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2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Japan Proves

Specifically proves it solves better than “decoupling”!

Elias Bouckaert 01/2021 Team, E. (2021, May 9). Japan’s 2050 net-zero emission policy: A case for degrowth? EIAS. https://eias.org/publications/briefing-paper/japans-2050-net-zero-emission-policy-a-case for-degrowth/

Proponents of green growth heavily emphasise the importance of innovation. But sceptics point out that there is no guarantee that technological innovation will advance fast enough to achieve a sufficiently fast and intensive global decoupling. A paper issued by the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) collects empirical data from relevant studies in order to assess the feasibility of decoupling and sustainable green growth. Based on collected data, the paper argues that adequate decoupling is extremely unlikely to occur in the near future.103 Indeed, there are several aspects to be considered with regards to decoupling. For example, one should be aware of the so-called rebound effect, meaning that increased resource efficiency often results in lower prices and therefore leads to higher demand, sometimes contradictorily leading to more intensive resource consumption (Jevons paradox). It has also been observed that psychological factors likely play a role in the rebound effect, with people tending to use less polluting technology (e.g., an EV) more often than its more polluting counterpart. Furthermore, the effects of depletion should not be overlooked. For example, accessible extraction sites for fossil fuels such as oil and gas have the tendency to be sourced before less accessible ones. This means that through gradual depletion, more energy is increasingly required to extract fossil fuels. For instance, in 1999 it took roughly one unit of oil or gas to extract 33 new units, whereas in 2005, this number declined to only 18 units. 104 Taking these observations into account, it becomes clear that solely relying on sectoral and technological improvements is not an option to achieve net-zero emissions. Additionally, if a country succeeds in decoupling its resource use from economic growth, this does not mean that efforts can be relaxed. There is the possibility that economic growth and resource use become relinked at a later point in time. It will therefore be a constant challenge to, once achieved, keep emissions at net zero over time. To effectively combat climate change, a permanent decoupling would be required.105 Several of the cited studies have found that GDP is one of the most important drivers of CO2 emissions, even when technological innovation is taken into account. Over the last decade, global energy demand grew at the fastest pace recorded in history. In 2018, energy demand increased by 2.3%, with global CO2 emissions rising by 1.7%.106 In Japan’s case, low GDP growth – less than 0.7% real GDP growth for 2019 - has contributed to a suppression of energy demand and, consequently, GHG emissions. 107,108 Taking these and other problematic aspects of decoupling into account, the EEB paper brings attention to the idea of “post-growth” or “degrowth”. Degrowth is a concept which emphasises the unsustainability of perpetual growth. The concept can be defined as “a voluntary, democratically negotiated, equitable downscaling of societies’ physical throughput until it reaches a sustainable steady-state”109 or “a phase of planned and equitable economic contraction in the richest nations, eventually reaching a steady state that operates within the 104 Ibid. p. 34. 105 Ibid. p.14. 106 Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing. Futures. p. 155. 25 Earth’s biophysical limits.”110 In essence, this means that rather than pursuing economic growth and counting on rapid technological innovation to mitigate its negative effects on the environment, degrowth proposes to cease the pursuit of economic growth after a satisfactory standard of living is reached. It is argued that the most effective way to combat climate change is to simply cause less environmental damage, rather than attempting to mitigate it afterwards. Degrowth also proposes to produce and consume less, especially when it comes to richer countries. It is argued that a circular economy based on the current extent of industrialized production and waste is not achievable. Many resources cannot be recycled and those that can, decrease in quality with every repurposing, meaning that the recycled resource will eventually become waste as well. It is therefore argued that even optimising the circular economy would still result in an abundance of waste and a high demand for virgin resources, due to high consumption levels. Recycling itself also requires energy and new materials. If new materials are required at a higher rate than the environment can produce them, a circular economy cannot be reached.111 Furthermore, resource extraction causes significant GHG emissions, being responsible for roughly half of the world’s carbon emissions.112,113,114 Degrowth argues that to combat climate change, the largest economies will have to shrink to a sustainable level. One study estimates that if the wages of the global poor were to be raised to USD 3-8 per day under current conditions, this would mean spending 66% of the 2°C Paris Agreement threshold

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Japan Proves

Japan proves degrowth possible and necessary for a green future

Nathan Gardels May 5th 2023 Gardels, N. (2023, May 5). Degrowth in Japan. NOEMA. https://www.noemamag.com/degrowth-in-japan/#:~:text=TOKYO%20%E2%80%94%20Decades%20after%20the%20supposed,the%20last%20quarter%20of%202022.

TOKYO — Decades after the supposed end of Japan’s “lost years,” the country remains on the cusp of degrowth. Its GDP  by a mere annualized rate of 0.1% in the last quarter of 2022. While most economists thus regard Japan as the sick man among the advanced nations, Kohei Saito considers the trajectory of degrowth exactly where a healthy society ought to be headed when the world is heating up from overconsumption. Saito is the 36-year-old author of “,” which embraces degrowth as the way out of the climate crisis and anxieties of incessant competition that have driven so many sararīman to exhausted despair. Though an unfashionable Marxist, his book clearly hit a nerve, especially among the young, selling more than half a million copies in Japan. This historically frugal island nation that emerged in ancient times from what philosopher Takeshi Umehara called “the civilization of the forest” would seem more fertile ground than most for Saito’s radical message to take root. Going back to the Edo Period of the late 1600s, the Tokugawa Shogunate recognized the ecological crisis of deforestation caused by the extensive use of wood for building. It severely restricted logging and massively planted trees to reforest the landscape. And, of course, the first international effort to stem global warming was called the Kyoto Protocol. The Shinto and Buddhist sensibility that reveres nature as the oneness of all being is still evident in the gardens and shrines that punctuate the ugly concrete sprawl of rapid postwar modernization that spread everywhere during the 1950s and 60s.  It was in that period that the architect Fumihiko Maki and others launched the “metabolism movement,” which sought to integrate traditional spatial patterns into the design of megastructures and borrow ideas from the adaptive capacities of organic biology as a way to cope with the mushrooming density and congestion of hyper-urbanization. Intuitively, they already understood in those days that the unprecedented scope of metastasizing development required a response that looked toward natural forms and systems.

It is not so surprising then that it is a Japanese thinker as well who has retrieved the theory of “metabolic rift” from the more obscure works of Karl Marx. The concept is at the core of Saito’s effort to greenify the red hues of historical materialism. According to Saito, Marx saw the interaction between the human species and its natural environment as “the basis of living.” By turning “nature” into a commodified resource to feed economic growth, capitalism splintered the balanced unity between human and nonhuman beings. That split is now manifested in the Anthropocene where the entire planet has been so transformed by this prevalent mode of production and consumption that the Earth’s livable biosphere is threatened.  For Saito, only a steady-state economy that foregoes the relentless reach for more growth and recovers the natural world as a public commons can mend the rift Marx identified. This reading would place the old master thinker of the Industrial Revolution in the ranks of later “era of limits” apostles such as Ivan Illich. The self-described archeologist of modern certitudes preached the “virtue of enoughness” and contrasted the convivial interdependence of social and natural relations with the ideology that perpetually contrives new markets by transmuting wants and desires into “needs.”

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Climate

Degrowth solves both strengthens economies and helps resolve climate change.

Hickel, 22 Degrowth can work — here’s how science can help Wealthy countries can create prosperity while using less materials and energy if they abandon economic growth as an objective. 12 December 2022 Jason Hickel is a professor at the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona (ICTA-UAB), Spain, and a visiting senior fellow at the International Inequalities Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. Big SPENCE

The global economy is structured around growth — the idea that firms, industries and nations must increase production every year, regardless of whether it is needed. This dynamic is driving climate change and ecological breakdown. High-income economies, and the corporations and wealthy classes that dominate them, are mainly responsible for this problem and consume energy and materials at unsustainable rates,. Yet many industrialized countries are now struggling to grow their economies, given economic convulsions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, resource scarcities and stagnating productivity improvements. Governments face a difficult situation. Their attempts to stimulate growth clash with objectives to improve human well-being and reduce environmental damage.

Researchers in ecological economics call for a different approach — degrowth. Wealthy economies should abandon growth of gross domestic product (GDP) as a goal, scale down destructive and unnecessary forms of production to reduce energy and material use, and focus economic activity around securing human needs and well-being. This approach, which has gained traction in recent years, can enable rapid decarbonization and stop ecological breakdown while improving social outcomes. It frees up energy and materials for low- and middle-income countries in which growth might still be needed for development. Degrowth is a purposeful strategy to stabilize economies and achieve social and ecological goals, unlike recession, which is chaotic and socially destabilizing and occurs when growth-dependent economies fail to grow. Reports this year by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) suggest that degrowth policies should be considered in the fight against climate breakdown and biodiversity loss, respectively. Policies to support such a strategy include the following. Reduce less-necessary production. This means scaling down destructive sectors such as fossil fuels, mass-produced meat and dairy, fast fashion, advertising, cars and aviation, including private jets. At the same time, there is a need to end the planned obsolescence of products, lengthen their lifespans and reduce the purchasing power of the rich. Improve public services. It is necessary to ensure universal access to high-quality health care, education, housing, transportation, Internet, renewable energy and nutritious food. Universal public services can deliver strong social outcomes without high levels of resource use.Enable sustainable development. This requires cancelling unfair and unpayable debts of low- and middle-income countries, curbing unequal exchange in international trade and creating conditions for productive capacity to be reoriented towards achieving social objectives.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Turns War !

Economic crisis stops war

Clary 15 (Christopher; is a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015)

Economic downturns not only create incentives to cut spending, they encourage vigorous pursuit of opportunities for economic cooperation. This, too, can engender conciliatory behavior. Economic downturns can increase motives to pursue trade and investment. Rivalries with old foes often directly impinge on trade and investment with the adversary and may indirectly impinge on trade and investment with third parties, especially if the rivalry is viewed as being likely to generate disruptive military conflict. Additionally, economic aid is sometimes used as an inducement for adversaries to set aside a political dispute. This aid can either serve as a side payment from one rival to another, or it can be offered by a third party to one or both rivals as an incentive to set aside lingering disputes.¶ Such aid is more attractive during periods of economic turmoil than during periods of comparative normalcy. In South Asia, India and Pakistan struggled from 1947 to 1960 with how to manage water resources in the Indus Rivers basin, inheriting a canal system meant to service pre- partitioned India. Pakistan, suffering an economic downturn, and India, reliant on foreign aid to avert economic crisis, agreed to an Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 to resolve the lingering dispute, made possible in substantial part because of World Bank financing that was especially attractive to the struggling economies. In the Middle East, Egypt and Israel made the hard choices necessary for the Camp David accord in 1979 precisely because the Sadat and Begin governments faced difficult economic situations at home that made the U.S. aid guarantee in exchange for a peace agreement especially attractive.21 In 1982, the Yemen’s People’s Republic agreed to stop its attempts to destabilize Oman, because otherwise Yemen would not receive economic assistance from Arab oilproducing states that it desperately needed.22 In the late 1990s, El Niño-induced flooding devastated Ecuador and Peru, spurring reconciliation as leaders sought to increase trade, secure investment, and slash military expenditures so they could be used at home.23 As one Western diplomat assessed at the time, Ecuador and Peru “have decided it's better to see reason…. They see foreign companies eager to invest in South America, and if Peru and Ecuador are in conflict, it makes them less attractive than, say, Argentina or Brazil or Chile for investment purposes. That's the last thing either country wants.”24

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Turns War !

Economic growth incentivizes states to wage war.

Robinson ’17 (William; is professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara “Global Capitalist Crisis and Trump’s War Drive” April 19th)

There is another mechanism that has sustained the global economy: militarized accumulation. Here there is a convergence around the system’s political need for social control and its economic need to perpetuate accumulation. Unprecedented global inequalities can only be sustained by ever more repressive and ubiquitous systems of social control and repression. Yet quite apart from political considerations, the TCC has acquired a vested interest in war, conflict, and repression as a means of accumulation. CIT has revolutionized warfare and the modalities of state-organized militarized accumulation, including the military application of vast new technologies and the further fusion of private accumulation with state militarization.

As war and state-sponsored repression become increasingly privatized, the interests of a broad array of capitalist groups shift the political, social, and ideological climate toward generating and sustaining social conflict — such as in the Middle East — and in expanding systems of warfare, repression, surveillance and social control. The so-called wars on drugs, terrorism, and immigrants; the construction of border walls, immigrant detention centers, and ever-growing prisons; the installation of mass surveillance systems, and the spread of private security guard and mercenary companies, have all become major sources of profit-making.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Turns War !

Economic Growth increases the chances of war, rather than preventing it.

Boehmer 8 (Charles; is a Ph.D. in Political Science, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: 1875–1999, 6-30-2008)

The results again show that GDP growth appears to have a direct effect on the decisions to enter into war, which seems to support my theory that it affects decision‐makers’ views about national performance and hence resolve. This direct effect is notable relative to growth in military expenditures. Additionally, the only control variable that holds any explanatory power is major power status. The occurrence of war does not even appear to be a function of time; the Peace Years and spline variables are statistically insignificant. Although the magnitude and duration of GDP growth affects the occurrence of war, the time since a state’s past involvement in war has no effect on participation in future wars. War is a complex event to explain, and only the GDP growth variable offers any further explanation than simply that major powers are more war‐prone than minor power states. Table V presents the changes in the probability of a state entering into war as its economy fluctuates in its economic growth. Again, only GDP growth and Major Power are statistically significant. Being a major power increases the risk that a state will become involved in a war in a given year by 248% compared with minor powers. 12 12 If one divides the sample between major and minor powers, the effect of GDP growth affects positively participation in Fatal MIDs by both major and minor powers, although the effect is stronger for minor powers. The opposite is true, however, for participation in wars, where the effect of GDP growth is stronger for major powers relative to minor powers. This is logical given that these states possess the capabilities to sustain a conflict beyond 999 battle deaths compared with minor power states. A full standard deviation increase in economic growth (moving from 3.7% to 7.9%) increases the probability that a state will become involved in a war by 34.6%. Hence, the substantive effect of economic growth is not as strong as the effect of being a major power but it is important nonetheless and offers more explanatory power than the remaining covariates. The theory set forth earlier theorizes that economic growth increases perceptions of state strength, increasing the likelihood of violent interstate conflicts. Economic growth appears to increase the resolve of leaders to stand against challenges and the willingness to escalate disputes. A non-random pattern exists where higher rates of GDP growth over multiple years are positively and significantly related to the most severe international conflicts, whereas this is not true for overall conflict initiations. Moreover, growth of military expenditures, as a measure of the war chest proposition, does not offer any explanation for violent interstate conflicts. This is not to say that growth of military expenditures never has any effect on the occurrence of war, although such a link is not generally true in the aggregate using a large sample of states. In comparison, higher rates of economic growth are significantly related to violent interstate conflicts in the aggregate. States with growing economies are more apt to reciprocate military challenges by other states and become involved in violent interstate conflicts.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Turns War !

Economic decline is a buffer to war.

Christina Davis & Krzysztof J. Pelc 17, Christina L. Davis is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton. Krzysztof J. Pelc is an Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University. “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection”

Our statistical findings show that under conditions of pervasive economic crisis at the international level, states exercise more restraint than they would when facing crisis alone. These results throw light on behavior not only during the crisis, but throughout the WTO period, from 1995 to the present. One concern may be that the restraint we observe during widespread crises is actually the result of a decrease in aggregate demand and that domestic pressure for import relief is lessened by the decline of world trade. By controlling for product-level imports, we show that the restraint on remedy use is not a byproduct of declining imports. We also take into account the ability of some countries to manipulate their currency and demonstrate that the relationship between crisis and trade protection holds independent of exchange rate policies. Government decisions to impose costs on their trade partners by taking advantage of their legal right to use flexibility measures are driven not only by the domestic situation but also by circumstances abroad. This can give rise to an individual incentive for strategic self-restraint toward trade partners in similar economic trouble. Under conditions of widespread crisis, government leaders fear the repercussions that their own use of trade protection may have on the behavior of trade partners at a time when they cannot afford the economic cost of a trade war. Institutions provide monitoring and a venue for leader interaction that facilitates coordination among states. Here the key function is to reinforce expectations that any move to protect industries will trigger similar moves in other countries. Such coordination often draws on shared historical analogies, such as the Smoot–Hawley lesson, which form a focal point to shape beliefs about appropriate state behavior. Much of the literature has focused on the more visible action of legal enforcement through dispute settlement, but this only captures part of the story. Our research suggests that tools of informal governance such as leader pledges, guidance from the Director General, trade policy reviews, and plenary meetings play a real role within the trade regime. In the absence of sufficiently stringent rules over flexibility measures, compliance alone is insufficient during a global economic crisis. These circumstances trigger informal mechanisms that complement legal rules to support cooperation. During widespread crisis, legal enforcement would be inadequate, and informal governance helps to bolster the system. Informal coordination is by nature difficult to observe, and we are unable to directly measure this process. Instead, we examine the variation in responses across crises of varying severity, within the context of the same formal setting of the WTO. Yet by focusing on discretionary tools of protection—trade remedies and tariff hikes within the bound rate—we can offer conclusions about how systemic crises shape country restraint independent of formal institutional constraints. Insofar as institutions are generating such restraint, we offer that it is by facilitating informal coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts. In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Turns War !

Studies go neg – no econ wars

Brandt and Ulfelder 11 (Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University. Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability”)

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Turns War !

Recessions cause austerity and the defense budget is inevitably cut putting a hold in international rivalries.

Clary 15, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, Christopher Clary is an Assistant Professor of Political Science. His research focuses on the sources of cooperation in interstate rivalries, the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, U.S. defense policy, and the politics of South Asia, April 21, 2015, Date Accessed: 07/01/23. (GMF)

Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost invariably assumes growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597712 Updated April 21, 2015 Clary 5 sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7 Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending At a minimum, the political costs of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures alone make such a path unappealing. In practice, this can spur policymakers to curtail national security spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil. There is often more discretion over defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so defense expenditures are doubly costly since they 6 Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 7 Paul Pierson, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics 48, no. 2 (January 1996): 145. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597712 Updated April 21, 2015 Clary 6 both take up valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas, rather than constituencies at home. Pursuing defense cuts may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector, which shows a strong aversion to military conflict even if that means policies of appeasement and conciliation.8 During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs associated with defense expenditure—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—are real but acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different types of spending. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and arms industries, but even in militarized economies this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller than those that favor social and economic expenditures over military ones. Defense Cutbacks Encourage Rapprochement An interest in defense cutbacks can lead to conciliatory behavior through two paths. First, the cutbacks themselves serve as a concrete signal to adversaries that the military threat posed by the economically distressed state is declining. This permits the other state to halt that portion of defense spending dedicated to keeping up, breaking the back of ongoing arms races through reciprocated, but non-negotiated moves. Unilateral conventional force reductions were a major element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in the late 1980s, alongside negotiated strategic arms control, and diplomatic efforts to achieve political understandings with the United States.9 Gorbachev similarly used force reductions in Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Far East to signal to China in 1987 8 Jonathan Kirshner, Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 9 Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s,” NIE-11-14-89, February 1989. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597712 Updated April 21, 2015 Clary 7 that he was serious about political negotiations.10 Elsewhere, non-negotiated, tit-for-tat military redeployments facilitated Argentina-Brazil rapprochement.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Growth Unsus

2. Bubble markets – growth makes them inevitable.

Bin Yang, 17. “Stock Market Crash, New Market Failure Theory and Extremely Great Economic and Financial Crises.” World Review of Political Economy 8, no. 1 (2017): 4–34.

The Western economics discusses classic market failures such as natural monopoly and economic externality, but neglects bubble economy, causing greater harm and inducing excessive speculation. This is because it aims to safeguard the need of financial capital for chasing exorbitant speculative profits to a great extent, and meanwhile, bubble economy reveals the fatal flaw in the free market mechanism, that is, the unregulated free market cannot restore the balance between supply and demand under many conditions, but also exacerbates the imbalance between supply and demand, sharp rise and drop in prices and distorted allocation of economic resources. Therefore, it is necessary to develop new market failure theories to rectify the flaw in the Western economics, which is of great theoretical and practical significance to currently deepening the reform and opening up, avoiding the impact of global financial turmoil frequently occurring, and safeguarding the security of national economy and finance and social stability. Marx believes that the law of value plays a role in adjusting socialized mass production, and prices influenced by the supply and demand situation fluctuate around values and regulate the allocation of resources. Where a gap between supply and demand arises on the market, price fluctuations will deviate from values, that is, when supply falls short of demand, prices will be higher than values, and when supply exceeds demand, prices will be lower than values. If the gap between supply and demand is small, the balance between supply and demand may spontaneously restore under the law of value; however, if such gap is too large so that prices are far away from values, the law of value will fail and it is difficult to restore the balance between supply and demand. Where supply is far greater than demand, prices will be much lower than values, and for survival, producers will increase the supply instead of reducing it so as to obtain the income required for survival in this way. In the event of drastic fall in prices, supply is increased to maintain a steady income when the expected income effect promotes the collapse in prices. Where supply is far less than demand, prices will be much higher than values, and the sharp rise in prices will attract a large amount of speculative capital to be invested in for huge profits, so when the expected income effect brings about spurt in prices, demand increases and the situation of short supply becomes more serious, leading to a further surge in prices. Marx does not discuss the phenomenon that short supply gives rise to bubble economy and failure of the law of value, but deeply discusses the problem that the law of value fails to play its regulating role and it is difficult to restore the balance between supply and demand in the course of oversupply due to overproduction resulting in an economic crisis. Marx also discusses the following issues: capitalists’ pursuit of maximum surplus value limits workers’ income growth; the contradiction between unlimited expansion of production and effective social demand leads to overproduction; in case of an economic crisis, it is difficult to achieve values, a lot of resources are wasted, and extremely serious oversupply and failure or disorder of the market regulation mechanism occur. In fact, Marx’s economic crisis theory is a kind of market failure theory, which mainly discusses the process of how the basic social contradiction in the era of industrial capitalism inevitably leads to a glut due to overproduction on the market, thus causing market failure and destructive spontaneous adjustments to the economic cycle. At present, it is imperative to develop and extend Marx’s economic crisis theory from the overproduction crisis in the era of industrial capitalism to the financial crisis in the era of financial capitalism due to bursting of bubbles. After Western countries enter the stage of financial monopoly capitalism, the rise of consortiums of financial monopoly capital and the development of new financial instruments make the characteristics of the economic cycle and the economic crisis change a lot gradually; margin financing and securities lending, borrowing for investment in stocks and financial derivatives, etc., arising on the eve of the Great Depression in 1929 start to trigger a spurt in prices and huge bubble economy on the markets of equities and other capital, forming extremely serious short supply and market failure on the capital market; with the interference from speculative demand, prices no longer fluctuate around values, resulting in the failure of the law of value; when bubbles inflate, prices are pushed up by speculators unceasingly so that they are increasingly further away from values, and after bubbles burst, panic drives prices to fluctuate far below values; on the one hand, the false wealth bubble effect temporarily alleviates the insufficiency of consumer demand and postpones the outbreak of market failure and economic crisis caused by overproduction, and on the other hand, it leads to further exploitation and plunder of public wealth by excessive financial speculation, and once the false wealth bubble bursts, consumer demand will decrease further, greatly deepening the glut of real economy and overproduction crisis. Marxist theory of political economy upholds that unlike the third industry serving the real economy such as scientific research, education and medical treatment, virtual financial speculation does not create value but plunders the value created by the real economy, and it has no social positive significance but causes huge waste of economic resources. The famous “Glass-Steagall Act” for financial regulation formulated in Roosevelt’s time strictly distinguishes commercial banks serving the real economy through deposit and lending from investment banks carrying out speculative trading on equity and futures markets, and strictly prohibits commercial banks from granting loans to investment banks for supporting their speculative trading, effectively restricting the expansion of the scale of speculation with financial capital through borrowing and leverage and achieving a great success of avoiding financial crises and banking crises for decades. The principle of the above act is conforming to Marx’s theory that finance must serve the real economy and new market failure theories established on the basis of the development of Marxism, thus effectively preventing the gap between supply and demand on various asset markets and market failure as well as asset prices deviating from values for a long term and attracting and plundering social wealth, and avoiding the direct and indirect flow of public deposits to equity markets and other speculative fields, and the panic of bank runs and the collapse of money supply, which arise from failure in speculation, causing a comprehensive deflation, overproduction and economic recession. For the current reform of the financial system, China must also take Marxist theories as guidelines, draw lessons from successful experience in strict regulation in Roosevelt’s time and the social reform period of the United States and Europe, especially the formulation of regulation laws strictly distinguishing commercial banks from investment banks, and establish the fire-wall strictly restricting the flow of commercial banks’ loans to investment banks and shadow banks, and never follow the current financial liberalization policies of the United States and Europe which deny the successful experience in the social reform, nor imitate the mixed operation mode of the United States and Europe which repeals the financial firewall effectively limiting speculation. It is worth pointing out that Keynesian theories blame the economic crisis on the imbalance between savings and investments, but ignores the important role virtual financial speculation plays in inducing crises prior to the Great Depression. Ruling elites of the United States and Europe admit that the obvious moderation of the economic cycle in the post-war golden economic period of Western countries should be attributed to social reform policies which contain the greed of financial capital and protect public interests and whose ideological basis is Marxism attach- ing great importance to social justice and real economy rather than Keynesianism neither paying attention to social distribution nor distinguishing real economy from virtual economy. Although the United States and Europe have adopted Keynesianism in recent years to stimulate their economy, their fiscal and monetary policies foster virtual financial capital but ignore real economy and public interests, so plenty of financial resources have been spent on the rescue of the equity market but the effect achieved is less than one tenth of that in the social reform period. The key reason is that the United States and Europe have repealed the Glass-Steagall Act at present, so they cannot prohibit commercial banks from engaging in speculative trading irrelevant to real economy or commercial banks’ loans from flowing to speculative and unregulated shadow banks, which causes various banks to indulge in financial speculation and are reluctant to support real economy, and the inflation of virtual bubble economy makes the whole financial system in a precarious state. The bailout and stimulus polices adopted by the government and the Federal Reserve System also ignore real economy but rescue virtual bubble economy which grabs the value created by real economy rather than creates value so that the United States and Europe fall into the new normal of flagging real economy for a long term, cannot create enough jobs or stimulate the growth of income or consumption, are forced to manage to maintain the inflating virtual bubble by repeated capital injection under quantitative easing, and make public opinions on false recovery to attract social capital and plunder public wealth. American mainstream public opinions publicly acknowledge that stimulus policies only have “trickle-down effect,” reflecting visually the disadvantage that they cannot benefit the real economy and the public Marxist crisis theory is able to fully explain the overproduction crisis in the era of industrial capitalism, while new market failure theories are needed to explain the Great Depression in the era of financial monopoly capitalism. Facing Flaws in the Mainstream Western Economics The curves of supply and demand on the commodity market stated in the mainstream Western economics seem to be very scientific and wonderful, but in fact, they just apply to the small gap between supply and demand near the price equilibrium point. In case of any too large gap between supply and demand, which is far away from the equilibrium price, due to a variety of reasons, the supply curve will become a vertical straight line after inclining upward for a while, and the reason is that it is difficult to continue to expand production for such restrictions as enterprise equipment and factories. The spurt in prices often leads to the inflow of a large number of capital for chasing huge speculative profits, so that the normal demand curve suffers serious distortion and changes from tilting down to tilting up, and suppliers may also be attracted by high profits to become speculators and their unwillingness to sell out and speculative hoarding will distort the supply curve which tends to slope down. This means that the stagnation of supply and sharp increase in demand cause prices to rise faster, even out of control, and the market price mechanism fails and hardly impels the recovery of balance between supply and demand. Dutch tulip bubble is a kind of classic commodity bubble economy. Thus, it can be seen that once the gap between supply and demand is too big, resulting in spurt in prices and then inducing excessive speculation, the price mechanism for free markets will lose the function of impelling the recovery of balance between supply and demand, and also allocate a large number of resources to speculators independent of producers and consumers, and the exit of speculators after they obtain profits will be a huge blow to production and consumption. A too big gap between supply and demand of general commodities will give rise to local market failure, and for some important commodities such as grain, steel and other bulk commodities with wide upstream and downstream links, the sharp rise in prices and excessive speculation will have negative impact on the national economy. Compared with commodity markets, asset markets are more suitable for investors to participate in, for example, properties, and equities are apt to induce the bubble economy with extensive negative effect. The upsurge in asset prices will make suppliers more unwilling to sell out or more willing to hold assets, and the supply curve will tend to slope down after tilting up. As the demand for assets is more prone to be distorted by excessive speculation than the demand for commodities, the demand curve of assets will tip up greater after sloping down, which means that compared with commodity markets, it is more difficult to achieve the balance between supply and demand on assets markets; more serious spurt in prices out of control and market failure will occur; and the negative feedback process that the gap between supply and demand gradually decreases and supply and demand tend to be balanced will become the positive feedback process that the gap between supply and demand gradually increases and tends to be out of control. The serious harmfulness of market failures caused by such bubble economy far exceeds that of classic market failures such as natural monopoly and economic externality. To maintain the security of public wealth and national finance, it is necessary to carry out in-depth study on new market failure theories discussing the bubble economy, despite inevitable deprecation and opposition from financial speculation capital groups. The above new market failure theories discussing the bubble economy show that the extremely serious short supply caused by natural or human factors may trigger the positive feedback process of surge in speculative demand and spurt in prices. This is not the normal market price regulation process prompting the market supply and demand to trends toward balance, because the market supply and demand and prices will not tend to a stable equilibrium, but after a peak of prices out of control is reached and the power for climbing up is exhausted, speculative capital that manipulates the market will suddenly shift to sell-off, which brings about a widespread market panic and then the avalanche-type exit from the market and too large glut, and deepens the positive feedback process of market panic, scrambling to sell off and slump in prices, resulting in prices far lower than normal values and hold-up and heavy losses of investors, and the market supply and demand and prices fluctuate at a place far below the normal equilibrium point until panic vanishes gradually and a new wave of speculation occurs. In the process of market failure due to expansion of the bubble economy above, market participants’ wealth inflates rapidly and bursts suddenly like a bubble, and normal market suppliers and demanders are deprived of a large number of wealth, which is transferred to speculators who are not interested in the supply and demand. The result of market failure is that a large number of resources are allocated to a small number of speculation manipulators, leading to the waste, spending and inefficiency of economic resources and the polarization between the rich and the poor, and then intensifying social contradictions, instability and political manipulation by economic oligopolists and resulting in the transfer of crises by launching foreign economic or military wars and shift of losses onto others.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Growth Unsus

1. Environment – throughput is too high now, and green tech can’t solve.

Singh and Dhara 21

(Vandana Singh is a professor of physics at Framingham State University, Chirag Dhara is a climate physicist and a research associate at the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology. June 20, 2021, The Delusion of Infinite Economic Growth, Scientific American https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-delusion-of-infinite-economic-growth/)

The electric vehicle (EV) has become one of the great modern symbols of a world awakened to the profound challenges of unsustainability and climate change. So much so that we may well imagine that answer today to Life, the Universe and Everything might plausibly be “EV.” But, as Douglas Adams would surely have asked, if electric vehicles are the answer, what is the question? Let us imagine the “perfect” EV: solar powered, efficient, reliable and affordable. But is it sustainable? EVs powered by renewable energy may help reduce the carbon footprint of transport. Yet, the measure of sustainability is not merely the carbon footprint but the : the aggregate quantity of biomass, metal ores, construction minerals and fossil fuels used during production and consumption of a product. The approximate metric tonne weight of an EV constitutes materials such as metals (including rare earths), plastics, glass and rubber. Therefore, a global spike in the demand for EVs would drive an increased demand for each of these materials. Every stage of the life cycle of any manufactured product exacts environmental costs: habitat destruction, biodiversity loss and pollution (including carbon emissions) from extraction of raw materials, manufacturing / construction, through to disposal. Thus, it is the increasing global material footprint that is for the twin climate and ecological crises. The global material footprint has grown in lockstep with the exponentially rising global economy (GDP) since the industrial revolution. This is largely because of egregious in a socioeconomic system founded on growth without limits. Can we resolve this fundamental conflict between the quest for limitless growth and the consequent environmental destruction?Industrial era exponential rise in the use of primary and derived physical resources: cropland (a), fossil fuels (b), freshwater (c), metals (d), plastic (e). Credit: ENTER TECHNOLOGY Technological innovation and efficiency improvements are often cited as pathways to decouple growth in material use from economic growth. While technology undoubtedly has a crucial role to play in the transition to a sustainable world, it is constrained by fundamental physical principles and pragmatic economic considerations. Examples abound. The engine efficiency of airplanes has improved little for decades since they have long . Likewise, there is a hard limit on the efficiency of photovoltaic cells of because of the physical properties of the semiconductors that constitute them; in practice for economic and pragmatic reasons. The power generation of large wind farms is as a simple yet utterly unavoidable physical consequence of wake effects. The awesome exponential increase in computing power of the past five decades will since it is physically impossible to make the transistors on the computer chip, already roughly 5 percent of the size of the coronavirus, much smaller. Whether it is principles of classical, quantum or solid state physics or thermodynamics, each places different but inexorable constraints on technological solutions. Basically, physical principles that have allowed incredible technological leaps over the past century also inevitably limit them. We might consider that extensive recycling of materials would offset efficiency limits. Recycling is crucial; however, while glass and metals can be recycled without loss of quality, materials such as paper and plastic can be recycled before becoming too degraded. Additionally, recycling itself may be an and materials-intensive process. Even if physical laws could be broken (they cannot) to achieve recycling with 100 percent efficiency, added demand from the imperative for economic growth would necessarily require virgin materials. The key point is that efficiency is limited by physics, but there is no sufficiency limit on the socioeconomic construct of “demand.” Unfortunately, the situation is even more dire. Economic growth is required to be exponential; that is, the size of the economy must double in a fixed period. As referenced earlier, this has driven a corresponding increase in the material footprint. To understand the nature of exponential growth, consider the EV. Suppose that we have enough (easily extractable) lithium for the batteries needed to fuel the EV revolution for another 30 years. Now assume that deep-sea mining provides four times the current amount of these materials. Are we covered for 120 years? No, because the current 10 percent in demand for lithium is equivalent to doubling of demand every seven years, which means we would only have enough for 44 years. In effect, we would cause untold, , devastation of marine ecosystems to buy ourselves a few extra years’ supply of raw materials. Exponential growth swiftly, inevitably, swamps anything in finite supply. For a virus, that finite resource is the human population and in the context of the planet it is its physical resources. The inescapable inference is that it is essentially impossible to decouple material use from economic growth. And this is exactly what has transpired. did a careful accounting of the material footprint, including those embedded in international trade, for several nations. In the 1990–2008 period covered by the study, no country achieved a planned, deliberate economywide decoupling for a sustained length of time. Claims by the Global North to the contrary conceal the substantial offshoring of its production, and the associated ecological devastation, to the Global South. Recent proposals for ecocidal and fantastical mining are an unsurprising consequence of a growth paradigm that refuses to recognize these inconvenient truths. WHAT IS SUSTAINABILITY? These observations lead us to a natural minimum condition for sustainability: all resource use curves must be simultaneously flatlined and all pollution curves simultaneously extinguished. It is this resource perspective that allows us to see why EVs may help offset carbon emissions yet remain utterly unsustainable under the limitless growth paradigm. Sustainability from a resource perspective: Exponentially rising resource use and pollution (a and b) are unsustainable. We define sustainability as flatlined resource use (c) and extinguished pollution (d). Credit: Aditi Deshpande THE REAL QUESTION We have argued that the inextricable link between material consumption and GDP makes the infinite-growth paradigm incompatible with sustaining ecological integrity. Thus, while EVs constitute a partial answer to the climate question, within the current paradigm they will only exacerbate the larger anthropogenic crises connected to unsustainable resource consumption. The real question is this: how do we transition to founded on the reconciliation of equitable human well-being with ecological integrity

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Degrowth CP

Only de-growth solves climate change – low-carbon is impossible under growth economies.

Demaria 18, “Why economic growth is not compatible with environmental sustainability”, Federico Demaria is an Assistant Professor of Ecological Economics and Political Ecology at the University of Barcelona, and a researcher at the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Autonomous University of Barcelona. His research aims to inform theory on how environments are shaped, politicized, and contested. He is an editor of the journal Sustainability Science. He has been a visiting scholar at research centres in India, China, USA, UK,Netherlands, Croatia, Germany, and Italy. He is the co-editor of Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era (2014) and Pluriverse: A Post-development Dictionary (2019), and a co-author of The Case for Degrowth(2020), February 22, 2018, Date Accessed: 07/01/23. (GMF)

'Growth for the sake of growth' remains the credo of all governments and international institutions, including the European Commission. Economic growth is presented as the panacea that can solve any of the world's problems: poverty, inequality, sustainability, you name it. Left-wing and right-wing policies only differ on how to achieve it. However, there is an uncomfortable scientific truth that has to be faced: economic growth is environmentally unsustainable. Moreover, beyond a certain threshold already surpassed by EU countries, socially it isn't necessary. The central question then becomes: how can we manage an economy without growth? Enough is enough Kenneth Boulding, the economist, famously said that: “Anyone who believes that exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist”. Ecological economists argue that the economy is physical, while mainstream economists seem to believe it is metaphysical. Social metabolism is the study of material and energy flows within the economy. On the input side of the economy, key material resources are limited, and many are peaking including oil and phosphorus. On the output side, humanity is trespassing planetary boundaries. Climate change is the evidence of the limited assimilative capacity of ecosystems. It is the planet saying: 'Enough is enough!'. Mainstream economists - finally convinced by the existence of biophysical limits - have started to argue that economic growth can be decoupled from the consumption of energy and materials. Trade off Historical data series demonstrates that this - up to now - has not happened. At most, there is relative decoupling - a decrease in resource use per unit of GDP. But, there is no absolute decoupling which is what matters for sustainability: an absolute decrease of environmental resources consumption. The only periods of absolute dematerialisation coincide with economic recession. Trade should also be taken into account, to avoid externalisation of pollution intensive activities outside the EU. The current economy cannot be circular. The main reason being that energy cannot be recycled, and materials only up to a point. The global economy recycles less than 10 percent of materials; about 50 percent of processed materials are used to provide energy and are thus not available for recycling. It is simple: economic growth is not compatible with environmental sustainability. The list of nice oxymorons is long - from sustainable development to its reincarnations like green economy or green growth - but wishful thinking does not solve real problems. Increase in GDP leads to increase in material and energy use, and therefore to environmental unsustainability. No magic bullet There is an uncomfortable scientific truth that has to be faced: economic growth is environmentally unsustainable. Technology and market based solutions are not magic bullets. Faith in technology has become religious: scientific evidence shows that, based on past trends in technological improvement, these are coming way too slowly to avoid irreversible climate change. For instance, efficiency improvements lead to rebound effects, in the context of economic growth (the more efficient you are, the more you consume; e.g. cars and consumption of gasoline). Renewable energy produces less net energy, because it has a lower EROI (Energy Return on Investement) than fossil fuels. For this, and other reasons, it cannot satisfy current levels of energy consumption, which therefore needs to be reduced. Most of the world’s fossil fuel reserves must be left in the ground, unburned, to keep a global temperature rise to no more than 2°C. In fact, fossil fuels should be called unburnable fuels. Science sometimes brings bad news. An article recently published in Nature Sustainability argues that: “No country in the world meets the basic needs of its citizens at a globally sustainable level of resource use.” The question then is: How can the conditions for a good life for all within planetary boundaries be generated? The uncomfortable truth to be faced by policy makers is the following: Economic growth is ecologically unsustainable. The total consumption of materials and energy needs to be reduced, starting with developed countries. De-growth strategy Economic growth might also not be socially desirable. Inequalities are on the rise, poverty has not been eliminated and life satisfaction is stagnant. Economic growth is fueled by debt, which corresponds to a colonization of the future. This debt cannot be paid, and the financial system is prone to instability. For instance, scientifically it is not clear how the European Union will achieve a low-carbon economy in the context of economic growth, since it implies a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. In fact, climatologists Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows have argued convincingly that: “[F]or a reasonable probability of avoiding the 2°C characterization of dangerous climate change, the wealthier nations need, temporarily, to adopt a de-growth strategy.” Obviously, a transition from a growth society to a degrowth one poses several challenges. However, the emerging field of ecological macroeconomics is starting to address them convincingly.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Degrowth CP

The CP creates opportunity for the next recession to spur a permanent shift towards degrowth.

Kallis et al. 20

[Giorgos Kallis is an ICREA professor at ICTAUAB, where he teaches ecological economics and political ecology; Susan Paulson, based at the University of Florida, studies and teaches about gender, class, and ethnoracial systems interacting with bodies and environments; Giacomo D’Alisa is based at CES-UC in Coimbra, Portugal; Federico Demaria is a lecturer in ecological economics and political ecology at the University of Barcelona, part of the Environmental Justice Atlas team that studies and maps environmental conflicts and injustices around the world, “Making Changes on the Ground” through “Strategies for Mobilization,” The Case for Degrowth, Polity Press, 2020, pp. 44–109] rc/pfox

Crises can catalyze personal changes, open cracks in dominant norms and expectations, and bring people together to reinvent themselves and their relationships. Angelos Varvarousis explains how, between 2009 and 2016, many Greeks disoriented by prolonged crisis found meaning in cooperative projects ranging from urban gardens, time-banks, and collective art centers to solidarity clinics and food banks.6 The collapse of mass consumption and the crisis of the welfare state destabilized identities that have long been experienced as natural. Ephemeral common experiences, such as mass occupation of public plazas or impromptu planting of gardens, acted as rites of passage for participants transitioning from a past no longer viable to a future yet to be defined. In the practical work of producing new commons, people experiment with new selves and relations.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 1NC – Core › 1NC – Degrowth CP

Transition is smooth and doesn’t collapse the economy.

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification.” https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222 ==MJ

This is known as ‘degrowth’. Degrowth is a planned reduction of energy and resource throughput designed to bring the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces inequal- ity and improves human well-being (Kallis, 2018; Latouche, 2009). It is important to clarify that degrowth is not about reducing GDP, but rather about reducing throughput. From an ecological per- spective, that is what matters. Of course, it is important to accept that reducing throughput is likely to lead to a reduction in the rate of GDP growth, or even a decline in GDP itself, and we have to be prepared to manage that outcome in a safe and just way. This is what degrowth sets out to do. While degrowth theory is attracting increasing attention among academics and social movements, for people new to the idea it raises a number of questions. Here I address questions about language and terminology, questions about economic recession, and questions about international political economy and the North–South divide. The language of degrowth Many of the objections to degrowth have to do with the term itself. Some people worry that degrowth introduces confusion because it is not, in fact, the opposite of growth. When people say ‘growth’ they normally mean growth in GDP, so one might reasonably assume that degrowth is likewise focused on reducing GDP. Proponents of degrowth are therefore condemned to perpetually clarify that degrowth is not about reducing GDP, but rather about reducing material and energy throughput. It would seem that this creates unnecessary problems. But, in fact, the problem here arises from the word growth, not degrowth. In reality, people pursue growth not in order to increase an abstract number (GDP), but because they want to consume or do more, which of course requires using more materials and energy. So when economists and politicians talk about growth they really mean an increase in materials and energy (and specifically an increase in commodified materials and energy), even though this is not stated outright. The preoccupation with GDP is a fetish that obscures this fact; it makes it seem as though growth is immaterial when in reality it is not. If GDP growth did not come along with an increase in material consumption, people would not pursue it (what’s the point of having a higher income if it doesn’t enable you to expand military spending, buy bigger houses and faster cars, or pay people to do things for you?). In this sense, degrowth, with its focus on reducing material and energy use (and reducing patterns of commodification), is in fact an appropriate opposite to growth, and indeed clarifies what growth itself is actually about. Now, one might ask, why use the term degrowth at all, when you could just say ‘we want to reduce energy and material throughput’ and avoid the confusion? There are a few reasons for this. First, most economists would agree that reducing energy and material throughput is important, but they assume this can be accomplished while continuing to pursue economic growth at the same time (indeed, they may even believe that more growth will eventually lead to a reduction in throughput). We need some way of distinguishing the degrowth position from this standard ‘green growth’ assumption. If we accept the empirical evidence that green growth is unlikely to be achieved, then we have to accept that reducing throughput will impact on GDP itself, and we must focus on how to restructure the economy so that this can be managed in a safe and just way. For this, ‘degrowth’ is a simple, handy term that allows us to clarify what is at stake, and concentrates the mind on what is required. Proponents of degrowth often argue that the word degrowth is useful as a ‘missile’ word. For an increasing number of people, it is obvious that perpetual growth is a problem; for them, degrowth seems intuitively correct as a response to ecological crisis, and they can get on board immediately. Other people have a negative initial reaction to the word, but it is nonetheless useful in such cases to the extent that it challenges and disrupts people’s assumptions about how the economy should work, by questioning something that is generally taken for granted as natural and good. In many cases, negative initial reactions give way to contemplation (do high-income countries really need more growth?), and then curiosity (perhaps we can actually flourish with less throughput, and even less output?), and then investigation (what is the relevant empirical evidence?) that eventually leads people to change their views. This kind of intellectual transformation is enabled, not inhibited, by using a provocative term. Trying to avoid provocation, or trying to be agnostic about growth, creates a milieu where proble- matic assumptions remain unidentified and unexamined in favour of polite conversation and agreement. This is not an effective way to advance knowledge, especially when the stakes are so high. Some people worry about using degrowth because it is a ‘negative’ term, rather than positive. But it is only negative if we start from the assumption that more growth is good and desirable. If we want to challenge that assumption, and argue the opposite (that more growth is unnecessary and dama- ging, and that it would be better if we slowed down), then degrowth is a positive term. Take the words colonization and decolonization, for example. We know that those who engaged in coloniza- tion felt it was a good thing. From their perspective – which was the dominant perspective in Europe for most of the past 500 years – decolonization would therefore seem negative. But the point is pre- cisely to challenge the dominant perspective, because the dominant perspective is wrong. Indeed, today we can agree that this stance – a stance against colonization – is correct and valuable: we stand against colonization, and believe that the world would be better without it. That is not a nega- tive vision, but positive; one that’s worth rallying around. Similarly, we can and should aspire to an economy without growth just as we aspire to a world without colonization. We can take this observation one step further. It is important to recognize that the word ‘growth’ has become a kind of propaganda term. In reality, what is going on is a process of elite accumulation, the commodification of commons, and the appropriation of human labour and natural resources – a process that is quite often colonial in character. This process, which is generally destructive to human commu- nities and to ecology, is glossed as growth. Growth sounds natural and positive (who could possibly be against growth?) so people are easily persuaded to buy into it, and to back policies that will generate more of it, when otherwise they might not. Growth is the ideology of capitalism, in the Gramscian sense. It is the core tenet of capitalism’s cultural hegemony. The word degrowth is powerful and effective because it identifies this trick, and rejects it. Degrowth calls for the reversal of the processes that lie behind growth: it calls for disaccumulation, decommodification, and decolonization.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › ?

Fiscal policies and taxation implemented by the government have always been considered a key part of the neoclassical economic model.

Kotlikoff 84 - Kotlikoff, Laurence J. Taxation and savings-A neoclassical perspective. No. w1302. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1984.

ABSTRACT This paper discusses recent neoclassical analyses of taxation and savings. Contrary to the popular view that fiscal policy has highly ambiguous impacts on savings, neoclassical models admit a host of policies with clear and potentially quite powerful affects on the accumulation of wealth. The paper considers four fundamental types of fiscal policies and compares their quantitative effect on savings. The essential elements of these policies involve inter— and intragenerational redistribution, marginal and intra— marginal taxation, and the level of government consumption. Conventional accounting measures of "taxes", spending, and "deficits" provide, at best, little guide to changes in underlying fiscal instruments and, at worst, precisely opposite indicators of the direction of such changes. Indeed, the continued use of and concern with conventional fiscal measures is symptomatic of widespread fiscal illusion. These points are developed within the context of certainty models. The paper also considers the role of fiscal policy in both mitigating and exacerbating economic risks facing the private sector. Since precaution is a major motivation for saving, governments can greatly influence wealth accumulation either by using fiscal policy to pool private risks or by making fiscal policy itself highly uncertain. Laurence J. Kotlikoff National Bureau of Economic Research 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, NA 02138 I. Introduction The ability of governments to alter an econon"s rate of wealth accumulation is a question that has intrigued economists since the inception of the discipline. Recently the issue has received considerable attention from researchers puzzled by historically low U.S. saving rates and dramatic differences in saving rates across industrialized countries. While no consensus on the appropriate model of saving behavior has been reached, investigation of tax policy within a variety of neoclassical models suggests that governments can significantly influence the accrual of national wealth. This assessment of the current state of knowledge about neoclassical savings behavior and government policy differs markedly from a view, still accepted in many circles, that tax policy within the standard economic paradigm has highly ambiguous impacts on wealth accumulation. The ambiguity is associated with allegedly opposing income and substitution effects arising from changes in tax rates, in particular, capital income tax rates. While this allegation is true for a subset of tax changes, neoclassical models admit a host of policies with clear and potentially quite powerful effects on national savings. "Structural" tax changes provide an important example of such effective policies. They are defined here as changes in either the tax base or the progressivity of the rate structure used to generate a given time path of receipts while holding the time path of government consumption fixed. Holding constant the time path of receipts provides a prescription for setting tax rates through time. A key feature of these policies is that they "compensate" the private sector for imposing a new tax by removing an old one. Since these policies involve no changes in the timing and level of the government's direct absorption of resources, they leave unchanged the private sector's intertemporal consumption and leisure possibility frontier.1 If it so chooses the private sector can consume as much and work as little in the new tax regime as it does in the old. Such a response clearly leaves the private sector with the same collective resources to finance its own as well as the government's unaltered time path of consumption. The private sector will, however, generally respond to new tax regimes by choosing a different point on its budget frontier. The movement along this intertemporal frontier and its associated changes through time in savings and labor supply are determined by unambiguous substitution effects and, potentially, income effects. Although there is no aggregate change in income for the private sector, since its possibility frontier has not changed, structural tax changes typically redistribute resources across and within generations. However, for any structural tax policies the net income effects of this redistribution reinforce the substitution effects in raising or lowering savings. The distinction between compensated and uncompensated policy changes is clarified by considering the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Excluding the possibility that government debt can grow indefinitely at a faster rate than that of the economy, this constraint requires governments to equate the present value of receipts, inclusive of base money creation, to the present value of expenditures, inclusive of interest and principal payments on net government debt. While restricting the set of policies, including structural tax policies, that can be used over time to alter wealth formation, the government's long term budget is consistent with a wide range of short and medium term policies. In particular, the government can permit debt to grow fora long time at a faster rate than the economy, although indefinite use of this policy is not feasible.2 In addition to Structural Tax Policy, the government's intertemporal budget constraint suggests three other classes of policies for organizing a discussionof taxation and saving. These are: Tax—financed Changes in Government Consumption—— changes in the time path of government consumption that are contemporaneously financed by adjustments in tax rates of a particular tax base. Intergenerational Tax Policy—— reduced taxation of particular cohorts financed by increased taxation of other cohorts, holding constant the tax base and the time path of government consumption. In contrast to structural tax policy, this rule for setting tax rates involves changes in the time path of total annual tax receipts since total annual tax receipts need not equal annual government consumption. Intragenerational Tax Policy—— reduced taxation of particular members of a cohort contemporaneously financed by increased taxation of other members of that cohort. In contrast to broad structural changes in either the tax base or tax progressivity which are not cohort— _14 specific and, consequently, redistribute intergenerationally, these cohort—specific policies involve only intragenerational redistribution. Analysis of these four classes of policies provides insight into the economic impacts of the essentially unlimited broader combination of these and other policies. This survey is limited to the savings effects of fiscal policy in "full employment" neoclassical models, assuming, in most of the discussion, well functioning capital markets. The emphasis on "full employment" neoclassical models may be justified by the secular, rather than cyclical nature of the subject. In addition, the very significant new body of literature based on such models provides more than enough material for a single survey. Finally, much of the popular discussion concerning the behavior of savings and related variables over the cycle invokes these models, although not always validly. Section II provides background information for the subsequent discussion; it describes long—term trends in U.S. saving rates and domestic investment rates. Striking differences in postwar saving behavior among industrialized nations are also documented. This historical and international evidence provides a healthy perspective on the issue of taxation and saving. Few would argue that long—term trends in U.S. saving rates and the current low rate of U.S. saving relative to those of our principal trading partners are due solely, or even primarily, to differences in fiscal environments. Government policy is a significant determinant of national savings, but it is only one of several important forces at play. Other critical factors that jointly influence savings are intertemporal preferences, demographics, existing technology and the rate of technical change, patterns of human capital formation, the extent of market adianta—family lending, and the degree of market and intra—family risk—pooling. Each of the four stylized policies is considered sequentially in Sections 14through T. Their examination raises a number of traditional topics including the impact of government debt on national savings, the extent to which government consumption substitutes for private consumption, the distinction between investment and savings incentives, the savings impact of progressive taxation, the relationship between human and physical capital accumulation the degree to which borrowing constraints alter the analysis, and the welfare implications of alternative tax structures. The discussion in these sections, which takes up a large portion of this article, ignores issues of uncertainty. Many important and interesting insights can be obtained by working with oxides of certainty. The introduction of uncertainty, in some cases, obscures these insights. In addition, many of the results from certainty models carry over to models with uncertainty. In general, certainty models provide a benchmark for examining current policies in more realistic settings in which tastes, technologies, and indeed future government behavior is uncertain. Analysis of the four classes of policies as constrained by the government’s long term budget makes it clear that the fundamentals of fiscal policy are not aggregate "taxes", "spending", and "deficits", rather they are changes in marginal incentives, intra—marginal redistribution across and within generations, and direct government consumption. Section III examines government and private intertemporal budget constraints for purposes of precisely defining the policies considered in Sections IV through VII. The main objective of Section III is, however, to identify the government's underlying policy instruments and to caution the reader that official accounting definitions of taxes, expenditures, and debt provide little guide to the underlying fiscal structure. On the contrary, our proclivity to discuss such issues as savings and government policy in terms of this conventional nomenclature is symptomatic of widespread fiscal illusion. To drive home this point, Section III demonstrates how identical fiscal policies can be conducted with the government reporting essentially any level of taxes, spending, and deficits that it desires. Describing fiscal policy in terms of its effects on marginal incentives, intramarginal transfers, and direct absorption of resources requires changes in vocabulary and accounting, but a new fiscal language is necessary to discuss consistently the savings impact of our plethora of fiscal policies, all of which ultimately involve these basic elements. A key feature of the new fiscal language should be descriptions of the lifetime budget constraints of a small set of representative households as well as descriptions of the fundamental fiscal instruments that affect these constraints. Household budget constraints depend only on net marginal prices and net intramarginal endowments. Since the calculation of these prices and endowments are free of accounting conventions, a set of representative budget constraints would provide a coherent basis for analyzing the changes in and the consequences of a large variety of fiscal policies. Section VIII addresses the impact of taxation on savings in uncertain environments. A series of contributions (Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave, l941; James Tobin, 1957; Jan Mossin, 1968; Peter Diamond, 1977; James Mirrlees, 19714; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978; Martin Bailey, 1978; Steven Shavell and —7— Laurence Weiss, 1979; Hal Varian, 1980; Roger Gordon, 1981; Alan Auerbach, 1981;Jerenv Bulow and Lawrence Summers, 1982; Jonathan Eaton and Harvey Rosen, 1980;Robert Merton, 1981) expressly or by implication suggest that a variety of tax/transfer schemes constitute implicit insurance markets. To the extent that private provision of insurance is both available at the margin and is as efficient as government insurance, the government's pooling of risks through the tax/expenditure system will have few or no implications either for risk—pooling for national saving. At the opposite extreme one could imagine that, in the absence of government insurance, particular risks would be pooled neither in formal private markets nor in informal family settings. In this case the effect of government taxation on savings is analyzed by simply considering the impact of the availability of each particular type of insurance on national savings. Section VIII describes the potential insurance properties of a number of fiscal policies including capital and labor income taxation, and Social Security's unfunded tax/benefit provisions. Unfortunately, there are few studies that directly compare wealth accumulation with and without particular forms of insurance. Section VIII, as a consequence, draws inferences about taxation, insurance, and savings that are rather speculative in nature. These types of comparisons certainly represent a promising area for future research. The government as a cause of uncertainty, rather than a source of insurance, is an alternative possibility explored briefly in Section VIII. In principle the private sector could self—insure against random government redistribution ang current generations. Capricious redistribution between current and future generations is also potentially insurable assuming intergenerational altruism as in Robert Barro (19Th). Without such private insurance, the impact on savings of government imposed uncertainty is again determined by comparing economies with and without the particular risks generated by the government.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › 2AC – Basic Income – No Link

Basic income is not a form of neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economists reject redistribution to give people incentives to enter the labor force by denying them a safety net.

Lewis et al. 05 [Michael Lewis *Michael Monroe Lewis is an American author and financial journalist. He has also been a contributing editor to Vanity Fair since 2009, writing mostly on business, finance, and economics. He is known for his nonfiction work, particularly his coverage of financial crises and behavioral finance. Steven Pressman *Dr. Pressman is an Emeritus Professor of Economics and Finance at Monmouth University in West Long Branch, NJ. He also serves as co-editor of the Review of Political Economy, as Associate Editor and Book Review Editor of the Eastern Economic Journal, and a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the journal Basic Income Studies. He has served on the Board of Directors of the Association for Social Economics from 2000 to 2002, and has been on the Board of Directors of the Eastern Economic Association from 1994 to the present. Since 1996 he has served as Treasurer of the Eastern Economic Association. In his ten years as Treasurer he has built up a reserve for the organization of around $200,000. Dr. Pressman received his Ph.D. in 1983 from the New School for Social Research. He has published around 120 articles in refereed journals and as book chapters, and has authored, or edited 13 books, including Women in the Age of Economic Transformation (Routledge, 1994), Economics and Its Discontents (Edward Elgar, 1998), A New Guide to Post Keynesian Economics (Routledge, 2001), Alternative Theories of the State (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006), 50 Major Economists, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2006), and Leading Contemporary Economists (Routledge, 2008). His main areas of research are poverty and income distribution, and government tax and spending policies (including basic income plans, Social Security, education financing and spending, taxing e-commerce, health care policy, and anti-poverty policy). Karl Widerquist *Karl Widerquist is an American political philosopher and economist at Georgetown University in their campus in Qatar. “THE BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE AND SOCIAL ECONOMICS.” Review of Social Economy Volume 63, 2005 - ] AZHS

Mainstream economists have also endorsed BIG (Hayek 1944; Friedman 1962; Friedman and Friedman 1980) because of its simplicity and its obvious advantages in simplifying government antipoverty efforts; however, radical neo-liberal economists and many neoclassical economists have rejected any form of redistribution as contrary to the “tough love” policy necessary to give the lazy an incentive to enter the labor force by denying them a social safety net. This opposition to BIG can be criticized both from inside and from outside the domain of so-called value-neutral neoclassical economics. From inside, one must recognize that “tough love” policies, which give workers greater incentive to work, also give employers less incentive to pay livable wages and therefore may not prove very loving toward those workers. Many Americans make the value judgment that poverty wages are too low. A value-neutral economist cannot question that value judgment, but should instead limit herself to addressing the following question: If voters and policymakers want to increase the incomes of low-wage workers, what is the most efficient way to do that? The answer is the basic income guarantee (see Bryan in this volume). Few, if any, economists have the restraint to take the value judgments of voters and policy markers from granted, but if they are serious about value-neutral economics, this is what they will have to do. The statement “BIG should not be introduced if it causes a decrease in work effort,” is a heavily value-laden statement that must be rejected by any economist who takes the fact-value distinction seriously and believes in “values-free” science. A criticism of this view from outside neoclassical economics would recognize that most

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › 2AC – Basic Income Good

Basic income solves unemployment.

Widerquist et al. 13 [Karl Widerquist * American political philosopher and economist at Georgetown University in their campus in Qatar. José A. Noguera * Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Director of the Analytical Sociology and Institutional Design Group (). His empirical research is currently focused on tax compliance, social influence dynamics, prosocial motivations, and the feasibility of universal welfare policies such as basic income. Most of his publications can be consulted in . Yannick Vanderborght * Professor of Political Science at the Saint-Louis University Brussels, Belgium, where he currently directs the Research Centre in Political Science (crespo.be). He is also a member of the Hoover Chair at Louvain University. Jurgen De Wispelaere * Policy Fellow with the Institute for Policy Research at the University of Bath and a Political Economy Research Fellow with the Independent Social Research Foundation. “Basic Income An Anthology of Contemporary Research.” This edition first published 2013 © 2013 Blackwell Publishing ] AZHS

Basic income would share out social security benefits and income tax allowances in such a way as to allow access to employment for the whole adult population, and encourage job-sharing rather than jon-reservation. Because it would be unconditional, its terms would allow people to take such employment as was available with security that their basic needs would be met. In an increasingly fragmented labour market, with more part-time and short-term employment contracts, it would give both men and women incentives to take such work. If Basic Income was introduced in a step-by-step way, with transitional pay- ments of well below subsistence level, this would redistribute employment only at the lowest end of the labour market, and benefit the poor in marginal ways; but as its level rose, so it could effect employment at better wages, and the incentives of more earners. If more generous allowances were paid to people with handicaps, their access to both employment and independence would be improved. Basic Income paid at equal rates to men and women would eventually give better incentives for sharing unpaid work in the house- hold, and women would escape the role of full-time carers, in which the present benefit structure traps them. Basic Income could, of course, be used as a subsistence income by people wanting to do unpaid community work, or be pooled by those starting a co-operative – for example, a co-operative for people with disabilities, or carers. In general, it would allow a more rational division between paid and unpaid work, rather than encouraging the growth of service employment for its own sake. The case for Basic Income as a response to the underclass phenomenon rests, therefore, on two features. By ameliorating (eventually eliminating) the poverty trap, it would give the excluded minority access to the market system of fairness by reward for effort, and hence to savings, property and other private goods. But also, by giving everyone a universal share of resources on the grounds of membership (citizenship), it would be a mechanism for including all in the common good. In my view, Basic Income is the fairest way of sharing out rights, roles, obligations and access in our present situation, but it would not give rise to a just society without and equally determined policy commitment to communal resources for sharing in a good quality of national and local life. A revaluation of the public sphere would be an essential part of such policies, and would help to include the underclass in active citizenship roles. In other words, there should be a redistribution of value from private to public goods, as well as a new priciple for the distribution os income.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › 2AC – Basic Income Good

Many countries have already implemented basic income to help specific groups of people and have proven to be successful.

Molina et al 20 [George Gray Molina* Strategic Policy Engagement, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, NY, USA. María Montoya-Aguirre* Strategic Policy Engagement, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, NY, USA. Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez* Department of International Development, Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy, King’s College London, London, UK. “Temporary Basic Income in Times of Pandemic: Rationale, Costs and Poverty-Mitigation Potential.” ] AZHS

It is urgent and only fair to provide shock-resistant transfers in the form of what is termed in this research note a Temporary Basic Income (TBI). The term basic income has been commonly used to refer to universal basic income (UBI) schemes in a simpler way by longstanding proponents (e.g. , ; , ; ), without implying that the universal component does not still apply to it. Such a term is employed here to denote schemes of emergency cash assistance that are explicitly temporary, while retaining some of the features that characterize UBI. In general, UBI schemes carry the notion of a right to income with an undetermined duration; its coverage is universal or quasi-universal; and its delivery is unconditional, not subject to means or job-seeking testing or spending conditions (see also ). TBI as proposed here, on the other hand, are not universal but targeted to people with livelihoods below a vulnerability-to-poverty threshold, which is at least 70% above the value of the poverty line (see next subsection). While this targeting involves, by definition, a mechanism to exclude non-eligible people, TBI remains unconditional in terms of not imposing behavioural conditions such as job-search or use of the cash benefits. Finally, the delivery of TBI, as with that of UBI, is assumed to be made on an individual basis, regardless of household composition, thus avoiding any assumption of economies of scale and unintended within-household discrimination that could be particularly harmful for women’s empowerment and control of economic resources.[4] The coverage, size, and duration of the TBI schemes shown below assume that the costs of the crisis are widespread, profound and potentially lasting. As such, the amounts per beneficiary might help people to cover some expenses to support education and work from home or assist households to prevent the depletion of productive assets—in addition to enabling people to cover essential spending and, crucially, reaching those who have not been able to make any progress in average consumption through business-as-usual policies (e.g. ). There is strong evidence for developing countries that, in the presence of unconditional cash transfers, human capital accumulation can be protected and boosted through expenditure on more and better diets, as well as on health and education services (see, e.g. ; ). Moreover, by allowing people to meet their essential consumption needs, cash assistance could also lead to the protection and accumulation of productive assets and the diversification of livelihoods (). A few available studies have already reported some positive results regarding the adequacy of emergency cash transfers to mitigate some of the effects of the crisis on peoples’ livelihoods. For instance, experimental evidence from Colombia has shown that the roll-out of the value-added tax compensation—a form of unconditional cash assistance delivered to one million households a week after the national lockdown—exerted moderate, but positive effects in improving households’ financial health, food access, children’s education, and psychological well-being (). Results from simulations on household surveys suggest that emergency cash assistance could have a sizeable and significant offsetting effect of the short-term impacts on food insecurity () and poverty (; ). Finally, although from a high-income context, an unintended consequence of the delivery of a universal one-off grant is worth mentioning. While most people allocated it to debt relief, a sizeable share (up to 18%), composed mostly of relatively richer citizens, transferred their grant to supplement the incomes of poorer relatives and friends (). The idea of a TBI arises from the urgency to deliver shock-resistant transfers to an unprecedented crisis. Several countries have taken a step forward in this direction by rolling out similar schemes under different names and with diverse targeting thresholds. Tuvalu, for instance, implemented a fully-fledged scheme that does fulfill the UBI criteria, although articulated as having a limited lifespan (). Spain approved a long-term commitment to provide a minimum income guarantee for vulnerable families up to a minimum threshold.[5] In Colombia, the government introduced the Solidarity Income scheme to deliver resources to an additional three million vulnerable households—and increase the cash transfers for 12 million people through existing assistance schemes (). Additional examples include Serbia’s universal one-off payments, or the schemes launched by the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, or Philippines with coverages ranging from half to three fourths of the total population ().

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › 2AC – Basic Income Good

Basic income good – ensures all those who choose not to work, or are constrained, have alternatives they would not have under a capitalist system.

Panitch 11 [Vida Panitch *Associate Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University, Canada. She has published many article on concepts of commodification and exploitation, including “Transnational Surrogacy and the Justice Condition of Non-Exploitation” in the American Journal of Bioethics (2014). “Basic income, decommodification and the welfare state.” Philosophy & social criticism, 2011 - journals.sagepub.com ] AZHS

Van Parijs’ proposal entails the transfer of a minimum income to all members of society regardless of their willingness to work, no matter whom they live with, or whether they are rich or poor.3 He defends this proposal on the grounds that an unconditional income would provide people with the freedom to choose not only what to buy but how to spend their time, and hence with the opportunity to do whatever it is they might want to do with their life. He argues that even Malibu surfers should be entitled to the basic income to pursue their particular lifestyle, despite the fact that they are perfectly able to contribute productively to the economy and pay taxes to the state from which they obtain support. 4 In response to this claim he has encountered the following challenge: In granting a basic income that is not conditioned on the willingness of the able to work, the UBI promotes freedom without responsibility, and thereby both offends and undermines the ideal of social obligation that undergirds the [liberal] welfare state. A UBI would not only inspire a segment of the able population – largely young, healthy, unattached adults – to abjure work for a life of idle fun. It would also depress the willingness to produce and pay taxes of those who resent having to support them. . . . The social insurance programs that form the foundation of modern welfare states constitute the terms of a great social con- tract. Like any insurance, they purchase a right to provision from others conditional on a willingness to provide for others, if one is able. . . . The contract is thus sustained and legitimated only by a recognition on the part of the able of an obligation to work and pro- vide for the dependent and those who care for them. It is hard to see how such a contract can be sustained by a system that advertises as one of its virtues that it would free the able to live in idleness. 5 This criticism stems from the liberal view that, insofar as society constitutes a coopera- tive venture for mutual advantage, the benefits of cooperation should be reserved for those who participate in this venture, or at least for those who are willing, if unable, to do so. What this critique of Van Parijs’ project misses, however, is that while he tries (appar- ently unsuccessfully) to make his view palatable to liberal theorists by appealing to the concepts of freedom and neutrality, he does not attempt to offer justificatory grounds for the liberal welfare state. Indeed, on his view, liberal schemes are eminently unfair, not simply because of their limited and conditional nature, but because they make social 2 Philosophy and Social Criticism 000(00) entitlement entirely dependent on a citizen’s willingness to participate in the capitalist market economy. Van Parijs criticizes John Rawls, for example, for restricting mem- bership in the worst-off group to the working poor by including leisure time among the primary goods (calculated as 24 hours minus a standard working day). On Rawls’ scheme, the more leisure time one has, the higher the index of primary goods one can be said to hold; someone who does not work a standard working day (for whatever reason) will not qualify as among the worst-off and will thus be ineligible for welfare benefits. In a similar critique of Ronald Dworkin’s scheme, Van Parijs argues that since the choice not to work could be understood as precisely that – a choice (as opposed to a circumstance) – any shortfalls suffered as a result of this choice would have to be borne by the individual alone. 6 Unlike liberal theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin, Van Parijs is clearly not con- cerned to justify welfare programs reserved for those unable rather than unwilling to work, but rather to ensure that all those who choose not to work, or are constrained by a lifestyle that does not include (well-paid) wage-labor, are provided with genuine alternatives they would not otherwise have under a capitalist economic system. And the liberal criticism that his scheme permits and encourages young, healthy, unattached adults to abjure productive work for a life of idle fun has somewhat less bite when we consider the extent to which a basic income might be particularly beneficial, not so much to Malibu surfers, but to students, single mothers and artists, who would no longer be required to support themselves by taking jobs that would prevent them from pursuing the very lifestyles they were seeking to support, and to the working poor, who would no longer be forced to take the most menial, alienating and exploitative of jobs simply to survive. The foundational idea of the basic income, for Van Parijs, is thus not to encourage idleness and free-riding, but to separate social entitlement from labor market participa- tion, and to ensure that social freedom is not conditional on the individual’s willingness to sell her or his labor power like any other marketable commodity. His defense of a UBI, he states, reflects ‘a key component of the old critique of capitalism by ‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘utopian’’ socialism alike: the revolt against proletarian subjection to the wage relation- ship, and hence to the capitalists’ rule’. 7 The institutionalization of a UBI would thus constitute a profound moral reform, for Van Parijs, not because it realizes the liberal ideal of reciprocity, but because it liberates individuals from market dependency and thereby decommodifies labor.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › 2AC – Basic Income Good

Basic Income is a facet in which humans can reciprocate cooperative behavior in order to challenge the assumptions of neoclassical theories and create a real world model of situations in which the idea of a basic income can solve real world problems.

Lewis 5’ -  Michael Lewis is an American author and financial journalist. He has a B.A in art and archaeology from Princeton University, USA, and graduated cum laude. He also subsequently attended the London School of Economics, UK, and received an MA in economics in 1985. [“The basic income guarantee and social economics”, Review of Social Economy, Volume 64, 2005, issue no. 4, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00346760500364536] AT GH  

A criticism of this view from outside neoclassical economics would recognize that most people do not behave as neoclassical economists assert they must, and that the world is not configured in the simple way that neoclassical economists presuppose. As Robert Frank (1988) and others have pointed out, people vote, they donate blood, they engage in acts of heroism, and they refuse to defect in single-play prisoner’s dilemma games. None of this would be possible if people were only motivated by self-interest. Altruistic behavior seems to exist side-by-side with selfish behavior (Widerquist 2003). Similarly, a good deal of psychological research, stemming from the work of Kahneman and Tversky, has demonstrated that people frequently act based on habits or heuristics rather than by following the axioms of economic rationality (Plous 1993). The question then becomes an empirical one—which of these forces on human nature is greater in various contexts? Do habits and altruistic behavior tend to trump neoclassical rationality when incomes are guaranteed, or will most people work less hard? There is some empirical evidence that government attempts to redistribute income do not adversely affect economic growth or labor efforts, at least given current levels of redistribution and current social mores (Pressman 2004). This evidence bodes well for the efficacy of a basic income guarantee. Recent work in evolutionary game theory has argued that social interdependencies do matter. Many real world situations take the form of social dilemmas like the famous prisoner’s dilemma (see Poundstone 1992). In these situations, what is rational based on short-run individual utility maximization yields outcomes that leave everyone worse off. The best possible results in social dilemmas arise when individuals follow norms of reciprocity and general social rules rather than engaging in selfish utility maximization. Moreover, evolutionary psychologists have produced substantial evidence that human beings have evolved in such a manner that they have the capacity to learn these norms and rules in order to gain from social interaction (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). Our genetic disposition towards not defecting in social situations implies that individuals may not shirk when given income guarantees. One important reason for this is that shirking generally leads to punishment. BIG punish shirkers by forcing them to live off the social minimum, which may be all the punishment we need. There is no certainty that the current system of using homelessness as the punishment for shirking is necessary to keep the labor market functioning. From an evolutionary perspective, a basic income guarantee can be viewed as a social experiment designed to yield gains from cooperative behavior; but it is an experiment undertaken with the understanding that benefits can be reduced if it turns out that shirking behavior exceeds socially acceptable levels. All this work, from many different perspectives and disciplines, calls into question the main objections to a basic income guarantee. It also supports the assumptions of social economics, and opens the door for policy proposals, like a basic income guarantee. The book review (below) by Joel Blau describes one BIG proposal for Ireland developed by Charles M.A. Clark. Clark would give a bit more than 100 Euros per week to working age adults, larger amounts to the elderly and smaller amounts to children. This would be financed by a flat tax. The papers that follow all develop the economic and philosophical case for such basic income guarantee plans from diverse perspectives and disciplines.