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2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Impacts › !---Nuclear Extinction---2NC/1NR

Nuclear risk is existential and independently turns climate.

Torres ’23 [Émile. *philosopher who writes about existential risk, PhD candidate in philosophy at Leibniz Universität Hannover in Germany, writing has been published by the Washington Post, Aeon, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Futures. “The Doomsday Clock Is an Imperfect Metaphor — but the Existential Danger Is All Too Real.” Salon. February 5, 2023. https://www.salon.com/2023/02/05/the-doomsday-clock-is-an-imperfect-metaphor--but-the-existential-danger-is-all-too-real/.]perth

Yet even Mainländer acknowledged that persuading everyone to stop their baby-making activities (he advocated for celibacy) would be difficult. Human extinction by choosing not to procreate just isn't realistic. But thermonuclear weapons really could create an anthropogenic extinction scenario. How? The main danger, you may be surprised to learn, isn't from the initial blasts. Those would certainly be catastrophic, and indeed the most powerful thermonuclear weapon ever detonated — the Soviet-made , tested just once in 1961 — had an explosive yield more than 1,500 times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, which destroyed much of the city. That's bigger than most of the weapons in our nuclear arsenal, but these can still wreak horrific havoc, as you can  by testing out different weapons in different cities on Nuke Map.

But in fact, the greater threat comes from the possibility that nuclear explosions would ignite massive conflagrations called firestorms, so hot that they produce their own gale-force winds. The explosion over Hiroshima, in fact, triggered a hellish firestorm that, along with the initial blast, killed roughly  of the city's population. The intense heat would catapult large quantities of the black soot produced by these fires straight through the troposphere — the layer of the atmosphere closest to Earth's surface — and into the stratosphere, the next layer up, which you may have traversed if you've ever flown in a commercial jetliner over the poles.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Internals › i/L---Russia Militarism---2NC/1NR

It's the bedrock for every assertive action.

Gros ‘15 [Daniel. *German economist who currently serves as the Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies, a European think tank. The price of oil and Soviet/Russian aggressiveness. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2015.]perth

There has been much speculation about the reasons that prompted President Putin’s increasingly hostile reaction in 2012-13 to the negotiations on an EU-Ukraine association agreement. The chain of events is well known. Russian pressure led the then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, to decline to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, which sparked the Euro Maidan in Kyiv. These protests were then used a pretext for the annexation of Crimea and the support for anti-Maidan rebels in the Donbass region, which was then followed by an outright, even if covert, invasion. It is often argued that Russia is reacting to a perceived encroachment of the EU/NATO on an area that it considers its own neighbourhood (and President Putin said as much during his annual end-of-the-year press conference in December). However, history suggests that the underlying reason for Russian aggressiveness is simpler: A decade-long period of a steadily rising oil prices (and that of other raw materials) created a feeling of strength, bordering on invulnerability, which made Russia more assertive, and ready to use any opportunity to deploy its military power. The abrupt reversal of this trend since the summer of 2014 will thus be the harbinger of a much less aggressive Russian stance as long as oil remains at present levels.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Internals › i/L---Russia Militarism---2NC/1NR

History shows a straight line between high prices and Russian militarism.

The Economist ’16 [“Oil Price and Russian Politics: A History.” The Economist. January 21, 2016.

That the oil price correlated with Soviet politics is not surprising – in the uncompetitive command economy oil and gas revenues accounted for 67% of all exports. But the correlation remained just as strong after the end of the Soviet Union and transition to a market economy, and oil and gas remained the main source of Russian export revenues. When Vladimir Putin came to power the price of oil was $25 [twenty-five dollars] a barrel. Mr Putin allied himself with America, did not object to NATO’s enlargement that took in the Baltic States and saw September 11th 2001 as Russia’s chance to get closer to NATO. Seven years later, when the oil price was at $105 [one hundred and one dollars] a barrel, Russia invaded Georgia, and its relationship with America deteriorated dramatically. Thanks to the global financial crisis, oil prices soon fell to $67 a barrel, and Russia accepted Barack Obama's attempted "reset" (though that effort soon went sour). Over the last two years, Russia has stepped up its aggressive stance abroad. The invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea took place when the price of oil was still over $100 [one hundred dollars] a barrel.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Internals › i/L---Aggression---2NC/1NR

Oil wealth uniquely augments petrostate power towards risk-taking elites and removes barriers for escalation.

Petti ’22 [Matthew. *former national security reporter at the National Interest and a 2020-2021 Fulbright fellow. “Are We Past 'Peak Petrostate'?” Reason. September 24, 2022. https://reason.com/2022/09/24/are-we-past-peak-petrostate/.]perth

Emma Ashford, a foreign policy scholar at the Stimson Center, makes the opposite claim in Oil, the State, and War. It isn't the need for cheap energy that drives foreign policy, she argues; it's the economics of energy production that make petrostates more trigger-happy. On one hand, control over energy markets removes constraints on warmaking. On the other hand, the "resource curse" warps political institutions. And of course, oil money helps governments buy fancy weapons.

Oil is unique in how it influences state behavior. Like many other natural resources, petroleum is scarce and expensive. Unlike those other resources, oil is necessary for the world economy to keep running. And all oil is bought and sold on the same global market, priced in U.S. dollars, meaning a change anywhere affects prices everywhere.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Internals › !---High Price Turn---2NC/1NR

Link alone turns case---high prices reinforce drilling cycles, reversing green investment.

Gardner ’22 [Timothy. *reporter for Reuters. “Explainer: Why $100 Oil Could Hurt the Energy Transition More than It Helps.” Reuters. March 3, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/why-100-oil-could-hurt-energy-transition-more-than-it-helps-2022-03-03/.]perth

The surge in crude oil prices past $100 a barrel has raised a big question: Will this latest spike in the notoriously volatile oil market help to speed the global transition from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources to fight climate change?

The answer is probably not.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › AT: Renewables Link Turn---2NC/1NR

Renewables are only cheap because of fossil fuels---rapid transition explodes long-term costs.

Toh ’21 [Lucas. *International Fellow in Columbia University’s Master of Public Administration program. “Let’s Come Clean: The Renewable Energy Transition Will Be Expensive.” Columbia Climate School. October 26, 2021. https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/10/26/lets-come-clean-the-renewable-energy-transition-will-be-expensive/.]perth

Environmentalists have been telling us that wind and solar mean cheaper, cleaner energy. They herald a future of electric vehicles quietly zipping around on electricity that created thousands of green jobs. If all of this is true, why are we suffering from a global energy crisis just months after adding record amounts of new renewable capacity?

The reality is that wind and solar are only cheap during the early stages of transition. Until now, renewables have been viable because of the massive base of fossil fuel generation that supplies most of our electricity needs and also stands in for intermittent wind and solar. But this changes as renewable penetration increases. Relying on more and more fossil fuels to shore up a growing share of intermittent renewables becomes increasingly costly and risky, as Europe is finding out. Then, moving to the next stage of the energy transition requires massive spending to get past using fossil fuels for baseload and balancing electricity. To be clear, these costs are justified, given that the costs of unabated climate change will be far higher. But continuing to push the false narrative of abundant and affordable clean energy is a huge political risk that will backfire when the public has to pony up for a bill they weren’t expecting.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L-—Carbon Tax---2NC/1NR

CARBON PRICING---it necessitates higher oil prices.

Jack ’22 [Gregory. *VP of Public Affairs @ Ipsos. “Carbon Taxes Are Meant to Boost Gas Prices….” Ipsos. April 22, 2022. https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/knowledge/society/carbon-taxes-are-meant-to-boost-gas-prices.]perth

The idea behind a carbon tax is simple. Fossil fuels like oil and natural gas exact a cost on the environment that is not captured in their market price. By forcing people to “pay more,” the carbon tax “internalizes the externality,” or reveals the hidden or true cost of burning fossil fuels. That is, it gets people to pay the actual cost of burning fossil fuels.

Those who use less still get the rebate. They effectively get a double benefit, saving money by spending less because they reduce their use of fossil fuels, while at the same time receiving the rebate based on the average carbon price paid in their province. This benefit relies on them changing their behaviour and spending less on fossil fuels.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L---Speed---2NC/1NR

SPEED---the plan’s unanticipated pivot hikes prices.

Kennedy ‘23 [Charles. *writer for Oil Price. “BP’s CEO Warns of Oil and Gas Price Spikes If Energy Transition Is Rushed.” Oil Price. February 28, 2023. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/BPs-CEO-Warns-Of-Oil-And-Gas-Price-Spikes-If-Energy-Transition-Is-Rushed.html.]perth

The energy transition needs to happen in an orderly fashion, BP's chief executive Bernard Looney said on Tuesday, warning of renewed oil and gas price spikes if supply is cut too quickly without a drop in demand.

"Reducing supply without also reducing demand inevitably leads to price spikes – price spikes, leads to economic volatility," Looney said at the International Energy Week event in London today, weeks after BP scaled back its emissions targets and said it would produce more oil and gas for longer.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L---Underinvestment---2NC/1NR

UNDERINVESTMENT---renewable funding trades off with oil.

Newman ’22 [Rick. *senior columnist at Yahoo Finance. “Why the War on Fossil Fuels Is Causing Chaos.” Yahoo News. December 8, 2022. https://news.yahoo.com/why-the-war-on-fossil-fuels-is-causing-chaos-182128187.html.]perth

But the war on fossil fuels that are the source of those carbon emissions is causing its own forms of chaos.

Oil, natural gas and other types of carbon-based fuel will be essential for decades, yet the pace of investment in future capacity is declining in the United States and other western nations, and chronic shortages are becoming likely. There’s plenty of carbon in the ground, but energy firms no longer want to risk the long-term investments required to get it out.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L---Consolidation---2NC/1NR

No link turns---transition is irrelevant for suppliers solely dependent on oil.

Goldthau & Westphal ‘19 [Andreas and Kirsten. *professor of public policy @ Central European University **assistant professor for international relations and foreign policy @ the University of Gießen. "Why the global energy transition does not mean the end of the petrostate." Global Policy 10, no. 2 (2019): 279-283.]perth

The global energy transformation does not mean the end of the petrostate. The low carbon transition may in fact well facilitate new oligopolies, and a higher market concentration among fewer crude suppliers. As energy‐intensive sectors dislocate from fast‐decarbonizing OECD countries, this presents oil 6 producer countries with new export opportunities in refined oil products and in the fast‐growing petrochemicals sector. ‘Peak demand’ will remain an OECD‐centered phenomenon for the foreseeable future, with growth in oil consumption ‘moving East’ before eventually also flattening out there. For traditional oil exporters this opens inroads into the new demand centers in South East Asia (and Latin America). In the long run, oil will cease to play a role in a low carbon energy system. Until then, it will continue filling the pockets of a significant number of petrostates. An important policy challenge will lie in dealing with the very high cost producers whose social contract obligations deprive them of viable alternatives to ‘panic and pump’, and whose short‐term political outlook may include the possibility of collapse. Fast decarbonizers, i.e. mostly the rich world, will need to prepare for tipping points at which the rising spread between the social and the market price of oil fatally tilts the domestic politics against these countries incumbent regimes. The speed of the decar‐ bonization pathway will play an important role in that regard. The energy geopolitics of a low carbon future might for some time resemble the ones of the fossil past. Fast decarbonizers committed to making the bright clean energy future work will therefore need to prepare for a two‐fold challenge: managing a rapidly changing energy system in order to secure the transformation dividends it will bring, for human security and economic welfare (Goldthau, Keim, and Westphal 2018); and balancing the (geo)political afterpains of the incumbent fuels leaving the system.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L---Consolidation---2NC/1NR

CONSOLIDATION---insulated petrostates quickly capitalize on shortages to win market domination.

Colgan & Hinthorn ’23 [Jeff D., and Miriam. *Associate Professor of Political Science @ Brown University **PhD student @ MIT. "International Energy Politics in an Age of Climate Change." Annual Review of Political Science 26 (2023).]perth

On an international level, a common narrative about the energy transition is that oil- and coal exporting states stand to lose the most, as their energy reserves will eventually become stranded assets, meaning assets that become devalued earlier than expected (Bos & Gupta 2018, Van de Graaf & Bradshaw 2018). Consequently, these states are often expected to lose political leverage over today’s hydrocarbon importers (Overland et al. 2019). However, while fossil fuel exporters as a category of states may be losers of the energy transition, that does not mean that each and every exporting state will be. Some states, especially those with fossil fuels that are especially attractive on economic or geopolitical grounds, are likely to continue pumping oil for many years to come. Moreover, while demand for fossil fuels may fall, if supply falls at an even faster rate as various producers exit the market, there could be shortages and price spikes. Paradoxically, the energy transition could increase the profitability and geopolitical leverage of the remaining fossil fuel exporters for a period of time (Goldthau & Westphal 2019, Bordoff & O’Sullivan 2022)

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L---Stranding---2NC/1NR

The short-term rush to drill kills off renewables---independently turns case.

Konrad ’22 [Kai. *director at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. “An Unexpected Future for Oil and Gas.” Max Planck Society. July 2022. https://www.mpg.de/19037054/an-unexpected-future-for-oil-and-gas.]perth

Moreover, even if these collective efforts were to succeed in reducing global demand for oil and gas, a second problem would arise. The world’s oil and natural gas reserves will not simply disappear when demand for them collapses. For example, the deposits under the desert sands of Saudi Arabia still hold billions of barrels of fossil fuels – with a value of billions upon billions of euros at today’s market prices. But what would it mean for Saudi Arabia if global demand for oil and gas were to dry up within a few decades? The remaining reserves would become largely worthless, and so it’s better for Saudi Arabia – and any other country with large oil and gas deposits – to pump its own reserves out of the ground quickly and sell them before they lose their value. From an economic perspective, these considerations can be understood via intertemporal equilibrium models for exhaustible natural resources, and are consistent with fundamental scientific insights in the field of resource economics. Market logic dictates that falling demand in the future will lead to a rapidly increasing supply of oil and gas in the present and hence to a fall in prices. As prices fall, the use of oil and gas will increase, and so will CO2 emissions in countries that are not party to a climate agreement – and elsewhere – until the demand restrictions imposed by such an agreement take effect. The drop in prices will also make it difficult for alternative energy sources to assert themselves in a market flooded with cheap oil and gas. Moreover, there will be a decrease in the natural incentives for innovation in green technologies.

The impact of war and sanctions has meant that gas and oil prices have not followed this pattern in recent weeks. Although it will take a while to compensate for disruptions in the supply coming from Russia, these disruptions do not affect the total quantity of oil and gas available for extraction over time. In this respect, this price volatility does not contradict the supply decisions outlined here – and these decisions are likely to be taken in the coming years and decades should a binding and effective global climate agreement be adopted.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › Links › L---Green Transition---2NC/1NR

TRANSITION---policy action has the greatest influence on pricing.

Salisu et al. ‘23 [Afees A., Umar B. Ndako, and Xuan Vinh Vo. *researchers from Centre for Econometrics and Applied Research, Ibadan, Nigeria b Institute of Business Research, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam c Economic Policy Directorate, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria d Institute of Business Research and CFVG Ho Chi Minh City, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam. "Transition risk, physical risk, and the realized volatility of oil and natural gas prices." Resources Policy 81 (2023): 103383.]perth

The increasing concern around climate change and its associated risk has continued to attract the attention of researchers aimed at providing technical support to investors and policy makers to guide their decisions. The motivation for this study is further underscored by the behavior of the energy market that is characterized by huge emissions with more severe impacts on climate change than most of the other non-energy markets. Consequently, we demonstrate how investors in the energy markets can price climate risks by focusing on three related objectives. First, we first establish the connection between climate risk and energy market volatility in order to understand how energy-related risk reacts to climate change-related risk. Note that climate risk is technically partitioned into transition (based on climate policy and decisions from international summits on climate) and physical risks (based on global warming and climate-related disasters) (see Faccini et al., 2021, 2022) and therefore we perform distinct analyses for the two climate risk measures. The outcome from these distinct analyses is important for policy decisions and necessary strategic measures to take in addressing climate risk. Second, we further test whether the inclusion of climate risk in the predictive model of energy market volatility improves its out-of-sample forecasts. This information is useful for energy pricing that accommodates climate risk. Thus, in the third objective, we examine the extent to which the pricing of climate risk can offer better utility gains than ignoring it. For brevity, we consider two major energy commodities, oil and natural gas, that contribute significantly to emissions and therefore, our conclusions are drawn from the results obtained for the two commodities. Nonetheless, several robustness checks are rendered to strengthen the reliability of our findings and allow for meaningful generalization for other energy- and perhaps non-energy-related commodities.

Our findings are summarized as follows. One, we find that climate risk affects energy risk and including the former in the predictive model of the latter improves out-of-sample forecasts across multiple forecast horizons. Two, transition risk appears to have greater effect on energy risk than physical risk and we may therefore assume that investors in the energy market are more concerned about the policy actions and strategies directed towards mitigating climate change. Third, we also note that investors that directly observe climate risks when pricing energy commodities are more likely to derive higher economic gains than those that ignore the risks and the outcome from transition risk is greater than that of physical risk. Therefore, profit-seeking investors in the energy market are encouraged to pay attention to the global discuss around climate risk, particularly transition risks as they have the ability to influence the volatility formation of crude oil and natural gas significantly. Likewise, practitioners and academics who are constantly involved in the analyses of energy markets may find our proposed model and the various conclusions insightful, particularly in terms of producing more accurate forecasts when analysing the risks associated with the energy market. Future research may consider whether the above findings can be generalized to include other natural resources like gold and silver.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › UQ › AT: Transition Now---2NC/1NR

Oil is inevitable---it’s only a matter of meeting global demands.

Kelanic ’20 [Rosemary. *Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Black gold and blackmail: Oil and great power politics. Cornell University Press, 2020.]perth

The NPS predicts that even if all of the above policy promises are kept, global oil demand will increase by roughly 10 million barrels per day (mb/d) from about 95 mb/d in 2017 to 106 mb/d in 2040, with nearly the entire demand increase coming from developing countries such as India and China. That is the optimistic scenario. Limiting the increase in demand to such a small rise over the next twenty years would represent a staggering policy achievement; to hit those num- bers, the number of electric cars in use would have to increase more than ninetyfold, from about 3.3 million vehicles today (or roughly 0.3 percent of a global fleet of 1,100 million cars) to 300 million by 2040 (roughly 15 percent of a projected fleet of 2,000 million cars). Absent the promised policy interventions, oil demand would instead increase by 26 mb/d to reach 121 mb/d over the same period.3 How likely are countries to meet the aspirational targets articulated in the Paris Agreement and elsewhere? There is ample reason for pessimism, not least because Donald Trump has committed to pulling the United States, currently the world’s largest oil consumer, out of the treaty altogether. Dealing with climate change is a nightmare from the point of view of international cooperation. Compliance with emissions-reducing international agreements is costly, states have strong incentives to free ride off the climate policies of others, and no enforcement mechanism exists to punish states that cheat. It is a safe bet that the probability that states will fully adhere to stated promises—especially now that the United States has shrugged them off—is zero. Future oil consumption, therefore, will almost certainly surpass projections made by the NPS. Because the NPS understates future demand, the analysis in this chapter, which is based on that scenario, represents the lower bound of the strategic problems facing petroleum-deficit states. We can be relatively confident that future petroleum deficits will be at least as bad as the estimates made below

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › UQ › AT: Transition Now---2NC/1NR

Transition is non-existent absent dramatic policy action---that makes the plan a unique trigger.

Colgan & Hinthorn ’23 [Jeff D., and Miriam. *Associate Professor of Political Science @ Brown University **PhD student @ MIT. "International Energy Politics in an Age of Climate Change." Annual Review of Political Science 26 (2023).]perth

The first reason is that societies have been slow to politically accept climate change as a reality, and even slower to figure out a response to it (Keohane & Victor 2011, Hayes & Knox-Hayes 2014, Tingley & Tomz 2014, Allan 2018). Even in the face of climate-related disasters, voters are reluctant to update their climate beliefs or economic behavior ( Javeline & Kijewski-Correa 2019). In part, this is because of intentional efforts by businesses and interest groups opposed to proclimate policy (Oreskes & Conway 2011, Brulle & Roberts 2017).

A second reason is that, even in the face of climate change, most voters are not willing to sacrifice energy consumption for environmental goals, and their willingness to pay for climate mitigation measures is relatively low (Kotchen et al. 2013, Ansolabehere & Konisky 2014). Moreover, voters tend to punish political incumbents for rising energy prices (Decker & Wohar 2007, Ross et al. 2017). The anticipated clean energy transition also will likely hurt those who make their livelihoods in ways related to fossil fuels (Downie 2019, Mildenberger 2020, Gaikwad et al. 2022). Therefore, voters are likely to penalize politicians who advocate for the measures needed to bring about the energy transition as quickly as possible. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that humanity will achieve the more ambitious goals for climate sustainability, like limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › UQ › U---Low Prices---2NC/1NR

Prices have stabilized after Ukraine.

Sonenshine 3/29 [Jacob. *analyst for Barron’s. “Oil Prices Have Dropped Sharply. Its next Move Is Key.” Barron’s. March 29, 2023. https://www.barrons.com/articles/crude-oil-price-stocks-8a4409c0.]perth

The price of oil has dropped significantly, and now faces a technical crossroads. Crude’s next move will be key for investors in both oil contracts and oil stocks. 

WTI crude oil has fallen 9% to about $72 a barrel from its level just before the banking sector’s troubles emerged earlier this month. Those issues have stoked fears that lending, and therefore spending, will slow down, which would decrease demand for oil. 

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
Block › UQ › U---Controls Prices---2NC/1NR

US oil exports set the direction for global prices.

Slav ’23 [Irina. *reporter for Oil Price. “U.S. Influence on Global Oil Prices Is Growing.” Oil Price. February 17, 2023. https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/US-Influence-On-Global-Oil-Prices-Is-Growing.html.]perth

These travels made the U.S. a factor in global oil price-setting just as it climbed up to the place of the world’s biggest oil producer. OPEC had a worthy challenger for the first time in its history. The change was so dramatic that oil market observers touring the media produced a mountain of analysis claiming that OPEC was dead, killed by U.S. shale.

While this proved to be a premature statement, the price-setting power of the United States on the oil market has certainly increased significantly. Most of the significance of this increase came last year, after the European Union began sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and, among everything else, targeted its oil sector. The obvious alternative for the still energy-intensive EU was the oil produced by its sanction allies in the United States.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
1NC › Scenarios › Russia---1NC

Goes nuclear.

Gabuev ’22 [Alexander. *senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Putin’s Doomsday Scenario.” The Atlantic. November 11, 2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/russia-putin-nuclear-escalation-ukraine-war/672082/.]perth

Neither should anyone set too much store by the ostensible restrictions in Russian nuclear doctrine. Despite them, as many senior Russian officials have pointed out, the doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory against conventional aggression. Furthermore, their vague language could give Putin plenty of room for maneuver—something seen in the serial instances on his watch in which Russian laws, including the constitution itself, have been bent or violated.

From Moscow’s point of view, the illegally annexed territories now belong to Russia. Accordingly, losing them to an invading army would mean one thing: Russia’s nuclear arsenal is no deterrent to any potential aggressor. The way that senior Ukrainian officials have been framing the breakup of Russia as a desired outcome of the war is not helpful—serving only to confirm Putin in his long-held belief that the West’s goal in supporting Ukraine is regime change in Moscow and the destruction of his country.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
1NC › Scenarios › Russia---1NC

High prices supercharge Russian risk-taking.

Moran ’22 [Michael. *journalist for Al Jazeera. “Russia-Ukraine Crisis: When Oil Prices Climb, Putin Gets Bolder.” Al Jazeera. February 4, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/4/russia-ukraine-crisis-when-oil-prices-climb-putin-gets-bolder.]perth

Amid the historic tensions between Russia and Ukraine and the grand geopolitical dynamics currently unfolding between Moscow and the West, the role that crude oil plays in greasing the wheels of conflict can become obscured.

But a look back at past conflicts reveals a strong correlation between soaring oil prices and Moscow’s willingness to assert its will aggressively beyond its borders.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
1NC › Scenarios › Middle East---1NC

That causes great power war.

Klare ’18 [Michael. *Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. “Gearing up for the Third Gulf War.” Common Dreams. May 14, 2018. https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/05/14/gearing-third-gulf-war.]perth

Like the first two Gulf wars, the third could involve high-intensity clashes between an array of American forces and those of Iran, another well-armed state. While the United States has been fighting ISIS and other terrorist entities in the Middle East and elsewhere in recent years, such warfare bears little relation to engaging a modern state determined to defend its sovereign territory with professional armed forces that have the will, if not necessarily the wherewithal, to counter major U.S. weapons systems.

A Third Gulf War would distinguish itself from recent Middle Eastern conflicts by the geographic span of the fighting and the number of major actors that might become involved. In all likelihood, the field of battle would stretch from the shores of the Mediterranean, where Lebanon abuts Israel, to the Strait of Hormuz, where the Persian Gulf empties into the Indian Ocean. Participants could include, on one side, Iran, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and assorted Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen; and, on the other, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). If the fighting in Syria were to get out of hand, Russian forces could even become involved.