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2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Solvency

Without NATO-level response, disinformation responses are patchwork and ineffective.

McInnis Starling 21 [Kathleen J. McInnis is an author and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2006 to 2009, she served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working primarily on NATO’s Afghanistan operations. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, where she worked on NATO and transatlantic security matters. McInnis also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), working NATO-Afghanistan matters and stability operations capability development. Prior to joining the Pentagon, McInnis spent several years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzing US nuclear weapons strategy, strategic capabilities, NATO, European security, and transatlantic relations. Before joining CSIS, she was a researcher in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, working on NATO, the European Union, and US-UK political-military relations Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the initiative’s programming and research and leads on the defense policy and European security practice areas. Her own research focuses on great-power competition with China and Russia, deterrence and US force posture, and transatlantic security. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has produced and contributed to reports on Russia’s nuclear strategy, space security, military mobility, political warfare, Europe-China relations, and the US-UK relationship. Starling’s analysis has been featured in a range of publications, and she has provided commentary for NPR, the BBC, and ABC News, among others. Within the Transatlantic Security Initiative team, she played a leading role in managing NATO’s official public diplomacy efforts (“NATO Engages”) around the Alliance’s 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting and other summits. Starling was also the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Starling worked in the UK Parliament with the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, providing analysis on UK defense, Middle East security, and technology. Originally from the United Kingdom, she also worked for the Britain Stronger in Europe (BREMAIN) campaign. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and historyhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021_final.pdf]

One of the dominant challenges of contemporary statecraft is the “cylinders of excellence” problem: the stovepiping of key policies, activities, and even worldviews by bureaucracies that, practically speaking, limits the ability of nations to design and implement holistic strategies to address current and emerging threats.12 To date, NATO allies and partners have generally muddled through on countering political warfare with discrete efforts to identify and counter disinformation, improve cyber defenses, and sanction Russia and other actors in response to below-threshold attacks. Yet, these counterefforts have been mixed in terms of effectiveness, scope of response, and the actors involved. China and Russia’s authoritarian political warfare campaigns are neither siloed, piecemeal, nor singular in nature. Accordingly, these challenges demand a much more robust and comprehensive approach from NATO allies and—crucially—they require a reimagined response that better incorporates external partners (including partner states, multilateral organizations, civil society, and private sector actors). Ultimately, political warfare is a matter that NATO allies and partners must attend to with more urgency and intentionality lest they be at risk of becoming the orb spider: having mindlessly, inadvertently contributed to the design of a world that is no longer compatible with transatlantic security and the democratic values and freedoms that are central to our way of life. This paper argues that NATO has both a designated strategic role to play due to its mandate in the 1949 Washington Treaty, and an operational-level toolkit to utilize, when it comes to developing and implementing an urgently needed Comprehensive Approach to countering authoritarian political warfare.13 Political warfare can be difficult to pinpoint, as both malign and non-malign activities can be blended together as part of an ultimately coercive influence campaign. Political warfare is, therefore, most readily discerned at the strategic level, where a clearer picture of overall behaviors and trends can be aggregated and analyzed—a task that NATO headquarters is well positioned to take on. NATO convenes not only heads of state and government, military leaders, and ministers of defense, but also ministers of foreign affairs and others civilian leaders 13 This paper uses the terms political warfare, authoritarian political warfare, coercion, and authoritarian coercion interchangeably. The key difference this paper highlights is the distinction between hybrid and political warfare/coercion. Parsing these terms from the overall conceptual umbrella of “hybrid warfare” enables an analysis of what, specifically, NATO might do to counter the political warfare components of hybrid warfare. on a regular basis. With multiple divisions and directorates, NATO headquarters has the ability to engage with outside actors, including nongovernment actors and civil society. NATO has the platform to further dialogue and coordinate action among multiple stakeholders in a way that is necessary to spur cross-national and multinational counter-political warfare efforts in the transatlantic community. For NATO to get a handle on countering political warfare, it can also benefit from its various partnership frameworks to learn from and employ the capabilities of partner nations and nongovernment actors. Partners like Finland and Sweden have often led the way on countering political warfare nationally, while partners like Georgia and Ukraine have much experience to share. Civil society and commercial actors also have a part to play in any proposed counterstrategies and in developing potential solutions. A whole-of-system approach is required to combat whole-ofsystem attacks. NATO is well positioned to help build that holistic approach and it should do so with greater urgency.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Solvency

NATO needs to seriously consider and study A.I in order to tackle the new technology. NATO-wide integration is key.

KASAPOĞLU and KIRDEMIR 28 November 2019 CAN KASAPOĞLU, BARIŞ KIRDEMIR As the AI revolution and accompanying technologies are transforming geopolitical competition, NATO should address internal and external disparities in AI capabilities. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/artificial-intelligence-and-future-of-conflict-pub-80421

NATO would benefit from initiatives to prepare for, govern, and regulate AI-related policy priorities. From developing capabilities to building consensus on the challenges mentioned above, NATO needs new mechanisms to tackle emerging threats and continuously adapt to the dynamism of AI-led developments Comprehensive collective initiatives are known to be effective in the cybersecurity field. The alliance should establish an AI task force to review policies and strategic issues. On the policy level, NATO should initiate a continuous and meaningful conversation among decisionmakers, industry, civil society, and the scientific research community. The alliance has a long way to go in developing algorithmic warfare capabilities and adopting an AI-enabled C4ISR structure.14 Because most innovations in AI and robotics come from outside the military-industrial complex, some studies have encouraged the alliance to cooperate closely with big tech or develop ties with promising start-ups.15The interdisciplinary conversation needs to go beyond tech companies. AI and other modern disruptive technologies relate to a multitude of scientific fields, from computer science to behavioral biology, neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, robotics, nanotechnology, and many others. NATO nations have relied on these scientific communities to lead AI innovations. However, the level of integration of these sectors is still significantly below what is required, in part because of a populist backlash against experts among parts of the political class. The transatlantic community needs to build a culture to overcome such communication issues and ensure a continuous conversation. NATO must test its social-cognitive and digital-security vulnerabilities systematically. Ideally, red teaming—in which a group adopts an adversarial point of view to challenge an organization to improve its effectiveness or detect a major weakness—and experimentation efforts should cover both allied exercises and more isolated, peacetime activities to test defenses in national security apparatuses. Inputs from the interdisciplinary and multisectoral conversation, as well as continuous exercises, may provide significant information for new concepts. A new international and interdisciplinary research center, as an analytical hub and in the form of a center of excellence, would enable effective solutions for all the challenges mentioned above. The proposed institution would blend the high-level techno-scientific outputs of existing NATO bodies, such as the Science and Technology Organization, the Innovation Hub, and centers of excellence with state-of-the-art scientific contributions from member states and in-house experts.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Solvency

Cooperating with Nato can effectively address solve cognitive warfare with Russia and China

Mclinnis and Starling ‘21 (Kathleen J. McInnis, a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative, Clementine G. Starling, the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council “The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare,” report, issue, 06/01/21, ) – KN

While tensions flare up at times, NATO’s success has been its flexibility and adaptability to meet both emerging security challenges as well as the political demands of its members and partners. Now is a critical time, once again, for NATO to answer the call, in this instance by embracing and acting upon its important role in countering nonmilitary coercion strategies. Traditional and nontraditional security, economics, trade, diplomacy, and emerging technologies can no longer be considered discretely, nor can the interrelationships be ignored to satisfy preferences for bureaucratic stovepiping. As a matter of urgency, NATO must help its member states and partners grapple with how to think about authoritarian coercion strategies and develop holistic responses to them. Failure to do so risks the possibility of the international system, upon which NATO allies rely, being hollowed out from within—commercially, technologically, socially, or otherwise—and allies being unable to either defend themselves or contribute to the common defense. Responding to political warfare is arguably the most important geopolitical challenge of our time. NATO can, and must, help address it.

The concept of conducting synchronized activities short of overt warfare to achieve strategic ends has subsequently been expressed by policy makers through terms such as “gray zone competition” and “comprehensive coercion.” Hybrid warfare is conceptually distinct but related to political warfare and authoritarian coercion as it describes the application of these hostile activities and strategies across the conflict spectrum during times of war and peace. Political warfare refers to these coercive activities outside the context of overt hostilities. In the strategic calculations of both Moscow and Beijing, political warfare appears to be a critical—if not decisive—line of effort in hybrid warfare campaigns. NATO’s work to date on hybrid warfare—coordinating with the European Union (EU) and other partners and providing support to NATO allies on critical areas upon request—represents crucially important steps in the right direction. Further, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) counters disinformation and propaganda every day. Still, by framing NATO’s response as one of hybrid warfare, its conceptual strength may also be a fundamental limitation.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Poland

Article V doesn’t check Russia mistargeting

El-bawab ‘22 (Nadine El-bawab, I am a Northeastern University graduate with dual Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science with a concentration in International Relations and Diplomacy. I am fluent in both English and Arabic, I lived in Egypt for 9 years and currently live in Boston, MA, “Article Title,” ABC News, March 1, 2022, )

President Joe Biden repeatedly has said the United States will not be sending troops to fight Russia in Ukraine, but vowed that the U.S. would defend its NATO allies. "As I made crystal clear, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of American power," he reiterated in an address Thursday. The main goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's founding in 1949 was to foster mutual assistance in response to the Soviet Union's expansion in Europe. A key component of the treaty, Article 5, covers "collective defense," which means that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all allies. Amid the current crisis, Article 5 could mandate a more direct response from the U.S. and other treaty members if Russian aggression escalates beyond Ukraine. NATO announced last week it launched its response force, a deployment of about 40,000 troops to provide land, air and naval assistance across the alliance. This is the first time the force has been deployed for a "deterrence and defence role," a NATO spokesperson said. Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, told ABC News it is possible Article 5 could be invoked while the U.S. and its allies are providing military aid to Ukraine. “Let's say that Russia succeeds in toppling the government. And it then tries to occupy and pacify Ukraine. Assuming that the U.S. and its allies attempt to get arms to a Ukrainian resistance movement, there's a not insignificant risk that Russia might try to interdict that flow. And that whether by design or by accident, an artillery shell or a missile or a bomb could land in Poland or another NATO country,” Kupchan said. “And then we're looking at the prospect of an attack on NATO territory and the potential trigger of the Article Five collective defense guarantee, which then raises the prospect of potential military conflict between NATO and Russia,” Kupchan said. All participating countries agree to the form of solidarity outlined in the article, making it a key component of the alliance. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it borders Poland, Hungry, Slovakia and Romania, which are members. Ukraine has been moving toward the West and away from Russia, attempting to join both NATO and the European Union. Kupchan said its geographical location could be strategic during this conflict. “In the current moment, Ukraine's border with four NATO countries affords it two important advantages,” Kupchan said. “One is refugees are able to seek asylum in NATO countries, and we're seeing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians head west. And the other is that now that Ukraine's airspace is … dominated by Russia, the long border between Ukraine and NATO affords an opportunity to continue to funnel weapons and other sources of support to Ukraine." The first time Article 5 was invoked was after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The alliance had already identified terrorism as a risk affecting its security in 1999. In response to the attack, NATO engaged in the fight against terrorism, launching its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area to patrol the skies over the U.S. In 2008, NATO appeared to open the door for Ukraine's membership saying it would become a member of the alliance, despite a lack of consensus between members, Kupchan said. NATO did not specify a pathway or timeframe for Ukraine to join the alliance. “In 2008, the Bush administration wanted to proceed with what's called a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia. And European partners were reluctant, in part because neither Ukraine nor Georgia was ready to join NATO and because of concern that NATO's enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine would be seen as provocative in Russia,” Kupchan said. “Given the lack of consensus within NATO, the alliance agreed to issue a generic statement that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO members, but didn’t specify a timeframe or a pathway,” Kupchan said. Russian President Vladimir Putin linked the current crisis to Russia's NATO demands, including a guarantee that NATO will stop expanding to the East, in a video address days before Russia invaded Ukraine. Putin accused the U.S. and NATO of ignoring his demands and blamed the West for the Ukraine crisis. "[Putin] has said explicitly that he wants to see NATO's military presence [reduced] in the eastern flank and that would include the three Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, " Kupchan said. "He wants to see NATO pull its capability back." "One of the tragic dimensions of this conflict is that the Russians knew full well, that Ukrainian membership in NATO was not under consideration. It was not on the table. And NATO governments were quite explicit about that. Nonetheless, Putin decided to invade the country," Kupchan said. Its unlikely Putin would launch an attack on a NATO ally because he would be looking at a "full-scale war," he said. "My guess is that he understands that this is a non-starter," Kupchan said. In addition to NATO's deployment of its response force, it also said it was deploying a quick response brigade of 3,500 troops that could deploy on short notice while the larger unit gathers its troops from various member nations. "Our measures are and remain preventive, proportionate and non-escalatory," a statement from NATO said last week. Kupchan said it is still unclear how far west Russia will go into Ukraine. "It's conceivable that there could be a rump in Ukraine that Russia does not try to grab hold of and Western Ukraine has generally been much more integrated into Europe, than into Russia," Kupchan said.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Poland

Signaling is an independent deterrent to Russia

Grady 22 John Grady U.S., NATO in for a ‘Long Haul’ Conflict with Russia, Says Polish PM John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News.https://news.usni.org/2022/05/17/u-s-nato-in-for-a-long-haul-conflict-with-russia-says-polish-pm May 17, 2022 4:39 PM

Morawiecki praised the United States for its “stepped-up presence” on NATO’s eastern flank to signal to Russia that the alliance is serious about defense. Mark Brzezinski, American ambassador to Poland, said that in Warsaw, there are now 12,600 American soldiers on Polish bases. Either arriving with them or coming soon are M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. “We are being tested, and Poland is under threat,” he said when explaining the reasoning behind the U.S. troop levels there. Former ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, said, “we don’t know who will win” in Ukraine, but the Ukrainians “have a reasonable chance of success.” He said the West has to keep the pressure on Moscow. “We can’t screw this up.” Brzezinski added that the movement of so many U.S. forces and so much equipment eastward from the U.S. and other bases in Europe “allow[s] NATO to stand firm.” He said the American build-up and similar moves by the United Kingdom further underscore Washington’s and London’s commitment to the alliance. “Sanctions will not stop Russia today,” Katarzyna Pisarska, chair of the Warsaw Security Forum, added. “But we need more of them” to weaken Putin, his coterie and the nation’s economy over time. Europeans also need to become more energy independent from Moscow to cripple Putin’s ability to wage war by cutting off revenues from his largest source of foreign revenue, said Georgette Mossbacher, who also served as an ambassador to Poland. By building liquified natural gas terminals and exploring nuclear energy, Mossbacher said Warsaw took these steps when Moscow seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Foreign energy sales provided revenue for 36 percent of Russia’s released 2022 budget, according to a Reuters report from earlier this year. Pisarska said the Russian leader has been steering his country into “self-isolation” since 2008 to consolidate power. A large part of self-isolation is playing out in domestic propaganda to build support for the regime’s war, which it calls a “special military operation,” and in other propaganda denigrating Ukraine, Poland and other eastern and central European nations as ruled by Nazis. The unrelenting stream of stories and postings on these points also makes the Russian audience more accepting of crimes and atrocities committed by its soldiers, she added. For years, the Russian public has been fed a steady diet that “mass genocide has been carried out in Donbas” by the Ukrainians. Days before the invasion, Putin recognized two provinces in Donbas, where there are large numbers of Russian speakers, as independent of Kyiv. Separatists in the two provinces, backed by the Kremlin, have been engaged in a civil war with the Ukraine government for eight years. The secretary general of the United Nations said Russia’s claim violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity as a nation. When the disinformation and propaganda turn outward, Pisarska said it plays on nationalist feelings that oppose allowing more Ukrainian refugees to enter Poland and other NATO and European Union countries. “You see that in the comment lines” on social media, and this digital campaign “never stops,” despite constant monitoring by social media firms, said Marta Poslad, director of central and eastern European public policy for Google. “The technology is constantly changing,” and that makes removing hated-filled disinformation even more difficult, she added. Despite the Russian propaganda aimed at Poland’s nationalists, Brzezinski called Warsaw “a humanitarian superpower.” He cited citizens driving to the border to greet and help refugees and others opening their doors to house them as examples of how ordinary Poles have responded to the invasion. Rafal Trzaskowski, Warsaw’s mayor, estimated that the Polish capital was now housing 300,000 Ukrainian refugees.NATO and the West must be “in the fight for the long haul” economically, diplomatically and militarily in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, Poland’s prime minister said Tuesday. Although drawing the line at direct military confrontation, Mateusz Morawiecki, in prepared remarks delivered by a Polish chancellery official at the Atlantic Council, said, “it’s up to us to win the battle” of protecting Ukrainian sovereignty and blunting possible Kremlin moves against alliance members. “Ukraine is fighting this war not only for its security but ours.” He said the Feb. 24 invasion “turns out to be a wake-up call” to all of Europe about President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in eastern and central Europe. In response to the invasion, the prime minister added, “we, the Europeans, have to step up our defense spending.” Poland already meets the NATO threshold of spending 2 percent of its gross domestic product on security. In light of the war in Ukraine, Warsaw intends to raise that percentage in coming years.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Poland

Holding the line against Russia is imperative. Russian perception of success is a risk in and of itself.

Pavel, Engelke, Cimmino ‘22 (Berry Pavel, senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, Peter Engelke, a deputy director and senior fellow within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with the Global Energy Center, Jeffrey Cimmino, associate director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Four ways the war in Ukraine might end,” blog, issue, 03/01/22, ) – KN

The most dangerous scenario for the future of Europe and the global order is one in which the Ukraine conflict sets the stage for a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia. There are multiple pathways toward such an outcome, including:

NATO could decide to escalate its involvement in Ukraine by, for example, attempting to implement a no-fly zone or another form of direct intervention. For now, the United States and other NATO allies have rejected implementing a no-fly zone—but that calculus could change if Russia continues to escalate its bombardment of civilians. Russia would be forced to decide whether to back down or directly engage alliance military forces. If it chooses the latter, the risk of an escalating armed conflict between NATO and Russia would increase substantially.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

The US and UK have no intention to stop sanctions

Reuters, 6-21-2022, "UK says it will impose further sanctions on Russia," https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-impose-more-sanctions-russia-foreign-secretary-says-2022-06-21/

LONDON, June 21 (Reuters) - The British government is determined to impose further sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so until Moscow fully withdraws from Ukraine, foreign minister Liz Truss said on Tuesday. "We are determined to provide more weapons, impose more sanctions and back Ukraine in pushing Russia out of their territory," Truss told parliament. Truss said she would be travelling to Turkey on Wednesday to discuss options to help get grain out of Odesa, saying that there was only a matter of weeks to find a solution. Britain, the United States and the European Union have coordinated in imposing massive sanctions on Moscow for what they call an invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has termed it a military operation. "We will continue to impose sanctions, we will continue to stop importing goods from Russia until we see Russia fully withdraw from Ukraine," Truss said. Britain has targeted Russian business

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Aff Key to Supporting Sacntions

Analysis By, 6-6-2022, "Analysis," Washington Post, --MV

The momentum behind Western sanctions against Vladimir Putin is flagging. Even as the European Union toasts its toughest restrictions yet against the Russian war machine — including a partial ban on oil imports — concessions are mounting, from exempting pipeline crude to removing Putin’s favorite cleric from the sanctions list. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, an admirer of Putin, is clearly playing a big role in splintering the united front. But the risk of fatigue and waning morale goes well beyond Budapest. The cost of hitting Putin where it hurts — energy — is preying on many leaders’ minds at a time of high inflation and economic slowdown, as is the grim sight of Russia’s advance regaining momentum after 100 days of fighting. Along with differences of opinion percolating inside and outside the EU over what an endgame might look like, this doesn’t bode well for the near term. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who now must reassemble her governing coalition after its collapse last week, is keen to keep tightening the screws on Moscow. But she acknowledges everything will get more “difficult” from here — with little chance of a gas embargo in the next raft of restrictions. It’s time for a different approach — or a “pause,” as Kallas’ Belgian counterpart, Alexander De Croo, puts it. There’s no easy fix for sanctions fatigue. The “financial weapon” is an imperfect tool that is prone to patchy enforcement and unintended consequences. The unprecedented scale of sanctions against Putin’s inner circle, as well as Russia’s financial system, airlines and trade, will contribute to an estimated 10% decline in Russian gross domestic product this year. But it has not deterred or dislodged Putin. Worse, there have also been some counterproductive effects. The rising price of energy has lined Putin’s pockets while impoverishing importers. Russia’s oil-and-gas revenue will be about $285 billion this year, according to Bloomberg Economics estimates. Throw in other commodities, and that more than offsets $300 billion in Russian foreign reserves frozen as part of the sanctions. And while seizing the yachts and villas of wealthy oligarchs feels good, it’s jarring to see Western firms leaving Russia sell assets to those billionaires who are effectively too big to be sanctioned. Even if the long-term answer here will be to go harder and faster against Russia, it will be vital to shore up economic defenses at home first. Barclays Plc estimates a full embargo on Russian natural gas may reduce euro-area GDP by 4% compared to a baseline scenario; without extra economic support for households, the rhetoric of Orban — who tastelessly compares energy sanctions to an economic “nuclear bomb” — will spread. Already, a YouGov survey from April found European public opinion somewhat conflicted: More than 30% of respondents in seven countries including Spain and Italy advocated investing in trade and diplomacy with Russia, rather than defense and security. Without light at the end of the economic tunnel, the public mood might turn. If this war drags on and becomes a test of morale, the West and the EU have the advantage in terms of resources and human capital, as Miguel Otero Iglesias of the Elcano Royal Institute has noted. But that comes with a need to protect the most vulnerable in society; fiscal support should be “inevitable,” he rightly adds. Pandemic-style support measures should inspire Europe’s next policy steps, whether via the joint borrowing structure of the EU’s recovery fund or “SURE” loans offered to member states to protect employment. Unity really will be strength at a time of rising interest rates and fragile public finances — especially as Putin starts to throttle gas supplies to countries that don’t play by his rules. It is easy to assume, as some have, that the dividing line in this conflict is between those who want to accommodate Putin and those who are on Ukraine’s side. This is neither accurate nor helpful. The journey of Italy is especially instructive: Before Putin’s invasion, Mario Draghi was mulling deeper gas ties with Russia. He has since supported an oil ban and backed sending heavy weapons to Ukraine despite domestic political resistance.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Sanctions are Affecting Russia more than expected

Guardian, 6-11-2022, "Sanctions are hitting hard enough to hurt Russia, if not stop it," --MV

Sanctions have affected many aspects of life in Russia, but one particular shortage has sent the wealthy elite into a spin: beauty clinics are running out of Botox. The business daily newspaper Kommersant reported this month that Botox imports saw a threefold drop to 74,500 units in the period between January and March compared with the same time last year, after one western manufacturer stopped exporting to Russia. While the beauty industry is a small cog in the machine, the decision by western allies to sever financial and trade ties with Russia has plunged the country’s economy into a deep recession, with the OECD forecasting a 10% contraction this year and a fall of more than 4% in 2023. Sanctions have not halted the military assault, but some are now asking whether a promise to lift them could bring Russia to the negotiating table: a return to global markets, in exchange for peace in Ukraine. The British foreign secretary, Liz Truss, held out such a prospect in March, when she suggested Britain could lift sanctions if Russia commits to a full ceasefire and withdrawal, with a promise of “no further aggression”. Some of the allies have closer links to Russia than others. Last week, Germany’s former premier Angela Merkel defended her decision to increase trade links with Russia, and Germany’s reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. “It is a great tragedy that it didn’t work, but I don’t blame myself for trying,” she said. But Tim Ash, a Russia expert at the Chatham House thinktank, says Germany underestimated Putin for a long time. He says sanctions, which should have been tougher in response to Crimea, are working and should remain in place. “The sanctions have exceeded most people’s expectations and they have exceeded Putin’s as well,” he says. “The self-sanctioning by the likes of McDonald’s has also hit the Russian economy, with around 1,000 major businesses pulling out of the country when they didn’t need to. They weren’t on any sanctions list.” Output in industries from aviation to automotive has crashed. In May, the number of cars sold across Russia tumbled by 83% from the previous month, to 24,000. Rewind to May 2021 and monthly sales were nearer 150,000. Likewise, Russian plane makers are in a fix now that US, Japanese, EU and UK sanctions have blockaded the industry.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

More Russia sanctions incoming

Reuters 22 “France's Macron Not Ruling Out More Russia Sanctions”https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-05-31/frances-macron-says-not-excluding-anything-about-additional-eu-sanctions-against-russia-going-forward May 31, 2022

PARIS (Reuters) -French President Emmanuel Macron said on Tuesday that, following a sixth European Union package of sanctions against Russia, nothing could be ruled out in terms of additional sanctions in the coming weeks. Speaking to reporters following an EU summit in Brussels, he also said he hoped that in the next days and weeks agreement could be reached with Russia to allow more exports of food from Ukraine. He said recent talks on the matter between the Russian and Turkish presidents had produced "positive conclusions". "I hope that the next few days or weeks will make it possible to resolve this situation," Macron added. During his last conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Macron said he had made an offer to offered to Putin to draft a U.N. Security Council resolution providing a framework for the release of grain from Ukraine's blocked seaports.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Sanctions were heavily influential on Russia’s economy and it will continue to decline

Bellaware ’22 (Kim Bellaware, Kim Bellware covers national and breaking news for The Washington Post. She previously worked for the Chicago-based civic journalism lab City Bureau, The Huffington Post and as a freelancer for the New York Times, Rolling Stone, Vice News and other outlets, “Sanctions may help shrink Russian economy by up to 15 percent, Blinken says,” The Washington Post, June 26, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/26/russia-ukraine-war-putin-news-live-updates/)

Russia’s economy is predicted to slow between 8 and 15 percent next year amid new sanctions by the United States and other Group of Seven members, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday. In the four months since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has faced mounting economic pressure from sanctions by Ukraine’s Western allies. Several North American and European countries have banned Russian oil and energy imports; Russian banks have been blocked from accessing the SWIFT international payment system, effectively cutting off Russia from global banking; and international companies have pulled out of the country. On Sunday, G-7 members announced that they would ban imports of Russian gold, denying President Vladimir Putin the revenue he needs to fund the war against Ukraine. Penalties for the Kremlin could amount to tens of billions of dollars, President Biden tweeted Sunday morning. Blinken, speaking Sunday on CNN’s “State of the Union,” said the sanctions are having a “dramatic” effect. “Well, first, let’s take gold, the thing that we’re just announcing. That is the second-most-lucrative export that Russia has after energy. It’s about $19 billion a year. And most of that is within the G-7 countries,” he said. Blinken added that Russia cannot capitalize on higher oil prices because of export controls, denying it a way to modernize its defense sector, technology and energy exploration. Those sectors, he said, will continue to decline. “Already, we’re seeing predictions that the Russian economy will shrink by 8 to 15 percent next year,” Blinken said. “The ruble is being propped up artificially, at great expense.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Sanctions necessary to respond to Russia; they solve for the Ukraine food crisis

Ukrinform ’22 (Ukrinform, “G7 should strengthen sanctions against Russia after missile strikes on Kyiv - Yermak,” Ukrinform, 6/26/22, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3515583-g7-should-strengthen-sanctions-against-russia-after-missile-strikes-on-kyiv-yermak.html)

The head of the President's Office, Andriy Yermak, has said that sanctions against Russia should be tougher, with the need to include a gas embargo in the new EU sanctions package. He wrote this on Telegram, Ukrinform reports. "The G7 summit must respond to Russia's strikes on Kyiv. Sanctions should be more aggressive. An embargo on gold exports is good, but a gas embargo is needed in the new EU sanctions package," Yermak said. In his opinion, military convoys to unblock Ukrainian ports should be the answer to the food crisis orchestrated by Russia. "Recognition of Russia as a sponsor of terrorism is very necessary," he said. He also reiterated that Ukraine needs more heavy weapons. "More heavy weapons for Ukraine is the way to victory over an enemy who understands only force," Yermak said. Early on Sunday, June 26, several explosions rocked Ukraine's capital Kyiv, with one missile hitting a nine-storey residential building in the Shevchenkivskyi district, partially destroying the 7th, 8th and 9th floors. A three-day summit of the Group of Seven countries began in the Bavarian Alps on Sunday, with world leaders expected to discuss critical global challenges largely caused by Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the heads of state and government of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy and Japan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel are taking part in the summit.

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2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Sanctions are key to keep Russia at bay

Treisman ‘22, [Rachel Treisman is a writer and editor for the Morning Edition live blog, which she helped launch in early 2021. Treisman previously covered business at the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and evaluated the credibility of digital news sites for the startup NewsGuard Technologies, which aims to fight misinformation and promote media literacy] "How sanctions factor into negotiations between Russia and Ukraine ," NPR.org, --AL

Zarate says sanctions could play two important roles in the ongoing peace talks. For one, they help shape how Russia feels the costs of its actions, something he says should play into the calculus of negotiators at the bargaining table. In other words, he says, they should understand that things are only going to get worse for Russia as its economy continues to feel the effects of sanctions. The conversation could also come to include the lifting of certain sanctions, such as restrictions on trade or investment. "Every sanction that is used as a stick can also be used as a carrot," Zarate says, adding that he has seen this in the case of Iran and other countries that are seeking to get out from under the pressure of economic sanctions. Zarate says a "classic dilemma" with the application of sanction is that if you're putting maximum pressure on an economy, you're ultimately harming ordinary people and their ability to operate commercially. "Whether or not the regime leadership feels it directly, or whether or not they even care about the effects on their population is a different question," he said, pointing to examples like Iraq's Saddam Hussein and the Castros in Cuba. Zarate says the sanctions targeting Russian oligarchs have been a way to try to get at Putin's assets. He sees them as an attempt to (at least psychologically ) impact Putin's level of comfort and warn him that the international community won't let him rest — even if the Russian people are bearing that cost.

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2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Even if sanctions aren’t effective in general, they can be effective on Russia.

Brian O’Toole and Daniel Fried 6-24-2022, "Sanctioning Russia is a long game. Here’s how to win.," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctioning-russia-is-a-long-game-heres-how-to-win/

As the G7 considers these crucial near-term policy actions, it will also need to consider how to keep the pressure on Russia now that the initial flurry of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given way to what will likely be a longer war—and an even longer effort to isolate and weaken Putin and his regime. An effective policy is one that ramps up pressure on Moscow while deepening its political isolation, highlighting Russian atrocities in Ukraine. Here are several additional measures policymakers should consider along those lines:

Restrict additional Russian exports. After oil and gas, major  gems, gold, and other precious metals; iron and steel products; aluminum; and wood. The EU has already imposed restrictions on many of these; the United States should follow suit. Both the United States and the EU, as well as the United Kingdom, could also use sanctions (some of which are already imposed) to target Russian shipping and insurance sectors and thwart Russian efforts to redirect exports otherwise intended for the United States or Europe. Market impact, however, may augur against action targeting big Russian companies, such as Rusal, that have dominant global positions—since sanctions would likely cause further inflation or supply-chain disruptions. 

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2AC › Latin America › Sanctions

Sanctions effective – they create internal pressure for Putin to change behavior.

Elizabeth Goitein and Benjamin Waldman 4-11-2022, "How the Russia Sanctions Work and What Congress Needs to Know," Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-russia-sanctions-work-and-what-congress-needs-know

The Biden administration  in late February that Russia’s economy will “go[] backwards as long as President Putin decides to go forward with his invasion.” The threat of widespread financial distress was borne out immediately after institutional blockades and asset freezes took effect. The ruble lost  of its value, spurring the central bank to , implement draconian restrictions on capital conversion, and  the stock market . It was as if more than $300 billion in central-bank reserves had , limiting Putin’s ability to weather the effects of sanctions. Soon, one senior American official , we will “see inflation spike and economic activity contract.” Expert assessments are sobering: Russia’s GDP will  9% in 2022, its debt has been  to “junk,” and a default may be . Total financial collapse, however, is less certain. Understanding that the United States and its allies retain a weighty interest in Russian energy production, OFAC   “related to energy” from the  of its sanctions package. Bipartisan pushback led the administration to ban imports of Russian oil and natural gas, but whether this measure will choke “” remains unclear. As OFAC , Russia’s energy sector remains relatively unencumbered, particularly since European nations have been   to follow Biden’s lead. That means —  — Putin can still rely on  to  his war posture. Moreover, Russia has found receptive trading partners beyond the West. India, for instance, has begun snapping up , thereby extending Russia’s economic viability.

In the meantime, ordinary Russians will experience the sharp sting of sanctions. Fear that the ruble will collapse has already precipitated a race to withdraw deposits, drawing  across the country; restrictions on consumer banks have left travelers  abroad, their credit cards worthless;  no longer processes transactions in Russia, cutting freelancers off from their incomes; and export controls have contributed to soaring prices of , commencing a vicious cycle of price-gouging. Secretary of State Antony Blinken explicitly  this dynamic: “We regret that tens of millions of Russians will suffer because of the dangerous decisions made by a tiny circle of corrupt leaders.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America

Latin America key to solve sanctions

Alvarado ‘22 (Gabriel Alvarado, nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council, “Upcoming Summit Could Begin to Heal US-Latin America Ties,” Magazine, issue, 06/23/22, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/97873-us-passes-bills-to-foreground-national-cybersecurity)-KN

The Biden administration should use the Summit to describe the region’s importance to key White House priorities, from Build Back Better to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, including strategic competition with Beijing and the recently unveiled Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. U.S. officials have indicated that they intend to discuss issues related to the Framework at the Summit. But they should also explicitly invite Latin American countries to participate in it, following the precedent of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which includes Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Canada. U.S. officials should come prepared to explain how Latin American can help counter Chinese and Russian efforts to upend international norms and promote authoritarian practices. As part of this, they should describe and explicitly criticize China’s support for Russia’s Ukraine invasion to counter propaganda and false messaging from Beijing and Moscow.

The Biden administration, which recently designated Colombia a major non-NATO ally along with Brazil and Argentina, should invite more Latin American partners to cooperate with the alliance. Here again, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s support would be a timely topic of discussion. One specific area of cooperation might be migration—NATO is currently dealing with the forced displacement of Ukrainians, while Latin America faces similar challenges, such as the massive displacement of Venezuelans, largely to Colombia. Another useful topic to discuss would be alternative sources of critical goods. Brazil,for example, has been reluctant to punish Moscow with sanctions because its food supply depends on Russian fertilizer.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America

Latin American relations vulnerable due to Trump era trade policy.

The Financial Times Editorial Board 6-8-2022, "The US’s lack of ambition risks losing Latin America," No Publication, https://www.ft.com/content/5e579b12-e0c1-41c0-8600-ae394ef48c8f

The United States this week hosts a summit of leaders from across the Americas for the first time in 28 years. What should be a golden opportunity for Washington to show leadership risks instead highlighting the decline of US influence close to home. The president of Mexico, the most important US ally and its biggest regional trading partner, will not attend the summit. Andrés Manuel López Obrador ruled out going after Washington refused to invite the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela because they were not democracies. Honduras and Bolivia also shunned the summit over the selective guest list. The presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala, both smarting from US criticism, appeared unlikely to go. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro only agreed to show up after extracting the promise of a first bilateral meeting with Joe Biden. Caribbean nations successfully lobbied to stop the US from inviting Venezuela’s opposition chief Juan Guaidó. The squabbling is unfortunate because Latin America matters. A major fuel and food producer, the region could help fill the gap in global supply left by the war in Ukraine and the boycott of Russia. Latin America has the world’s biggest reserves of lithium and is rich in other metals. It has excellent locations for generating wind and solar power. Less happily, it is also the source of most of the world’s cocaine. When Bill Clinton convened the inaugural Summit of the Americas in 1994, he did not need to cajole presidents into coming. On offer was a bold initiative: the promise of a free trade area stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Those negotiations ended in failure but the idea remains a high water mark for US ambition in the region. Judged against that yardstick, this week’s promised offerings look meagre. Washington is touting a “partnership for economic prosperity”, a migration declaration and the promise of $300mn in assistance. These are poor substitutes for ambitious trade deals and major infrastructure investment, which could transform Latin America’s growth prospects and stimulate US companies to relocate manufacturing closer to home. The no-shows from Mexico and Central America and the non-invitation of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are particularly awkward for the migration declaration. It will not bear the signatures of the presidents of countries behind the biggest increase in illegal US border crossings in two decades. The Biden administration’s aversion to new trade treaties has robbed it of what should be a trump card. Ecuador and Uruguay’s pro-US governments are among those frustrated at the difficulty of engaging Washington to negotiate on commerce and investment. There have been other disappointments. Little has been done to change the Trump-era punishment policies which have failed to bring democracy to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America

Russia gaining ground in Latin America but U.S. can push back.

By Vladimir Rouvinski, 2-13-2017, "Kennan Cable No.20: Understanding Russian Priorities in Latin America," Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no20-understanding-russian-priorities-latin-america

For Russia, the key value of Latin America and the Caribbean is its geographical proximity to the United States. In the eyes of the Kremlin, it is Washington’s “near abroad.”  Moscow believes that its own “near abroad,” the territory of the former Soviet Union, to be a region where Russia’s interests must be taken into consideration by all other states. The Russian government further believes that the United States consistently ignores Russian interests, and for this reason Russia must amplify its presence in Latin America in response. As early as 1997, the then-Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, while visiting Latin America, reportedly said that if Russia maintains a presence in the region, it might help Russia deal with the West in Russia’s neighboring territories. This vision was only reinforced in the following years: in 2013, Moscow declared its relations with Latin America were of “strategic” importance.

During the crisis in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, Russia displayed hesitation in part because of the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Black Sea and by Washington’s support for Tbilisi and Kyiv. From this perspective, the flashy but brief sword-rattling in South and Central America can be explained as a kind of logic of reciprocity: Moscow first sent its war planes and navy ships to the Western Hemisphere soon after the Russian-Georgian 2008 war, while signs of increased military cooperation with Nicaragua coincided with the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. But the notion of reciprocity in the “U.S. near abroad” extends far beyond the military sphere. Latin America occupies a particular place in the political spectacle underway on Russian television. The extraordinary popularity of Vladimir Putin in Russia stems mainly from a common perception in Russia that he has restored Russia’s role as a world power, with the United States reemerging as Russia’s most important rival. Russian activities in Latin America provide the Russian mainstream media with opportunities to portray Russia as a rising world power capable of establishing its presence even in the United States’ “backyard.” The regular visits by Russia’s president and other top officials receive prominent coverage on major Russian TV channels and popular print media. This coverage particularly increased after 2008, when the joint declarations of Russian and Latin American political figures from the ALBA countries, Argentina, and Brazil began to include references to the imperative role Russia will play in constructing a new “just” world political order against the wishes of Washington and America’s allies. With the continuing Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s direct involvement in Syria, Russian government-controlled media now often reports on how Latin American leaders support the Russian position. Other activities that get covered include, but are not limited to, joint celebrations of events such as the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War (a high-level delegation from Moscow took part in the festivities in Cuba), joint opening of memorials to local iconic leaders (such as the Chavez Memorial Museum in Venezuela), or Vladimir Putin and Kristina Fernandez launching Russia Today’s Spanish-language broadcasting as a national public channel in Argentina. When they visit Russia, Latin American heads of state are taken to the Great Patriotic War memorials or are shown paying respect to Russian national traditions (for example, Hugo Chavez was awarded the title of Honorary Cossack). As a result of the efforts by the Russian media, today the Russian general public is much better aware of Latin America and its importance for Russia than in the recent past: According to Russian surveys asking to name nations friendly to Russia, not a single Latin American nation was listed in 2006; by 2008 several started to appear; and, by 2016, Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil made it to the top 10 list of countries friendliest to Russia.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America

Russia is increasing influence in Latin America to counteract US influence.

Small ’22 "As U.S. popularity declines, Putin gains foothold in Latin America," Newsweek, , 2-25-2022 --AL

Russians still believe that Latin America is a backyard of the United States and that it should be considered their exclusive area of influence," Rouvinski said. "So they want to reach out to this area precisely to carry out reciprocal actions." He explains that many Russian elites see the world in terms of spheres of influence, and believe the United States is encroaching on theirs with unpopular actions in countries like Belarus and Ukraine. "Vladimir Putin and the Russian elites believe that parts of Eastern Europe and some Central Asian countries naturally belong to the Russian sphere," Rouvinski said. "They believe that nothing should happen there without the explicit or implicit permission of Russian authorities," he added. American involvement in these places has led the Kremlin to plan their own retaliation. But instead of exploring direct military interventions or investing billions into local infrastructure projects, Russian officials have relied on trade, diplomacy and media savvy to expand their influence in Latin America. Russian trade in the region has increased by 44% since 2006 to nearly $12 billion in 2020. Over the past year, high-ranking Russian and Latin American officials have met much more frequently to discuss collaboration and negotiate bilateral trade agreements. Just last week, Brazilian President Jair Bolsanaro visited Moscow to discuss a strategic partnership between the nations. "We jointly strive to develop political, economic and humanitarian ties," Putin told a news conference at the conclusion of the meeting. "We closely cooperate on the international stage."

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Latin America

Russia/Venezuela partnership destabilizes latin America

DiaLogo ‘17, "Russia-Venezuela Military Partnership A Threat to Latin America," Diálogo Américas, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/russia-venezuela-military-partnership-a-threat-to-latin-america/#.YrQEn3bMLrd--AL

The Venezuelan regime’s support for the Vladimir Putin government amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a destabilizing factor for Latin America. “Russia has the full support of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro said, upon receiving Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov at the Miraflores Palace on February 16, 2022. “We have ratified the path of powerful military cooperation between Russia and Venezuela,” he added. Russia and China are the Venezuelan regime’s main weapon suppliers. According to Rear Admiral (ret.) Carlos Molina Tamayo, former head of Armament for the National Bolivarian Armed Force, who lives in exile in Spain, following his participation in the coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002, Moscow has delivered weapons systems worth more than $15 billion to Venezuela since the 2000s. In addition, “the Venezuelan NGO Control Ciudadano detailed in 2021 Venezuela’s purchase from Russia of an unspecified quantity of Orlan 10, an unmanned aerial vehicle for reconnaissance operations,” Voice of America said on January 18. But this connection goes much further. Julio Borges, former foreign envoy for Interim President Juan Guaidó, warned that Maduro and Putin’s goal is to destabilize the region, with the partnership of Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega and Cuba’s Miguel Díaz Canel. “They have opened the region’s doors for Putin to import a conflict that is not ours, putting hemispheric security at risk. Our region cannot be part of Russia’s international chess game,” Borges said via Twitter on February 24, as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Days before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Riabkov said he could not confirm nor rule out the possibility of sending Russian military assets to Venezuela, Voice of America reported. Weapons for guerrillas At present, however, the greater concern is that irregular armed groups could get their hands on light weapon systems Russia delivered to the Venezuelan regime. According to Molina Tamayo, these weapons range from AK-103 rifles to the Igla-S surface-to-air missile systems. “Chávez’s purchase of AK rifles was in the interest of getting closer to Russia,” he said. The most serious issue has to do with the Igla-S system. In 2017, Reuters reported that, according to a military document its teams were able to review, the Maduro regime would have some 5,000 Russian-made surface-to-air missiles. Since then, government officials of the region and foreign affairs experts have expressed concerns that these weapons could be slipping out of the regime’s hands and into those of irregular armed groups, such as the National liberation Army, and dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. In February 2019, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration warned about increasing risk to U.S. civil aviation of flying “into, out of, within or over the territory and airspace of Venezuela,” due to the concern that the regime could lose control some its man portable air defense systems, which could in turn be used by non-state armed actors. Amid the conflict over the invasion of Ukraine, Molina Tamayo says that Putin’s plan is to cement Venezuela, as well as Cuba and Nicaragua’s, “‘pro-Russian,’ [stance] in order to annoy the United States.”