2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Economy DA – UTNIF – Starter Packet › 1NC › Shell- General- 1NC
Center on Budget Policy and Priorities, 5-1-2023, "Chart Book: Tracking the Recovery From the Pandemic Recession," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/tracking-the-recovery-from-the-pandemic-recession
The COVID-19 pandemic precipitated a devastatingly sharp contraction of economic activity and huge job losses in early 2020, as government restrictions and fear of the virus kept people at home and businesses shut. Workers in industries and occupations that paid low wages and required face-to-face encounters — disproportionately women, workers of color, workers without a bachelor’s degree, and foreign-born workers — were particularly affected, experiencing massive employment and earnings losses. Federal policymakers enacted substantial relief and recovery measures in 2020 and 2021 to support the economy and relieve hardship. These measures helped fuel an economic recovery beginning in May 2020 that made the deepest recession in the post-World War II era also the shortest. (According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the acknowledged arbiter of business-cycle dating, the contraction in economic activity marking the pandemic recession lasted only two months: March and April 2020.) The expansion in economic activity in the recovery proved to be stronger and faster than initial projections. These projections may have been colored by what happened in the Great Recession of 2007-2009, which at the time was by far the worst recession since the Great Depression and the recovery from which was disappointingly slow, with high unemployment lasting years after the economy began to grow. But the causes of and policy responses to the two recessions were quite different. In particular: A global financial crisis in 2008 turned what started out as a mild recession into the Great Recession, while a global public health crisis precipitated the pandemic recession. The recovery from the Great Recession was impeded by the lingering effects of a burst housing bubble and banking crisis on households’ income and wealth and on bank lending, which depressed growth in consumer spending and business investment. By contrast, the course of the pandemic economy was influenced by ebbs and flows in virus caseloads and the extent of voluntary and official lockdowns and social distancing measures to address the virus; when the health situation improved, business and consumer activity began to pick up quickly. Policymakers’ fiscal response to the Great Recession, notably the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the 2009 Recovery Act, was large for its time and effective at arresting an even sharper downturn. But it was neither large enough nor sustained long enough to promote a rapid recovery with stronger job growth. The response to the pandemic recession, including the CARES Act and three other measures in March and April 2020, a December 2020 package, and the 2021 American Rescue Plan, was much larger. This suggests that policymakers had learned key lessons from the Great Recession experience. The Federal Reserve took similar monetary policy steps in both recessions, cutting its target interest rate for monetary policy effectively to zero and implementing large-scale asset purchases (quantitative easing). Without sufficient help from fiscal measures, however, expansionary monetary policy was unsuccessful at stimulating a rapid recovery or raising the inflation rate to the Fed’s policy target of 2 percent following the Great Recession. In contrast, these policies paired with strong fiscal measures supported a much faster recovery from the pandemic recession. In the recovery from the Great Recession, the Fed’s expansionary monetary policy was consistent with achieving both of the Fed’s dual-mandate goals of high employment and stable prices, which required lowering unemployment and raising the inflation rate. Initially this also was true in the recovery from the pandemic recession. But the emergence of inflation in 2021 created a more challenging environment for monetary policy, requiring efforts to bring down inflation while maintaining high employment. The Fed reversed its expansionary monetary policy in March 2022 and began raising its short-term interest rate target and reducing its holdings of long-term assets (quantitative tightening). The Fed has stressed that it will take the steps necessary to keep higher inflation expectations from becoming entrenched. The economy has largely healed, and the groups that experienced the largest losses in the recession have recouped a substantial share of their losses. This chart book tracks the pandemic economy, looking at both the macroeconomics (economic growth, employment, wages, and prices) and how different demographic groups have fared. Overall, the policy response was strong and effective in promoting a rapid economic recovery. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the economy has largely healed, and the groups that experienced the largest losses in the recession have recouped a substantial share of their losses. The overall number of jobs rose above pre-pandemic levels in August 2022, but was still below what it likely would have been with normal job growth and no pandemic. Even amid strong job growth, challenges remain to achieving a full and equitable recovery and ongoing economic expansion, especially with the emergence of high inflation in 2021 and rapidly tightening monetary policy in 2022.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
Aff Answers › Perms › 2AC – Perm do Both
Carpenter and Hamilton 20 (Daniel Carpenter; Allie S. Freed Professor of Government and Director, Center for American Political Studies, Harvard University; Darrick Hamilton; Henry Cohen Professor of Economics and Urban Policy, The New School; “A Federal Job Guarantee: Anti-Poverty and Infrastructure Policy for a Better Future”; Scholars Strategy Network; 4/30/20; ) [DTD]
What would a federal job guarantee program look like? The program would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary and Department of Labor will be charged with working in conjunction with other agencies, and states and localities to identify an inventory of public infrastructure tasks and associated jobs. 1. Jobs to support state and local governments. State and local governments account for most of the government employment in the United States, and they comprise an important part of our federalist system. In a range of policy domains – public health, education and job training, infrastructure, health provision and conservation – it is state and local governments that have the legal authorities and historical capacities to act. Yet state governments also have the weakest capacity to respond to an economic crisis. First, state governments have nothing like the Federal Reserve to back their debt (this is one among several reasons that the Federal Reserve has recently been looking into mass purchases of municipal bonds). They cannot print money. Second, state governments lack the expansive revenue-generating capacity of the federal government. Beyond this, state governments have in recent decades constrained their powers with balanced budget amendments, while a number of states (Illinois and Connecticut are two examples) have badly underfunded pension systems, and still others have tethered their income to commodity (especially petroleum) sales, which are at historically low prices and whose price declines have damaged state revenues. Workers and some capital costs for projects at the local, county, or state levels can be funded in a way to provide regional full employment and infrastructure needs. The projects and areas with the greatest needs could be cued to receive the federal intervention sooner. The Department of Labor would work closely with local governments. Local and state governments would, in conjunction with community organizations, develop project proposals to address local infrastructure needs, similar to the local, state, and federal collaborations in the design of direct government employment programs of the New Deal. Localities are likely most aware of the infrastructure needs to offer the greatest benefit to their communities. In order to minimize inequality across states and reduce the burden of discrimination, the workers under this program would be federally employed but would be tasked or apportioned (perhaps by formula, to reduce near-term political discretion) to states according to their economic, public health, and infrastructure needs. Even if the work occurs at the state and local level, the federal government needs to step in to provide the jobs, and there are a range of tools it has to do so. The traditional tool consists of program-specific block grants that have been an important feature of American government since the New Deal and especially the Nixon era. The problem with these grants is that they often permit state and local officials to withhold important resources from populations in need, as occurred with so many states’ refusal to take Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act. Our proposal would build upon the strengths of grants by making the jobs available to states and local governments, but would address the inequality-related weakness of these programs by making the employees federal workers who, as such, are made available to state and local governments. In order to avoid potentially unconstitutional imposition of requirements upon state governments (which were declared unconstitutional in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)), the federal government could offer these jobs as an option, as it did with Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act. Another alternative is to allow state and localities to develop a bank of proposals for physical and human infrastructure from which a federal authority (operating under formulaic or discretionary procedures) can prioritize with regards to urgent and useful needs. The state and localities can even administer the program with federal oversight, however, the workers would be ultimately employed by the federal government, as opposed to state or local employees by way of a federal grant.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency Answers › 2AC – Fed Key – Leakage
Murphy 12 (Robert Murphy; Senior Fellow with the Mises Institute; “Carbon ‘Tax Swap’ Deals: A Review and Critique”; Institute for Energy Research; November 2012; ) [DTD]
4. Numerical Estimates of the Significance of Leakage Above we have laid out the theoretical problems with using estimates of the global SCC to calibrate a regional carbon tax. In this subsection we will provide some numerical estimates of the actual significance of this issue. Caron et al. (2012) analyzed the cap-and-trade program in the state of California. They summarized their results as follows: We estimate the impact of California’s cap-and-trade program on the leakage of emissions to other regions using a calibrated general equilibrium model. Sub-national policies can lead to high leakage rates as state economies are generally closely connected to other economies, including integration of electricity markets. Measures that will prevent leakage from California’s capand-trade program include requiring permits to be surrendered for emissions embodied in imported electricity and legislation banning “resource shuffling.” Under a cap-and-trade policy without measures to reduce leakage, the price of emission permits is $12 per ton of CO2 and emissions in other regions increase by 46% of the reduction in emissions in California. When imported electricity is included in the program and resource shuffling is banned, the carbon price is $65, there is negative leakage to regions exporting electricity to California, positive leakage to other regions and the overall leakage rate is 2%. We conclude that although there is potential for large increases in emissions elsewhere due to California’s cap-and-trade policy, enforcement of requirements for imported electricity will be effective at curtailing leakage. (Caron et al. 2012, emphasis added) Free-market conservatives who have applauded a revenue-neutral carbon tax should take note of the passages we have highlighted in the excerpt above. In the absence of other restrictions on commerce, a simple implementation of a cap-and-trade program in California—which does not set a marginal penalty on carbon emissions, but instead caps the total amount of permissible emissions in the state—would lead to an emission price ($12/ton) below what many analysts believe is the global social cost of carbon (SCC). The explanation for this result is that faced with higher costs of operation and with no other regulations on their activities, electricity providers in California would simply curtail production in-state, and turn to importing (cheaper) electricity produced in other U.S. states where California’s cap-and-trade program did not apply. This mechanism explains why 46 percent of the drop in California emissions would be offset by increased emissions in other regions. Thus, we see that Bauman and Hsu’s casual description of British Columbia’s $30 carbon tax as “the best climate policy in the world” was quite dubious, even on their own terms. Yet the excerpt from Caron et al. is even more revealing. Precisely because of this problem of leakage, the authors of this study were not content to consider merely a cap-and-trade program. Instead, they modeled the effects of the California state government imposing more regulations on the energy sector, namely, placing a tariff on electricity imported from outside the state and banning “resource shuffling.” By introducing these additional, top-down interventions in the economy, the authors were able to bolster the potency of a state-level cap-and-trade program, because now—by cracking down on “leakage” so that it is only 2 percent—they found the price of permits rising from $12 to $65/ton, a more than fivefold increase. As this example illustrates, free-market conservatives should be aware that, even on theoretical grounds, the so-called “market solutions” of a carbon tax or capand-trade program may not address the problems of climate change in the eyes of those most alarmed, making command-and-control regulations necessary to contain unintended consequences. Naturally, the estimates of leakage emanating from national carbon policies are lower than those associated with subnational policies. Caron and his co-authors themselves summarized the literature by reporting that “[g]eneral equilibrium assessments of leakage from federal policies commonly estimate leakage rates between 10% and 30%” (Caron et al. 2012, p. 2). Distinguished economist William Nordhaus, one of the pioneers of the economics of climate change—and himself a vocal proponent of carbon taxes—provided his own analysis of the importance of a worldwide policy: Our modeling results point to the importance of near-universal participation in programs to reduce greenhouse gases. Because of the structure of the costs of abatement, with marginal costs being very low for the initial reductions but rising sharply for higher reductions, there are substantial excess costs if the preponderance of sectors and countries are not fully included. We preliminarily estimate that a participation rate of 50 percent, as compared to 100 percent, will impose an abatement-cost penalty of 250 percent. Even with the participation of the top 15 countries and regions, consisting of three-quarters of world emissions, we estimate that the cost penalty is about 70 percent. (Nordhaus 2008, p. 19, emphasis added)
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency Answers › 2AC – Fed Key – Leakage
Xu and Hobbs 21 (Qingyu Xu; Postdoctoral Research Associate at High Meadows Environmental Institute in the Andlinger Center for Energy and Environment Department; Benjamin Hobbs; the Theodore M. and Kay W. Schad Professor of Environmental Management at John Hopkins Whiting School of Engineering; “Economic efficiency of alternative border carbon adjustment schemes: A case study of California Carbon Pricing and the Western North American power market”; Science Direct; Energy Policy; vol 156; 7/13/21; ) [DTD]
5. Conclusions and policy implications Carbon pricing is widely regarded as the most cost-efficient and theoretically attractive approach to cut carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector. However, carbon leakage, owing to the homogeneity of electricity and the limited geographical coverage of carbon pricing when implemented by a local jurisdiction, can substantially weaken the effectiveness of local carbon pricing when the jurisdiction is embedded in a larger regional power market. If implemented carefully with effective policies to assign emissions to imports, border carbon adjustments (BCA) can be a remedy that mitigates carbon leakage and improves the economic efficiency of local carbon pricing. BCA policies based on ineffective deemed emission rates for imports, however, can provide little incentive to reduce emissions outside the regulated jurisdiction, and can even worsen costs and emissions (e.g., through contract shuffling). Thus, the performance of BCA in power systems is greatly undermined, and new ways to set the deemed emission rate (or default emission rate) for electricity imports are warranted. This paper explores the potential cost and emission impacts of different BCA schemes that could possibly be implemented in the California carbon pricing program, a local carbon pricing policy in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council of North America. Our simulation shows that the impacts of California carbon pricing and potential BCAs on the western North American power market have multiple aspects. Based on estimates from a generation and transmission investment and operations model for the year 2034, we find that if there is a California carbon price but no BCA, then California emissions decrease. However, the rest-of-system's emissions increase in compensation, perhaps by even more than the California reduction. The emission leakage is largely due to a shift from gas-fired power from existing gas power plants of California to those in the rest of the system. More incentives for interstate transmission development will result because of the California carbon price, and this effect is not limited to the California boundary. Under the assumptions of our case study, local carbon pricing would raise both the cost to California consumers and the cost to the system in total without lowering emissions, and, consequently, California carbon pricing without BCA is ineffective and costly.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
Aff Answers › Solvency Answers › 2AC – Fed Key - Generic
1NC Morris et al 16 (Adele Morris, former Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director for Climate and Energy Economics at the Brookings Institution; Yoram Bauman; holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Washington; David Bookbinder; former Chief Counsel at Niskanen Center; “What to consider when designing a state-level carbon tax”; Brookings Institution; 6/26/16; ) [DTD]
To be sure, this hardly lays out an economically ideal approach to the mitigation of global climatic disruption. While far better than nothing, even a reasonably coordinated collection of state and provincial carbon pricing policies, in part derived from a patchwork of federal regulations and supplemented by a collage of other federal and sub-national policies, would create inefficiently disparate abatement incentives across sources, gases, sectors, and jurisdictions. Relying on state action also complicates international negotiations around both emissions targets and carbon prices. For example, it is difficult for the U.S. State Department to make a strong case to other countries that the United States will achieve a particular emissions goal by a certain date if the policies to attain it are directed by state actors over which the federal government has little control. Arguably, a more comprehensive approach, across and within major economies, will prove indispensable to achieve ambitious GHG stabilization targets at reasonable cost. But in the absence of new federal legislation in the United States, this scenario of state and provincial coordination is about as good as it could get. 50
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › AT: Perms › 2NC – AT: Perm do Both
Cross and Welton 21 (Jesse Cross; Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Shelly Welton; Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; “Making Federalism Work: Lessons from Health Care to the Green New Deal”; Scholar Commons; University of South Carolina Law School; pp. 765-826; 2021; ) [DTD] GND = Green New Deal
To navigate the entrenched cooperative federalist structures that pervade U.S. energy and environmental law, 209 and which are now complicated by many "uncooperative" states,210 attention must be devoted to how to map the GND's substantive priorities onto the structure of the modern administrative state. Today, U.S. energy and environmental law are both deeply federalist in their structures. In environmental law, "cooperative federalism" predominates,211 in which the federal government sets certain minimum standards for environmental quality and then allows states flexibility in planning for how to meet those standards. 212 In energy law, the other body of U.S. law central to efforts at rapid decarbonization, 213 jurisdiction is less cooperative, but also shared.214 The Federal Power Act ("FPA"), which has structured relations between the federal and state governments in the field of electricity since 1935, gives the federal government control over the pricing of interstate, wholesale electricity sales and interstate transmission lines, but leaves to states control over the retail electricity sector (that is, utility sales of electricity to end-use consumers) and over electricity generation. 215 Similarly, laws about infrastructure siting give states considerable authority over where and when to approve new transmission lines, oil pipelines, and electric generation facilities.216 Many states have used their authority under the FPA to respond aggressively to climate change, filling the federal climate change policy lacuna with a range of state-level policies. 217 A growing number of states now have laws that require decarbonization of the electricity sector on the same aggressive scale contemplated by the GND. 218 However, other states remain intransigent on climate, or continue to take steps in the wrong direction-such as Ohio's July 2019 legislation actively promoting coal.219 All to say, hyperpartisanship persists in state climate politics, much as it does in health care. One central challenge confronting the architects of the GND will be how to structure a successful program that takes advantage of these longstanding federalism arrangements, without succumbing to their weaknesses. 220 On these questions, we believe the ACA offers substantial lessons regarding whether and how-in our contemporary, hyperpartisan times-to effectively build states into major federal social justice legislation. 221 B. Applying the Lessons 1. Federal Funding There are good reasons-perhaps political above all else-that the GND might choose to use conditional funding to induce states to achieve certain priorities, including affordable housing, clean energy infrastructure development, job creation, and living wages. Yet, just as in the health care context, there are real costs to such arrangements for a program centered on tackling inequality as a core mission. The same states that would likely prove non-cooperative even in the face of overwhelmingly rational incentives are the ones where low-income communities and communities of color may most need assistance. 222
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – AT: No Funding
Morris et al 16 (Adele Morris, former Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director for Climate and Energy Economics at the Brookings Institution; Yoram Bauman; holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Washington; David Bookbinder; former Chief Counsel at Niskanen Center; “What to consider when designing a state-level carbon tax”; Brookings Institution; 6/26/16; ) [DTD] *table omitted
2. REVENUE The states that have begun pricing carbon through cap-and-trade programs have so far used allowance auction revenue primarily for environmental goals. For example, California’s aforementioned AB 32 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) for power sector emissions in nine northeastern states both earmark allowance auction revenue for environment-related purposes.11 A study of the cumulative $1.4 billion in RGGI auction proceeds from 2008 to 2013 reports that the large majority of the revenue went to energy efficiency programs, energy bill assistance, and other GHG abatement activities.12 However, some RGGI states have shown interest in using the revenue for non-environmental purposes. For example, in 2010, New York used half of its revenue and New Jersey used all of its RGGI funds (prior to departing from the program the following year) to balance their budgets. A state-level carbon tax, particularly if set above the price signals operating in existing cap-and-trade programs and applied economy-wide, could raise enough revenue in many states to play a substantial fiscal role.13 How much revenue? Table 1 below shows the 2013 energy-related CO2 emissions by state in tons as reported by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA). 14 The table provides an illustrative estimate of the potential revenue in each state, both in millions of dollars and as a share of state GDP in 2013, by multiplying each state’s fossil fuel CO2 emissions inventory by a hypothetical tax of $20 per ton of CO2. 15 Of course, the actual revenue in any state would depend on details of the tax base, the tax rate, how emissions respond to the price signal, and the policy and macroeconomic shifts that could lower revenues from other tax instruments. But this estimate at least indicates the order of magnitude of revenues available should policymakers wish to consider a carbon tax option. Table 1 shows that some jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia and Vermont, would raise relatively little revenue from a carbon tax. That is generally because they either have no power plants within their borders or because they already have low-carbon electricity sectors, for example by relying mainly on hydropower. Other states, such as Wyoming and West Virginia, could raise over two percent of their state GDP from a $20 per ton tax on fossil energy-related CO2 emissions.17 Two percent of GDP is significant for a state tax; nationally, on average states collect only about five percent of GDP from their own revenue instruments, including sales, property, income, and business taxes (not counting transfers from the federal government).18 Forecasting revenue from the carbon fee involves multiplying the scheduled tax rates by a forecast of emissions subject to the tax. Revenues will depend on fluctuating demand for fossil energy, for example owing to weather and economic conditions, along with the responsiveness of fossil energy demand to the carbon price. These factors will vary significantly by state, depending on the existing energy mix, emissions patterns, and economic activity. Despite the uncertainties in forecasting carbon tax revenues, states may find that carbon fees are less volatile than other state revenue sources.19 For example, one major challenge that California faces is the pro-cyclical nature of its revenue stream; revenues fall just as economic activity falls and demands on social safety net programs rise. A recent study concluded that there are several factors behind California's relatively high degree of revenue volatility, notably “the extraordinary boom and bust in stock market-related revenues from stock options and capital gains.”20 Replacing or supplementing volatile sources of revenue (such as taxes on capital gains and corporate income) with a carbon tax would help stabilize state finances and avoid a boom-and-bust cycle of funding for programs like schools and social welfare programs. We return to the issue of revenue use in Section 4 below. The revenues from a carbon tax are subject to a (desirable) erosion of the tax base, particularly over the long run as capital in long-lived power plants and other industrial facilities turns over. States with relatively high coal use in their electricity sectors are likely to experience more emissions abatement than states in which relatively more emissions reductions need to come from transportation. If states adopt tax rates that rise in real terms, the rising rate can more than counteract the decline in the tax base. In that case, it could take decades before states need worry about declining carbon tax revenues.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Carbon Tax
Morris and Weber 15 (Adele Morris; former Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director for Climate and Energy Economics at the Brookings Institution; Evan Weber; “To comply with the Clean Power Plan, states should tax carbon”; Brookings Institution; 9/2/15; ) [DTD]
Two years ago, with meaningful legislation to reduce climate-disrupting greenhouse gas pollution stalled, President Obama instructed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin regulating emissions from our nation’s largest source: electric power plants. Under its Clean Air Act authority, the EPA recently released a final rule that sets state-specific emissions limits for 2030 and outlines ways states can achieve their targets. One of these options, as EPA has now clarified, is “a fee for CO2 emissions from affected [Electricity Generating Units]”—or more simply, a carbon tax. For many states, a carbon tax could be the most easily administrable and cost-effective compliance approach, and they should start taking the idea seriously. Since the release of the final rule, much attention has been given to how states can trade emissions allowances across borders to reach goals jointly, allowing more abatement where costs are lowest. The requirements for these complicated schemes occupy hundreds of pages of the rule, while EPA devotes only one sentence (in the preamble) to the potentially equally cost-minimizing carbon tax approach. The agency clearly prefers cap-and-trade over other options, as evidenced by the detail in the rule and EPA’s accompanying proposed federal plan for states who do not submit an acceptable (or any) implementation plan. However, another factor accounts for EPA’s apparent short shrift for a tax approach: the concept is remarkably simple to understand—one-sentence simple—and just as easy to administer. By gradually increasing the cost of emitting greenhouse gases from coal- and natural gas-fired power plants by charging a per-ton fee for the CO2 emissions the plants already monitor, states could both reduce electricity demand from fossil fuel sources and level the playing field for zero-emissions alternatives like wind and solar. States already know how to implement such a tax; every state already taxes fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and natural gas. A state would just need to show, by modeling (the kind EPA already does), that its proposed carbon tax trajectory will hit its Clean Power Plan target and be prepared to adjust it or take other actions if emissions are off course. This simplicity can provide real economic and environmental benefits. British Columbia, the first government in North America to implement a straight-up carbon tax, reduced its emissions 7.1 times faster than analysts expected, in part because the transparent and predictable price signal allowed business and consumers to invest efficiently and with foresight. A new paper from the Brookings Institution shows that a carbon tax has a slight efficiency edge over tradable performance standards. And, unlike trading schemes, a carbon tax won’t transfer ratepayer dollars from one state to utilities in other states. The benefits of a carbon tax, state or federal, will depend heavily on how the revenue is used. States could use the revenue any way they wish, including giving dividends to households or swapping out other taxes. Studies show that the most cost-effective policy would lower (or prevent increasing) other taxes that discourage working, investing, and saving. States could also use revenue to protect low-income households from energy cost increases, assist coal workers in the energy transition, fund climate adaptation, repair infrastructure, reduce budget shortfalls, or pursue other goals. Importantly, states that adopt a carbon tax can demonstrate the policy’s viability and inform both federal and international efforts. The Clean Power Plan, assuming it survives the inevitable litigation, addresses just one sector in one country through 2030. To stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, stronger and more coherent and transformative legislation, carefully leveraged to achieve ambitious action abroad, will be essential, and economists agree that pricing carbon is a core strategy. Already there are campaigns underway to put a price tag on climate pollution in Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Vermont; the approach would be even better-suited to states like Illinois, who need to make significant greenhouse gas reductions and have unfunded liabilities. State innovations have led to some of the biggest federal policy changes in our nation. By allowing states to pursue fees on carbon, the Clean Power Plan opens the door for states to lead once again.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Carbon Tax
Morris et al 16 (Adele Morris, former Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director for Climate and Energy Economics at the Brookings Institution; Yoram Bauman; holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Washington; David Bookbinder; former Chief Counsel at Niskanen Center; “What to consider when designing a state-level carbon tax”; Brookings Institution; 6/26/16; ) [DTD]
Harmonizing policies across jurisdictions Harmonizing carbon price policies across states (and perhaps federal or sub-federal jurisdictions in Canada, Mexico, and elsewhere) would simplify compliance for large firms, allow more upstream taxation, and help avoid driving investment and emitting activities to other jurisdictions, a phenomenon known as leakage. Formal linking, such as with a cap-and-trade system is one way to do this, but it is certainly not the only approach. Coordinating institutions can offer model tax legislation, analytical resources, and other tools that that could help states develop their policies and promote common policy design elements, such as points of taxation, carbon price trajectories, treatment of imported and exported fuels and electricity, and other approaches that would facilitate trade and reduce investment distortions. This work could also include states and provinces with cap-and-trade programs. For example, they could harmonize their floor prices on allowance auctions with tax levels in other jurisdictions. Precedents for this kind of cooperation include the IFTA fuel tax arrangement discussed earlier. In addition, the Multistate Tax Commission advises states on the adoption of uniform tax policies to simplify the tax code and ease the burden on interstate commerce. These discussions could extend to the context of carbon tax design. 49
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Jobs Guarantee
Sierra Club no date (Sierra Club; “A Green New Deal Is Already Underway in States and Cities”; ) [DTD]
Momentum for a Green New Deal continues to grow. Over 100 members of Congress have endorsed the landmark Green New Deal resolution and polls show broad support for this bold plan to tackle the climate crisis and pollution, create millions of high-paying jobs, and counteract systemic injustices. The policy changes envisioned in the Green New Deal resolution are not hypothetical. In fact, many are already happening at the state and local level, where broad local coalitions of labor, environmental, and racial justice groups are winning pro-climate, pro-jobs, pro-equity policies that help lay the groundwork for a national Green New Deal. In addition to more than 100 cities nationwide that have already committed to 100 percent clean, renewable energy, here are just a few examples of state and city initiatives that offer models and momentum for a nationwide Green New Deal. NEW YORK CITY The New York City Council recently passed a job-creating bill that takes aim at the city's largest source of climate pollution: inefficient buildings. The new policy, cited as part of the city's own Green New Deal, will require about 50,000 large buildings to meet ambitious targets for reducing climate pollution. The building retrofits required by the policy are expected to create about 8,000 jobs each year. To protect low-income residents, the policy includes terms to prevent rent increases in rent-regulated buildings. MAINE Maine recently enacted a new "Act To Establish a Green New Deal for Maine." The law will create a task force of labor, youth, climate science, and other representatives to craft a strategy for achieving 80% renewable energy in Maine by 2040, creating good jobs in renewable energy and manufacturing, and ensuring low-income households have access to affordable solar power. The Maine AFL-CIO has praised the policy, saying that workers must "have a seat at the table in crafting bold climate protection policies." LOS ANGELES In April 2019, Los Angeles Mayor Garcetti released an update to the Sustainable City pLAn, calling it "L.A.'s Green New Deal." The plan lays out the most ambitious and achievable climate goals for the city to date. It would invest in L.A.'s local workforce and economy by creating good union jobs for thousands of technicians, electricians, engineers, and other clean energy workers. Critically, the plan tackles the ongoing poor air quality that Los Angeles and other Southern California communities continue to breathe as the worst region for smog pollution in the country. ILLINOIS The Future Energy Jobs Act gives low-income families priority access to solar panels, while providing solar-installation job training, particularly for formerly incarcerated people and communities fighting environmental injustice. The law also sets new energy-efficiency standards that are slated to further reduce air and climate pollution, create over 7,000 new jobs each year to retrofit buildings, and cut $4 billion in energy costs for Illinois families. CALIFORNIA In addition to committing to 100 percent clean energy by 2045, California’s Buy Clean policy helps stimulate clean manufacturing by requiring that tax dollars be spent on goods manufactured under conditions that protect our climate. The law will help ensure that when the state government buys steel for bridges or glass for offices, it sends tax dollars to manufacturers that are slashing their climate pollution and creating good jobs. NEW MEXICO New Mexico has enacted a historic law to transition to 100 percent carbon-free electricity by 2045. The bill sets interim milestones for clean energy adoption and invests heavily in NM communities, accounting for retiring an existing coal-fired generating plant while pursuing a just and equitable transition to a clean energy future for NM workers and families. PORTLAND In 2018, after a grassroots campaign led by communities of color, voters in Portland overwhelmingly approved a ballot referendum that will raise $30-70 million per year, via a fee on big retailer profits, for energy efficiency, renewable energy, job training, affordable housing, regenerative agriculture, and green infrastructure projects. A new task force of city stakeholders will be tasked with deciding annually the beneficiaries of the fund, with at least half of the revenue going toward investments in low income communities and communities of color. SEATTLE In August 2019, the Seattle city council unanimously passed a resolution calling for a city-level Green New Deal, which seeks to eliminate Seattle’s climate pollution by 2030, address historical and current injustices, and create thousands of good, green, well-paying, unionized jobs. The effort is being led by local environmental justice organizations and frontline communities of color, and includes a "Healthy Homes, Healthy Businesses" ordinance that would require new buildings in the city to run on clean electricity rather than gas appliances. PITTSBURGH Pittsburgh United's Clean Rivers Campaign has been pushing for job-creating green infrastructure projects that could drastically reduce flooding in some of the city’s vulnerable neighborhoods. They are one of many local coalitions across the country calling for, and often securing, public investments in green spaces to absorb rainwater, replacement of lead pipes, and other infrastructure upgrades to increase climate resilience and ensure clean water. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA The Clean Energy DC Omnibus Act of 2018 requires DC to transition to 100 percent clean, renewable electricity sources by 2032. It also sets stronger, job-creating building performance standards to reduce energy use and make buildings more energy efficient and requires buses and large private vehicle fleets to transition away from dirty fuel and toward electric vehicles.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Jobs Guarantee
Reese 19 (Isaac Reese; “Explainer: Why the Green New Deal Doesn’t Need Congress”; United States Studies Centre; 6/20/19; ) [DTD]
STATES GO IT ALONE US cities and states are adopting elements of the Green New Deal’s framework to address local needs. These local adaptations of the Green New Deal are becoming building blocks in accomplishing its establishment nationwide. For example, Maine’s version of the Green New Deal is the first to be backed by multiple major labour unions – an important ally in infrastructure reform. Meanwhile, the national Green New Deal has only recently gained the support of one labour union. The Illinois Green New Deal focuses on the environmental justice bill while at the national level there has been criticism for including it. Legislators in Washington encompassed utilities in the passage of its Green New Deal, which often are ignored in the climate change discussion regarding the transition of renewables. Grassroots activism has allowed these states to bring this legislation forward. None more apparent than in Minnesota. It’s Green New Deal, which has been youth-led, pulls from many aspects of the federal Green New Deal, but most significantly aims to transition Minnesota’s utilities to be 100 per cent carbon-free by 2030. Washington is the only state to pass its bill while the others are still in the process. It should be noted that Maine, Illinois and Washington’s legislative branches are Democrat-controlled, but Minnesota’s senate is Republican-controlled and its House of Representatives is Democrat-controlled. Some states have been building towards something akin to a Green New Deal long before the debate came to Capitol Hill. For example, California has been leading the nation on what sustainable, environmentally-minded reform looks like, and how possible it is to strive for, even without national direction. Although California’s climate and renewable energy policies are not labelled as a ‘Green New Deal’, they seek to accomplish many of the same core aims. SOWING THE SEEDS OF A GREEN NEW DEAL The Trump administration will likely never implement something akin to a Green New Deal. That doesn’t mean its death, however. The US federal system allows states to move in a different direction to the White House and this is a case where there is strong evidence that they could. As momentum builds and states continue to adopt and strengthen legislation with the Green New Deal in mind, the foundation for a national framework will be built incrementally. The Green New Deal is feasible and possible. Municipalities and states around the United States are already making it happen.
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › 1NC › 1NC – States CP
Morris et al 16 (Adele Morris, former Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director for Climate and Energy Economics at the Brookings Institution; Yoram Bauman; holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Washington; David Bookbinder; former Chief Counsel at Niskanen Center; “What to consider when designing a state-level carbon tax”; Brookings Institution; 6/26/16; ) [DTD]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Pricing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) would address the market failure inherent in an economy that doesn’t price damaging emissions. Much has been written about the design of a federal-level carbon tax. This paper adapts these findings to the state level, motivated by pending federal regulations (which place implementation obligations on states), policy discussions in states with commitments to ambitious long-term emissions targets, and state budget shortfalls that could necessitate new revenue. Notwithstanding the myriad political impediments to a carbon tax, this paper explains how state policymakers can design one to fit their fiscal, economic, distributional, and environmental goals. A state-level carbon tax, particularly if set above prevailing emissions allowance prices in state cap-and-trade programs and applied economy-wide, could raise enough revenue in many states to play a substantial fiscal role; a $20 per ton tax on energy-related CO2 emissions could raise up to two or three percent of state GDP in the most emissions-intensive states. That is significant for a state tax; nationally, on average states collect only about five percent of GDP total from their own revenue instruments, including sales, property, income, and business taxes. A tax that rises at an annual rate above inflation should produce a reliable revenue source for decades even while it reduces emissions. States face many choices, including the sectors and sources of GHGs to cover, the point in the supply chain of fossil fuels at which to impose the tax, and other policy design elements. Importantly, the point of taxation is largely independent of who actually bears the economic burden of the tax because upstream producers or distributors will pass their costs along to those who buy their products. Thus states can choose a point of taxation that maximizes coverage, minimizes the number of taxpayers, and/or or coincides with existing state or federal tax or GHG reporting obligations. This paper reviews those and a host of other options regarding: • the tax treatment of carbon embodied in fuels, electricity, and goods that are imported or exported from the state; • tradeoffs arising across addressing the disproportionate burdens on low-income households and using the revenue in ways that promote economic growth; • how states can harmonize policies to avoid distortions in investment and trade; and • how a carbon tax can feature in state implementation plans for the Clean Power Plan and EPA rules under the Clean Air Act
2023
UTNIF
Counterplan
States CP – UTNIF – Starter Packet › 1NC › 1NC – States CP
Newman 21 (Nathan Newman; Criminal Justice and Sociology Professor at CUNY; “Reset Labor Markets With a Local Half-Time Job Guarantee”; The Nation; 9/21/21; ) [DTD]
Such local job guarantee programs would build on federal proposals in recent years by Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, proponents of the Green New Deal, and policy centers like the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Center for American Progress, and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College—all pushing federal programs to ensure that anyone wanting a job is guaranteed one by the government. While no federal job guarantee program looks likely to be approved in the current congressional session, the federal dollars flowing to states and local governments from the American Rescue Plan Act and Biden’s projected “Build Back Better” program create an opportunity for some states and local governments to pilot local versions that could be models for a future federal policy. Such federal funding will help offset the substantial initial costs of a job guarantee program—which in time, as multiple studies of job investment programs show, will substantially offset those initial costs. By raising the long-term income of participants, a job guarantee will stimulate the overall economy and increases local tax revenues. Higher job participation also tends to reduce other government spending, by improving school outcomes of participants’ children and reducing criminal justice costs. Beyond supporting participants themselves, a key goal of a job guarantee is to expand overall worker power in the economy to demand higher wages. Reducing the desperation of the unemployed will strengthen individual and collective bargaining in all local industries; the resulting higher wages and consumption in turn will stimulate local economies and tax revenue.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
AT: Off-Case Arguments › Politics DA › 2AC – Politics – Plan Popular
Bergquist et al 20, Parrish Bergquist, Matto Mildenberger and Leah C Stokes, “Combining climate, economic, and social policy builds public support for climate action in the US”, Environmental Research Letters (May 12, 2020).
Overall, our results emphasize that including social and economic programs expands support for climate policies. While we do find heterogeneity in support—particularly as a function of partisanship– the net effect is positive. We also find that climate policy support is strongest among African Americans when social policies are included, but that Hispanic and non-Hispanic Whites are also broadly supportive of these programs. While the presence of a carbon tax increases Democratic support for policy packages, the way that tax revenues are used not have a marginal impact on overall support. While some have argued that a revenue-neutral carbon tax might garner more support among Republicans than other carbon tax designs, we do not find evidence for this claim.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
AT: Off-Case Arguments › Cap and Trade CP › 2AC – Perm do Both
Li and Jia 16 (Wei Li, Zhije Jia, 3-15-2016, "Carbon tax, emission trading, or the mixed policy: which is the most effective strategy for climate change mitigation in China?," SpringerLink, ) EXCERPT: Abstract
China, as the world’s largest emitter, intends to achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early to mitigate global change. Under this strategy, a dynamic, recursive computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to analyze the economy, energy, and environment impact of CO2 emission reduction policy based on 17 scenarios in China: carbon tax, emission trading scheme (ETS), and the mixed policy in different price level, in order to find out which kind of emission reduction strategy is more feasible. The results show that CO2 emission in 2030 will be reduced with the implementation of tax, ETS and mixed policy, by 10–13 %, 12–14 %, and 18–28 %, respectively. From 2016 to 2030, China can reduce 18,338–24,156 Mt CO2 through the implementation of mixed policy. Furthermore, relative to single policy, mixed policy has stronger effects on primary energy consumption cut, by 738–1124 Mtoe or 18–28 %, which will make CO2 emissions reach a peak before 2030 and the peak emission is not greater than 12 billion tons which is in line with the reduction demand in China. Thus, the mixed policy is the most effective strategy so that mixed policy is recommended to parties included in Annex I in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol and other countries with large potential of emission reduction, while ETS is suggested to countries with low carbon emissions per capita which can balance economic development and CO2 mitigation.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
AT: Off-Case Arguments › Cap and Trade CP › 1AR – Solvency Deficits
Yonah et al 9 (Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., and David M. Uhlmann. "Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade." Stanford Environmental Law Journal, vol. 28, no. 1, 2009, pp. 3-50. HeinOnline, ) EXCERPT: IV Conclusion
The global climate change crisis will not be resolved simply by implementing a carbon tax or a cap and trade system-or by any other legislative approach. Fundamental changes in energy production, development, and conservation, as well as changes in transportation, land use, and natural resource policies, must be pursued alongside efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. An effective carbon mitigation strategy, however, will be the centerpiece of any successful program to combat global climate change. While the widespread embrace of cap and trade is a positive development after decades of inaction, before we move forward we should pause to consider whether a cap and trade system is the best approach to combating global climate change. This Article demonstrates that a better response to global climate change would be a carbon tax that is adjusted over time to achieve the necessary reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the corresponding improvements in alternative energy sources and land and resource management practices that are essential to conserving our planet for future generations.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
AT: Off-Case Arguments › Cap and Trade CP › 2AC – Solvency Deficits
Yonah et al 9 (Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., and David M. Uhlmann. "Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade." Stanford Environmental Law Journal, vol. 28, no. 1, 2009, pp. 3-50. HeinOnline, ) EXCERPT: Introduction (p. 4-8)
Global climate change is the most significant environmental issue facing our nation and the world. There no longer is any question that global warming is occurring. Nor is there any serious debate about whether human activity is the root cause. If we fail to make significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over the next ten to twenty years, we face the possibility of catastrophic environmental harm by the end of this century. The leading proposal in the United States and abroad for addressing global climate change is some form of market-based cap and trade system. During the 2008 presidential campaign, both major party candidates supported cap and trade. Many of the mainstream environmental groups advocate cap and trade and, in an unusual alliance, their position is shared by many industry groups. A cap and trade system therefore is likely to be the focal point of domestic legislation during the Obama Administration and whatever international agreement follows the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. The popularity of a cap and trade system may reflect the fact that cap and trade offers something for everyone. For environmentalists, cap and trade promises a declining cap on the carbon dioxide emissions that are the principal cause of global warming. For industry groups, cap and trade offers the possibility of a new market in carbon allowances and therefore the potential for significant income for companies who can inexpensively reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. For economists, cap and trade allows the market to take into account externalities as it determines the price of carbon. For politicians, cap and trade offers the opportunity to take action to combat global warming without implementation of a complex regulatory permitting scheme or imposition of a tax on fossil fuels. The global climate change crisis calls for innovation from industry to meet the challenge of carbon dioxide emissions reductions and promote the development of alternative energy sources. It is essential that the United States and the world take strong and decisive action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A cap and trade system offers the benefit of increasing limits on carbon dioxide emissions and, at least theoretically, a flexible approach that allows the market to select the most efficient and innovative carbon dioxide reduction techniques and thus lower the cost of any required carbon dioxide emission reductions.3 The popular and intellectual appeal of a cap and trade system, however, obscures a number of practical considerations that, at a minimum, counsel against cap and trade as the leading edge of domestic efforts to combat climate change. First, even if Congress passed cap and trade legislation early in the Obama Administration, it would be years before a cap and trade system would become operational, because of the inherent delays of the rulemaking process (including the likelihood of litigation over whatever regulatory system is adopted). Second, the effectiveness of a cap and trade system could be undermined by the challenges of setting baselines for emission reduction targets, the free distribution of allowances, and the use of offsets in lieu of meaningful emission reduction measures. Third, while a cap and trade system promises fixed reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, the tradeoff is uncertainty about the price of those reductions. If the price of carbon rises too high, there will be political pressure to relax the carbon cap, thus removing the primary benefit of a cap and trade system. Moreover, an international environmental crisis is not the best time to experiment with a largely untested emissions control system on a global scale. It is far from clear that a cap and trade system for carbon dioxide emissions will work on a national and international level. While the United States utilized a cap and trade system to reduce acid rain in the 1990s,4 we have never used cap and trade to address an emissions problem that involves such a wide variety of sources, nor do we have experience with a global cap and trade system. A more efficient and effective market-based approach to reduce carbon dioxide emissions would be a carbon tax imposed on all coal, natural gis, and oil produced domestically or imported into the United States. A carbon tax would enable the market to account for the societal costs of carbon dioxide emissions and thereby promote emission reductions, just like a cap and trade system. A carbon tax would be easier to implement and enforce, however, and simpler to adjust if the resulting market-based changes were either too weak or too strong. A carbon tax also would produce revenue that could be used to fund research and development of alternative energy and tax credits to offset any regressive effects of the carbon tax. Because a carbon tax could be implemented and become effective almost immediately, it would be a much quicker method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions than a cap and trade system. In addition, because a carbon tax could be effective in advance of any international treaty regarding greenhouse gas emissions, a carbon tax would provide the United States much needed credibility in the negotiations over international carbon dioxide limits. A carbon tax could then supplement an international cap and trade system, combine with emission caps in an international hybrid "cap and tax" approach, or become the focal point for the next international treaty to address global climate change. A carbon tax carries its own practical limitations, perhaps the most significant of which is the challenge of enacting tax legislation in the United States. Those political considerations may be compounded by instability in energy prices (which peaked at over $140 per barrel during the summer of 2008, only to fall below $50 per barrel by November 2008) and economic concerns created by the global credit crisis during the fall of 2008. A cap and trade system may be more viable politically, because it is not labeled a tax nor is it as transparent about its effect on energy prices. The political advantages of cap and trade may be more illusory than real, however, since opponents of climate change legislation will argue that either approach would increase energy costs and further damage an already weakened economy.' Moreover, while climate change legislation will be difficult to enact during a possible recession, the climate change crisis will worsen and become more costly to address if Congress fails to enact limits on greenhouse gas emissions early in the Obama Administration.' Part I of this Article reviews the global climate change crisis and the inadequacy of historical efforts to combat global warming. This overview demonstrates the need for strong and immediate action to address climate change after such a long history of relative inaction, particularly in the United States. Part II discusses alternatives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, specifically carbon dioxide. We focus on traditional regulatory approaches under existing provisions of the Clean Air Act, since those would be easier to implement than a new statutory scheme. We conclude that an "upstream" market-based approach that targets fossil fuel production, perhaps in combination with selected regulatory controls under the Clean Air Act, would make the most sense for reducing carbon dioxide emissions across all sectors of the economy. Part III explains why a carbon tax would be a more effective market-based response to global climate change than a cap and trade system. This Part argues that both a carbon tax and a cap and trade system incorporate the necessary carbon price signal, with a tax offering "price certainty" and cap and trade offering "benefit certainty," but asserts that a carbon tax would be simpler to implement, more transparent, and less vulnerable to abuse. A carbon tax would also generate needed revenue to support development of alternatives to fossil fuels, and it would send a stronger message about the perils of carbon dioxide emissions. Part IV concludes by suggesting that, while fundamental changes also must occur in energy, transportation, and land use policy, an effective mitigation strategy for carbon dioxide emissions will be the centerpiece of any successful program to combat global climate change.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
Case › Solvency › 2AC – Jobs Guarantee – AT: Unemployment
Heires 21 (Gregory Heires; Senior Associate Editor of District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; “A Federal Jobs Guarantee: Ending Unemployment”; National Jobs for All Network; 6/4/21; ) [DTD]
Advocates describe a Federal Jobs Guarantee as an affordable solution to the challenges of short-term and structural unemployment. If enacted, the jobs guarantee would ensure that nearly all job seekers are able to find work, and it would significantly diminish government spending on unemployment relief and the many individual, family, and societal problems caused by unemployment. “A Federal Jobs Guarantee would virtually end unemployment,” said Trudy Goldberg, chair of the Nation Jobs for All Network. “I am absolutely convinced that a jobs guarantee would ultimately save tax dollars through reducing the cost of unemployment while bringing in more revenue thanks to the new employment opportunities it would create,” said NJFAN board member Phillip Harvey, a professor of law and economics at Rutgers University. The pandemic-induced economic downturn has created a growing interest in a federal jobs guarantee. Earlier this year, Rep. Ayana Pressley (D-Mass.) unveiled a proposal for a jobs guarantee with the support dozens of groups, including the NJFAN and PolicyLink. The Right to a Job In our modern political era, the roots of the proposal go back to the New Deal. As early as 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a major campaign speech, stated that “Every man has a … a right to make a comfortable living.” It was the achievement of full employment in World War II that convinced him that it was possible for the federal government to guarantee living-wage work. The first tenet of President Roosevelt’s 1944 Economic Bill of Rights called for the “right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms of the nation.” The second tenet supported the right to “earn enough” to lead a life of dignity. Goldberg points out that FDR regarded the job guarantee as “the most fundamental, and one on which the fulfillment of the others in large degree depends.” By this he meant that the right to employment would make it easier to achieve guarantees of decent housing, health care, and education. In short, Goldberg emphasizes, the Job Guarantee is central to the achievement of essential economic rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948—and inspired by Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights–states that everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. For decades, NJFAN has been a leading voice in the country for a federal jobs guarantee. In 1994, Goldberg and NJFAN board members Sheila D. Collins and Helen Lachs Ginsburg wrote “Jobs for All: A Plan for the Revitalization of America,” which launched the National Jobs for All Network (formerly Coalition). In the book, the authors outlined a plan for full employment that would guarantee a living-wage work “based on the philosophy that work and production, exchange and distribution should be redesigned in ways that are conducive to the full development of the innate potential of all people and to the sustainability of the ecosystem.” A Federal Job Guarantee would set a new, higher standard — not only for wages but also for hours, schedules, and benefits — that private employers would need to compete against to find workers, according to a PolicyLink. A proposal developed by NJFAN board member Darrick Hamilton and economists William Darity and Mark Paul envisions creating a National Investment Employment Corps. The U.S. Labor Department would run the new agency, which would allocate funds for state, county, and local governments, as well as Native American nations. It would work with other federal agencies to provide funds for training and jobs in infrastructure and care giving. The price tag for a federal jobs program would be hefty, requiring the spending of billions of dollars on new jobs and training. One estimate places the tab at $612 billion a year, which assumes that official unemployed workers and others who are seeking work but not covered by the official government unemployment statistics would be paid $20 an hour and work 40 hours a week, according to a 2020 Insider article by George Pearkes. But put that in perspective: The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that the government spends substantially more on military consumption and investment every year: 3.94 percent as of the third quarter of 2019, versus 2.7 percent of GDP on all discretionary non-defense spending consumption and investment by the federal government, which does not include transfer programs like Medicare and Social Security. While the spending on a federal jobs guarantee would be high, its expenditures would be partially offer by spending related to job loss. With a federal jobs program in place, the need for unemployment insurance ($33 billion in fiscal year 2016) would plummet, as a study by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities points out. Demand for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ($16 billion) would largely disappear. Thanks to boosted wages, millions of families would not have to rely on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ($368 billion) and the Children’s Health Insurance Program ($14 billion). Affected workers would not need to be covered by health care coverage, so they would no longer need to rely on Medicaid ($368 billion) as they would health coverage in their new jobs. Apart from addressing the persistent problems of poverty, inequality, structural unemployment and low-wages, a federal jobs guarantee would benefit the economy overall. A federal jobs guarantee would help address the business cycle and be “smoother” than one-time traditional stimulus packages, according to Harvey. Historically, governments have responded to major economic downturns and employment crises with Keynesian-inspired policies of injecting huge sums into the economy. These expenditures, however, generally do not target specific jobs and specific areas where unemployment is high, and there is a lag of about 18 months before the stimulus works. With a permanent program in place, the government would be able to act more quickly to provide jobs to unemployed workers to help jump-start the economy. “The program would be faster, better targeted and cheaper,” Harvey said.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
Case › Solvency › 2AC – Jobs Guarantee – AT: Unemployment
Kasy and Lehner 23 (Maximilian Kasy; Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford; Lukas Lehner; an economist at the Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School (INET Oxford) and the Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford; “Employing the unemployed of Marienthal: Evaluation of a guaranteed job program”; Oxford University; 4/21/23; ) [DTD]
5 Conclusion We conclude by summarizing our evaluation approaches and main findings, before discussing bigger-picture takeaways and avenues for future research. Our evaluation is based on several experimental and non-experimental contrasts, as summarized in Table 4. We use an experimental staggered roll-out design, comparing earlier and later entrants into the program, to identify direct effects of the job guarantee on the treated. We use a synthetic control approach at the municipality level to identify spillover effects of the job guarantee on the untreated, as well as the average total effect of the job guarantee on the labor market. And we compare program participants to observationally similar individuals in control towns, to separate out anticipation effects, and to estimate the long-term effects of the job guarantee. Assignment to the two groups (early and late entrants) in the experimental comparison is based on pairwise matched random assignment. This approach allows us to increase the precision of our estimates by making the two groups observationally as similar as possible. This reduces standard errors relative to conventional random assignment, which is particularly relevant given our small sample size. Both the pairwise matches and the synthetic control weights were pre-registered. This ties our hands and prevents us from cherry-picking results, including for the observational comparisons in our evaluation. Our inference approach is primarily based on randomization inference (permuatation inference). This guarantees finite sample validity without any asymptotic approximations. In Appendix A, we also report conventional confidence intervals, using robust standard errors; the conclusions remain unchanged. Turning to our empirical findings, a first remarkable fact is that everyone offered a job after the 8-week training phase accepted this job. In our experimental comparison, we find large positive effects of the job guarantee on participants’ economic and non-economic well-being. This includes effects on employment, income, and income security, which are expected given the nature of the program. This also includes large positive effects on time structure, activity, social contacts, collective purpose, and social status. These non-econonomic effects of employment have been discussed in the sociological literature, mostly in the context of observational studies, but have received less attention in economics. We do not find effects on physical health and economic preferences, including time and risk preferences, reciprocity, altruism, and trust. The estimated effects persist over time. We further find a large reduction of municipality-level unemployment, which is driven by a near-elimination of long-term unemployment. There appears to be no increase of short-term unemployment. While we were not able to independently verify program costs, it is estimated that the total cost per eligible particpant and year was around EUR 30,000, of which around EUR 20,000 were wages, taxes, and social insurance contributions for participants. These findings have implications for both policy and future research. First, our findings suggest that the job guarantee is a promising policy instrument to reduce long-term unemployment, and to improve the well-being of the unemployed. Crucial for this conclusion was our focus on participant well-being. This contrasts with a focus on market employment as the primary outcome for most existing evaluations of active labor market programs.
2023
UTNIF
Affirmative
Case › Climate Advantage › 2AC – AT: Squo Solves
Evans 22 (Megan Evans; Senior Government Affairs Manager at National Skills Coalition, served as a lobbyist for the Association of Equipment Manufacturers, served as a Staff Assistant for the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; “Inflation Reduction Act: limited funding for workforce, but not enough.”; National Skills Coalition; 8/19/22; ) [DTD]
Despite public commitments from Democrats that job-creating investments in infrastructure and energy would be paired with sufficient funding for the workforce training that is essential to filling these new jobs, IRA contains none of the $40 billion for workforce that skills advocates had been pursuing. While the IRA does contain funding and energy tax credits to support targeted workforce programs, there is no funding for programs inclusive of those serving youth and adults authorized under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) and the Perkins Career and Technical Education Act. There is also no funding for strategies NSC’s network identified as critical for supporting infrastructure and energy job creation, including expanding federal financing for high-quality, short-term programs at community and technical colleges; investments in partnerships between industry, educators, and other workforce experts; or supporting worker access to and success in training for jobs for which businesses are and will be hiring. This legislation falls short of what training providers need to support workers, businesses and communities. NSC looks forward to working with Congress, the administration and network partners to continue to advocate to policymakers on the critical need for robust investments in skills and tax credits that truly incentivize employers to provide training and career pathways for underrepresented populations. Energy Tax Breaks There are roughly a dozen energy related tax credits in the legislation that intend to facilitate access to clean energy and support workers’ access to apprenticeship and prevailing wages. For the most part, these credits are available to energy producers or to support the construction or retrofit of facilities to include energy efficient components. The programs provide either a base credit or a bonus rate if the contractors and laborers are paid prevailing wages and registered apprentices represent a percentage of labor hours scaled up over three years. For those employers who meet the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements, the bonus rate is five times the base credit rate. These credits may help increase apprenticeship offerings in the clean energy and construction space, but fail to include a focus on access to apprenticeship or prevailing wage for workers of color or women – those who have historically and continue to be excluded from good jobs in energy sectors. A narrow selection of credits for illustrative purposes are included below: The Production Tax Credit (PTC) for electricity generated from renewable energy sources which had been phasing out is extended to 2025 for energy produced from wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and hydropower sources. Facilities that meet the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements can earn up to five times the credit of qualifying facilities who don’t leverage these priorities. The Investment Tax Credit (ITC) is also extended through 2024 and provides a credit for installing renewable energy generation equipment. The base credit provided is 6%. For facilities that meet the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements, the bonus credit lands at 30%. The tax credit programs, including those explained above, create a potential for increased demand for apprenticeship programs; however, they do not come paired with dedicated funding to help stand up these programs, empower businesses to hire workers from local communities, support partnerships between industry and training provider, or for federal agencies to track which workers the agencies are providing apprenticeship opportunities. While some employers may choose to meet the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements necessary to take advantage of the bonus credits, it is unclear how many employers who do not already meet these requirements will be impacted by these provisions. Programmatic Funding There is roughly $4.5 billion in the IRA that could be used for workforce or occupation-specific training. None of this funding is specifically allocated to support the costs of workers accessing or succeeding in training. Advocates may be able to collaborate with Energy agencies and contractors to support occupational-specific training and upskilling. The opportunities NSC has identified in the Inflation Reduction Act include: $250 million is provided to support agricultural research and education including providing pathways to the agricultural sector or federal employment. $200 million in assistance to states and municipalities to help provide training and education to contractors involved with the installation of energy efficiency improvements. These funds can be used to reduce the cost of training, provide testing and certification and partner with non-profits to develop and implement programs. $330 million for grants to states and municipalities to adopt energy efficient building codes and provide training and enforcement programs to achieve full compliance $670 million for grants to states and municipalities to meet or exceed codes zero energy standards and provide training and enforcement programs to achieve full compliance and adoption $400 million for competitive grants to states, municipalities, tribes, or nonprofit school transportation entities to replace heavy-duty vehicles with those that are zero emissions. Workforce development and training to support maintenance, operations and charging/ fueling are eligible uses for funds under this program. $2.8 billion for Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grants. Grants will be awarded to a partnership of tribes, local governments, Institutions of Higher Education and a non-profit community-based organization; a non-profit community-based organization; or a partnership of non-profit community-based organizations. Recipients may use the funds to monitor, prevent, and remediate investments in low and zero emissions technology and infrastructure as well as workforce development efforts that help reduce greenhouse gases. What’s next While skills advocates will be glad to see some limited funding for workforce, it simply isn’t enough. The business leaders, labor leaders, community college leaders, industry training providers and other stakeholders who participated in our infrastructure Industry Recovery Panel (a group NSC convened to advise the Biden administration and Congress on federal recovery policies) have made it clear that local resident training, industry partnerships, equitable career pathways, short term training and flexible apprenticeships are critical components to meet our nation’s infrastructure and energy goals. Instead of the narrow, occupation-specific investments that continue to come out of Congressional spending packages, advocates require legislation that: Makes robust investments in supporting businesses in the energy sectors working with each other to support training and education opportunities; Support training and education providers’ capacity to support workers success in these opportunities; and Where Congress does focus on tax policy, this policy should center on providing additional benefits to businesses who provide training and supports for workers who have been unemployed and who need access to additional training opportunities. As NSC’s network continues to work with Congress and the Administration, these are the type of sensible legislative solutions we will pursue to make a real impact on workers and businesses alike.