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2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- Economy Advantage › 1NC --- UBIs Bad for Econ

Turn – Providing 1K a month is bad – laundry list of warrants.

Paul Boyce 5-5-2019. (Paul is a Business Economics graduate from the UK and currently an editor at http://boycewire.com., . "Universal Basic Income Is a Pandora’s Box." No Publication. Web. accessed 5-18-2023 < https://fee.org/articles/universal-basic-income-is-a-pandora-s-box/ >.)MSUCB

The case for a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a strong one, in some ways. A UBI would stimulate aggregate demand, help those affected by technological change, and create a basic income for the poor. Its effectiveness and impact, however, depend on how much is given out. The benefits and consequences of a $100 UBI will be very different than one of $1,000. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, I will look at the case for a $1,000 per month UBI—as suggested by presidential candidate Andrew Yang.

Previous Experiments Are Not Comparable

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- Warming Advantage › 1NC --- Warming Defense

Warming won’t be catastrophic

Zycher 21 – Dr. Benjamin, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Doctorate in Economics from UCLA, Master in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, and Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from UCLA, Former Senior Economist at the RAND Corporation, Former Adjunct Professor of Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and at the California State University Channel Islands, and Former Senior Economist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. “The Case for Climate Change Realism”, AEI, , 06-21-2021

Unable to demonstrate that observed climate trends are due to anthropogenic climate change — or even that these events are particularly unusual or concerning — climate catastrophists will often turn to dire predictions about prospective climate phenomena. The problem with such predictions is that they are almost always generated by climate models driven by highly complex sets of assumptions about which there is significant dispute. Worse, these models are notorious for failing to accurately predict already documented changes in climate. As climatologist Patrick Michaels of the Competitive Enterprise Institute notes:

During all periods from 10 years (2006-2015) to 65 (1951-2015) years in length, the observed temperature trend lies in the lower half of the collection of climate model simulations, and for several periods it lies very close (or even below) the 2.5th percentile of all the model runs. Over shorter periods, such as the last two decades, a plethora of mechanisms have been put forth to explain the observed/modeled divergence, but none do so completely and many of the explanations are inconsistent with each other.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- Warming Advantage › 1NC --- Not Good for Warming

Increased consumption is a barrier.

MacNeill, T., & Vibert, A. (2019). Universal Basic Income and the Natural Environment: Theory and Policy. Basic Income Studies, 14(1). doi:10.1515/bis-2018-0026 MSUCB

There is reason to be concerned that a universal basic income could negatively affect the ecosystem. This point has been acknowledged by most theoretical research on the relation between BIG and the environment (Andersson, 2010; Boulanger, 2010), and all of the BIG advocates we consulted for this research recognized this potential issue as well. Recent studies have found that the environmental impacts of nations consistently rise with per capita income (Aşıcı & Acar, 2016; Uden, Salhuddin, Alam, & Gow, 2017). Income has also been found to be the main determinant of greenhouse gas emissions on an individual and household level. This income effect is so strong that it tends to statistically overwhelm pro-environment behavioral change even for those who self-identify as eco-conscious (Ivanova et al., 2018). This implies that it is not how we consume that determines the bulk of our personal environmental impact, but how much we consume. This is concerning since our total consumption is strongly tied to income. Furthermore, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) – the amount of each additional dollar of income we use for consumption instead of savings – is lower for those who are on the high end of a country’s wealth distribution (Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka, & White, 2017). These understandings lead to an uncomfortable insight regarding the potential environmental impact of basic income strategies. That insight is that even if basic income were enacted via a direct redistribution of income from the wealthiest quintiles to the poorest with no net increase in total income per capita, we could still expect a negative environmental impact via increased consumption due to differentials in the MPC. This tension between poverty eradication and environmental degradation is so troublesome that it has been acknowledged in a discussion paper by OXFAM – one of the world’s largest non-governmental poverty reduction organizations (Raworth, 2012). The paper argues that poverty alleviation that is achieved without considering environmental consequences would push the biosphere beyond the limits necessary to sustain human civilization as we currently know it. Hubacek, Baiocchi, Feng, and Patwardhan (2017) report a similar finding regarding carbon emissions. Eradicating poverty through a basic income guarantee is not exactly the same as reducing it via economic growth. However, there have been no studies on the relation between basic income and consumption, so we must assume that consumption-based impacts would be similar to other forms of poverty reduction all other things being equal. A useful study has been produced on the consumption impacts of Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) annuities. APF annuity payments are not strictly a basic income program since they are not large enough to assure that basic needs are covered. They are a universal income supplement, however, as they are yearly dividend checks based on investment returns from the APF (which was originally establish with oil royalties). This annuity, which is usually approximately $2000, is distributed to every Alaskan citizen. The only published journal article on consumption and the APF has found that the MPC related to the APF is no different from that of any other form of income in all US states (Hsieh, 2003). The study finds that income from the APF increases individual consumption irrespective of the income bracket to which the individual belongs. A later book on the same topic reiterated these findings (Goldsmith, 2012). Thus, if we can take evidence from the APF fund as an exemplar of what to expect from consumption via a BIG, we can expect significant ecological impacts through increased overall consumption.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- Warming Advantage › 1NC --- Not Good for Warming

It’s not good for warming – quite the opposite in fact.

Salla Kalaniemi et. al 12-01-2020 ( Salla Kalaniemi and Jukka Heionen - University of Iceland, Faculty of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Juudit Ottelin and Seppo Junnila - Aalto University, Department of Built Environment. "Downscaling consumption to universal basic income level falls short of sustainable carbon footprint in Finland" Published in ScienceDirect. Accessed 06-19-2023. URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901119315333#abs0005) MSUCB

The carbon footprint at the UBI consumption level is on average 4.8 tCO2-eq, which is 49 % lower than the average carbon footprint in Finland. However, adding the governmental consumption and investments components to the UBI carbon footprint increases it to around 6.2 tCO2-eq, which is higher than the global average or “fair share”. Furthermore, the results illustrate that even a cutdown in the consumption levels in Finland down to the UBI level would not be enough to reach sustainable lifestyles considering the 1.5- or 2-degree climate targets in the long run. Innovations to decrease the GHG-intensity of consumption are needed as well. The results emphasize the need for low-carbon solutions for housing, nutrition, and travelling for all income classes. Economic growth has been and still is based on extensive utilization of fossil fuels. This has led to suggestions to build an alternative economic system based on degrowth. However, the results of our study raise the question on how to run a welfare state like Finland, with a large public sector and a wide variety of public goods and heavily subsidized semi-public goods, and have funding for new technologies to tackle the climate change in a degrowth economy. Nonetheless, in the light of the results of the study, it is equally difficult to see how continuous economic growth could be reconciled with 1.5- or 2-degree climate targets.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- Not good for heg

It also tanks labor market dynamics – that means If a significant portion of the population chooses to rely solely on the basic income, it could create labor shortages and negatively impact productivity and innovation and weaken the United States' ability to drive economic growth and maintain its technological edge.

Suban Abdulla 3-19-2021. (Reporter, . "Universal basic income study shows it could make unemployment worse." No Publication. Web. accessed 6-19-2023 < https://www.yahoo.com/video/universal-basic-income-unemployment-uk-economy-personal-finance-105905931.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAE_O7hsBd7d3kEuvqaCX3lA7a6N2Ro6YbYqgWMCmj0ijI0MDcAA3bkVoGEUoKkw3pFGYG5NNNWSZymkDLW1ZCRESJHG0SSQjdfX0Xj0KG9SsDjhRFTGNXHvH1O-g2EbjVuTSgUd-Jrt-iTiF3KH7gumqyL_5doMGmeHn3_vxEhC1 >.)MSUCB

Universal basic income (UBI) could lead to higher unemployment despite claims that the policy might alleviate contemporary labour force issues including job polarisation and inequality. A study by the European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research (ECONPOL) found that UBI has a "small effect" on employment in Finland. The study examines 2,000 benefit recipients in Finland who were randomised to receive a monthly basic income and was carried out in 2017 and 2018. UBI involves unconditional cash payments to all citizens whatever their income and can be used on anything. This ensures that everyone in society has a minimum standard of living. Some people believe that it could either replace or complement other targeted welfare benefits or tax allowances. The study showed that despite the considerable increase in work incentives, days in employment remained statistically unchanged in the first year of the experiment. In fact, they appeared "somewhat higher in the second" year, said one of the authors of the research Kari Hämäläinen. "In this regard, the Finnish experiment provides an interesting contrast," said Ohto Kanninen, another author. The researchers, Jouko Verho, Hämäläinen, and Kanninen identified three broad policy lessons from their study, Removing Welfare Traps: Employment Responses in the Finnish Basic Income Experiment. First, improving monetary incentives for employment "might not work in hard-to-employ" populations, especially if the increase in incentives peaks at relatively high wage levels. "These findings are particularly relevant for many European countries, with a high level of long-term unemployment, relatively high minimum wages, and extensive social safety nets," the study said. Second, filling out unemployment benefit claims online might have become so easy that some people do this even if they don't need to. "If researchers want to find convincing evidence of the existence of bureaucratic traps, a more promising topic could be the benefit complexity that results from the interaction of different types of benefits." Finally, labour market policies that entice participation with monetary supplements seem to counteract the employment-promoting threat effect of active labour market programmes. "There is a real possibility that a well-intentioned policy exacerbates the unemployment problem," the research said.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- Not good for heg

UBI is bad for American economic competitiveness – means there’s no way to compete with China.

Isabel V. Sawhill 6-15-2016. (Senior Fellow - Economic Studies, Center on Children and Families, Future of the Middle Class Initiative, . "Money for nothing: Why a universal basic income is a step too far." Brookings. Web. accessed 6-18-2023 &lt; <a class="vglnk" href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2016/06/15/money-for-nothing-why-a-universal-basic-income-is-a-step-too-far/" rel="nofollow"&gt;.)MSUCB

The idea of a universal basic income (UBI) is certainly an intriguing one, and has been gaining traction. Swiss voters just turned it down. But it is still alive in Finland, in the Netherlands, in Alaska, in Oakland, CA, and in parts of Canada. Advocates of a UBI include Charles Murray on the right and Anthony Atkinson on the left. This surprising alliance alone makes it interesting, and it is a reasonable response to a growing pool of Americans made jobless by the march of technology and a safety net that is overly complex and bureaucratic. A comprehensive and excellent analysis in The Economist points out that while fears about technological unemployment have previously proved misleading, “the past is not always a good guide to the future.” HURTING THE POOR Robert Greenstein argues, however, that a UBI would actually hurt the poor by reallocating support up the income scale. His logic is inescapable: either we have to spend additional trillions providing income grants to all Americans or we have to limit assistance to those who need it most. One option is to provide unconditional payments along the lines of a UBI, but to phase it out as income rises. Libertarians like this approach since it gets rid of bureaucracies and leaves the poor free to spend the money on whatever they choose, rather than providing specific funds for particular needs. Liberals fear that such unconditional assistance would be unpopular and would be an easy target for elimination in the face of budget pressures. Right now most of our social programs are conditional. With the exception of the aged and the disabled, assistance is tied to work or to the consumption of necessities such as food, housing, or medical care, and our two largest means-tested programs are Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit. THE CASE FOR PATERNALISM Liberals have been less willing to openly acknowledge that a little paternalism in social policy may not be such a bad thing. In fact, progressives and libertarians alike are loath to admit that many of the poor and jobless are lacking more than just cash. They may be addicted to drugs or alcohol, suffer from mental health issues, have criminal records, or have difficulty functioning in a complex society. Money may be needed but money by itself does not cure such ills. A humane and wealthy society should provide the disadvantaged with adequate services and support. But there is nothing wrong with making assistance conditional on individuals fulfilling some obligation whether it is work, training, getting treatment, or living in a supportive but supervised environment. In the end, the biggest problem with a universal basic income may not be its costs or its distributive implications, but the flawed assumption that money cures all ills.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- No Heg Impact

No leadership impact – empirics.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, , 06-03-2020

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- Heg Bad

Because transition wars are hype and institutions are resilient

G. John Ikenberry 18, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs,

In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting point is the classic “power transition” perspective. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order—its emergence, stability, and decline—and the rise and fall of great powers. It is a perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I argue that although America’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global order. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global power transition. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed. But the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” While there is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order. These hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power. Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- Heg Bad

Reject their evidence based on neolib propaganda

Walt 19 Stephen Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. [“The End of Hubris,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, Iss. 3, (May/Jun 2019): 26-35, 4-16-2019, URL: ] DTS

OUT WITH THE OLD Despite the disappointments of the past 25 years, the American foreign policy elite remains convinced that global leadership is their birthright and that Washington must continue trying to force other countries to conform to U.S. dictates. This perspective is an article of faith at almost every foreign policy think tank inside the Beltway and is repeatedly invoked in task-force reports, policy briefs, and op-eds. A similar groupthink pervades the U.S. media, where unrepentant neoconservatives and unchastened liberal internationalists monopolize the ranks of full-time pundits; proponents of realism, restraint, and nonintervention appear sporadically at best. The result is that foreign policy debates are heavily skewed in favor of endless intervention. Moving back to a more realist grand strategy will require broadening the parameters of debate and challenging the entrenched interests that have promoted and defended a failed foreign policy. The clubbiness of the foreign policy establishment has also produced a disturbing lack of accountability. Although the community contains many dedicated, imaginative, and honorable individuals, it is dominated by a highly networked caste of insiders who are reluctant to judge one another lest they be judged themselves. As a result, error-prone officials routinely fail upward and receive new opportunities to repeat past mistakes. Consider the officials responsible for (and the commentators who cheered on) the bungled Middle East peace process, the misguided expansion of nato, the botched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the cia's torture of detainees in the war on terrorism, the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance of Americans, the disastrous nato intervention in Libya, and the American machinations in Ukraine that gave Russia a pretext to seize Crimea. None of those officials or commentators has suffered significant professional penalties for his or her mistakes or malfeasance. Indeed, nearly all of them still enjoy prominent positions in government, think tanks, the media, or academia. No one is infallible, of course, and a desire to hold people accountable could be taken too far. Policymakers often learn from past mistakes and become more effective over time. But when the same people keep making the same errors and neither recognize nor regret them, it is time to look for new people with better ideas. Despite the stagnation within the foreign policy establishment, the prospects for a more realist, more restrained U.S. foreign policy are better today than they have been in many years. For all his flaws, Trump has made it easier to propose alternatives to liberal hegemony by expressing such disdain for the elite consensus. Younger Americans are more skeptical of their country's imperial pretensions than are their elders, and some new members of Congress seem bent on clawing back some of the control over foreign policy that presidents have amassed over the past 70 years.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- Heg Bad

It emboldens adversaries which makes their impact inevitable

----terminally unsustainable, causes failed states, financial crises, widening inequality, prolif, anti-western terror

Walt 19 Stephen Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. [“The End of Hubris,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, Iss. 3, (May/Jun 2019): 26-35, 4-16-2019, URL: ] DTS

IF IT AIN'T BROKE . . . In the nineteenth century, when the United States was weak, leaders from George Washington to William McKinley mostly avoided foreign entanglements and concentrated on building power domestically, expanding the country's reach across North America and eventually expelling the European great powers from the Western Hemisphere. In the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. presidents such as Wood- row Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt used the country's newfound strength to restore the balance of power in strategically critical regions outside the Western Hemisphere. But they let other great powers do most of the heavy lifting, and thus the United States emerged relatively unscathed-and stronger than ever-from the world wars that devastated Asia and Europe. Letting other states shoulder the burden was not possible during the Cold War, so the United States stepped up and led the alliances that contained the Soviet Union. American leaders paid lip service to democracy promotion, human rights, and other idealistic concerns, but U.S. policy was realist at its core. Through the Bretton Woods system and its successors, the United States also helped foster a more open world economy, balancing economic growth against the need for financial stability, national autonomy, and domestic legitimacy. Put simply, for most of U.S. history, American leaders were acutely sensitive to the balance of power, passed the buck when they could, and took on difficult missions when necessary. But when the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States found itself, as the former national security adviser Brent Scowcroftput it in 1998, "standing alone at the height of power . . . with the rarest opportunity to shape the world," U.S. leaders rejected the realism that had worked well for decades and tried to remake global politics in accordance with American values. A new strategy-liberal hegemony-sought to spread democracy and open markets across the globe. That goal is the common thread linking President Bill Clinton's policy of "engagement and enlargement," President George W. Bush's "freedom agenda," and President Barack Obama's embrace of the Arab revolts of 2010-11 and his declaration that "there is no right more fundamental than the ability to choose your leaders and determine your destiny." Such thinking won broad support from both political parties, the federal bureaucracies that deal with international affairs, and most of the think tanks, lobbies, and media figures that constitute the foreign policy establishment. At bottom, liberal hegemony is a highly revisionist strategy. Instead of working to maintain favorable balances of power in a few areas of vital interest, the United States sought to transform regimes all over the world and recruit new members into the economic and security institutions it dominated. The results were dismal: failed wars, financial crises, staggering inequality, frayed alliances, and emboldened adversaries. HEGEMONIC HUBRIS When Clinton took office in 1993, the United States was on favorable terms with the world's other major powers, including China and Russia. Democracy was spreading, Iraq was being disarmed, and Iran had no nuclear enrichment capacity. The Oslo Accords seemed to herald an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington seemed well positioned to guide that process. The European Union was adding new members and moving toward a common currency, and the U.S. economy was performing well. Americans saw terrorism as a minor problem, and the U.S. military seemed unstoppable. The wind was at the country's back. Life was good. But those circumstances fueled a dangerous overconfidence among American elites. Convinced that the United States was "the indispensable nation," as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously put it in 1998, they believed they had the right, the responsibility, and the wisdom to shape political arrangements in every corner of the world. That vision turned out to be a hubristic fantasy. Repeated attempts to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians all failed, and the two-state solution sought by three U.S. presidents is no longer a viable option. Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, and Washington responded by launching a global war on terrorism, including invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Those campaigns were costly failures and shattered the U.S. military's aura of invincibility. Much of the Middle East is now embroiled in conflict, and violent extremists operate from Africa to Central Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, India, Pakistan, and North Korea tested and deployed nuclear weapons, and Iran become a latent nuclear weapons state. The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2008 exposed widespread corruption in the country's financial institutions and triggered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression-a calamity from which the global economy has yet to fully recover. In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, and it has interfered in a number of other countries since then-and its relations with the West are now worse than at any time since the Cold War. China's power and ambitions have expanded, and cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has deepened. The eurozone crisis, the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from the eu, and energetic populist movements have raised doubts about the eu's future. Democracy is in retreat worldwide; according to Freedom House, 2018 was the 13th consecutive year in which global freedom declined. Illiberal leaders govern in Hungary and Poland, and the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual Demoracy Index has downgraded the United States from a "full" to a "flawed" democracy. The United States was not solely responsible for all these adverse developments, but it played a major role in most of them. And the taproot of many of these failures was Washington's embrace of liberal hegemony. For starters, that strategy expanded U.S. security obligations without providing new resources with which to meet them. The policy of "dual containment," aimed at Iran and Iraq, forced the United States to keep thousands of troops on the Arabian Peninsula, an additional burden that also helped convince Osama bin Laden to strike at the U.S. homeland. Nato expansion committed Washington to defend weak and vulnerable new members, even as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom let their military forces atrophy. Equally important, U.S. efforts to promote democracy, the open-ended expansion of nato, and the extension of the alliance's mission far beyond its original parameters poisoned relations with Russia. And fear of U.S.-led regime change encouraged several states to pursue a nuclear deterrent-in the case of North Korea, successfully. When the United States did manage to topple a foreign foe, as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the results were not thriving new democracies but costly occupations, failed states, and hundreds of thousands of dead civilians. It was delusional for U.S. leaders to expect otherwise: creating a functional democracy is a difficult process under the best of circumstances, but trying to do it in fractured societies one barely understands is a fool's errand. Finally, globalization did not deliver as promised. Opening up markets to trade and investment brought great benefits to lower and middle classes in China, India, and other parts of the developing world. It also further magnified the already staggering wealth of the world's richest one percent. But lower- and middle-class incomes in the United States and Europe remained flat, jobs in some sectors there fled abroad, and the global financial system became much more fragile. This sorry record is why, in 2016, when Trump called U.S. foreign policy "a complete and total disaster" and blamed out-of-touch and unaccountable elites, many Americans nodded in agreement. They were not isolationists; they simply wanted their government to stop trying to run the world and pay more attention to problems at home. Trump's predecessors seemed to have heard that message, at least when they were running for office. In 1992, Clinton's mantra was "It's the economy, stupid." In 2000, Bush derided Clinton's efforts at "nation building" and called for a foreign policy that was "strong but humble." Obama pledged to end foreign wars and focus on "nation building at home." These expressions of restraint were understandable, as surveys had repeatedly shown that a majority of Americans believed the country was playing the role of global policeman more than it should and doing more than its share to help others. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 80 percent of Americans agreed that "we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home," and 83 percent wanted presidents to focus more on domestic issues than on foreign policy. Clinton, Bush, and Obama all understood what the American people wanted. But they failed to deliver it. So has Trump. Although his Twitter feed and public statements often question familiar orthodoxies, the United States is still defending wealthy nato allies, still fighting in Afghanistan, still chasing terrorists across Africa, still giving unconditional support to the same problematic Middle Eastern clients, and still hoping to topple a number of foreign regimes. Trump's style as president is radically different from those of his predecessors, but the substance of his policies is surprisingly similar. The result is the worst of both worlds: Washington is still pursuing a misguided grand strategy, but now with an incompetent vulgarian in the White House.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- China = Neo revisionist

China is neo revisionist – their behavior is consistent with competitive status quo powers – creating ADIZs, island disputes, and offshore resources

Robert Farley 8-29-2014. (Robert Farley is an assistant professor and senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, as well as a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College. "China Might Just Be an Assertive Status Quo Power." The Diplomat. Web. 8-29-2014. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-might-just-be-an-assertive-status-quo-power/ >) MSUCB

Is China a status quo or a revisionist power? This question dominated 20th century geopolitics. Attempts to discern whether competitors intended to adjust the existing international order in their favor, or to overthrow that order and install something new, sat at the heart of statecraft and diplomacy at the openings of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The question goes to the heart of the willingness of people and statesmen to make the sacrifices necessary to defend national interests. World War I might have been worth fighting against a revolutionary power, rather less so against states that merely desired a reshuffling of the deck. Unsurprisingly, this question has animated (if often implicitly), U.S. discussion of the problems created by the rise of China. We can agree on certain things. Chinese ; there is a , and it’s worthwhile . All of this tells us less about China’s long-range aims than we might think, however. Sometimes it’s hard to see whether a state is pro-status quo or revisionist. Russia appears only recently to have determined, after 15 years of struggle, that it simply cannot live within the international order created and maintained by the United States. For a very long time Imperial Japan sought to understand its own foreign policy as part of the broader colonial project that the European powers had created, before rejecting even that as insufficient. On the converse, in the Cold War the United States determined, eventually, that Soviet Russia was basically an ornery status quo power, different in character from either Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany. Thus far, there is precious little to indicate that China genuinely seeks to overturn the existing international order of East Asia, rather than carve out a larger (and more unique) place within that order. Competitive status quo powers , throwing their weight behind squabble over islands, and playing hardball with respect to contested offshore resources. Similarly, launching increasingly aggressive interceptions of recon aircraft in the vicinity of China is something that we could expect of a mildly competitive status quo power, especially one enjoying growth in economic and military power. The best, most robust, longest enduring international orders carve out a space for legitimate competition, while also delegitimating certain actions (the annexation of a neighbor’s province, for example). But the experience of the last couple of years also reaffirms that there’s nothing necessarily pleasant about how a status quo power jockeys for position under an existing rule set. Moreover, simply granting that China does not seek revolution hardly means that the United States, Vietnam, the Philippines, or Japan need to view Chinese .

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- China Not Revisionist

And Biden’s policies

Steven Lee Myers and Amy Qin 7-20-2021. (Steven Lee Myers  is a veteran foreign and national security correspondent for The New York Times, currently based in California covering misinformation at home and abroad. From China, he contributed to the articles on the coronavirus pandemic that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. Amy Qin is an international correspondent for The New York Times covering the intersection of culture, politics and society in China. "Biden Has Angered China, and Beijing Is Pushing Back (Published 2021)." No Publication. Web. 7-20-2021. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/world/asia/china-biden.html >) MSUCB

From ’s perspective, the blows from the United States just keep coming. over the crackdown in Xinjiang. A about the deteriorating climate in Hong Kong. The rejection of visas for students and researchers suspected of having links to the People’s Liberation Army. Now the United States has to accuse the Chinese Ministry of State Security not only of cyberespionage but also of . The torrent of attacks has infuriated Beijing, but six months into the tenure of President Biden, the Communist Party leadership has yet to find an effective strategy to counter the American moves. In Beijing’s view, Mr. Biden has taken a more strategic approach than his predecessor, enlisting allies to join his campaign against Chinese behavior in ways that appear to have frustrated officials. has resorted to its usual instinct for tit-for-tat measures, while lashing out with a heavy dose of vitriol and sarcasm. Although both sides have said that they want to avoid a new Cold War, they are plunging into an increasingly ideological conflict that shows little sign of easing. The result has been a deterioration of relations that, to the surprise of many in Beijing, has surpassed even the four tumultuous years of dealing with President Donald J. Trump. “The United States has declared its comeback, but the world has changed,” Le Yucheng, a vice minister of foreign affairs, said in with the nationalistic news site Guancha.cn, echoing a Biden administration catchphrase. “The United States needs to see these changes, adapt to them, and reflect upon and correct its mistakes in the past.” It is not clear whether the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has formally signaled a change in foreign policy strategy, but judging from public statements and actions in recent weeks, patience with the Biden administration has worn thin. China has retaliated against American and European sanctions over China’s political repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang with . It has reined in on American stock exchanges. And it has stepped up military activity in the South China Sea and in the water and air around Taiwan in response to for the island democracy under Mr. Biden. The quickening tempo of military operations increases the chances of armed confrontation — even if accidental. The incendiary language emanating from some officials and state media in China would make climbing down even more difficult, given a nationalistic mood at home. Mr. Xi on July 1 celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China to warn that anyone who challenged the country’s sovereignty would “crack their heads and spill blood on the Great Wall of steel built from the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people.” Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said, “The Chinese government realizes very clearly up until now the pressure and unprecedented challenges that China faces in the world.” “The problem is they know that to change this means that China has to change its fundamental policy, which is firmly deemed by the Chinese leaders as not possible, or at least not worth it,” he added. Tensions have been mounting since the top diplomats from the two sides in March. Those meetings opened with an extraordinarily rancorous exchange about the issues that divide them. Mr. Biden’s special envoy on climate change, John Kerry, followed up with a visit to Shanghai in April, but included no new efforts to work together. Since then, cooperation on any issue has been scarce. Instead, there has been an almost daily exchange of recriminations. The animosity has become so intense that even a visit by the new deputy secretary of state, Wendy R. Sherman, has become a diplomatic dispute, with officials on both sides wrestling over who would attend any meetings, tentatively scheduled for next week. Mr. Biden, who has with another obstreperous American adversary, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, has not yet announced a face-to-face with Mr. Xi. Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi, who met many times as their countries’ vice presidents, have not spoken since their two-hour-plus telephone call in February during the American president’s first month in office. Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dismissed the newest American-led accusations as “made up out of thin air.” He said the United States was the world leader in cyberattacks. Wu Qiang, an independent political analyst in Beijing, said mutual suspicion was blocking a return to more stable relations. “There is a lack of political trust,” he said. “This is the biggest obstacle.” In Beijing, there is no question who is to blame. The view is that Mr. Biden’s moves reflect an American intention to undercut China’s growing economic and military might. The strategy to recruit allies in the effort seems to have particularly rankled. “Biden’s administration is isolating China with a multilateral club strategy,” Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, wrote in a response to questions. “This strategy has brought about much more difficulties to China’s economic development and pressure on China’s diplomatic relations than Trump’s unilateral strategy.” China has treated the deterioration of relations, in part, as a propaganda problem. In public statements and on social media, it has sought to discredit the United States as an arbiter of international behavior and values. When , Chinese state media castigated what it called a “sluggish” response, glossing over similar tragedies at home. Mr. Zhao, the foreign affairs ministry spokesman, recently called the 1921 Tulsa race massacre an example of “genocide” by the United States. While Mr. Zhao’s plays well among nationalists, others in China have raised concerns about such an aggressive strategy. At a seminar in Beijing last week organized by the Center for China and Globalization, a research group based in the Chinese capital, some scholars were stark about the country’s global image. A by the Pew Research Service, for example, found that overwhelming majorities of people in 15 major countries had a negative perception of China. Chu Yin, a professor at the University of International Relations in Beijing, called on China’s diplomats to be more flexible and creative in telling the country’s story abroad. “I often say that our diplomatic personnel have made great strides in their foreign language skills, but their ability to tell stories and find emotional resonance has been regressing in great strides,” Mr. Chu said at the seminar. “Now, China’s national image is not going over well, and this is directly related.” But China’s hard-line approach seems unlikely to change soon. Within the Chinese political and diplomatic establishment, there is an understanding that this tough approach comes from the top. Mr. Xi seems undaunted. Even before Mr. Biden won the election, Mr. Xi was reported to have reprised a theme that has since appeared much more frequently in public discussions. “The East is rising, while the West is declining,” he was said to have last year. Deng Yuwen, a former editor of a Communist Party newspaper who now lives in the United States, said many in China believed the coming five years would be the most tense period in relations so far. “China’s view now is that ‘We are so strong that it’s no problem for us to confront you. We can confront you for as long as is necessary,’” he said.

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- China Advantage › 1NC --- China Not Revisionist

Only reacting to US interference in Taiwan

Peter Symonds 8-21-2022. (Peter Symonds is is a member of the International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site, and the national editor of the WSWS in Australia. Symonds joined the Socialist Labour League, the predecessor of the Socialist Equality Party of Australia, in 1984. In 1987, he joined the staff of the SLL’s newspaper, Workers News. Since the launch of the WSWS in 1998, he has played a leading role in its analysis of political and social developments in Asia, Australia and the South Pacific. Symonds has written and lectured extensively on the history of Trotskyism in Asia and the Chinese revolutions of the 20th century. "In wake of Pelosi visit, US announces trade talks with Taiwan." World Socialist Web Site. Web. 8-21-2022. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/08/22/ptwk-a22.html >)MSUCB

The rapid expansion of official ties with Taiwan undercuts the One China policy adhered to by virtually every country in the world as the basis for diplomatic relations with China. While de facto recognising Beijing as the legitimate government of all China, including Taiwan, various governments are following the US in overturning longstanding diplomatic protocols, undermining the One China policy and raising tensions with Beijing. The US-Taiwan talks on a pact, known as the US-Taiwan Initiative for 21stCentury Trade, first mooted in June, are due to take place in the northern autumn. Taiwan, as of last year, was the eighth largest trading partner of the United States, while the US is Taiwan’s second largest trading partner after China. A broad range of American corporations are heavily dependent on Taiwan for the supply of semiconductors. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces more than half the world’s computer chips and has a virtual monopoly—over 90 percent—on the manufacture of the most advanced semiconductors. Taiwan relies on American agricultural imports as well as the purchase of American military hardware. The announcement last Wednesday by the Office of the US Trade Representative stated that the talks will cover 11 trade areas, but will particularly focus on agriculture and digital industries. The US Commerce Department is also preparing to hold talks, including on measures to secure semiconductor supply chains, underscoring the vital strategic importance of Taiwan’s chip manufacturing. The talks will take place under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which functions as Washington’s de facto embassy in Taipei. During the Trump administration, the AIT moved to new premises in June 2018 on a site covering 6.5 hectares, more than twice the size of the previous compound, and has a staff of more than 450. Shu Jueting, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce, criticised the US-Taiwan trade talks, saying China opposed any form of official exchanges with Taiwan, including on “agreements with sovereign connotations or an official nature.” Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province which it will forcibly reunify if Taipei ever declares formal independence from China. The pace of delegations arriving in Taipei is accelerating. A third US group headed by Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb landed in Taiwan yesterday for trade talks—just three weeks after Pelosi’s visit and a week after a US congressional delegation headed by Senator Ed Markey. The Financial Times reported that a group of Japanese lawmakers led by Keiji Furuya of the ruling Liberal Democratic party is due to arrive today in Taipei. Next week a Lithuanian delegation is expected to be present when the country opens its representative office in Taipei—a move that provoked economic retaliation by Beijing. Canadian parliamentarians and two German delegations plan to visit in October. The US announcement of trade talks last week was clearly not just a routine matter. Also present was Daniel Kritenbrink, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, who praised what he called “an ambitious road map for trade negotiations” with Taiwan. At the same time, he declared the US would continue “to deepen our ties with Taiwan” and, in particular, to support “Taiwan’s self-defence” and maintain “our own capacity.” In reality, the US, under Trump and now Biden, has greatly increased the sale of arms to Taiwan, including offensive weaponry. Moreover, under Biden, Washington is pursuing a strategy—as it has already done in provoking its proxy war with Russia—of goading Beijing into attacking Taiwan in a war aimed at weakening and destabilising the Chinese regime. Drawing on the Ukraine war, US is pressing Taiwan to pursue a “porcupine” military strategy, featuring the stockpiling of weaponry such as shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and attack drones, to inflict maximum damage on Chinese forces. A Wall Street Journal video on August 12 reported that Taiwan was considering expanding training in the use of such weaponry, with President Tsai Ing-wen pictured holding a Taiwanese-made Kestrel anti-armour rocket. The US is also selling Taiwan the more sophisticated mobile HIMARS missile system that has a far greater range and has agreed to sell MQ-9 Reaper drones. The flurry of diplomatic activity is taking place amid heightened military tensions across the narrow Taiwan Strait separating the island from the Chinese mainland. While the Chinese military has wound back the extensive live-fire drills staged in the immediate aftermath of Pelosi’s visit, it continues to mobilise its forces, with the Taiwanese defence ministry reporting 17 Chinese aircraft and five Chinese ships operating around Taiwan on Saturday. Last Thursday the Taiwanese military staged its own drills at the Hualien Air Base on the country’s east coast to simulate a response to a Chinese missile attack, using Taiwanese-made Sky Bow 3 anti-aircraft missiles and 35-millimetre anti-aircraft cannon. Defence ministry spokesperson Sun Li-fang condemned Chinese military exercises, then added that they “provide us with the opportunity for combat-readiness training.” Though not immediately related, China announced last week that it is sending military forces to take part in large-scale “Vostok” exercises being staged by Russia from August 30 to September 5. The joint military exercises, which are held every four years, have in the past involved hundreds of thousands of troops. Other countries taking part include India, Belarus, Mongolia and Tajikistan. While Beijing declared that China’s participation was “unrelated to the current international and regional situation,” the US-NATO proxy war against Russia and Washington’s menacing confrontation with China are driving the two countries together. A year ago, Russia and China held joint military exercises in north-central China involving more than 10,000 troops. Last October, the two countries held joint naval drills in the Sea of Japan, then engaged in their first joint patrols in the western Pacific. The US, which mobilised the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and its battle group in waters off Taiwan during Pelosi’s visit, has indicated that it is preparing another provocation against China by sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait. Such an operation can only further heighten tensions with China and raise the danger of an incident that becomes the starting point for a far wider and more dangerous conflict.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Environment defense

No environment extinction

Hance 18 – Jeremy, wildlife blogger for the Guardian and a journalist with Mongabay focusing on forests, indigenous people, climate change and more. He is also the author of Life is Good: Conservation in an Age of Mass Extinction, “Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point?”, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary, 01-16-2018 *edits notated with brackets

Just over 250 million years ago, the planet suffered what may be described as its greatest holocaust [mass death]: ninety-six percent of marine genera (plural of genus) and seventy percent of land vertebrate vanished for good. Even insects suffered a mass extinction – the only time before or since. Entire classes of animals – like trilobites – went out like a match in the wind.

But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Democracy defense

Their warrants for democratic peace have been empirically disproved many times,

Christopher Layne 8/2/2005 “China’s Role in American Grand Strategy: Partner, Regional Power, or Great Power Rival?” http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter%205%20Layne.pdf

The so-called democratic peace theory is also invoked to support the proposition that an impending Sino-American rivalry can be ameliorated. Among those US strategists who have taken a hard line on China, the view has taken hold that conflict with China is inevitable—unless China becomes a democracy. In part, this is because China’s external ambitions are seen as being in conflict with America’s interests. However, China’s ‘aggressiveness’ is ascribed by US hard-liners, in large measure, to the nature of its domestic political system. Simply put, the containers view China as a ‘bad’ state. This Wilsonian viewpoint is quintessentially American. The time-tested American remedy for a ‘bad’ state is to transform it into a ‘good’ state—that is, into a democracy. The Wilsonian outlook incorporates the so-called ‘democratic peace theory,’ which asserts that democracies never go to war with fellow democracies. Hence, expanding the ‘democratic zone of peace’ is deemed a vital American security interest. Yet the democratic peace theory is singularly devoid of intellectual merit. There are two (not mutually exclusive) causal explanations of the democratic peace: first, in democracies, statesmen are restrained from going to war by the public, upon which the human and economic costs of war fall; and second, in their external relations with one another, democratic states are governed by the same norms of peaceful dispute resolution that apply to their domestic politics. Neither causal logic holds up under scrutiny. Democracies have often gone to war enthusiastically (Britain and France in 1914, the United States in 1898). And there is an ample historical record demonstrating that, where vital national interests have been at stake, democratic states routinely have practiced big-stick, realpolitik diplomacy against other democracies (including threats to use force). Moreover, contrary to the democratic peace theory’s central tenet, democratic states have gone to war with each other. It matters little, however, whether the democratic peace theory is true. What matters is that most of the American foreign policy community believes it is true. And this belief has consequences. After all, if a nondemocratic state (in this case, China) is likely to be a trouble-maker and challenge the United States, the obvious solution to the problem is for the United States to cause that state to metamorphose into a democracy: ‘The ultimate American objective on China is to induce China to behave more responsibly and to become more democratic.’ The impulse to be a ‘crusader state,’ however, invariably has pushed the United States down the road of foreign policy misadventure, and will do so if Washington pushes its Wilsonian agenda on Beijing.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Democracy defense

Democracy does not spread peace – historical record proves their evidence is uninformed hype.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 94

Wilsonian ideology drives the American Empire because its proponents posit that the United States must use its military power to extend democracy abroad. Here, the ideology of Empire rests on assumptions that are not supported by the facts. One reason the architects of Empire champion democracy promotion is because they believe in the so-called democratic peace theory, which holds that democratic states do not fight other democracies. Or as President George W. Bush put it with his customary eloquence," democracies don't war; democracies are peaceful.."16 The democratic peace theory is the probably the most overhyped and under supported "theory" ever to be concocted by American academics. In fact, it is not a theory at all. Rather it is a theology that suits the conceits of Wilsonian true believers—especially the neoconservatives who have been advocating American Empire since the early1990s. As serious scholars have shown, however, the historical record does not support the democratic peace theory."' On the contrary, it shows that democracies do not act differently toward other democracies than they do toward nondemocratic states. When important national interests are at stake, democracies not only have threatened to use force against other democracies, but, infact, democracies have gone to war with other democracies.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Democracy defense

--US has zero democratic credibility.

Ashford 21 – Emma, Senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. “America Can’t Promote Democracy Abroad. It Can’t Even Protect It at Home”, Foreign Policy, , 01-07-2021

“What if journalists wrote about U.S. politics the way they wrote about other countries?” asked a dozen tongue-in-cheek articles since 2016. Twitter users joked about the embattled president of a former British colony, huddling in his palace, refusing to concede the election. But all of that ended Wednesday afternoon, when a violent mob rushed past U.S. Capitol Police and invaded Congress, forcing the evacuation of lawmakers and ending with tear gas, gunfire, and at least four deaths. The pictures called to mind Boris Yeltsin on top of a tank, the Arab Spring, or the streets of Venezuela. For those watching around the world, the United States had become what American leaders so often decried: a weak democracy unable to prevent violence and bloodshed from marring the transition of power from one leader to the next.

It’s a sign of how broken U.S. foreign-policy debates are that the primary reaction from many commentators was to worry about America’s moral authority and global leadership. There were comments about how happy China’s Xi Jinping must be and worries that this would undermine U.S. democracy promotion abroad. Michael McFaul, a former Obama-era ambassador to Moscow, tweeted that “Trump today delivered his latest, but hopefully his last gift to Putin.” Meanwhile, a group of NGOs, including the National Endowment for Democracy, issued a statement reaffirming its “commitment to stand in solidarity with all those around the world who share democratic values.” In short: in the middle of a literal coup attempt aimed at halting the certification of a democratic election, with insurrectionists storming the Capitol, many foreign-policy hands were fretting about whether the United States could continue to spread democracy and human rights abroad and whether it might impact America’s ability to engage in great-power competition with China.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Democracy defense

Democracy is resilient but fails

Doorenspleet 19 – Renske, Award Winning Scholar, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick, Director, Centre for Studies in Democratization, PhD in Political Science from Leiden University, Postdoctoral Fellowship Completed at Harvard University. “ Rethinking the Value of Democracy”, Palgrave Macmillian, pg. 239-243 xx-xx-2019

The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed.

Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Democracy defense

--Democratic backsliding has already happened – 2021 was unprecedented

Walsh 21 – Bryan, the Future Correspondent for Axios. He covers emerging technology and the trends shaping geopolitics, work, warfare and more. “The global decline of democracy”, Axios, , 12-15-2021

Democratic governance is sliding backward in the U.S. and much of the world, according to a series of recent reports.

Why it matters: The future will be shaped by the push and pull of democratic and autocratic forces within countries and beyond their borders. If supporters of democracies can't halt democracy's retreat, freedom and civil liberties could follow.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
AFF › Democracy defense

No impact to democracy

Mousseau 16 – Michael, Political Science Professor at the University of Central Florida. “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, pg. 1-18, , 01-28-2016

A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010).

Resolution of this controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015).