believes China is biding its time and experimenting with new tactics, which it hopes will succeed in influencing the island’s future elections. For example, the report said that China’s Communist Party is believed to have played a role in hacking Tsai’s office in May to discredit her. Reporters covering her office at the time claimed to have received minutes of internal meetings from an anonymous email account, which accused the president of corruption. Tsai's administration responded by saying that the documents had been doctored and contained fabricated content. Taiwan should, Tzeng said, stay alert and establish a comprehensive fact-checking system to prevent fake news and misinformation from subverting public opinion. Taiwan should also “work with regional and global liberal democracies to establish a common defense mechanism” as China’s influencing attacks have a global outreach and aren’t limited to Taiwan. They constitute the most serious challenge facing democratic societies today, Tung Li-wen, former head of the ruling DPP’s China affairs department, wrote in a 2019 essay. Chinese citizen journalist and blogger Zhou Shuguang, who now lives in Taiwan, said many Chinese have taken to the internet to spread China’s narrative. Two groups of such online promoters of China’s narrative are known as “Little Pink” and “50 Cent Party,” The groups, he said, have formed China’s sizable army of online trolls to spread fake news, for example, rumors about Tsai’s academic background. Despite repeated clarifications, many kept circling rumors that the president’s 1984 doctorate degree from the London School of Economics was fake. A 2016 study, led by Harvard University data scientist Gary King, found that 50 Cent Party produced 488 million “fake” social media posts a year to distract other internet users from news and online discussions painting the Communist Party in a negative light.

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2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

Link turn – U.S. and allied AI capabilities key to forecasting China offensive.

Takagi, ‘21, [Koichiro Takagi is a visiting fellow with Hudson Institute’s Japan Chair. His research areas include future warfare, cognitive warfare, and the relationship between emerging technologies and operational concepts. Mr. Takagi is a former deputy chief, Defense Operation Section] "New Tech, New Concepts: China’s Plans for AI and Cognitive Warfare," No Publication, AL

The United States and its allies should analyze intelligentized warfare more to avoid surprise attacks in future wars. They should also designate the cognitive arena as a new operational arena, along with land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace, to raise awareness and invest resources. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider how to win the “battle of narratives” to counter the manipulation of public opinion in wartime. Future warfare comes from innovative theory and cannot be derived from existing weapons. In the 1920s, when Germany developed the concept of blitzkrieg warfare, the country did not have any tanks, as the Treaty of Versailles banned them. Even in 1939, when Germany led the blitzkrieg, less than 10 percent of the German troops were armored forces. Most of China’s colossal military still has outdated equipment, and only a tiny percentage of its troops have modern intelligence equipment. The vision of future warfare lies not in existing equipment, but in military thought. The United States and its allies have to evaluate hypotheses about the future, rigorously and effectively. Regardless of whether China’s intelligentized warfare succeeds or not, it is important to pay attention to the cognitive domain in warfare and consider the means to win in it. The idea of directly influencing human cognition is not new, but with the development of AI, it may be more feasible. Intelligentized warfare uses AI to intimidate the enemy’s decision-makers and manipulate public opinion. Dealing with the direct manipulation of public opinion requires a complex operation. There are many studies about the manipulation of public opinion by China and Russia in peacetime, but there have been few analyses on wartime efforts. In warfare, both sides will use their own narratives. For example, in the case of the Taiwan-China conflict, the Chinese narrative will be something like, “These are China’s domestic problems that other countries should not be involved in.” In contrast, the narrative of the United States and its allies will likely be about the defense of democratic society. Many sub-narratives will support these narratives. There will be a battle of the narratives to determine which narratives will penetrate and gain support in the international community. China’s intelligentized warfare is a far cry from the information age wars that have been waged in the past and is not simply the use of AI or unmanned weapons systems in warfare. Its feasibility is unknown and may have been overestimated, out of political necessity. But with its goals of influencing human cognition directly and controlling the enemy’s will, it is a revolutionary idea

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2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

Link turn - China developing cognitive warfare now with the intention to control the highest decision-makers’ will.

Takagi, ‘21, [Koichiro Takagi is a visiting fellow with Hudson Institute’s Japan Chair. His research areas include future warfare, cognitive warfare, and the relationship between emerging technologies and operational concepts. Mr. Takagi is a former deputy chief, Defense Operation Section] "New Tech, New Concepts: China’s Plans for AI and Cognitive Warfare," No Publication, AL

The United States and its allies may have built the Maginot Line of the information age. But just as the German armored units broke through the Ardennes Forest in ways the French did not expect, so the Chinese People’s Liberation Army may break through the United States’ information-age arsenal, no matter how cutting-edge, if the technology remains tied to the operational concepts of a previous era. China is developing a new concept of warfare, which they call intelligentized warfare (智能化战争). First mentioned by the government in 2019, it is an innovative military concept with a focus on human cognition, which Beijing intends to use to bring Taiwan under its control without waging conventional warfare. However, only a few of the many studies on intelligentized warfare have focused on this aspect of human cognition. Chinese thinkers have clearly stated that the core operational concept of intelligentized warfare is to directly control the enemy’s will. The idea is to use AI to directly control the will of the highest decision-makers, including the president, members of Congress, and combatant commanders, as well as citizens. “Intelligence dominance” or “control of the brain” will become new areas of the struggle for control in intelligentized warfare, putting AI to a very different use than most American and allied discussions have envisioned. This article analyzes the essence of China’s intelligentized warfare, its possibilities, and limitations, and suggests measures that the United States and its allies should take.

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2AC › 2AC China Trade-Off

NATO is pivoting toward checking China AI now.

Gallo ‘22, [William Gallo is the VOA Seoul bureau chief and regional correspondent.] "Why NATO’s China Focus May Endure," VOA, 6-24-2022 --AL

Europe’s growing skepticism of China can also be observed in NATO’s recent history. In 2019, China was included for the first time in a NATO statement – but only in a single sentence saying Beijing “presents both opportunities and challenges.” By 2021, NATO’s tone had shifted. A joint communique issued in Brussels said China presents “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.” The statement also slammed China’s “coercive” policies, “opaque” military modernization, use of “disinformation,” and military exercises with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic area. A major reason for NATO’s more combative tone is the Ukraine war, which coincided with Beijing and Moscow declaring a “no limits” partnership. Just weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Beijing, where they announced a broad plan to counter Western influence around the world. Since Russia’s invasion, China has attempted to portray itself as a neutral party. But many European observers are not convinced, noting China has consistently defended Russia from global criticism and instead blamed Washington for engaging in a "Cold War mindset" that provoked Moscow. Pierre Morcos, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Ukraine conflict has “confirmed the growing strategic rapprochement between China and Russia.” “The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic area and the Indo-Pacific region are deeply inter-connected. A crisis in a region can have deep impacts on the other one,” he said. That explains why like-minded Asian countries are eager to play an active role in supporting Ukraine and pushing back against Russia, Morcos said. “I think that we will see growing coordination and consultations between NATO and these countries in the future notably to discuss the aftershocks of the war in Ukraine but also exchange about China’s capacities and activities,” he added. Speaking at a forum earlier this week, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insisted the alliance does not regard China as an adversary. However, he suggested the coming summit would result in a statement acknowledging “China poses some challenges to our values, to our interests, [and] to our security.” China has responded angrily to NATO’s eastward focus. At a Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry briefing Thursday, spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused NATO of engaging in a “highly dangerous” effort to create hostile blocs in Asia. “NATO has already disrupted stability in Europe,” he said. “It should not try to do the same to the Asia-Pacific and the whole world.”

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2AC › Latin America › Solvency

AI capacity building key

Slapakova, Linda 29 March 2021 "Towards an AI-Based Counter-Disinformation Framework," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/03/towards-an-ai-based-counter-disinformation-framework.html

The myriad opportunities for leveraging AI to counter disinformation may require stakeholders to consider actions for addressing the above-described challenges and barriers through regulatory, technology-oriented, and capacity-building measures. There are three key priorities towards which these measures could be oriented: Government stakeholders could engage with platforms and technology developers to prioritise technology development towards strengthening the ability of AI models to recognise contextual nuance in social media discourse and adapt more rapidly to recognise novel pieces of disinformation. As RAND Europe's previous research highlighted,  can provide significant opportunities in this context through enhancing AI-based detection models by analysing potential false or misleading information in the context of the wider rhetorical battlefields of social media discourse. The development of new technical, AI-based approaches for countering disinformation could be sufficiently 'future proof' in considering the potential impacts of an AI-based counter-disinformation framework on digital human rights such as freedom of expression online. It could also regard the adoption of AI as an enabler of a more comprehensive response to disinformation, rather than an isolated, overly technology-centric solution. Future efforts could therefore also focus on fostering societal resilience to information threats through . This could include strengthening the understanding of social media users of the potential impacts of technologies such as AI on social media content and strengthening their ability to recognise malign information while engaging in informed discourse with others. The integration of AI in counter-disinformation frameworks could go hand in hand with comprehensive organisational capacity-building. The adoption of more  models can, for example, foster institutional capacity for using AI-based disinformation detection models. Beyond detection, institutions particularly in the public sector might explore specialised AI training for technical personnel to be able to leverage innovative AI-based solutions for countering disinformation.