Search the archive.

Israel and the Palestinians will not find a solution to their conflict without third-party mediation. Such a party is no longer the traditional arbiter, the US, but is now Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have created a promising geostrategic environment in the region, and have the means and the political clout to succeed where all others have failed.

Over the past year, Saudi Arabia has initiated a major new geostrategic approach to the Middle East to achieve three distinctive objectives: stabilize to the maximum extent the conflict-ridden region, increase its regional and international influence and stature, and ensure steady oil exports. To that end, Riyadh resumed its diplomatic relations with its arch enemy Iran, invited Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad back into the Arab fold, expanded its tacit relations with Israel, hosted talks between the combatant parties in Sudan, and continued to exert efforts to mediate between Ukraine and Russia, all while pursuing an independent but carefully calibrated course in its foreign relations, especially with the big powers — the US, Russia, and China — and consolidating its leadership role in the Arab world. By all accounts, Saudi Arabia has become the most significant rising power in the Middle East that no state in the region can rival.

In the face of an uncertain and ballooning program cost, the real question we should be asking is — why aren’t we just retiring the ICBM part of the arsenal? ICBMs are an anachronism, a thermonuclear dinosaur, and have been for a long time. The strategy for their use is a relic of the Cold War, they do nothing to counter the real threats we face today and they can easily stand to be eliminated from the U.S. nuclear arsenal. To Russia with love With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the ICBM mission has been relegated to theory. Designed as a deterrent against Russian nuclear forces in the 1970s, the Minuteman III can only really hit targets inside of Russia. While they could technically reach targets outside of Russia, say North Korea, China or Iran, missiles fired at those targets would still have to overfly Russia. In that scenario the Russians would, understandably, think a salvo of nuclear warheads was coming their way and launch a counterattack.

Trump’s tweet set off a barrage of heated discussions on long-standing U.S. regime change policy toward the Middle East, with some pundits such as retired Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor predicting a possible war with Iran that could draw in China and Russia.

Indeed, China has large stakes in Iran’s stability. It is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, and its largest trading partner, while Iran is a key strategic node connecting Asia and the Middle East on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, after decades of overthrown governments precipitating failed states and rising terrorism, China is against further Western-sponsored regime change in the region.

The most obvious scenario for Israel to use nuclear weapons would be in response to a foreign nuclear attack. Israel’s missile defenses, air defenses, and delivery systems are far too sophisticated to imagine a scenario in which any country other than one of the major nuclear powers could manage a disarming first strike. Consequently, any attacker is certain to endure massive retaliation, in short order. Israel’s goals would be to destroy the military capacity of the enemy (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) and also send a message that any nuclear attack against Israel would be met with catastrophic, unimaginable retaliation.

<<PARAGRAPH BREAKS PAUSE>>

There is more. An unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war between Israel and Iran could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between fully rational leaders, but also as the unintended consequence of mechanical, electrical, or computer malfunctions. This includes hacking interference, and should bring to mind a corollary distinction between unintentional/inadvertent nuclear war and an accidental nuclear war. Though all accidental nuclear war must be unintentional, not every unintentional nuclear war would be generated by accident. An unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war could sometime be the result of misjudgments (both fundamental and seemingly trivial) about enemy intentions.

<<PARAGRAPH BREAKS PAUSE>>

Louis Rene Beres, 3-15-2019, Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, "Nuclear War Avoidance in the Middle East: Background (Part I)," Jurist, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/03/beres-mideast-nuke-1/, KL

Before appropriately legal remedies can be identified and assessed, one key question needs to be asked: How, more-or-less exactly, might Israel ultimately find itself in some configuration or other of actual nuclear war? What, with still greater exactitude, are the more-or-less identifiable circumstances under which Israel could sometime discover itself involved (whether wittingly or unwittingly) with belligerent nuclear weapons use? To meaningfully answer these complex questions, pertinent analysts must capably integrate the expressly strategic aspects of their necessary investigations with the jurisprudential.

Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory.

The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world's total population.

In his Foreign Affairs article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Kenneth Waltz suggests that a nuclear-armed Iran is nothing to fear. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that Iran’s membership in the nuclear club will actually increase stability in the Middle East. However, Waltz misses an essential point: nuclear deterrence does not rule out the potential for conventional escalation, which can destabilize regions in unpredictable and potentially catastrophic ways. When it comes to nuclear-armed adversaries, the outbreak of “full-scale war”[1] cannot be the only definition of instability. Tense relations between nuclear-armed foes, be they offensive posturing or limited conventional conflict, create opportunities for miscalculation and escalation to the nuclear level. A closer examination of relations between India and Pakistan reveals that nuclear weapons embolden revisionist nuclear states – i.e., states dissatisfied with the existing regional balance of power – and raises the propensity for and incidence of conventional conflict. Taking Pakistan as a model, a weaponized Iran, believing it has a significant deterrent capability, will, at a minimum, increasingly antagonize Israel without fear of nuclear reprisal. Another, more frightening, side effect of Iranian weaponization runs contrary to Waltz’s deterrence model: Both Israel and Iran could each believe a preemptive strike lay in its favor. For these reasons, Waltz’s assertion that a nuclear Iran will increase stability in the Middle East is wrong. Waltzian neorealists claim that states are rational actors seeking, above all, security within an anarchical international system. States maximize their own security by attempting to balance their power against the status quo power; i.e., a state content with the existing, regional balance of power. Security imbalances spur instability. For Waltz, such is currently the case in the Middle East. Because of Israel’s nuclear dominance, it can project undeterred hostility towards its neighbors.[2] The defensive realist remedy for this type of instability is nuclear balance. Waltz suggests that, “By reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less.”[3] Given that all states are rational actors seeking to maximize their relative security, Waltz argues that fear of nuclear reprisal vis-à-vis a second-strike capability acts as a sufficient deterrent between two nuclear-armed adversaries.[4] Hence, if Iran developed nuclear weapons, relations between the two most powerful actors in the Middle East would become more stable. In contrast, many nuclear proliferation experts use the stability-instability paradox to explain how regions with rival nuclear powers become increasingly unstable. The stability-instability paradox posits that two nuclear-armed, adversarial states, believing that neither will initiate a nuclear strike, can and will increasingly engage in offensive posturing and limited conflict with one another.[5] The newly-weaponized, revisionist state – for example, Pakistan or potentially Iran – feels emboldened, and more freely resorts to adventurism in the form of enhanced offensive posturing, increasing low-level conflict, and perhaps stronger support for terrorists. On the other hand, the status quo state – India or Israel in these cases – perceives its freedom of action constrained by its adversary’s new status.[6] Instability at the conventional level in the form of more pronounced aggressive posturing and/or limited conflict heightens tensions between major regional powers, and leaves the door open for escalation and miscalculation at the nuclear level. For Waltz, India and Pakistan prove his point: These two nuclear-armed adversaries have not launched a nuclear war against one another because they fear a reciprocal strike, thereby balancing each other and stabilizing their relations. However, Waltz’s analysis only explains why India and Pakistan have not yet launched a calculated nuclear attack against one another. He fails to consider how tensions across the conflict spectrum have increased since India and Pakistan both weaponized, which could inadvertently escalate to the nuclear level. Flashpoints between India and Pakistan highlight the stability-instability paradox clearly. S. Paul Kapur reveals how Pakistan’s weaponization has “encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior,” whereby it can challenge India “without fearing catastrophic Indian retaliation.”[7] In the Kashmir crisis, Pakistan supported a violent insurgency in Kashmir and the Indian state of Jammu. While the extent to which Pakistan involved itself in the initial fighting remains unclear, Pakistani forces did engage in their “largest-ever peacetime military exercise” and announced a strategic shift to a “policy of offensive defense” in relations with India.[8] Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto acknowledged, “Nuclear weapons ‘came out’ as an important tool in that struggle,” allowing Pakistan to “provide extensive support for ‘a low-scale insurgency’…while insulat[ing it] from a full-scale Indian response.”[9] Similarly, in the Kargil crisis, the Pakistani military “marshaled a substantial body of forces” and crossed the Line of Control (the military border between the Indian and Pakistani-controlled parts of the disputed region), resulting in Indian air and ground mobilization and significant casualties on both sides.[10] Sumit Ganguly explains, “Absent nuclear weapons, Pakistan would not have undertaken the…misadventure.”[11] Relations between India and Pakistan reveal that weaponization emboldens revisionist nuclear states and raises the propensity for conventional conflict. While exhibiting nuclear restraint in both of these situations, India has made “aggressive changes” to its “conventional military posture.”[12] India’s new Cold Start doctrine, for example, “enable[s] India to rapidly launch a large-scale attack against Pakistan.”[13] Responding to this, the director-general of Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), illustrates how conventional instability can escalate to the nuclear level: Cold Start “is destabilizing; it is meant to circumvent nuclear deterrence […]. If it becomes too threatening we [Pakistan] will have to rely on our nuclear capability.”[14] While the line at which Pakistan would employ nuclear weapons remains unclear, this statement suggests that Pakistan’s strategic calculations in responding to conventional conflicts with India now include a nuclear contingency plan. Equally disconcerting, Indian officials believe they can “calibrate” their actions relative to Pakistan’s tolerance, “stopping short of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear thresholds.”[15] Erroneously appraising another country’s red lines could have catastrophic effects, leading to unintended drastic escalation.[16] The India-Pakistan relationship displays how the stability-instability paradox subjects the region to escalation and miscalculation on a nuclear scale. The stability-instability paradox also holds true for the Israel-Iran case. Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton, and Matthew Irvine point out that a nuclear-armed Iran could stir regional conflict, producing high-stakes miscalculations with “some inherent risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war.”[17] A Middle East where “conflict below the nuclear threshold seem[s] ‘safe’” will likely “encourage Iranian adventurism, reduce Israeli freedom of action, and increase aggressive actions by Iranian proxies.”[18] Geographic proximity and mutual distrust could lead “Israel and Iran [to] adopt ‘launch-on-warning’” doctrines for their nuclear arsenals, increasing the chances that “false warnings of an impending attack by one side” could unravel into an “accidental nuclear war.”[19] When it comes to a weaponized Iran, Waltz’s contention fails to follow its own rational deterrence logic. In this scenario, it is not fear of a second strike that deters Israel and Iran, but vulnerability to a first strike that could lead one side or the other to initiate a nuclear attack. Kahl notes, “Reciprocal fears of surprise attack could produce incentives for either side to launch a deliberate pre-emptive attack.”[20] Israel, with its nuclear superiority, fearing a nuclear-armed Iran, could seek to annihilate Iran’s small arsenal by initiating a first strike. Even if Iran only feared an Israeli conventional attack, Iran’s nascent nuclear arsenal, extremely vulnerable to an Israeli strike, could generate an Iranian “use them or lose them” sentiment, where Iran could also calculate that a first strike lay in its favor.[21] This would leave two nuclear-armed adversaries without diplomatic relations living in close proximity to one another, both feeling vulnerable and potentially believing a first strike could work to its advantage.[22] In the Middle East, even the prospect of a weaponized Iran heightens the potential for conflict to escalate to nuclear levels. While no one can know with certainty what the regional security environment will look like if Iran joins the nuclear club, one thing is certain: nuclear weapons sustain the possibility of nuclear war. The Waltzian deterrence model may hold true in a Cold War retrospective, but unintended accidents and escalation are still possible. When adversarial states both possess a nuclear second-strike capability, relative security gains cannot be achieved at the nuclear level. Waltz concedes that because states seek to maximize their relative security, nuclear states may choose to develop a massive conventional weapons arsenal as well. In this way, even Waltz acknowledges the paradoxical nature of nuclear weapons, admitting heightened aggression and limited war is possible even when both states are nuclear-armed.[23] As demonstrated by the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons generate increasingly aggressive behavior, creating greater opportunities for conflict, not fewer. A likely scenario between Israel and a nuclear Iran involves increased low-intensity conflict where low-level skirmishes could lead to unintended escalation or accidental nuclear detonation. At worst, nuclear-armed foes could decide that a first strike is worth the risk.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

N-PLAYER COMPETITION

It is tempting to think that it would be cheaper and more effective to have distant allies like Germany or South Korea or Saudi Arabia rather than link their security to U.S. forces, bases, and assurances. Nuclear theorists like Kenneth Waltz to the so-called “pacifying” effects of nuclear weapons, saying their existence makes states “exceedingly cautious” and therefore less likely to fight similarly-armed opponents. If more countries had the bomb, the logic goes, fewer wars would occur. But countries do not obtain the bomb in a vacuum. The nuclear posture and strategic decisions of nuclear-armed nations have a significant, often immediate, impact on the nuclear acquisition decisions of other nations. More simply: If your adversary or your neighbor goes nuclear, you will, too. There is nothing automatic about the nuclear domino theory, and it has been successfully countered in some regions, but the theory is generally correct. The Soviet Union got the bomb because, as Stalin his scientists after Hiroshima, “The balance has been broken. Build the bomb. It will remove the great danger from us.” Britain and France got the bomb because the Soviets (and the U.S.) had it. China did the same, then India got the bomb because China did; Pakistan because India did. Nuclear competition in Asia would not end if South Korea decided to build a nuclear arsenal. Others in the region would likely follow suit. Japan, Taiwan, perhaps Vietnam. Similarly, a Saudi bomb would likely beget an Iranian bomb, a Turkish bomb and even an Egyptian bomb. Far from making the region — and the United States — safer, these arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires, each primed to unleash unprecedented destruction at the slightest twitch.

Despite Saudi interest and the United States’ status as the world’s foremost producer of nuclear power,121 U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation has remained at a low level. Riyadh and Washington entered into a non-binding memorandum of understanding in 2008 that provided for low-level nuclear energy collaboration (and stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing”).122 The Trump administration controversially123 issued seven authorizations enabling U.S. companies to share unclassified nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia for marketing purposes.124 In 2022, the two countries entered into a nuclear safety cooperation memorandum of understanding.125

Since 2012, Riyadh and Washington have periodically attempted to negotiate an agreement pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.126 Section 123 outlines the process for, and mandatory elements of, an agreement authorizing U.S. exports, for civilian purposes, of major nuclear material and equipment, including components of nuclear reactors. These “123 agreements” are subject to review by Congress, which can block them.127

Barak, Axios contributor based in Tel Aviv, “Biden adviser in Saudi Arabia as part of Israel normalization push,” June 21, 2023 dmr

Amos Hochstein, President Biden's senior adviser for energy and infrastructure, is visiting Saudi Arabia this week for talks with senior Saudi officials, two sources familiar with the trip tell Axios. Why it matters: Hochstein’s trip is part of the diplomatic push by the White House to try to reach a set of agreements that would upgrade U.S.-Saudi relations and include a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The White House wants to try to complete this diplomatic initiative in the next six to seven months before the presidential election campaign consumes President Biden’s agenda, as Axios reported last month. Driving the news: Hochstein arrived in Saudi Arabia a day after Biden’s top Middle East adviser Brett McGurk finished a separate visit as part of the same effort. Among the issues that Hochstein is expected to discuss is the Saudi demand that the U.S. supports a civilian nuclear program in the kingdom that will include uranium enrichment, the source said. This is one of the most difficult and sensitive issues in the negotiations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and between the U.S. and Israel, according to the source. The big picture: Any U.S-Saudi deal to upgrade relations will have a major economic component. The source said the U.S. wants to make sure that such a deal keeps Saudi Arabia closer to the U.S. when it comes to competition with China.

With a grandiose diplomatic flourish China brokered a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the process upending US calculus in the Gulf and beyond. While the United States has angered its Gulf allies by apparently dithering over morality, curbing arms supplies and chilling relations, Saudi Arabia’s King-in-waiting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, has found a kindred spirit in China’s leader Xi Jinping. Both are bold, assertive, willing to take risks and seemingly share unsated ambition. Friday’s announcement that Riyadh and Tehran had renewed diplomatic ties was unexpected, but it shouldn’t have been. It is the logical accumulation of America’s diplomatic limitations and China’s growing quest to shape the world in its orbit. Beijing’s claim that “China pursues no selfish interest whatsoever in the Middle East,” rings hollow. It buys more oil from Saudi Arabia than any other country in the world. Xi needs energy to grow China’s economy, ensure stability at home and fuel its rise as a global power. His other main supplier, Russia, is at war, its supplies therefore in question. By de-escalating tensions between Saudi and Iran, Xi is not only shoring up his energy alternatives but, in a climate of growing tension with the US, also heading off potential curbs on his access to Gulf oil. Xi’s motivation appears fueled by wider interests, but even so the US State Department welcomed the surprise move, spokesman Ned Price saying, “we support anything that would serve to deescalate tensions in the region, and potentially help to prevent conflict.” Iran has buy-in because China has economic leverage. In 2021 the pair signed a trade deal reportedly worth up to $400 billion of Chinese investment over 25 years, in exchange for a steady supply of Iranian oil. Tehran is isolated by international sanctions and Beijing is providing a glimmer of financial relief. And, in the words of Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei last year, there’s also the hope of more to come as he sees geopolitical power shifting east. “Asia will become the center of knowledge, the center of economics, as well as the center of political power, and the center of military power,” Khamenei said. Saudi has buy-in because war with Iran would wreck its economy and ruin MBS’s play for regional dominance. His bold visions for the country’s post fossil-fuel future and domestic stability depend on inwardly investing robust oil and gas revenues. US influence on the wane It may sound simple, but the fact the US couldn’t pull it off speaks to the complexities and nuance of everything that’s been brewing over the past two decades. America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have burned through a good part of its diplomatic capital in the Middle East. Many in the Gulf see the development of the war in Ukraine as an unnecessary and dangerous American adventure, and some of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial claims over Ukraine not without merit. What the global West sees as a fight for democratic values lacks resonance among the Gulf autocracies, and the conflict doesn’t consume them in the same way as it does leaders in European capitals. Saudi Arabia, and MBS in particular, have become particularly frustrated with America’s flip-flop diplomacy: dialling back relations over the Crown Prince’s role in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi (which MBS denies); then calling on him to cut oil production swiftly followed by requests to increase it. These inconsistencies have led the Saudis to hew policy to their national interests and less to America’s needs. During his visit to Saudi last July, US President Joe Biden said: “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.” It seems now that the others are walking away from him. China steps up On Beijing’s part, China’s Gulf intervention signals its own needs, and the opportunity to act arrived in a single serving. Xi helped himself because he can. The Chinese leader is a risk taker. His abrupt ending of austere Covid-19 pandemic restrictions at home is just one example, but this is a more complex roll of the dice. Mediation in the Middle East can be a poisoned chalice, but as big as the potential gains are for China, the wider implications for the regional, and even global order, are quantifiably bigger and will resonate for years. Yet harbingers of this shake-up and the scale of its impact have been in plain sight for months. Xi’s high-profile, red-carpet reception in Riyadh last December for his first overseas visit after abandoning his domestic “zero-Covid” policy stirred the waters. During that trip Saudi and Chinese officials signed scores of deals worth tens of billions of dollars. China’s Foreign Ministry trumpeted Xi’s visit, paying particular attention to one particular infrastructure project: “China will deepen industrial and infrastructure cooperation with Saudi Arabia (and) advance the development of the China-Saudi Arabia (Jizan) Industrial Park.” The Jizan project, part of China’s belt and road initiative, heralds huge investment around the ancient Red Sea port, currently Saudi’s third largest. Jizan lies close to the border with Yemen, the scene of a bloody civil war and proxy battle between Riyadh and Tehran since 2014, sparking what the United Nations has described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Significantly since Xi’s visit, episodic attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels on Jizan have abated. There are other effects too: the plans to upscale Jizan’s container handling puts Saudi in greater competition with the UAE’s container ports and potentially strains another regional rivalry, as MBS drives to become the dominant regional power, usurping UAE’s role as regional hub for global businesses. Xi will have an interest seeing both Saudi Arabia and the UAE prosper, but Saudi is by far the bigger partner with higher potential global economic heft and, importantly, massive religious clout in the Islamic world.

During both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then, spheres of influence evolved in response to systemic pressures generated first by great-power rivalry and later by superpower competition. They were functional adaptations to the dynamics of multipolar and bipolar competition in that they reduced the possibility of war and thus contributed to the overall stability of the international order.

During the subsequent era of unipolarity, however, the specific systemic pressures that had given rise to the two superpower dominated spheres during the Cold War era largely evaporated. As Cold War competition gave way to the universalization of the U.S.-led liberal international order, spheres of influence evolved yet again, this time reflecting the new realities of U.S. hegemony in a globalizing world. In this new context, the logic of spheres was less about managing multipolar imperial rivalry, or about stabilizing Soviet-American geopolitical relations under conditions of mutual nuclear vulnerability and ideological hostility, than it was about sustaining and expanding the so-called “liberal international order.” During the post-Cold War era, a system defined by two spheres based on ideologically determined blocs dominated by the two superpowers gave way to one defined by a single, world-wide sphere of influence dominated by the sole remaining superpower, the United States. For the most part, other states conceded—or at least did not actively challenge—Washington’s assertion of this planetary sphere of influence. Functionally, this new unipolar-sphere arrangement both reflected the underlying structure and logic of the Liberal International Order and licensed U.S. intervention against “rogue states” or illiberal non-state actors that threatened that order. During this era, non-U.S. spheres did not disappear entirely, of course. Russia, for example, asserted a residual sphere of influence in its “near abroad.”

Saudi Arabia is seeking security guarantees from the United States, help with developing a civilian nuclear program and fewer restrictions on U.S. arms sales as its price for normalizing relations with Israel, people familiar with the exchanges say.

If sealed, the deal could set up a major political realignment of the Middle East.

Title: What will come first: War with Iran or peace with Saudi Arabia?

Like many things in the Middle East, timing is rarely a coincidence. On Tuesday, as IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi was addressing a conference in Herzliya where he issued a threat to attack Iran, a mysterious explosion took place at a chemical factory about 100 km west of Tehran.

Anthony Chimente earned a Ph.D. from Durham University in Middle East Politics with a focus on civil-military relations in fragmented states. His main interests include military, security, and international affairs in the region. Dr. Chimente spent five months as a visiting associate lecturer in comparative politics at Northumbria University. He is currently an independent researcher and advisor with Gulf State Analytics, a geopolitical consultancy based in Washington, D.C. “Tentative Steps Toward a New Saudi-Israeli Relationship,” June 25, 2023 https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/arab-world/tentative-steps-toward-a-new-saudi-israeli-relationship/

On May 7th, a US delegation led by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan traveled to Saudi Arabia for a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This meeting was held to discuss prospects for normalization of relations with Israel in light of thawed relations between President Biden, MbS and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Motivations for Normalization Now Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan assumed his duties in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. At the time, Jordan was directed to question the governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, now King of Saudi Arabia, on how Saudi nationals constituted 15 of the 19 hijackers. Salman denied Saudi involvement and shifted blame to the Israelis, in what he considered a conspiracy to drive a wedge between the US and the kingdom. A meeting with the minister of interior, Prince Nayef, produced similar results. Both meetings illustrated that in the Saudi mind: everything wrong with the world in those days was the fault of Israel. Marking a sharp turn in Saudi opinion, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (commonly known as MbS) commented in 2022, “we don’t look at Israel as an enemy, we look to them as a potential ally, with many interests that we can pursue together.” Saudi businessman and Prince, Alwaleed bin Talal, also expressed how both countries are now intertwined and on the potential path for normalization; “for the first time, Saudi Arabian interests and Israel are almost parallel…It’s incredible.’ The crown prince calculates that the parallel interests that are driven by domestic projects and the economic, commercial, and financial benefits acquired through normalization will be beneficial for the kingdom. Tel Aviv is a natural ally for Saudi Arabia. It is a leader in environmental advances and the energy sector, which could be an aid in the Saudi project Vision 2030. The Saudis therefore acknowledge that a relationship with Israel is mutually beneficial and could aid in transforming their economy into a high-tech financial center. Israel’s economy is complementary to Saudi Arabia, not competitive with it like the energy-based economies of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, whose own oil diversification and modernization strategies are very similar to Saudi Arabia’s. Normalization will also serve the wider goal of establishing a more integrated, regionally focused economy, while at the same time enhancing security. Tel Aviv can assist Riyadh in countering perceived internal terrorist security issues and the perceived Iranian threat. This can also foster closer security relations and enable a regional security complex to emerge that can rival the declining thirty-year-old US-dominated role. Politically, the Saudis also recognize the prospects of normalization as a substantial bargaining chip with any new presidential administration. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested in a speech at a Washington think tank that negotiations towards normalization were underway, but declined to comment further. He said he did not want to “upset the efforts we are undertaking on this issue.” Tellingly, Sullivan stressed that “getting to full normalization is a declared national security interest of the United States. We have been clear about that.” The rumored appointment of former U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Shapiro, by Secretary of State Tony Blinken, as an envoy for the Abraham Accords also highlights the administrations ambitious desire to implement an Israeli-Saudi deal. Joe Biden’s Saudi Arabia Visit to Meet Mohammad bin Salman For President Biden, foreign policy and domestic politics motivate Washington’s drive towards normalization. A success could help to counter criticism of US diplomatic decline in the Middle East after the China-brokered peace deal between Saudi and Iran. The Biden administration calculates the prospect of Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia might be enough to convince Netanyahu to abandon some of Israel’s more egregious policies towards the West Bank. The administration inherited the Abraham Accords and realized they are keen on broadening the circle of Arab Israeli normalization. The Israeli prime minister perceives Saudi Arabia as the paramount outreach to the Arab world and a cornerstone of the Abraham Accords. A normalization deal would cement Israeli standing in the Arab world and reap the benefits of bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia. Compromise is the Necessary Answer Concessions from both parties are necessary for normalization to materialize, but each one needs to be viewed individually, not just considered as a package. The major problem rests in the multilateral nature of the negotiations: Netanyahu’s right-wing government must be willing to make concessions concerning the Palestinians. In a phone call with the Israeli prime minister, MbS iterated the demands necessary for normalization. This included strengthening the Palestinian security apparatus at the expense of the Israeli Defense Forces in Judea and Samaria, while requesting Palestinian security forces assume control over al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, leaving the Western Wall under full Israeli control. The Biden Administration also established similar conditions to broker normalization. The White House stipulated the need for progression on the Palestinian issue regarding the restoration of peace talks with the Palestinian Authority. They also demanded Israel halt its judicial overhaul. An EU diplomat emphasized that the Americans are unsure what price Netanyahu is willing to pay for normalization on the substantive issues. This includes allowing Riyadh a civilian nuclear program and access to more advanced weapons systems similar to those sold to Tel Aviv. The diplomat also questioned whether Netanyahu is politically capable to initiate conductive outreach to Palestine and the Palestinian Authority, “in order to make it easier for Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman to risk open agreement with Israel.” Netanyahu is constrained based on the political configuration of his government ministers. Zionist Ministers of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Bezalel Smotrich wanted to be compensated for agreeing to the pause in judicial reform which the prime minister, at least temporarily, agreed to accept. Equally, both Saudi and American leadership are possibly discontented with the current Palestinian Authority leadership. This coupled with Netanyahu’s unwillingness to consider a two-state solution decreases the probability of a resolution to the Palestinian issue. The Saudis will probably be less supportive of Mahmoud Abbas than they have been in the past until there is new direction in the Palestinian government and the transition stabilizes. This is another area that will potentially allow Israel-Saudi relations to develop. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan consistently iterates the kingdom’s adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative which would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state on the basis of the two-state solution before normalization. However, MbS is more progressive regarding Palestine, holding a close circle of advisors known for sympathetic positions towards Israel. Saudi Arabia will be constrained on making peace with Israel, absent some major concessions for the Palestinians. The crown prince exercises tremendous power within the kingdom, but it is unclear how King Salman’s opinions shape the decision-making process in respect to Palestine. The crown prince must delicately balance normalizing relations with the issue of Palestine because unlike the UAE, turning their back to the Palestnians would hinder their goal of becoming a leader in the Arab World. The long-term ambitions of Saudi Arabia will likely accelerate normalization once MbS ascends the throne. However, there is a likelihood that the crown prince might wait until King Salman has passed, unless the US acquiesces to all his demands. Saudi Arabia has much more ambition regarding the nature of concessions desired in return for normalization with the Biden Administration. MbS is demanding American assistance to establish a civilian nuclear program, a formal alliance with the US to include security guarantees perhaps similar to those offered to the UAE and the status of procuring US weapons similar to NATO member states or major non-NATO allies. The sale of weapons, negotiation of a formal alliance/security agreement, and transfer of civilian nuclear technology will all require the active buy-in of Congress. But it won’t be easy. A Future Perspective on Saudi-Israeli Relations There is tentative evidence that relations are warming between Tel Aviv and Riyadh, given that the latter has permitted Israeli airplanes to overfly Saudi airspace. There have also been rumors of communication between their security services. Mossad and the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency have cooperated on addressing shared concerns, including on the Iranian nuclear program, Sunni extremism and other security issues. Additionally, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, accompanied by other Israeli officials and then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, reportedly had an exchange in Neom with the crown prince in late 2020. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reportedly met with the Israeli Minister for Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, to further discuss Saudi Arabia. Importantly, the direct overflight permission granted to Israeli airlines and the development of special visas for Israeli businesspeople are significant steps with the prospects to further facilitate business transactions already taking place. Tel Aviv has been engrained both overtly and covertly in commercial and business activities with Saudi Arabia for years. Publicly, a number of high-profile Israeli businessmen attended the Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh last year signaling Tel Aviv’s growing acceptance in Saudi Arabia. It was reported during the conference that Saudi Arabia and Israel signed two multi-million dollar deals concerning water and agricultural technology. MbS is focused on domestic issues where Israeli commercial and economic relations can assist in making Vision 2030 a reality. Israeli companies, investors and businessmen are playing a role in the Vision 2030 development agenda. Growing commercial ties can support the kingdom’s transformation from an oil-dependent to successfully diversified economy. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel are at a high point, perhaps the best they have ever been. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen remains optimistic, reportedly stating that “he believes some kind of breakthrough in normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia could well occur by the end of the year.” While it is clear that the Saudis are interested in normalization, the process will manifest incrementally at this moment in time and more precipitously once MbS becomes king.

Gopal Misra, Reporter for Tehelka, Daijiworld, and HTDS Content Services “Can America succeed in winning back its old friend Saudi Arabia?,” June 16, 2023

http://tehelka.com/can-america-succeed-in-winning-back-its-old-friend-saudi-arabia/

Saudi Arabia is seeking security guarantees from the United States, help with developing a civilian nuclear program and fewer restrictions on U.S. arms sales as its price for normalizing relations with Israel, people familiar with the exchanges say.

If sealed, the deal could set up a major political realignment of the Middle East.

To the cynic, meetings between White House officials and congressional leaders offer little more than pageantry - an opportunity to portray legislative work, not to do it. And, to be sure, sometimes these interbranch exchanges entail little more than pleasantries and pictures. However, many close observers of the presidential-congressional relationship have long cited prevoting bargaining across Pennsylvania Avenue as being substantively important. For example, discussing President Eisenhower's legislative record in 1953, CQ staffers issued a caveat they have often repeated in the years since: The President's leadership often was tested beyond the glare spot- lighting roll calls....Negotiations off the floor and action in commit- tee sometimes are as important as the recorded votes. (CQ Almanac 1953,77) Many a political scientist has agreed. Charles Jones (1994), for one, wrote, "However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation .If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally" (195)' And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, "many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and recorded by means other than roll calls ... " (68). Still, while citing earlygame processes as being potentially important, no one has yet shown how (or when) they are, much less integrated the earlygame and endgame within a unified framework. This is what I aim to accomplish here. Specifically, let me now uncover how, in addition to the familiar endgame lobbying option, presidents may also seek to exert influence in the legislative earlygame by implementing a two-pronged approach: mobilizing leading allies and deterring leading opponents.