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2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Hypersonics Turn › Defense

Hypersonics are just hedges against U.S. and NATO missile defense improvemets.

Andrew W. Reddie 1-13-2020, "Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/

Characterizing the hypersonic “arms race.” Alongside concerns surrounding strategic stability, US policy makers have also expressed concern that the United States is “behind” in a hypersonic arms race—with deployment of US hypersonic capabilities currently  for 2022. To the extent to which there is a “race” surrounding hypersonic weapon systems at all, Russia and China do enjoy an  in the development of hypersonic technology—measured by the number of successful hypersonic weapon tests. Prior to Putin’s announcement, China’s DF-ZF boost-glide vehicle had  the most success in testing, while India and France are  to be close behind. Against the backdrop of a historical record in which Moscow has long had more  compared to the United States, what should military analysts make of the US failure to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons first? The answer: very little. As noted above, the United States is the primary developer of missile defense technologies, with Moscow and Beijing registering their objections to various US deployments in Europe and East Asia over the past two decades. Amid concerns that US missile defense systems might eventually be used against them—and particularly in the absence of their own missile defense capabilities—investment in hypersonic weapons makes sense for both Moscow and Beijing. In the language of strategists, research and development of hypersonic weapons represent a “hedge” against future advancements in US missile defense technologies. This driver is  for the United States. As such, nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons would provide  appreciable benefits to the existing US nuclear capabilities encapsulated in the nuclear triad. This reality is also reflected in the fact that the current research and development programs in the United States focus on  rather than nuclear payloads for hypersonic weapon systems. Others have also  that this conventional focus increases the accuracy requirements of US hypersonic weapons—which may explain some of the delay in their deployment. Commentary suggesting that increased US investment in hypersonic weapons is needed to “match” or “lead” are also incongruous with the various offset strategies used by the United States to engage in military competition over the past six decades. For example, faced with superior Russian conventional forces in Europe in the 1950s, Eisenhower  a much smaller US ground force with battlefield nuclear weapons—using a technological solution to asymmetrically compensate for a strategic disadvantage. More recently, the third offset strategy  to “include autonomous learning systems for handling big data and determining patterns, human-machine collaboration for more timely relevant decision making, and assisted human operations”—and using these technological capabilities as a force multiplier. In both cases, military planners did not seek to match an adversary capability for capability. Instead, they sought a policy solution that addressed the underlying strategic threat. These offset strategies offer benefits both in terms of flexibility and reducing the resource cost of strategic competition, and it is unclear why this logic would be abandoned in the context of hypersonic missile threats.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Hypersonics Turn › Defense

Hypersonics are not uniquely threatening – not developed enough.

Andrew W. Reddie 1-13-2020, "Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/

Hypersonics and missile defense. Just as missile defense systems represent an antidote to traditional nuclear missiles that travel on a ballistic trajectory, hypersonic weapons represent an innovation to overcome these defenses. As a result, it is difficult to discuss the strategic effects of hypersonic weapons without taking into account the current state missile defense capabilities. Among those who frame hypersonic weapons as a strategic game-changer, there are three aspects of missile defense that are too often ignored. First, missile defense technologies remain in their infancy, with the United States the only country possessing significant numbers of deployed missile defense systems. Second, US capabilities are explicitly deployed to deter North Korea and Iran—not peer or near-peer competitors like Russia or China. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes, “Today’s US missile defenses provide significant protection against potential North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile strikes against the US homeland, and will improve as necessary to stay ahead of missile threats from rogue states.” Finally, amid a mixed test record with debates surrounding the appropriateness of test conditions, it remains unclear whether existing US missile defense technologies are as successful as policy makers might like. In light of the above and in the near term, Moscow’s deployment of hypersonic nuclear weapons changes little. Given that US missile defense systems are not designed to address the threat posed by peer competitors with large numbers of nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of the United States to a nuclear attack from Russia is the same in January 2020 as it was in November 2019, prior to Russia fielding this class of weapon. The fact that both Washington and Moscow rely on their respective mutual vulnerability—not missile defense technologies—to deter nuclear warfare remains unchanged. Among those who theorize that missile defense itself is destabilizing, hypersonic missiles may actually strengthen strategic stability by reinforcing rather than degrading the mutual vulnerability upon which nuclear deterrence rests.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Hypersonics Turn › Defense

Russian hypersonic missiles are defective in current war but they still have extravagant number

John Grady, 5-19-2022, John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News. “Russian Hypersonic Missiles Underperforming in Ukraine Conflict, NORTHCOM Says," USNI News,

The Kremlin’s most advanced missile systems are not operating effectively in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, U.S. Northern Command chief Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck said Wednesday before the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee.

The Russians have “had challenges with some of their hypersonic missiles as far as accuracy,” he told the panel.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Hypersonics Turn › Defense

Russia wont deploy hypersonic missiles

Andrew Reddie, 1-13-2020. Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project for Nuclear Gaming. “Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, //jsam

Speaking on December 24, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin marked the deployment of Russia’s first nuclear-capable hypersonic missile system, noting, “Today, we have a unique situation in our new and recent history. [Other countries] are trying to catch up with us. Not a single country possesses hypersonic weapons, let alone continental-range hypersonic weapons.”

The question that is now facing policy makers in Washington, Beijing, London, and elsewhere is whether and how this deployment reshapes strategic stability.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Case › 2024 Election

2024 election failure collapses NATO – U.S. relations

David Knowles, 3-29-2022,(senior editor)"Romney: NATO would rethink U.S. relationship if Trump wins 2024 election," No Publication, --MV

Sen. Mitt Romney, R-Utah, said Tuesday in a CNN interview that if former President Donald Trump won the 2024 election, the NATO alliance would be significantly damaged. Romney, the 2012 GOP presidential nominee, said NATO members would wonder whether they could continue to count on the United States. MITT ROMNEY: And they wonder whether we're going to return to the-- if you will-- the policies that we've had for the last 70 years, or whether we're instead going to take the turn that Donald Trump represented. If he were to come back as the US President, I think it would represent a pretty dramatic departure for the world, and they would rethink whether they can count on the United States to-- [MUSIC PLAYING] Well, I think what's happened in NATO is that they have said, can we rely on the US? And is this America First idea, which is the president saying to everybody, hey, go off and do your own thing. I think that approach is one that frightens other members of NATO, and they wonder are we committed to NATO, and to our mutual defense, or are we all going to go off on our own? And so they wonder. - Are they ever going to get over that, do you think? - Well, they wonder whether we're going to return to the-- if you will-- the policies that we've had for the last 70 years, or whether we're instead going to take the turn that Donald Trump represented. If he were to come back as the US President I think it would represent a pretty dramatic departure for the world, and they would rethink whether they can count on the United States to lead NATO, and to lead other nations as they push back against China and against Russia. - So you think that the 2024 election will decide this question? About permanent damage to Nato? - I think if President Trump were to return as president, that the nations of the world would say that they have to really rethink. [MUSIC PLAYING]

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Case › 2024 Election

Past Incidents prove Russian Infiltration and Hacks on the US – disinformation campaigns and even political interference

James Lamond, 10-3-2018, (senior policy adviser at the Center for American Progress - focuses on Russian interference, European security, and foreign influence.)"The Origins of Russia’s Broad Political Assault on the United States," Center for American Progress, --MV

On January 6, 2017, the U.S. intelligence community released a declassified assessment to the public confirming what most had already suspected: Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election.1 Since the intelligence community released its assessment, the public has learned a great deal about this assault from the special counsel investigation, press reporting, and declassified intelligence. Based on analysis of available material, it has become increasingly clear when, how, and why Russia launched the campaign against American democracy. It is evident that there was a surge of activity intended to influence the American electorate and political institutions that originated in 2014 as a counterresponse to the U.S.-led international isolation of Russia following its intervention in Ukraine. To be clear, Russia’s use of political weaponry against the United States extends further back than just 2014. In fact, a 1981 U.S. State Department Special Report defined Soviet active measures as “operations intended to affect other nations’ policies, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence,” but not including the legitimate tools of public diplomacy.2 The 1981 report highlights many of the same instruments that Russia uses today, including disinformation, controlling foreign media, deploying front groups, using blackmail, and engaging in political-influence operations.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Case › 2024 Election

Try or die for the affirmative – disinformation campaigns are only going to become more sophisticated in the 2024 election cycle.

Ashley Parker, 9-28-2021, "As Trump hints at 2024 comeback, democracy advocates fear a ‘worst-case scenario’ for the country," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-trump-hints-at-2024-comeback-democracy-advocates-fear-a-worst-case-scenario-for-the-country/2021/09/28/ee357558-1a47-11ec-914a-99d701398e5a_story.html

In recent weeks, Trump has maneuvered to firmly establish himself as the predominant and most powerful figure in Republican politics. He has injected his voice into federal and state campaigns, endorsing several secretary of state candidates who embraced his false fraud claims and worked to overturn the results of the 2020 election. And while still banned from Twitter, he has issued a flurry of angry tweet-like statements through his political action committee.

He has also reemerged at rallies, appearing last Saturday in Perry, Ga., with another rally planned for Oct. 9, at the Iowa State Fairgrounds in Des Moines. Speaking in Perry, the former president promised to “make America great again” and called for “an earth-shattering win in November 2022,” before looking ahead to the next presidential election. “We’re not forgetting 2020,” Trump said. “The most corrupt election in the history of our country. Most corrupt election in the history of most countries, to be followed by an even more glorious victory in November of 2024.” In some ways, the concerns among Democrats, constitutional scholars and democracy advocates about what the return of Trump could mean are simply one side of a coin, with Trump supporters representing the flip side. A majority of Republicans still support Trump leading their party, according to polls.  released in September found that 68 percent of Republicans and those who lean Republican say democracy is under attack, with about 7 in 10 of them believing that President Biden didn’t win the 2020 election. One side’s nightmare scenario — Trump running in 2024 and reclaiming the presidency — represents to the other side simply the democratic system working as it should. The threats to democracy that Trump critics envision are largely twofold. One real risk, they say, is that four years after the failed Jan. 6 insurrection, Trump and his supporters emerge in 2024 more sophisticated and successful in their efforts to steal an election. “For me, the scary part is, in 2020, this was not a particularly sophisticated misinformation or disinformation campaign,” said Matt Masterson, who ran election security at the Department of Homeland Security between 2018 to 2020. Referring to some of the outlandish conspiracy theories of ballot fraud posited in the wake of the 2020 election by Trump’s allies, he added: “We’re talking about bamboo ballots and Italian satellites and dead dictators.” In the future, Masterson said, these sorts of falsehoods are going to become more advanced and nuanced — exploiting genuine areas of confusion in the electoral system — and thus harder to combat.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Case › 2024 Election

Russia has been making the first move, causing a ton of destructions

MILLER ‘22 (MAGGIE MILLER, a cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO, “Russian hackers targeting U.S., other Ukraine allies,” newsletter, issue, 06/22/22, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/22/russian-hackers-target-u-s-00041342)-KN

Russian intelligence agencies have been hacking into scores of organizations in the U.S. and other Ukraine-allied countries, according to a Microsoft report that shows Russia waging a global cyberwar alongside its attacks in Ukraine.

In the report released Wednesday, Microsoft said that Russian hackers have attempted to infiltrate networks at more than 100 organizations in the U.S. and dozens across 42 other countries since Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Targets have included the foreign ministries of NATO states, humanitarian organizations, think tanks, IT groups and energy suppliers. The hackers successfully infiltrated these networks in almost 30 percent of the attempts, and managed to steal data in about a quarter of those instances. “The destructive cyberattacks have been underreported because in a way, they are invisible to the naked eye, you only know they happen when they succeed,” Microsoft President Brad Smith said during remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. “But what we see from our perspective at the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center and the literally 24 trillion signals a day is that it has been a formidable, intensive, even ferocious set of attacks.” The U.S. has been the main target, but Russian hackers have also directed attacks at Polish groups helping deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine, along with organizations in Baltic nations and Turkey.Ukraine has also been widely targeted. Microsoft found evidence that the Russian military conducted cyberattacks against 48 Ukrainian government agencies and other organizations, though Ukraine has been able to successfully repel most of these attacks. These have included cyberattacks coordinated with missile strikes on railroads and other transportation systems, and an attempt to breach the network of the nuclear power company in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine in early March — the day before it was occupied by Russian troops.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC Case › 2024 Election

Russia is more willing to take drastic action for 2024 elections

Bertrand, Cohen, Lillis & Lyngaas, ‘22, "US assesses Putin may increase efforts to interfere with US elections," CNN, , 4-11-2022-- AL

The intelligence community has made understanding Putin’s mindset a priority since early in the invasion, sources familiar with internal deliberations told CNN. Raw assessments have pointed to his increasingly unpredictable behavior, and US officials believe Putin is more willing to consider taking risks due to his anger over Russia’s failures in Ukraine – something his advisers, who officials say have not been telling him the full truth, did not prepare him for. The Associated Press reported on Saturday that Putin may use US support for Ukraine as a pretext to interfere in US elections. Lawmakers were briefed by intelligence officials last week on Putin’s calculus on potential influence operations, according to another US official familiar with the briefing. The briefing acknowledged that, should Putin shift his focus to inflicting harm outside of Ukraine, US midterm elections this year present one possible target for Russian operatives, according to the US official. Russian actors also attempted to influence the 2016 and 2020 elections. The briefing did not suggest there was specific intelligence saying that the Kremlin would target US elections, according to the official, but rather that elections are one of multiple areas that the Russian government could target for influence operations in response to the war in Ukraine. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley testifies before the House Armed Services Committee on Capitol Hill, April 5, 2022 in Washington, DC. US readies for long-term European security ramp-up after Russia's invasion “If Putin feels backed into a corner he may turn his cyber forces in any number of directions,” the US official said, adding that officials are on heightened alert given US midterm elections this year. While it would be difficult for Russia to tamper with voter tallies, another source noted that Russia would not need to change many, if any, votes “to throw the security of the entire voting enterprise into question.” Even if Russian hacking efforts did not affect the outcome at all, sowing chaos and distrust in the voting systems could be enough of a victory, another source said. When asked about the assessments, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment. “Our Election Threats Executive continues to lead the Intelligence Community’s efforts against foreign threats to US elections,” ODNI spokesman Nicole de Haay said in a statement to CNN. Elections are not the only target Russia could have in mind. The US government has begun warning about the possibility that Russia could try to attack US critical infrastructure, urging private sector owners and operators to be prepared. “All businesses, all critical infrastructure owners and operators need to assume that disruptive cyber activity is something that the Russians are thinking about, that are preparing for, that are exploring options, as the President said,” Jen Easterly, director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, told CNN late last month.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Solvency

AI is key

Slapakova, Linda 29 March 2021 "Towards an AI-Based Counter-Disinformation Framework," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/03/towards-an-ai-based-counter-disinformation-framework.html

Though the majority of malign information on social media is spread by relatively simple bot technology,  suggests that AI is being leveraged for more sophisticated online manipulation techniques. The extent of the use of AI in this context is difficult to measure, but many information security believe that AI is already being leveraged by malign actors, for example to better determine attack parameters (e.g., 'what to attack, who to attack, [and] when to attack'). This enables more targeted attacks and thus more effective information threats, including disinformation campaigns. Recent advances in AI techniques such as  have also given rise to concerns that AI may be used to create more authentic synthetic text (e.g., fake social media posts, articles, and documents). Moreover, Deepfakes (i.e., the leveraging of AI to create highly authentic and realistic manipulated audio-visual material) represent a prominent example of image-based AI-enabled information threat. AI also provides various opportunities for strengthening responses to increasingly sophisticated and democratised disinformation threats. Aside from  with which AI models can detect pieces of false or misleading information or recognise the  used by social media bots in spreading disinformation (e.g., the rhetorical tools they adopt), AI models also represent more  avenues for countering disinformation by reducing the time and resources needed for detection. AI-based solutions have been adopted, for example, to identify social media bots through  bot-spotting or bot-labelling (i.e., detecting and labelling fake social media accounts). The pace and scale of disinformation on social media is also increasingly challenging the reliance on manual fact-checking, indicating that a level of automation may indeed be required to effectively address the social media-based disinformation challenge. AI can also play an enabling role in efforts to foster wider institutional and societal resilience to disinformation. This can include the of AI-based detection into toolkits and applications that flag false or misleading content on social media to users while also educating them about various information manipulation techniques, thus advancing digital literacy.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Solvency

A NATO coordinated effort to fight back against political warfare is necessary to preserve NATO control

McInnis Starling 21 [Kathleen J. McInnis is an author and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2006 to 2009, she served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working primarily on NATO’s Afghanistan operations. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, where she worked on NATO and transatlantic security matters. McInnis also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), working NATO-Afghanistan matters and stability operations capability development. Prior to joining the Pentagon, McInnis spent several years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzing US nuclear weapons strategy, strategic capabilities, NATO, European security, and transatlantic relations. Before joining CSIS, she was a researcher in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, working on NATO, the European Union, and US-UK political-military relations Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the initiative’s programming and research and leads on the defense policy and European security practice areas. Her own research focuses on great-power competition with China and Russia, deterrence and US force posture, and transatlantic security. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has produced and contributed to reports on Russia’s nuclear strategy, space security, military mobility, political warfare, Europe-China relations, and the US-UK relationship. Starling’s analysis has been featured in a range of publications, and she has provided commentary for NPR, the BBC, and ABC News, among others. Within the Transatlantic Security Initiative team, she played a leading role in managing NATO’s official public diplomacy efforts (“NATO Engages”) around the Alliance’s 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting and other summits. Starling was also the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Starling worked in the UK Parliament with the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, providing analysis on UK defense, Middle East security, and technology. Originally from the United Kingdom, she also worked for the Britain Stronger in Europe (BREMAIN) campaign. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and historyhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021_final.pdf]

Forging common approaches among NATO allies and partners on political warfare is no easy task. Political warfare is a complex beast; by design it is hard to notice, identify, call out, and grapple with. There is a reason that allies and partners, for now, have largely approached political warfare as distinct issues—including disinformation, election interference, political coercion, and economic pressure—with varying degrees of effort and success. It is challenging to put our heads around the entirety of the problem set. Nevertheless, the very nature of the problem is that it is cross-cutting, interlinked with other types of warfare and tools, and that it plays out and pulls levers in multiple actors’ jurisdictions. For that reason, and for NATO to really grapple with political warfare—to achieve deterrence, mitigation, management of the effects, and to mute the impact—it must tackle the whole, holistically and comprehensively. It is helpful that NATO has both an Article 2 Washington Treaty strategic mandate and operational experience and lessons learned to help allies and partners grapple with these challenges. Indeed, NATO has tackled multi-sector, multi-actor problems before; its prior Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a robust framework to forge a collective and effective response to political warfare. A Comprehensive Approach 2.0 would enable NATO to bring together multiple layers of actors, including government agencies (defense, foreign affairs, treasury, homeland security, law enforcement, etc.); the public, civil society, and private sector actors; NATO member states and partner nations; and different multinational institutions like the EU and the UN. Such groups can work to forge a multi-vector approach to threat assessments of, consensus building on, and coordinating responses to Russian, Chinese, and other authoritarian political warfare. Partners across multiple countries and sectors are critical to the success of a Comprehensive Approach 2.0 and enable NATO to extend its understanding, situational awareness, and learn best practices from others. The urgency of this problem should not be understated. While NATO allies and partners are coming to grips with aspects of Russian and Chinese political warfare tactics, they have fallen behind and remain on the back foot in effectively responding to this challenge. NATO is still not far enough along in recognizing threats in existing and emerging areas like predatory economic practices and subversive energy investments. Allies and partners’ approaches to hybrid warfare, while laudable for their developments in some areas of disinformation and cyber defense, have overall been insufficient to match the evolution of the threat landscape. NATO’s current approaches to hybrid warfare can be stiflingly broad, preventing effective tailoring of strategies to match the threat. There is still an overreliance on NATO’s military arm and a lack of focus and intent on how to employ its political toolkit and nonmilitary competencies. Ultimately, a strategic shift is needed within NATO for the Alliance to play a more advanced role in countering political warfare, enabled by its Article 2 mandate. A utilization of NATO’s nonmilitary actors, toolkit, and responses will enable a more nimble and effective Alliance posture to the political warfare side of the hybrid spectrum. As China, Russia, and other authoritarian actors seek to thwart international institutions from within and undermine them from the outside, this is an urgent problem. Mitigating political warfare over the next decade will be critical to upholding the value and integrity of the very institutional underpinnings that provide security for transatlantic peoples. It is the only way for NATO to avoid the sad fate of the orb spider and build resilience against the coopting and subversion of the liberal world order upon which our shared security relies. In other words, NATO must protect the transatlantic web. NATO has managed challenges like this before. With the right strategic focus and approach it can more effectively counter political warfare and forge a more secure future for like-minded allies and partners.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Solvency

Nato says yes -

Brussels Summit Communiqué 2021

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm Our nations continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities to target our political institutions, our public opinion, and the security of our citizens.  While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support Team.  In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack.  NATO and Allies will continue to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid threats.  Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative.  We are enhancing our situational awareness and expanding the tools at our disposal to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing comprehensive preventive and response options.  We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine Scenario - Poland

Broader Western Europe war collapses the current world order.

Robin Wright 3-10-2022, "The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West," New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-growing-fear-of-a-wider-war-between-russia-and-the-west

Since Russia’s invasion, the besieged Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, has repeatedly warned the West about the danger that Putin would target other European nations. “Everyone thinks that we are far away from America or Canada. No, we are in this zone of freedom,” Zelensky said in a television interview, on Monday. “And, when the limits of rights and freedoms are being violated and stepped on, then you have to protect us. Because we will come first. You will come second. Because, the more this beast will eat, he wants more, more, and more.” The U.S., however, pushed back this week on key military requests from , for fear of Russia’s reaction. Putin’s reckless offensive has forced the U.S. to adopt awkward policy positions. On March 5th, Zelensky  to members of the House and Senate for more military aid, notably help in obtaining Soviet-era warplanes that Ukrainian pilots are trained to fly and that could balance Russia’s air superiority. On Wednesday, the Pentagon rejected an offer from Poland to turn over twenty-eight MIG-29 fighter jets to U.S. custody—flying them to a base in Germany—for transfer to Ukraine. U.S. intelligence officials assessed that an American role in a transfer “may be mistaken as escalatory and could result in significant Russian reaction that might increase the prospects of a military escalation with nato,” the Pentagon spokesman, John Kirby, . U.S. involvement was deemed to be “high risk.” The majority of Ukraine’s warplanes are still intact, a senior Defense Department official added, while acknowledging that Russia’s surface-to-air missiles now have an “umbrella” that covers virtually all of Ukraine. The Administration cited the same fears about Zelensky’s request for help from nato in establishing a no-fly zone over part of Ukraine to protect civilians. “We also have to see to it that this war does not expand,” Blinken said on Wednesday, at a joint press conference with his British counterpart. “Our goal is to end the war, not to expand it, including potentially expand it to nato territory.” Otherwise, he warned, “it’s going to turn even deadlier, involve more people, and I think potentially even make things harder to resolve in Ukraine itself.” On Thursday, Avril Haines, the director of National Intelligence, acknowledged that the U.S. is now in a uniquely challenging position. “We are obviously providing enormous amounts of support to the Ukrainians, as we should and need to do,” she told the Senate Intelligence Committee. “But at the same time trying not to escalate the conflict into a full-on nato or U.S. war with Russia. And that’s a challenging space to manage.” Yet, at each of his four stops in nato countries near Russia, Blinken heard dire predictions about the broader Russian threat beyond Ukraine—and the need for the U.S. to do more. In Riga, on Monday, the Latvian Foreign Minister, Edgars Rinkēvičs, , “We have no illusions about Putin’s Russia anymore.” In Vilnius, the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, turned to Blinken and , “Deterrence is no longer enough. We need more defense here, because otherwise it will be too late here, Mr. Secretary. Putin will not stop in Ukraine; he will not stop.” And in Tallinn, on Tuesday, the Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas,  that nato countries “need to adapt to the new reality” of a “very aggressive Russia” and permanently strengthen their defenses in the air, on land, and at sea. Pressed on what specifically countries on Russia’s borders needed, she replied, “Everything.” Eastern European countries—notably those once allied with, or part of, the former Soviet Union’s empire—have long warned of the potential for Russian aggression. “We, the Poles, are already tired of reminding everyone: ‘We told ya so,’ ” Marek Magierowski, Poland’s Ambassador to the U.S., told me in an interview this week. He cited the forewarning by the late Polish President Lech Kaczynski during the Russian invasion of Georgia, in 2008. “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow—the Baltic states and later, perhaps, time will come for my country, Poland,” Kaczynski had said. Magierowski added, “We have never had any doubts whatsoever about Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.” Putin has been waiting for this “window of opportunity” for years, he said. “He convinced himself that the West is weak, divided, wallowing in a decadent mood. He thought the free world wouldn’t care about Ukraine’s fate, as it didn’t care about Czechoslovakia’s in 1938,” when Europe tolerated Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland. Putin, he told me, is similarly “emboldened” because the West was “tragically lenient” and “outrageously complacent” after Russia , in 2006; , in 2014; , in 2016; reportedly used chemical weapons to  and his daughter, in 2018; and poisoned the opposition leader , in 2020. Over the past three decades, Eastern Europeans have often encountered skepticism of their view of Putin as the U.S. and Western Europeans, notably the former German Chancellor , advocated dealing pragmatically with Russia.

During his European trip, Blinken repeatedly promised that nato, this time, would prevent further Russian expansion. “We will defend every inch of nato territory with the full force of our collective power,” he vowed, in Estonia. But U.S. experts worry, too, about an unintended incident triggering a wider war, like the spark that ignited the First World War, a conflict that dragged on for four years and killed tens of millions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe,” Thomas E. Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,  issued on Tuesday. It might not matter what the U.S. does, he wrote. Crippling sanctions “could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence,” Graham cautioned. But, if nato appeared restrained, Moscow could be “tempted to press militarily even further into Europe” to enlarge its sphere of influence. The rippling impact of broader Russian aggression would stress “the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations” of the international order created after the Second World War, Graham wrote. Given the Russian leader’s history, Angela Stent, a former National Intelligence officer and the author of “,” is worried about a miscalculation. “The concern we have to have immediately is that the war in Ukraine doesn’t inadvertently spread to Poland or Romania by some unforeseen clash, which would then have to involve nato in a war with Russia,” she told me. Stent also worries about Putin’s intentions short of war. “You can use nonmilitary means to disrupt societies. And he’s already been doing that for the past couple of decades.” As the Russian leader grows increasingly cornered, she added, he will seek to exploit popular sentiment in countries like Serbia, where a pro-Russia march to support the war was held last week. The new U.S. intelligence assessment warns that Russia will employ “an array of tools” to undermine the interests of the U.S. and its nato allies. “We expect Moscow to insert itself into crises” whenever it sees an opportunity, it concludes. On Wednesday, the Biden Administration  after Russia’s bizarre claim that the U.S. and Ukraine were developing chemical and biological weapons. The State Department spokesperson, Ned Price, said that Moscow has a long track record of accusing the U.S. of the very crimes that Russia is perpetrating. These tactics are “an obvious ploy” by Russia to try to justify “further premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified attacks,” he said. Russia, as the aggressor, still has the upper hand. But, for the U.S. and its allies, the one positive sign is that the performance of the Ukrainian military has exceeded expectations. Russian forces have fallen far short of Putin’s goal of a swift seizure of Kyiv and the ouster of Zelensky’s government. The first two weeks have, instead, been grinding for Moscow. U.S. intelligence estimates that between two thousand and four thousand troops fighting for Russia—not all of them Russian—have died in the first two weeks. The bravery of Ukrainians, so far, has prevented the worst-case scenario.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine Scenario - Poland

Without Polish support, war in Ukraine spills out into Western Europe

Michael Baranowski 3-16-2022, "Secure NATO’s Borders Before Putin’s War Spills Over," GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/secure-natos-borders-putins-war-spills-over

Viewed from Warsaw, Russia’s war in Ukraine is getting closer to our borders.

President Vladimir Putin, frustrated with the slow progress of his land operation and heavy losses, is indiscriminately destroying cities and killing civilians. Russia bombed a military base barely ten miles from the Polish border over the weekend, sparking fears that the war may soon spill onto NATO territory. At the same time, Russia threatened to target convoys with Western weaponry coming across the border from Poland to Ukraine. These actions are meant as a warning to NATO: “Keep out!” The alliance should do no such thing. Now is the time to prepare for the possibility that this war enters NATO territory, and today’s meeting of NATO’s ministers of defense is the perfect opportunity to do so. In recent weeks, the United States doubled its troop numbers in Poland from 5,000 to 10,000 and delivered two batteries of anti-missile Patriot systems. Other allies buttressed the Baltic states and Romania with additional soldiers. And NATO activated its response force and their contingency plans, granting the Supreme Allied Commander Europe greater flexibility to act in an emergency. NATO has already reinforced its eastern members. But more must be done to ensure our security and deter Russia from expanding this conflict. Placing two Patriot batteries in Poland is a good beginning, but they cannot cover the entire length of Poland’s border with Ukraine—or Romania’s, or Slovakia’s. The alliance’s force posture in the northeastern flank is a real problem. Belarusian territory has become de facto Russian military space. That means that the Baltic states are surrounded by Russia to the south and east, and only the narrow “Suwalki Gap” corridor between Poland and Lithuania connects them to the rest of NATO territory. Poland now has over 700 miles of border vulnerable to Russian military operations. And Russia’s military is ready. The most militarized corner of Europe is Kaliningrad, a Russian region bordering Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, where 30,000 troops and 300 tanks sit ready to reach Poland, the Baltic states, and Germany. Since the Russian build-up for this war started, Russia placed an additional 30,000 troops in Belarus and brought a force of 190,000 to fight the war in Ukraine itself. Even this brief overview shows that NATO’s current reinforcements do not begin to address the existing imbalance in military power. NATO needs to correct this imbalance, and its members’ defense ministers should consider the following at today’s meeting: how best to support Ukraine militarily in the war against an aggressive Russia; how to immediately shore up the air-and-missile defenses of frontline states; and how to begin to change NATO’s force posture on the eastern flank. Given that Putin already crossed many “uncrossable” lines, the alliance must now move from a force posture that relies on “deterrence by presence” to “deterrence by defense.” There is a long way to go to get there.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine Scenario - Poland

But Poland is key to containing the Ukraine war.

The Economist 12 March 2022, "Why Poland has become NATO’s linchpin in the war in Ukraine," https://www.economist.com/europe/poland-will-play-an-outsized-role-in-western-efforts-to-assist-ukraine/21808064

Polish leaders have long pushed their partners in nato and the eu to forge closer ties with Ukraine, warning of the risk of Russian aggression, only to be dismissed as paranoid. Russia’s murderous and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has proven them entirely right. Polish denunciations of Russia’s imperial ambitions, which Americans and western Europeans once pooh-poohed as post-communist stress disorder, have now become standard nato talking points. But it is not just Poland’s view of Russia that is being taken more seriously; it is Poland’s role in the world. In a matter of a few weeks, the country has become the linchpin of the Western effort to defend Ukraine and deter Russia, a task as important as it is dangerous. Hundreds of Stinger missiles, Javelin anti-tank weapons and other munitions have already poured into Ukraine through Poland and Romania, part of America’s $350m package to assist the besieged country. Poland itself has dispatched an ammunition convoy to Ukraine, and plans to send mortars, small drones and man-portable missile systems, known as manpads, from its own supplies. Weapons deliveries from other countries, including a €450m ($490m) consignment financed by the eu, are on the way, too. “The biggest share of military equipment, both lethal and non-lethal, will go through Poland,” says Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, a military-analysis firm. “Like it or not,” says Stanislaw Koziej, a former brigadier-general in Poland’s army, “we are going to be the main link in the chain connecting Ukraine and the West.” Poland is nearer the eye of the storm than any other nato member. It risks being drawn in further. For days the country mooted giving its mig-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for f-16s from America. The Americans, who initially pushed the plan, balked when Poland asked to send the jets via an American airbase in Germany. On March 9th they backed out, saying transferring the jets risked escalation. Poland wants to do as much as possible, say officials in Warsaw, without being dragged into the war. The crisis has also turned Poland, almost overnight, into the country with the second-largest refugee population in Europe. At least 2m people have escaped Ukraine since the start of the invasion, the most extensive and rapid movement of  in Europe’s post-war history. Over 1.3m have reached Poland. The country has coped remarkably well with the influx. But its resources are stretched. Poland was already home to Europe’s largest Ukrainian diaspora, over a million strong, and so is an important recruiting ground for Ukraine’s resistance. In the first ten days of the war, Polish border guards recorded 217,000 crossings into Ukraine. A large share were Ukrainians heading back home to fight. “Our people are waiting,” says Aleksandr, who arrived at the border by bus from Estonia. “They’re going to tell us what to do, give us ammunition and guns, and then we’re off to work.” Poland’s size, location and infrastructure make it the West’s most important gateway to Ukraine. The two countries share a 530km (330-mile) border, punctuated by over a dozen crossings. The airport in Rzeszow, about an hour’s drive from the border, is the closest big airport to Ukraine on nato territory. Flight radar data show an uptick in military aircraft, almost certainly involved in weapons deliveries, flying in and out of Rzeszow since the start of the war. Were Kyiv to fall to the Russians, which is still far from guaranteed, Ukrainian troops and volunteers would probably regroup in the west of the country, in or around Lviv, only 80km from the Polish border. This would further raise Poland’s importance for Ukraine. The war has already strengthened Poland’s position in nato. The alliance is increasing its presence in Poland dramatically. America had deployed nearly 5,000 new troops to Poland in February, even before the Russian invasion, bringing the total to some 9,000. It also recently approved the sale to Poland of 250 Abrams tanks. Poland also hopes to reconcile with the rest of the eu. The bloc has repeatedly chided Poland’s nationalist government for stacking its top court with cronies, threatening judges who rule against it and harassing the media. The stand-off prompted the eu to freeze €36bn in pandemic recovery funds earmarked for Poland and to fine it for ignoring rulings by the European Court of Justice. Poland has moved to meet some eu demands, and its efforts in the face of Russia’s aggression may earn it a more sympathetic hearing. But there are incalculable risks involved, too. Analysts say Russian retaliation of one kind or another against Poland is a near certainty. The longer the war lasts, the more desperate Russia will be to destroy the supply lines connecting Poland to Ukraine. “I’m afraid that Russian rocket attacks against those supply lines are something we have to take into account in the coming days and weeks,” says Wojciech Kononczuk of the Centre for Eastern Studies, a think-tank in Warsaw. America clearly takes the possibility seriously: it is sending Patriot missile-defence batteries to Poland. Others mention the threat of Russian sabotage and cyberattacks inside Poland. A social-media monitoring group has already uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign intended to spread panic and drive up resentment towards refugees from Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s threats against countries that interfere in Ukraine are not to be taken lightly. But for Poland and nato, the only risk bigger than that of Russian retaliation is the risk of Western inaction. “There’s no alternative, because we’re in the same boat,” says Mr Kononczuk. “The only difference is that Ukraine’s in the front, and we’re in the back.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine Scenario - Poland

Ukrainian refugees and historical animosity between Poland and Ukraine are a unique target for Russian disinformation campaigns.

Vanessa Gera 4-10-2022, "Poland-Ukraine ties seen as target of Russian disinformation," ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/poland-ukraine-ties-target-russian-disinformation-83992663

WARSAW, Poland -- Days before Poland’s  in November, vandals painted the blue-and-yellow colors of the Ukrainian flag on monuments in Krakow. The vandalism, which took place as Russia massed troops near Ukraine’s border, looked as if Ukrainians were defacing memorials to Polish national heroes.

Yet some clues suggested otherwise.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine Scenario - Poland

NATO commitment to Ukraine through cyber and conventional forces strong now.

Pierre Morcos and Sean Monaghan 3-29-2022, "NATO and the European Union Show Unity and Resolve in Brussels," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-european-union-show-unity-and-resolve-brussels

The leaders of NATO and the European Union met in Brussels last week, along with G7 leaders, for an extraordinary trio of summits one month after Vladimir Putin began his invasion of Ukraine. While Russia continued its devastating assault across Ukraine, leaders from Europe, North America, and Japan reinforced their united front against Moscow’s war of aggression, repeating demands for Russia to end the conflict and withdraw its forces from Ukraine while increasing the economic and international pressure against the Kremlin. They also stood firm with the people of Ukraine, committing to further economic, humanitarian, and military support.  On economic sanctions, leaders focused on fully implementing existing sanctions against Russia and Belarus, with the United Kingdom adding . The European Union, NATO, and G7 all announced  to “close loopholes and target actual and possible circumvention.” NATO called specifically  “to abstain from supporting Russia’s war effort in any way, and to refrain from any action that helps Russia circumvent sanctions.” The EU-China summit at the end of this week provides another opportunity to make this point. Energy security was prominent, with European nations doubling down on their  to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, adding to  by the United Kingdom and the United States to phase out Russian oil imports this year. EU leaders accelerated their  with Russia, assisted by the United States, which will send more natural gas to Europe. However, with some nations more reliant than others on Russian energy sources and domestic consumers increasingly affected, energy politics may be the biggest test of Europe’s unity and resolve in the coming weeks and months. On the humanitarian front, the European Union is directly  Ukraine and its neighbors, which already host 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees. Washington  $1 billion in new humanitarian aid and will admit 100,000 Ukrainians fleeing the war. As the dire siege of the city of Mariupol continued, President Macron  that France, together with Turkey and Greece, was planning an “exceptional humanitarian operation” to evacuate civilians. With a major food crisis looming, France also launched—in its role as current chair of the Council of the European Union—an international  with the African Union to avert famines in vulnerable countries dependent on Russian and Ukrainian crops.In providing military support to Ukraine, NATO and the European Union continue to walk the tightrope between helping Ukraine defend itself and avoiding escalation into a direct conflict with Russia. NATO allies  to provide Ukraine with more defensive weapons, plus new “cybersecurity assistance” and “equipment to help Ukraine protect against biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats.” The European Union  to double its support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility to €1 billion. Beyond their immediate assistance to Ukraine, NATO and the European Union are revising their military plans to deal with a more intense and persistent period of confrontation with Russia. In the short term, NATO has  four new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia—adding to its four existing missions in Poland and the three Baltic states, which have also been bolstered. There are now 40,000 forces from all allies under the direct command of NATO, concentrated in Eastern Europe. These are supported by air and naval forces positioned from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea, including an unprecedented five carrier strike groups. In the longer term, NATO leaders looked to  their collective defense and deterrence, stating, “We will now accelerate NATO’s transformation for a more dangerous strategic reality, including through the adoption of the next Strategic Concept in Madrid.” In the days before its summit, the European Union also adopted its first defense and security concept, named the “,” designed to “make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider.”  Last week’s summits demonstrated once again the unity and resolve shown by the nations of NATO and the European Union in the face of Russia’s challenge to Ukrainian sovereignty and European security. As a  of the war begins, NATO and the European Union will need to keep this momentum while addressing the many long-term aftershocks of the conflict on the humanitarian, energy, food, and defense fronts. With this in mind, the road to NATO’s summit in Madrid at the end of June will be critically important.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine scenario - Sanctions

Russia war in Ukraine an ongoing form of structural violence.

BBC News 31 May 2022 "Ukraine reports 15,000 suspected war crimes," https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61652467

Around 15,000 suspected war crimes have been reported in Ukraine since the war began, with 200 to 300 more reported daily, its chief prosecutor said. Some 600 suspects have been identified and 80 prosecutions have begun, Iryna Venediktova told reporters in The Hague. The list of suspects includes "top military, politicians and propaganda agents of Russia", she added. Russia has denied targeting civilians or involvement in war crimes.

What is a war crime?

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine scenario - Sanctions

Latin America is key to successful sanctions on Russia. Russian influence in the region allows them to evade and also opens up the option for forward missile deployment.

Carlos Malamud, Rogelio Nuñez, 03 march 2022 "Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: a pawn in the game for Putin’s resurgent Russia," Real Instituto Elcano, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-in-the-ukraine-crisis-a-pawn-in-the-game-for-putins-resurgent-russia/

As the tensions over Ukraine continue to rise between Russia and the West (defined by the Kremlin here as the US, NATO and the EU), Moscow has hinted at plans to deploy military forces in Latin America, specifically in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ryabkov, recently remarked that ‘I don’t want to confirm anything… or rule anything out’. The Kremlin’s thinly veiled threat to send troops (or perhaps even a more substantial deployment) highlights the importance of understanding the role played by Latin America in Moscow’s strategy. Such declarations can be interpreted as a way of setting boundaries for Washington, sending a clear signal on the need for mutual respect and to refrain from meddling in each other’s respective sphere of influence. If the US continues its expansion in the former Soviet republics, Russia will respond by increasing its presence in Washington’s own back yard. Against the backdrop of rising tensions with the US and the EU, in January 2022 the Russian government announced it was strengthening strategic cooperation with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua ‘in all areas’. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, communicated that Vladimir Putin had agreed to reinforce bilateral ties in recent conversations with the three countries’ leaders, citing Russia’s ‘close relations and strategic cooperation in all areas: economic, cultural, education and technical-military’. The rivalry between Russia and the US in their respective geographic neighbourhoods shares the same underlying dynamic, based on a strategy of ‘supporting resilience’. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has cultivated relations with countries in the post-Soviet space, supporting their sovereignty and independence from Russia. For its part, Moscow has sought to preserve and increase its influence among the historic allies of the USSR (Cuba and Nicaragua) and –much to Washington’s chagrin– has become a fundamental source of support for the regimes of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Even if the Biden Administration believes Russia lacks the military capacity to follow through on its threats in the region (National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has accused the Kremlin of grandstanding), there are nonetheless historic and modern precedents that mean they must be taken seriously. During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, for the first time, Moscow sent two nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, alongside four warships, including the nuclear battlecruiser Peter the Great. This pattern was repeated in 2013 and again in 2018, when the Russian government declared its intention to establish an air base on the Venezuelan island of La Orchilla. In an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, it is impossible to ignore events on the other side of the globe, especially when one of the parties involved (in this case Russia), threatens to deploy troops in Cuba and Venezuela, alongside other ‘technical and military measures’. Going by past experience, such measures could range from the deployment of military specialists and technical experts (as has been the case in Venezuela) through support for new hybrid forms of warfare (including cyber-attacks) and even the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, Venezuela or potentially Nicaragua, mirroring the situation in Kaliningrad and other border zones. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 shows this threat must be taken seriously, even if the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 sought to avoid a repeat of the crisis by transforming Latin America into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, this is not the only nuclear option available to Moscow: another, less costly alternative (in financial terms) would be to deploy its Zircon hypersonic missiles in submarines stationed off the US coast. The spectre of a nuclear deployment in Latin American territory would bring an end to over half a century of regional consensus on the need to avoid the presence of nuclear arms. If there is one lesson that can be learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is that when two major powers negotiate to avoid war, the associated allies –voiceless players like Castro’s Cuba– have no say in the final outcome. Castro was incensed when he discovered that the USSR had agreed behind his back to withdraw its missiles in exchange for the US doing likewise Turkey. However, governments in the region should not need the materialisation of a nuclear threat to spur them into action. They must stand up and be counted on their immediate concerns, a case in point being rising energy costs, which –except in producer countries– increase the burden on families and are forcing governments to increase fiscal spending via subsidies. The truth is that a coordinated regional response is simply not feasible at present, not only because it would be unprecedented, but also because of the level of fragmentation and divergence, the broad spectrum of positions on the crisis, and the preferences of the parties involved.

Familiar faces and emerging powers: China, Russia, Iran, India and Turkey on the Latin American chessboard

2022 CNDI Affirmative
1ac – Cognitive Warfare › Advantage 2: Ukraine scenario - Sanctions

Russian efforts to gain Latin American support directly trades off with American soft power and opens the possibility for Russian military bases.

Gurganus ’18 (Julia Gurganus, Julia Gurganus was a nonresident scholar with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focus is on trends in Russian foreign policy and Russia-U.S. relations., “Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”, 05/03/18, )

Although Russia’s efforts to engage Latin America are largely overshadowed by the U.S. and Chinese presence, Moscow’s propaganda outlets are working to stoke anti-U.S. sentiment and support populist figures in upcoming elections. Moscow is also using its military and commercial ties to establish a meaningful presence, and thus enhance its image as a global power. As Russia-U.S. relations continue to deteriorate, Russia will likely turn to the Western Hemisphere as an important symbol of its global reach and to challenge the United States. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are poised to serve as the cornerstones of this effort but do not on their own provide enough critical mass to allow Moscow to shape the region’s overall direction. Moscow’s reach in Latin America is limited by its modest resources. Russian military deployments there are costly and complicated, and Moscow lacks the financial resources to meet Latin America’s need for foreign investment or to serve as an important market for exports. Yet Moscow has been adept at promoting its presence at a low cost, and it can sustain this approach for a long time. When combined with China’s growing role in Latin America, this puts U.S. leadership and dominance at risk. Over time, Washington faces the prospect of losing ground with important economic and political allies. In the political realm, Russia is looking to draw on its ties with countries in the region to promote its international agenda. Over the past ten years, it has received political support from a handful of countries—Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—across a host of issues important to Russia, such as Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine. Bolivia’s Morales tweeted upon Putin’s reelection that it “guarantees geopolitical equilibrium and world peace before the onslaught of imperialism.” In the economic realm, Russia is ready to capitalize on the fallout from NAFTA renegotiations, and while it cannot economically replace the United States as a consumer or an investor, it is well positioned to respond to Latin American nations’ eagerness to diversify away from what they see as an unreliable, uncooperative United States. In terms of security, the United States faces potential military and intelligence challenges if Moscow is able to establish a greater physical presence in the region. Short of establishing its own bases, Moscow could pursue agreements with key countries that would provide it with the option of placing its assets and forces in the United States’ backyard. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have hosted Russian ships in their ports and have engaged in joint exercises.