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2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Rightsizing

Restraint is effective. Only offshore balancing in the Persian Gulf preserves primacy, ensures domestic development, and checks terrorism and proliferation.

Walt & Mearsheimer ‘16 – [John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Stephen Walt is Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," Foreign Affairs, , July/August, 2016] TDI

Americans’ distaste for the prevailing grand strategy should come as no surprise, given its abysmal record over the past quarter century. In Asia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are expanding their nuclear arsenals, and China is challenging the status quo in regional waters. In Europe, Russia has annexed Crimea, and U.S. relations with Moscow have sunk to new lows since the Cold War. U.S. forces are still fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, with no victory in sight. Despite losing most of its original leaders, al Qaeda has metastasized across the region. The Arab world has fallen into turmoil—in good part due to the United States’ decisions to effect regime change in Iraq and Libya and its modest efforts to do the same in Syria—and the Islamic State, or ISIS, has emerged out of the chaos. Repeated U.S. attempts to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace have failed, leaving a two-state solution further away than ever. Meanwhile, democracy has been in retreat worldwide, and the United States’ use of torture, targeted killings, and other morally dubious practices has tarnished its image as a defender of human rights and international law.

The United States does not bear sole responsibility for all these costly debacles, but it has had a hand in most of them. The setbacks are the natural consequence of the misguided grand strategy of liberal hegemony that Democrats and Republicans have pursued for years. This approach holds that the United States must use its power not only to solve global problems but also to promote a world order based on international institutions, representative governments, open markets, and respect for human rights. As “the indispensable nation,” the logic goes, the United States has the right, responsibility, and wisdom to manage local politics almost everywhere. At its core, liberal hegemony is a revisionist grand strategy: instead of calling on the United States to merely uphold the balance of power in key regions, it commits American might to promoting democracy everywhere and defending human rights whenever they are threatened.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Rightsizing

A reduction in deployments and alliance commitments signals a return to offshore balancing that shifts foreign policy towards restraint and modesty.

Arafat 20 – [Alaa Al-Din, formerly taught in the National Security and Defence Studies programme at Oman National Defence College and Sultan Qaboos University, Oman. He was a professor of Middle East Studies at the French University in Egypt and an Associate Researcher at London University. “Regional and International Powers in the Gulf Security.” Middle East Today, , April 22, 2020] TDI

The offshore balancing was Washington’s security policy toward the region from the 1970s to 1990s. While the onshore balancing was Washington’s security policy toward the region from the 1990s to 2010s. In fact, the American onshore balancing proved failure. Since 2013, America simply cannot reshape the region through force. Neither US interventions nor substantial military deployments have increased the stability of the region or the security of the United States. Instead, far too often, American involvement in the Middle East has done exactly the opposite. Despite the deaths of over 6500 US service members (and an estimated 300,000 civilians) in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as costs of more than $3.4 trillion, the Middle East is no more stable, democratic, or prosperous than it was two decades ago.133 In fact, since 2003, the region has witnessed the inability Washington to ensure the regional security, considerable deterioration of the American relations with most regional powers, increasing terrorist threats, including ISIS and al-Qaeda which despite losing most of its original leaders, al-Qaeda has metastasized across the region.134 Furthermore, the current status of Iraq, nuclear technology of Iran, the role on non-state actors, the roles of other external actors, proved that US effort to establish a suitable approach in the region has failed. Similarly, Persian Gulf countries have also failed to establish a security framework for the region. Given these failures, it is time to try something different: a return to offshore balancing. Obama’s 2010 and 2012 NSSs have ushered Washington’s strategic thinking to return to its offshore balancing. In fact, a strategy of offshore balancing would define US interests much more narrowly. It would focus on key interests and on the potential for regional hegemons to arise.135 The return to the initial American strategy of offshore balancing could be an ideal par excellence. Offshore balancing envisions a dramatic reduction in America’s overseas military deployments and alliance commitments, and a shift toward greater restraint and modesty in US policy writ large. It is premised on the idea that this type of retrenchment will actually produce better security outcomes at a better price.136 The offshore balancing is not passive security approach, but it is strategy that depends on setting clear priorities, emphasizing reliance on regional allies, and reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts. Accordingly, Washington can enhance regional security and not get bogged down fighting the wars of its regional partners.137 The offshore balancing in the Persian Gulf means that the United States will use of air and naval capabilities to counter threats, while also enhancing its commitment to its GCC allies by bolstering their defense capabilities through arms sales and military training. These elements can help the United States develop a balanced strategy to limit the threat posed by Iran, but also show America’s capability to provide security to the Middle East.138 In this context, Washington would transfer to the states of the region the tasks of maintaining their regional security, including the costs and risks of their defense, and upholding the balance of power in their own neighborhood. In this context, the Gulf States would be the first defense line of the region. The regional states would be responsible for providing security for their region, rather than asking Washington to do this for them.139 In this approach, the United States would dramatically reduce its military footprint in the region, leaving only the bare minimum of the current arrangements in place.140 These include keeping the headquarters of the 5th Fleet would remain in Bahrain, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, keeping some prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and Qatar and intelligence-gathering facilities. Generally, Washington should refrain from deploying large numbers of US forces in the Persian Gulf. Instead, Washington could simply rely on equipment stored on container ships stationed at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean.141 In short, offshore balancing would allow for US military presence in the region to be reduced dramatically. With offshore balancing, Washington should not provide Gulf States with a “blank cheque” that might drag it too directly into many of the region’s conflicts in places such as Syria and Yemen.142 Furthermore, offshore balancing is a strategy of restraint that would allow the United States to minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers.143

The offshore balancing would also relieve the United States of its burden of managing the security affairs of turbulent Persian Gulf.144 Importantly, a shift to that strategy would result in defense-related savings of perhaps 16–29% relative to the relevant post-Cold War figures. Such savings are certainly not trivial.145 For instance, the January 2012 US Defense Strategy Review envisaged an 8% reduction in the defense budget over a ten-year period—a fairly gradual reduction expected to shave around $50 billion off the defense budget each year.146 Additionally, it becomes difficult for Washington to sustain the level of larger military deployment of forces overseas. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cost between $4 trillion and $6 trillion and killed nearly 7000 US soldiers and wounded more than 50,000.147 Offshore balancing also helps reducing terrorist attacks against the US targets. The less the United States is involved in the Middle East, the less its people are likely to be attacked by terrorists from the region. It is no accident that Switzerland does not suffer from Middle Eastern terrorism.148 Osama bin Laden was among the earliest critics of America’s regional presence, justifying his barbaric terrorist attacks with a narrative of resistance to occupation. He accused the United States of “occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula” and called for every Muslim to kill Americans until US troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia.149 Furthermore, the American people are mostly against the US involvement in the region. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 52% of Americans polled believed that the United States “should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own.”150 Likewise, an April 2016 Pew poll found that 57% of Americans agree that the United States should “deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can.”151 On the other hand, the Arab people demonstrates fatigue with the American policy. A poll by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), covering 84% of the population of the Arab world in 2011, shows that 73% of the people in the region regard the United States and Israel as the two most threatening countries to their interests.152

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Rightsizing

The US is overcommitted to the Persian Gulf now. The plan frees resources to the Indo-Pacific while retaining influence in the Middle East.

Sweeney 21 – [Mike, Fellow at Defense Priorities and an incoming doctoral student at the Schar School of Policy and Government. “When It’s over: An American Withdrawal Plan for the Middle East.” Modern War Institute, , March 25, 2021] TDI

Is it too early to begin planning for the United States to leave the Middle East? There’s a strong argument to be made it’s not. Over the past few years discussion of the United States decamping from the region—or at least significantly downsizing its basing footprint—has finally entered mainstream foreign policy debates. Articles like  by Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes in Foreign Affairs and  by Martin Indyk in The Wall Street Journal examined the ways in which the region has decreased in importance to US interests. As a result, there has been a renewed willingness to look at the necessity of the extensive US basing footprint developed over the past thirty years.

In truth, most intellectual energy is still being spent on whether the United States should leave the Middle East, not how. But,  eighteen months ago, a plan will eventually be needed for a US departure for several reasons. Not least of these is that the United States has never attempted to withdraw from a major geographic region since the global expansion of its military footprint in the wake of the Second World War.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Regional Stability

A substantial reduction in on-the-ground presence preserves resources and prevents instability and extremism in the Gulf.

Manning & Preble 21 – [Robert, fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as a senior strategist at the National Counterproliferation Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) from 2010 to 2012, and as the director of long-range energy and regional/global affairs at the US National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group from 2008 to 2010; Christopher, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute from 2011 to 2020, and director of foreign policy studies from 2003 to 2011. Preble graduated from George Washington University in 1989 and received a PhD in history from Temple University in 2002, “Reality Check #8: Rethinking US Military Policy in the Greater Middle East.” Atlantic Council, , June 24, 2021] TDI

Given these realities, the United States should substantially reduce the number of US forces permanently stationed in the region and scale down or eliminate routine US Navy deployments to the Persian Gulf. Occasional joint exercises in and around the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea could include ships on Mediterranean or Indo-Pacific deployments, but the anachronistic requirement to maintain a US carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf poses an unnecessary burden on a US Navy that is already strained to the .

The United States should conduct a zero-based review, seeking to trade bases for places: instead of maintaining fixed assets and permanent air and naval facilities, Washington should renegotiate and extend access arrangements with local partners. Greater investments in intelligence and early warning, as well as continued close coordination with regional states—and other countries with an interest in preserving a regional balance of power—will be equally important. In exchange, the elimination of the permanent carrier presence would help the US Navy divert its scarce shipbuilding resources away from those legacy platforms to new technologies (e.g., unmanned aerial and subsurface vehicles, as well as enhanced missile defenses).

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Regional Stability

Economic crisis triggers global nuclear war AND populism.

Roubini 22 – [Nouriel, Professor of Economics at New York University Stern School of Business, “Dark Destiny” in “MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, And How to Survive Them”, Little, Brown and Company, October 18, 2022] TDI

Manifestations of economic malaise—stagnant growth, stagnant employment numbers and job losses—will have disturbing political consequences. They can lead to political extremism, usually under the guise of right-wing populism, but the left-wing version shares ,some commonalities. When populism reaches a fever pitch, it tends to vilify pluralistic values associated with liberal democracy and rule of law. Populists of both extremes are united in their callousness or antipathy toward foreigners and against domestic elites. That creates an opening for authoritarian demagogues who denounce their political opponents as elitists, and embrace prejudice against disadvantaged minorities, while praising redistribution of wealth from rich to poor not based on the rule of law, as in China and Russia.

In emerging markets—leaving aside outright dictatorships in some of the poorest countries—authoritarians now run governments in Russia, Belarus, Turkey, Hungary, the Philippines, Brazil, Venezuela, Kazakhstan and China, among others. Cascading megathreats will only make that list grow longer.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Regional Stability

Middle east instability spirals — global war.

Klare 18 – [Michael, Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. “Gearing Up for the Third Gulf War.” Common Dreams. , May 14, 2018] TDI

A Third Gulf War would distinguish itself from recent Middle Eastern conflicts by the geographic span of the fighting and the number of major actors that might become involved. In all likelihood, the field of battle would stretch from the shores of the Mediterranean, where Lebanon abuts Israel, to the Strait of Hormuz, where the Persian Gulf empties into the Indian Ocean. Participants could include, on one side, Iran, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and assorted Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen; and, on the other, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). If the fighting in Syria were to get out of hand, Russian forces could even become involved. All of these forces have been equipping themselves with massive arrays of modern weaponry in recent years, ensuring that any fighting will be intense, bloody, and horrifically destructive. Iran has been acquiring an assortment of modern weapons from Russia and possesses its own substantial arms industry. It, in turn, has been supplying the Assad regime with modern arms and is suspected of shipping an array of missiles and other munitions to Hezbollah. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have long been major recipients of tens of billions of dollars of sophisticated American weaponry and President Trump has promised to supply them with so much more. This means that, once ignited, a Third Gulf War could quickly escalate and would undoubtedly generate large numbers of civilian and military casualties, and new flows of refugees. The United States and its allies would try to quickly cripple Iran’s war-making capabilities, a task that would require multiple waves of air and missile strikes, some surely directed at facilities in densely populated areas. Iran and its allies would seek to respond by attacking high-value targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, including cities and oil facilities. Iran’s Shia allies in Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere could be expected to launch attacks of their own on the U.S.-led alliance. Where all this would lead, once such fighting began, is of course impossible to predict, but the history of the twenty-first century suggests that, whatever happens, it won’t follow the carefully laid plans of commanding generals (or their civilian overseers) and won’t end either expectably or well. Precisely what kind of incident or series of events would ignite a war of this sort is similarly unpredictable. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the world is moving ever closer to a moment when the right (or perhaps the better word is wrong) spark could set off a chain of events leading to full-scale hostilities in the Middle East in the wake of President Trump’s recent rejection of the nuclear deal. It’s possible, for instance, to imagine a clash between Israeli and Iranian military contingents in Syria sparking such a conflict. The Iranians, it is claimed, have set up bases there both to support the Assad regime and to funnel arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. On May 10th, Israeli jets struck several such sites, following a missile barrage on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights said to have been launched by Iranian soldiers in Syria. More Israeli strikes certainly lie in our future as Iran presses its drive to establish and control a so-called land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. Another possible spark could involve collisions or other incidents between American and Iranian naval vessels in the Persian Gulf, where the two navies frequently approach each other in an aggressive manner. Whatever the nature of the initial clash, rapid escalation to full-scale hostilities could occur with very little warning. All of this begs a question: Why are the United States and its allies in the region moving ever closer to another major war in the Persian Gulf? Why now? The Geopolitical Impulse The first two Gulf Wars were driven, to a large extent, by the geopolitics of oil. After World War II, as the United States became increasingly dependent on imported sources of petroleum, it drew ever closer to Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil producer. Under the Carter Doctrine of January 1980, the U.S. pledged for the first time to use force, if necessary, to prevent any interruption in the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to this country and its allies. Ronald Reagan, the first president to implement that doctrine, authorized the "reflagging" of Saudi and Kuwaiti oil tankers with the stars and stripes during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War that began in 1980 and their protection by the U.S. Navy. When Iranian gunboats menaced such tankers, American vessels drove them off in incidents that represented the first actual military clashes between the U.S. and Iran. At the time, President Reagan put the matter in no uncertain terms: “The use of the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians.” Oil geopolitics also figured prominently in the U.S. decision to intervene in the First Gulf War. When Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait in August 1990 and appeared poised to invade Saudi Arabia, President George H.W. Bush announced that the U.S. would send forces to defend the kingdom and so played out the Carter Doctrine in real time. “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence,” he declared, adding that “the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States.” Although the oil dimension of U.S. strategy was less obvious in President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003, it was still there. Members of his inner circle, especially Vice President Dick Cheney, argued that Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the safety of Persian Gulf oil lanes and needed to be eliminated. Others in the administration were eager to pursue the prospect of privatizing Iraq’s state-owned oil fields and turning them over to American oil companies (a notion that evidently stuck in Donald Trump’s mind, as he repeatedly asserted during the 2016 election campaign that “we should have kept the oil”). Today, oil has receded, if not entirely disappeared, as a major factor in Persian Gulf geopolitics, while other issues have moved to the fore. Of greatest significance in animating the current military standoff is an escalating struggle for regional dominance between Iran and Saudi Arabia (with a nuclear-armed Israel lurking in the wings). Both countries view themselves as the hub of a network of like-minded states and societies -- Iran as the leader of the region’s Shia populations, Saudi Arabia of its Sunnis -- and both resent any gains by the other. To complicate matters, President Trump, clearly harboring deep antipathy toward the Iranians, has chosen to side with the Saudis big league (as he might say), while Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, fearing Iranian advances in the region, has opted to weigh in on the Saudi side of the equation in a major way as well. The result, as suggested by military historian Andrew Bacevich, is the “inauguration of a Saudi-American-Israeli axis” and a “major realignment of U.S. strategic relationships.” Several key factors explain this transition from an oil-centric strategy emphasizing military power to a more conventional struggle among regional rivals that has already deeply embroiled the planet’s last superpower. To begin with, America’s reliance on imported oil has diminished rapidly in recent years, thanks to an oil drilling revolution in the U.S. that has allowed the massive exploitation of domestic shale reserves through the process of fracking. As a result, access to Persian Gulf supplies matters far less in Washington than it did in previous decades. In 2001, according to oil giant BP, the United States relied on imports for 61% of its net oil consumption; by 2016, that share had dropped to 37% and was still falling -- and yet the U.S. remains deeply involved in the region as a decade and a half of unending war, counterinsurgency, drone strikes, and other kinds of strife sadly indicate. By invading and occupying Iraq in 2003, Washington also eliminated a major bulwark of Sunni power, a country led by Saddam Hussein who, two decades earlier, had been siding with the U.S. in opposing Iran. That invasion, ironically enough, had the effect of expanding Shiite influence and making Iran the major -- possibly the only -- winner in the years of war that followed. Some Western analysts believe that the greatest tragedy of the invasion, from a geopolitical point of view, was the ascension of Shiite politicians with close ties to Tehran in post-Hussein Iraq. Although that country’s current leaders appear intent on pursuing a path of their own in the post-ISIS moment, many powerful Iraqi Shiite militias -- including some that played key roles in driving Islamic State militants out of Mosul and other major cities -- retain close ties to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. While disasters in themselves, the wars in Syria and Yemen have only added additional complexity to the geopolitical chessboard on which Washington found itself after that invasion and from which it has never extricated itself. In Syria, Iran has chosen to ally with Vladimir Putin’s Russia to preserve the brutal Assad regime, providing it with arms, funds, and an unknown number of advisers from the Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah, a Shiite political group in Lebanon with a significant military wing, has sent large numbers of its own fighters to Syria to help Assad’s forces. In Yemen, the Iranians are believed to be providing arms and missile technology to the Houthis, a homegrown Shiite rebel group that now controls the northern half of the country, including the capital, Sana’a. The Saudis, in turn, have been playing an ever more active role in bolstering their military power and protecting embattled Sunni communities throughout the region. Seeking to resist and reverse what they view as Iranian advances, they have helped armmilitias of an extreme sort and evidently even al-Qaeda-associated groups under attack from Iranian-backed Shiite forces in Iraq and Syria. In 2015, in the case of Yemen, they organized a coalition of Sunni Arab states to crush the Houthi rebels in a brutal war that has included a blockade of the country, helping to produce mass famine and a relentless American-backed air campaign, which often hits civilian targets including markets, schools, and weddings. This combination has helped produce an estimated 10,000 civilian deaths and a singular humanitarian crisis in that already impoverished country. In response to these developments, the Obama administration sought to calm the situation by negotiating a nuclear deal with the Iranians and by holding out the promise of increased economic ties with the West in return for reduced assertiveness outside its borders. Such a strategy never, however, won the support of Israel or Saudi Arabia. And in the Obamayears, Washington continued to support both of those countries in a major way, including supplying massive amounts of military equipment, refueling Saudi planes in midair so they could strike deeper into Yemen, and providing the Saudis with targeting intelligence for their disastrous war. The Anti-Iranian Triumvirate All of these regional developments, in play before Donald Trump was elected, have only gained added momentum since then, thanks in no small degree to the pivotal personalities involved. The first of them, of course, is President Trump. Throughout his election campaign, he regularly denounced the nuclear deal that Iran, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union all signed onto in July 2015. Officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement forced Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program in return for the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions. It was a plan that Iran scrupulously adhered to. Although President Obama, many senior American policymakers, and most European leaders had argued that the JCPOA -- whatever its flaws -- provided a valuable constraint on Iran’s nuclear (and so other) ambitions, Trump consistently denounced it as a “terrible deal” because it failed to eliminate every last vestige of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure or ban that country’s missile program. “This deal was a disaster,” he told David Sanger of the New York Times in March 2016. While Trump, who has filled his administration with Iranophobes, including his new secretary of state and new national security adviser, seems to harbor a primeval animosity toward the Iranians, perhaps because they don’t treat him with the adoration he feels he deserves, he has a soft spot for the Saudi royals, who do. In May 2017, on his first trip abroad as president, he traveled to Riyadh, where he performed a sword dance with Saudi princes and immersed himself in the sort of ostentatious displays of wealth only oil potentates can provide. While in Riyadh, he conferred at length with then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the 31-year-old son of King Salman and a key architect of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical contest with the Iranians. Prince Mohammed, who serves as the Saudi defense minister and was named crown prince in June 2017, is the prime mover behind the kingdom’s (so far unsuccessful) drive to crush the Houthi rebels in Yemen and is known to harbor fierce anti-Iranian views. At an earlier White House luncheon in March 2017, bin Salman, or MBS as he’s sometimes known, and President Trump seemed to reach an implicit agreement on a common strategy for branding Iran a regional threat, tearing up the nuclear agreement, and so setting the stage for an eventual war to vanquish that country or at least to fell the regime that runs it. While in Riyadh, President Trump told a conference of Sunni Arab leaders that, “from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. It is a government that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing the destruction of Israel, death of America, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this very room.” While no doubt gratifying to the Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, and other Sunni rulers listening, those words echoed the views of the third key player in the strategic triumvirate that may soon drive the region into all-out war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also known as “Bibi.” For years, he has railed against Iranian ambitions in the region and threatened military action against any Iranian move that would, as he saw it, impinge on Israeli security. Now, in Trump and the Saudi Crown Prince, he has the allies of his dreams. In the Obama years, Netanyahu was a fierce opponent of the Iranian nuclear deal and used a rare appearance before a joint session of Congress in March 2015 to denounce it in no uncertain terms. He has never -- right up to the days before Trump withdrew from the accord -- stopped working to persuade the president that the agreement should be junked and Iran targeted. In that 2015 speech to Congress, Netanyahu laid out a vision of Iran as a systemic danger that would later be appropriated by Trump and his Saudi confederates in Riyadh. “Iran's regime poses a grave threat, not only to Israel, but also the peace of the entire world,” he asserted in a typically hyperbolic statement. “Backed by Iran, Assad is slaughtering Syrians. Backed by Iran, Shiite militias are rampaging through Iraq. Backed by Iran, Houthis are seizing control of Yemen, threatening the strategic strait at the mouth of the Red Sea. Along with the Straits of Hormuz, that would give Iran a second choke-point on the world’s oil supply.” Now, Netanyahu is playing a major role in driving the already crippled region into a war that could further destroy it, produce yet more terror groups (and terrorized civilians), and create havoc on a potentially global scale, given that both Russia and China back the Iranians. Girding for War Pay attention to the words of Netanyahu in Washington and Donald Trump in Riyadh. Think of them not as political rhetoric, but as prophesies of a grim kind. You’re going to be hearing a lot more such prophesies in the months ahead as the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia move closer to war with Iran and its allies. While ideology and religion will play a part in what follows, the underlying impetus is a geopolitical struggle for control of the greater Persian Gulf region, with all its riches, between two sets of countries, each determined to prevail. No one can say with certainty when, or even if, these powerful forces will produce a devastating new war or set of wars in the Middle East. Other considerations -- an unexpected flare-up on the Korean Peninsula if President Trump’s talks with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un end in failure, a fresh crisis with Russia, a global economic meltdown -- could turn attention elsewhere, lessening the importance of the geopolitical contest in the Persian Gulf. New leadership in any of the key countries could similarly lead to a change of course. Netanyahu, for example, is now at risk of losing power because of an ongoing Israeli police investigation into allegedly corrupt acts of his, and Trump, well, who can say? Without such a development or developments, however, the way to war, which will surely prove to be the road to hell, seems open with a Third Gulf War looming on humanity’s horizon.

Independently, military conflict encourages Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz. Deterrence fails.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Regional Stability

Miscalculation causes an open war in the Middle East and jeopardizes global trade.

Damayanti et al. 22 – Angel, associate professor in the Department of International Relations, Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta. She obtained her Doctoral degree from University Sains Malaysia in 2017, Alexander Texas Meresin; student research assistant at the Center for Security and Foreign Affairs Studies, Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta. He obtained his bachelor’s degree in international relations from UKI in 2021, and Bryan Libertho Karyoprawiro; junior researcher at the Center for Security and Foreign Affairs Studies, Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta. He obtained his bachelor’s degree in international relations from UKI in 2021. “United States-Iran Shared Interest and the Stability of the Strait of Hormuz.” Global Strategis https://doi.org/10.20473/jgs.16.2.2022.357-378. February 16, 2022] TDI

The escalation of tension in the Strait of Hormuz poses a security threat to Iran, the US, and countries in the region. The long-term increase in the US deployments of naval, missile defense, intelligence, and asset surveillance in the area prompted Iran to do the same to counter the US. The hope of a peaceful resolution to this crisis is far-fetched because neither side is willing to concede. However, for this crisis to be resolved in a non-violent manner, both parties must reach an agreement and mutual understanding (Slade 2019). If the escalation of tensions in the region continues, a miscalculated move by either side can create an open war that leads to an even greater catastrophe.

Tensions between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz impact three things. The first is regional instability. Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are not just between Iran and the US. Strait’s user countries, both Middle Eastern countries and outside the region, are also experiencing tensions with Iran. The extension of the tension’s impact happened due to Iran’s activities which significantly increased the scope and rate of missile attacks directed at the oil infrastructure and other countries’ ships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz (Goldenbrg al. 2019). Since the US reimposed economic sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports in 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that if Iranian oil cannot exit through the Strait of Hormuz, then oil from other countries must not go through the strait accordingly. The policy underlies several of Iran’s attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran carried out a series of attacks in the form of confiscation and detonation of tankers from other countries such as Britain, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Norway, and even South Korea to threaten these countries to lift their sanctions immediately (Gambrell 2019).

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Regional Stability

Conflicting leadership interests ensure minor conflicts around the Strait of Hormuz escalate quickly.

Damayanti et al. 22 – [Angel, associate professor in the Department of International Relations, Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta. She obtained her Doctoral degree from University Sains Malaysia in 2017, Alexander Texas Meresin; student research assistant at the Center for Security and Foreign Affairs Studies, Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta. He obtained his bachelor’s degree in international relations from UKI in 2021, and Bryan Libertho Karyoprawiro; junior researcher at the Center for Security and Foreign Affairs Studies, Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta. He obtained his bachelor’s degree in international relations from UKI in 2021. “United States-Iran Shared Interest and the Stability of the Strait of Hormuz.” Global Strategis https://doi.org/10.20473/jgs.16.2.2022.357-378, February 16, 2022] TDI

The tension between the United States (US) and Iran has yet to improve. It started with negative perceptions of the two after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The US-Iran relationship continued to deteriorate during the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran throughout 1980 and the imposition of an embargo by the US on Iran during the Bill Clinton administration (Raharjo 2012). The worsening of US-Iran relations peaked after the US, under Donald Trump’s administration, left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that deals with Iran’s nuclear program. The US-Iran conflict flared up in mid-2019 when the US blamed Iran for attacking merchant ships and oil tankers around the Strait of Hormuz (Reed 2019). On the other hand, Iran was irate since the US included the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the list of international terrorist groups. The tension was further worsened by the killing of top General Qasem Soleimani of the IRCG in early 2020 (Congressional Research Service 2020).

Despite the conflict and different political views, the two countries have common interests in the Strait of Hormuz. The strait is the only access for the Middle East countries to develop their sea-based trading. Thus, the channel becomes essential for the economies of the Middle East region, especially for oil and gas exports, and for countries that depend on energy imports, mainly the US and its allies in the Asia Pacific (Slade 2019). Thus, the US, Iran, and other countries have common interests in ensuring the security and stability of the sea-based trading routes in the Strait of Hormuz. Regrettably, the US and Iran are both interested in dominating the leadership in the strait to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz and ships passing through the channel (Gilsinan 2019).

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Regional Stability

The US is bolstering its military presence in the Persian Gulf.

Fossum 23 – [Sam, B.A. in journalism from Johns Hopkins. “US Bolstering Defense Posture in the Persian Gulf after Iran Seized Two Merchant Ships in Recent Weeks | CNN Politics.” CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/12/politics/us-iran-persian-gulf/index.html. May 12, 2023] TDI

“Today, the Department of Defense will be making a series of moves to bolster our defensive posture in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. US central command will provide additional details on those reinforcements in coming days,” he continued.

The decision by the US to take further security measures in and around the strategically critical Middle East waterway comes after two internationally flagged merchant vessels were seized by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in recent weeks,  who added that Iran has interfered with or attacked 15 internationally flagged merchant ships over the past two years.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR Extensions › 1AR --- Semiocap Thesis/Bifo Wrong

The alt doesn’t solve + Bifo is not qualified – turns K solvency

White 22, (Will White 2022), bachelor of arts in history – UCLA, freelance writer, syndicated columnist, political theorist, (; “,” 

Bifo’s prescription to semiotic capitalism is to isolate an act of language to escape the technical automation of capitalism and produce a new form of life.[4] He suggests that poetry exceeds the established meaning of words in communicative spaces and thus expand the imaginary beyond the captures of semiotic capitalism.[5] However, this prescription saps revolutionary potential in resisting capitalism. There is a significant issue with the way Bifo perceives semiotic capitalism and its remedy. Bifo’s conception of capital negates the fundamental premise of dialectical materialism. Forwarding the theory that capital has transcended from the material to semiotics indicates that capital functions outside the superstructure of capitalist modes of production. I.e., class antagonisms are being framed as a question of symbolic exchange instead of material repression of the working class. This saps revolutionary potential among the people because it miseducates them and thus splits any focus on a single material capitalist structure in favor of pursuing abstract academic Marxism. The impact of such revisionism upholds the ideological hegemony of the imperial “left,” whose focus is not invested in the direct liberation of the people. In other words, these forms of theorizing capital do not work as revolutionary strategies and abandon the immediate material struggles of black, brown, and indigenous proletarians. After all, theory without practice that is not axiomatically rooted in material and militant resistance of the U.S. empire and vice versa are all gateways to new forms of liberalism.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[15] The neg doesn’t escape hyper reality since they still operate with second order simulacra – this means simulacrums will continue to appear, gutting any chance of alt solvency – the alt gets coopted by the never-ending signs and signifiers

Baudrillard 93 [Jean Baudrillard, (like Goodin but better) "Symbolic Exchange and Death" Sage Publications Ltd, 1993, https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/symbolic-exchange-and-death/book203211, DOA:4-1-2018]

The current revolutions index themselves on the immediately prior phase of the system. They arm themselves with a nostalgic resurrection of the real in all its forms; in other words, with simulacra of the second order: dialectics, use value, the transparency and finality of production, the "liberation" of the unconscious, or of repressed meaning (of the signifier, or of the signified called desire), and so on. All of these liberations offer, as ideal content, the phantoms which the system has devoured in successive revolutions and which it subtly resuscitates as revolutionary fantasies. All these liberations are just transitions toward a generalized manipulation. The revolution itself is meaningless at the present level of random processes of control. To the industrial machine corresponds the rational, referential, functional, historical consciousness. But it is the unconscious — nonreferential, transferential, indeterminate, floating - that corresponds to the aleatory machin(ations) of the code. Yet even the unconscious has been reinserted into the game: it long ago relinqu- 122 Symbolic Exchange and Death ished its own reality principle in order to become an operational simulacrum. At the exact point where its psychic principle of reality is confused with its psychoanalytic reality principle, the unconscious becomes, like political economy, another simulation model. The entire strategy of the system lies in this hyperreality of floating values. It is the same for money and theory as for the unconscious. Value rules according to an ungraspable order: the generation of models, the indefinite chaining of simulation. Cybernetic operationality, the genetic code, the random order of mutations, the principle of uncertainty, and so on: all of these replace a determinist and objectivist science, a dialectical vision of history and consciousness. Even critical theory and the revolution belong to the second-order simulations, as do all determinate processes. The installation of third-order simulacra upsets all of this, and it is useless to resurrect the dialectic, "objective" contradictions and the like, against them; that is a hopeless political regression. You cannot beat randomness with finality; you cannot beat programmed dispersion with prises de conscience or dialectical transcendence; you cannot defend against the code with political economy or "revolution." All these old weapons (including those of the first order, the ethics and metaphysics of man and nature, use value, and other liberatory referentials) have been progressively neutralized by the general system, which is of a higher order. Everything that gets inserted into the definalized space-time of the code, or tries to interfere with it, is disconnected from its own finalities, disintegrated and absorbed — this is the well-known effect of recuperation, or manipulation: cycling and recycling at each level. "All dissent must be of a higher logical type than that to which it is opposed."1

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[14] No Impact. Capitalism is sustainable and self-correcting. Profits, income, savings, and productivity are all trending upwards, and public investment ensures adaptability.

O’Rourke, 21—Professor of Economics at NYU Abu Dhabi (Kevin Hjortshøj, “Capitalism: worries of the 1930s for the 2020s,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 37, Issue 4, Winter 2021, Pages 650–663, dml) [figures omitted; TFP=total factor productivity]

The first question which the authors have been asked to address is: what has gone wrong? But that presupposes that something has gone wrong, which is far from evident. On the contrary, according to many traditional metrics capitalism is behaving exactly the way it is supposed to.

The classical economists, from Smith to Marx, as well as later theorists such as Weber, believed that what defined capitalism above all else was its ceaseless pursuit of accumulation for its own sake. High savings rates were the engine propelling capitalism forward. Readers from Britain (where the gross adjusted savings rate in 2018 was just 13.5 per cent) or the United States (where it was 18.3 per cent) will be well aware that their countries are not saving as much as they once did, but the Anglosphere is not the world, and the global savings rate has been trending upwards since the 1990s (Figure 1): there is no sign of any crisis on this score.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[13] Bifo’s analysis is reductive and over-totalizing

Pursley 10 [Mike, “From Alienation to Autonomy by Franco "Bifo" Berardi”//ASherm]

Here’s a taste of some of the most abstract: “The infinite capacity of replication of the recombining simulator device erases the originality of the event.” Or how about: “The productive finalization of technology ends up subjugating the thinking process from the standpoint of its own epistemological structures.” Indeed. Capitalism, and his absolute distaste for it, is where Bifo makes himself absolutely clear. It’s the catch-all cause for all modern strife, a “pathogenic mechanism” that is the ruin of everything. Preaching “liberation from capitalism” is where the author will most likely loose all but the most radical of readers. The capitalist system is clearly not without faults, but presenting it as scapegoat for every ill we face may be too simple. At times Bifo seems a cranky old curmudgeon madly shaking his fist at the present. This is the Bifo that bemoans “collective mental pollution” and says of the world: “too many signs, too fast, too chaotic.” His qualms with hyperreal society are at times a good diagnosis of our problems, but the prescribed anti-capitalist panacea remains questionable. For all the theory involved to make his case, Bifo’s solution is strangely and kind of awesomely underwhelming. We are urged to reconsider how wealth is defined, to focus more on friendships and an easygoing life rather than profits. Who but Henry Ford himself could argue with that? The volume ends with a few thoughts on the current Great Recession, where the collapse of the economy “can be read as the return of the soul.” For that, we will have to see.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[12] Bifo’s theory is wrong – collapse has been empirically disproven

Malcolm Harris 11, Senior Managing Editor and Columnist for The New Inquiry, Writer and Editor for Sharable, “I Sure Hope Bifo Doesn’t Count Vibrators as Tools of Estrangement”, Destructural, 2-20, \\iris

I just finished Franco Berardi’s The Soul at Work, and though there’s a lot to agree with in there, the conclusion left me feeling argumentative. In reviving Baudrillard’s critique of the politics of desire, Berardi argues that horizontalism and affirmation – two cornerstones of Deleuze and Guatarri’s schizo thought – have been irredeemably co-opted by capital. Our social pathology is no longer Freudian repression, but overabundance of affirmation, of injunctions to consume and desire that produce panic and depression. When our very affective expressions have been colonized, the multitude is nothing but a robotic swarm:

“The multitude can speak hundreds of thousands of languages, but the language that enables it to function as an integrated whole is that of the economic automatisms embodied in technology. Seized in a game of mirrors of indeterminacy and precariousness, the multitude manifests its dark side and follows automatisms that turn its wealth into misery, its power into anguish and its creativity into dependency.”

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[11] Scenario planning is key to solving the affs impacts

Barma et al. 16 (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, )

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric. Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas. This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world. What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[9] Pragmatic policy reforms can be successful, but require specific goal-oriented approaches---role playing strategy development and normative value is key

Hill 1983 [Lewis E. Hill is the recipient of the 1998 Veblen-Commons award and a professor of economics at Texas Tech. “The Pragmatic Alternative to Positive Economics.” Review of Social Economy, Vol. 41, No. 1 (April, 1983), pp. 1-11 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/29769142]//AS

Pragmatism is a philosophy which holds that all reality has practical consequences and that, therefore, the best way to know and to understand reality is through the consideration of practical consequences. Most pragmatists believe that the meaning of a proposition, idea, or event is to be found only in its practical consequences, and that the sum of the practical consequences is the whole of the meaning. Pragmatists tend to be antirationalistic in that they reject the intellectual power of human reason as the inherent source of truth and question deductive logic as a method of defining the truth. Most major philosophies had their genesis in Europe or Asia, but pragmatism originated in the United States and grew out of American historical experience. Life on the American frontier was a constant struggle which forced hard choices among alternatives that had to be judged according to their practical consequences. Americans learned to analyze and to evaluate reality on the basis of practical consequences and to use this knowledge and understanding of reality to solve practical problems. [Kallen] The first scholar to systematize pragmatism into a philosophy was Charles Sanders Peirce, who summarized his basic idea in his pragmatic imperative: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." [Peirce, p. 124] Peirce saw no contradiction between pragmatic thought and metaphysical thought. His philosophy of religion seems to be based on metaphysics. Peirce believed that the essence of Christianity is the distinction between the Way of Life, which is based on love, and the Way of Death, which was based on hatred. [Peirce, pp. 354-355] William James continued the pragmatic tradition in philosophy, but he moved pragmatism away from metaphysics and toward radical empiricism. James believed that pragmatism is both a philosophical method and a theory of truth. As a philosophical method, pragmatism involves the analysis and evaluation of practical consequences. As a theory of truth, pragmatism holds that ideas are true only to the extent that they effectively help us to relate one part of our experience to the other parts of our experience and to integrate the past with the future. James pioneered in the development of pragmatic instrumental ism by emphasizing the functional nature of mental activity and the instrumental character of knowledge. [James, pp. 43-81] It was John Dewey, however, who perfected instrumentalism as the highest form of the pragmatic philosophy. Instrumentalism is based on the presumption that effects imply causes and that both causes and effects imply solutions to problems. The instrumental process is the process of solving problems; it always integrates thought with action, theory with practice, means with ends, and factual judgments with value judgments. Most instrumentalists conceive life as an infinite series of problems to be solved, and the life process as problem-solving. The process begins with a sensing of the difficulty as a set of undesirable consequences. It then proceeds to an analysis of the cause-and-effect relationships involved in the problem. Next, various solutions are considered and analyzed according to the interpretation of the causal relationship. Finally, one solution is accepted and implemented, while the others are rejected. If the remedy effectively solves the problem, it is verified pragmatically. If the remedy proves to be ineffective, the problem will remain and other solutions will be attempted. [Dewey, pp. 223-239] Perhaps the greatest contribution of the instrumentalists to economics and the other social sciences is their theory of normative value. Dewey believed that normative value judgments are instrumental and corrigible. People have the ability to learn how to derive values from experience and how to use these values in the instrumental process of making normative value judgments and solving practical problems. Moreover, people also have the ability to test and to verify the truth of values and value judgments by drawing from experience to evaluate their practical consequences. You should accept a value as true only if it effectively relates the various parts of your experience into an authentic whole and successfully integrates your past with your future. You should accept a value judgment as true only if it is based on a true value and only if it contributes significantly to the instrumental process of solving problems. This process of instrumental verification can result in the revision and improvement of both values and value judgments. [Dewey, pp.575-598] Thus normative values and value judgments are induced from previous experience and verified by reference to subsequent experience. The instrumental philosophy of science has been applied to economics by Clarence Edwin Ayres, who was strongly influenced not only by John Dewey, but also by Thorstein Veblen. [Veblen] Veblen had developed his dichotomy to distinguish between the creative, supportive, and productive patterns of instrumental or technological behavior and the destructive, exploitative, and wasteful patterns of institutional or ceremonial behavior. Ayres accepted the Veblenian dichotomy and believed that these creative patterns of instrumental behavior are symbolized by the technological life process, which becomes the most basic and the most important value that can be induced from experience. This technological life process is the fundamental value upon which most other true values are based. [Ayres, pp. 205-230] The Dewey-Ayres instrumental theory of normative value is thoroughly consistent with Peirce's philosophy of religion, which conceives of Christianity as the quest to establish the supremacy of the Way of Life over the Way of Death. It is also consistent with the research of Sigmund Freud, which suggested that the human personality could be interpreted as a conflict between opposing propensities or instincts: the good life instinct and the bad death instinct. [Freud, pp. 140-152] An effective instrumental method for solving problems presupposes the existence of a valid and reliable theory of normative value to provide the norms and standards by reference to which both problems and solutions are defined and analyzed. Without a sound theory of normative value, an economist could neither define the problem as a set of bad consequences nor recognize a solution as a set of good consequences. Moreover, the evaluation of alternative courses of remedial action would require the use of a normative value theory. The great strength of the pragmatic-instrumental philosophy of science is that it includes both an effective method of solving problems and an entirely valid theory of normative value. The instrumental method gives the theory of normative value pragmatic impact; the normative value theory makes the instrumental process effective. Together, the instrumental theory of normative value and the instrumental method of solving problems provide an extremely effective method of identifying, defining, analyzing, and solving pragmatic politico-economic problems. This method can suggest solutions for the urgent problems that threaten the survival of modern industrial civilization. The abuse of economic power, for example, is a problem because it involves exploitation, which is a disvalue according to the Dewey-Ayres instrumental theory of normative value. The primary cause has been the decline of competition and the resulting concentration of uncontrolled economic power. To the extent that this cause predominates, the appropriate remedy would be the strict and effective enforcement of the antitrust laws to destroy the power concentrations which can be eliminated, and improved governmental regulation to control the economic power which cannot be destroyed. The secondary cause has been the perversion of governmental regulation away from its intended purpose of protecting consumers and toward an unintended purpose of promoting a business interest. The regulation of transportation, for example, has been perverted toward a cartelization of the trucking industry. To the extent that this is the cause, the relevant remedy would be a selective deregulation of industry. Mainstream positive economists cannot deal with this problem effectively, because they implicitly assume that the economy of the United States closely approximates pure competition. Simultaneous inflation and unemployment not only represent inefficiency and waste in the system, but also result in severe human suffering. Clearly, one cause of inflation is an excessively rapid rate of increase in the supply of money. The obvious remedy for this cause is a tight monetary policy. Another cause is the market power which permits big labor unions to demand and win wage rates far above the competitive equilibrium and which allows price administrators to pass cost increases through to consumers to such an extent as to cause a cost-push inflation. If a powerful cost-push inflation is countered by monetary and fiscal policies, then the result will be to reduce aggregate demand. Price administrators may react to the reduction in aggregate demand in either of two ways. If they elect to maintain production and to reduce prices, then the policies will solve the problem of inflation. But if they elect to maintain prices and to reduce production, then the policies will not only fail to solve the problem of inflation, but also cause an additional problem of simultaneous unemployment. One possible remedy for this cost-push inflation would be the elimination of the market power of big labor unions to administer wages and of big business to administer prices. Alternatively, another more feasible remedy might be a firm but flexible incomes policy to prevent unjustifiable increases in wages and prices. It is my belief that the elimination of inflationary expectations would raise the level of employment to some extent. Other governmental policies and programs could then be used to alleviate the human cost of the remaining unemployment.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[7] Reality exists and is knowable. Saying it doesn’t is ethical relativism that licenses mass violence.

Every 2007 (Peter, Principal Lecturer and an Associate Head of Department for Computing at Coventry University “The Fascination Payload: Cultural Studies and the first Gulf War” initially written in ’96, edited in ’07, and edited for potentially abelist language http://www.academia.edu/6175231/The_Fascination_Payload_Cultural_Studies_and_the_First_Gulf_War)

Jean Baudrillard chose the occasion of the Gulf Conflict to extend his thesis that global society is so caught in the grip of media simulation that its connection with reality has, once and for all, been severed: "Just a couple of days before war broke out in the Gulf, one could find Baudrillard regaling readers of the Guardian newspaper with an article which declared that this war would never happen, existing as it did only as a figment of mass media simulation, war-games rhetoric or imaginary scenarios beyond all limits of real-world, factual possibility" (Norris: 11) In choosing to concentrate on the undeniably manifest talk of war and foregrounding the role of strategic simulation whilst, simultaneously, refusing to engage in an account of events beyond the media, Jean Baudrillard was able to construct the case that a war conducted at a distance would be, of necessity, a matter of pure speculation and simulation: "Exchanging war for the signs of war" (Baudrillard 1994: 62). Written in to this article, almost as a fail-safe device against the collapse of his contention, was an interdiction against the ability of anyone to make a claim to know the truth of the situation. For, in Baudrillard's eyes, such a claim would be "banking on a realist ontology that clung to some variant of the truth/falsehood or fact/fiction dichotomy" (Norris: 13). A claim that would be forever stuck in nostalgia for some ultimate truth telling discourse (or metalanguage) - offering a delusory refuge from the "knowledge that we are nowadays utterly without resources in the matter of distinguishing truth from falsehood" (ibid: 13). This is akin to Richard Rorty's position in "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity" in which: "To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there", (q.v. Sprinkler: 125) The ethical consequences of such linguistic relativism can be seen when one compares Baudrillard or Rorty's position to that of revisionist historian Robert Faurrison. Faurrison claimed that as there were no surviving 'eye witnesses' to Nazi gas chambers there would, ultimately, be no way of confirming those chamber's existence. These consequences became more evident as events unfolded in the Gulf. Outbreaks of the real -Virilio's 'interruptions' - such as the bombing of the El Almiriyah air raid shelter (no matter how mediated or explained away by military spokespeople) could not disguise the fact that people, civilians, actually died. There were eye-witness survivors. Baudrillard's take on the fact/fiction dichotomy began to look decidedly sickening: "There will be nobody in a position to know what they are seeing, reading or hearing is not some fictive 'simulacrum' of the real, conjured up by the ubiquitous propaganda machine or the various techniques of media disinformation" (Norris: 12) To go down the road, like Baudrillard, of a fictive conspiracy theory in which images of death at El Almiriyah were nothing more than the a highly competent, cinematically constructed, simulation is surely stretching the limits of credibility. If contemporary truth is, according to this post-modern critical line, only a matter of rhetorical or suasive force then El Almiriya was the point at which Baudrillard's "(un)truth claim" lost its own persuasive appeal - breaking the bounds of virtually ever)' consensual notion of reality. Despite this, following the conflict, Baudrillard was minded to publish an article entitled "La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas en lieu" (The Gulf War did not take place) in Liberation - An extract of which was published in The Guardian. In the article he conceded that "this 'simulated' war has not been entirely a product of mass-media illusionist techniques; that large numbers of Iraqi conscripts and civilians had been killed by the Allied aerial bombardment; that massive damage had been inflicted on the country's infrastructure" (Norris: 192). Nevertheless, none of the 'facts' had persuaded him to drop his original contention that the war had predominantly existed as a virtual construct: "If we have no practical knowledge of this war - and such knowledge is out of the question - then let us at least have the sceptical intelligence to reject the probability of all information, of all images whatever their source. To be more 'virtual' than the events themselves, not to re-establish some criterion of truth - for this we lack the means" (q.v. Norris 194). With this Baudrillard maintains a strict adherence to the notion of the impossibility of veridical knowledge. And herein lays his paradox - that in the same article he can admit the 'facts' as regards casualties whilst denying any means of ascertaining their truth. Admitting knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge, in the same breath, is a logical error - both cannot be true.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC Semiocapitalism Core

[5] The alt fails --- the neg’s radical movement reproduces the K’s impacts – breeds authoritarian takeover and counter-violence

Higonnet 2012 [Patrice Higonnet is a French author and historian who currently serves as a Robert Walton Goelet Research Professor of French History at Harvard University. Foreign Affairs , JULY/AUGUST 2012, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 140-145. “Robespierre’s Rules for Radicals: How to Save Your Revolution Without Losing Your Head.” https://www.jstor.org/stable/23218048]//AS

THE REVOLUTION MADE ME DO IT To understand Robespierre, one must see the French Revolution in tragic terms. The revolution did not devolve into the Terror owing to the revolutionaries' zealous pursuit of liberté., égalité, and fraternité. To the contrary: it devolved because by July 1794, the overwhelming majority of the revolutionaries no longer wanted to reach those goals, whose immediate effects for them, they feared, might be the confiscation of their property, or the guillotine, or both. Indeed, once in power, the Jacobins proved completely incapable of resolving the contradictions of their own revolutionary program. But it is also true that the revolution was influenced by Robespierre's intern conflicts. Robespierre detested violence and was opposed to capital punishment. Yet he persisted, against all evidence, believing that smashing invisible (and usually imagined) conspiracies and executing his opponents would solve his problems and those of the revolution. McPhee concedes that Robespierre was ultimately paranoid and madegravev errors of judgment. He was not, however, "the emotionally stunted, rigidly puritanical and icily cruel monster of history and literature." For McPhee, it wasn't Robespierre who ruined the French Revolution: it was the revolution that brought a decent, sincere, and hard working democrat to his doom. But McPhee has little to say about why there was a French Revolution in the first place, or about why it proceeded so relentlessly. Most historians have relied on deterministic explanations of the revolution's deeper causes to explain its trajectory. For some on the left, such as the writer Jean Jaurès and the historian Albert Mathiez, 1789 was a critical step in a proletarian advance that would build strength in the European revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune of 1871, and the Russian revolts of 1905, before finally coming to fruition in 1917, when the East was Red and the West was ready. For others, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, the nature of the French Revolution was revealed more by its continuity with the past, rather than its discontinuity. In 1789, the Old Regime died, never to be reborn. But the revolution that destroyed it nonetheless failed miserably because the French were incapable of self-government, corrupted as they were by bad habits born of centuries of absolutist monarchy. In this debate, McPhee's softly stated preference is to see the revolution—and, by extension, Robespierre—as an enduring model for all those who yearn for civic republicanism. To this effect, McPhee quotes the French historian Georges Lefebvre, who wrote that "Robespierre should be described as the first who defended democracy and universal suffrage . . . the intrepid defender of the Revolution of 1789 which destroyed in France the domination of the aristocracy." Subscribing to this view, McPhee claims that the revolution shifted from the fraternal celebration after the fall of the Bastille in 1789-90 to the murderous terror and civil war of 1793-94 because Robespierre's dedication to the principles of republican democracy were unfortunately unshared. "Throughout the Revolution," McPhee writes, Robespierre "had seen those whom he had trusted betray that trust by compromise or treachery" Thus, to save the revolution from itself, Robespierre had to act as he did. FOR IT BEFORE HE WAS AGAINST IT But McPhee has frustratingly little about Robespierre's moral responsibility for the executions and bloodshed of the Terror. It might be true, of course, that if Robespierre wanted to retain his authority, he had no choice but to embrace violent repression. That, however, does not explain why he did it so brutally. Prior biographers have proposed all sorts of psychological explanations. But McPhee finds these unconvincing. "There is nothing in the evidence we have of Robespierre's actions and beliefs before May 1789 that would enable one to predict that, in particular circumstances, he would find repression and capital punishment the answer to dissent," he writes. McPhee does nevertheless delve into Robespierre's troubled childhood, the signal events of which were the death of his beloved mother when he was seven years old and his derelict and shameful father's abandonment of the family soon after, which left young Maximilien, his younger brother, and their sister to be raised by various relatives. Although McPhee does not do so, it is possible to conclude that this childhood turmoil helped turn Robespierre into a man who both loved and hated bourgeois life and authority and tended to resolve his personal and professional problems by abstracting them as best he could, raising them from an insoluble, quotidian, and material context to a higher plane, on which he was never wrong. Politically, the most obvious instance of this psychological habit was his unvarying insistence that something that might at first have looked like the criminal act of a faction—for example, the Jacobins' seizure of power— was in fact a national and universalistic movement. The reverse was the case, of course, when it came to the actions of his enemies. In practice, this kind of self-deception allowed Robespierre u to oppose authorities of all kinds until it became necessary to transform himself into a murderous authoritarian. But the revolution posed a number of contradictions that he could not resolve through mental abstraction. In the spring of 1794, leading the Jacobin revolution required Robespierre to be for the rule of law and for its suspension, to defend and attack private property, to support and reject nationalism, to embrace feminism and antifeminism, and to promote religion and irreligion. Likewise, although McPhee makes a persuasive case that Robespierre was totally dedicated to the ideal of fraternité, there is no denying that he was often viscerally opposed to applications of that ideal. In February 1793, when the Parisian sans-culottes rioted for food and soap, Robespierre scolded these cold, hungry, desperate foot soldiers of the revolution. "I am not saying that the people are guilty," he complained, "but when people rise, must they not have a goal worthy of them? Must paltry goods be of concern to them? ... The people must rise up, not to collect sugar, but to bring down the tyrants." In late July 1794, some of "the people" did just that, and Robespierre's failure to determine where bourgeois democracy might find its true limits finally led him to the guillotine. Afraid that they would be the next ones to be purged and sentenced to death, a number of Robespierre's former allies on the Committee of Public Safety and in the National Convention, the legislative assembly, ordered him to be arrested. Captured some hours later, and after having probably tried to shoot himself, he was guillotined the next day.

2023 Michigan Kritik
blocks › Theory › At: floating pik

Fairness:

Piks do not change the advocacy of the negative at all. It supports its claims on the K with the correct methodology.

Piks can be answered with many of the same answers as any other CP. In order to be “fair” debate would need to exclude all CPs which would crush negative ground.