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2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 2NC—AT: No PC

Yes court capital

Hasday’ 2022[Jill Elaine Hasday is a Distinguished McKnight University Professor and the Centennial Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Her work focuses on family law, antidiscrimination law, constitutional law, and legal history] Cathy Wurzer and Gretchen Brown, Top stories of 2022: Roe v. Wade's fall and its impact on Minnesota, December 22, 2022,

JILL HASDAY: OK, so I teach 14th Amendment. I teach constitutional law more generally. And one lesson I've always taught the students is there's only so much institutional capital the court has. And there's cases where they save it and there's cases where they spend it. Whatever you think of the opinion on the merits, it's just an enormous expenditure of institutional capital, the court overturning Roe in one fell swoop. Chief Justice Roberts in his concurrence, he doesn't like Roe either, but he wants to do it gradually. So we'll see. It's just it is an enormous expenditure of institutional capital and it does make the court's legitimacy vulnerable because the court doesn't have an army to enforce its decisions.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 2NC—AT: No PC

Studies prove - PC theory is real for the court

Mukherjee’ 2023[Hauser Global Postdoctoral Fellow, New York University Law School, New York, N.Y., United States]Gaurav Mukherjee, The political economy of effective judicial remedies, 11 July 2023, /HZ

Second, Remedies draws on the experience of international and supranational courts to inform its approach to the two-track remedial system that lies at the book’s ideational core. For Roach, there are closer parallels between domestic and international courts than have been previously acknowledged, in that their decisions do not enforce themselves, and they derive authority and legitimacy, at least partially, from the maintenance of goodwill, as well as acquiescence and support from governments. Such a comparison is necessarily weak as an analogy, is occasionally unstable, and breaks down entirely under certain circumstances. For example, domestic courts safeguard their institutional capital through substantively minimalist, jurisprudentially incrementalistic, and executive deferent strategies, failing which they invite legislative reprisal.9 International courts experience some of these concerns in different degrees and nature, but governments may find it difficult to engage in retaliatory attacks (beyond discursive ones) against them due to the collective nature of decision-making that underlies supranational systems of governance. Yet, the comparison Roach makes is a powerful one and shows how there may be closer parallels between domestic and supranational courts than previously acknowledged.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 2NC—Link Turn

Admin state is key to solve inequality

Rahman’18[K. Sabeel Rahman is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School where I teach courses on inequality, public policy, law and political economy, constitutional law, and administrative law. I am also a co-founder and co-chair of the Law and Political Economy Project, a network of legal scholars exploring themes of economic power and democracy and the legal constitution of 21st century capitalism.] K. Sabeel Rahman, “Policymaking as Power-Building,” Winter 2018, https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1988&context=faculty/HZ

Today Landis seems both prescient and naive-we are indeed increasingly dependent on regulatory agencies to do the heaviest lifting when it comes to policymaking and addressing changing social and economic conditions; but we also have very little faith in their ability to do so and serve the public good. This paper suggests one possible pathway forward: like Landis, I have suggested above that regulatory agencies can in fact help overcome failures of existing political processes. But instead of Landis' faith in expertise, I have argued above that it is the democratic potential of the regulatory process that gives rise to this potential. Regulatory agencies have the (under-utilized) potential to house and foster a more inclusive, empowered form of participation and engagement-mitigating disparities of political power. In so doing, regulation can also serve as an arena where constituencies can engage with the realities of policymaking, and share in the task of self-governance.24 7 As with popular constitutionalism, this concept of popular administration is both a descriptive and a normative one. It is descriptive in that it highlights a strand of administrative law theory and practice that often goes overlooked-the ways in which regulatory agencies have at times worked to foster more direct forms of interest representation, participation, and civic empowerment. It is normative in that it suggests that this inclusionary vision of regulation ought to be the ideal towards which regulatory reform should strive. This normative aspiration is made all the more vital by the realities of our current democratic deficits and the very real disparities of political power and influence. In recent years a growing body of research has highlighted the ways in which our electoral and legislative systems are deeply unresponsive and uninclusive. Popular administration is not a substitute for addressing these defects. But it is an important complement to legislative and electoral democracy-and an often overlooked arena in which reformers and citizens alike can attempt to gain a greater foothold in the political process. The potential here is vast. From community development initiatives designed by agencies like HUD, to the promotion of financial inclusion through the CFPB, to the design of new labor laws for the 21St century by Department of Labor, there are a variety of major public policy challenges, each of which implicate important and diverse constituencies who are not usually best represented through conventional geographic electoral districts or legislative lobbying. State and local administrative bodies also govern vast swaths of our social and economic lives, from housing, to the safety net, to workplace safety, to basic health and police powers, and have perhaps even greater plasticity to be adapted into more power-balancing processes and institutional forms. While power continues to shape the dynamics of governance and regulation, through regulation we might help rebalance these disparities, and in so doing create new types of democratic experience, participation, and self-governance.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 2NC—Link Turn

Admin state key to solve inequality—absence of regulation enables affluent powers to reinforce current social hierarchies.

Rahman’18[K. Sabeel Rahman is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School where I teach courses on inequality, public policy, law and political economy, constitutional law, and administrative law. I am also a co-founder and co-chair of the Law and Political Economy Project, a network of legal scholars exploring themes of economic power and democracy and the legal constitution of 21st century capitalism.]K. SABEEL RAHMAN Reconstructing the Administrative State in an Era of Economic and Democratic Crisis APRIL 2018 https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-131/reconstructing-the-administrative-state-in-an-era-of-economic-and-democratic-crisis/HZ

Michaels has written a wide-ranging and in many ways prescient book that anticipates today’s central debates: about the scope of administrative and executive power in a constitutional republic; the tensions between public and private, state and market, in an era of economic inequality and upheaval; and the dangers of overriding the procedures, norms, and softer conventions governing administrative action. Michaels rightly argues that dismantling the administrative state risks creating more aggrandized and unchecked executive power, not less. But the stakes are even larger than Michaels’s already expansive formulation. For it is also true that without an administrative state, other forms of social and economic power would similarly find themselves unrestrained. In a world without labor regulation, restraints on corporate concentration, or consumer protections, economic inequalities are magnified; without nondiscrimination regimes enforced and adapted by regulation, gender and racial hierarchies are harder to contest. Despite its neutral trappings in legal doctrine and thought, the administrative state is not ultimately a neutral institutional structure. Its origins are rooted in the attempt to grapple with the upheavals and inequalities of the industrializing economy. Similarly, its dismantling reflects not just legalistic and political critique, but also a systematic effort to shift the balance of social, political, and economic power.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 1NC

Chevron deference is key to solve existential risk - agencies are the only entity fast enough to respond to emerging crises

Bazelon and Posner’17[Emily Bazelon is a staff writer at The New York Times Magazine and is the Truman Capote Fellow for Creative Writing and Law at Yale Law School. She is also the author of “Charged: The New Movement to Transform American Prosecution and End Mass Incarceration,’’ which won the Los Angeles Times Book Prize in the current-interest category, and of the national best-seller “Sticks and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and Rediscovering the Power of Character and Empathy.” She is a co-host of Slate’s “Political Gabfest,” a weekly podcast. Eric Posner is a law professor at the University of Chicago Law School, Posner has taught international law, contract law, and bankruptcy, among other areas.]Emily Bazelon and Eric Posner The Government Gorsuch Wants to Undo April 1, 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/sunday-review/the-government-gorsuch-wants-to-undo.html/HZ

The court’s ruling in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. the United States, along with another case decided the same year, are the only instances in which the Supreme Court has ever struck down a federal statute based on this rationale, known as the “nondelegation doctrine.” Schechter Poultry’s stand against executive-branch rule-making proved to be a legal dead end, and for good reason. As the court has recognized over and over, before and since 1935, Congress is a cumbersome body that moves slowly in the best of times, while the economy is an incredibly dynamic system. For the sake of business as well as labor, the updating of regulations can’t wait for Congress to give highly specific and detailed directions. The New Deal filled the gap by giving policy-making authority to agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, which protects investors, and the National Labor Relations Board, which oversees collective bargaining between unions and employers. Later came other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (which regulates workplace safety) and the Department of Homeland Security. Still other agencies regulate the broadcast spectrum, keep the national parks open, help farmers and assist Americans who are overseas. Administrative agencies coordinated the response to Sept. 11, kept the Ebola outbreak in check and were instrumental to ending the last financial crisis. They regulate the safety of food, drugs, airplanes and nuclear power plants. The administrative state isn’t optional in our complex society. It’s indispensable. But if the regulatory power of this arm of government is necessary, it also poses a risk that federal agencies, with their large bureaucracies and potential ties to lobbyists, could abuse their power. Congress sought to address that concern in 1946, by passing the Administrative Procedure Act, which ensured a role for the judiciary in overseeing rule-making by agencies. The system worked well enough for decades, but questions arose when Ronald Reagan came to power promising to deregulate. His E.P.A. sought to weaken a rule, issued by the Carter administration, which called for regulating “stationary sources” of air pollution — a broad wording that is open to interpretation. When President Reagan’s E.P.A. narrowed the definition of what counted as a “stationary source” to allow plants to emit more pollutants, an environmental group challenged the agency. The Supreme Court held in 1984 in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council that the E.P.A. (and any agency) could determine the meaning of an ambiguous term in the law. The rule came to be known as Chevron deference: When Congress uses ambiguous language in a statute, courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of what the words mean. Chevron was not viewed as a left-leaning decision. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the Reagan administration, after all, voting 6 to 0 (three justices did not take part), and spanning the ideological spectrum. After the conservative icon Justice Antonin Scalia reached the Supreme Court, he declared himself a Chevron fan. “In the long run Chevron will endure,” Justice Scalia wrote in a 1989 article, “because it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its needs.” That was then. But the Reagan administration’s effort to cut back on regulation ran out of steam. It turned out that the public often likes regulation — because it keeps the air and water clean, the workplace safe and the financial system in working order. Deregulation of the financial system led to the savings-and-loans crisis of the 1980s and the financial crisis a decade ago, costing taxpayers billions. Businesses, however, have continued to complain that the federal government regulates too much. In the past 20 years, conservative legal scholars have bolstered the red-tape critique with a constitutional one. They argued that only Congress — not agencies — can create rules. This is Schechter Poultry all over again. And Judge Gorsuch has forcefully joined in. Last year, in a concurring opinion in an immigration case called Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, he attacked Chevron deference, writing that the rule “certainly seems to have added prodigious new powers to an already titanic administrative state.” Remarkably, Judge Gorsuch argued that Chevron — one of the most frequently cited cases in the legal canon — is illegitimate in part because it is out of step with (you guessed it) Schechter Poultry. Never mind that the Supreme Court hasn’t since relied on its 1935 attempt to scuttle the New Deal. Nonetheless, Judge Gorsuch wrote that in light of Schechter Poultry, “you might ask how is it that Chevron — a rule that invests agencies with pretty unfettered power to regulate a lot more than chicken — can evade the chopping block.” At his confirmation hearings, Judge Gorsuch hinted that he might vote to overturn Chevron without saying so directly, noting that the administrative state existed long before Chevron was decided in 1984. The implication is that little would change if courts stopped deferring to the E.P.A.’s or the Department of Labor’s reading of a statute. Judges would interpret the law. Who could object to that? But here’s the thing: Judge Gorsuch is skeptical that Congress can use broadly written laws to delegate authority to agencies in the first place. That can mean only that at least portions of such statutes — the source of so many regulations that safeguard Americans’ welfare — must be sent back to Congress, to redo or not. On the current Supreme Court, only Justice Clarence Thomas seeks to strip power from the administrative state by undercutting Chevron and even reviving the obsolete and discredited nondelegation doctrine, as he explains in opinions approvingly cited by Judge Gorsuch. But President Trump may well appoint additional justices, and the other conservatives on the court have expressed some uneasiness with Chevron, though as yet they are not on board for overturning it. What would happen if agencies could not make rules for the financial industry and for consumer, environmental and workplace protection? Decades of experience in the United States and around the world teach that the administrative state is a necessary part of the modern market economy. With Judge Gorsuch on the Supreme Court, we will be one step closer to testing that premise.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 1NC

The plan would be received as major liberal ruling--Robert would amass huge PC and spend them on other rulings such as Chevron

Shamshiri’2022[Peter is a lawyer and co-host of the 5-4 podcast.]PETER SHAMSHIRI The Insular Cases Survive Because the American Legal System Keeps Them Safe NOVEMBER 14, 2022 HZ

A few weeks back, the Supreme Court quietly declined to hear Fitisimanu v. United States, leaving in place one of the most explicitly racist jurisprudential regimes in American law. Fitisimanu was a direct challenge to the Insular Cases, a set of Supreme Court cases dating back to 1901, following the Spanish-American War, that established the scope of the constitutional rights held by citizens of America’s newly acquired territories in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. The Court’s rulings firmly established the residents of those territories as secondary citizens, with fewer constitutional protections than citizens of established states. While residents would receive certain fundamental rights—the Court did not clarify which—the rest were to be dictated by Congress as it saw fit. Unlike the mostly-veiled racism of modern Supreme Court cases, the racism of the Insular Cases was explicit. Moreover, it was fundamental to the holding of the cases. One case, Downes v. Bidwell, found that “the administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be impossible” in territories inhabited by “alien races.” Another referred to residents of Puerto Rico as members of “savage tribes.” It was on that basis—the idea that different races required different governing structures—that the Court denied the residents of the annexed territories the full protection of the Constitution. In other words, this was not the sort of incidental racist language that might make its way into other Supreme Court decisions from the era. The belief that the residents of these territories should be treated differently because they are of a different race was central to the Court’s reasoning. The Philippines became an independent nation in the wake of World War II, but the Insular Cases form the basis for the legal regime that governs the United States’ relationships with Puerto Rico and Guam to this day. The legal apartheid established by the Insular Cases left the citizens of the newly-annexed territories with a patchwork of rights. While Congress has passed laws making them U.S. citizens (meaning they can, for example, travel and work freely throughout the country), they are effectively shut out of the federal democratic process: They cannot directly participate in presidential elections, and have only symbolic representation in Congress. Limits on voting rights are only one of a parade of inequities. The territories have historically received lower levels of Medicaid funding than states, and just this year the Court held that Puerto Rican residents could be excluded from certain federal income benefits. The territories’ subjugated status has even affected the ongoing debt crisis in Puerto Rico—in 2016, the Supreme Court nullified a Puerto Rican law passed to help the government escape its then $20 billion in public debt, holding that unlike states, Puerto Rico did not have the right to authorize its local municipalities to file for bankruptcy. American jurisprudence is designed to protect the status quo. Lawyers speak highly of the idea of judicial restraint and its attendant principles: To name a few, stare decisis (the respect for precedent), the narrow tailoring of judicial opinions (the avoidance of decisions with unnecessarily broad impact), and constitutional avoidance (the idea that judges should avoid deciding cases on constitutional grounds if they can find another way to do it). Together, these doctrines operate to discourage judges from causing substantial and unpredictable shifts in the state of the law. Judges who use their position to engage in more proactive efforts to right jurisprudential wrongs are in turn decried as judicial activists, engaged in policymaking rather than the practice of law. We’re taught that there is wisdom in this rigidity. Legal analysis must be careful and measured, after all, and the judiciary should be wary of causing any major shifts in public policy. But the 120-year reign of the Insular Cases shows the consequences of inflexibility. The web of doctrines purporting to restrain judges can make it difficult to disentangle ourselves from past injustices. What’s more, it provides judges with intellectual cover when they quietly wish to see those injustices perpetuated. Our history is littered with grotesque Supreme Court cases. Some are no more than the vestigial remnants of old political and cultural regimes, cautionary tales relegated to constitutional history lessons. Others quietly comprise the foundations of our modern government. In 1889, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the so-called Chinese Exclusion Case, upheld the overtly racist Chinese Exclusion Act, reasoning that “foreigners of a different race” might not readily assimilate into American society. The case is not an anomaly—it helped lay the foundations of our modern immigration jurisprudence, where the judiciary gives heavy deference to the whims of the federal government. In 2018, the Supreme Court carried the case’s racist legacy forward in Trump v. Hawaii, upholding a Trump administration immigration policy that began as a plainly stated attempt to forbid Muslims from entering the country. Chae Chan Ping wasn’t cited, but the line between the cases is easily traced. Underlying Chae Chan Ping and the Insular Cases is a single phenomenon. What begins as open racism is obfuscated by legal process over time, eventually presenting itself as pragmatic, reasoned policy. Its machinations become ingrained into our government’s structure, and the ability of courts to intervene wanes. A better system would force the Court to either defend or denounce the de facto racial caste system it created over a century ago. In ours, the Court quietly declined review, content to rely on whatever deniability it’s afforded by abstract notions of judicial restraint. The Court will spend much of this term addressing racial injustice. With six conservatives at the helm, it is likely to deal a death blow to affirmative action in higher education, and further erode the remedial capacities of the Voting Rights Act of 1964. They’ll do so while claiming that they are serving the interests of equality under the law. But the conservative commitment to racial equality has always been a smirking half-truth, designed to weaken remedies for discrimination while its structural underpinnings are left to calcify. Whatever lip service the Court gives to equality as a principle, its decision to leave a system of explicit racial tiers enshrined in our law shows how shallow its rhetoric really is.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 1NC

Roberts uses liberal rulings to amass PC that he can spend on bigger rulings-- the last term proves

Gerstein’ 2023[Josh Gerstein is POLITICO’s Senior Legal Affairs Reporter. Gerstein covers the intersection of law and politics, including Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of President Donald Trump and his associates, as well as ensuing counter-investigations into the origins of the FBI’s initial inquiry into the Trump-Russia saga.]JOSH GERSTEIN, The Supreme Court’s term was full of whimpers. Then it ended with a bang. 06/30/2023 https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/30/supreme-court-term-end-roberts-conservative-00104511/HZ

Chief Justice John Roberts spent months amassing institutional capital with centrist-seeming rulings. This week, he cashed in with dramatic victories for the right. If liberals expected a big course correction from a Supreme Court mired in ethics controversies and rocked by record-low approval ratings, the justices’ final decisions of the term laid that to rest. Moves by Chief Justice John Roberts in the weeks leading up to the grand finale seemed to signal an eagerness on his part to project an air of moderation. In surprising decisions on voting rights, election law and other issues, he aligned with the court’s liberal bloc, perhaps in the hope of showing that the court, dominated by conservatives, isn’t always looking to take a wrecking ball to long-established precedent. But if Roberts amassed some political capital from those decisions, he swiftly spent it on Thursday and Friday. In the three most politically divisive cases of the term, the court issued polarized 6-3 decisions — two of which Roberts wrote himself, and all of which delivered sweeping conservative victories on issues that are high priorities for the right. “The last two days of the term were absolutely cataclysmic and, to the extent people were asleep at the wheel, it’s because he kind of anesthetized them,” said New York University law professor Melissa Murray. Last June, the six-justice conservative majority cemented by former President Donald Trump flexed its muscles for the first time — with Roberts sometimes on the sidelines, as he was when the five other conservatives overturned Roe v. Wade. This term, he seemed intent on regaining some control. Earlier this month, the chief justice broke with his own history in voting-rights cases, taking the helm as the court, in a 5-4 vote, sided with Black voters in a Voting Rights Act case challenging alleged racial gerrymandering. The decision, which drew sharp dissents from the conservative bloc, is expected to help Democrats win several congressional seats in 2024. Then, Roberts again took the pen as the court refused to embrace a radical legal theory that could have given state legislatures far-ranging powers over elections — potentially even the power to nullify disputed elections, much as Trump and his allies tried to do in 2020. In other fractured decisions rebuffing adventurous conservative legal arguments, Roberts voted with the liberals to sustain President Joe Biden’s immigration policy and uphold the Indian Child Welfare Act. These opinions seemed of a piece with the chief justice’s reputation as a pragmatic institutionalist seeking to protect the court amid intense criticism. But some observers warned his moves were mere feints aimed at preserving the veneer of respectability around the court, even as the conservative supermajority’s project to dramatically reshape American law marched on. The unusual alliances and cross-cutting cleavages that marked some of the term’s earlier decisions were nowhere to be found on Thursday and Friday as the court’s highest-profile cases came down on predictable ideological lines. When the smoke cleared, the decades-long use of race to achieve diversity in college admissions was effectively dead, as was Biden’s marquee policy forgiving student debt for tens of millions of Americans. And the high court’s two-decade-plus string of decisions expanding the rights of the LGBTQ community was stopped in its tracks and beaten back by a ruling upholding the right of business owners to refuse service to same-sex couples on free-speech grounds. Some analysts say the idea that the Roberts-backed decisions earlier in the term were truly centrist is misguided because they were actually rejections of radical positions — like the contention that state legislatures should be able to alter any aspect of election rules or even overturn election results without state courts or state constitutions playing any role. “The Roberts court should get zero credit for the idea that the independent state legislature doctrine being rejected is any kind of moderation,” said Fordham law professor Jed Shugerman. “That’s just Overton Window talk,” he added, referring to a strategy that seeks to shift the debate in a particular direction by floating a previously unthinkable possibility and then backing away from it. Shugerman also said some of the maneuvering by Roberts and his colleagues is hard to reconcile, like acknowledging the need to rely on race in litigating Voting Rights Act cases but entirely reproaching the practice in college admissions. “It’s hard to square all of that colorblindness rhetoric from the affirmative action case, while they were at the same time writing a very much, rightly, not-colorblind interpretation of the Voting Rights Act,” Shugerman said. “It’s hard to read those two decisions next to each other.” Some conservative legal experts pointed to the immigration case, in which the court tossed out a challenge to the Biden administration’s priorities for arresting and detaining people living in the country illegally. That decision snubbed both the state of Texas and the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals — both of which have played key roles in recent years to advance legal challenges to policies ranging from immigration to abortion. “Texas and the 5th Circuit didn’t do particularly well at the court this term,” said Jonathan Adler, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University. “At the same time, that doesn’t mean affirmative action is OK or the Biden student loan program is OK.” Roberts’ sensitivities about the court being seen as wantonly overturning precedent were on particular display in the affirmative action case, where his opinion seemed to rule out the use of race in admissions in the way most elite colleges and universities use it these days. Yet, he stopped short of overruling the 2003 precedent that blessed continued use of race as a factor in that arena, Grutter v. Bollinger.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Court DA › 1NC

Court will narrow Chevron now, rather than overturn it - Roberts' moderation is key

King’2023[Pam King is an international speaker, author, and trainer, as well as a longtime Utah business owner.] Pamela King, Chevron doctrine: Not dead yet, 05/24/2023, https://www.eenews.net/articles/chevron-doctrine-not-dead-yet/HZ

The Supreme Court has signaled that it could be prepared to upend a tool that helps federal agencies legally defend their power to regulate on key issues like climate change — but the justices have options if they want to avoid upsetting the nearly 40-year-old precedent. As soon as summer 2024, the justices will decide a case that asks them to overrule — or at least put guardrails on — the Chevron doctrine, a legal theory born from a 1984 Supreme Court case that gives federal agencies leeway to interpret their regulatory authority when statutes are unclear. A ruling to overturn the deference standard could deflate the power of agencies like EPA just as they are gaining ground in the race to tackle climate change — and potentially open the Supreme Court to new scrutiny for its willingness to overturn long-standing precedent, as it did last year on abortion rights. “I wouldn’t be surprised if the justices limit Chevron, as opposed to overruling it,” said Katrina Kuh, a law professor at Pace University. Chevron analysis is composed of two steps: First, a court must determine whether a statute is unclear, and then it must determine whether an agency’s interpretation of that ambiguity is reasonable. Kuh said she sees a path for the court to find that Congress’ silence on a disputed matter does not equal statutory uncertainty. Although Chevron has fallen out of favor at the conservative-dominated Supreme Court, lower benches frequently use the doctrine to save federal rules from legal challenge. In the Chevron case the Supreme Court is currently considering — Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo — the herring fishing industry is fighting a NOAA Fisheries rule that requires vessels to pay the salaries of third-party monitors to study their hauls to prevent overfishing. Herring fishing operators have argued that while the Magnuson-Stevens Act — the statute that undergirds the NOAA Fisheries rule — clearly allows the agency to require onboard observers, the law is silent on whether it can require vessels to pay for that monitoring. “Just the fact that there’s silence there doesn’t automatically mean you go to Chevron step two,” said Kuh. The question presented in the fishing industry’s Supreme Court petition gives the justices the option to stop short of overturning Chevron. The petition asks whether the court should overrule the doctrine or “at least clarify that statutory silence” does not rise to the level of a statutory ambiguity requiring deference to an agency. Legal observers say there is reason to believe the justices would lean toward the latter option. The Supreme Court was asked to overrule Chevron deference just last year in a dispute over a Department of Health and Human Services rule governing Medicare drug reimbursements. Instead, the justices unanimously scrapped the regulation without ever mentioning Chevron deference. During arguments on the Medicare rule, three of the court’s conservative justices — Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch — signaled that they were prepared to overturn Chevron. But legal observers say the court’s more moderate conservatives — Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett — may be reluctant to completely do away with long-standing precedent. Roberts in particular has demonstrated interest in avoiding big swings in prior cases, said Peter Hsiao, a partner at the law firm King & Spalding.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Court Legitimate—2NC

SC ruling ignores text of the constitution—it is the dictator inside our democratic institution.

Segall’16[Eric J. Segall is the Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of Law. He is the author of Supreme Myths: Why the Supreme Court is Not a Court and its Justices are Not Judges]ERIC J. SEGALL, The Constitution Means What the Supreme Court Says It Means Harvard Law Review February 2016, https://harvardlawreview.org/forum/vol-129/the-constitution-means-what-the-supreme-court-says-it-means/HZ

Just a few days before this journal published Professor David Strauss’s excellent Foreword suggesting that constitutional text matters little to constitutional law, Judge Richard Posner, the most cited legal scholar of our generation,2 shocked many academics attending a constitutional law conference at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Judge Posner said that when he decides cases, he does not care what people in the late eighteenth century thought about today’s legal issues or even what the constitutional text says about those problems.3 He remarked that following the Constitution does not mean adhering to its text but instead respecting Supreme Court interpretations of that text. Constitutional law as made by judges, Judge Posner emphasized, is much more about creating rules that make sense today than interpreting an old and often obsolete document. He concluded the following: If you look at the entire body of constitutional law, that body of law bears very little resemblance to the text of the Constitution in 1789, 1791, and 1868. . . . That’s the reality. The only useful way to advocate with regard to constitutional law is to give a good contemporary argument for or against a particular interpretation.4 Judge Posner’s remarks created significant controversy that night (and on social media),5 possibly because he said exactly what Strauss warns is “never” appropriate: that it is perfectly fine (even desirable) for judges to “ignore” constitutional text. Despite this difference between Judge Posner and Strauss, they do agree substantially on how the Supreme Court decides constitutional law cases. In his Foreword, Strauss persuasively details how the Supreme Court follows a common law approach to constitutional decisionmaking in which the Justices rely primarily on the Court’s prior decisions when deciding cases. He argues that constitutional text is usually irrelevant to constitutional outcomes, and he presents specific examples of decisions completely at odds with what appears to be unambiguous language. Strauss’s article eloquently supports Judge Posner’s antitextual remarks. But Strauss does not go quite far enough in his article and certainly not as far as Judge Posner. Judge Posner explicitly argued that the text is irrelevant to Supreme Court Justices when they decide constitutional questions. It is well past time that more academics openly embrace that position as well, and Strauss should be one of the first given his longstanding description of constitutional law as common law.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Court Legitimate—2NC

SC has no constitutional stance to interpret the constitution—it is only a power steal from congress

Cooper’22[Ryan Cooper is the Prospect’s managing editor, and author of How Are You Going to Pay for That?: Smart Answers to the Dumbest Question in Politics. He was previously a national correspondent for The Week. His work has also appeared in The Nation, The New Republic, and Current Affairs.]RYAN COOPER The Case Against Judicial Review JULY 11, 2022 https://prospect.org/justice/the-case-against-judicial-review/HZ

If Democrats don’t bring the Supreme Court to heel, Americans will live under judicial despotism for the foreseeable future. In just a one-week span in June, the Supreme Court dealt several terrific blows to American freedom and self-government. It overturned a century-old New York law restricting the concealed carry of firearms; it overturned Roe v. Wade, allowing about 26 states to ban abortion, with more to come if Republicans win the congressional midterms; and it sharply limited the ability for the executive branch to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, which could eventually hamstring the administrative apparatus that has governed the United States for well over a century. The Court also recently agreed to hear a case on the “independent state legislature doctrine,” which holds that state legislatures have total power over their electoral systems. If the ruling goes conservatives’ way again, it would allow gerrymandered Republican legislatures to hand the presidency to their own party in 2024, striking another blow against democracy itself. This disaster is being perpetrated by perhaps the least democratically legitimate Supreme Court in history. Five of the six right-wing justices were appointed by presidents who took office after losing the popular vote. The other, Clarence Thomas, is married to an avowed conservative activist who actively agitated to overturn the 2020 election. In 2016, Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell held one seat open for a year, in violation of all precedent and the text of the Constitution, to ensure his preferred replacement. Republicans have had a Court majority since the Nixon administration, even though they have won the presidential popular vote just once since 1989. More from Ryan Cooper The inexorable march of tradition and timidity on the part of the government’s other branches has given this pack of conservative apparatchiks what amounts to monarchical powers over the American people. It’s no wonder that their decisions are so terrible—and so ominous for the country’s future. What is to be done? I propose to attack the problem at the root and abolish judicial review. The Court does not have the sole power to interpret the Constitution, nor the power to strike down any law it choses, and it’s time to say so. Even fairly hard-bitten progressives are often unsettled by this idea. Most Americans learn in high school civics that the Supreme Court gets final say on whether laws are constitutional, and that this is core to the functioning of the constitutional system. Yet this view is incomplete. Judicial review does not appear in the Constitution and is not firmly rooted in American tradition. For roughly the first three-quarters of the 19th century and the middle third of the 20th, those powers were heavily circumscribed by tradition and competition from the other branches of government. And for good reason: When the Court has exercised sole power to interpret the Constitution, with rare exceptions it has used that power to obliterate Americans’ constitutional rights, uphold white supremacy, and protect abusive corporations from unions and the regulatory state. While challenging the judiciary is commonly associated with Andrew Jackson, the two best presidents in history, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, had no choice but to directly confront the Court in order to advance justice. If America does not follow their lead, presidential powers will evaporate along with those of Congress and the freedom of the American people. LET ME BEGIN WITH THE TEXT of the Constitution. It grants by far the most formal authority to Congress—the power to tax, regulate foreign trade and interstate commerce, coin money, declare war, create patents and a post office, and much else. The president executes the laws as written by Congress, serves as commander in chief of the military, and conducts foreign policy. The Supreme Court, by contrast, only has “judicial Power” that “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” As often in the Constitution, this is exceptionally vague, but as far as the Court being able to overturn acts of Congress, the justices arrogated that privilege to themselves in Marbury v. Madison in 1803. Though some founders, like Alexander Hamilton, did argue in favor of judicial review, support was by no means unanimous. As historian Michael Kammen explains in A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture, Marbury was highly controversial at the time and remained so for decades, which restricted judicial review in practice. “[It] is not widely appreciated,” Kammen writes, “that the procedure and its supporting doctrine developed gradually, was used sparingly for almost a century, and has never lacked critics who were both harsh and astute: Presidents Jefferson, Monroe, Jackson, and Van Buren, for example.” One of the few times during the antebellum period the Court did exercise judicial review in a high-profile case, the resulting controversy was so explosive it helped touch off the Civil War. In Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Roger B. Taney infamously ruled that African Americans had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect,” and added for good measure that the carefully constructed Missouri Compromise—which had kept a rough balance of power between slave and free states, and banned slavery from the territories—was unconstitutional, even though it had nothing to do with the specifics of the case. This was a raw exercise of political power. Taney was a partisan Democrat, defender of slavery, and die-hard racist, and was using rule-by-decree in an attempt to settle the slavery question in favor of the planter class. The Constitution didn’t enter into the equation. Judicial review does not appear in the Constitution and is not firmly rooted in American tradition. But the rest of the country did not submit to Taney’s despotism. Northern voters and leaders reacted with furious outrage, and multiple state legislatures passed measures defying the Court. Arguments against Dred Scott and the lawless Court were a central part of the new Republican Party’s messaging, and in Lincoln’s 1860 campaign for president. In his inaugural address, Lincoln directly attacked judicial review: “[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court … the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.” In this, Lincoln followed the thinking of Jefferson, who argued that judicial review makes the Constitution “a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please.” Lincoln got to the core of the problem. Under a strong form of judicial review, the Court has despotic powers by definition. Congress and the president theoretically check one another, and more importantly have to face voters at regular intervals. But justices are appointed, serve for life, can overrule both the legislature and the president, and can’t be removed from office aside from impeachment (which, as Donald Trump proved beyond any question, is virtually a dead letter in our hyper-partisan times). Indeed, the Court doesn’t even have an ethics code of any kind. It would be completely legal for a justice to hold an auction for his or her vote outside the Court building. During the war, Taney attempted to reverse President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, despite the fact that the Constitution explicitly authorizes doing so “in Cases of Rebellion.” Taney then tried to hold Gen. George Cadwalader in contempt for refusing to obey his ruling. Both times, the Lincoln administration ignored him. As the president pointed out in a later message to Congress, Taney’s tendentious nitpicking would destroy the foundations of the Constitution itself: “Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?” (That said, Lincoln still got Congress to pass a law supporting his action once it came back into session, just for good measure.) Unfortunately, this spirit did not last. Supreme Court highlights of the Gilded Age included tossing the convictions of white supremacist mass murderers for violating their victims’ civil rights (United States v. Cruikshank), giving legal sanction to Jim Crow apartheid (Plessy v. Ferguson), inventing the idea of corporate personhood without even providing an argument for it (Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad), and spending 40 years striking down any economic regulation that interfered with the free market (most notably in Lochner v. New York). The Lochner era extended through the early New Deal period, when the Court struck down several of President Roosevelt’s attempts to fight the Depression, leading him to propose a measure to add additional justices to the Court in 1937. The plan did not pass, but shortly after FDR proposed it, conservative Justice Owen Roberts switched his position to upholding New Deal laws. Though historians debate how much Roberts was motivated by FDR’s plan, the president’s goal was accomplished, and for the next couple of decades the Court was relatively sparing with its review powers. Once again, fighting American history’s greatest calamities required bringing the Court to heel. ONE OF THE WORST ASPECTS of judicial review is that it ultimately corrupts law itself. By placing constitutional interpretation in the hands of a council of unaccountable ideologues, the temptation to use that power for political purposes is overwhelming. The very idea that it is possible to interpret language or assemble facts in a neutral fashion gives way to fabricated reasons why the Constitution mandates whatever specific political goal the justices happen to have. To be sure, there has been one period of a couple decades when the Court was a force for good, from striking down segregation in Brown v. Board of Education to establishing the right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade. However, these actions were not nearly as effective as legislation—the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act actually ended Jim Crow, not Brown, and in any case half the reason Jim Crow got going can be attributed to the Court itself, through Plessy. Furthermore, deciding questions of medical policy should be a matter for Congress; we’re seeing today the fragility of judicially established protections that can be torn up one by one. Today, an entrenched conservative majority, lifetime appointments, the de rigueur trend of strategic retirement, and the distortions of the Electoral College mean that the Court is all but immune from democratic accountability. It has not sunk in yet among many liberals, especially the Democratic Party leadership, how doomed they are under the status quo. Absent aggressive reform, it is vanishingly unlikely that Democrats will get a majority on the Court for the foreseeable future. Expand The majority simply has to hold on long enough for Republicans to win the Senate and the presidency, in which case the oldest members can retire. To break this majority, Democrats would have to hold the presidency continuously for something like 20 years, which hasn’t happened since the New Deal. In the meantime, the Court has been hacking away at the voting rights of liberal demographics, making it hard for Democrats to maintain state legislative or House majorities. If they aren’t stopped, another Plessy-style decision blessing an updated version of Jim Crow is coming soon. Groups like Demand Justice have opted to advocate for adding justices as a reform solution. Packing the Court is completely in keeping with previous law and tradition; indeed, it was FDR’s preferred option. But at bottom, it would preserve the principle of judicial review, while mostly abolishing it in a cumbersome manner with an unclear resolution. Changing the makeup of the Court by stacking it with partisans would still leave the judicial branch free to overturn laws, but only with the approval of whichever party held Congress and the White House last. If Democrats pack the Court, Republicans will of course return the favor at the earliest possible moment. Under such a system, ultimately it will be elections that settle questions of constitutional law. If that is the objective, it is both more honest and dramatically easier to simply attack judicial review head-on. SO WHAT WOULD THIS MEAN in practice? A current or future president, in response to some particularly egregious Supreme Court diktat, would explain their problems with the ruling, and insist that they will not obey the decision. They would say that in their opinion, Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided, that the Court does not get to claim sole power to interpret the Constitution, and that the Constitution has no stipulation about the U.S. being a judicial dictatorship. From now on, if Congress, for example, directs the president to regulate air pollution, then they will do as instructed, rather than obeying the Court’s wishes. Now, this would likely end in a direct confrontation between the president and the Court, with one commanding the power of the judiciary and the other the federal bureaucracy and the military. But while the possibility of such a conflict is alarming, it would only bring into the open what is already happening—a straight-up contest for political power that has nothing to do with the law. What might the endgame look like? It would probably resolve into something similar to what we see in other rich democracies that have not allowed their governments to become dangerously imbalanced in favor of the judiciary. While constitutional courts or other systems of theoretical judicial review do exist in many peer countries (and they have gotten somewhat stronger over the years, particularly in the European Union), none of them have anything close to America’s brand of hyper-powerful Supreme Court. The Nordic countries, for instance, have some formal processes of judicial review, but outside of Norway the tradition of parliamentary supremacy is so strong that they are virtually never used, and even the Supreme Court of Norway is far less powerful than the country’s parliament. The U.K. and New Zealand do have a formal review process for the courts, but only for acts of public bodies—they cannot strike down legislation. Australia’s High Court has nominal powers similar to its American counterpart, but in practice has hesitated to exercise them to nearly the same degree. Germany does have a fairly powerful Federal Constitutional Court—but wouldn’t you know it, that means it struggles with some of the same problems as the U.S., like when that court struck down a law legalizing abortion in 1993. (Still, even this court is not nearly as aggressive or powerful as its American counterpart.) No other functioning democracy has anything like the wretched American spectacle of the last decade, where minority interest groups spend millions trying to get through the courts what they could not get through the legislature, and the people wait on tenterhooks during each session of the top court to see which of their freedoms might vanish next. And we don’t have to live with that. The risk of theoretically unconstrained congressional majorities must be set against the current fact of the Court steadily stealing the powers of Congress. Reversing what can seem like an iron law of judicial supremacy in the U.S. is admittedly hard to imagine happening. But there are also options that stop short of this. As Joshua Zeitz recently suggested at Politico, Congress could limit judicial review over certain issues. Or it could add a supermajority requirement for the Court to overturn laws or take away previously granted constitutional rights. Indeed, Article III states that the Supreme Court holds appellate jurisdiction in all cases, but “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” Again, this is practically equivalent to my suggestion—if Congress were to just append jurisdiction-stripping language to every law, as it has done in a handful of cases in the past, judicial review would be ended. But if preserving a scrap of tradition is necessary to get people behind the basic idea, so be it. Finally, as the Prospect has written previously, on issues of statutory interpretation Congress can counteract the Court, if they disagree with its findings, simply by clarifying statutory language to reassert their prerogatives. (Indeed, one factor enabling the current power of the Court is paralysis in Congress, which makes such simple language fixes extremely difficult.) The key thing is to attack the Court head-on. The other branches cannot just sit there and take the arrant fake-legal decrees, because that will only embolden the justices. The plain and undeniable fact is that unfettered judicial review is a violation of basic principles of American democracy, and no court can be trusted with it. Under any government, there is always a danger of its power being abused. Democratically elected legislatures are not immune from this problem. It must be admitted that, should Republicans take control of Congress and the White House without any constraint from the Court, there’s a strong chance they’d pass all manner of abusive stuff. The Florida legislature, for example, recently passed a bigoted “don’t say gay” bill that blatantly violates the civil rights of LGBT teachers. But the risk of theoretically unconstrained congressional majorities must be set against the current fact of the Court steadily stealing the powers of Congress, eroding the freedom of the people—and, of course, doing nothing to protect gay Florida teachers from a feral state legislature. It’s far from the first time American courts have ignored the Bill of Rights, and it won’t be the last. The relevant question when it comes to constitutional design is what kinds of government institutions are most likely to abuse their power. Common sense and history teach us that elected representatives who must seek re-election at regular intervals are the least likely to abuse their power. Totally unaccountable courts where the judges can essentially pick their successors have much greater opportunity. A judicial system that limits itself to adjudicating criminal and civil cases, and making sure that legislation is interpreted consistently, can fill a necessary and proper role. The Supreme Court, drunk on unchecked power for too long, must be brought to heel.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Court Good--2NC

Only the CP solves—congress is comparatively more progressive and durable than court

Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ

Ely’s conjecture flies in the face not merely of the under protection of racial and other minorities, but that the empowerment of the court more regularly leads to the protection of minorities who do not deserve it. Taking stock, the intuitive appeal of Ely’s first conjecture depended upon both conflating state and federal officials and omitting affirmative harms done by courts to minorities and other vulnerable groups. With these clarifications, it becomes far from obvious that officials insulated from majoritarian pressures are less bigoted than those who are not. By itself, that should be enough to make mainstream liberals open to institutional experimentation since the obviousness of Ely’s conjecture was what made judicial empowerment seem like the “safe” course of action. Adding to the ledger the aid courts have provided for wealthy minorities, legislative empowerment should seem to liberals at least somewhat safer. Either way, the key claim is that attention to the full history of judicial (and legislative) activity makes liberal confidence in the judiciary completely untenable. As admirable as the Warren Court may have been, it gives liberals no reason to place faith in the judiciary as an institution. Assuming, though, that liberals come away from this historical account not yet convinced of the superiority of legislatures but merely uncertain, the question becomes how, under conditions of uncertainty, to decide between judicial and legislative empowerment. Here, it becomes critical to attend not only to the relative tendency of judges and elected officials to afford protections to minorities and other vulnerable groups but also to the type of protections each of those actors has been disposed to afford. Most significantly, federal courts in particular have, for various reasons, been mostly unwilling or unable to recognize and enforce positive rights for minorities and other vulnerable groups, opting systematically for negative rights instead.119 Most visibly, “[f]or nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not secure ‘positive’ rights to governmental aid,”120 rejecting constitutional arguments for, among other things, state-financed abortion,121 special scrutiny for policies disadvantaging disabled persons,122 and increased funding for schools in low-income districts.123 During that same period, legislatures have provided, through ordinary legislation, contraception at no cost to patients,124 guaranteed access to places of public accommodation for disabled persons,125 and direct payments to low- and middle-income parents, among many other positive guarantees.126 As we use those terms, “positive” rights are guarantees by the state to bring about some material outcome, whereas “negative” rights are promises by the state not to bar the pursuit of that outcome through “private” transactions. So construed, a “positive” right to abortion would, for example, require that the state make abortions available at minimal or no cost to the patient, while a “negative” right would require only that the state not prohibit the procedure, leaving financing and accessibility to contracting individuals. As different scholars have noted, even the implementation of negative rights involves affirmative measures by the state—a federal right to abortion, understood negatively, requires the availability of judicial proceedings to challenge state and local ordinances that conflict with that right.127 At the same time, for any given right, we think it remains helpful to ask whether that right is understood as positive or negative.128 And when it comes to the rights that typically concern us, like those to abortion, racial equality, or freedom of speech, courts have been reluctant to interpret those rights positively, in notable contrast to legislatures. What accounts for courts’ comparative apprehension to recognize and enforce positive rights? Domestically, the U.S. Constitution is widely regarded as, in the words of Judge Richard Posner, a “charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”129 This pervasive understanding, especially among judges, is grounded partly in a contestable history according to which the principal concern of the Framers was government overreach as opposed to state inaction.130 So too, the narrative continues, the drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments “sought to protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental services.”131 Apart from such historical claims, domestic courts offer institutional reasons to be wary of judicial recognition and enforcement of positive rights. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit significant disparities in per-pupil expenditures within public schools, reasoning in part that judicial “interference[ ] with [a] State’s fiscal policy” is presumptively inappropriate because judges “lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.”132 Similarly, in Maher v. Roe, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require state funding of “nontherapeutic” abortions, explaining that the “decision whether to expend state funds” on such procedures was “fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply divided,” and that for “policy choices as sensitive as those . . . the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.”133 Taking stock again, if mainstream liberals came away from the historical discussion unsure whether to empower elected officials or courts, a commitment to real freedom of choice points toward elected officials. Because courts are more hesitant than elected officials to recognize positive rights, theirs is a world in which abortion remains practically unavailable for poor women and many women of color, despite fewer legal prohibitions of the procedure. Similarly, explicit racial segregation of residential areas and schools has been supplanted by effective segregation through geographic migration and zoning policies. Put slightly differently, given the relative hesitancy of courts to recognize positive rights, empowering courts over legislatures has the effect of prioritizing the minimization of express legal barriers to individual choices over the guarantee that everyone is in a real sense able to make these choices. The reason is that courts’ ability to recognize and enforce negative rights is one and the same as the power to set aside positive rights afforded by legislatures. Practically speaking, this means that for every Griswold v. Connecticut,134 there is a Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.;135 for every Brown, the Civil Rights Cases, and so on. The result is a world with fewer immediate legal barriers to contract, but also one with fewer persons having real opportunity to choose. In sum, the intuitive appeal of Ely’s narrative that courts are more protective of “discrete and insular” minorities (however those are identified136) and other vulnerable groups depends on attending to the help that empowered courts provide but not to the concomitant harms. This is, of course, not to say that courts never provide help. Particularly in moments when public sentiment takes a reactionary turn, a judiciary appointed during a prior moment will likely act as a modest bulwark against the manifestation of those reactionary sentiments in government policy. The question, though, is whether minorities and other vulnerable groups on the whole fare better under a regime of judicial supremacy. And as this Part suggests, there is no reason to believe that courts are systematically more attentive to the interests of vulnerable populations generally speaking. Worse still, courts’ unwillingness or inability to recognize and enforce positive as opposed to negative rights puts a depressingly low ceiling on the sort of freedom judicial empowerment might achieve.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Court Good--2NC

Court prioritizing the elite—it historically prefers the protection of affluent minorities over racial/political minorities.

Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ

Third, discussions of rights, including Ely’s, typically center on how well courts or elected officials attend to the interests of political minorities and other vulnerable groups most mainstream liberals regard as deserving of constitutional protection.107 Hence, for Ely, the discussion builds from the idea of “discrete and insular” political minorities articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,108 and then goes on to consider the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and the like.109 As previously mentioned, whether it is beneficial to assign protection of these minorities’ interests to courts or elected officials is itself a difficult question. What complicates the matter even further, though, is that by so limiting the discussion, we miss that authorizing courts to protect the interests of these minorities and other groups opens the possibility of judicial protection for undeserving minorities as well. As Evelyn Atkinson recounts,110 for example, the extension of Fourteenth Amendment protection to Chinese immigrants in Yick Wo v. Hopkins111 was intimately bound up with the granting of Equal Protection rights to corporations in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.112 The Court would rely upon both sets of precedents during its Lochner era, invalidating swaths of legislative protections for workers on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.113 More recently, in a series of First Amendment decisions, the Court has construed commercial and political speech doctrine to insulate corporations and affluent individuals from disclosure requirements,114 political spending constraints,115 and restrictions on the sale of consumer information.116 Add to this the use of free speech doctrine to undermine unionization,117 and the “weaponiz[ation]” of the First Amendment becomes clearer still.118 Whether the Court’s history of affording protections to wealthy, powerful minorities outweighs whatever aid it has secured to political minorities deserving of protection is, again, complicated and not something we can hope to settle here. For present purposes, the claim is simply that by empowering courts to protect politically disadvantaged minorities and other vulnerable groups, courts are simultaneously empowered to determine which minorities and groups are deserving of protection. And, as even the brief sketch above shows, courts have, as a historical matter, very often and very consequentially gotten it wrong—at least from the perspective of liberals.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Court Good--2NC

Congress key to undo the discrimination done by the court—empirics prove

Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ

Second, while Ely candidly discusses the Court’s imperfect record combatting majoritarian bigotry, he and mainstream liberals for whom his first conjecture is intuitive pay far less attention to instances in which the Court was a source of bigotry itself. Most glaringly, Brown—the pinnacle of the Court’s rights protection—in large part reversed the damage Plessy v. Ferguson97 had done by its permissive attitude towards the separation of races in public schools. More broadly, the Court played an instrumental role in the end of Reconstruction, especially in the Civil Rights Cases, undermining federal majoritarian efforts toward racial equality in the form of guarantees of equal treatment in public accommodations and public transportation.98 And in the civil rights arena, the damage that the Court does to minorities can require more politically accountable branches to undo. Only the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, finally undid part of the damage of the Civil Rights Cases by extending statutory protection to racial minorities that the Court never again allowed the Fourteenth Amendment itself to afford.99 Other parts of the Court’s lasting damage, like the state action doctrine, remain.100 As Nikolas Bowie documents,101 this pattern of judicial harm extends from the antebellum period with decisions like Dred Scott to the early twentieth century with cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart102 to late twentieth century examples like Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña.103 And as liberals today know all too well, this trend continues into the twenty first century with cases like Shelby County v. Holder104 in which the Roberts Court has shown consistent hostility to statutory protections for the voting rights of racial and ethnic minorities.105 While weighing cases like these against contemporary opposites—for example, United States v. Windsor,106 in which the Court was concededly protective of the rights of LGBTQ persons even against discriminatory federal legislation—the point here is just that these unfortunate cases have to be weighed. The Court, in other words, can be a source of harm as well as help even for the political minorities that Ely highlights.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Court Good--2NC

Prefer Congress--courts comparatively fails to safeguard minority rights

Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ

Taken together, this combination of historical reminders and contemporary experience makes plausible to many that political majorities in the United States cannot be trusted to respect the rights of at least these minorities. But what about courts? Does history or experience give reason to think that judges do better? Here, Ely, like many before and since, calls to mind various moments when the Supreme Court was indeed protective of relevant groups. Recalling heroic moments from the Court’s history—with heavy emphasis on Warren Court classics like Brown and Gomillion v. Lightfoot88—Ely offers examples of the Court acting in the rights-protective role he recommends and, more importantly, conjectures and predicts judges will actually perform. Here again, for mainstream liberal audiences, Ely’s reminders are mostly superfluous as the Warren Court’s legacy is what grounds that group’s confidence, or at least faith, in the judiciary.89 Add to this more recent examples of protections for LGBTQ persons afforded by the otherwise reactionary Roberts Court, and belief in the importance of judges in protecting minorities from the political branches of government grows further still.90 Ely acknowledges, of course, that the Court’s record in these areas is flawed, criticizing, for example, the Rehnquist Court’s rights-restrictive tendencies.91 The moments of rights protection that do occur—even as the Supreme Court moved further right—are enough to warrant the assumption that courts are on balance better. Liberals follow suit in adopting this view even today. If Ely’s argument is best understood as historical in nature, the question is, then, how does his history hold up? This is really two separate questions: First, is his depiction of the Warren Court correct, and second, is it generalizable across time so that it authorizes Ely’s conjecture in different historical circumstances? Ely’s suggestion that the history of the United States is one of persistent discrimination against political minorities is beyond question. Indeed, as recent scholarship has highlighted, the histories of discrimination widely taught in this country are, if anything, woefully incomplete.92 Nonetheless, Ely’s portrayal of the judiciary’s role in that history of discrimination is itself conveniently partial. In addition, the implicit comparison Ely makes between judges and more politically accountable branches of government, and legislatures in particular, is misleading. First, the comparison at issue for Ely is between judges and elected officials. For that comparison to be informative, though, one must hold all other relevant factors fixed, including, among other things, jurisdiction. Suppose, for instance, that certain state elected officials prove reliably less attentive to minority interests than do federal judges. In that scenario, one might be learning less about the difference between elected officials and judges than between state and federal officials. And, indeed, many of the historical examples favorable to Ely fit precisely this schema. The vast majority of the civil rights cases from the Warren Court era that involve judicial intervention see the Court declaring unconstitutional various state laws.93 So too with more recent favorable examples like Obergefell v. Hodges.94 To be sure, the mere fact that it is federal judges negating the actions of state elected officials does not make these cases irrelevant for purposes of institutional comparison. If, for example, federal judicial interventions were prompted by the unwillingness or inability of federal elected officials to act, such cases could still teach us something about the comparative tendency of judges and elected officials to countenance bigotry.95 As it turns out, though, in many of the cases just mentioned, federal judicial decisions were anticipated or supplemented by federal action, especially federal legislation. And in many of those cases, it is at least plausible that it was federal legislation that had the greater impact in counteracting discrimination—with Brown the most widely discussed example.96

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › AT: Statehood bad—2NC

Puerto Rican supports Statehood--Referendum proves

UN’23[It’s the United Nation. You know what it is]United Nation, Special Committee on Decolonization Approves Resolution Reaffirming Puerto Rico’s Inalienable Right to Self-determination, Independence, 22 JUNE 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/gacol3372.doc.htm/HZ

By the terms of the resolution titled “Decision of the Special Committee of 20 June 2022 concerning Puerto Rico” — which was approved without a vote — the Special Committee supported a process enabling the Puerto Rican people to take decisions in a sovereign manner, to address their urgent economic and social needs, including unemployment, marginalization, insolvency and poverty, and the problems related to education and health, which have been aggravated by the ravages of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, and the earthquakes affecting the south-western part of the island. Among other things, it urged the United States Government to complete the return of all lands occupied by its military forces in the territory to the people of Puerto Rico. The representative of Cuba, introducing the text, said the draft recognizes that the current status of Puerto Rico prevents it from taking sovereign decisions to address its own needs and define its own future, amid the grave socioeconomic problems it faces. Expressing concern about undue controls and economic influence imposed by the United States over the island, he also voiced concern over actions carried out against supporters of Puerto Rican independence, which have been mentioned in declassified documents. Prior to approving the resolution, members of the Special Committee — formally known as the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples — heard testimony from as many as 51 petitioners with ties to Puerto Rico. While many spoke out in favour of a full self-determination process leading to national autonomy for the island, others pointed out that the foregoing was a minority opinion, with most Puerto Ricans voting in favour of becoming the fifty-first state of the United States in a November 2020 referendum. Calling for decolonization in the context of statehood, those speakers emphasized that Puerto Ricans deserved the same fundamental rights — including those of voting and representation — that were granted to United States citizens on the mainland. Among them was Yadira Ofarrill, speaking for the Congressional Extended Delegation-Georgia Chapter, who stressed that the decolonization of Puerto Rico must be by popular vote — the most democratic vehicle — although some people mistakenly think that addressing the United Nations to ask for independence is the only way to decolonize the island. Noting her preference for statehood — a valid form of decolonization that would turn Puerto Rico into a sovereign state in the United States, like the other 50 states — she stressed that the decision must be made by Puerto Ricans living on the island. Adrián González Costa, speaking for Puerto Rican Independence Party, urged Washington, D.C., to comply with their decolonization obligation, pointing out that the matter is languishing due to a lack of commitment on the part of the executive branch of the United States and to paralysing polarization. The political leaders in Puerto Rico in favour of annexation are merely simulating interest in advancing this matter in the United States Congress and, therefore, have become de facto allies of those who are entrenched in their colonial immobility, he added.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › 2NC--1AC card recut—we read yellow

1AC concede the obligation of a strict scrutiny is key—which can only be solved through the CP

Fergus-Callahan, 23 --- Senior Articles Editor, Denver Law Review  (Carolyn Fergus-Callahan, "UNITED STATES V. VAELLO-MADERO: A “SHAMEFUL” FAILURE TO PROTECT NEEDY AMERICAN CITIZENS LIVING IN THE U.S. TERRITORIES", 4-12-2023, Denver Law Reveiw, https://www.denverlawreview.org/united-states-v-vaello-madero-a-shameful-failure-to-protect-needy-american-citizens-living-in-the-u-s-territories)//EG

2. Territorial Residents Are Powerless to Protect Themselves from the Majoritarian Political Process. The principle that legislation burdening disenfranchised groups is entitled to strict scrutiny arises from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Products. 200 "Footnote four's" focus on "political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" which can "ordinarily be relied upon to protect minorities" laid the foundation for the Court in subsequent cases to "trigger" strict scrutiny when the challenged classification burdens a group without political protection. 21 Although the Court ordinarily accords a "heavy presumption of constitutionality" to legislative enactments made by "a coequal and representative branch of. . Government, " that presumption must be questioned if the enactment burdens a group that is not adequately represented 202 Residents of Puerto Rico, despite heir statutory U.S. citizenship, cannot vote in Presidential elections. 203 Their representation in Congress is limited to one non-voting Resident Commissioner, who "is constrained to a role akin to that of a lobbyist. "2 Puerto Rico is "self-governed" in that its people can choose a governor and establish a constitution, but Congress retains plenary authority to revoke this power at any time. 205 Congress could likewise revoke Puerto Ricans' United States citizenship. 206 The "indefinite political subordination" of residents of Puerto Rico, sanctioned by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, leaves them defenseless against discriminatory legislation, a status that is not only problematic, but also constitutionally suspect. *27 It should therefore obligate the Court to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating classifications that burden territorial residents. Nowhere is the effect of Puerto Rico's political powerlessness more dramatically illustrated than in the disaster relief context. As an island territory, Puerto Rico is on the front line of the climate crisis.208 Residents of Puerto Rico *disproportionately experience sea level rise, extreme temperatures, intense tropical storms, and the resulting damage to ecosystems, health, culture, and infrastructure," despite contributing very little to greenhouse gas emissions. 209 In 2017 alone, the island was devastated by two Category 4 hurricanes, Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria. I Hurricane Maria, a "near-Category 5" storm that struck within weeks of Hurricane Irma, left almost 3,000 dead and decimated the island's agriculture and aging power infrastructure.? In the aftermath of the storm, the island lost power for almost two months, and intermittent outages continued for six months after that.21? Residents lacked potable water, fuel, and food supplies.? In September 2022, six years after Hurricane Maria's landfall, the flooding and rainfall from Hurricane Fiona again left the island's residents powerless and without potable water.?" The federal government's actions in the aftermath of the 2017 storms laid bare the enduring effects of Puerto Rico's political powerlessness. For example, the federal government triggers the disaster response component of welfare assistance, designed to offer local governments additional flexibility and funds to cope with disasters like tropical storms, only after the President declares a "major disaster" or "emergency" exists in the area requesting aid.?$ As a result, only a President that Puerto Rico residents did not and could not vote for can authorize Puerto Rico's disaster relief funds.216 Once a "major disaster" is declared, the President instructs federal agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to "support . .. local efforts in whatever was authorized by federal law. »217 When, however, FEMA is responding to multiple disasters at once, "extra political pressure and impetus can make a difference" in how the agency prioritizes aid recipients.? Puerto Rico's one non-voting member of Congress lacks the political ammo necessary to ensure aid is delivered in an equitable and timely manner, and it likewise lacks the bargaining power necessary to lobby for an aid package from Congress.29 In this way, Puerto Rico's indefinite disenfranchisement leaves it "shut out from agenda-setting, determining funding and policy priorities, and opportunities to sit at the decision-making table. *22 Disaster relief access is just one example of the way Puerto Rico's political powerlessness plays out in the legislative setting and accordingly why the Court should treat classifications burdening this disenfranchised group with strict scrutiny. As one commenter points out, an additional argument in support of this contention is "the role the judiciary has played in the entrenchment of Puerto Rico's 'political vacuum.'*# He points out that "the indefinite reaffirmation of Congress's plenary power over the island" stated by the Court in Harris and Califano "raises concerns when combined with Supreme Court statements regarding the "temporary' character of the arrangement made possible by the Insular Cases and the territorial incorporation doctrine. " If the Court "created an intermediate step on the divergent roads to statehood or independence . under the presumption that Congress would revisit the matter at a later date," Congress's failure to do so while continuing to pass discriminatory legislation should be viewed with suspicion.? This suspicion should necessitate the application of strict scrutiny.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › 1nc

Statehood solves---advocates agree

PR51st’22[PR51st serves to inform, engage and activate support for Puerto Rico statehood in ways that are compelling, interactive, fact-based and easy to share. On this website, and all other PR51st platforms, we talk about what’s happening in the statehood movement today, and how you can get involved to support equality through statehood for Puerto Rico.] PR51stApril 25, 2022 https://www.pr51st.com/gorsuch-puerto-rico-opinion-confirms-statehood-only-path-to-equality-2/HZ

Last week, on April 21, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress can withhold Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits from Americans in Puerto Rico. In the case Social Security Administration v. Vaello Madero, an 8-to-1 majority vote of members on the high court held that Congress does not have to treat Puerto Rico the same as states in federal legislation, because that island is one of the last five “unincorporated” U.S. territories. The ruling confirms that Americans in Puerto Rico and other “unincorporated” territories do not have fully equal rights compared to U.S. citizens residing in the states. The Vaello Madero decision reverses lower court rulings holding that Congressional authorization for SSI benefits in the 50 states and some but not all “unincorporated” territories requires equal benefit eligibility for Puerto Rico and hence all territories. By rejecting those lower court rulings in its Vaello Madero decision, as it has in every territorial rights case in the modern era the Supreme Court again upheld the “unincorporated” territory doctrine that originated in 1901 as a court-invented political status classification. Justice Gorsach voted with the court majority, but filed a concurring opinion not directly addressing the actual merits of the Vaello Madero case. Instead Gorsach took aim at the Insular Cases, writing “The Insular cases…deserve no place in our law…are…shameful…Because no party asks us to overrule the Insular Cases to resolve today’s dispute, I join the Court’s opinion. But the time has come to recognize that the Insular Cases rest on a rotten foundation. And I hope the day comes soon when the Court squarely overrules them.” Overrule the Insular Cases? For example, if the courts declare Puerto Rico (and presumably all unincorporated territories) “incorporated,” does that lead to full equality – including voting representation in Congress and Electoral College – attainable only through statehood? Or, does it make a less than fully equal incorporated status permanent? If the U.S. Constitution has to be amended to make a Gorsuch envisioned incorporation fully equal to statehood, wouldn’t admission of Puerto Rico as a state or integration of small territories into existing states be more realistic than amending the Constitution? The answer is that if U.S. citizenship is to continue the only path to full equality is statehood. If the unincorporated territories are prepared to give up current statutory U.S. nationality and citizenship, then independence with or without free association with the U.S. is the only other status option that ends the current colonial condition of the territories.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › 1nc

Congressional action solves – legislation can extend benefits to Puerto Rico

González and Bejarano ‘22[Carolina González is a senior Director of Strategic Communication, Sarai Bejarano is the manager of Traditional & Digital Media]Carolina González Sarai Bejarano Civil Rights Groups Condemn the Supreme Court’s Decision in U.S. v. Vaello-Madero 21, April 2022 https://www.latinojustice.org/en/news/civil-rights-groups-condemn-supreme-courts-decision-us-v-vaello-madero/HZ

Civil rights groups condemn the Supreme Court’s decision to exclude citizen residents of Puerto Rico from federal safety-net programs in the U.S. v. Vaello-Madero case, and demand the Biden administration stop defending discrimination against Puerto Ricans and other citizens living in U.S. territories, especially when it comes to federal benefits for disabled, low-income, and elderly citizens.

The Supreme Court’s decision today represents the continuation of the U.S. government's century-long discriminatory treatment of Americans living in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories. In spite of the Court’s assertion, this discrimination is not just based on the Territorial Clause of the Constitution but also on racist cases decided by the Supreme Court in the early 20th century in a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases. Despite his campaign promise to end discrimination against Puerto Ricans, President Biden failed to use this historic opportunity to exercise his powers and immediately fulfill his commitment. Instead, he deferred to Congress, whose rationale for this discrimination seems to be that it is too costly to ensure that a federal safety-net exists for all of the nation’s most vulnerable if they live in a U.S. territory. The lone voice of justice on the court came from Justice Sotomayor, who in her dissent stated, “SSI is designed to support the neediest citizens. As a program of last resort, it is aimed at preventing the most severe poverty. In view of that core purpose, denying benefits to hundreds of thousands of eligible Puerto Rico residents because they do not pay enough in taxes is utterly irrational. Congress’ decision to deny to the U. S. citizens of Puerto Rico a social safety net that it provides to almost all other U. S. citizens is especially cruel given those citizens’ dire need for aid.” We concur. Hispanic Federation and its allies recognize this decision as a setback, not a defeat, and vow to continue our collective work to ensure all U.S. citizens are treated equally and fairly regardless of where they live. Congress must act now to end this injustice that perpetuates a two-tier system of citizenship among potentially millions of residents of Puerto Rico and other territories. We also call on President Biden to fight to ensure Congress enacts legislation to treat Puerto Ricans equitably in all federal safety net programs that support the most vulnerable citizens. “We condemn the Supreme Court’s decision today to exclude Puerto Ricans from SSI and their defense of ongoing discrimination in federal safety-net programs. It is shameful that our nation’s highest court once again failed to protect the democratic and constitutional rights of ALL U.S. citizens and continues to treat Puerto Ricans with such appalling injustice. Such cruel practices counter the fundamental objective of federal welfare programs, helping the most vulnerable citizens. Although this decision is a setback, it is not a defeat. Hispanic Federation will continue to work to ensure that all U.S. citizens, regardless of where they live, are treated equally and fairly,” said Frankie Miranda, President and CEO of Hispanic Federation. Vaello-Madero, a U.S. citizen with a disability, was sued for nearly $28,000 for receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments after he moved from New York to Puerto Rico to be with his family. Although Madero won his case in the lower courts, the Justice Department appealed it at the Supreme Court. SSI provides funding to the most vulnerable people, including the disabled, blind, and elderly, who cannot support themselves. It is available only to U.S. citizens living in the 50 states, D.C., and the Northern Mariana Islands but excludes U.S. citizens living in other territories. “The Supreme Court turned a blind eye to the historical discrimination in federal safety-net programs against Puerto Ricans and other citizens living in U.S. territories. SSI is not just a policy; it is a policy that could save the lives of vulnerable people, including my daughter Isabella who was born with major heart conditions. My daughter did not ask for her illness, yet she has to continue to suffer the consequences of such injustice. Is it fair to prevent Puerto Ricans from accessing potentially life-saving assistance only because of where they live? This injustice is causing a lot of pain and suffering for families in similar situations and worse because they may not have a voice to be heard against this discriminatory decision. I am hurt and disappointed that the U.S. government, once again, decided to discriminate against my daughter and the thousands of families like ours. Now it is time for Congress to fight this discriminatory practice and guarantee that all U.S. citizens receive equal access to federal safety-net programs, no matter where they live,” said Aurelis Aponte, mother of a child with a disability who lost benefits when returning to Puerto Rico.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › 1nc

Judicial supremacy is broken—only congress has the power to interpret the scope of constitutional protections – we should reclaim democratic control over the Constitution rather than legitimizing judicial supremacy – reliance on the Supreme Court turns the aff

Bowei and Renan’22[Nikolas Bowie is a professor at Harvard Law School. Daphna Renan is a professor at Harvard Law School.]Nikolas Bowie and Daphna Renan The Supreme Court Is Not Supposed to Have This Much Power And Congress should claw it back. JUNE 8, 2022 https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/supreme-court-power-overrule-congr ess/661212/HZ

It’s June again—that time of year when Americans wake up each morning and wait for the Supreme Court to resolve our deepest political disagreements. To decide what the Constitution says about our bodily autonomy, our power to avert climate change, and our ability to protect children from guns, the nation turns not to members of Congress—elected by us—but to five oracles in robes. This annual observance of judicial supremacy—the idea that the Supreme Court has the final say about what our Constitution allows—is an odd affliction for a nation that will close the month ready to celebrate our independence from an unelected monarch. From one perspective, our acceptance of this supremacy reflects a sense that our political system is simply too broken to address the most urgent questions that we confront. But it would be a mistake to see judicial supremacy as a mere symptom of our politics and not a cause. Contrary to what many people have come to believe, judicial supremacy is not in the Constitution, and does not date from the founding era. It took hold of American politics only after the Civil War, when the Court overruled Congress’s judgment that the Constitution demanded civil-rights and voting laws. The Court has spent the 150 years since sapping our national representatives of the power to issue national rules. These judicial decisions have destroyed guardrails that national majorities deemed vital to a functional, multiracial democracy—including protecting the right to vote and curbing the influence of money in politics. Even worse, the Court’s assertion of the power to invalidate federal laws has stripped Americans of the expectation, once widely shared, that the most important interpretations of the Constitution are expressed not by judicial decree but by the participation of “We, the People,” in enacting national legislation. In the decades before the Civil War, when national parties violently contested the constitutionality of slavery west of the Mississippi, the center of gravity was Congress. As the historian James Oakes recounts, when a border-state senator proposed asking the Supreme Court to decide the issue in 1848, other senators ridiculed his idea as implausible. “The Constitution was interpreted as variously as the Bible,” Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire responded. White southerners believed “the Constitution carries slavery with it,” while northerners construed the Constitution “to secure freedom.” As Hale and his contemporaries appreciated, resolving such a fundamental national disagreement could never turn on a court’s answer to which interpretation was more correct. Rather, the winning interpretation would depend on whether adherents could build sufficient political majorities to control the national government. The Supreme Court did attempt to decide the question in its infamous 1857 Dred Scott decision—interpreting the Constitution to hold that the federal government lacked the power to abolish slavery anywhere in the United States. But rather than accept this novel assertion of judicial supremacy over Congress, the Republican Party responded with defiance. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln successfully ran for president on a platform of repudiating the Court with national legislation. In his inaugural address, he remarked that “the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,” then “the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.” Through the Civil War and the Reconstruction era that followed, the politically dominant Republicans in Congress enacted legislation to build a multiracial democracy in the United States for the first time. Some of these laws boldly overruled the Court, including statutes in 1862 and 1866 that began the abolition of slavery and recognized the citizenship of Black people. Others prevented the Court from retaliating against Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution, such as legislation stripping the Court of jurisdiction over certain matters. Still others enlisted the Court in the project of enforcing Congress’s constitutional judgments. Acts in 1870 and 1871 instructed federal courts to enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments against recalcitrant state officials, while acts in 1870 and 1875 tasked judges with banning voting restrictions, lynch mobs, and racial discrimination. Only after Republicans lost control of Congress in 1875 was the Court able to enforce its contrary interpretations of the Constitution—to devastating effect. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and related cases, the Court refused to enforce federal civil-rights laws on the theory that the newly enacted Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments gave Congress no power against private racial violence or discrimination in public accommodations. For the next half century—as part of what the historian W. E. B. Du Bois called the “counter-revolution of property”—the Court condemned the Reconstruction Congress as a group of unprincipled fanatics. And it invented new doctrines that authorized the Court to invalidate federal legislation that it thought went too far toward interfering with white business interests. It was during this period that judicial supremacy took hold as a dominant ideology in the United States. This bears repeating: Judicial supremacy is an institutional arrangement brought to cultural ascendancy by white people who wanted to undo Reconstruction and the rise of organized labor that had followed. And that makes sense, as judicial supremacy can harness the power of an entrenched minority and use that power to undermine the more democratic legislative branch. Decades after the Court in Marbury v. Madison first anticipated that it might disagree with Congress about a federal law’s constitutionality, the justices finally convinced skeptics of the need for this authority by disempowering Congress and unraveling its legislative efforts to establish political equality. In the nearly 150 years since Reconstruction, the thrust of judicial supremacy has continued to be revanchist. Through the 21st century, the justices overwhelmingly have exercised their claim of supremacy over Congress to insulate the wealthy and powerful from federal labor laws, federal voting laws, federal civil-rights laws,federal campaign-finance laws, and federal health-care laws. Decisions such as Citizens United and Shelby County are typical examples of how the Court has overruled Congress to make it harder for ordinary people to participate in American democracy on equal terms. But their damage goes beyond even that: Because the limits of our constitutional imagination can extend no further than the opinions of those who happen to sit on the Court, judicial supremacy has also impoverished what we think is possible through democratic politics—and through organizing for political change at the national level. Rather than look to the Court to glimpse some fundamental truth from scant constitutional text, Americans ought to demand that their elected representatives engage in the hard work of national lawmaking. Congress must act, even if it means overriding the interpretations of the Court and reshaping its jurisdiction. Encouragingly, members of the House have recently passed bills to enforce their understanding of what federal laws our nation demands and our Constitution permits—including reproductive freedom and voting rights. But the bills have all stalled in the Senate for two reasons that remain within its control. One, the filibuster, will be abolished as soon as 50 senators recognize that a permanently incapacitated Senate is far more destructive than an active Senate that might one day be controlled by an opposing party. But the other obstacle may be more pernicious: a fear among legislators that there is no point to legislating if the Court will simply invalidate anything Congress achieves. Yet as the Reconstruction Congress recognized, everything the Court has the power to do comes from federal statutes passed by Congress—statutes that a majority of Congress always has the power to amend. Conflicts over constitutional interpretation are not really over who has the best understanding of words inscribed in an old document. They are about who—or which actors in our system of national government—can deliver on a particular, and inherently contested, meaning in the context of our current times. It is a question of political leadership, not legalism. There is nothing unconstitutional about Congress reasserting its authority to define the nation’s highest law. The experience of Reconstruction brings into view this firmly grounded practice. In fact, a surviving remnant of the Reconstruction Congress’s work—today codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983—has underwritten some of the most famous cases in modern constitutional law. In Section 1983, Congress instructed federal courts to stop state or local officials from depriving anyone of their “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” Section 1983 is what Oliver Brown invoked when he challenged Kansas’s segregation laws in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, what “Jane Roe” invoked to challenge Texas’s abortion law in Roe v. Wade, and what James Obergefell invoked when he challenged Ohio’s same-sex-marriage ban in Obergefell v. Hodges. While these landmark cases invalidated state laws, the justices were following, not undermining, Congress’s orders. The decisions overruling state interpretations of the Constitution don’t represent judicial supremacy, but rather Congress’s ability to make and enforce national constitutional commitments. Congressional checks on the Supreme Court are also very different from the calls for “nullification” by slaveholders before the Civil War, their descendants during the civil-rights movement, and Texas legislators today. The Civil War itself resolved that the representatives of states must enforce their constitutional interpretations not by defying the government created by the Constitution but by participating in it. For the past two centuries, Congress has been the branch of the federal government where our democracy’s pursuit of equal justice under law has most often been realized. The question is not whether some commitments—abolition, reproductive freedom, racial equality—are worth making supreme and constitutive of a national American identity. Rather, the question is who gets to decide the content of those commitments for all Americans: the 50 states, a five-justice majority, or our national legislature. If the Court is today eviscerating those very constitutional commitments through its case law, Congress should enact or amend federal statutes to advance a different understanding of a nation built on democratic justice. It should reshape the Court’s ability to intervene in these disputes, including by restricting the Court’s authority to set aside federal legislation. And it should conscript the Court in enforcing federal commitments when resistant state officials brazenly declare that the national government has no jurisdiction to protect Americans from their parochial rule. The thing stopping Congress from reversing each wrongheaded decision the Court issues this month therefore isn’t the Constitution. It’s our failure to demand more from our elected representatives. The promise of a genuinely multiracial democracy will fade if Americans are unwilling to embrace structural reforms that can make our policies and our politics more responsive to majority rule. How Congress allocates the power to interpret the Constitution should be at the heart of those reforms. We simply cannot build a better politics if we don’t reclaim the authority of Congress to resolve our most fundamental disagreements. Rather than allow a handful of us to define the Constitution’s meaning in a mystical ritual each June, the rest of us should define it with the hard, messy work of American politics year-round.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs TT Puerto Rico › Congress CP › 1nc

Court fails—they are institutionally coded to revoke minority rights AND are slow to change.

Rosenberg’08[Gerald N. Rosenberg is an American political science and law professor at the University of Chicago. A Phi Beta Kappa, Summa Cum Laude graduate of Dartmouth College, he holds an M.A. degree in Politics and Philosophy from Oxford University, a J.D. degree from the University of Michigan Law School and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University. He is also a member of the Washington, D.C. bar.]Gerald N. Rosenberg The hollow hope : can courts bring about social change? University of Chicago Press. Retrieved July 18 2023 from http://www.myilibrary.com?id=196636&ref=toc./HZ

What is the role of U. S. courts in producing significant social reform? When and under what conditions will U.S. courts be effective producers of significant social reform? When does it make sense for individuals and groups pressing for such change to litigate? What kinds of effects from court victories can they expect? Which view best captures the reality of American politics? Given the alleged success of the social reform litigation of the last four decades, and Americans' attachment to the Dynamic Court view, it is tempting to suggest that it always makes sense for groups to litigate. On the other hand, our attachment to the vision of the Constrained Court, as well as a knowledge of legal history, can suggest that courts can never be effective producers of significant social reform. But "always" and "never" are claims about frequency, not conditions. To fully understand the role of the courts in producing significant social reform, we must focus on the latter. Many scholars have turned their attention to the questions this litigation activity raises. However, their findings remain unconnected and not squarely centered on whether, and under what conditions, courts produce significant social reform. Some writing has focused on the determinants of winning court cases rather than on the effects of court decisions. Galanter (1974), for example, asks "why the 'haves' come out ahead" and suggests that the resources and experience available to established and on-going groups provide an advantage in litigation. Similarly, Handler (1978), while exploring outcomes as well as the resources available to litigants, stresses the latter too. While these and similar works provide interesting theories about winning cases, that is a different question from the effects courts have on political and social change. On the outcome side, there are numerous individual studies. Unfortunately, they tend to focus narrowly on a given issue and refrain from offering hypotheses about courts and change. 1 More self-consciously theoretical case studies have examined admittedly non-controversial areas (Rebell and Block 1982), the need for federal pressure to improve race relations (Hochschild 1984), or have suggested so many hypotheses (one hundred and thirty-five of them) as to be of little practical help (Wasby 1970, 246-66). Finally, the extensive law review literature on institutional reform either lacks evidence or focuses on individual cases with little or no attempt to generate hypotheses. 2 While much of this work is well done, it does not address the larger question. In the bulk of this chapter, I flesh out the two views. My aim is to make each view plausible, if not enticing. Then, critically examining evidence for their plausibility, I develop a set of constraints and conditions under which courts can produce significant social reform. These suggest that both views oversimplify court effectiveness. The view of courts as unable to produce significant social reform has a distinguished pedigree reaching back to the founders. Premised on the institutional structure of the American political system and the procedures and belief systems created by American law, it suggests that the conditions required for courts to produce significant social reform will seldom exist. Unpacked, the Constrained Court view maintains that courts will generally not be effective producers of significant social reform for three reasons: the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary's inability to develop appropriate policies and its lack of powers of implementation.