Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Links › Link Uniqueness – China = Cyber Threat

China is the biggest cyber threat.

Perlroth 21 [Nicole, Nicole Perlroth is a cybersecurity and digital espionage reporter. She is the bestselling author of the book, “This Is How They Tell Me The World Ends,” about the global cyber arms race. “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.,” July 20, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html]

On Monday, the United States again accused China of cyberattacks. But these attacks were highly aggressive, and they reveal that China has transformed into a far more sophisticated and mature digital adversary than the one that flummoxed U.S. officials a decade ago. The Biden administration’s indictment for the cyberattacks, along with interviews with dozens of current and former American officials, shows that China has reorganized its hacking operations in the intervening years. While it once conducted relatively unsophisticated hacks of foreign companies, think tanks and government agencies, China is now perpetrating stealthy, decentralized digital assaults of American companies and interests around the world. Hacks that were conducted via sloppily worded spearphishing emails by units of the People’s Liberation Army are now carried out by an elite satellite network of contractors at front companies and universities that work at the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security, according to U.S. officials and the indictment. While phishing attacks remain, the espionage campaigns have gone underground and employ sophisticated techniques. Those include exploiting “zero-days,” or unknown security holes in widely used software like Microsoft’s Exchange email service and Pulse VPN security devices, which are harder to defend against and allow China’s hackers to operate undetected for longer periods. “What we’ve seen over the past two or three years is an upleveling” by China, said George Kurtz, the chief executive of the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike. “They operate more like a professional intelligence service than the smash-and-grab operators we saw in the past.” China has long been one of the biggest digital threats to the United States. In a 2009 classified National Intelligence Estimate, a document that represents the consensus of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, China and Russia topped the list of America’s online adversaries. But China was deemed the more immediate threat because of the volume of its industrial trade theft. But that threat is even more troubling now because of China’s revamping of its hacking operations. Furthermore, the Biden administration has turned cyberattacks — including ransomware attacks — into a major diplomatic front with superpowers like Russia, and U.S. relations with China have steadily deteriorated over issues including trade and tech supremacy.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Uniqueness › 2NC/1NR --- AT: Ukraine UQ Thumper

US/EU prioritization of China has ramped up following the events in Ukraine.

Brunnstorm and Martina ’22 (Correspondents at Reuters, “U.S. can focus on two theaters - Indo-Pacific and war in Europe, official says”, Reuters February 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-can-focus-two-theaters-indo-pacific-war-europe-official-says-2022-02-28/)

The United States will keep its focus on the Indo-Pacific despite the Ukraine crisis, the White House Indo-Pacific policy coordinator said on Monday, adding Washington has been deeply engaged in two theaters simultaneously before, including during World War Two and the Cold War. "It’s difficult. It’s expensive. But it is also essential, and I believe that we’re entering a period where that is what will be demanded of the United States and this generation of Americans," the official, Kurt Campbell, told an event hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. "There is a deep recognition and intention here inside the government, in the White House, to sustain every element of our engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” Campbell said. Campbell said coming months would show U.S. "determination" to sustain high-level engagement with the region President Joe Biden has declared a priority for policy and resources in pushing back against China's expanding influence. Biden plans to host a summit with Southeast Asian leaders in March and attend a summit of the Quad grouping of the United States, Australia, Japan and India in May. read more Campbell said Biden would travel too for meetings involving Southeast Asian states this year. Biden is also sending a delegation of former senior security officials to Taiwan on Monday in a show of support for the island amid fears that China might seek to take advantage of a distracted West to move against it. "You will see a whole range of activities across the board, diplomatically, institutionally ... investment, and also economic and trade," Campbell said. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a director for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy at the White House National Security Council, said she was confident that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not divert from U.S. Indo-Pacific goals. "There is a way that the resources we are sending to Ukraine right now are actually quite distinct from what we are trying to do on the Indo Pacific strategy," she said. "That does not mean that we won’t feel moments of resource scarcity, but it does mean that we can plan both simultaneously." Campbell and Rapp-Hooper said the world was watching closely China's position towards Russia's invasion, which happened three weeks after Beijing and Moscow announced an enhanced strategic partnership. The White House has called on China to condemn Russia's actions, the largest assault on a European state since World War Two. Campbell said China was in an awkward position, but Washington wanted to keep communication lines with Beijing open. He said he believed Chinese leaders "have been concerned" by the solidarity of U.S. allies and partners and also by the "brutality" of Russia's invasion. "It is undeniable that right now China is occupying an awkward nexus in which they're trying to sustain their deep and fundamental relationship with Russia." Campbell said it was too early to tell what conclusions China would draw, but Washington had explained to Beijing in advance the risks associated with Russia's invasion. "It's clear from our perspective that the association, so public and so deep, between Russia and China is indeed quite uncomfortable right now." Beijing has largely steered clear of criticizing Moscow, but has stressed its traditional position on the need to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and last week abstained in a U.N. vote on a resolution condemning the Russian invasion. At the same event, the head of Asia policy for the European Union's diplomatic service, Gunnar Wiegand, also stressed the need to keep negotiation channels open with China, while the EU special envoy for the Indo-Pacific, Gabriele Visentin, said events in Ukraine would encourage the bloc to step up engagement with Asia.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Uniqueness › 2NC/1NR --- Uniqueness Extension

Pivot to Asia now.

Sun, ’22 (Yun Sun directs the China program at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington D.C.. “After Biden's pivot to Asia, China feels the chill,” Politico, 6/23/22, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/06/23/after-biden-pivots-to-asia-china-feels-the-chill-00041590)-Alex

The Biden administration, hoping to counter China’s growing influence in Asia, has initiated several high-level engagements with Asia in recent months, ranging from summits to a presidential visit to the region. Despite lukewarm reception at home, it’s now clear that Washington’s Asia pivot caused much anxiety in China.

The administration's outreach started with Southeast Asia — the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington in mid-May followed by President JOE BIDEN’s high-profile visit to South Korea and Japan on May 19-24. In Japan, Biden attended a summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India (the Quad) and launched the long-expected.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Uniqueness › 2NC/1NR --- Uniqueness Extension

US aligned in the Indo-Pacific now – plan shifts alliance commitments to Europe.

Hudson ’22 (John Hudson is a national security reporter at the Washington Post covering the State Department and diplomacy. “Russian aggression must not distract from China threat, Blinken says”, The Washington Post, May 26, 2022, )

The United States must remain focused on the economic and military threat posed by China despite the challenges presented by Russia and other top adversaries, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Thursday in a widely anticipated address on U.S.-China policy. The Biden administration has long singled-out China as the “biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century,” but Russia’s three-month war in Ukraine has consumed the White House’s time and attention as the death toll climbs and the fighting sends energy prices and inflation soaring. In Blinken’s address, the culmination of months of internal deliberations over how to approach Beijing, he emphasized that China, unlike Russia, is the only country powerful enough to challenge U.S. dominance on the world stage. “Even as President Putin’s war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China,” Blinken said. “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order, and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it.” Blinken said allowing China to dominate the 21st century given its lack of respect for human rights “would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.” He specifically called out the country’s human rights practices in Tibet, Hong Kong and Xinjiang, where he accused Beijing of carrying out “genocide” against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. On a range of humanitarian, economic and security issues, Blinken said the United States was “more aligned with partners across the Indo-Pacific” than ever before. From the George W. Bush administration onward, American presidents have sought to reorient U.S. foreign and defense policy toward Asia, home to many of the world’s fastest-growing economies. But geopolitical events in Europe and the Middle East have presented myriad distractions.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Philippines Add-on › AT: SCS Goes Nuclear

China will not use nuclear weapons in the SCS

Quiggin ’21 [John Quiggin, Australian economist, a Professor and Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland. He is a Fellow of numerous learned bodies including the Econometric Society, and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, “Myths that stir trouble in the South China Sea”, theinterpreter, Dec 23 2021, ] -Chinmay

In 1964, when China first tested nuclear weapons, Mao Zedong used to claim that the country was populous enough to survive an all-out nuclear attack. His successors are under no such illusion. And Mao’s statement was made in the context of announcing a “no first strike” policy, to which China has adhered ever since. There is no evidence that China has any intention of using nuclear weapons except as a deterrent to a nuclear attack by another power The mutual sabre-rattling associated with South China Sea mythology is beneficial to a variety of actors in the United States, China and elsewhere. The military-industrial complex, against which President Eisenhower warned 60 years ago, is powerful in every country, and always seeks to promote preparation for large-scale war as well as the routine use of military power for political and commercial ends. Nationalist politicians promote territorial claims of all kinds, and exaggerate their importance. And both Chinese and Taiwanese governments have good reasons to keep the idea of an invasion of Taiwan alive.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Philippines Add-on › AT: Presence Deters China

US presence in the SCS is destabilizing – causes war

Valencia 21 (Mark Valencia, Mark J Valencia is an internationally recognized maritime policy analyst, political commentator and consultant focused on Asia. Most recently he was a visiting senior scholar at China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies and continues to be an adjunct senior scholar with the Institute. Valencia has published some 15 books and more than 100 peer-reviewed journal articles, ‘Seeds of war in the South China Sea’, Asia Times Holdings Limited, July 27, 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2021/07/seeds-of-war-in-the-south-china-sea/)

War between China and the US is not inevitable. But it is becoming increasingly likely, and the South China Sea bears its seeds. In their meeting on Monday in Tianjin, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman that China had : “The United States must not challenge or seek to subvert China’s model of governance; it must not interfere in China’s development; and it must not violate China’s sovereignty or harm its territorial integrity.” The US continues to do all three. Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Xie Feng “expressed [China’s] strong dissatisfaction towards the wrong remarks and actions of the US” regarding the origins of Covid-19, Taiwan, , Hong Kong and the South China Sea. US President Joe Biden has publicly what he considers a long-term existential threat to Americans’ fundamental political beliefs and way of life. He says autocracies like China and Russia are betting that their systems will out-compete democracies in addressing the enormous complex challenges of the 21st century. He explained that they think democracies, with their unwieldy checks and balances, will not be able to function efficiently and effectively to meet these challenges. In short, they think that they can satisfy their populaces by providing continuity and stability and thus human security rather than Western-style unrestricted individual freedoms and resultant chaos and insecurity. So, the two are on a fundamental collision course driven by competing ideologies and visions of the “international order.” Although it is still possible to compromise and co-exist, neither is inclined to do so. The “threat” of China now drives US foreign policy. The US is applying “whole of government” pressure on China – instituting sanctions because of what it considers unfair economic practices, theft of intellectual property, cyber hacking, its harsh treatment of minorities in Xinjiang, its political crackdown in Hong Kong and its bullying in the South China Sea.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Philippines Add-on › AT: Philippines Key

Philippines are not a strategic partner.

Bandow ’21 (Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, “The Philippines: America’s Perpetually Useless Ally”, CATO Institute, April 28 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/philippines-americas-perpetually-useless-ally)-BS

China has parked its fishing fleet in waters claimed by the Philippines. Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte has fulminated ineffectively. So far, at least, the Biden administration has declined to go to war on Manila’s behalf. But the possibility remains so long as the U.S. foolishly guarantees Philippine security. Indeed, some things never change. One is the limited value of the Philippines as an ally. Its people are friendly and welcoming — and quite pro‐​American. But it is a semi‐​failed state with a military to match. Manila is a sad example of how the US has picked up the old German habit of allying with the least stable nations possessing the weakest militaries — as Berlin did with Austro‐​Hungary in World War I and Italy in World War II. In the case of Washington the primes useless partner is the Philippines. The relationship wouldn’t matter so much if Manila didn’t expect America to protect not only its home islands, but also every useless piece of rock claimed by the Philippines against China, such as Scarborough Shoal. If Beijing and Washington end up at war — a horrific possibility — the cause should be more serious than the Philippines. Manila is as an American ally because of blatant US imperialism. The early Americans revolted against empire and eschewed overseas adventurism as they overspread the North American continent. However, the Sirens of Asia attracted Washington. After the US went to war with Spain, formally to liberate Cuba promoted by a simultaneously scurrilous and scandalous “Yellow Press” propaganda campaign, American forces seized the Philippines as well. Famed imperialists declared that the oceans made the archipelago contiguous, and thus an appropriate target of annexation. Washington should drop its defense guarantee and begin negotiations to turn the faux mutual defense treaty into a real treaty of mutual cooperation. Alas, the Filipinos had other ideas, having already launched a domestic independence movement. What followed was three years of ruthless irregular warfare, featuring “concentration zones,” which US soldiers compared to Washington’s veritable extermination campaigns against native Americans. War crimes mixed with starvation to kill 200,000 or more Filipino civilians. Resentment long lingered, especially in some Muslim‐​majority islands, such as Mindanao, where armed opposition to the central government continues. Even Duterte raised the issue, demanding the return of the famed Balangiga Bells, taken as war booty and which, he reasonably contended, “are reminders of the gallantry and heroism of our forebears … who resisted the American colonization and sacrificed their lives in the process.” Washington finally granted the archipelago’s independence in 1946, after the Philippines’ liberation from Japan. The US approved the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which, like similar agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Europe (NATO), effectively ran only one way, committing the US to defend the Philippines. Four decades later a deteriorating bilateral relationship and volcanic eruption pushed America out of both Clark Airfield and Subic Bay. The departure was long overdue. The archipelago obviously matters not at all to defending America itself. Washington would prefer that Manila rather than Beijing control resources and waterways in the region, but the practical impact on the US is marginal. Base access always is useful. However, no Philippine president, even one calmer and friendlier than Rodrigo Duterte, would likely make his or her nation available for American military operations against the PRC except to defend against an unlikely attack on the archipelago. Aiding America against Beijing would make the Philippines a permanent enemy of China, which will always be close by.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Impact › 2AC --- No Invasion

A Taiwan invasion will never happen – China’ shortcomings make it incapable

Cohen ’21 [Michael A. Cohen, Cohen (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is an American academic who is the Director of the International Affairs Program at The New School. He also works as Advisor to the Dean of the Faculty of Architecture, Design, and Urban Planning of the University of Buenos Aires., “No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan”, The New Republic, November 19, 2021, kassounian

The United States has long played a key role in the territorial dispute. It initially signed a bilateral defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954 and over the years supplied the island with armaments. Even after recognizing the Chinese Communist government in Beijing in 1979, the U.S. has adhered to position of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to the question of an American response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. But today, with U.S.-Chinese relations at one of the lowest points in recent memory—and as the Chinese military takes increasingly provocative military actions toward Taiwan—the fears of war have increased. So, too, have the calls for the U.S. to ratchet up its efforts to defend Taiwan, including the potential use of military force. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, got the party started last March when he warned a Senate committee that China could invade Taiwan “in the next six years.”. Writing in The Wall Street Journal, former Trump Defense official Elbridge Colby , “Beijing has made clear it is willing to use force to take Taiwan.… And this isn’t mere talk. The Chinese military has rehearsed amphibious attacks, and commercial satellite imagery shows that China practices large-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the region.” In the Bible of the foreign policy establishment, Foreign Affairs, Orianna Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,  that “whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.” Yes, , says the Heritage Foundation. And Taiwan’s top defense official—perhaps not surprisingly—warned recently that China will be able to mount  by 2025.Some U.S. policymakers have taken these warnings to heart. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton has called for the U.S. to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and make clear its willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley warned recently that “if China takes control of Taiwan, Beijing will be emboldened to seize other territories around the globe” and called on the U.S. to increase pressure on China, including a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing. But how legitimate are these fears? Is the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan a serious and urgent concern? The answer is “not very.” And it’s a view, ironically, endorsed by the Pentagon. Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best: Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening. As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities. The soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible. One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Impact › 2AC --- Taiwan --- Invasion Inevitable

Xi will invade – re-election

Zhang ’21 (Dr. Junhua Zhang is a senior associate at the European Institute for Asian Studies. He has been a professor of political science at the School of International and Public Affairs of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Zhejiang University for 10 years. , “Xi Jinping’s headaches multiply before reelection,” DECEMBER 7, 2021, ) -LM

While China has been able to make great technological strides of its own in recent years, what has really helped its advancement is its access to Western innovations. During President Xi’s next two terms, that access is likely to be significantly restricted. Once China can no longer easily use and copy American, European and Japanese tech to boost its own industries, the government will need to find ways other than increasing productivity to raise revenue – for example by increasing taxes. The tax burden in China is already hefty, and adding to the weight will likely hurt the poor more than benefit them. Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, President Xi is an ambitious man who constantly feels the need to demonstrate his infallibility. This desire is not only in his nature, but is dictated by the immense pressure he is under – and the more he centralizes power in his own hands, the greater that pressure becomes. Once President Xi is “reelected,” the uncertainties regarding China’s economy and foreign policy will multiply. If the economy falters, he will want to draw the country’s attention to other issues – Taiwan is the low-hanging fruit here. For at least the next three years, however, retaking Taiwan by force will prove too costly for China. On the other hand, Beijing could achieve two goals by taking Pratas Island first, which is currently occupied by Taiwan. That type of operation would allow China to flex its military muscle vis-a-vis Taiwan, while potentially deterring neighbors or Western nations from pushing too hard against its claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, Beijing will further intensify its pressure on Taipei by blacklisting prominent figures and institutions it sees as favoring Taiwanese independence, hoping to strong-arm the island into compliance.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Impact › 2AC --- Taiwan --- Invasion Inevitable

China plans to attack this fall

Feng ’22 (John Feng is a contributing editor at newsweek. , “China Planned Taiwan Invasion in Fall, Alleged Russian Intel Leak Claims,” March 16, 2022, ) -LM

Taiwan's top diplomat said he couldn't speak on the authenticity of a purported Russian intelligence document that claimed Chinese President Xi Jinping had plans to annex the island nation this fall. Joseph Wu, Taiwan's minister of foreign affairs, said on Wednesday that his country would have to prepare regardless. "No matter if or when China decides to attack us, we must always be ready to defend ourselves," he told reporters in Taipei. During a defense committee hearing in the island's legislature, Wu told lawmakers that he was aware of media reports about the document said to be written by an anonymous analyst with Russia's Federal Security Service calling themself "Wind of Change." The foreign minister said he wasn't able to verify the alleged FSB document, but said Taiwan's own intelligence services were closely monitoring relevant chatter. The letter in question is part of a series published by France-based Russian dissident Vladimir Osechkin, a human rights lawyer who runs gulagu-net.ru, a website documenting abuses in Russian jails. Osechkin claims to have received seven letters since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The FSB whistleblower has painted a detailed picture of fear and chaos inside Russia's principal intelligence service, where apparently none but a select few were aware of Putin's plans. Christo Grozev, the executive director of investigative journalism group Bellingcat, said earlier this month that his FSB contacts believe the whistleblower to be authentic, even if they didn't agree with the conclusions of his analysis. In the fourth letter to Osechkin, dated March 9, the author describes the difficult position in which Moscow has put Beijing because of Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, a move that united the West and turned Russia into such a pariah that China would find it hard to offer support. "Because of the war, Russia has such a negative image for a number of countries that the United States can easily push sanctions against China, at least with the Europeans, if it risks circumventing the sanctions on Russia," the letter read. "China depends on exports so much that, coupled with its dependence on commodity prices…this would be almost a fatal blow." The whistleblower continued: "Not only that: Xi Jinping was at least tentatively considering the capture of Taiwan in the autumn—he needs his own small victory in order to be re-elected for a third term—there is a colossal power struggle among the [party] elite. Now, after the events in Ukraine, this window of opportunity has shut, which gives the United States the opportunity to both blackmail Xi and negotiate with his [political] rivals on favorable terms."

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Impact › 2AC --- Taiwan --- Invasion Inevitable

China is at its strongest right now and will invade Taiwan soon

Werlemen ’21 [CJ Werlemen, Global Correspondent for Byline Times, “A US-China War Over Taiwan Appears Not Only Inevitable, But Imminent”, Byline Times, 8 October 2021, ] -Chinmay

Two years ago, in what would be his first major speech on Taiwan, Chinese President Xi Jinping warned that Taiwan’s reunification was inevitable, saying that “we make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means” and that “Taiwan’s independence goes against the trend of history and will lead to a dead end”. Earlier this week, Taiwan’s Defence Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, said that military tensions between China and Taiwan are at their highest in four decades, warning that Beijing will be in a position to launch a full-scale invasion in 2025. “For the military, the current situation is the grimmest in the more than 40 years since I joined the service,” he told Parliament. “It is capable now, but it has to calculate what it would cost, and what kind of outcome it wishes to achieve.” He warned that even a single “miscalculation” or “slight carelessness” could spark a full-blown crisis. While nearly the entire academic field of international relations has long predicted war between a rising China and a declining US is inevitable because great-power war typically occurs at the “intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline” – otherwise known as Thucydides Trap – a growing chorus of security elites are arguing an inverse of this theory. “The United States needs to prepare for a major war, not because its rival is rising but because of the opposite,” argue Hal Brands, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University. Drawing comparisons between Nazi Japan and Imperial Japan in the lead-up to the Second World War, they argue that China is reaching its most threatening point now because its economy and military production capacity has peaked at the same time that it is being increasingly shunned, condemned and isolated, as a result of its mishandling and cover-up of the Coronavirus pandemic outbreak, its persecution of its ethnic Uyghur minority, and aggressive military expansionism in the South China Sea and Himalayas. The recent multi-trillion-dollar collapse of property developer Evergrande, and the more recent billion-dollar collapse of another, Fantasia Holdings Group, reveals an economy drowning in a culmination of years of bad debt, poor decisions, corruption and negligence. These realities could force Beijing to take on a “now or never mentality… and grab what it can before it’s too late”, warn Brand and Beckley, who argue that “the most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline”. Adding further humiliation to President Xi Jinping’s leadership was the unexpected but crushing defeat of the pro-China KMT party in last year’s Taiwanese presidential election. For all of these reasons, the US, along with the UK Australia, Japan and India are behaving in a manner that suggests their respective military leaders believe that war in the Taiwan Strait, and/or elsewhere in Indo Pacific is inevitable within the next decade, with the recent establishment of actual and would-be security alliances – AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Their collective beliefs and actions were vindicated by comments delivered in Chinese state media on Thursday, warning that the threat of war is “real” and that it “may be triggered at any time”. Ultimately, there are very few reasons to believe that a US-China war over Taiwan won’t materialise within this decade or the next – making the breakaway and sovereign island state arguably the most pivotal in international politics for the foreseeable future.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Impact › 2AC --- Taiwan --- Invasion Inevitable

China invades Taiwan – cannot be deterred.

Saxty, ’22 (Jonathan Saxty is assistant editor of Brexit Watch, and writes for journals like the Telegraph, the Express and The Spectator. “Make no mistake China WILL invade Taiwan – and the world will be at war – JONATHAN SAXTY,” The Express, 4/25/22, ) -Alex

To be clear, the CCP is absolutely committed to what it sees as retaking Taiwan. The leadership in Beijing has said so again and again, and to not do so could risk an incalculable loss of face. Don’t think that war in Ukraine has put China off. Chinese state media has not stopped telling the people how well it has been going for Russia – a policy likely to embolden Chinese public demands to invade Taiwan. Taiwan may well present difficulties but the island is still 16-times smaller than Ukraine and could be more easily blockaded to prevent supplies from getting in. Lose Taiwan to China and the US could lose the Western Pacific. Lose the Western Pacific - and apart from the huge loss of credibility among Asia-Pacific allies like Australia and Japan, and all the implications for them – and the US has lost its role as guarantor of the sea lanes, a huge component of the dominance of the dollar, a crown jewel of US economic might. Sticking with economics, any hopes the US has of ‘decoupling’ from China would take an enormous hit if Taiwan fell, given its outsized role in the semiconductor industry. Ending overreliance on Taiwan is not an overnight task either, any more than moving manufacturing away from China would be. There is a purpose behind this. China wants Taiwan, and unlike Russia over Ukraine, has made this crystal clear.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Link › 2AC --- No Link --- No Tradeoff

No Tradeoff between Europe and Asia

Baker and Kanno-Youngs ’22 (Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. He also is the author of six books, most recently " Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House, including homeland security and extremism. He joined The Times in 2019 as the homeland security correspondent.” “Biden Begins Trip to Asia Meant to Reassure Allies of Focus on China”, Th eNew York Times, May 19 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/politics/biden-trip-asia.html)

President Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia since taking office, hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China, even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe. With his original strategy of pivoting foreign policy attention to Asia effectively blown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off between Europe and Asia and that only the United States can bring together the democracies of the East and West to stand up to autocracy and aggression in both spheres. For Mr. Biden, finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president. The competing demands on his time and attention were on display on Thursday as he squeezed in a last-minute meeting at the White House with the leaders of Sweden and Finland to welcome their decisions to join NATO before heading to Joint Base Andrews to board Air Force One for the long flight to South Korea. And days before that, Mr. Biden hosted Southeast Asian nations at the White House to detail new investments in clean energy and maritime assets, part of an effort to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific. “We are preparing for all contingencies, including the possibility that such a provocation would occur while we are in Korea or in Japan,” Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, told reporters this week before Mr. Biden departed Washington. Mr. Sullivan has consulted his counterpart in China in recent days to discuss, among other things, the prospect of a North Korean provocation. Mr. Biden’s trip is also aimed at reassuring allies in the region who were rattled by President Donald J. Trump’s unorthodox approach to Asia in recent years. Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an American-negotiated regional trade pact meant to counter China’s growing economic sway. He repeatedly questioned American troop commitments to South Korea and the mutual defense agreement with Japan, while engaging in what he called a “love affair” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Bruce Klingner, a longtime C.I.A. analyst on Asia now at the Heritage Foundation, said South Korea and Japan were increasingly nervous about North Korea’s capabilities and Mr. Trump’s threats to pull back from the region. “Biden should provide unequivocal assurances of U.S. dedication to the defense of our allies and affirm the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee of nuclear, conventional and missile defense forces,” he said. A couple of recent studies have concluded that even though American political influence in the region has risen again with Mr. Trump leaving power, the United States has continued to lose economic influence because of the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. “The biggest criticism of the administration in Asia right now is they have no economic strategy and they’re ceding the field to China,” said Michael J. Green, the incoming chief executive of the United States Studies Centre in Australia and a former Asia adviser to President George W. Bush. To address that, Mr. Biden plans to unveil a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which is a pale shadow of a full-scale trade pact but will outline various mutual priorities like digital trade and supply chain security. American officials hope it will be joined by many of the countries still in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Mr. Green called that an important first step but one that behind the scenes, the Japanese, Australians and others find inadequate for the moment — although they are unlikely to say so publicly. “A lot of their interest is to show the U.S. is back and China is not going to write the economic rules,” Mr. Green said. Matthew P. Goodman, senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that if the Biden administration did not offer greater access to the American market, nations in the region would be looking for direct funding to expand infrastructure and the digital economy. “I think a lot of partners are going to look at that list and say: That’s a good list of issues. I’m happy to be involved,” said Mr. Goodman. “But, you know, are we going to get any tangible benefits out of participating in this framework?” In crafting the economic framework, Biden administration officials have focused in part on labor and environmental standards. But without the benefits of lowered trade barriers, other countries may be reluctant to make costly commitments. “The bottom line is the United States is not coming to the table with market access,” said Sheila A. Smith, a senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “And that’s the trade piece. That’s what the region is looking for.” During stops in Seoul and Tokyo, Mr. Biden will encounter two new partners who are both seen as more aligned with American priorities and likely to have good chemistry with the president, according to Mr. Green and other analysts and officials. The first, President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea, was inaugurated on May 10 and has taken a stronger approach to China and North Korea than his predecessor, while the second, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, was elected just last October and enjoys a level of popularity that is likely to keep him in office for the duration of Mr. Biden’s term, unlike the frequent revolving-door governments in Tokyo. “Inevitably North Korea is going to make itself front and center as part of the agenda for a Biden-Yoon summit,” said Scott A. Snyder, the director of U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Just the fact that that speculation is out there makes it necessary for the two leaders to talk about extended deterrence, how that works, and to try to deepen their shared commitment to security and defense.” While in Tokyo, Mr. Biden will also meet with other leaders of the so-called Quad — the United States, Japan, Australia and India — his second time sitting down with his counterparts in a bloc meant to resist Chinese hegemony in the region. With Australian elections scheduled for Saturday, it remained unclear who would attend the meeting, on Tuesday. But the most complicating factor may be how Mr. Biden approaches Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who has been hesitant to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine out of fear of undermining security ties with Moscow. Moreover, Mr. Biden’s promise to combat autocracies around the world will be put to the test with Mr. Modi, who has marginalized and maligned minority Muslims. But the president’s aides said he can press the international campaign to thwart Russian aggression while still navigating the diplomatic complexities of the Asian-Pacific region and reaffirming America’s role in this part of the world. “He remains focused on ensuring that our efforts in those missions are successful,” said Mr. Sullivan, “but he also intends to seize this moment, this pivotal moment, to assert bold and confident American leadership in another vital region of the world.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Link › 2AC --- No Link --- No Tradeoff

The U.S. can split resources between Europe and Asia

Brumstrom & Martina, ‘22 (David Brumstrom is correspondent on U.S. Asia Policy for Reuters. He’s been reporting for four decades. Michael Martina is a graduate of Tshinga University, University of Florida and University of Washington. Now, he works as a political correspondent at Reuters. “U.S. can focus on two theaters - Indo-Pacific and war in Europe, official says,” Reuters, 2/28/22, ) -Alex

WASHINGTON, Feb 28 (Reuters) - The United States will keep its focus on the Indo-Pacific despite the Ukraine crisis, the White House Indo-Pacific policy coordinator said on Monday, adding Washington has been deeply engaged in two theaters simultaneously before, including during World War Two and the Cold War. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a director for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy at the White House National Security Council, said she was confident that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not divert from U.S. Indo-Pacific goals. "There is a way that the resources we are sending to Ukraine right now are actually quite distinct from what we are trying to do on the Indo Pacific strategy," she said. "That does not mean that we won’t feel moments of resource scarcity, but it does mean that we can plan both simultaneously."

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Link › 2AC --- NATO Counterbalance --- China Prioritization

NATO focusing on China now – no tradeoff

Wilson, Lawless, and Corbet 6-28 (The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business.” NATO pivots to highlight Chinese ‘challenges’ for 1st time”, The Associated Press, June 28, 2022, )

NATO has for the first time singled out China as one of its strategic priorities for the next decade, warning about its growing military ambitions, confrontational rhetoric toward Taiwan and other neighbors, and increasingly close ties to Russia. While Russia’s war against Ukraine has dominated discussions at the NATO summit, China earned a place Wednesday among the Western alliance’s most worrying security concerns. “China is substantially building up its military forces, including nuclear weapons, bullying its neighbors, threatening Taiwan ... monitoring and controlling its own citizens through advanced technology, and spreading Russian lies and disinformation,” Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said after presenting NATO’s ten-year Strategic Concept. “China is not our adversary,” Stoltenberg said, “but we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents.” The strategic document directed its harshest language at Russia, but the mere mention of China was significant; the 2010 document did not discuss China. The official turn by NATO puts the world’s largest military alliance based on the United States armed forces on guard against China, which has the world’s second-largest economy and a rapidly growing military, both in numbers and in top-notch technology. “One of the things that (China’s) doing is seeking to undermine the rules-based international order that we adhere to, that we believe in, that we helped build,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. “And if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.” China has yet to condemn Russia’s four-month long war against Ukraine and has criticized sanctions brought against Moscow by NATO members. A year ago, Russia and China extended a friendship treaty promising even more “strategic cooperation” in defending their common interests. That was followed up in November with an agreement to strengthen their military ties. Weeks before Russia’s February invasion, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin for a summit at which they pledged a partnership that had “no limits.” Western leaders are concerned that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine could embolden China to be more assertive over Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a part of its territory with no right to independent recognition as a state or representation on the world stage. Speaking at an event in Madrid that was not part of the NATO summit, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said that unless China is checked “there is a real risk that they draw the wrong idea which results in a catastrophic miscalculation such as invading Taiwan,” referring to the self-governing island that China claims as a province. However, in a move interpreted to show it was somewhat uneasy over the war in Ukraine, China voted to abstain in a United Nations motion to demand Russia halt its attack. China has greatly increased its diplomatic reach via foreign investment, above all in central Asia and Africa. Now it is seeking to match that with greater military might, especially in the South China Sea where it has built bases on disputed islands. The U.S. navy has pushed back by conducting drills in those waters.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Uniqueness › 2AC --- Pivot Fails

US is losing to China now – pivot fail inevitable – structural problems unrelated to the AFF.

Townshend and Crabtree ’22 (Mr. Townshend is a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Crabtree is executive director of the Asia office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The U.S. Is Losing Its Military Edge in Asia, and China Knows It”, New York Times, June 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/international-world/us-military-china-asia.html)

As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is losing its bite. Take the United States’ military presence in the region. It has about 55,000 military personnel in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea. Several thousand more are deployed across Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Guam. This posture has barely changed since the 1950s. But plans to reinvigorate the U.S. presence have been stymied by inadequate budgets, competing priorities and a lack of consensus in Washington on how to deal with China. The Pentagon has increased investments in cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech conflict with China in the 2030s. But the balance of power is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they are deployed unless the United States brings new resources to the table soon. President Biden this year submitted the largest defense budget ever in dollar terms, but much of the increase will be swallowed up by skyrocketing inflation. Mr. Biden, like former President Donald Trump, is thus falling short of a target of 3 percent to 5 percent real annual budget growth, a bipartisan goal set even before the Ukraine war and often cited as the minimum the Pentagon needs in today’s era of great-power competition. While the U.S. military is globally dispersed, China can concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its own neighborhood. It now has the capability. China has the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force and an imposing arsenal of missiles designed to deter the United States from projecting military power into the Western Pacific in a crisis. China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier is nearing completion, and other new hardware is being developed or is already in service. Beijing is also raising alarm with its readiness to project that strength. While much attention is focused on its behavior toward Taiwan, China is building and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. It also broke ground on an expanded naval port in Cambodia last week, which may one day provide its first military foothold in another Asian country. A security agreement with the Solomon Islands could lead to something similar, and Beijing is aggressively courting other Pacific nations. America’s military position in Asia, by contrast, has been hampered by decades of preoccupation with Middle East conflicts. The war in Ukraine has morphed into a long-term $54 billion commitment and forced Mr. Biden to delay and redraft his administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy — critical documents that lay out global priorities and resource needs — as officials grapple with how to manage China and Russia at the same time. Mr. Biden’s team ended the lengthy and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but that has not freed up many resources for the Indo-Pacific. Washington must not lose sight of the fact that China is a far greater security threat than Russia, now and in the long term.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › A2 US Bad

US liberalism was key to anti-imperial struggle—opposition to imperial powers and building platforms for state sovereignty

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. pp 243-245. LJS

Finally, the deepest and most far-reaching force separating liberalism from empire has been the struggle over the global expansion of the Westphalian state system. A world of sovereign states was a precondition for the spread of liberal internationalism. Therefore, the struggle to extend sovereign rights of statehood to peoples and nations was the real bulwark against empire. By building on and reinforcing this grand shift from empire to the nation-state, liberal internationalism ultimately placed its “project” within the Westphalian system—it became, in a sense, the set of ideas for organizing the world once the world finally shed its imperial foundations. Empire had ordered the world for centuries, and when the twentieth century asked what would replace empire as the world’s organizing logic, liberal internationalism stepped forward as the alternative. How the Westphalian state system came to encompass the world is a question that still requires scholarly attention.100 The sovereign state arrived quite late for most regions outside the West—essentially in the twentieth century, after the world wars. For most of the past five hundred years, European great powers were not eager to export or universalize the Westphalian order. They held on to empire and colonies until forced to give them up. In this sense, the spread of Westphalia is not a story of the imposition of a Western idea on the rest of the world, but of the failure of the European state system to sustain empire.101 To pursue movements for independence and selfdetermination on their own, peoples and societies outside Europe took advantage of the cracks and clashes in the European imperial system. As noted earlier, Edward Keene argues that great wars between liberal and totalitarian states discredited the old civilizational vision of sovereignty and imperial hierarchy. Christian Reus-Smit finds, in the universalization of norms of sovereignty and self-determination after two hundred years of struggles over individual rights, a story of the “evolution and transmission of the legitimating institutions that sustain sovereignty.”102 This surely is part of the explanation. But it remains to be explained why empires, as a form of global order, failed. John Darwin argues that empires have tended to fail for four reasons: “external defeat or geopolitical weakness; ideological contagion and the loss of legitimacy; domestic enfeeblement at the centre of empire—the loss of political will and economic capacity; and colonial revolt.”103 All of these triggers of imperial crisis seemed to be present in the twentieth century. Considered as wars of empire, the world wars decisively weakened and brought to an end the European system of empire. In this drama, the United States played an important role in both undercutting empire and promoting the Westphalian state system. It did this first during the two world wars, by joining and later leading coalitions of allies that ultimately defeated states with expansive imperial projects. In World War I it was Imperial Germany, which had conquered a large area of Eastern Europe and seized much of the Russian Empire’s western territories. This war resulted in the collapse of four long-established European empires: Romanov Russia, Habsburg Austria-Hungary, Hohenzollern Germany, and Ottoman Turkey. World War II effectively finished off the Japanese empire and severely weakened the British and French empires, though the latter two, because they were on the winning side, took a couple of decades to dissolve. During the Cold War, the United States also engaged in balancing against the Soviet Union—seeking to contain the expansion of Soviet power and influence as well as thwarting communist coups and revolutions in many weak, independent states. At the same time, as noted earlier, the United States played a variety of roles in facilitating states’ ability to survive as independent members of international society. It led efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of nonaggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the twentieth century, the American-led international order institutionalized open trade and multilateral cooperation, providing the infrastructure for a global economic system, which in turn strengthened the smaller states’ ability to sustain their sovereignty. Also in the second half of the twentieth century, the American system of military alliances dampened violent conflicts among allied states, particularly in Europe and East Asia, and this prevented the Westphalian system from falling back into violent conflict and empire building.104 Thus the “American century” was also the century of the global spread of the nation-state. They were different political projects, but each helped the other gain ground.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › A2 Liberalism = Imperialism

Liberalism is least coercive and self-reflexive

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 245-252. LJS

How do we square these contradictory impulses? If liberal internationalism has offered a vision of a postimperial global order, is it also implicated in a pattern of liberal interventionism, or liberal imperialism? Some critics see liberal internationalism as a fig leaf with which elites disguise and legitimate more traditional great-power impulses. The problem with liberal internationalism is that it does not put a sufficient ideological or political brake on American interventionism. Other critics make an even stronger argument—that liberalism itself drives American interventionism. As ideologies and political projects, liberalism and liberal internationalism are inherently revisionist. It is American liberalism that leads the United States to intervene and seek to reshape other societies. For realist critics, the liberal sources of American interventionism look particularly striking since the end of the Cold War, when the United States emerged unrivaled and undisciplined by the bipolar balance of power. Equipped with unipolar power and liberal internationalist ideas, the United States found itself supporting the expansion of NATO and the European Union, engaging in humanitarian intervention, projecting itself into regional conflicts and civil wars, and pursuing violent regime change, most fatefully in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The suggestion is that a more realist-oriented America would have pursued a more restrained vision of the national interest.106 The liberal tradition has certainly informed the conduct of American foreign policy. As I noted in chapter 6, during the Cold War, liberalism became a “fighting faith” that tied American power to a global struggle to protect the liberal democratic world when that world was under attack from powerful illiberal forces. A great contest between open societies and totalitarian challengers was an ideological struggle but also a military and geopolitical struggle. Leading liberal thinkers of the day, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Isaiah Berlin, and Raymond Aron, considered the survival of the democratic way of life to be at extreme risk. Western liberal democracies had stumbled in the 1920s and 1930s by failing to respond to the instabilities and inequalities of capitalist society. In response, these Cold War liberals, as Jan-Werner Müller argues, sought to “craft a principled politics of freedom for the twentieth century.”107 Their view of the threats to liberal democracy focused on both the troubled internal politics of Western societies, where the political center was threatened by extremism on the Right and the Left, and the wider world-historical struggle then unfolding with the Soviet Union and international communism. Schlesinger’s influential 1949 book The Vital Center epitomized this worldview. It offered a defense of pluralism and open societies and called for the continuation of New Deal–style reform by activist governments. But in response to the larger global challenge, Schlesinger urged collective action by the liberal democracies, led by the United States, to defend their institutions and the liberal international order from totalitarian rivals.108 The challenge to liberal democracy was manifest in a worldwide struggle between alternative visions of modernity. Cold War liberalism offered a narrative that put liberal internationalism in the service of an activist American foreign policy.109 Is the American liberal tradition inherently interventionist? Do liberal principles predispose the United States to actively seek to impose democracy on other states? A long tradition of realist thinking has argued that they do. As Henry Kissinger maintains, “the idea that peace depends above all on promoting democratic institutions has remained a staple of American thought to the present day,” and he traces this idea back to Woodrow Wilson.110 The United States is often depicted as a “crusader state” seeking, under the sway of liberal ideas, to remake the world in its own image.111 More recently, realist scholars have linked American liberalism to controversial American foreign policy actions in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, such as the doctrine justifying preventive war and forcible regime change. John Mearsheimer argues that liberalism provides the impulse and legitimating rationale for repeated episodes of American military interventionism. Liberal ambitions spurred the United States to push Western institutions to the doorsteps of Russia and China and provided the rationale for the disastrous war in Iraq. Similarly, Michael Desch traces American interventionism to the founding ideas of liberal internationalism. He sees Kantian liberalism as providing the philosophical justification for military efforts to democratize illiberal sovereign states by force. In effect, the liberal tradition generates what David Hume called an “imprudent vehemence” toward illiberal regimes.112 These claims bring the debate back to the question of whether liberalism contains an “urge” to empire. Mearsheimer and Desch essentially take the view of liberalism that is elaborated by Uday Mehta in Liberalism and Empire. Here it is not empire but military interventionism that the leading liberal state uses to bring backward people and regimes into the modern world. Intervention and regime change are embedded in the assumptions that liberalism makes about the “state of nature” and the conditions for peace. Only when all states embrace representative government will liberal democracies be truly safe. But the urge to intervene to promote democracy is clearly contingent, not absolute. Most liberal internationalists would almost certainly agree that, all else being equal, liberal democracies would be safer in a world dominated by liberal democracies. But whether this justifies forcible regime change is another matter. Kant’s view of intervention was surely more complicated—and contingent—than Desch admits. Kant did believe that a republican constitution is the ideal, he also acknowledged that even despotic states have a claim of legitimate authority that entitles them to nonintervention. Kant did argue that “perpetual peace” depends on all states developing republican forms of rule, but this does not generate a right by liberal states to bring about such a result by force.113 Michael Doyle has shown that liberalism is conflicted—even “congenitally confused”—on the question of intervention. Liberalism embraces principles that are in tension with each other. On one hand, liberal principles accord all states, including illiberal states, the right to noninterference, even when these states inflict harm on their own populations or violate their rights. On the other hand, liberalism also emphasizes that the rights of individuals in these societies must also be respected, and this opens the door—at least under extreme conditions—to intervention.114 Doyle argues that Kant “made a strong case for respecting the right of non-intervention because it afforded a polity the necessary territorial space and political independence in which free and equal citizens could work out what their way of life would be.”115 But Kant could also imagine polities that so abused their people—committing massacres or genocide, for example—that the duty of nonintervention would not apply. This contingency, of course, raises the question of how liberal states should decide whether and how to respond. Liberalism thus offers arguments for and against intervention. Georg Sørensen has described these alternative logics as the “liberalism of imposition” and the “liberalism of restraint.”116 The liberalism of imposition is manifest in the state’s employment of power to expand liberal principles. John Stuart Mill argues this position when he writes that noncivilized societies—which he calls “barbarous” nations—do not observe the rules and traditions of international morality, and therefore their independence does not merit full respect. Liberalism of restraint, Sørensen argues, stresses a different set of liberal values, such as “pluralism, non-intervention, respect for others, moderation, and peaceful cooperation on equal terms.”117 This is the vision that Gerry Simpson has called “charter liberalism,” with its values embodied in the United Nations Charter. States are accorded equality of treatment, their sovereign independence is respected, and each state is allowed to determine how to establish its own rights and protections.118 Restraint liberals recognize that some states will violate basic rights, but until some extreme line of violence and genocide is crossed diversity is tolerated, in the belief that over the long run, these societies will evolve toward universal standards of rights and decency.119 These debates within the liberal tradition burned fiercely during the years surrounding the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. How much was liberal internationalism implicated in this decision? The Bush administration articulated a sweeping new doctrine of national security based on American global dominance, the preventive use of force, “coalitions of the willing,” and the struggle between freedom and tyranny. In the spring of 2003, this doctrine provided the intellectual backdrop for the invasion of Iraq. As the invasion turned into a protracted war, the Bush administration increasingly invoked liberal internationalist ideas to justify its actions. In his now famous second inaugural address, George W. Bush stood on the steps of the US Capitol and proclaimed, “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”120 The echoes of Woodrow Wilson and the Cold War liberal internationalism of Truman and Kennedy were unmistakable. But was Bush truly Wilson’s heir? Liberal internationalists themselves debate this issue.121 Some argue that Bush followed a “neoconservative” stand of liberal internationalism, focused on putting the full weight of American power behind bringing the “blessings of liberty” to oppressed people.122 Others argue that this neoconservative turn in American foreign policy was a distortion of liberal internationalism and that the Bush grand strategy was more imperial than liberal. Multilateralism is at the heart of the liberal international vision, these people argue, but the Bush administration willfully put the United States above the rules and institutions of the liberal order. In the long run, liberal democracies will be safer and more secure in an international order undergirded by shared rules and norms, cooperative security, and mutual restraint—and the Bush administration was undermining such an order.123 Liberal internationalists clearly differ on the importance of democracy promotion to their project, and on whether democracy is best promoted through force or example.124 But were the ideological origins of the Iraq War really traceable to liberal internationalism? The principal architects of this ill-fated venture were, by all accounts, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.125 It is difficult to describe the political ideology of any of these officials as liberal internationalism. For all three, the primary objective of the war was the preservation and extension of American primacy in a region important to American national interests. They saw Iraq as a regional revisionist state with a demonstrated record of chemical-weapons use and a long-standing ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, making it a military threat to American forces and allies in the region. The decisive defeat of Iraq was also meant to provide a worldwide demonstration of America’s capacities and willingness to defend its global position against challengers such as North Korea and Iran and to dispel lingering doubts created during the Clinton years about America’s willingness to use force. In the decade before the war, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz had all been associated with efforts to enunciate a post–Cold War American grand strategy of preventing the emergence of a peer competitor.126 All three had publicly urged the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime for more than a decade before the 2003 invasion. Their utterances betrayed no trace of liberal internationalism. Put simply, the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq was decidedly realist. Prominent academic realists opposed the war, offering eloquent critiques of American hubris and grand strategy.127 But the case for war was also argued, at least initially, in realist terms. Democracy promotion was among the rolling rationales for the war offered by the Bush administration, but it is difficult to believe that this goal was the originating impulse for the war. It is more plausibly seen as the administration’s public justification for the war and possibly a template for postwar Iraqi reconstruction. Democracy was not a core objective: it emerged later, as a program for making Iraq into a pillar of the hegemonic American order in the region.128 Some liberal internationalists supported the war and others opposed it, but many of those supporters were less focused on democracy promotion than on the genuinely frightening threats that weapons of mass destruction posed and on the search for responses to this threat when deterrence and arms control were not effective. (It turned out, of course, that the reason Hussein could not be persuaded to give up his weapons of mass destruction was that he had nothing to give up, and he wanted to hide this fact from neighboring enemies like Iran.) Finding cooperative solutions to rising problems of security interdependence was at the top of the post–September 11 liberal internationalist agenda, but it tended to get lost in the controversies over the Iraq War.129 Even if one could disentangle American liberalism from power politics, it is not clear that a purely realist-oriented foreign policy would be more restrained or enlightened. There is no necessary link between liberal internationalism and coercive regime change. Liberalism may provide reasons to intervene abroad, but it also provides ideological and institutional mechanisms that restrain the exercise of military power. Realist critics think they can prevent another Iraq by removing liberal internationalist ideas from policymaking. But liberal internationalism also inspired the building of the wider system of postwar rules, institutions, and partnerships. Realists cannot assume that this system would have been built in a purely realist world of offshore balancing. If the goal is a “restrained” foreign policy, the postwar system of rules and institutions that ties the liberal democracies together under shared commitments and rules of conduct is surely part of the solution and not the problem.130 A large part of the resistance to the Bush administration’s war in Iraq was based on standards of conduct that the United States had championed. Western Europeans, for example, criticized the war as a transgression of liberal internationalist notions of sovereignty, multilateralism, and international law. Two scholars have called this “liberal anti-Americanism.”131 If military interventionism is not inherent in either liberalism or realism, the question comes down to the quality of political institutions and decision making. Does the United States learn from its mistakes? The lack of enthusiasm for new Iraqi-style interventions does suggest that foreign policy decision makers—liberal internationalists or not— do rethink their views.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › A2 Liberalism = Imperialism

Liberalism is structurally opposed to imperialism—liberal organizations are vehicles for anti-colonial and anti-patriarchal struggle

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 240-243. LJS

Third, the international organizations established after the two world wars created platforms and capacities that experts and activists could use in their struggles against empire. While the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations helped Britain and other European states secure what remained of their imperial holdings, they also served as institutional sites for activism and repositories of universalistic norms and principles that opponents of empire could deploy in their struggles for self-rule. Both the league and the United Nations created institutional channels for groups that previously had little input into diplomacy or the shaping of international rules and practices to provide a counterweight to the old imperial order. These groups included women’s organizations, international activists, and non-Western governments and peoples.91 As I have noted, the Great War did not quell the European appetite for empire, and the League of Nations was widely seen in Europe and Great Britain as an opportunity to strengthen the prestige and administration of imperial rule. But the league also played a role—if a conflicted and awkward one—in moving the world toward the end of empire and the spread of selfdetermination. “If one considers its work in stabilizing new states and running the minorities protection and mandates system,” Susan Pedersen argues, “the League appears as a key agent in the transition from a world of formal empires to a world of formally sovereign states.”92 Pedersen looks specifically at the league’s Permanent Mandates Commission, the system established in 1921 to manage the territories in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire had lost in the war. The mandates system did not directly alter the aims of the remaining imperial powers, which sought to preserve their colonies and continued to see empire as a civilizing mission. “What was new,” Pedersen argues, “was the apparatus and the level of international diplomacy, publicity, and ‘talk’ that the system brought into being.” The mandates system was a vehicle for “internationalization”—a process “by which certain political issues and functions are displaced from the national or imperial, and into the international realm.”93 Unintended by its architects, the mandates system became a vehicle by which those favoring self-determination and revision of the Versailles settlement could press their claims. It provided a platform for internationalists, humanitarians, nationalists, and others who sought to expose the dark side of imperial rule. The wider league complex of institutions had the same effect, drawing international commissions, organizations, lobbyists, and experts into a sprawling and ongoing debate about the future of European empire and the normative foundations of statehood.94 It would take decades and another world war to bring about a global system of sovereign states. But the league pointed the way. India took advantage of the League of Nations to gain rights and recognition before its independence in 1947. Great Britain, in an effort to strengthen its presence and voting share at Versailles, overcame the opposition of the other great powers to gain separate representation for its dominions, including India. Although still a British dependency, India—along with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa—actively participated in the conference’s deliberations and signed the peace treaty on the basis of “legal equality.”95 Because the Covenant of the League of Nations was part of the peace treaty, India acquired the right to become a founding member of the league, the only state among the thirty-one original members that was not legally self-governing. India’s internal and external relations continued to rest with the British government, but as one observer notes, “for the first time in the modern period, [India] came into direct and formal contact with the outside world.”96 Between 1919 and 1947, India’s position within the international legal system remains anomalous. While formally not a sovereign state, India exercised treaty-making power and participated in almost every international conference after 1920. As a league member, India attended the Washington Conference on Naval Armaments in 1921, signed the Washington treaty, and was admitted to the International Labour Organization, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and other league-related organizations. It signed numerous multilateral treaties, including the KelloggBriand Pact of 1928.97 In 1945, India was invited to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, and it became a founding member of the new world organization. Over this period, India’s self-governing status remained limited and many Indian nationalist leaders saw their country’s presence in these international bodies as a capitulation to British imperialism. Nonetheless, India took advantage of the status it gained over these decades to pave the way for independence, consolidating India as a diplomatic unit and giving its nationalist movement international recognition.98 The United Nations was even more explicit in facilitating the transition away from empire. It formally enshrined the idea of universal membership in a world of sovereign states and provided the legal and political framework for the recognition and integration of new states into the postimperial Westphalian order. As decolonization accelerated, the United Nations rapidly expanded from 51 original members in 1945, to 100 in September 1961, and to 159 by the end of 1985. Ironically, the United Nations is widely seen as the embodiment of internationalist ideas, but its greatest achievement may be the global triumph of the sovereign state system. Adam Roberts notes the United Nations’ importance in providing a framework for decolonization: The UN sometimes assisted the process of decolonization through referenda, and also through General Assembly resolutions—most notably the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. But its most important contribution was in providing a framework for entry into international society of the numerous new and reconstituted states, many of which were intensely vulnerable. For them, the UN was not just the main means of securing diplomatic recognition, but also a world stage, a negotiating forum, a provider of well-paid jobs, and a source of symbolic protection. The UN embodies principles, including racial equality and the sovereign equality of states, that were vital to the decolonization process.99

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › A2 Liberalism = Imperialism

Liberalism is ideologically opposed to imperialism—the right to self-determination created an anti-colonial feedback loop between liberal democracies, former colonies, and oppressed groups within great powers

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. pp 237-240. LJS

A second force separating liberal internationalism and empire was the ideas themselves, filtered through political movements both in the liberal democracies and outside the Western world. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, the most sweeping of these ideas, can be seen as efforts by wartime democratic leaders to mobilize their people for war. In this sense, they served an instrumental purpose. For Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter was a way to legitimize for the American people their imminent entrance into the war. It was an effort to counter Nazi propaganda by offering subjugated nations and neutrals in Europe a sweeping liberal democratic vision of a better world to come. But even if universalist principles are uttered for instrumental reasons, once they enter into the discourse they become part of the contested ideological landscape upon which political struggles are waged.76 To be sure, some liberal internationalists were deeply committed to presiding over liberalism’s separation from empire. Roosevelt’s closest adviser on postwar planning, Sumner Welles—the driving force behind the Atlantic Charter and later the United Nations—earnestly sought to use wartime negotiations with the British to escort Britain’s empire offstage. He and other Wilsonians had spent the 1930s reflecting on the failures of 1919, looking for new ways to build a cooperative global order that, as Welles put it, “implies the juridic equality of every nation and the acceptance of a moral order and of effective international law.”77 Welles sought to lay down principles that would weaken the political standing of empire in the postwar world.78 But it was the wider use of self-determination and sovereign equality that gave these principles impact. This struggle was waged on many fronts, driven by geopolitical and ideological clashes and movements within the West and between it and the non-West. It is not simply—or primarily—a story of the West “externalizing” its ideas and institutions to the rest of the world. NonWestern peoples and societies seized on the principles and institutions that the West had developed for itself and adapted them for their own purposes in their struggles for independence. Witnessing the decolonization movements in 1964, Rupert Emerson observed that when non-Western people “press for equality, democracy, and the right of self-determination, they are asking their present and erstwhile rulers to live up to the ideals which these same rulers have transmitted to them and proclaimed as their own. . . . The nationalism which developed in the imperial West in the nineteenth century, with its implied right of self-determination, can in this sense be seen as one of the key sources of anti-colonialism.”79 Westphalian and liberal internationalist ideas were both pushed and pulled into the rest of the world. The “reception and remolding of Western ideas” by peoples and societies in the non-West, C. A. Bayly argues, “set limits on the nature and extent of their domination by European power-holders.”80 The formal and informal unraveling of empire and colonialism is one of the great dramas of the post-1945 era. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the previous century’s era of imperial expansion underwent a radical reversal. Robin Winks notes, “One after another, the colonized territories tried to establish their independence from European control. From Guinea to Somalia, from Morocco to India, the flags of France, Britain, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal came down. In their place were hoisted newly designed flags of the newly sovereign states. By the mid-1980s, no substantial area was under colonial rule, although the radically discriminatory regime prevailed in the Republic of Africa.”81 The predominant view in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century was that the imperial system would remain the core organizing logic of world order. Yet, in less than a hundred years, these empires—along with the Soviet Union—had disappeared.82 Political movements in the United States and the other liberal democracies also had a behind-the-scenes impact on their government’s policies toward empire. In the nineteenth century, the British anti–slave trade movement pressed the Parliament to abolish the slave trade throughout the British Empire. During and after World War I, the women’s suffrage movement in the United States and Britain became increasingly active in international affairs. The war itself affected the lives of women, galvanizing the suffragist movement and illuminating the role of war in modern society. Many in the movement made a direct connection between the right to vote and campaigns for peace and worldwide social justice.83 During the war, women’s groups on both sides of the Atlantic, led by figures such as Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch, actively participated in debates on the postwar settlement.84 Together, Addams and Balch became leaders of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, devoted to peace education, international dialogue, and socially progressive causes, for which they later received the Nobel Peace Prize.85 This group and others explicitly linked the denial of women’s rights and social justice in their societies to the pursuit of militarism and imperialism abroad. During the 1940s, domestic political struggles—particularly over civil rights—and the continuing activities of progressive movements reinforced liberal internationalist efforts abroad. Americans struggling for civil rights explicitly linked their causes with anticolonial movements.86 The linkage showed itself, for example, in June 1942, when Walter White, representing the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, met with Sumner Welles and urged the Roosevelt administration to call a “Pacific Conference” devoted to ending colonial rule in Asia. White wanted FDR to meet with Indian leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi and the Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to announce America’s support for Asian statehood and national self-rule. White also suggested that, with the “Pacific Charter” in hand, a delegation of Americans, led by Wendell Willkie and a “distinguished American Negro whose complexion unmistakably identifies him as being a colored man,” should go to India and announce American support for the Indian struggle.”87 The idea did not have great support in the administration. Even those who took issue with the British Empire were unwilling to take steps that might weaken Britain’s position in the struggle with Nazi Germany. After World War II, the American civil rights movement and social justice campaigns drew connections between their struggles and the struggles of nationalist and anti-imperialists abroad. In 1947, W. E. B. Du Bois used the platform of the United Nations for “An Appeal to the World,” describing the injustices of racial segregation and inequality in the United States and associating the struggles of African Americans with the victims of colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. “Our treatment is not merely an internal question for the United States,” he argued, “it is a basic problem of humanity.”88 Not only did civil rights activists appeal to international audiences for support and solidarity, many US political leaders also saw progress on civil rights as integral to fighting the Cold War. During these decades, the American government’s relationship to civil rights legislation was shaped by the sense that it was necessary to manage its international image. As the historian Mary Dudziak argues, “the need to address international criticism gave the federal government an incentive to promote social change at home.”89 The connections also ran in the other direction as the American civil rights movement, along with other social justice advocates, put pressure on the US government to support anticolonial causes abroad.90