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2023 MNDI Counterplan
Minimum Wage CP – MNDI DMP › Solvency › Solvency – Consumer Spending

Minimum Wage increases demand for goods and services and create 100,000 new jobs.

Cooper and Hall ’12 [David and Doug Hall; August 14; David Cooper is director of the; Doug Hall was Director of EPI’s  (EARN); Economic Policy Institute, "How raising the federal minimum wage would help working families and give the economy a boost", ] PS

The immediate benefits of a minimum-wage increase are in the boosted earnings of the lowest-paid workers, but its positive effects would far exceed this extra income. Recent research reveals that, despite skeptics’ claims, raising the minimum wage does not cause job loss. In fact, throughout the nation, minimum-wage increases would create jobs. Like unemployment insurance benefits or tax breaks for low- and middle-income workers, raising the minimum wage puts more money in the pockets of working families when they need it most, thereby augmenting their spending power. Economists generally recognize that low-wage workers are more likely than any other income group to spend any extra earnings immediately on previously unaffordable basic needs or services. Increasing the federal minimum wage to $9.80 by July 1, 2014, would give an additional $39.7 billion over the phase-in period to directly and indirectly affected workers, who would, in turn, spend those extra earnings. Indirectly affected workers—those earning close to, but still above, the proposed new minimum wage—would likely receive a boost in earnings due to the “spillover” effect (Shierholz 2009), giving them more to spend on necessities. This projected rise in consumer spending is critical to any recovery, especially when weak consumer demand is one of the most significant factors holding back new hiring (Izzo 2011). Though the stimulus from a minimum-wage increase is smaller than the boost created by, for example, unemployment insurance benefits, it is still substantial—and has the crucial advantage of not imposing significant costs on government. Assessing the economic benefits of a minimum-wage increase Showing that raising the minimum wage would be a tool for modest job creation requires an examination of the stimulative effects of minimum-wage increases. Because minimum-wage increases come from employers, we must construct a “minimum-wage increase multiplier” that takes into account the increase in compensation to low-wage workers and the decrease in corporate profits that both occur as a result of minimum-wage increases. Raising the minimum wage means shifting profits from an entity (the employer) that is much less likely to spend immediately to one (the low-wage worker) that is more likely to spend immediately. Thus, increasing the minimum wage stimulates demand for goods and services, leading employers in the broader economy to bring on new staff to keep up with this increased demand. When economists analyze the net economic stimulus effect of policy proposals (e.g., tax rate changes that boost income for some and reduce it for others), they use a set of widely accepted fiscal multipliers to calculate the total increase in economic activity due to a particular increase in spending. In applying these multipliers, economists generally recognize a direct relationship between increased economic activity and job creation. This analysis assumes that a $115,000 increase in economic activity results in the creation of one new full-time-equivalent job in the current economy. Using these same standard fiscal multipliers to analyze the jobs impact of an increase in compensation of low-wage workers and decrease in corporate profits that result from a minimum-wage increase, we find that increasing the national minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.80 per hour by July 1, 2014, would result in a net increase in economic activity of approximately $25 billion over the phase-in period and over that period would generate approximately 100,000 new jobs (see Appendix for methodological details). In fact, the hike in the federal minimum wage would create jobs in every state, as seen in Appendix Table 1. (Detailed state-level breakdowns of the demographics of workers who would be affected by the increase—and the degree to which the wages of various types of workers would rise—are available at .) Though the resulting employment impact is modest in the context of the millions of workers currently unemployed nationwide, creating tens of thousands of jobs would be a step in the right direction and would boost the economy. The benefits of a minimum-wage increase in an economic downturn Examining the positive effects of a minimum-wage increase leads to an overarching discussion of the economic case for increasing the earnings of the lowest-paid workers during an economic downturn. In the current economic climate, nearly everything is pushing against wage growth. With 3.4 unemployed workers for each job opening (Gould 2012), employers do not have to offer substantial wages to hire the workers they need, nor do they have to pay substantial wage increases to retain workers. Indeed, between 2009 (when the last minimum-wage increase took place) and 2011 (the most recent year for which data are available), nearly every state experienced wage erosion at the 20th percentile (according to an analysis of Current Population Survey data). Even conservative economists suggest higher wages might help speed the recovery. American Enterprise Institute scholar Desmond Lachman, a former managing director at Salomon Smith Barney, told The New York Times, “Corporations are taking huge advantage of the slack in the labor market—they are in a very strong position and workers are in a very weak position. They are using that bargaining power to cut benefits and wages, and to shorten hours.” According to Lachman, that strategy “very much jeopardizes our chances of experiencing a real recovery” (Powell 2011). Furthermore, the national unemployment rate currently stands at 8.3 percent and is not expected to return to pre-recession levels for several years. Considering the past year’s sluggish job growth rate, a minimum-wage increase that creates about 100,000 new jobs would help strengthen the recovery. Conclusion The multiple positive effects that would result from a higher minimum wage are clear: It would boost the earnings of working families hardest hit by the Great Recession, spur economic growth, and create about 100,000 net new jobs. In an economic climate in which wage increases for the most vulnerable workers are scarce, raising the minimum wage to $9.80 by July 1, 2014, is an opportunity that America’s working families cannot afford to lose.

2023 MNDI Counterplan
Minimum Wage CP – MNDI DMP › Solvency › Solvency – Consumer Spending

Minimum Wage raise stimulates economic growth by boosting consumer spending

Roberts ’21 [Lily and Ben Olinsky; January 27; Lily Roberts is the managing director of the Economic Policy Team at the Center for American Progress; Ben Olinsky is the senior vice president for policy and strategy at the Center; Senior Fellow; Center for American Progress, "Raising the Minimum Wage Would Boost an Economic Recovery—and Reduce Taxpayer Subsidization of Low-Wage Work", ] PS

, CAP has demonstrated that an increase in the minimum wage would significantly decrease the use of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), as millions of workers are currently paid so little that they must rely on the public social safety net. Indeed, an increase to the federal minimum wage (and the elimination of the subminimum wage for people who work for tips and people with disabilities) would have broad benefits for the economy beyond the wages of affected workers. Wage increases—particularly for those at the bottom of the income spectrum—increase community-level economic activity and support local businesses; reduce the amount by which taxpayers subsidize corporations for the low wages they pay; and reduce the pay inequalities for women and people of color that depress overall economic growth. An increase to the minimum wage would be far from divisive: American voters have signaled , bipartisan support for raising the minimum wage to $15. In November, of Florida voters supported a ballot measure to do just that, even as the state’s voters backed Donald Trump for reelection. The percentage of Americans who say that during the pandemic—66 percent of Americans supported raising the minimum wage in February 2020, while 72 percent supported it by August 2020. The failure of the Senate in recent years to pass minimum wage legislation has meant real, tangible harm to American families. The last time Congress passed an increase to the minimum wage was in 2007, which fully phased in by 2009. Since 2009, America’s minimum wage workers have endured the longest period since 1938 without a pay raise, while the rising cost of living simultaneously eroded the value of the minimum wage by more than 17 percent. Last year, CAP put this into sharp relief by highlighting how much workers are losing each day the Senate fails to act: While the Raise the Wage Act languishes in the Senate, workers lose $62 every eight-hour workday earning an hourly wage of $7.25 instead of $15. That’s $310 a week, $1,348 a month, and $16,174 a year. Eliminating these losses would also be a crucial step toward for women and particularly women of color, who work in low-wage and tipped occupations. As Congress works on coronavirus rescue legislation and a subsequent package to rebuild the economy, the minimum wage should not be dismissed. Raising the wages of low-income workers will stimulate the economy; substantially lower the amount the country spends on social safety net programs such as SNAP; and reduce economic inequality, thereby unleashing additional economic growth in a period of recovery. Stimulate the economy by putting more money in workers’ wallets Phasing in a minimum wage increase between 2021 and 2025 would boost consumer spending and economic growth as the country recovers from the public health and economic crises. Different methodological approaches predict varying aggregate effects of minimum wage increases. However, calculations uniformly point toward wage increases begetting stimulus, especially wage increases for low-wage workers:

The that low-wage worker households spent an additional $2,800 in the year after a $1-per-hour increase to the minimum wage.

2023 MNDI Counterplan
Minimum Wage CP – MNDI DMP › Solvency › Solvency – States

States and local governments lead on raising the minimum wage now – CP just builds on status quo

The Hill, ’22 (ADDY BINK AND NEXSTAR MEDIA WIRE, “These states are raising their minimum wages in 2023,” The Hill, 12/26/22, https://thehill.com/homenews/nexstar_media_wire/3776862-these-states-are-raising-their-minimum-wages-in-2023/)//CTP

Amid inflation, and no changes on the federal level, multiple states will be raising their minimum wages in 2023. The federal minimum wage in the U.S. is $7.25, a rate that hasn’t changed since 2009. As of fall 2022, 15 states and territories had minimum wage rates that matched the federal minimum wage, down from 16 last year (Puerto Rico increased its minimum wage to $8.50). In the new year, 27 states will see an increase in their minimum wage. Most will take effect on January 1, but others will have to wait further into 2023. Washington has the highest minimum wage rate of any state, at $15.74, which is up from the $14.49 threshold it set in 2022. California comes in second highest at $15.50, a 50 cent increase over 2022. Washington, D.C. has the highest overall minimum wage at $16.10. D.C.’s wage will rise again in July 2023, in proportion to the increase in the Consumer Price Index, according to its Department of Employment Services. Oregon and Nevada also won’t see their minimum wages increase until later this year. In July, Oregon’s rate will rise from the current $13.50 to a yet-to-be-determined amount based on the Consumer Price Index, a figure released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. In Nevada, the minimum wage will increase to $10.25 for employers providing qualifying health benefits and $11.25 for those that don’t. Two states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, will satisfy their scheduled incremental increases to bring their minimum wages to $15. Six other states move one step closer to reaching that milestone in 2023: New Jersey by 2024 Delaware, Illinois, Maryland (for large employers), and Rhode Island by 2025 Florida and Maryland (for small employers) by 2026 Florida’s incremental minimum wage increase will take effect at the end of September.

2023 MNDI Counterplan
Minimum Wage CP – MNDI DMP › Notes › 1nc - Federal

Raising the federal minimum wage increases economic growth – no downsides – prefer comparative ev

Zipperer ’19 [Ben; 2-7-2019; economist at the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) in Washington, D.C. with focus in the minimum wage and low-wage labor markets; Economic Policy Institute, "Gradually raising the minimum wage to $15 would be good for workers, good for businesses, and good for the economy: Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor", https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-testimony-feb-2019/]BG

A national $15 minimum wage by 2024 is an important corrective to ensure that low-wage workers share the benefits of economic growth. The bulk of recent economic research on the minimum wage, as well as the best scholarship, establishes that prior increases have had little to no negative consequences and instead have meaningfully raised the pay of the low-wage workforce. Minimum wage workers, and low-wage workers generally, are mostly adults and are also disproportionately women and people of color. Workers in every region of the country will soon need $15 per hour to maintain a modest but adequate standard of living. We can afford to pay the lowest-paid workers more than they were paid 50 years ago Raising the national minimum wage is well overdue. Workers today who are paid the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour are, after adjusting for inflation, paid 29 percent less than their counterparts 50 years ago. This is despite the fact that the economy’s capacity to deliver higher wages has doubled in the last 50 years, as measured by labor productivity, or the amount of output produced by workers. As Figure A shows, had the minimum wage kept pace with labor productivity growth since 1968, this year it would be more than $20 per hour. Today, however, a single parent earning the current federal minimum wage does not earn enough through full-time work to bring his or her family above the federal poverty line.1 [GRAPH OMITTED] Increasing the national minimum wage to $15 by 2024, as proposed in the Raise the Wage Act of 2019 (H.R. 582), is an important corrective to our failure to raise the minimum wage. A $15 minimum wage by 2024 would ensure that a portion of the country’s labor productivity gains are translated into higher living standards for low-wage workers. At the same time, the proposal does not raise the minimum wage to $15 immediately, but instead gradually phases in the increase over a period of six years so that employers can adjust to the new standard. My colleague David Cooper has estimated that raising the minimum wage to $15 by 2024 would lift the pay of about 40 million workers, or 27 percent of the eligible workforce. Affected workers who work year-round would receive a raise on the order of $3,000 a year. This is enough to make a tremendous difference in the life of a preschool teacher, bank teller, or fast-food worker—more than half of those working in each of these occupations earns less than $15 per hour today. More broadly, low-wage workers today constitute a large portion of the workforce. About 25 percent of all workers earned $13 or less per hour in 2018 and the vast majority of them would benefit from a minimum wage increase to $15 by 2024.2 Were it enacted, for the first time the lowest-wage workers would make more than they did in 1968, the last high point of the minimum wage. While this would be a bold step, the resulting pay increase would be relatively modest compared with the economy’s capacity to deliver improvements in living standards. A $15 minimum wage in 2024 would have 28 percent more purchasing power than the minimum wage did at its 1968 high point, but over that time period, the economy’s potential for higher living standards, as reflected in labor productivity, will have grown by 119 percent. Moreover, because of the gradual phase-in, a $15 minimum wage in 2024 is not the same as $15 per hour today, but equivalent to about $13 per hour in 2018 dollars, after adjusting for projected inflation.3 The proposed legislation also indexes the minimum wage to median wages so that low-wage workers will share a common trajectory of wage growth with the broader labor market. By establishing regular, predictable increases to the minimum wage that are linked to overall wage growth, the proposed legislation improves the ability of the minimum wage to reduce inequality. A rise to $15 an hour would reverse decades of growing pay inequality between the lowest-paid workers and the middle class, and indexing future increases would prevent any future growth in that gap. The proposed legislation also gradually phases out the outdated subminimum wage for tipped workers, which Congress has frozen at a meager $2.13 per hour since 1991. Establishing a single wage for tipped and nontipped workers alike is long overdue and will help raise the total take-home pay for workers in tipped occupations. Indeed, Sylvia Allegretto and David Cooper have found that in states where tipped workers receive the full regular minimum wage, tipped workers earn a higher median wage, inclusive of tips. As a result, poverty rates are lower for tipped workers in states with a single, equal minimum wage. Because under current policy they are not paid an adequate regular wage, tipped workers’ economic security is precarious given that they are especially vulnerable to wage theft. Additionally, the current, separate subminimum wage for tipped workers is likely to increase their income volatility and also perpetuate racial discrimination.4 Economic research justifies bold minimum wage increases Minimum wages are one of the most well-studied topics in economics. Although there sometimes appears to be much controversy about size of the employment effects of the minimum wage, the weight of recent evidence shows that minimum wage increases have worked exactly as intended, by raising wages without substantial negative consequences on employment. Paul Wolfson and Dale Belman reviewed 15 years of research published since 2001—which comprised 37 studies and 739 estimates—and found that the average estimated employment effect of minimum wage increases was very small.5 In addition, Wolfson and Belman, as well as Isaiah Andrews and Maximilian Kasy in a new review, found statistical evidence that there is a bias toward publishing findings showing a statistically significant negative employment effect.6 Finally, Sylvia Allegretto, Arindrajit Dube, Michael Reich, and I found that studies using the most high-quality, credible research designs also found little to no employment effects.7 These findings taken together suggest that both the average study as well as the best research show that there has been little downside to raising minimum wages. While much of this research concentrates on the effects of the average or typical minimum wage increase in the United States, current research also suggests that even higher minimum wages have helped raise wages without reductions in employment. Doruk Cengiz, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner, and I studied all major state-level minimum wage increases between 1979 and 2016 and found they significantly raised wages without reducing the employment of low-wage workers. Notably, we also found the same positive outcomes for even the highest minimum wages in our study.8 Separately, important new scholarship by Ellora Derenoncourt and Claire Montialoux found that the highest minimum wages the United States has ever experienced—the minimum wages of the late 1960s—significantly raised wages without reducing the employment of low-wage workers.9 Because the evidence shows there has been little downside both to minimum wages in general and to minimum wages at their highest points in U.S. history, larger increases are economically justified. Modest and infrequent increases to the minimum wage leave money on the table that otherwise could have been earned by low-wage workers. In other words, by failing to enact bold increases in the minimum wage, we will have deprived low-wage workers of wage increases they could have had without costing them much in terms of reduced employment.10 The benefits of a $15 minimum wage in 2024 for workers, their families, and their communities will far outweigh any potential costs of the policy. To gain a sense of the large improvements a $15 minimum wage by 2024 will make in the lives of low-income communities, we can turn to research by Arindrajit Dube on how minimum wages raise incomes for the poorest families. In a new article soon to be published in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Dube demonstrates that the income-raising effects of the minimum wage significantly reduce the number of Americans in families below the poverty line.11 In particular, if the U.S. had a $12 national minimum wage in place last year, there would be 6.2 million fewer individuals living in poverty. The resulting income gains and poverty reductions would be especially large for black and Hispanic families and for single mothers. We should expect similarly sized poverty-reducing effects of a $15 minimum wage in 2024, given that such a policy is equivalent to about $13 per hour in 2018 dollars, after adjusting for projected inflation.

2023 MNDI Counterplan
Minimum Wage CP – MNDI DMP › Notes › 1nc – States

States drive minimum wage increases

DeSilver ’21 – Sr. writer and editor (Drew DeSilver, “When it comes to raising the minimum wage, most of the action is in cities and states, not Congress,” Pew Research Center, 3/12/21, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/03/12/when-it-comes-to-raising-the-minimum-wage-most-of-the-action-is-in-cities-and-states-not-congress/)//CTP

Prospects for raising the federal minimum wage, which has stood at since 2009, appear to have yet again, despite for the idea. In truth, though, for the past several years most of the real action on minimum wages has been in states, counties and cities, not on Capitol Hill. Just this past November, for example, Florida voters approved , which will gradually raise the state’s minimum until it reaches $15 in 2026. [chart omitted] As a practical matter, the $7.25 federal minimum wage is actually used in just 21 states, which collectively account for about 40% of all U.S. wage and salary workers – roughly 56.5 million people – according to our analysis of state minimum-wage laws and federal employment data. In the 29 other states and the District of Columbia, minimum wages are higher – ranging from $8.65 in Florida to $15 in D.C. In eight of the states with higher-than-federal minimum wages, some cities and counties have adopted local ordinances that provide for even higher rates than their state’s minimum, accelerate schedules for future increases, or both. (None of the states where the $7.25 federal minimum prevails have higher local minimums.) Our research found at least 46 such cities and counties – most of them (36) in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas of California. The highest local minimum wage in the country, $16.84, is in , a suburb of San Francisco. A few other cities, such as San Diego and Albuquerque, New Mexico, also have local minimum wage laws, but they’ve been overtaken by increases in state rates. Tacoma, Washington, repealed its local minimum-wage ordinance in 2019 for that reason. Two states, Oregon and New York, don’t permit localities to adopt their own minimums but have regional variations built into their statewide laws to account for wide cost-of-living differentials within those states. In Oregon, which has a three-tiered wage scale, the “standard” hourly minimum of $12 applies, by our estimate, to only about 38% of the state’s 1.8 million wage and salary workers. The minimum wage is $13.25 for workers in the Portland metro area, the state’s largest (with about half of all wage and salary workers) and most expensive. And in 18 “nonurban” counties, which combined have about 11% of Oregon’s payroll workers, the minimum is $11.50. Scheduled future increases in the three zones (metro Portland, standard counties and nonurban counties) also vary based on the relative cost of living. Similarly, New York state has one minimum wage for New York City ($15), one for the city’s suburban counties ($14, rising to $15 on Dec. 31), and one for the rest of the state ($12.50, adjusting annually for inflation until it too reaches $15). The $7.25 federal minimum wage is pretty much one-size-fits-all across industries and occupations (or most: tipped employees, students, farmworkers and young trainees can be paid less under certain circumstances). But states, cities and counties can, and often do, provide for a range of minimums for different types of employers. Nevada, for instance, sets a minimum wage of $8 an hour for employers that offer their workers health benefits but mandates $9 for employers that don’t. Seattle’s minimum wage is now $16.69 for most employers, but small employers (those with 500 or fewer employees worldwide) can pay $15 if an employee’s tips or company-provided medical benefits equal at least $1.69 an hour. Most states with higher-than-federal minimums also have acted to automate the process of adjusting the minimum wage, rather than leaving it to year-by-year legislative whim. In 10 states (plus D.C.), the minimum wage rises annually based on some sort of inflation or cost-of-living index, with the intent of preserving its current purchasing power. Thirteen other states are in the process of raising their minimums on a multiyear schedule – seven will begin automatic indexing at some point in the future, while in the other six the increases will stop upon reaching a set level. All but one of the 46 cities and counties we identified with their own minimum wages also have adopted automatic cost-of-living increases, either in effect now or beginning at some point in the future.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Answers › 2NC --- Liberalism good

Don’t believe their benign articulation of neoliberalism. Biopolitical protection of capital markets can always find a justification for its interventions that circumvent the possibility of community building.

Sani 2012 [Giorgo, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Studies at International Christian University (ICU) in Japan, Development Dialogue, April “Empowering the Disposable? Biopolitics, Race, and Human Developement” IV, https://www.academia.edu/2621970/Empowering_the_Disposable_Biopolitics_Race_and_Human_Development]

Sen’s methodological individualism and belief in the naturalness of the market is consistent with the ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault 2007, 2008) of liberal ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991, 2008), which seeks, through the construction of rational, self-interested autonomous individuals, to reduce the great mass of culturally differentiated humanity to ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998; Shani 2010). Defined as ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species become the object of a political strategy’, the origins of biopower or biopolitics, go back to the attempt, starting in Europe in the 18th century, ‘to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race’ (Foucault 2008: 1). These problems, Foucault argues, are inseparable ‘from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared’: liberalism (Foucault 2008: 317). Liberalism, for Foucault, is neither an ideology nor a theory but a practice: ‘a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization which obeys…the internal rule of maximum economy’ (Foucault 2008: 318). As a form of critical reflection on governmental practice, liberalism is based on the principle that ‘one always governs too much’ (Foucault 2008: 321, 319). This qualifies the pastoral impulse implicit in governmental rationality: the power to ‘make live’ which is itself a legacy of the pastoral individualising power of the Christian ecclesiastical pastorate (Foucault 2007: 364). Consequently, the ‘market’ role is crucial in deciding who lives and who is disposable. In Foucault’s words, it enters the governmentalising processes as ‘privileged site of experiment in which one can pinpoint the effects of excessive governmentality’ (Foucault 2008: 320). The market was considered by the classical political economists of the 18th century to be directed by natural forces. For Adam Smith, the development of a market economy is the outcome of a natural propensity within people to ‘truck, barter and exchange’ in pursuit of their material self-interest. Our instinctive desire to better our condition produces mutually beneicial outcomes through the operation of (God’s) ‘invisible hand’ and universal laws governing prices and wages (Smith 1976). Through concepts such as the ‘true price’ that is formulated by the natural workings of the economy, the market appears as a site of ‘veridiction’. Since the sovereign is thought of as incapable of fully grasping the ‘truth’ of the market, classical economists were therefore opposed to mercantilist restrictions on the free low of goods and service and considered the proper role of government to ‘let things follow their course’ (Foucault 2007: 48). Although they appeared as ‘external’, the limitations on sovereign power imposed by the ‘market’ were, consequently, internal to the process of governmentality. Consequently, liberalism appears as ‘the principle of the self-limitation of governmental reason’ (Foucault 2008: 20). Like Adam Smith and the other classical economists, Sen accepts the (internal) limitations placed on governmentality as ‘natural’ and, therefore, external to it. Human development, he argues, can only take place through participation in a market economy, which is the best guarantee of freedom. Where he departs from the neoliberal (but not the classical) tradition is in his insistence that the state and other governmentalising agencies can – and should – play an active role in the developmental process within the constraints imposed by the market. Whereas Smith and the other political economists considered homo oeconomicus to be a natural description of the human individual under conditions of freedom, Sen – in common with contemporary neoliberalism – believes that he or she has to be constructed through a discourse of ‘empowerment’. As a strategy of governmentality, ‘empowerment’ creates the liberal subjectivity needed for capitalism by ‘emancipating’ the individual from prior social and cultural arrangements and inculcating the skills and resources needed to participate in a market economy. The state, in Sen’s view, is pri marily responsible for the production of this liberal subjectivity through the dissemination, via compulsory education, of what Smith referred to as ‘habits of industry’: autonomy, calculation and relexivity. The ‘empowered’ individual is expected to be ‘unencumbered’ (Hopgood 2000) by communal and social ties and to possess the ability to calculate and the capacity for relexivity. A well-educated, healthy workforce made up of autonomous, calculating and relexive individuals will thus have the ‘capability’ (neoliberals prefer ‘capital’) to attract foreign direct investment and to generate economic development. For neoliberals, however, the state – particularly in the global South – has become a signiicant barrier to development. The state’s responsibility for executing the liberal project of modernity is entrusted instead to the private sector and a plethora of international, non-governmental and quasi-governmental organisations. This new institutional architecture is designed to allow neoliberal ‘governmentality’ (Ong 2006) to operate on a global scale. Neoliberal governmentality seeks to maximise market allocation at the expense of the state by making the market mechanism the sole legitimate means of allocating resources in society, thus rejecting the fundamentals of classical and ‘embedded’ liberalism. It responds to the biopolitical problems which beset human beings collectively as ‘a set of living beings forming a population’ by individualising them: as active informed citizens, individuals, and not the state, are made primarily responsible for their own welfare. Furthermore, the dominant ‘Chicago School’ of neoliberalism seeks ‘to extend the rationality of the market…to domains which are not exclusively or primarily economic’ (Foucault 2008: 323). This includes forcibly imposing ‘the rationality of the market’ on ‘populations’ living in indebted ‘developing’ societies through IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs seek to create the disciplinary mechanisms needed for the construction of homo oeconomicus by transforming institutional structures and creating autonomy; inculcating certain habits such as calculation and relexivity, and developing the capacity of the state so that it can undertake these tasks (Williams 1999: 90). Speciically, this entails ‘disciplining’ the state through privatisation of state-run industries, economic liberalisation, deregulation of the economy, rolling back of welfare, reduction of expenditures on public goods, tightening of fiscal discipline, favouring of free lows of capital in order to attract foreign direct investment, strict controls on organised labour, tax reduction and unrestricted currency repatriation. The disciplined neoliberal state consequently favours strong individual property rights, the rule of law and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade (Harvey 2007: 64) This ‘global disciplinary’ neoliberalism, as Stephen Gill has pointed out, requires a juridical-political dimension in order for it to appear as hegemonic: a ‘new constitutionalism’ that seeks to ‘lock in’ the ‘rights’ of investors and privilege the ‘security of capital’ over ‘human security’ (Gill 2003). The new political architecture of the global political economy is provided by international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which ‘disciplines’ member states for pursuing policies detrimental to the interests of (multinational) capital, the World Economic Forum at Davos, which provides an arena where government, business and media leaders can meet and coordinate policy goals, and, perhaps most importantly, the Group of Eight (G8) and now the Group of Twenty (G-20) inance ministers and central bank governors, who met in London in April 2009 to discuss the world-wide economic crisis. Their objectives are ‘to create a set of long-term economic and political reforms that gain constitutional status, thus underpinning the extension of the disciplinary power of capital on a world scale’ (Gill 2000).

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Answers › 2NC --- State Good

The idea of a possible utopian state leads to mass failure.

Ellis 16 [Cameron Ellis, Assistant Professor at Stanford University, “The Ethics of Unseeing: Exploring Utopia between Miéville and Agamben”, Trent University, https://www.routledge.com/The-Ethics-of-a-Potential-Urbanism-RPD-Critical-encounters-between-Giorgio/Boano/p/book/9781138616608, DSB]

This article is not grounded in sociological theory per se; however, it does argue that a contribution to the field itself may be found in otherwise strictly literary or philosophical texts. Recent sociopolitical uprisings have again demonstrated the tendency to think that genuine change can only be enacted through mass revolt. Critics and opponents of these movements have pejoratively declared them failure because they lack a “positive vision”. Is there a crisis in utopian thinking today? Perhaps. It is thought that mass movements constitute a power onto themselves capable of bringing about genuine change in the world. However, these movements are eventually met with what Slavoj Žižek calls “the proverbial morning after question” (What happens tomorrow morning?) (see Žižek, 2012). Maybe the masses are not the only valid conduit by which to change the system; what is needed is a personal comportment to the world which allows for continuous utopian potential to be lived through and change enacted through. Perhaps one ought to revisit the site of the individual for a possible analysis of overlooked utopian potential. To begin the return to the individual I propose a quasi-hermeneutic move to address the concept of utopia itself, originating as it did with the work of Thomas More in 1516. Fátima Vieira writes that More’s imaginary island was originally to be called “Nusquama”, from the Latin word “Nusquam”, which means “nowhere”, “no place”, “on no occasion”. However, More wanted to convey a meaning that exceeded this notion. Inspired by the travel/imperial expeditions of his time (e.g., Amerigo Vespucci, Christopher Columbus, and Angelo Poliziano) and the then blossoming capitalist markets, More wanted the name of his fictional island to reflect a sense of possibility and hope that the Otherness of these new lands (the New World) would bring for Europe. Furthermore, More wanted to convey the idea of an ideal society that “existed” somehow without being reified qua plan as in the Republic or Laws of Plato (Vieira, 2010: 3-4). As such the Western tradition was indelibly marked by what I will call – echoing Alain Badiou – the More-Event: the invention of the word “utopia”: “derived from the Greek ‘ou’ (‘non-’) and ‘topos’ (‘place’), means ‘no-place’ (with a possible pun on ‘eu’ (‘good’): ‘good-place’)” (Bruce, 2008: xxi). The use of the Greek over the Latin in the naming of Utopia was also intended as a homage to the Classical Ancient period of the Greeks that was thought by those Renaissance Humanists – of which More is counted – as the height of human achievement and culture. But what of this no-place today? How might it to be interpreted today? I believe that insight might be gained if no-place (utopia) is thought of as an always-already being-in-no- place as opposed to no-place as such dwelling just behind the horizon (but close enough that one senses its presence) as it is commonly understood today. This amounts to a veritable involution of no-place from an “out-there” to an “interior” (i.e., subjective) comportment with respect to the world. Indeed there are some contemporary cultural markers which point to the gradual awareness of this involution of the notion of no-place. My argument can be sensed in the words of the nineteenth-century historian Jacob Burckhardt: “We would like to know the waves on which we sail across the ocean; but we ourselves are these waves” (qtd. in Blumenberg, 1997: 69). Here Burckhardt alludes to the limitless frontier that is the face of all that is possible and encourages the recognition that one is already that frontier. It is the responsibility of the subject to “float” upon the “waves” to the point where, like Burckhardt, “we ourselves are these waves”. Jacques Rancière helps clarify this sentiment when he tells of Wordsworth’s experience of the festivals of revolutionary France: “Wordsworth’s path is the poetry of the humble, dedicated to glorifying, in the language of the simple, the most modest of wildflowers that the walker ignores or steps on” (Rancière, 2003: 23). For Wordsworth, one was able to experience the utopian nature of the moment, the here-and- now. Wordsworth writes, Not in Utopia, subterranean fields, Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where! But in the very world, which is the world Of all of us. (qtd. in Rancière, 2003: 11) It may appear that what Wordsworth presents his reader with is the very thing Marx and his followers wanted to abject from the consciousness of man; that is, a form of utopianism which descends into idle daydream and lack of political efficacy. In the words of Žižek – and to reverse Marx – perhaps “the only way to stop the system from working is to stop resisting it” (Žižek, 2012: 108). One may rightly be skeptical of this proposition. However, there is a politically disruptive aspect or potential in perceiving utopia as embedded in the real of the here and now. M. H. (Behooz) Tamdgidi has perhaps argued for this point strongest in the recent literature. Tamdgidi’s claim is that utopia is not a (no-)place properly speaking, nor is it strictly speaking a “desire” for something better; rather, utopia is an “attitude”: In contrast to reactive modes of anti-systemic behavior that concentrate on building a movement that instrumentally focuses on the destruction of the old order in order to reach a good life projected into the future (be that future distant or near, illusively or “realistically” conceived), the utopian attitude involves making effort, whatever their scope, towards imagining, theorizing and/or practically realizing that future goal in the here and now. (Tamdgidi, 2003: 131) My argument is one that espouses a form of Quixotism, where “inns must be castles” (De Unamuno, 1954: 327), or, like the response to Billy’s questions “where am I?” and “how did I get here?” upon being abducted by the Tralfamadorians in Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five: It would take another Earthling to explain it to you. Earthlings are the great explainers, explaining why this event is structured as it is, telling how other events may be achieved or avoided. I am a Tralfamadorian, seeing all time as you might see a stretch of the Rocky Mountains. All time is all time. It does not change. It does not lend itself to warnings or explanations. It simply is. Take it moment by moment, and you will find that we are all, as I’ve said before, bugs in amber. (Vonnegut, 1991: 85-86) Utopia is to be sensed and developed as such from the non-signifying experiences of the individual. This sensation is an affective quality inherent to one’s comportment with respect to the world that can then be emitted outward into the greater social body, continuing to balloon outward until “utopia” comes to affect all things in the cosmos. The catch, however, is that, much like Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorians, Tamdgidi’s seemingly expanding balloon of utopia does not begin in the individual and end with the cosmos; it simply is. At this point I will transition to a working example or case study through which I hope to develop a more concrete interpretation of the conception of an interior foundation for utopia. I think China Miéville’s The City and the City beautifully expresses the intimate connection between the cosmic and the non-signifying – “silent utopias” – which “never find expression in any tangible literary or communal forms” (Tamdgidi, 2003: 137) and yet no less constitute Utopia. This potential is located in Miéville’s brilliantly weird concept of “unseeing”.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Answers › 2NC --- Root Case: Otherization

Bio-power is the common driver of the otherization of others and the creation of any issues including racism, securitization, homophobia, which falls into which groups are the most otherized within capitalist society.

DEMİRBAŞ ‘19 ELİF DEMİRBAŞ, Bogazici University MS, Brandeis University PhD, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, 2019 https://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12622927/index.pdf

EDTo be more explicit, we can say that discipline is addressed to bodies (Foucault, 2003, p. 242). It aims to control and homogenize individuals, to fit them into their appropriate roles in the social hierarchy, and to exclude those who do not comply. Institutions such as schools or other mechanisms of power, such as the family or the police, exist in order to get individuals in line with the disciplinary society that they live in. And institutions such as the hospitals, asylums, and prisons take care of people who cannot or will not bow down. The major tool in disciplinary power’s disposal is surveillance (Foucault, 1980, p. 102). This is obvious when one thinks of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, which is the quintessential form of disciplinary power. What is not obvious, though, is its invisibility. Disciplinary power renders its subjects visible rather than itself (Foucault, 1984, p. 199). The subjects have to be under constant surveillance, or, to be more precise, they have to feel like they are under constant surveillance for disciplinary power to work. Subjects who think that they are under constant surveillance internalize disciplinary power so much so that they become their own inspectors (Altunok, 2007, p. 17). In other words, the “visibility [of subjects] assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault, 1984, p. 199). Disciplinary power was pivotal in the establishment of market economy and the corresponding market society (Foucault, 2003, p. 36; Polanyi, 2001). In its formation, capitalism, or market economy in Polanyi’s words, required the commodification of land, labor and money, three fictitious commodities, which can never be fully commodified because human beings do not produce land – 63 land is provided to us by the Earth – they do not give birth to their children with the purpose of turning them into life-time laborers, and they did not invent money to sell it in the market, money is just a medium of exchange (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 75-76). These fictitious commodities, however, had to be commodified to ensure the completion of production chains that were essential to the capitalist mode of production. And for the commodification of labor, disciplinary power was essential as it gave the bourgeoisie the power to force the lower classes into working in factories. Disciplinary power is a compilation of strategies of power aimed to fulfill three criteria: to exercise power with the minimum amount of cost (not just economic, but political or even social as well), to receive maximum returns and keep the cycle of power running by continuously imposing disciplinary strategies in the institutions from which they receive their results, such as schools, armies, industries, and hospitals (Foucault, 1984, p. 207). “In short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system” (ibid, p. 207). As capitalist economy grew, disciplinary power relations spread from Europe to cover the face of the Earth, as they could be used in most diverse political regimes, apparatuses, or institutions (ibid, p. 211).

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Answers › 2NC --- AT: Biopower Good

Biopolitics dehumanizes individuals by viewing society at the aggregate level of population through a lens of separation and categorisation, dividing society into those who must be reformed and those who must be exterminated.

Sörensen 2012 [Jens Stilhoff, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Development Dialogue, April “The Failure of Statebuilding – Changing Biopolitics and the Splintering of Societies” IV, https://www.academia.edu/27448172/The_Failure_of_Statebuilding]

We can think of liberalism as an ethos of government that aims to govern by promoting freedom conceptualised in a certain way and of biopolitics as a technology of government that is integral to liberalism. Biopolitics, as elaborated by Foucault, is concerned with humans as species life rather than with states, borders and territory, and aims to promote life, to gain knowledge about life and administer its processes, and to manage risk, not on the level of the individual but on the level of population (Foucault 2007; 2008). Population is not the same as ‘people’. A population is a quantity or cohort of individuals deined according to certain criteria; from an insurance viewpoint it is simply a risk pool (Dillon and Lobo Guerrero 2008: 267). Biopolitics aims to control circulation and manage efects of circulation, to promote good circulation, for example trade or movement of investment capital, and to prevent or manage the efects of bad circulation, such as disease, refugee lows, or the movement of terrorists and their inancial networks (Foucault 2007, 2008; Dillon 2006; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). There is a non-liberal biopolitics, such as for example Nazi biopolitics during the Second World War or a contemporary Islamic biopolitics, but there is no liberalism without biopolitics. Biopolitics, in Foucault’s elaboration, concerned life at the aggregate level of population. This was typical of the post-war modernist project and here it reached its zenith in the modern welfare state. But while biopolitics was aggregate it is necessary to break up the biological continuum of life in some way, and thereby biopolitics always has an inherent logic of separation and categorisation. One way of dividing is on the basis of race; others are through distinctions between liberal and non-liberal or developed and under-developed life. Although liberalism purports to be universal and makes universal claims it views non-liberal forms of life as incomplete and potentially a threat. Such life needs to be addressed and traditionally liberalism has done so in one of three ways: with reform or development; by ‘preservation in situ’ (reservations or self-sustenance); or by extermination. Colonial policy contained all three elements and after colonialism international development emerged as the governmental form for addressing non-liberal life. Under the modernist project the state was the central reference for doing so. The Third World state was, with international support, the vehicle for mobilising population and natural resources, addressing domestic strictures, implanting new methods and technology, and pushing towards agricultural reform, industrialisation and modernisation. In short, it was the vehicle for development and the model it would follow in its developmental journey was the Western liberal industrialised and modernised state. Thus the Keynesian projection in the South was the ‘developmental state’ (although the latter term was initially coined for Japan and a particular form of Asian state-led development). The biopolitical dimension of the change has been addressed by Melinda Cooper (2008). She argues that neoliberalism reworks the value of life as established in the welfare state and New Deal model of social reproduction (Cooper 2008: 9). Neoliberalism does not merely want to capitalise the public sphere and its institutions, but the life of the nation, social and biological reproduction as a national reserve and foundational value of the welfare state (ibid.). The realm of reproduction itself becomes exposed to direct economic calculus. Keynesian economics attempted to safeguard the productive economy against the luctuations of inancial capital. Neoliberalism, by contrast, installs speculation at the very core of production. Neoliberalism, in other words, profoundly reconigures the relationship between debt and life, as institutionalised in the mid-20th-century welfare state (Cooper 2008: 10). The result is a new kind of governmental rationality spreading to all spheres of social and political life.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Alt › 2NC --- AT: Passivity

The alt isn’t passive analysis but active resistance of neoliberal structures.

LaMothe 22 [Ryan LaMothe, December 2022, “Giorgio Agamben and Resistance: bridging the consultation room and the political in the Anthropocene Age”, Free Association: Psychoanalysis and Culture, Media, Groups, Politics Number 87, https://freeassociations.org.uk/FA_New/OJS/index.php/fa/article/view/426, JMH]

While human beings do not unfold like a programmed mechanism, their subjectivities, as Agamben recognizes, are nevertheless shaped by social, political, and economic apparatuses (Prozorov, 2014, p.24). This is where the concept of inoperativity comes into play. For Agamben, “inoperativity” means to deactivate the functioning of the apparatuses, which does not mean that these apparatuses do not continue to operate or do not continue to have effects (pp.31-34). Put another way, inoperativity vis-à-vis the subject means that she is not captive to the grammar of the apparatuses, even if they continue to have their effects. Bartleby, for instance, rendered inoperative the capitalistic apparatuses by choosing not to actualize his potentiality (impotentiality), though the end result was tragic. I want to stress that inoperativity is, for Agamben (2004), not passive (p.134). That is, inoperativity or “preferring not” does not “affirm inertia, inactivity or apraxia…but [is] a form of praxis that is devoid of any telos or task, does not realize any essence and does not correspond to any nature” (p.33). Inoperativity, then, is any action of impotentiality that does not actualize what is expected by society’s apparatuses. Bartleby’s “I would prefer not” is one example. Martin Luther King’s (and others’) nonviolent protests is another illustration of rendering inoperative the violence of racist apparatuses. In other words, King’s nonviolent actions were acts of impotentiality in that he was not allowing racist apparatuses to determine his subjectivity; that is, to actualize or act on his fear and hatred. Other recent examples of the impotentiality of inoperativity, with regard to climate change, are eco-villages, where people prefer not to operate out of the apparatuses of neoliberal capitalism. While Agamben does not use the term “resistance,” it is possible to interpret inoperativity as a form of resistance that preserves, in the case of Bartleby, his potentiality by way of living out his impotentiality. Bartleby, in preferring not to, resists his employer and capitalist apparatuses. This said, Agamben’s philosophical discussion does not include addressing how people come to actualize potentiality or impotentiality, which leads me to turn to a developmental perspective that offers a way of thinking about the emergence of resistance as inoperativity.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Alt › 2NC --- Biocommunism (GND)

Biocommunism breaks the cycle of serial policy failure towards and communal approach to power.

Dyer-Witheford 22

Nick Dyer-Witheford (associate professor @ University of Western Ontario, winner of Gertrude J. Robinson Book Prize from Canadian Communication Association), 5-25-2022, "Biocommie: Power and Catastrophe," Socialist Futures, https://projectpppr.org/populisms/biocommie-power-and-catastrophe //MLT

Independently, the philosopher Szymon Wróbel l (2020a; 2020b) has developed the concept of biocommunism as process of “population empowerment” in which “power over life is transformed into the power of life itself”, a “fold of being onto itself” (2020a). His exploration offers several plangent formulations resonating with this paper’s line of thought. There is, however, a major divergence between our two accounts of “biocommunism”. For Wróbel it remains a regulative ideal without, and indeed in refusal of, any institutional realization of “biopower”, a “dis-organizing principle”, whereas I consider biocommunism a practical political project in which such power is communized (see Højme 2022). Obviously both these versions of “biocommunism” stage an encounter between communist thought, pre-eminently Marx’s, with Michel Foucault’s (2007; 2008) proposition that “biopower”—the governance of “life itself“– is a defining feature of modernity, and with its subsequent spin-offs and variants in the work of thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Roberto Esposito (2008). The version I offer here is influenced by the work of Michal Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) and Tiziana Terranova (2009; 2015), for whom biopower exercised from above can be countered by an insurgent biopolitics arising from below, and of several subsequent developments of this line of thought. Of particular importance, given the centrality of planetary heating to the age of catastrophe, is the work of Emanuele Leonardi (2012) on the biopolitics of climate crisis, and—alongside several associates—on a new articulation of Marxism with “de-growth” ecology (Leonardi 2021; Barca 2020; Feltrin 2021 and 2022; Lassere 2020a and 2020b). Approaching the issue from a different angle is discussion arising from Frederic Jameson’s (2016) controversial vision of socialism as a “universal army of labour” (to which I will return later), and in particular from Alberto Toscano’s (2016; 2020) proposal of a “biopolitics from below”, and responses by Panagiotis Sotiris (2020) and Gareth Dale (2021) in a pandemic context. None of these sources, should, however, be held responsible for the use made of their ideas in the fabrication of biocommunism. As the issues of a climate emergency and other ecological disasters is central to the agenda of biocommunism, it can be objected that the term merely replicates the problematic of “eco-socialism”, already the topic of a large and important literature (Foster 2000; Moore 2015). If biocommunism seeks to rephrase the issue, it is in part to convey that ecological crisis has entered a new phase in which the time for averting disaster has expired, and battles are now fought out on already-catastrophized ground, demanding more urgent “measures taken” (Brecht 1929). It is also, however, to dispute the hyphen of eco-socialism, which, while critically important in bringing the ecological and social together in left thought, also continues to conceptually separate them.[1] This obscures the contemporary imbrications of politics with nature so apparent in the current polycrisis where, for example, future carbon dioxide concentrations in the planetary atmosphere for generations to come may depend on disruptions of energy sources arising from an horrific but (by historical standards) relatively small central European war. Biopower, biopolitics and hence biocommunism are terms proper to a moment where “ecological” and “governmental” processes relentlessly loop around in mutual reconfiguration.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Alt › 1NC --- Biocommunism (GND)

The alternative is biocommunism—only a society based on communal biopolitics can avoid the failure of past socialist regimes and end the capitalist mode of production.

Dyer-Witheford 22

Nick Dyer-Witheford (associate professor @ University of Western Ontario, winner of Gertrude J. Robinson Book Prize from Canadian Communication Association), 5-25-2022, "Biocommie: Power and Catastrophe," Socialist Futures, https://projectpppr.org/populisms/biocommie-power-and-catastrophe //MLT

All biocommunist measures to remedy and repair the consequences of capitalism’s polycrisis require foresight and coordination, that is, planning. The current catastrophe sequence demonstrates the failure of the market as a viable global planning mechanism. It has elicited calls from varied positions on the left, from Leninist to social democratic, for governmental economic and ecological plans (Malm 2020; Brancaccio and Passarella 2022; Krahé 2022). The revival of socialist and communist planning traditions and the proposal of new solutions to their endemic problems, is a major topic of this conference. (Benanav 2022; Groos and Sorg 2022; Heyer 2022; O’Neill 2022). This paper only appends three biocommunist notes. First, in the era of global warming and the sixth extinction, “red plenty” planning models demand revision to reckon with ecological limits (see Sorg 2022). Biocommunism would be a combination of social and environmental levelling to create a social system positioning itself between a ceiling of environmental sustainability and a floor of equalized social development. The conceptual basis for such planning exists in the “boundary model” presented by green authors such as Kate Raworth (2017), who’s unfortunately named “doughnut economics”—also sometimes termed “arrival” economics (Trebeck and Williams 2019)—proposes humanity occupy a central zone of “fair and just” social development between two encircling dangers of ecological overshoot and economic shortfall. The problem with Raworth’s proposition is, however, its refusal to confront the incompatibility between its goals and capital’s accumulatory drive. In practice, “boundary models” have, since the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 been hijacked by corporate green-washers to legitimize ongoing economic extraction, preserving the “growth” imperative (Barca 2020). Biocommunist planning would therefore be a counter-version, weaponized to fight through to the abolition of capital, where the options offered to hominids by their shifting ecological and economic boundaries could be assessed without such presuppositions.[7] Second, biocommunist planning need not necessarily supply the highly variegated complex consumerism characteristic of advanced capitalist economies. Although digital, networked and algorithmic planning hold out possibilities for solving historically intractable “calculation problems” characteristic of such economies, it should not be presumed that such a consumption driven society would be the biocommunist summum bonum. A mode of production beyond capital could have different goals, trading off high consumerism for free time, environmental plenitude, social solidarity and species-survival. This essay has suggested that ecological and equalitarian constraints may together favor provision of a common “basket of goods”, and observance of “public luxury and private sufficiency” principles, with a subordinated market sector supplying a reduced range of consumer items. To the degree that social consensus is forged around such common goals, calculation problems are simplified. Struggle towards such a goal is truly radical but may come to seem pragmatic in the midst of vast market breakdowns, in which capital initiates its own spontaneous, barbaric “degrowth”. Third, as or more challenging than the “calculation problem”, is the “transmission problem”—that of ensuring a social coordination in which plans from above are engaged with proposals from below. This is a two- or rather many- sided flow vital in terms not just of accurate relay of information (though this is undoubtedly important), but also of counter-planning alteration, critique and counterproposal. The failure to instantiate a two-way transmission system in state socialism too often resulted in unilateral top-down governing processes that were not only massively uninformed and bureaucratically corrupt but ultimately murderously tyrannical. The tendency for bilateral efforts to degenerate into unilateral authoritarianism will doubtless make many, even (or especially) on the left, recoil from the idea of a communist biopower. Without making any pretense to solve what is probably the prime objection to a planned economy—an objection that that can only be answered by creating counter examples of such an economy’s conduct—I suggest that it is precisely around this transmission problem, which is also, of course, a democracy problem, that thinking about “biopolitics” is useful. Foucault’s concept of biopolitics is associated with his idea of governmentality—that is to say, government conceived not solely as state power but in a more capillary form, enacted through a range of institutions and organizations with varying relations to and degrees of autonomy from the centralized apparatuses of rulership, combining—in Deleuzian terms—both molar and molecular components, or, in Foucault’s own language, a “mesh of power” (Foucault 2012). The political valency of this “mesh” is ambivalent. It has the potential to be a creeping, insidious and implacable disciplinary mechanism, all the more deadly to the degree that it is diffuse and decentralized. But there is an inverse concept, where the disaggregated and distributed nature of power becomes the occasion to reverse or oscillate the directions of its biopolitical flows from heights to depths, peripheries to centres, hubs to spokes, persistently reconfiguring the architecture of power. The model of biocommunism discussed here would be a form of governmentality in which the unions of emergency workers and the councils of environmental proletarians, alongside other forms of communal power become interlocuters of state planning proposing and revising planning functions that are increasingly diffused out from the official apparatus into what Marx and Engel termed a “vast association”(1848). Wróbel (2020, 37) insightfully observes that the moment when populations cease to be the object of biopower, but become its subject is when “the people” emerge, but—contra his rejection of any possible institutional form for this emergence—I contend that in such a moment a “biopolitics from below” (Toscano 2016), a powerful, protagonistic biocommunism, becomes possible.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Water

Biopolitical policy manifests in the micromanaging of water resources by the government. This micromanaging disproportionally affects women, leading to gendered inequality.

Tandon 2007 - Founder and Executive Director of Networked Intelligence for Development, agrarian economist and gender and rural developments specialist [Nidhi Tandon, Empowering women for gender equity, Volume 21, Issue 73 “Biopolitics, climate change and water security: impact, vulnerability and adaptation issues for women” IV] https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics//

Women make up 70% of the world’s poor. Their vulnerabilities are further accentuated by race, class, ethnicity and age. When natural disasters and dramatic environmental shifts take place, women and men are affected differently because of their different social roles, responsibilities and access to support. In Zambia, for instance, women and youth contribute 70% of agricultural labour, but they have little access to productive assets and are marginalised in the decision-making processes at both the household and community levels. These gender differences become more acute when productive resources are eroded, making female- and youth-headed households the most vulnerable of the rural poor (Government of Zamiba, 2004). Women are the most affected by water stress – more than half of the 1.2 billion people who do not have access to water worldwide are women and girls. In most developing countries, women are responsible for water management at the domestic and community level. It is estimated that women and girls use more than eight hours a day travelling between 10 and 15 kilometres to transport between 15 and 20 litres of water on each trip. Men, especially in rural areas, do not play the role of getting or carrying water. Their relation with water has more to do with agricultural work and with the storage of water. This gender-determined inequality has implications to women’s daily life from a rights-based perspective, since the carrying of water not only causes them physical disorders but also makes it impossible for them to make time for education, income generation, politics and recreation. According to a report from the Women and Environment Development Organisation (2007:2), ‘women use vegetation and forests for medicinal plants, food and fuel as well as for income generation, but these ecosystems rely on a healthy water supply. As the environment deteriorates, women's livelihoods become increasingly vulnerable. […] Access to toilets has a huge impact on women; in many communities women walk a long distance to use facilities, often risking personal safety – there is an increased incidence of sexual and physical assault when toilets are in remote locations. In rural areas where toilets may be unavailable, deforestation and loss of vegetation have forced women and girls to rise earlier and walk further in search of privacy. Toilets are also unavailable for vast numbers of poor women who work in urban centres. About one in ten school-age African girls do not attend school during menstruation or drop out at puberty because of the absence of clean private sanitation facilities in schools’. Long-term and persistent drought also impacts women more acutely. Tens of thousands of atrisk people migrate across traditional tribal and political boundaries in search of food and water in countries worst affected by drought, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, where close to eight million people live. This migration further exacerbates existing competition over scarce grazing areas and water – provoking further inter-clan conflict, with women risking further gender-based violence. An Oxfam (2005) report on the impact of the 2005 Asia Tsunami reported that the majority of those killed and least able to recover were women (many drowned simply because they had never learnt to swim). In Aceh, Indonesia’s largest city, located in Sumatra, for example, more than 75% of those who died were women, resulting in a malefemale ratio of 3:1 among the survivors. As many mothers died, there were major consequences with respect to infant mortality, early marriage of girls, neglect of girls’ education, sexual assault and trafficking in women and prostitution (Oxfam, 2005)

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Water

Biopolitical policy leads to inequity in water distribution which furthers inequality by managing people’s access to an essential resource. You can’t live without water. Biopolitics hurts certain groups access to water. Biopolitics = mass genocide.

Tandon 2007 - Founder and Executive Director of Networked Intelligence for Development, agrarian economist and gender and rural developments specialist [Nidhi Tandon, Empowering women for gender equity, Volume 21, Issue 73 “Biopolitics, climate change and water security: impact, vulnerability and adaptation issues for women” IV] https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics//

Unlike geopolitics, which views nature exclusively as strategic resources, biosphere politics views the environment as the irreducible context that sustains all of life and sets the conditions and limits for all other human thought and activity. In the biospheric era, the exploitation of nature gives way to a sense of reverence for the natural world and a sustainable relationship with the environment.’ (Rifkin, 1991:4)Seen in this context, biopolitics is about the location (supply) of water, the ownership of (control over) water and about access (rights) to water – and the implications of these relationships with water on life as a whole. The biopolitics of water is complex and uneven. It is complex because life depends on water. By putting a price on water, one is de facto putting a monetary value on life. It is uneven, because access to water often reflects socio-economic inequalities, including land ownership. In today’s world, a single child’s access to clean water teeters between, on the one hand, the universal management of a global common good and, on the other hand, more and more regulation by social and economic interests over a highly localised private good. At the micro level of biopolitics, the subsequent allocation of this resource is very much about a series of ‘life’ decisions that, in many developing countries, have critical gendered aspects and ramifications.Where there is water scarcity, the biopolitics of water is even more complex. How do we ensure that those who have no voice and few means have an equal claim to water? In a situation of climate volatility, supply of and control over water is made further acute – climate governs the weather, weather dictates water distribution and water distribution controls life (Leonard, nd). Water makes up one of the three largest industries in the world (alongside oil, gas and electricity). Investor deals in infrastructure including water and sanitation systems, soared to $145bn in 2006 (CARE, 2006). The Summit Water Universe in 2005 was composed of 359 companies with $661bn of market value. In other words, those with the capital and the means regard the water sector as a high potential investment opportunity and will continue to prescribe market remedies and privatisation solutions for water scarcity into the next millennium. In a world dominated by finance capital and high technology solutions where power and wealth is concentrated in the hands of the very few, how do we ensure that real water needs are not compromised by speculative profit motives? Global household water requirements are miniscule compared to water use in industry and agriculture. Even more miniscule by comparison are the water consumption rates of poor households in Africa. In light of this, how realistic is it to suppose that women in African countries might stand a chance in negotiating rights over their meagre water needs? One aspect of water biopolitics is the trade in virtual water. Virtual water is the amount of water embedded in food produce and other products through their production. For instance, producing one kilogram of wheat requires about 1,000 litres of water. In other words, there is a virtual flow of water out of the producing country that needs to be factored into the export of crops or commodities. In some instances, industries are literally draining away local water resources. The Lake Naivasha area in Kenya, for instance, is home to huge flower farms that export their produce to lucrative European markets. Electric pumps are used to draw water from Lake Naivasha to irrigate the farms, and this is threatening thelake's very existence (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). ‘The human census in 1969 showed just 27,000 people living in the surrounding areas. Today, the population is nearly 300,000, and security guards patrol the few paths left open for local people and animals to get to the lake. Naivasha, officially 130 square kilometres, shrank last year to about 75% of its 1982 size, and the great papyrus swamps that were the breeding grounds for fish have been largely cut down. The undulating hills around the lake have few trees left’ (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). According to conservationists and ecologists, the lake could be little more than an African Aral sea – a turbid muddy pond – in about 20 years time. The most visible changes to the lake in the last 30 years and the cause of much of its problems are the giant sheds and greenhouses of more than 50 major flower farms that line its shores and the settlements of people who have flooded into the area since the global flower industry moved in. Naivasha is now Europe’s prime source of cut flowers and, to a lesser extent, vegetables, which are grown on more than 50 square kilometres of land around the lake in the open and under 2,000 hectares of plastic (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). Britain imported 18,000 tonnes of flowers from Kenya in 2005, nearly twice the amount it imported in 2001. There are no publicly available figures for how much water the companies extract from the lake but they are conservatively estimated to take at least 20,000 cubic metres of water a day on average. A combination of climate change, which is increasing the severity and frequency of droughts, and the over-extraction of water is now stretching the lake to its limits. ‘Last year, we could walk right into the heart of the lake through the mud. We are literally watching over the lake as it makes its last kicks’, said a security guard at one of the biggest flower farms (O Ogodo and J Vidal, ‘The African paradise ravaged by roses’, The Guardian, 14 February 2007). Sometimes the virtual drain of water is less obvious. In Varanasi, India, for instance, a community-led movement is now in its fifth year demanding the closure of the local Coca-Cola plant which continues to further deplete an already dangerously low water table (India Resource Centre, 2007). Another aspect of the biopolitics of water is geo-political. Water basins are often shared between different countries (Leonard, nd). Water does not follow political boundaries, but political boundaries quite often are drawn along water lines. Africa has the greatest number of rivers that cross or form international boundaries than any other continent. Ten river basins flow through 33 sub-Saharan countries and Egypt. Few of the trans-boundary river basins in the region are effectively jointly managed.Effective management would require treaties, political commitment, institutions, capacity, information and finance. Over the past decade, international river basin management protocols have developed, including the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol on Shared Waters, the Niger Basin Authority and the Lake Victoria Fisheries Authority. However, river basin authorities as yet have no legal framework for ensuring equity in access to and accountability for water supply and water quality management. Diversion projects continue with the justification that those who use the most water deserve the biggest share. Those of us who witnessed the impacts of ‘economic structural adjustment’ in the 1980s will recall how long it took before Western donors and the established aid institutions understood that structural adjustment should, after all, have a ‘human face’ and that this human face was primarily a woman’s face. Is there a parallel to be drawn here? Current economic models based primarily on privatisation strategies do not include accountability in terms of meeting peoples’ basic needs. How can we ensure that the ‘wide lens’ view of scientists and meteorologists, of planners, policy makers and politicians and of investment capital and grant funds focus also on the immediate ‘human face’ of climate adjustment – those on the ground, at the pumps, in the fields, those caring for the young and feeble?

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- UBI

UBI strengthens sovereign biopower by excluding the Other from the national community, reinforcing a permanent state of exception for non-citizens.

Knowles 21

Anthony Knowles (BA in Political Science & Sociology, MA in Sociology, PhD in Sociology @ University of Tennessee), 2021, "Universal Basic Income, Social Justice, and Marginality: A Critical Evaluation," Social Justice, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2807107598?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true //MLT

The first critique of UBI focuses on how it interfaces with marginalized communities and the potential dangers of a neoliberal UBI. The next two critiques explain how an uncritically examined UBI program could reproduce marginality in how it handles distribution to immigrants and incarcerated people. UBI is often framed rhetorically as a birthright for citizens of a country. It is a program of redistribution so vast that it can only be run by the state, and therefore is characterized by both the pros and cons of being administered by the modern capitalist state. Even though a UBI is called universal, there are still inherent limits to who counts as part of this universal. UBI implemented in the United States would be universally given to citizens of any race, gender, or employment status, but would obviously not be given to citizens of, say, Germany or Indonesia, nor to temporary visitors or tourists. This is an inherent limitation due to the nature of jurisdiction in the modern nation-state framework. This framework was inherited from centuries of national identity formation processes (Anderson 1983) and was congealed and fortified by the state's legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber 1922/2013). This therefore means that states ultimately have the power to decide who is entitled to a basic income, which can be problematic for noncitizens living in the country or those with an ambiguous citizenship status. In other words, the state has the power to define who is entitled to UBI and who is not, which ultimately gives the state more power to choose life or death, economic security or precarity, for those at the margins of inclusion in the nation. Though a UBI would be given to those who are unambiguously citizens of that nation-state, those outside that circle, those misconstrued to be outside that circle, or those made to be outside that circle by the state could be legally denied access to UBI. The state would consider this justified and legitimate as would segments of the public. This exclusion for those at the margins would be a kind of slow violence (Deb 2019) that may be further exacerbated if future waves of automation and technological displacement make gainful employment increasingly scarce. It adds another means for the state to exercise biopower, choosing which lives to foster and which lives to "let die" (Foucault 1978, 144) based on the state's definition of imagined community (Anderson 1983). Those who are not considered part of the imagined community, especially immigrants and refugees, may be barred not only from citizenship, but the minimum income as well, further marginalizing immigrant enclaves while citizens enjoy the benefits of basic income. This problem can be exacerbated by xenophobic and racist social structures and ideologies, as these various Others are framed as unworthy of receiving UBI or as not sufficiently part of the imagined community to deserve its benefits. For example, Bay and Pedersen (2006, 427-28) find that in Norway, a country known for both its racial homogeneity and strong welfare state, two thirds of the total sample expressed a positive view toward basic income, but approval among those who initially favored UBI dropped by 34 percent when reminded in a follow-up question that noncitizens would also receive UBI. This demonstrates the ideological power of nationality and how xenophobia can potentially damper the attractiveness of UBI. By putting the power to distribute UBI in the hands of the state, the power of the sovereign to make exceptions (Agamben 1998) must be exercised to carve out eligibility requirements for immigrants, refugees, and the stateless with various legal statuses. Such exceptions are already made in the US welfare system, as immigrants are barred from accessing welfare programs during their first five years in the United States and undocumented immigrants are banned from accessing them entirely (Fortuny & Chaundry 2011, Howard 2006). It should not be difficult to imagine that more restrictive admission requirements may be enacted to conditionalize the so-called universal program. A narrow focus on the domestic benefits of UBI leaves these considerations unexamined, allowing the universal in UBI to be uncritically accepted when the universal is in fact a particular that only has universal validity within a reified nation-state framework based around the imagined community (Anderson 1983). It is for this reason, among others, that Susskind (2020, 183-85) recommends a conditional basic income where the admissions policy for receiving it is clearly delineated. Such delineates are inevitable, making it vital for immigrants and immigrant advocacy groups to be wary of the eligibility requirements for any UBI proposal. This dilemma could also be described as part of the broader issue of border imperialism among modern capitalist states. As Walia (2013) explains, border imperialism is an alternative way of viewing state borders; rather than conceptualizing borders as protection from outside threats, border imperialism, disrupts the myth of Western benevolence toward migrants. In fact, it wholly flips the script on borders; as journalist Dawn Paley aptly expresses it, "far from preventing violence, the border is in fact the reason it occurs." Border imperialism depicts the processes by which the violences and precarities of displacement and migration are structurally created as well as maintained. (Walia 2013, 2) In this case, border imperialism defines who is in and who is out, who can access UBI and who cannot. Considering the immigration and border policies of the United States-under both Democratic and Republican administrations-and the European response to the Syrian refugee crisis, border imperialism remains the modus operandi of countries in the global north. This reality forces UBI advocates to ask whether the capitalist state, armed with the power to include and exclude, can really be trusted to implement UBI without reproducing precarity on the margins of society, especially for immigrants and others without full citizenship. The stakes for the millions of migrants, refugees, and stateless people of the world are too great to avoid responsibility. As the so-called third wave of UBI discourse continues among scholars, politicians, and citizens, it is important to confront such issues head on and seriously grapple with the implications of UBI for migration, inclusion, and social solidarity.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- UBI

UBI reifies commodification and social atomization by hindering critical examination of market logic.

Harris 23 Neal Harris (Senior Lecturer in Sociology @ Oxford Brookes, Editorial Board member @ European Journal of Social Theory), 3-10-2023, "Critical Theory and Universal Basic Income," Critical Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205231151562 //MLT

Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) united insights from Weber and Marx, and crucially, from Lukács, in their seminal work on reification. For Lukács (1972), reification chiefly refers to the artificial distanciation between the subject and their external world which is induced by capitalism. The capitalist subject views the world in a disengaged manner, abstracted from their surroundings, viewing others people, and their wider environment, as mere ‘things’, as ‘dead matter’ (Horkheimer, 1993: 81). For Lukács (1972), reification derives from ‘the fetish character of commodities’ and is ‘the subjective stance corresponding to it’ (p. 84). In a world which is governed by the exchange of commodities, a pathological form of consciousness comes to dominate. Reification is furthered by the market’s dependence on logics of false equivalence, what Lukács (1972) calls a ‘phantom objectivity’ (p. 6). The capitalist subject is encouraged to reduce their external world to exchangeable, purposeless matter which can be swapped for equivalent capital. The exchange value of a human liver is now commensurate with the exchange value of a certain weight of turnips, or of plutonium. The qualitative difference between the aforementioned objects is ‘written off as literature’ by the reifying logics of the market (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 7). For critical theorists, the hegemony of such reified consciousness is a crucial obstacle to progressive transformation as it prevents the development of critical reason. A fundamental concern for critical theorists, when assessing UBI, therefore, is will it help ameliorate reified consciousness? In this regard, the answer is a resounding negative. Rather than furthering a co-operative approach to all social relations, ever more domains of social life will become controlled by the market. As Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 12) argue, it is ‘fundamental to the concept of a basic income . . . that it is paid in cash’. We would then see an attendant expansion of the commodity form, because we will see an attendant expansion of market actors. The capital relation will now become more, rather than less dominant, as more actors become ‘consumers’, regardless of how their capital is ‘earned’. While the ‘hidden abodes’ of capitalism (Fraser, 2014) were undeniably irrational and inequitable in past social formations, they remained substantially immune from the reifying power of the market. For example, love, esteem and respect can be earned in a manner not mediated by wage-labour (Honneth, 1995). The introduction of a UBI would see ‘recognition’ taking the universal form of capital. Recall that for Van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986) UBI could displace the socialist stage of production in the route to communism as it would enable the development of a community who are socially conditioned to more readily embrace communistic values. However, when viewed through a critical theoretical lens, UBI serves to further entrench and embed reification and false equivalence. By expanding the field of consumers, and reaffirming capital as the fundamental method of affirming social recognition, UBI serves to reinforce a reified atomistic consciousness, rather than serving to enable the transition to a more communistic form of thought and sociality. Critical theory thus offers a warning against the implementation of a UBI: by expanding the market-mediated domains of the social world, the deeply pathological reified form of consciousness associated with capitalistic societies would further proliferate, rather than recede (see Delanty, 2020). This would serve to retard prospects for qualitative socialistic transition as the reified form of thought associated with commodification and the capitalistic relation will be further enshrined, rather than challenged. Money and Real Abstraction. While the discussion of reification may seem abstruse in the applied context of the discussion of UBI, Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s (1978) increasingly popular work focusses explicitly on the relationship between money and cognition. In summary, the argument presented by Sohn-Rethel is that a society which is organised around money will inevitably reproduce logics of domination and bondage because money is at core a manifestation of petrified, abstracted labour time (Sohn-Rethel, 1978). While Adorno and Horkheimer’s work focussed on the market and its relationship to instrumental rationality, Sohn-Rethel’s insights enable us to focus explicitly on the relationship between money and impeded cognition. This is of real value to a critical theoretical investigation of UBI, which, as Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 12) argue, must be paid in the form of money. For Sohn-Rethel (1978: 18–23), there is a fundamental pathology embedded within the logics of exchange which are connected to the transfer and holding of money. Importantly, this is not solely a psychological pathology, but a social pathology (see Harris, 2022). As Sohn-Rethel (1978: 20) argues the ‘economic conception of value is a real one’; while it lives only in the ‘human mind . . . it does not spring from it’. Rather, our actions, such as the everyday buying of selling of commodities with money represents a very real ‘social formation’ which induces a particular social synthetic form of cognition (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 2). The ‘conceptual foundations of the cognitive faculty’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 5) are shaped by the concrete forms of activity we take part in through our quotidian behaviour, such as buying bread or paying for petrol, whenever we hand over a note, or type in our pin. Crucially, the moulding of our cognition to that which is ‘socially necessary’ for capitalism occurs without subjects even ‘being aware of it’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 20). Our use of money naturalises reductive ways of thinking and being, which are fundamentally in keeping with the structurally necessary logics of capitalism (SohnRethel, 1978). Expressed more formally, this means that money (the means through which UBI is to be administered) pathologically shapes the ‘dimensions of private consciousness’ (1978: 26) in a manner that denigrates the individual’s critical-epistemic and phenomenological capacities (see Thompson, 2022). As Sohn-Rethel (1978: 59) words it, ‘[a]nyone who carries coins in his pocket and understands their functions . . . bears in his mind, whether or not he is aware of it, ideas which, no matter how hazily, reflect the postulates of the exchange abstraction’. When we live in a society based on exchange we are forced to acquiesce unknowingly to forms of thought which reinscribe the abstract value of expropriated labour as the base equivalence of all social life. This occurs through cognitive processes that are connected to quotidian material acts, inescapable when living within a money-based economy. Such ‘real abstractions’ not merely serve to naturalise the capitalist system, but serve to impede efforts to disclose its contradictions. UBI is definitionally based around money; having real, accessible money in liquid form. It cannot be operationalised in any form other than through money, and it cannot be presented through extended services, or progressive tax rates. There thus seems no way around Sohn-Rethel’s position; progressive advocates of UBI are forced to either find grounds to reject his claim, relativise it or accept a foundational weakness to the UBI approach. There is no way for UBI to be implemented without recourse to money. Indeed, advocates of UBI have claimed it is a positive that more people are awarded more money; feminists in particular have expressed support that care labour could be rewarded by money through UBI (see Flanigan, 2018). As such, through the implementation of UBI, a dominating and oppressive feature of capitalistic society, money, would not merely be reinforced, but its domain would be expanded (see Martinelli, 2017). Indeed, this expansion itself is heralded as a cause for celebration by some feminist advocates of UBI (see Flanigan, 2018). When viewed through the lens of ‘real abstraction’, the dependence of UBI on money can be seen to further a form of domination which supports the capitalistic ‘social synthesis’ at the cost of the subject’s capacity to truly comprehend their relation to the external world (Sohn and Rethel, 1978: 60). The capitalist subject’s relationship to nature, to the Other, is hidden behind the veil of false equivalences, deeply connected to the money form. In short, UBI would further enforce an impeded cognitive capacity, which would defer the possibility of meaningful qualitative transformation.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Taxation

Taxation is biopolitical—the IRS is a panopticon which regulates the delinquent taxpayer through a computerized surveillance state.

Bogenschneider 15 [Bret N. Bogenschneider (Vienna University of Economics and Business), 2015, " Foucault and Tax Jurisprudence: On the Creation of a “Delinquent” Class of Taxpayer," Washington University Jurisprudence, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=law_jurisprudence //MLT]

Foucault describes surveillance generally in terms of the “gaze.” The classic example of a disciplinary gaze is in reference to Bentham´s architectural structure: the Panopticon.72 Foucault describes Bentham´s Panopticon as follows: [A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.73 Surveillance enhances discipline mechanisms within social institutions. Persons under surveillance follow the rules by their own cognition, because “[i]n a true panoptic system, the inmates [are] confined by an invisible jailor—subdued into docile submission by his indistinguishable gaze.” 74 The gaze is not solely a penal mechanism; it also pervades schools and tax enforcement. Foucault explains surveillance in the following way: The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point would be both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned.75 The modern statistical and actuarial processes of the IRS are far more advanced than the “gaze” envisioned by Foucault. The modern surveillance capabilities of the IRS are truly extraordinary. Although the algorithm is a secret, the IRS computer not only cross-references the informational tax returns with the actual tax returns but also performs an evaluative function to assess the quantum of itemized deductions relative to income. This forms the basis for the modern surveillance society.76 As explained by Cohen: “These observations, which have obvious application to a wide variety of statistical and actuarial practices performed in both government and private sectors, have served as the foundation for elaboration of the work of modern ‘surveillance societies.’”77 However, the current version of IRS surveillance differs from Bentham’s vision of the Panopticon in at least one significant way. The Panopticon was conceived with the idea of public access to the social disciplinary institution: “The public would be admitted to the panoptic institution. While inspecting the prisoners, the public would also provide another control function within the institution—keeping the inspectors in line through indirect surveillance of their work.” 78 However, as it currently stands, the public has no access to IRS processes or records, which are held as a carefully guarded secret. The IRS operates to maintain the secrecy of tax records under federal law and not to allow public examination of tax records. Joseph Darby argues that the IRS asks for a great deal of information with the promise to hold it in strict confidence: “[T]he justifiable expectation of the taxpayer that the rather extensive information about his personal and financial life that he is required under threat of fine or imprisonment to furnish to the tax authorities will be held by them in confidence.” 79 Yet, as Darby explains: The taxpayer’s right to the confidentiality of information in the files of the tax collector is founded not on the U.S. Constitution, nor on the common law, but rather on Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code. This statute establishes a principle of confidentiality, qualified by numerous exceptions designed to assist governmental institutions in the performance of their assigned duties.80 Thus, the individual U.S. citizen does not have the right to maintain an inspecting “gaze” over the tax records of other U.S. taxpayers. An alternative version of the “gaze” in the tax system would be to allow the public to perform the role of the IRS by making tax filings public. The United States did not historically protect tax filings and neither do many other nations. As fully explained by Likhovski, “what seems natural to some—the ‘right’ of taxpayers not to have their income tax information revealed to fellow taxpayers—is actually the outcome of a specific historical trajectory.” 81 A very simple means to enforce the tax laws might be to reduce the amount of information disclosed in the tax return process, all while making such filings public. As Foucault explained, “[a] secret punishment is a punishment half wasted. This approach would also facilitate the decentralization of observational power away from the IRS and to the American public and allow the public “gaze” to disinfect the tax filings, particularly those of publicly traded corporate taxpayers.82

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Poverty

The federal government is waging a war on poverty, drawing on techniques of biopower to control and pacify the population

Mabee 2016 - Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Queen Mary, University of London, UK [Bryan, Critical Military Studies, Volume 2, Issue 3, December 18 “From ‘liberal war’ to ‘liberal militarism’: United States security policy as the promotion of military modernity” IV]

The paradoxes of liberal wars are well established. Michael Howard (Citation 1981) prominently argued that despite the importance that peace plays in liberal thought, liberal states are prone to the over-moralization of war, which has been detrimental to peace in international relations. Core to liberal thought was not pacifism, but an interest in solving the problems of war through war itself. Two sets of critical literatures have picked up on this point with regard to liberal warfare today. First is a broadly historical materialist critique of the use of military power as a means of imposing economic imperatives on other states and societies. Here war is seen as an extension of capitalist imperialism, particularly in its current neoliberal mode, and the focus is on opening up new spaces of accumulation (Callinicos Citation 2003; Harvey Citation 2003) or ‘pacifying’ uncivilized spaces (Neocleous Citation 2014). The second critique centres on the ‘liberal way of war’ that draws on Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics (e.g. Foucault Citation 2004, Citation 2007, Citation 2008). The ‘liberal way of war’ goes beyond mere violence or the institutions of the military, as liberal states not only engage in a crusade through militarized interventions abroad, but they also extend the power relations of liberal societies globally (Dillon and Reid Citation 2009; Evans Citation 2010; Jabri Citation 2006). The ‘liberal way of war’ is about using war as a technique of international biopower or governmentality, a means to pacifying and constituting the liberal subject (Dillon and Reid Citation 2009; Evans Citation 2010; Gregory Citation 2011; Kienscherf Citation 2011; Shaw Citation 2013a). Both sets of arguments point to the contradiction at the heart of supposedly peaceful liberal logics of governance: that of using war as a means to make a ‘liberal’ peace. Following from the historical sociological view given in the introduction, liberal war needs to be seen as a historically contingent set of practices – it cannot be generalized across time and place (cf. Chandler Citation 2010).

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Pandemics

The use of biopower to establish an effective governance paradigm during the Covid pandemic through biopolitical tactics of health terror holds larger implications for public policy that attempts to control and regulate the bodily autonomy of individuals.

Sfetcu 2022 [Nicolae, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, November 2022, , “Biopolitics and Geopolitics” IV Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Telework, https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics/]

It is always dangerous to entrust doctors and scientists with decisions that are ultimately ethical and political. (Dean 2020) In Medicine as Religion, Giorgio Agamben: states (Agamben 2020b) that in the modern West coexist three major belief systems: Christianity, capitalism and science, which sometimes intersect. The novelty consists in the fact that between science and the other two faiths, without noticing, an underground and relentless conflict was triggered, with successful results for science. In science, medicine occupies a special place, being characterized by does not need a special dogma, but is limited to borrowing its fundamental concepts from biology – there is a god or evil principle, namely disease, whose specific agents are bacteria and viruses, and a beneficent god or principle that is not health, but recovery, whose cultic agents are drugs and therapies the phenomenon has become permanent and ubiquitous – it is no longer about taking medication, doctor visits or surgery: all our lives we must worship this cult moment by moment, because the enemy, the virus, is always present and must be fought constantly the practice of worship is no longer free and voluntary – it becomes mandatory from a normative point of view the medical religion has unreservedly taken over the eschatological urgency from Christianity – the medical religion combines the perpetual crisis of capitalism with the Christian idea of an end time like capitalism and unlike Christianity, the medical religion does not offer the prospect of salvation and redemption – recovery is only temporary, as the evil God, the virus, cannot be eliminated once and for all. (Agamben 2020b) Patrick Zylberman described in 2013 the process by which health security becomes an essential part of state and international political strategies, (Flahault et al. 2016) by creating a kind of “health terror” as a tool for governance. Zylberman shows that the apparatus used by the WHO was articulated in three points: 1) the construction, based on a possible risk, of a fictitious scenario that would allow the governance of an extreme situation; 2) adopting the logic of the worst scenario as a regime of political rationality; 3) organizing all citizens in a way that strengthens government institutions, whereby the imposed obligations are presented as evidence of altruism and the citizen no longer has a right to health but is legally obligated to be healthy (biosecurity). Agamben considers, in Biosicurezza, Agamben 2020a) that the emergency situation can allow the design of a governance paradigm whose effectiveness will go beyond any normal form of governance. Thus, biosecurity has already proved capable of causing the absolute cessation of all political activities and all social relations as the maximum form of civic participation. “In question is a whole conception of the destinies of human society from a perspective that, in many respects, seems to have adopted the apocalyptic idea of the end of the world from the religions that are now at their west. After replacing politics with the economy, now, in order to ensure governance, even this must be integrated with the new paradigm of biosecurity, in front of which we will have to sacrifice all other requirements. It is legitimate to ask whether such a society can still be defined as human or whether the loss of sensitive relationships, face, friendship, love, can really be compensated by an abstract and supposedly completely fictitious health security.” (Agamben 2020a)

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Liberalism

The government allows biopower for the sake of innovation and worker flexibility, expanding the reach of capitalism.

Orr et al. 2023 [PhD student at USC Annenberg, “Necrocapitalism in the Gig Economy: The Case of Platform Food Couriers in Australia”. Antipode, 55(1), 200-221.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12877 /RS

The federal government facilitates the exercise of necropower by allowing platforms to circumvent regulations aimed at protecting workers from exploitation and maltreatment. Despite formal inquiries suggesting the need to overhaul the gig economy to ensure worker rights, the government maintains that “regulation should not come at the cost of innovation and worker flexibility” (Forsyth :290). Instead, platforms are framed as providing “positive disruption” to stagnant markets and as supporting innovation for economic growth (Koutsimpogiorgos et al. :532). These arrangements reflect Foucault’s () observation that neoliberalism is not simply a market society, but one in which the principles of the market economy are projected onto and embodied by the project of governance.